"11
Certainly Nevile Henderson got his wish.
Certainly Nevile Henderson got his wish.
Soviet Union - 1952 - Soviet Civilization
There were four main reasons in my opinion why
the British and French Governments did not wish to
enforce against Mussolini either economic or military
sanctions. In the first place, preferring fascism to social-
ism, they feared that far-reaching pressures against Italy
would topple the fascist regime and that genuine social-
ism would take its place. In the second place, they did
not want their own nationals to lose, even temporarily,
the economic advantages of trade with Italy.
In the third place, they were afraid that a defeat of
the Italian army by the forces of Emperor Haile Selassie
would give too much encouragement to the Negro popu-
lations of Africa against the imperialistic encroachments
of the white man. Even as intelligent a statesman as Jan
C. Smuts, several times Prime Minister of the Republic
of South Africa, thought that an Ethiopian victory against
a white nation would be a very dangerous thing. In the
fourth place, the British and French were already put-
ting into effect their considered policy of appeasing the
fascist Powers and letting them conquer and annex for-
eign lands on the supposition that they would eventually
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
attack the Soviet Union and not the Western democracies.
The general appeasement policy, fear of undermining
the fascist dictatorships and plain reluctance to risk war
led England and France to make only a pretense of op-
posing Italian and Nazi intervention in Spain on behalf
of General Franco's rebellion against the democratically
elected Loyalist Government. Mussolini actually sent
an army of more than 100,000 troops to Franco's aid.
And the frequently expressed horror of high British and
French officials against violent revolution quickly sub-
sided when it was the fascists who were doing the revolt-
ing. The Anglo-French "defenders" of Western democ-
racy instituted an effective boycott on the sale of military
equipment to democratic Spain; and the United States
took the same attitude. Loyalist Spain was thus denied
its ordinary rights under international law and early in
1939 finally went down to defeat.
In 1937 the Japanese army invaded China proper, as
distinct from Manchuria, which Japan had invaded and
overrun beginning with 1931. On this second occasion
of outright Japanese aggression the League of Nations,
under Anglo-French leadership, spent much time setting
up committees and sub-committees to write polite notes
to the Japanese Government asking what its intentions
were. After a considerable delay the League decided that
while there was no general obligation for its members
to impose economic sanctions against Japan, such sanc-
tions were applicable on a discretionary basis. Of course
this very discreet action did not get anywhere; and im-
perialist Japan, looked upon by Tories the world over
as the great bulwark against Bolshevism in the Far East,
pursued its bloody course unhampered. Again, the Soviet
Union took its principled position of standing "in readi-
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
ness to rebuff the aggressor jointly with other great states,
and small states too. "5
In March, 1938, Hitler sent his mechanized armies
across the Austrian border and annexed the whole of
Austria in the long-expected Anschluss. The Soviet Gov-
ernment vigorously protested this action and reaffirmed
its obligations under the principle of collective security.
Foreign Minister Litvinov urged a special conference to
consider the necessary means for "arresting the further
development of aggression and removing the accentuated
danger of a new world shambles. "6 Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain of Great Britain rejected this pro-
posal and nothing came of it.
In September, 1938, the Nazi dictator brought to a
head the outrageous demand "of Germany for the annexa-
tion of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. The Brit^
ish and French Governments crumpled quickly under
Hitler's threats of launching a general war; and on Sep-
tember 15 Chamberlain made his first flight to Munich
to meet the Nazi Chancellor. While Anglo-French dip-
lomacy was busy selling Czechoslovakia down the river,
Mr. Litvinov, on September 21, made one of his greatest
speeches before the League of Nations Assembly at
Geneva.
The Soviet Foreign Minister reminded his League
colleagues that the U. S. S. R. had advocated strong meas-
ures of collective security against the aggressor at the
time of the attacks on Ethiopia, Spain and Austria. As
to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet treaty of mutual assis-
tance with that country, Mr. Litvinov stated: "We
intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact, and
together with France, to afford assistance to Czechoslo-
vakia by the ways open to us. Our War Department is
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
ready immediately to participate in a conference with
representatives of the French and Czechoslovak War
Departments, in order to discuss the measures appropri-
ate to the moment. Independently of this we considered
that the question be raised at the League of Nations. . . .
[and that there be an] immediate consultation between
the Great Powers of Europe and other interested states,
in order if possible to decide on the terms of a collective
demarche.
"Unfortunately, other steps were taken, which would
have led, and which could not but lead, to such a capitula-
tion as is bound sooner or later to have quite incalcula-
ble and disastrous consequences. To avoid a problematic
war today and receive in return a certain and large-scale
war tomorrow -- moreover at the price of assuaging the
appetites of insatiable aggressors and of the destruction
or mutilation of sovereign states -- is not to act in the
spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations. To
grant bonuses for sabre-rattling and recourse to arms for
the solution of international problems -- in other words,
to reward and encourage aggressive super-imperialism --
is not to act in the spirit of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The
Soviet Government takes pride in the fact that it has no
part in such a policy. "7
Indeed, as the negotiations went on between Hitler,
Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier (Premier of
France), the Soviet Government was not even consulted
by the British and French Governments. Those two Gov-
ernments brusquely turned down the idea of any con-
ference on behalf of collective security and instead came
to an agreement, behind closed doors, with the Axis dic-
tators for the partition of Czechoslovakia. On the even-
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? SOVIET FOREIGN. POLICY
ing of September 29, following Chamberlain's second trip
to Munich, the deal was concluded and announced to
the Czechoslovak Government, which was required to
hand over the Sudeten territory peacefully to the Nazis.
