Further, the grief of
sensible
punishment corresponds to the pleasure
of sin (Apoc.
of sin (Apoc.
Summa Theologica
" Therefore they will be punished eternally.
Further, just as the good angels were made happy through turning to
God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God.
Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an
end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, which is
inadmissible.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi) Origen [*Cf.
[5178]FP, Q[64], A[2]] "erred in maintaining that the demons will at
length, through God's mercy, be delivered from their punishment. " But
this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First
because it is clearly contrary to the authority of Holy Writ (Apoc.
20:9,10): "The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire
and brimstone, where both the beasts and the false prophets [*Vulg. :
'the beast and false prophet,' etc. ] shall be tormented day and night
for ever and ever," which is the Scriptural expression for eternity.
Secondly, because this opinion exaggerated God's mercy in one direction
and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for
the good angels to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked
angels to be eternally punished. Wherefore just as he maintained that
the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length
from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls
of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the
unhappiness of this life.
Reply to Objection 1: God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since,
however, His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is
that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy
of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in
wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a
place, in so far as they are punished less than they deserve condignly,
but not that they are entirely delivered from punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted the distribution (of the
predicate) regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the
statement applies to men in the state of wayfarer, inasmuch as He had
mercy both on Jews and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every
Jew.
Reply to Objection 3: Anselm means that it is not just in the sense of
becoming God's goodness, and is speaking of the creature generically.
For it becomes not the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature
fail of the end for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for
all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men
or some angels should perish for ever, because the intention of the
Divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God's mercy suffers at least men to be punished eternally?
Objection 1: It would seem that God's mercy does not suffer at least
men to be punished eternally. For it is written (Gn. 6:3): "My spirit
shall not remain in man for ever because he is flesh"; where "spirit"
denotes indignation, as a gloss observes. Therefore, since God's
indignation is not distinct from His punishment, man will not be
punished eternally.
Objection 2: Further, the charity of the saints in this life makes them
pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in that
life. Therefore they will pray then for their enemies who are damned.
But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most
acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy
will in time deliver the damned from their punishment.
Objection 3: Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned
belongs to the prophecy of commination. Now the prophecy of commination
is not always fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the
destruction of Nineve (Jonas 3); and yet it was not destroyed as
foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason
(Jonah 4:1). Therefore it would seem that much more will the threat of
eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for a more lenient
punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to
all.
Objection 4: Further, the words of Ps. 76:8 are to the point, where it
is said: "Will God then be angry for ever? [*Vulg. : 'Will God then cast
off for ever? ']" But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc.
Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Is. 14:19, "But thou art cast out,"
etc. says: "Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never
shalt": and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all
human souls shall at length have rest from their pains.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the elect conjointly
with the damned: "These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the
just, into life everlasting. " But it is inadmissible that the life of
the just will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the
punishment of the damned will ever come to an end.
Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) "death is to men what
their fall was to the angels. " Now after their fall the angels could
not be restored [*Cf. [5179]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore neither can man
after death: and thus the punishment of the damned will have no end.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 17,18), some evaded
the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished
everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at
length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether
unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and
therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls of men who
die without charity, since "death is to men what their fall was to the
angels," as Damascene says.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying refers to man generically, because
God's indignation was at length removed from the human race by the
coming of Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to
remain in this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the
Divine anger in themselves, since no other way of reconciliation is
given to us save that which is through Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 24) and Gregory
(Moral. xxxiv) say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies,
that they may be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them to
be converted. For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we
should no more pray for them than for the demons. And since for those
who depart this life without grace there will be no further time for
conversion, no prayer will be offered for them, neither by the Church
militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray
for them is, as the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:25,26), that "God may give
them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from
the snares of the devil. "
Reply to Objection 3: A punishment threatened prophetically is only
then commuted when there is a change in the merits of the person
threatened. Hence: "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against
a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that
nation . . . shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil
that I have thought to do to them" (Jer. 18:7). Therefore, since the
merits of the damned cannot be changed, the threatened punishment will
ever be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy of commination is
always fulfilled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei. xxi, 24): "Nineve has been overthrown, that was evil, and a good
Nineve is built up, that was not: for while the walls and the houses
remained standing, the city was overthrown in its wicked ways. "
Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of
mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in
this life (which may be called God's anger on account of its
unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence
the Psalm continues (Ps. 76:11): "This is the change of the right hand
of the most High. " We may also reply that they refer to mercy as
granting a relaxation but not setting free altogether if it be referred
also to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not say: "Will He from His
anger shut up His mercies? " but "in His anger," because the punishment
will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have effect by
diminishing the punishment while it continues.
Reply to Objection 5: This gloss is speaking not absolutely but on an
impossible supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of
the devil's sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians
is brought to an end by the mercy of God. "For he that believeth and is
baptized shall be saved" (Mk. 16:16). Now this applies to every
Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jn. 6:55): "He that eateth My body
and drinketh My blood hath eternal life. " Now this is the meat and
drink whereof Christians partake in common. Therefore all Christians
will be saved at length.
Objection 3: Further, "If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss:
but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15), where
it is a question of those who have the foundation of the Christian
faith. Therefore all such persons will be saved in the end.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9): "The unjust shall not
possess the kingdom of God. " Now some Christians are unjust. Therefore
Christians will not all come to the kingdom of God, and consequently
they will be punished for ever.
Further, it is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better for them not
to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to
turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them. " Now
those who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever.
Therefore Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be
punished for ever.
I answer that, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 20,21), there
have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for
all men, but only for Christians. although they stated the matter in
different ways. For some said that whoever received the sacraments of
faith would be immune from eternal punishment. But this is contrary to
the truth, since some receive the sacraments of faith, and yet have not
faith, without which "it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11:6).
Wherefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal
punishment who have received the sacraments of faith, and professed the
Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time
some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and
these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since
according to 2 Pet. 2:21, "it had been better for them not to have
known the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back. "
Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith
and invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have
conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore some have
maintained that those alone are exempt from eternal punishment, who
persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, however guilty they may
have been of other crimes. But this is clearly contrary to Holy Writ,
for it is written (James 2:20): "Faith without works is dead," and
(Mat. 7:21) "Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter
into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doth the will of My Father Who
is in heaven": and in many other passages Holy Scripture threatens
sinners with eternal punishment. Consequently those who persevere in
the faith unto the end will not all be exempt from eternal punishment,
unless in the end they prove to be free from other crimes.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord speaks there of formed faith [*Cf.
[5180]SS, Q[4], A[3]] "that worketh by love [Vulg. : 'charity'; Gal.
5:6]": wherein whosoever dieth shall be saved. But to this faith not
only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin
whatsoever.
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of our Lord refers not to those who
partake only sacramentally, and who sometimes by receiving unworthily
"eat and drink judgment" to themselves (1 Cor. 11:29), but to those who
eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, which
incorporation is the effect of the sacramental eating, in those who
approach worthily [*Cf. [5181]TP, Q[80], AA[1],2,3]. Wherefore, so far
as the power of the sacrament is concerned, it brings us to eternal
life, although sin may deprive us of that fruit, even after we have
received worthily.