The next day this Government acquiesced, although
adding that it "protests the decision of the Four Great
Powers, which was entirely one-sided and taken without
Czechoslovakia's participation. "
Through the Munich settlement the British Tories,
with the French men-like-mice following their lead,
aimed to isolate the Soviet Union diplomatically, to avoid
a military clash with Hitler, to strengthen European fas-
cism as the best insurance against communism and to
turn the Nazi war machine east against the Russians.
Instead the Anglo-French super-diplomats dug their own
graves. As Winston Churchill later said: "France and
Britain had to choose between war and dishonor. They
chose dishonor. They will have war. "8 How correct
were the predictions of both Churchill and Litvinov
World War II soon proved.
Hitler speedily swallowed up the Sudetenland, but
had further plans in mind for the Czechoslovaks. On
March 15, 1939, the German army swept into Prague and
took over the rest of Czechoslovakia, which the Nazis
then incorporated into their Greater Germany. Prime
Minister Chamberlain adopted an attitude of wounded
surprise. On March 18 the Soviet Government again pro-
posed a conference of European states to institute meas-
ures for resisting aggression. At this very late date in
history the British Government rejected the Soviet pro-
posal as "premature. " With its approval the League of
Nations Secretariat suppressed an appeal to the League,
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
so that nobody would be embarrassed by the question
arising there.
On March 10, 1939, Joseph Stalin, as General Secre-
tary of the Soviet Communist Party, delivered an address
carefully reviewing the international situation. He sum-
med up Soviet foreign policy under four main points:
"First, we stand for peace and the strengthening of busi-
ness-like relations with all countries. This is our position
and we will adhere to it as long as these countries main-
tain identical relations with the Soviet Union, as long
as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of
our country. Second, we stand for peaceful, close and
friendly relations with all the neighboring countries
which have common frontiers with the U. S. S. R. That
is our position; and we shall adhere to it as long as these
countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union,
and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly
or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the
frontiers of the Soviet state. Third, we stand for the sup-
port of nations which have fallen prey to aggression and
are fighting for the independence of their country.
Fourth, we are not afraid of the threats of aggressors and
we are ready to retaliate with two blows for one against
instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet bor-
ders. "9
In spite of the many rebuffs it had received, the
Soviet Union was still desirous of working out with the
Western democracies common measures for collective
security and defense. But the Soviets were becoming
restive. In the same speech from which I have just
quoted, Mr. Stalin suggested that the dangerous game
of the appeasers "may end in serious failure for them-
selves. " And he asserted that the U. S. S. R. did not intend
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? SOVIET FOREICH POLICY
"to pull chestnuts out of the fire" for anyone. However,
on April 16, 1939, shortly after the wanton Italian seizure
of Albania on Easter week-end, the Soviet Government
tried again. In the words of Mr. Churchill in his book,
The Gathering Storm, the Soviets "made a formal offer,
the text of which was not published, for the creation of
a united front of mutual assistance between Great Britain,
France and the U. S. S. R. The three Powers, with Poland
added if possible, were furthermore to guarantee those
states in Central and Eastern Europe which lay under
the menace of German aggression. . . .
"The alliance of Britain, France and Russia would
have struck deep alarm into the heart of Germany in
1939, and no one can prove that war might not even then
have been averted. . . . Hitler could afford neither to
embark upon the war on two fronts, which he himself
had so deeply condemned, nor to sustain a check. It was
a pity not to have placed him in this awkward position,
which might well have cost him his life. . . . If Mr. Cham-
berlain on receipt of the Russian offer had replied, 'Yes.
Let us three band together and break Hitler's neck,' or
words to that effect, Parliament would have approved.
Stalin would have understood, and history might have
taken a different course. At least it could not have taken
a worse. . . . Instead there was a long silence while half-
measures and judicious compromises were being pre-
pared. "10
On May 3 Maxim Litvinov resigned as Soviet Foreign
Secretary and the more intransigent V. M. Molotov took
his place. This was clearly a sign that Soviet Russia was
becoming doubtful whether it could rely on the collect-
ive security policy of which Litvinov had been the prime
architect. At the end of May Mr. Molotov repeated
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
Stalin's warning that the U. S. S. R. was tired of appease-
ment. Prime Minister Chamberlain, it is true, had en-
tered into active negotiations with the Soviet Union;
but to quote Mr. Churchill again, they "proceeded lan-
guidly. " In June Chamberlain sent a minor official, Mr.
William Strang, to Moscow to carry on talks; and two
months later, on August 11, an Anglo-French military
mission arrived in the U. S. S. R. after a leisurely trip by
boat. Mr. Chamberlain appeared to think there was no
hurry. The hopeful conversations with the Russians
undertaken by this mission finally broke down when the
British and French representatives refused to agree that
the Soviet army would have the right to march into
Poland and the Baltic States to meet a German attack
on those countries or to prevent a Nazi fifth column from
taking control.
The Western negotiators said that since Poland and
the Baltic nations had asserted they would refuse to
allow Soviet troops in under any conditions, it would
not be honorable to bring pressure on these governments
to change their minds. Yet only about a year before the
Anglo-French partnership had considered it perfectly
honorable to submit to Nazi blackmail and to gang up
with Hitler in insisting that Czechoslovakia hand over
a large slice of its territory to Germany. Furthermore,
the League of Nations Covenant itself, in Article XVI,
lent support to the Soviet demand by stating: "The
Members of the League . . . agree that they will take the
necessary steps to afford passage through their territory
to the forces of any of the Members of the League which
are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League. "
I for one have never been convinced that the emis-
saries of Chamberlain and Daladier -- two Prime Minis-
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
ters who had repeatedly betrayed the principles of collect-
ive security -- really intended serious business. Light is
thrown upon their attitude by a statement made about
the same time by Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambas-
sador to Germany and a personal friend of General Her-
mann Goering. In his own book, Failure of a Mission,
Sir Nevile writes that he told Adolf Hitler in August,
1939, that "if an agreement had to be made with Moscow,
for whom communism was now merely the cloak for
intense nationalism and whose ulterior motives seemed
to me highly suspicious, I had rather Germany made it
than ourselves.
"11
Certainly Nevile Henderson got his wish. For the
Soviet Government, believing that the Anglo-French
terms for a mutual security pact would gravely endanger
Soviet defenses in case of a Nazi attack, felt compelled
to accept the other alternative: a treaty of non-aggression
with Germany. This was signed on August 23, 1939. The
pact was not an alliance any more than was the non-
aggression agreement with Japan concluded in April of
1941. The Soviet-German treaty gave the U. S. S. R. insur-
ance against having to withstand, under the most serious
military and diplomatic handicaps, a Nazi assault in
1939 and a valuable breathing spell to strengthen
itself for the later invasion. The Soviet-Japanese treaty
protected the rear of the U. S. S. R. during Hitler's mur-
derous attack. Both pacts, even though made with die-
hard Soviet enemies, seemed justified as hard-boiled de-
fensive strategy in the midst of a most threatening inter-
national situation and in view of the terrific struggle the
Soviet Union was facing.
It is widely held that the Soviet-German Non-Aggres-
sion Pact gave Hitler the needed encouragement to
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
launch his assault on Poland; and that therefore the
Soviets were morally culpable for that crime and the
outbreak of World War II. The actual fact is, however,
that months before the pact was concluded the Nazi dic-
tator had made his decision to march against Poland in
the fall of 1939. Mr. F. H. Hinsley, a Fellow of St. John's
College, Cambridge University, proves this up to the hilt
in his book, Hitler's Strategy, based to a large extent on
documents captured from the German Government.
The author shows that early in April, 1939, Hitler issued
two directives "ordering preparations so to begin that
the attack on Poland could take place at any time after
1 September. "12 And in a secret speech to his Comman-
ders-in-Chief on May 23 he announced his decision to
invade Poland "at the first suitable opportunity. " All
this was before negotiations with Soviet Russia had begun
in earnest.
Regarding Hitler's remarks on May 23, 1939, Mr.
Hinsley writes: "Far more important than the Russian
attitude as a factor in his determination to attack Poland
without delay was the problem of relative power between
Germany and the West. . . . With every month, he was
convinced, Germany's armaments advantage relative to
Poland and the Western Powers would now decline. "13
In another speech, on August 22, to his Commanders-
in-Chief, telling them about the coming treaty with the
U. S. S. R. , Hitler said: "Our economic situation is such
that we cannot hold out more than a few years. . . . We
have no other choice; we must act. . . . Therefore con-
flict is better now. . . . The initiative cannot be allowed
to pass to others. . . . We must accept the risk with reck-
less resolution. . . . We are facing the alternative of strik-
ing now or being destroyed with certainty sooner or
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
later. "14 These arguments, Mr. Hinsley points out,
justified the German war against Poland and the danger
of Britain and France becoming involved, regardless of
the Soviet pact. Of course that agreement was helpful
in the general strategy of the Nazis.
On the day on which the Soviet-German Non-Ag-
gression Pact was announced Joseph E. Davies, American
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote Under Secretary
of State Sumner Welles as follows: "The Soviet regime,
in my opinion, diligently and vigorously tried to main-
tain a vigorous common front against the aggressors and
were sincere advocates of the 'indivisibility of peace. '
Litvinov's able battle for peace and democratic ideas at
the League of Nations and the vigorous attitude of the
Soviet Government in being prepared to fight for Czecho-
slovakia were indications of real sincerity of purpose and
a marked degree of highmindedness. Beginning with
Munich, and even before, however, there had been an
accumulation of events which gradually broke down this
attitude on the part of the Soviet Government. . . . The
suspicion continued to grow that Britain and France
were playing a diplomatic game to place the Soviets in
the position where Russia would have to fight Germany
alone. "15
It is significant that Winston Churchill, who since
World War II has wielded such immense influence on
American attitudes toward Soviet Russia, was leader dur-
ing the pre-war years of a minority group in the British
Conservative Party which opposed Chamberlain's foreign
policy. Concerning the issue upon which the Anglo-
French-Soviet negotiations foundered in August, 1939,
Mr. Churchill in essence backed the Soviet position when
he asserted: "It is certain . . . that if Lithuania, Latvia
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
and Estonia were invaded by the Nazis or subverted to
the Nazi system by propaganda and intrigue from within,
the whole of Europe would be dragged into war. . . . Why
not then concert in good time, publicly and courageously,
the measures which may render such a fight unneces-
sary? "16 Present Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and
ex-Prime Minister David Lloyd George shared these
views.
Had Churchill, instead of the faltering Chamberlain,
been the head of England's government in 1938 and 1939,
the chances are that the Western democracies would have
established a solid peace front with the Soviet Union and
that events in Europe would have taken a very different
turn. In any case what the record of international affairs
shows -- and the comments of eminent men far from
sympathetic towards the Soviet system -- is that through-
out the eventful period of 1935-39 the Soviet Union stood
firm for the League Covenant and the principles of col-
lective security outlined therein.