Reply to Objection 3: In this passage of the Apostle the foundation
denotes formed faith, upon which whosoever shall build venial sins
[*Cf. [5182]FS, Q[89], A[2]] "shall suffer loss," because he will be
punished for them by God; yet "he himself shall be saved" in the end
"by fire," either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of
purgatory which will be after death.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all those who perform works of mercy will be punished eternally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not
be punished eternally, but only those who neglect those works. For it
is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not
done mercy"; and (Mat. 5:7): "Blessed are the merciful for they shall
obtain mercy. "
Objection 2: Further, (Mat. 25:35-46) we find a description of our
Lord's discussion with the damned and the elect. But this discussion is
only about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded
only to such as have omitted to practice works of mercy: and
consequently the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 6:12): "Forgive us our debts,
as we also forgive our debtors," and further on (Mat. 6:14): "For if
you will forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will forgive
you also your offenses. " Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who
forgive others their offenses, will themselves obtain the forgiveness
of their sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Godliness is
profitable to all things," says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule
of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and
though he should suffer from the inconstancy of the flesh, without
doubt he will be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can
boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting
punishment. " Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though
they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally: and
thus the same conclusion follows as before.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9,10): "Neither fornicators .
. . nor adulterers," etc. "shall possess the kingdom of God. " Yet many
are such who practice works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not
all come to the eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be
punished eternally.
Further, it is written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole
law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. " Therefore
whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other
works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be
punished eternally.
I answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above (De Civ. Dei
xxi, 22), some have maintained that not all who have professed the
Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those
who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other
crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be
acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the
absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in
works of mercy without having charity. Wherefore nothing profits them
to the meriting of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal
punishment, as may be gathered from 1 Cor. 13:3. Most evident is this
in the case of those who lay hands on other people's property, for
after seizing on many things, they nevertheless spend something in
works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all whosoever die in
mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from
eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an
ordinate manner. But those who while merciful to others are neglectful
of themselves do not show mercy ordinately, rather do they strike at
themselves by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not
obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that
mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why the discussion refers only to the
works of mercy is not because eternal punishment will be inflicted on
none but those who omit those works, but because eternal punishment
will be remitted to those who after sinning have obtained forgiveness
by their works of mercy, making unto themselves "friends of the mammon
of iniquity" (Lk. 16:9).
Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord said this to those who ask that their
debt be forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin. Wherefore the
repentant alone will obtain by their works of mercy the forgiveness
that sets them free altogether.
Reply to Objection 4: The gloss of Ambrose speaks of the inconstancy
that consists in venial sin, from which a man will be freed through the
works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a
scourging. Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense
is that those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh
through frailty are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore
such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by
those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord,
Who is blessed for evermore. Amen.
__________________________________________________________________
Appendix
__________________________________________________________________
Appendix 1
The following two questions were compiled by Nicolai from St. Thomas'
Commentary on the Sentences, and by him included in the supplement
between Questions 70 and 71.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY (TWO
ARTICLES)
We must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped
of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we
shall treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only.
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted
with punishment by fire?
(2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within
themselves?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a
bodily fire, and are punished by fire?
Objection 1: It would seem that souls which depart with none but
original sin, suffer from a bodily fire and are punished by fire. For
Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, xxvii] says: "Hold firmly
and doubt not that children who depart this life without the sacrament
of Baptism will be punished everlastingly. " Now punishment denotes
sensible pain. Therefore souls which depart this life with original sin
alone, suffer from a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of
fire.
Objection 2: Further, a greater fault deserves a greater punishment.
Now original sin is greater than venial, because it contains more
aversion, since it deprives its subject of grace, whereas venial sin is
compatible with grace; and again because original sin is punished
eternally, whereas venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that
venial sin is deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is
original sin.
Objection 3: Further, sins are more severely punished after this life
than during lifetime, for in this life there is room for mercy. Now,
sensible punishment corresponds to original sin in this life, for
children who have only original sin are justly subject to many sensible
punishments. Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this
life.
Objection 4: Further, even as in actual sin there is aversion and
conversion, so in original sin there is something corresponding to
aversion, namely the privation of original justice, and something
corresponding to conversion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment
of fire is due to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it
is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence.
Objection 5: Further, after the resurrection the bodies of children
will be either passible or impassible. If they be impassible---and no
human body can be impassible except either on account of the gift of
impassibility (as in the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as
in the state of innocence)---it follows that the bodies of children
will either have the gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious,
so that there will be no difference between baptized and non-baptized
children, which is heretical, or else they will have original justice,
and thus will be without original sin, and will not be punished for
original sin, which is likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they
be passible, since everything passible suffers of necessity in the
presence of the active, it follows that in the presence of active
sensible bodies they will suffer sensible punishment.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiii) that the mildest
punishment of all will be for those who are burdened with original sin
only. But this would not be so, if they were tormented with sensible
punishment, because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore
they will not suffer sensible punishment.
Further, the grief of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure
of sin (Apoc. 18:7): "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived
in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her. " But there is
no pleasure in original sin, as neither is there operation, for
pleasure follows operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Therefore
punishment by fire is not due to original sin.
Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which is entitled on
Holy Baptism, distinguishes three classes of unbaptized persons: those
namely who refuse to be baptized, those who through neglect have put
off being baptized until the end of life and have been surprised by
sudden death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive it
through no fault of theirs. Of the first he says that they will be
punished not only for their other sins, but also for their contempt of
Baptism; of the second, that they will be punished, though less
severely than the first, for having neglected it; and of the last he
says that "a just and eternal Judge will consign them neither to
heavenly glory nor to the eternal pains of hell, for although they have
not been signed with Baptism, they are without wickedness and malice,
and have suffered rather than caused their loss of Baptism. " He also
gives the reason why, although they do not reach the glory of heaven,
they do not therefore suffer the eternal punishment suffered by the
damned: "Because there is a mean between the two, since he who deserves
not honor and glory is not for that reason worthy of punishment, and on
the other hand he who is not deserving of punishment is not for that
reason worthy of glory and honor. "
I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to fault, according
to the saying of Isaias (27:8), "In measure against measure, when it
shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it. " Now the defect transmitted to
us through our origin, and having the character of a sin does not
result from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon
human nature by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal or
corruption of something that had been superadded to nature. Nor does
this sin belong to this particular man, except in so far as he has such
a nature, that is deprived of this good, which in the ordinary course
of things he would have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore
no further punishment is due to him, besides the privation of that end
to which the gift withdrawn destined him, which gift human nature is
unable of itself to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and
consequently the loss of this vision is the proper and only punishment
of original sin after death: because, if any other sensible punishment
were inflicted after death for original sin, a man would be punished
out of proportion to his guilt, for sensible punishment is inflicted
for that which is proper to the person, since a man undergoes sensible
punishment in so far as he suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt
did not result from an action of his own, even so neither should he be
punished by suffering himself, but only by losing that which his nature
was unable to obtain. On the other hand, those who are under sentence
for original sin will suffer no loss whatever in other kinds of
perfection and goodness which are consequent upon human nature by
virtue of its principles.