On September 1, 1939, the Nazi armies swept into
Poland. The League of Nations had failed in the main
purpose for which it was established twenty-odd years
before. In 1940 Hitler's blitzkrieg engulfed the Low
Countries and France; in 1941 western Russia. None-
theless, the idea of collective security through a world
organization did not down. And it was specifically in-
cluded in the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941 and the
Twenty-Year British-Soviet Pact of 1942. The Four-
Nation Moscow Declaration of October, 1943, stated that
China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United
States "recognize the necessity of establishing at the
earliest practicable date a general international organi-
zation, based on the principle of sovereign equality of
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? SOVIET POREIGH POLICY
all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all
such states, large and small, for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. "
Such an international organization came into being
in June of 1945 with the creation of the United Nations
at the San Francisco Conference. The Soviet Govern-
ment took an active part in this Conference and sent a
delegation headed by Foreign Minister Molotov. The
United Nations reaffirmed in its Charter the basic prin-
ciple of collective security and outlined effective measures
to bring it about. In the drawing up of the Charter a
number of disagreements took place between the dif-
ferent delegations. Noteworthy is the fact that Soviet
Russia was willing to compromise, as The New York
Times pointed out in an editorial, on at least ten im-
portant issues in order to assure the prompt and success-
ful establishment of the U. N.
Whatever its differences of opinion with other coun-
tries in the discussions over the U. N. Charter, Soviet
Russia continued to uphold the same principle of col-
lective security for which it had fought in the arenas of
diplomacy during the pre-war years. There was no basic
alteration in its policy; nor was it to be rationally ex-
pected that it would suddenly change from being a peace-
loving nation to a war-loving nation. Rarely do great
peoples reverse their fundamental historical pattern over-
night. Yet today we are asked to believe the far-fetched
story that the Soviet Republic, having vigorously sought
international peace for the first thirty years of its exis-
tence, has become all at once the chief fomenter of war
in the world.
The third major goal in its foreign policy is uni-
versal disarmament, including the abolition of atomic
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
weapons and international controls for atomic energy.
The Soviet record on disarmament has been a notable
one. At the Genoa Conference of 1922, the first inter-
national conference which Soviet Russia attended, the
Soviet Foreign Minister, G. V. Chicherin, proposed a
general reduction of armaments. At the meeting of the
Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference
at Geneva in 1927 the Soviet delegate, Maxim Litvinov,
surprised the world by his proposal for general and com-
plete disarmament. But, during the life of the League
of Nations, armaments increased immensely among the
Great Powers instead of diminishing.
After the formation of the United Nations the Soviet
delegation urged, in 1946, a general reduction of arma-
ments and prohibition of the production and utilization
of atomic energy for war purposes. In 1948, when the
cold war was well under way, the Soviet Government put
forward a plan at the U. N. to reduce the armaments and
armed forces of the Great Powers by one-third within a
year. As recently as November, 1951, Soviet Foreign
Minister Vishinsky repeated this proposal at a meeting
of the United Nations in Paris. The Western Powers
treated Mr. Vishinsky's scheme primarily as propaganda;
and, indeed, the tendency of the non-Soviet world from
1917 on has been to sneer at Soviet disarmament pro-
posals as insincere and designed to deceive. This atti-
tude I am convinced is unjustified.
Soviet Russia has upheld the goal of disarmament in
order to lessen international fears and frictions, decrease
the danger of war and save for constructive economic pur-
poses the colossal sums and energies which go into the
manufacture of armaments. The absence of unemploy-
ment and the general stability of its economic system are
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
not contingent on the armaments industry, but are based
on socialist ownership and country-wide planning. The
Soviets consider armaments production an economic
waste. Nonetheless, the very real menace of foreign ag-
gression has compelled them to develop a great defense
industry and to maintain a large army. It was fortunate
for America and the rest of the democratic world that
Soviet Russia was so well prepared when Hitler struck
in World War II.
Fourth, the Soviet Union believes in normal, flour-
ishing international trade as beneficial to itself and con-
ducive to peace. Naturally it was never in favor of the
economic and financial boycott imposed upon it by the
capitalist Powers after the First World War. And it has
always considered that substantial trade with the outside
world was an important part of its policy of peaceful
co-existence with the capitalist countries. It has all along
been particularly desirous of having good trade relations
with the United States.
In subscribing to the Atlantic Charter Soviet Russia
went on record with the other signatory nations in stat-
ing: "They will endeavor, with due respect for their
existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all
states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on
equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the
world which are needed for their economic prosperity.
They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration be-
tween all nations in the economic field, with the object
of securing for all, improved labor standards, economic
advancement and social security. "
It is no choice of Soviet Russia that these interna-
tional economic aims written into the Atlantic Charter
have been so disregarded since the Second World War.
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
In fact it has decried from the start the economic conse-
quences of the cold war that have necessarily followed
from the American policy of drastically restricting trade
with the U. S. S. R. and the countries of Eastern Europe.
It has regretted the serious drop in trade between Eastern
and Western Europe. As to American-Soviet business
relations, the Soviet Union stands ready to resume normal
trade on a reciprocal basis at any time. Of course the
Soviets will benefit from such commerce, but the United
States on its part will gain just as much.
Fifth in its peace program, Soviet Russia supports
the self-determination of peoples. Again, the Atlantic
Charter of 1941 sets forth the principles involved, assert-
ing: "Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial
or other. They desire to see no territorial changes that
do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned. They respect the right of all peoples
to choose the form of government under which they will
live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-govern-
ment restored to those who have been forcibly deprived
of them. "
On November 6, 1942, Premier Stalin, speaking of-
ficially for his Government, said that "the program of
action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition" for win-
ning the war must include "abolition of racial exclusive-
ness; equality of nations and integrity of their territories;
liberation of enslaved nations and the restoration of their
sovereign rights; the right of every nation to arrange its
affairs as it wishes; economic aid to nations that have
suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material
welfare; restoration of democratic liberties; destruction
of the Hitlerite regime. " While insisting on the sternest
possible attitude toward Hitler and all the Nazi criminals
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the British and French Governments did not wish to
enforce against Mussolini either economic or military
sanctions. In the first place, preferring fascism to social-
ism, they feared that far-reaching pressures against Italy
would topple the fascist regime and that genuine social-
ism would take its place. In the second place, they did
not want their own nationals to lose, even temporarily,
the economic advantages of trade with Italy.