Reply to Objection 1: In the authority quoted punishment denotes, not
pain of sense, but only pain of loss, which is the privation of the
divine vision, even as in Scripture the word "fire" is often wont to
signify any kind of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Of all sins original sin is the least, because it
is the least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will of the
person, but only by the will of the origin of our nature. But actual
sin, even venial, is voluntary by the will of the person in which it
is; wherefore a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial
sin. Nor does it matter that original sin is incompatible with grace;
because privation of grace has the character, not of sin, but of
punishment, except in so far as it is voluntary: for which reason that
which is less voluntary is less sinful. Again it matters not that
actual venial sin is deserving of temporal punishment, since this is
accidental, for as much as he who falls venially has sufficient grace
to attenuate the punishment. For if venial sin were in a person without
grace, it would be punished eternally.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between pain of sense before
and after death, since before death the pain of sense results from the
power of the natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior as
fever or the like, or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after
death nothing will act by natural power, but only according to the
order of divine justice, whether the object of such action be the
separate soul, on which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or
the body after resurrection, since then all natural action will cease,
through the cessation of the first movable which is the cause of all
bodily movement and alteration.
Reply to Objection 4: Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure,
which is in the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual
concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no pleasure. Hence,
sensible pain does not correspond thereto as punishment.
Reply to Objection 5: The bodies of children will be impassible, not
through their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the
lack of an external agent to act upon them: because, after the
resurrection, no body will act on another, least of all so as to induce
corruption by the action of nature, but there will only be action to
the effect of punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore
those bodies to which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will
not suffer punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will
be impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering;
hence impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state
in which they are?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in question suffer spiritual
affliction on account of the state wherein they are, because as
Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Matth. ), the punishment of God in that
they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their
being burned in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing
God. Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.
Objection 2: Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one
wishes to have. But these souls would wish to have the divine vision,
else their will would be actually perverse. Therefore since they are
deprived of it, seemingly they also suffer.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that they do not suffer, because
they know that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on
the contrary: Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain
of punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is
disinherited or deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore
these souls likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through no
fault of theirs, suffer none the less.
Objection 4: Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit
of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But
baptized children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of
Christ's merit. Therefore the unbaptized suffer pain through being
deprived of eternal life on account of Adam's demerit.
Objection 5: Further, separation from what we love cannot be without
pain. But these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for
that very reason will love Him naturally. Therefore since they are
separated from Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this
separation without pain.
On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after
death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment.
If for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin,
their sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the
damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have
the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the
mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is [*See A[1], "On the
contrary"]. If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it
follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their
will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus would be actually
inordinate, which is not to be granted. Therefore they will feel no
sorrow.
Further, right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of
what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv, and De
ira ii, 6) that "a wise man is not disturbed. " Now in these children
there is right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will
not be disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which they could
nowise avoid.
I answer that, on this question there are three opinions. Some say that
these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so
much in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have
lost. It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily
burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to
explore, and many more besides. Hence others say that they have perfect
knowledge of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that
they are deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow
on this account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as
it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are
condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow
cannot be little for the loss of so great a good, especially without
the hope of recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the
mildest. Moreover the very same reason that impugns their being
punished with pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues
against their feeling sorrow within, because the pain of punishment
corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original sin is
void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain. Consequently
others say that they will know perfectly things subject to natural
knowledge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal life
and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge
will not cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we must
explore.
Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason
one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one's
power to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one
is capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to
fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since
these things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked
that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man
who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because
he can prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life [*Cf.
[5183]FS, Q[109], AA[5],6]; so that if he fail in this, his grief will
be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess. But
children were never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was
this due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it
surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of
their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence they will nowise
grieve for being deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they
rejoice for that they will have a large share of God's goodness and
their own natural perfections. Nor can it be said that they were
adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by
the actions of others around them, since they could be baptized by
others, like other children of the same condition who have been
baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace
that one should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Wherefore the
lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die without
Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of
the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.
Reply to Objection 1: In those who, having the use of free-will, are
damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but
not in children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity
between the two.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the will may be directed both to the
possible and to the impossible as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, an ordinate
and complete will is only of things which in some way are proportionate
to our capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but
not if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should
be called "velleity" [*Cf. [5184]FS, Q[13], A[5], ad 1; [5185]TP,
Q[21], A[4]] rather than "will"; for one does not will such things
absolutely, but one would if they were possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or
bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at
their loss, whether this be through his own or another's fault: hence
it is clear that the argument is not based on a true comparison.
Reply to Objection 4: The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as
stated in Rom. 5:15, seqq. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized
children have as much of evil as the baptized have of good.
Reply to Objection 5: Although unbaptized children are separated from
God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from
Him: in fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods,
and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge
and love.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY
(SIX ARTICLES)
We must next treat of the souls which after this life expiate the
punishment of their actual sins in the fire of Purgatory.
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the pain of Purgatory surpasses all the temporal pains of
this life?
(2) Whether that punishment is voluntary?
(3) Whether the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons?
(4) Whether venial sin as regards its guilt is expiated by the pains of
Purgatory?
(5) Whether the fire of Purgatory frees from the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether one is freed from that punishment sooner than another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the pains of Purgatory surpass all the temporal pains of this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the pains of Purgatory do not surpass
all the temporal pains of this life. Because the more passive a thing
is the more it suffers if it has the sense of being hurt. Now the body
is more passive than the separate soul, both because it has contrariety
to a fiery agent, and because it has matter which is susceptive of the
agent's quality: and this cannot be said of the soul. Therefore the
pain which the body suffers in this world is greater than the pain
whereby the soul is cleansed after this life.
Objection 2: Further, the pains of Purgatory are directly ordained
against venial sins. Now since venial sins are the least grievous, the
lightest punishment is due to them, if the measure of the stripes is
according to the measure of the fault. Therefore the pain of Purgatory
is the lightest of all.
Objection 3: Further, since the debt of punishment is an effect of sin,
it does not increase unless the sin increases. Now sin cannot increase
in one whose sin is already remitted. Therefore if a mortal sin has
been remitted in a man who has not fully paid the debt of punishment,
this debt does not increase when he dies. But while he lived he was not
in debt to the extent of the most grievous punishment. Therefore the
pain that he will suffer after this life will not be more grievous to
him than all other pains of this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (xli De Sanctis): "This
fire of Purgatory will be more severe than any pain that can be felt,
seen or conceived in this world. "
Further, the more universal a pain is the greater it is. Now the whole
separate soul is punished, since it is simple: which is not the case
with the body. Therefore this, being the punishment of the separate
soul, is greater than any pain suffered by the body.
I answer that, In Purgatory there will be a twofold pain; one will be
the pain of loss, namely the delay of the divine vision, and the pain
of sense, namely punishment by corporeal fire. With regard to both the
least pain of Purgatory surpasses the greatest pain of this life. For
the more a thing is desired the more painful is its absence. And since
after this life the holy souls desire the Sovereign Good with the most
intense longing---both because their longing is not held back by the
weight of the body, and because, had there been no obstacle, they would
already have gained the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Good---it
follows that they grieve exceedingly for their delay. Again, since pain
is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, the more sensitive a thing is, the
greater the pain caused by that which hurts it: wherefore hurts
inflicted on the more sensible parts cause the greatest pain. And,
because all bodily sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity
that the soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the
soul itself. That the soul suffers pain from the bodily fire is at
present taken for granted, for we shall treat of this matter further on
[*Cf. [5186]XP, Q[70], A[3]]. Therefore it follows that the pain of
Purgatory, both of loss and of sense, surpasses all the pains of this
life.
Some, however, prove this from the fact that the whole soul is
punished, and not the body. But this is to no purpose, since in that
case the punishment of the damned would be milder after the
resurrection than before, which is false.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the soul is less passive than the body,
it is more cognizant of actual suffering [passionis]: and where the
sense of suffering is greater, there is the greater pain, though the
suffering be less.
Reply to Objection 2: The severity of that punishment is not so much a
consequence of the degree of sin, as of the disposition of the person
punished, because the same sin is more severely punished then than now.
Even so a person who has a better temperament is punished more severely
by the same sentence than another; and yet the judge acts justly in
condemning both for the same crimes to the same punishment.
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this punishment is voluntary?
Objection 1: It would seem that this punishment is voluntary. For those
who are in Purgatory are upright in heart. Now uprightness in heart is
to conform one's will to God's, as Augustine says (Serm. i in Ps. 32).
Therefore, since it is God's will that they be punished, they will
suffer that punishment voluntarily.
Objection 2: Further, every wise man wills that without which he cannot
obtain the end he has in view. Now those who are in Purgatory know that
they cannot obtain glory, unless they be punished first. Therefore they
are punished willingly.
On the contrary, No one asks to be freed from a punishment that he
suffers willingly. Now those who are in Purgatory ask to be set free,
as appears from many incidents related in the Dialogue of Gregory (iv,
40,65). Therefore they will not undergo that punishment voluntarily.
I answer that, A thing is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, by
an absolute act of the will; and thus no punishment is voluntary,
because the very notion of punishment is that it be contrary to the
will. Secondly, a thing is said to be voluntary by a conditional act of
the will: thus cautery is voluntary for the sake of regaining health.
Hence a punishment may be voluntary in two ways. First, because by
being punished we obtain some good, and thus the will itself undertakes
a punishment, as instanced in satisfaction, or when a man accepts a
punishment gladly, and would not have it not to be, as in the case of
martyrdom. Secondly, when, although we gain no good by the punishment,
we cannot obtain a good without being punished, as in the case of
natural death: and then the will does not undertake the punishment, and
would be delivered from it; but it submits to it, and in this respect
the punishment is said to be voluntary. In this latter sense the
punishment of Purgatory is said to be voluntary.
Some, however, say that it is not voluntary in any way, because the
souls in Purgatory are so replete with suffering, that they know not
that they are being cleansed by their pains, and deem themselves
damned. But this is false, for did they not know that they will be set
free, they would not ask for prayers, as they often do.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the soul in Purgatory are punished by the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in Purgatory are punished by
the demons; for, according to the Master, "they will have for torturers
in their pains, those who were their tempters in sin. " Now the demons
tempt us to sin, not only mortal, but also venial when they fail in the
former. Therefore in Purgatory also they will torture souls on account
of venial sins.
Objection 2: Further, the just are competent to be cleansed from sin
both in this life and afterwards. Now, in this life, they are cleansed
by pains inflicted by the devil, as was the case with Job. Therefore
after this life also, those who have to be cleansed will be punished by
the demons.
On the contrary, It were unjust that he who has triumphed over someone,
should be subjected to him after victory. Now those who are in
Purgatory have triumphed over the demons, since they died without
mortal sin. Therefore they will not be subjected to them through being
punished by them.
I answer that, As after the Judgment day the Divine justice will kindle
the fire with which the damned will be punished for ever, even so now
the elect are cleansed after this life by the Divine justice alone, and
neither by the ministry of the demons whom they have vanquished, nor by
the ministry of the angels who would not inflict such tortures on their
fellow-citizens. It is, however, possible that they take them to the
place of punishment: also that even the demons, who rejoice in the
punishment of man, accompany them and stand by while they are being
cleansed, both that they may be sated with their pains, and that when
these leave their bodies, they may find something of their own in them.
But in this life, while there is yet time for the combat, men are
punished both by the wicked angels as foes, as instanced in Job, and by
the good angels, as instanced in Jacob, the sinew of whose thigh shrank
at the angel's touch [*Gn. 32:25]. Moreover, Dionysius says explicitly
that the good angels sometimes inflict punishment.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin is expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the
guilt?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not expiated by the pains
of Purgatory as regards the guilt. For a gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral.
xvi, 28] on 1 Jn. 5:16, "There is a sin unto death," etc. says: "It is
vain to ask pardon after death for what was not amended in this life. "
Therefore no sin is remitted as to guilt after this life.
Objection 2: Further, the same subject is freed from sin as falls into
sin. But after death the soul cannot sin venially. Therefore neither
can it be loosed from venial sin.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says [*Dial. iv, 39] that every man will
be at the judgment as he was when he left the body, because "the tree .
. . wheresoever it shall fall, there shall it be" [*Eccles. 11:3]. If,
then, a man go forth from this life with venial sin, he will be with
venial sin at the judgment: and consequently one does not atone for
venial sin in Purgatory.
Objection 4: Further, it has been stated ([5187]XP, Q[2], A[3]) that
actual sin is not blotted out save by contrition. But there will be no
contrition after this life, because it is a meritorious act. For then
there will be neither merit nor demerit since, according to the
Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4], "death is to men what the fall was to
the angels. " Therefore, after this life, venial sin is not remitted in
Purgatory as to its guilt.
Objection 5: Further, venial sin is not in us except on account of the
fomes. Wherefore in the original state Adam would not have sinned
venially, as was stated (Sent. ii, D, xxi, 2). Now after this life
there will be no sensuality; because the fomes will cease when the soul
is separated, since it is called the "law of the flesh" (Rom. 7). Hence
there will be no venial sin then, and consequently it cannot be
expiated by the fire of Purgatory.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Dial. iv, 39] and Augustine [*De vera et
falsa poenit. iv, xviii, by some other author] say that certain slight
sins will be remitted in the life to come. Nor can this be understood
of the punishment: because thus all sins, however grave they be, are
expiated by the fire of Purgatory, as regards the debt of punishment.
Therefore venial sins are cleansed by the fire of Purgatory as to their
guilt.
Further, wood, hay, stubble (1 Cor. 3:12) denote venial sins, as we
have said ([5188]FS, Q[89], A[2]). Now wood, hay, stubble are consumed
in Purgatory. Therefore venial sins are remitted after this life.
I answer that, Some have asserted that no sin is remitted after this
life, as regards the guilt: that if a man die with mortal sin, he is
damned and incapable of being forgiven; and that it is not possible for
a man to die with a venial sin and without mortal sin, since the final
grace washes the venial sin away. They assign as reason for this that
venial sin is excessive love of a temporal thing, in one who has his
foundation in Christ, which excess results from the corruption of
concupiscence. Wherefore if grace entirely overcome the corruption of
concupiscence, as in the Blessed Virgin, there is no room for venial
sin. Hence, since this concupiscence is altogether abated and removed,
the powers of the soul are wholly subject to grace, and venial sin is
cast out.