In the third place, they were afraid that a defeat of
the Italian army by the forces of Emperor Haile Selassie
would give too much encouragement to the Negro popu-
lations of Africa against the imperialistic encroachments
of the white man. Even as intelligent a statesman as Jan
C. Smuts, several times Prime Minister of the Republic
of South Africa, thought that an Ethiopian victory against
a white nation would be a very dangerous thing. In the
fourth place, the British and French were already put-
ting into effect their considered policy of appeasing the
fascist Powers and letting them conquer and annex for-
eign lands on the supposition that they would eventually
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
attack the Soviet Union and not the Western democracies.
The general appeasement policy, fear of undermining
the fascist dictatorships and plain reluctance to risk war
led England and France to make only a pretense of op-
posing Italian and Nazi intervention in Spain on behalf
of General Franco's rebellion against the democratically
elected Loyalist Government. Mussolini actually sent
an army of more than 100,000 troops to Franco's aid.
And the frequently expressed horror of high British and
French officials against violent revolution quickly sub-
sided when it was the fascists who were doing the revolt-
ing. The Anglo-French "defenders" of Western democ-
racy instituted an effective boycott on the sale of military
equipment to democratic Spain; and the United States
took the same attitude. Loyalist Spain was thus denied
its ordinary rights under international law and early in
1939 finally went down to defeat.
In 1937 the Japanese army invaded China proper, as
distinct from Manchuria, which Japan had invaded and
overrun beginning with 1931. On this second occasion
of outright Japanese aggression the League of Nations,
under Anglo-French leadership, spent much time setting
up committees and sub-committees to write polite notes
to the Japanese Government asking what its intentions
were. After a considerable delay the League decided that
while there was no general obligation for its members
to impose economic sanctions against Japan, such sanc-
tions were applicable on a discretionary basis. Of course
this very discreet action did not get anywhere; and im-
perialist Japan, looked upon by Tories the world over
as the great bulwark against Bolshevism in the Far East,
pursued its bloody course unhampered. Again, the Soviet
Union took its principled position of standing "in readi-
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
ness to rebuff the aggressor jointly with other great states,
and small states too. "5
In March, 1938, Hitler sent his mechanized armies
across the Austrian border and annexed the whole of
Austria in the long-expected Anschluss. The Soviet Gov-
ernment vigorously protested this action and reaffirmed
its obligations under the principle of collective security.
Foreign Minister Litvinov urged a special conference to
consider the necessary means for "arresting the further
development of aggression and removing the accentuated
danger of a new world shambles. "6 Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain of Great Britain rejected this pro-
posal and nothing came of it.
In September, 1938, the Nazi dictator brought to a
head the outrageous demand "of Germany for the annexa-
tion of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. The Brit^
ish and French Governments crumpled quickly under
Hitler's threats of launching a general war; and on Sep-
tember 15 Chamberlain made his first flight to Munich
to meet the Nazi Chancellor. While Anglo-French dip-
lomacy was busy selling Czechoslovakia down the river,
Mr. Litvinov, on September 21, made one of his greatest
speeches before the League of Nations Assembly at
Geneva.
The Soviet Foreign Minister reminded his League
colleagues that the U. S. S. R. had advocated strong meas-
ures of collective security against the aggressor at the
time of the attacks on Ethiopia, Spain and Austria. As
to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet treaty of mutual assis-
tance with that country, Mr. Litvinov stated: "We
intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact, and
together with France, to afford assistance to Czechoslo-
vakia by the ways open to us. Our War Department is
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
ready immediately to participate in a conference with
representatives of the French and Czechoslovak War
Departments, in order to discuss the measures appropri-
ate to the moment. Independently of this we considered
that the question be raised at the League of Nations. . . .
[and that there be an] immediate consultation between
the Great Powers of Europe and other interested states,
in order if possible to decide on the terms of a collective
demarche.
"Unfortunately, other steps were taken, which would
have led, and which could not but lead, to such a capitula-
tion as is bound sooner or later to have quite incalcula-
ble and disastrous consequences. To avoid a problematic
war today and receive in return a certain and large-scale
war tomorrow -- moreover at the price of assuaging the
appetites of insatiable aggressors and of the destruction
or mutilation of sovereign states -- is not to act in the
spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations. To
grant bonuses for sabre-rattling and recourse to arms for
the solution of international problems -- in other words,
to reward and encourage aggressive super-imperialism --
is not to act in the spirit of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The
Soviet Government takes pride in the fact that it has no
part in such a policy. "7
Indeed, as the negotiations went on between Hitler,
Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier (Premier of
France), the Soviet Government was not even consulted
by the British and French Governments. Those two Gov-
ernments brusquely turned down the idea of any con-
ference on behalf of collective security and instead came
to an agreement, behind closed doors, with the Axis dic-
tators for the partition of Czechoslovakia. On the even-
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? SOVIET FOREIGN. POLICY
ing of September 29, following Chamberlain's second trip
to Munich, the deal was concluded and announced to
the Czechoslovak Government, which was required to
hand over the Sudeten territory peacefully to the Nazis.