Further, just as the good angels were made happy through turning to
God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God.
Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an
end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, which is
inadmissible.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi) Origen [*Cf.
[5178]FP, Q[64], A[2]] "erred in maintaining that the demons will at
length, through God's mercy, be delivered from their punishment. " But
this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First
because it is clearly contrary to the authority of Holy Writ (Apoc.
20:9,10): "The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire
and brimstone, where both the beasts and the false prophets [*Vulg. :
'the beast and false prophet,' etc. ] shall be tormented day and night
for ever and ever," which is the Scriptural expression for eternity.
Secondly, because this opinion exaggerated God's mercy in one direction
and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for
the good angels to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked
angels to be eternally punished. Wherefore just as he maintained that
the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length
from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls
of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the
unhappiness of this life.
Reply to Objection 1: God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since,
however, His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is
that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy
of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in
wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a
place, in so far as they are punished less than they deserve condignly,
but not that they are entirely delivered from punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted the distribution (of the
predicate) regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the
statement applies to men in the state of wayfarer, inasmuch as He had
mercy both on Jews and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every
Jew.
Reply to Objection 3: Anselm means that it is not just in the sense of
becoming God's goodness, and is speaking of the creature generically.
For it becomes not the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature
fail of the end for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for
all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men
or some angels should perish for ever, because the intention of the
Divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God's mercy suffers at least men to be punished eternally?
Objection 1: It would seem that God's mercy does not suffer at least
men to be punished eternally. For it is written (Gn. 6:3): "My spirit
shall not remain in man for ever because he is flesh"; where "spirit"
denotes indignation, as a gloss observes. Therefore, since God's
indignation is not distinct from His punishment, man will not be
punished eternally.
Objection 2: Further, the charity of the saints in this life makes them
pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in that
life. Therefore they will pray then for their enemies who are damned.
But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most
acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy
will in time deliver the damned from their punishment.
Objection 3: Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned
belongs to the prophecy of commination. Now the prophecy of commination
is not always fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the
destruction of Nineve (Jonas 3); and yet it was not destroyed as
foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason
(Jonah 4:1). Therefore it would seem that much more will the threat of
eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for a more lenient
punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to
all.
Objection 4: Further, the words of Ps. 76:8 are to the point, where it
is said: "Will God then be angry for ever? [*Vulg. : 'Will God then cast
off for ever? ']" But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc.
Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Is. 14:19, "But thou art cast out,"
etc. says: "Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never
shalt": and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all
human souls shall at length have rest from their pains.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the elect conjointly
with the damned: "These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the
just, into life everlasting. " But it is inadmissible that the life of
the just will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the
punishment of the damned will ever come to an end.
Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) "death is to men what
their fall was to the angels. " Now after their fall the angels could
not be restored [*Cf. [5179]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore neither can man
after death: and thus the punishment of the damned will have no end.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 17,18), some evaded
the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished
everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at
length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether
unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and
therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls of men who
die without charity, since "death is to men what their fall was to the
angels," as Damascene says.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying refers to man generically, because
God's indignation was at length removed from the human race by the
coming of Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to
remain in this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the
Divine anger in themselves, since no other way of reconciliation is
given to us save that which is through Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 24) and Gregory
(Moral. xxxiv) say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies,
that they may be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them to
be converted. For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we
should no more pray for them than for the demons. And since for those
who depart this life without grace there will be no further time for
conversion, no prayer will be offered for them, neither by the Church
militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray
for them is, as the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:25,26), that "God may give
them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from
the snares of the devil. "
Reply to Objection 3: A punishment threatened prophetically is only
then commuted when there is a change in the merits of the person
threatened. Hence: "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against
a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that
nation . . . shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil
that I have thought to do to them" (Jer. 18:7). Therefore, since the
merits of the damned cannot be changed, the threatened punishment will
ever be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy of commination is
always fulfilled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei. xxi, 24): "Nineve has been overthrown, that was evil, and a good
Nineve is built up, that was not: for while the walls and the houses
remained standing, the city was overthrown in its wicked ways. "
Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of
mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in
this life (which may be called God's anger on account of its
unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence
the Psalm continues (Ps. 76:11): "This is the change of the right hand
of the most High. " We may also reply that they refer to mercy as
granting a relaxation but not setting free altogether if it be referred
also to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not say: "Will He from His
anger shut up His mercies? " but "in His anger," because the punishment
will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have effect by
diminishing the punishment while it continues.
Reply to Objection 5: This gloss is speaking not absolutely but on an
impossible supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of
the devil's sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians
is brought to an end by the mercy of God. "For he that believeth and is
baptized shall be saved" (Mk. 16:16). Now this applies to every
Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jn. 6:55): "He that eateth My body
and drinketh My blood hath eternal life. " Now this is the meat and
drink whereof Christians partake in common. Therefore all Christians
will be saved at length.
Objection 3: Further, "If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss:
but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15), where
it is a question of those who have the foundation of the Christian
faith. Therefore all such persons will be saved in the end.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9): "The unjust shall not
possess the kingdom of God. " Now some Christians are unjust. Therefore
Christians will not all come to the kingdom of God, and consequently
they will be punished for ever.
Further, it is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better for them not
to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to
turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them. " Now
those who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever.
Therefore Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be
punished for ever.
I answer that, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 20,21), there
have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for
all men, but only for Christians. although they stated the matter in
different ways. For some said that whoever received the sacraments of
faith would be immune from eternal punishment. But this is contrary to
the truth, since some receive the sacraments of faith, and yet have not
faith, without which "it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11:6).
Wherefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal
punishment who have received the sacraments of faith, and professed the
Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time
some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and
these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since
according to 2 Pet. 2:21, "it had been better for them not to have
known the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back. "
Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith
and invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have
conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore some have
maintained that those alone are exempt from eternal punishment, who
persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, however guilty they may
have been of other crimes. But this is clearly contrary to Holy Writ,
for it is written (James 2:20): "Faith without works is dead," and
(Mat. 7:21) "Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter
into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doth the will of My Father Who
is in heaven": and in many other passages Holy Scripture threatens
sinners with eternal punishment. Consequently those who persevere in
the faith unto the end will not all be exempt from eternal punishment,
unless in the end they prove to be free from other crimes.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord speaks there of formed faith [*Cf.
[5180]SS, Q[4], A[3]] "that worketh by love [Vulg. : 'charity'; Gal.
5:6]": wherein whosoever dieth shall be saved. But to this faith not
only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin
whatsoever.
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of our Lord refers not to those who
partake only sacramentally, and who sometimes by receiving unworthily
"eat and drink judgment" to themselves (1 Cor. 11:29), but to those who
eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, which
incorporation is the effect of the sacramental eating, in those who
approach worthily [*Cf. [5181]TP, Q[80], AA[1],2,3]. Wherefore, so far
as the power of the sacrament is concerned, it brings us to eternal
life, although sin may deprive us of that fruit, even after we have
received worthily.