The next day this Government acquiesced, although
adding that it "protests the decision of the Four Great
Powers, which was entirely one-sided and taken without
Czechoslovakia's participation. "
Through the Munich settlement the British Tories,
with the French men-like-mice following their lead,
aimed to isolate the Soviet Union diplomatically, to avoid
a military clash with Hitler, to strengthen European fas-
cism as the best insurance against communism and to
turn the Nazi war machine east against the Russians.
Instead the Anglo-French super-diplomats dug their own
graves. As Winston Churchill later said: "France and
Britain had to choose between war and dishonor. They
chose dishonor. They will have war. "8 How correct
were the predictions of both Churchill and Litvinov
World War II soon proved.
Hitler speedily swallowed up the Sudetenland, but
had further plans in mind for the Czechoslovaks. On
March 15, 1939, the German army swept into Prague and
took over the rest of Czechoslovakia, which the Nazis
then incorporated into their Greater Germany. Prime
Minister Chamberlain adopted an attitude of wounded
surprise. On March 18 the Soviet Government again pro-
posed a conference of European states to institute meas-
ures for resisting aggression. At this very late date in
history the British Government rejected the Soviet pro-
posal as "premature. " With its approval the League of
Nations Secretariat suppressed an appeal to the League,
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
so that nobody would be embarrassed by the question
arising there.
On March 10, 1939, Joseph Stalin, as General Secre-
tary of the Soviet Communist Party, delivered an address
carefully reviewing the international situation. He sum-
med up Soviet foreign policy under four main points:
"First, we stand for peace and the strengthening of busi-
ness-like relations with all countries. This is our position
and we will adhere to it as long as these countries main-
tain identical relations with the Soviet Union, as long
as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of
our country. Second, we stand for peaceful, close and
friendly relations with all the neighboring countries
which have common frontiers with the U. S. S. R. That
is our position; and we shall adhere to it as long as these
countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union,
and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly
or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the
frontiers of the Soviet state. Third, we stand for the sup-
port of nations which have fallen prey to aggression and
are fighting for the independence of their country.
Fourth, we are not afraid of the threats of aggressors and
we are ready to retaliate with two blows for one against
instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet bor-
ders. "9
In spite of the many rebuffs it had received, the
Soviet Union was still desirous of working out with the
Western democracies common measures for collective
security and defense. But the Soviets were becoming
restive. In the same speech from which I have just
quoted, Mr. Stalin suggested that the dangerous game
of the appeasers "may end in serious failure for them-
selves. " And he asserted that the U. S. S. R. did not intend
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? SOVIET FOREICH POLICY
"to pull chestnuts out of the fire" for anyone. However,
on April 16, 1939, shortly after the wanton Italian seizure
of Albania on Easter week-end, the Soviet Government
tried again. In the words of Mr. Churchill in his book,
The Gathering Storm, the Soviets "made a formal offer,
the text of which was not published, for the creation of
a united front of mutual assistance between Great Britain,
France and the U. S. S. R. The three Powers, with Poland
added if possible, were furthermore to guarantee those
states in Central and Eastern Europe which lay under
the menace of German aggression. . . .
"The alliance of Britain, France and Russia would
have struck deep alarm into the heart of Germany in
1939, and no one can prove that war might not even then
have been averted. . . . Hitler could afford neither to
embark upon the war on two fronts, which he himself
had so deeply condemned, nor to sustain a check. It was
a pity not to have placed him in this awkward position,
which might well have cost him his life. . . . If Mr. Cham-
berlain on receipt of the Russian offer had replied, 'Yes.
Let us three band together and break Hitler's neck,' or
words to that effect, Parliament would have approved.
Stalin would have understood, and history might have
taken a different course. At least it could not have taken
a worse. . . . Instead there was a long silence while half-
measures and judicious compromises were being pre-
pared. "10
On May 3 Maxim Litvinov resigned as Soviet Foreign
Secretary and the more intransigent V. M. Molotov took
his place. This was clearly a sign that Soviet Russia was
becoming doubtful whether it could rely on the collect-
ive security policy of which Litvinov had been the prime
architect. At the end of May Mr. Molotov repeated
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
Stalin's warning that the U. S. S. R. was tired of appease-
ment. Prime Minister Chamberlain, it is true, had en-
tered into active negotiations with the Soviet Union;
but to quote Mr. Churchill again, they "proceeded lan-
guidly. " In June Chamberlain sent a minor official, Mr.
William Strang, to Moscow to carry on talks; and two
months later, on August 11, an Anglo-French military
mission arrived in the U. S. S. R. after a leisurely trip by
boat. Mr. Chamberlain appeared to think there was no
hurry. The hopeful conversations with the Russians
undertaken by this mission finally broke down when the
British and French representatives refused to agree that
the Soviet army would have the right to march into
Poland and the Baltic States to meet a German attack
on those countries or to prevent a Nazi fifth column from
taking control.
The Western negotiators said that since Poland and
the Baltic nations had asserted they would refuse to
allow Soviet troops in under any conditions, it would
not be honorable to bring pressure on these governments
to change their minds. Yet only about a year before the
Anglo-French partnership had considered it perfectly
honorable to submit to Nazi blackmail and to gang up
with Hitler in insisting that Czechoslovakia hand over
a large slice of its territory to Germany. Furthermore,
the League of Nations Covenant itself, in Article XVI,
lent support to the Soviet demand by stating: "The
Members of the League . . . agree that they will take the
necessary steps to afford passage through their territory
to the forces of any of the Members of the League which
are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League. "
I for one have never been convinced that the emis-
saries of Chamberlain and Daladier -- two Prime Minis-
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
ters who had repeatedly betrayed the principles of collect-
ive security -- really intended serious business. Light is
thrown upon their attitude by a statement made about
the same time by Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambas-
sador to Germany and a personal friend of General Her-
mann Goering. In his own book, Failure of a Mission,
Sir Nevile writes that he told Adolf Hitler in August,
1939, that "if an agreement had to be made with Moscow,
for whom communism was now merely the cloak for
intense nationalism and whose ulterior motives seemed
to me highly suspicious, I had rather Germany made it
than ourselves.
"11
Certainly Nevile Henderson got his wish. For the
Soviet Government, believing that the Anglo-French
terms for a mutual security pact would gravely endanger
Soviet defenses in case of a Nazi attack, felt compelled
to accept the other alternative: a treaty of non-aggression
with Germany. This was signed on August 23, 1939. The
pact was not an alliance any more than was the non-
aggression agreement with Japan concluded in April of
1941. The Soviet-German treaty gave the U. S. S. R. insur-
ance against having to withstand, under the most serious
military and diplomatic handicaps, a Nazi assault in
1939 and a valuable breathing spell to strengthen
itself for the later invasion. The Soviet-Japanese treaty
protected the rear of the U. S. S. R. during Hitler's mur-
derous attack. Both pacts, even though made with die-
hard Soviet enemies, seemed justified as hard-boiled de-
fensive strategy in the midst of a most threatening inter-
national situation and in view of the terrific struggle the
Soviet Union was facing.
It is widely held that the Soviet-German Non-Aggres-
sion Pact gave Hitler the needed encouragement to
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
launch his assault on Poland; and that therefore the
Soviets were morally culpable for that crime and the
outbreak of World War II. The actual fact is, however,
that months before the pact was concluded the Nazi dic-
tator had made his decision to march against Poland in
the fall of 1939. Mr. F. H. Hinsley, a Fellow of St. John's
College, Cambridge University, proves this up to the hilt
in his book, Hitler's Strategy, based to a large extent on
documents captured from the German Government.
The author shows that early in April, 1939, Hitler issued
two directives "ordering preparations so to begin that
the attack on Poland could take place at any time after
1 September. "12 And in a secret speech to his Comman-
ders-in-Chief on May 23 he announced his decision to
invade Poland "at the first suitable opportunity. " All
this was before negotiations with Soviet Russia had begun
in earnest.
Regarding Hitler's remarks on May 23, 1939, Mr.
Hinsley writes: "Far more important than the Russian
attitude as a factor in his determination to attack Poland
without delay was the problem of relative power between
Germany and the West. . . . With every month, he was
convinced, Germany's armaments advantage relative to
Poland and the Western Powers would now decline. "13
In another speech, on August 22, to his Commanders-
in-Chief, telling them about the coming treaty with the
U. S. S. R. , Hitler said: "Our economic situation is such
that we cannot hold out more than a few years. . . . We
have no other choice; we must act. . . . Therefore con-
flict is better now. . . . The initiative cannot be allowed
to pass to others. . . . We must accept the risk with reck-
less resolution. . . . We are facing the alternative of strik-
ing now or being destroyed with certainty sooner or
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
later. "14 These arguments, Mr. Hinsley points out,
justified the German war against Poland and the danger
of Britain and France becoming involved, regardless of
the Soviet pact. Of course that agreement was helpful
in the general strategy of the Nazis.
On the day on which the Soviet-German Non-Ag-
gression Pact was announced Joseph E. Davies, American
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote Under Secretary
of State Sumner Welles as follows: "The Soviet regime,
in my opinion, diligently and vigorously tried to main-
tain a vigorous common front against the aggressors and
were sincere advocates of the 'indivisibility of peace. '
Litvinov's able battle for peace and democratic ideas at
the League of Nations and the vigorous attitude of the
Soviet Government in being prepared to fight for Czecho-
slovakia were indications of real sincerity of purpose and
a marked degree of highmindedness. Beginning with
Munich, and even before, however, there had been an
accumulation of events which gradually broke down this
attitude on the part of the Soviet Government. . . . The
suspicion continued to grow that Britain and France
were playing a diplomatic game to place the Soviets in
the position where Russia would have to fight Germany
alone. "15
It is significant that Winston Churchill, who since
World War II has wielded such immense influence on
American attitudes toward Soviet Russia, was leader dur-
ing the pre-war years of a minority group in the British
Conservative Party which opposed Chamberlain's foreign
policy. Concerning the issue upon which the Anglo-
French-Soviet negotiations foundered in August, 1939,
Mr. Churchill in essence backed the Soviet position when
he asserted: "It is certain . . . that if Lithuania, Latvia
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
and Estonia were invaded by the Nazis or subverted to
the Nazi system by propaganda and intrigue from within,
the whole of Europe would be dragged into war. . . . Why
not then concert in good time, publicly and courageously,
the measures which may render such a fight unneces-
sary? "16 Present Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and
ex-Prime Minister David Lloyd George shared these
views.
Had Churchill, instead of the faltering Chamberlain,
been the head of England's government in 1938 and 1939,
the chances are that the Western democracies would have
established a solid peace front with the Soviet Union and
that events in Europe would have taken a very different
turn. In any case what the record of international affairs
shows -- and the comments of eminent men far from
sympathetic towards the Soviet system -- is that through-
out the eventful period of 1935-39 the Soviet Union stood
firm for the League Covenant and the principles of col-
lective security outlined therein.