Reply to Objection 3: In this passage of the Apostle the foundation
denotes formed faith, upon which whosoever shall build venial sins
[*Cf. [5182]FS, Q[89], A[2]] "shall suffer loss," because he will be
punished for them by God; yet "he himself shall be saved" in the end
"by fire," either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of
purgatory which will be after death.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all those who perform works of mercy will be punished eternally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not
be punished eternally, but only those who neglect those works. For it
is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not
done mercy"; and (Mat. 5:7): "Blessed are the merciful for they shall
obtain mercy. "
Objection 2: Further, (Mat. 25:35-46) we find a description of our
Lord's discussion with the damned and the elect. But this discussion is
only about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded
only to such as have omitted to practice works of mercy: and
consequently the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 6:12): "Forgive us our debts,
as we also forgive our debtors," and further on (Mat. 6:14): "For if
you will forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will forgive
you also your offenses. " Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who
forgive others their offenses, will themselves obtain the forgiveness
of their sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Godliness is
profitable to all things," says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule
of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and
though he should suffer from the inconstancy of the flesh, without
doubt he will be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can
boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting
punishment. " Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though
they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally: and
thus the same conclusion follows as before.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9,10): "Neither fornicators .
. . nor adulterers," etc. "shall possess the kingdom of God. " Yet many
are such who practice works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not
all come to the eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be
punished eternally.
Further, it is written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole
law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. " Therefore
whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other
works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be
punished eternally.
I answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above (De Civ. Dei
xxi, 22), some have maintained that not all who have professed the
Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those
who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other
crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be
acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the
absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in
works of mercy without having charity. Wherefore nothing profits them
to the meriting of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal
punishment, as may be gathered from 1 Cor. 13:3. Most evident is this
in the case of those who lay hands on other people's property, for
after seizing on many things, they nevertheless spend something in
works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all whosoever die in
mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from
eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an
ordinate manner. But those who while merciful to others are neglectful
of themselves do not show mercy ordinately, rather do they strike at
themselves by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not
obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that
mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why the discussion refers only to the
works of mercy is not because eternal punishment will be inflicted on
none but those who omit those works, but because eternal punishment
will be remitted to those who after sinning have obtained forgiveness
by their works of mercy, making unto themselves "friends of the mammon
of iniquity" (Lk. 16:9).
Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord said this to those who ask that their
debt be forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin. Wherefore the
repentant alone will obtain by their works of mercy the forgiveness
that sets them free altogether.
Reply to Objection 4: The gloss of Ambrose speaks of the inconstancy
that consists in venial sin, from which a man will be freed through the
works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a
scourging. Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense
is that those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh
through frailty are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore
such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by
those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord,
Who is blessed for evermore. Amen.
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Appendix
__________________________________________________________________
Appendix 1
The following two questions were compiled by Nicolai from St. Thomas'
Commentary on the Sentences, and by him included in the supplement
between Questions 70 and 71.
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OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY (TWO
ARTICLES)
We must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped
of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we
shall treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only.
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted
with punishment by fire?
(2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within
themselves?
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Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a
bodily fire, and are punished by fire?
Objection 1: It would seem that souls which depart with none but
original sin, suffer from a bodily fire and are punished by fire. For
Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, xxvii] says: "Hold firmly
and doubt not that children who depart this life without the sacrament
of Baptism will be punished everlastingly. " Now punishment denotes
sensible pain. Therefore souls which depart this life with original sin
alone, suffer from a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of
fire.
Objection 2: Further, a greater fault deserves a greater punishment.
Now original sin is greater than venial, because it contains more
aversion, since it deprives its subject of grace, whereas venial sin is
compatible with grace; and again because original sin is punished
eternally, whereas venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that
venial sin is deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is
original sin.
Objection 3: Further, sins are more severely punished after this life
than during lifetime, for in this life there is room for mercy. Now,
sensible punishment corresponds to original sin in this life, for
children who have only original sin are justly subject to many sensible
punishments. Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this
life.
Objection 4: Further, even as in actual sin there is aversion and
conversion, so in original sin there is something corresponding to
aversion, namely the privation of original justice, and something
corresponding to conversion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment
of fire is due to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it
is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence.
Objection 5: Further, after the resurrection the bodies of children
will be either passible or impassible. If they be impassible---and no
human body can be impassible except either on account of the gift of
impassibility (as in the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as
in the state of innocence)---it follows that the bodies of children
will either have the gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious,
so that there will be no difference between baptized and non-baptized
children, which is heretical, or else they will have original justice,
and thus will be without original sin, and will not be punished for
original sin, which is likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they
be passible, since everything passible suffers of necessity in the
presence of the active, it follows that in the presence of active
sensible bodies they will suffer sensible punishment.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiii) that the mildest
punishment of all will be for those who are burdened with original sin
only. But this would not be so, if they were tormented with sensible
punishment, because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore
they will not suffer sensible punishment.
Further, the grief of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure
of sin (Apoc. 18:7): "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived
in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her. " But there is
no pleasure in original sin, as neither is there operation, for
pleasure follows operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Therefore
punishment by fire is not due to original sin.
Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which is entitled on
Holy Baptism, distinguishes three classes of unbaptized persons: those
namely who refuse to be baptized, those who through neglect have put
off being baptized until the end of life and have been surprised by
sudden death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive it
through no fault of theirs. Of the first he says that they will be
punished not only for their other sins, but also for their contempt of
Baptism; of the second, that they will be punished, though less
severely than the first, for having neglected it; and of the last he
says that "a just and eternal Judge will consign them neither to
heavenly glory nor to the eternal pains of hell, for although they have
not been signed with Baptism, they are without wickedness and malice,
and have suffered rather than caused their loss of Baptism. " He also
gives the reason why, although they do not reach the glory of heaven,
they do not therefore suffer the eternal punishment suffered by the
damned: "Because there is a mean between the two, since he who deserves
not honor and glory is not for that reason worthy of punishment, and on
the other hand he who is not deserving of punishment is not for that
reason worthy of glory and honor. "
I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to fault, according
to the saying of Isaias (27:8), "In measure against measure, when it
shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it. " Now the defect transmitted to
us through our origin, and having the character of a sin does not
result from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon
human nature by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal or
corruption of something that had been superadded to nature. Nor does
this sin belong to this particular man, except in so far as he has such
a nature, that is deprived of this good, which in the ordinary course
of things he would have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore
no further punishment is due to him, besides the privation of that end
to which the gift withdrawn destined him, which gift human nature is
unable of itself to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and
consequently the loss of this vision is the proper and only punishment
of original sin after death: because, if any other sensible punishment
were inflicted after death for original sin, a man would be punished
out of proportion to his guilt, for sensible punishment is inflicted
for that which is proper to the person, since a man undergoes sensible
punishment in so far as he suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt
did not result from an action of his own, even so neither should he be
punished by suffering himself, but only by losing that which his nature
was unable to obtain. On the other hand, those who are under sentence
for original sin will suffer no loss whatever in other kinds of
perfection and goodness which are consequent upon human nature by
virtue of its principles.