On September 1, 1939, the Nazi armies swept into
Poland. The League of Nations had failed in the main
purpose for which it was established twenty-odd years
before. In 1940 Hitler's blitzkrieg engulfed the Low
Countries and France; in 1941 western Russia. None-
theless, the idea of collective security through a world
organization did not down. And it was specifically in-
cluded in the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941 and the
Twenty-Year British-Soviet Pact of 1942. The Four-
Nation Moscow Declaration of October, 1943, stated that
China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United
States "recognize the necessity of establishing at the
earliest practicable date a general international organi-
zation, based on the principle of sovereign equality of
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? SOVIET POREIGH POLICY
all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all
such states, large and small, for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. "
Such an international organization came into being
in June of 1945 with the creation of the United Nations
at the San Francisco Conference. The Soviet Govern-
ment took an active part in this Conference and sent a
delegation headed by Foreign Minister Molotov. The
United Nations reaffirmed in its Charter the basic prin-
ciple of collective security and outlined effective measures
to bring it about. In the drawing up of the Charter a
number of disagreements took place between the dif-
ferent delegations. Noteworthy is the fact that Soviet
Russia was willing to compromise, as The New York
Times pointed out in an editorial, on at least ten im-
portant issues in order to assure the prompt and success-
ful establishment of the U. N.
Whatever its differences of opinion with other coun-
tries in the discussions over the U. N. Charter, Soviet
Russia continued to uphold the same principle of col-
lective security for which it had fought in the arenas of
diplomacy during the pre-war years. There was no basic
alteration in its policy; nor was it to be rationally ex-
pected that it would suddenly change from being a peace-
loving nation to a war-loving nation. Rarely do great
peoples reverse their fundamental historical pattern over-
night. Yet today we are asked to believe the far-fetched
story that the Soviet Republic, having vigorously sought
international peace for the first thirty years of its exis-
tence, has become all at once the chief fomenter of war
in the world.
The third major goal in its foreign policy is uni-
versal disarmament, including the abolition of atomic
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
weapons and international controls for atomic energy.
The Soviet record on disarmament has been a notable
one. At the Genoa Conference of 1922, the first inter-
national conference which Soviet Russia attended, the
Soviet Foreign Minister, G. V. Chicherin, proposed a
general reduction of armaments. At the meeting of the
Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference
at Geneva in 1927 the Soviet delegate, Maxim Litvinov,
surprised the world by his proposal for general and com-
plete disarmament. But, during the life of the League
of Nations, armaments increased immensely among the
Great Powers instead of diminishing.
After the formation of the United Nations the Soviet
delegation urged, in 1946, a general reduction of arma-
ments and prohibition of the production and utilization
of atomic energy for war purposes. In 1948, when the
cold war was well under way, the Soviet Government put
forward a plan at the U. N. to reduce the armaments and
armed forces of the Great Powers by one-third within a
year. As recently as November, 1951, Soviet Foreign
Minister Vishinsky repeated this proposal at a meeting
of the United Nations in Paris. The Western Powers
treated Mr. Vishinsky's scheme primarily as propaganda;
and, indeed, the tendency of the non-Soviet world from
1917 on has been to sneer at Soviet disarmament pro-
posals as insincere and designed to deceive. This atti-
tude I am convinced is unjustified.
Soviet Russia has upheld the goal of disarmament in
order to lessen international fears and frictions, decrease
the danger of war and save for constructive economic pur-
poses the colossal sums and energies which go into the
manufacture of armaments. The absence of unemploy-
ment and the general stability of its economic system are
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
not contingent on the armaments industry, but are based
on socialist ownership and country-wide planning. The
Soviets consider armaments production an economic
waste. Nonetheless, the very real menace of foreign ag-
gression has compelled them to develop a great defense
industry and to maintain a large army. It was fortunate
for America and the rest of the democratic world that
Soviet Russia was so well prepared when Hitler struck
in World War II.
Fourth, the Soviet Union believes in normal, flour-
ishing international trade as beneficial to itself and con-
ducive to peace. Naturally it was never in favor of the
economic and financial boycott imposed upon it by the
capitalist Powers after the First World War. And it has
always considered that substantial trade with the outside
world was an important part of its policy of peaceful
co-existence with the capitalist countries. It has all along
been particularly desirous of having good trade relations
with the United States.
In subscribing to the Atlantic Charter Soviet Russia
went on record with the other signatory nations in stat-
ing: "They will endeavor, with due respect for their
existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all
states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on
equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the
world which are needed for their economic prosperity.
They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration be-
tween all nations in the economic field, with the object
of securing for all, improved labor standards, economic
advancement and social security. "
It is no choice of Soviet Russia that these interna-
tional economic aims written into the Atlantic Charter
have been so disregarded since the Second World War.
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
In fact it has decried from the start the economic conse-
quences of the cold war that have necessarily followed
from the American policy of drastically restricting trade
with the U. S. S. R. and the countries of Eastern Europe.
It has regretted the serious drop in trade between Eastern
and Western Europe. As to American-Soviet business
relations, the Soviet Union stands ready to resume normal
trade on a reciprocal basis at any time. Of course the
Soviets will benefit from such commerce, but the United
States on its part will gain just as much.
Fifth in its peace program, Soviet Russia supports
the self-determination of peoples. Again, the Atlantic
Charter of 1941 sets forth the principles involved, assert-
ing: "Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial
or other. They desire to see no territorial changes that
do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned. They respect the right of all peoples
to choose the form of government under which they will
live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-govern-
ment restored to those who have been forcibly deprived
of them. "
On November 6, 1942, Premier Stalin, speaking of-
ficially for his Government, said that "the program of
action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition" for win-
ning the war must include "abolition of racial exclusive-
ness; equality of nations and integrity of their territories;
liberation of enslaved nations and the restoration of their
sovereign rights; the right of every nation to arrange its
affairs as it wishes; economic aid to nations that have
suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material
welfare; restoration of democratic liberties; destruction
of the Hitlerite regime. " While insisting on the sternest
possible attitude toward Hitler and all the Nazi criminals
304
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:30 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015020686591 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust.