Reply to Objection 1: In the authority quoted punishment denotes, not
pain of sense, but only pain of loss, which is the privation of the
divine vision, even as in Scripture the word "fire" is often wont to
signify any kind of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Of all sins original sin is the least, because it
is the least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will of the
person, but only by the will of the origin of our nature. But actual
sin, even venial, is voluntary by the will of the person in which it
is; wherefore a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial
sin. Nor does it matter that original sin is incompatible with grace;
because privation of grace has the character, not of sin, but of
punishment, except in so far as it is voluntary: for which reason that
which is less voluntary is less sinful. Again it matters not that
actual venial sin is deserving of temporal punishment, since this is
accidental, for as much as he who falls venially has sufficient grace
to attenuate the punishment. For if venial sin were in a person without
grace, it would be punished eternally.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between pain of sense before
and after death, since before death the pain of sense results from the
power of the natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior as
fever or the like, or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after
death nothing will act by natural power, but only according to the
order of divine justice, whether the object of such action be the
separate soul, on which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or
the body after resurrection, since then all natural action will cease,
through the cessation of the first movable which is the cause of all
bodily movement and alteration.
Reply to Objection 4: Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure,
which is in the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual
concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no pleasure. Hence,
sensible pain does not correspond thereto as punishment.
Reply to Objection 5: The bodies of children will be impassible, not
through their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the
lack of an external agent to act upon them: because, after the
resurrection, no body will act on another, least of all so as to induce
corruption by the action of nature, but there will only be action to
the effect of punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore
those bodies to which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will
not suffer punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will
be impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering;
hence impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state
in which they are?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in question suffer spiritual
affliction on account of the state wherein they are, because as
Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Matth. ), the punishment of God in that
they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their
being burned in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing
God. Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.
Objection 2: Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one
wishes to have. But these souls would wish to have the divine vision,
else their will would be actually perverse. Therefore since they are
deprived of it, seemingly they also suffer.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that they do not suffer, because
they know that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on
the contrary: Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain
of punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is
disinherited or deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore
these souls likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through no
fault of theirs, suffer none the less.
Objection 4: Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit
of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But
baptized children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of
Christ's merit. Therefore the unbaptized suffer pain through being
deprived of eternal life on account of Adam's demerit.
Objection 5: Further, separation from what we love cannot be without
pain. But these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for
that very reason will love Him naturally. Therefore since they are
separated from Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this
separation without pain.
On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after
death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment.
If for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin,
their sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the
damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have
the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the
mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is [*See A[1], "On the
contrary"]. If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it
follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their
will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus would be actually
inordinate, which is not to be granted. Therefore they will feel no
sorrow.
Further, right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of
what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv, and De
ira ii, 6) that "a wise man is not disturbed. " Now in these children
there is right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will
not be disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which they could
nowise avoid.
I answer that, on this question there are three opinions. Some say that
these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so
much in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have
lost. It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily
burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to
explore, and many more besides. Hence others say that they have perfect
knowledge of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that
they are deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow
on this account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as
it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are
condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow
cannot be little for the loss of so great a good, especially without
the hope of recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the
mildest. Moreover the very same reason that impugns their being
punished with pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues
against their feeling sorrow within, because the pain of punishment
corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original sin is
void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain. Consequently
others say that they will know perfectly things subject to natural
knowledge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal life
and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge
will not cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we must
explore.
Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason
one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one's
power to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one
is capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to
fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since
these things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked
that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man
who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because
he can prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life [*Cf.
[5183]FS, Q[109], AA[5],6]; so that if he fail in this, his grief will
be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess. But
children were never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was
this due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it
surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of
their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence they will nowise
grieve for being deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they
rejoice for that they will have a large share of God's goodness and
their own natural perfections. Nor can it be said that they were
adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by
the actions of others around them, since they could be baptized by
others, like other children of the same condition who have been
baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace
that one should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Wherefore the
lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die without
Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of
the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.
Reply to Objection 1: In those who, having the use of free-will, are
damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but
not in children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity
between the two.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the will may be directed both to the
possible and to the impossible as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, an ordinate
and complete will is only of things which in some way are proportionate
to our capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but
not if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should
be called "velleity" [*Cf. [5184]FS, Q[13], A[5], ad 1; [5185]TP,
Q[21], A[4]] rather than "will"; for one does not will such things
absolutely, but one would if they were possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or
bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at
their loss, whether this be through his own or another's fault: hence
it is clear that the argument is not based on a true comparison.
Reply to Objection 4: The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as
stated in Rom. 5:15, seqq. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized
children have as much of evil as the baptized have of good.
Reply to Objection 5: Although unbaptized children are separated from
God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from
Him: in fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods,
and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge
and love.
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OF THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY
(SIX ARTICLES)
We must next treat of the souls which after this life expiate the
punishment of their actual sins in the fire of Purgatory.
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the pain of Purgatory surpasses all the temporal pains of
this life?
(2) Whether that punishment is voluntary?
(3) Whether the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons?
(4) Whether venial sin as regards its guilt is expiated by the pains of
Purgatory?
(5) Whether the fire of Purgatory frees from the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether one is freed from that punishment sooner than another?
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Whether the pains of Purgatory surpass all the temporal pains of this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the pains of Purgatory do not surpass
all the temporal pains of this life. Because the more passive a thing
is the more it suffers if it has the sense of being hurt. Now the body
is more passive than the separate soul, both because it has contrariety
to a fiery agent, and because it has matter which is susceptive of the
agent's quality: and this cannot be said of the soul. Therefore the
pain which the body suffers in this world is greater than the pain
whereby the soul is cleansed after this life.
Objection 2: Further, the pains of Purgatory are directly ordained
against venial sins. Now since venial sins are the least grievous, the
lightest punishment is due to them, if the measure of the stripes is
according to the measure of the fault. Therefore the pain of Purgatory
is the lightest of all.
Objection 3: Further, since the debt of punishment is an effect of sin,
it does not increase unless the sin increases. Now sin cannot increase
in one whose sin is already remitted. Therefore if a mortal sin has
been remitted in a man who has not fully paid the debt of punishment,
this debt does not increase when he dies. But while he lived he was not
in debt to the extent of the most grievous punishment. Therefore the
pain that he will suffer after this life will not be more grievous to
him than all other pains of this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (xli De Sanctis): "This
fire of Purgatory will be more severe than any pain that can be felt,
seen or conceived in this world. "
Further, the more universal a pain is the greater it is. Now the whole
separate soul is punished, since it is simple: which is not the case
with the body. Therefore this, being the punishment of the separate
soul, is greater than any pain suffered by the body.
I answer that, In Purgatory there will be a twofold pain; one will be
the pain of loss, namely the delay of the divine vision, and the pain
of sense, namely punishment by corporeal fire. With regard to both the
least pain of Purgatory surpasses the greatest pain of this life. For
the more a thing is desired the more painful is its absence. And since
after this life the holy souls desire the Sovereign Good with the most
intense longing---both because their longing is not held back by the
weight of the body, and because, had there been no obstacle, they would
already have gained the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Good---it
follows that they grieve exceedingly for their delay. Again, since pain
is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, the more sensitive a thing is, the
greater the pain caused by that which hurts it: wherefore hurts
inflicted on the more sensible parts cause the greatest pain. And,
because all bodily sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity
that the soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the
soul itself. That the soul suffers pain from the bodily fire is at
present taken for granted, for we shall treat of this matter further on
[*Cf. [5186]XP, Q[70], A[3]]. Therefore it follows that the pain of
Purgatory, both of loss and of sense, surpasses all the pains of this
life.
Some, however, prove this from the fact that the whole soul is
punished, and not the body. But this is to no purpose, since in that
case the punishment of the damned would be milder after the
resurrection than before, which is false.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the soul is less passive than the body,
it is more cognizant of actual suffering [passionis]: and where the
sense of suffering is greater, there is the greater pain, though the
suffering be less.
Reply to Objection 2: The severity of that punishment is not so much a
consequence of the degree of sin, as of the disposition of the person
punished, because the same sin is more severely punished then than now.
Even so a person who has a better temperament is punished more severely
by the same sentence than another; and yet the judge acts justly in
condemning both for the same crimes to the same punishment.
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this punishment is voluntary?
Objection 1: It would seem that this punishment is voluntary. For those
who are in Purgatory are upright in heart. Now uprightness in heart is
to conform one's will to God's, as Augustine says (Serm. i in Ps. 32).
Therefore, since it is God's will that they be punished, they will
suffer that punishment voluntarily.
Objection 2: Further, every wise man wills that without which he cannot
obtain the end he has in view. Now those who are in Purgatory know that
they cannot obtain glory, unless they be punished first. Therefore they
are punished willingly.
On the contrary, No one asks to be freed from a punishment that he
suffers willingly. Now those who are in Purgatory ask to be set free,
as appears from many incidents related in the Dialogue of Gregory (iv,
40,65). Therefore they will not undergo that punishment voluntarily.
I answer that, A thing is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, by
an absolute act of the will; and thus no punishment is voluntary,
because the very notion of punishment is that it be contrary to the
will. Secondly, a thing is said to be voluntary by a conditional act of
the will: thus cautery is voluntary for the sake of regaining health.
Hence a punishment may be voluntary in two ways. First, because by
being punished we obtain some good, and thus the will itself undertakes
a punishment, as instanced in satisfaction, or when a man accepts a
punishment gladly, and would not have it not to be, as in the case of
martyrdom. Secondly, when, although we gain no good by the punishment,
we cannot obtain a good without being punished, as in the case of
natural death: and then the will does not undertake the punishment, and
would be delivered from it; but it submits to it, and in this respect
the punishment is said to be voluntary. In this latter sense the
punishment of Purgatory is said to be voluntary.
Some, however, say that it is not voluntary in any way, because the
souls in Purgatory are so replete with suffering, that they know not
that they are being cleansed by their pains, and deem themselves
damned. But this is false, for did they not know that they will be set
free, they would not ask for prayers, as they often do.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the soul in Purgatory are punished by the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in Purgatory are punished by
the demons; for, according to the Master, "they will have for torturers
in their pains, those who were their tempters in sin. " Now the demons
tempt us to sin, not only mortal, but also venial when they fail in the
former. Therefore in Purgatory also they will torture souls on account
of venial sins.
Objection 2: Further, the just are competent to be cleansed from sin
both in this life and afterwards. Now, in this life, they are cleansed
by pains inflicted by the devil, as was the case with Job. Therefore
after this life also, those who have to be cleansed will be punished by
the demons.
On the contrary, It were unjust that he who has triumphed over someone,
should be subjected to him after victory. Now those who are in
Purgatory have triumphed over the demons, since they died without
mortal sin. Therefore they will not be subjected to them through being
punished by them.
I answer that, As after the Judgment day the Divine justice will kindle
the fire with which the damned will be punished for ever, even so now
the elect are cleansed after this life by the Divine justice alone, and
neither by the ministry of the demons whom they have vanquished, nor by
the ministry of the angels who would not inflict such tortures on their
fellow-citizens. It is, however, possible that they take them to the
place of punishment: also that even the demons, who rejoice in the
punishment of man, accompany them and stand by while they are being
cleansed, both that they may be sated with their pains, and that when
these leave their bodies, they may find something of their own in them.
But in this life, while there is yet time for the combat, men are
punished both by the wicked angels as foes, as instanced in Job, and by
the good angels, as instanced in Jacob, the sinew of whose thigh shrank
at the angel's touch [*Gn. 32:25]. Moreover, Dionysius says explicitly
that the good angels sometimes inflict punishment.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether venial sin is expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the
guilt?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not expiated by the pains
of Purgatory as regards the guilt. For a gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral.
xvi, 28] on 1 Jn. 5:16, "There is a sin unto death," etc. says: "It is
vain to ask pardon after death for what was not amended in this life. "
Therefore no sin is remitted as to guilt after this life.
Objection 2: Further, the same subject is freed from sin as falls into
sin. But after death the soul cannot sin venially. Therefore neither
can it be loosed from venial sin.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says [*Dial. iv, 39] that every man will
be at the judgment as he was when he left the body, because "the tree .
. . wheresoever it shall fall, there shall it be" [*Eccles. 11:3]. If,
then, a man go forth from this life with venial sin, he will be with
venial sin at the judgment: and consequently one does not atone for
venial sin in Purgatory.
Objection 4: Further, it has been stated ([5187]XP, Q[2], A[3]) that
actual sin is not blotted out save by contrition. But there will be no
contrition after this life, because it is a meritorious act. For then
there will be neither merit nor demerit since, according to the
Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4], "death is to men what the fall was to
the angels. " Therefore, after this life, venial sin is not remitted in
Purgatory as to its guilt.
Objection 5: Further, venial sin is not in us except on account of the
fomes. Wherefore in the original state Adam would not have sinned
venially, as was stated (Sent. ii, D, xxi, 2). Now after this life
there will be no sensuality; because the fomes will cease when the soul
is separated, since it is called the "law of the flesh" (Rom. 7). Hence
there will be no venial sin then, and consequently it cannot be
expiated by the fire of Purgatory.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Dial. iv, 39] and Augustine [*De vera et
falsa poenit. iv, xviii, by some other author] say that certain slight
sins will be remitted in the life to come. Nor can this be understood
of the punishment: because thus all sins, however grave they be, are
expiated by the fire of Purgatory, as regards the debt of punishment.
Therefore venial sins are cleansed by the fire of Purgatory as to their
guilt.
Further, wood, hay, stubble (1 Cor. 3:12) denote venial sins, as we
have said ([5188]FS, Q[89], A[2]). Now wood, hay, stubble are consumed
in Purgatory. Therefore venial sins are remitted after this life.
I answer that, Some have asserted that no sin is remitted after this
life, as regards the guilt: that if a man die with mortal sin, he is
damned and incapable of being forgiven; and that it is not possible for
a man to die with a venial sin and without mortal sin, since the final
grace washes the venial sin away. They assign as reason for this that
venial sin is excessive love of a temporal thing, in one who has his
foundation in Christ, which excess results from the corruption of
concupiscence. Wherefore if grace entirely overcome the corruption of
concupiscence, as in the Blessed Virgin, there is no room for venial
sin. Hence, since this concupiscence is altogether abated and removed,
the powers of the soul are wholly subject to grace, and venial sin is
cast out.
