No More Learning

There are six ways of becoming legitimate: two according to the canons
(Cap. Conquestus; Cap. Tanta), namely when a man marries the woman of
whom he has an unlawful child (if it were not a case of adultery), and
by special indulgence and dispensation of the lord Pope. The other four
ways are according to the laws: (1) If the father offer his natural son
to the emperor's court, for by this very fact the son is legitimate on
account of the reputation of the court; (2) if the father designate him
in his will as his legitimate heir, and the son afterwards offer the
will to the emperor; (3) if there be no legitimate son and the son
himself offer himself to the emperor; (4) if the father designate him
as legitimate in a public document or in a document signed by three
witnesses, without calling him natural.

Reply to Objection 1: A favor may be bestowed on a person without
injustice, but a person cannot be damnified except for a fault. Hence
an illegitimate child can be legitimized rather than "vice versa"; for
although a legitimate son is sometimes deprived of his inheritance on
account of his fault, he is not said to be illegitimate, because he was
legitimately begotten.

Reply to Objection 2: Illegitimate intercourse has an inherent
inseparable defect whereby it is opposed to the law: and consequently
it cannot be legitimized. Nor is there any comparison with an
illegitimate child who has no such defect.
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TREATISE ON THE RESURRECTION (QQ[69]-86)
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OF MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, AND FIRST OF THE PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE
AFTER DEATH (SEVEN ARTICLES)

In sequence to the foregoing we must treat of matters concerning the
state of resurrection: for after speaking of the sacraments whereby man
is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak of the
resurrection whereby man is delivered from the death of punishment. The
treatise on the resurrection offers a threefold consideration, namely
the things that precede, those that accompany, and those that follow
the resurrection. Consequently we must speak (1) of those things which
partly, though not wholly, precede the resurrection; (2) of the
resurrection itself and its circumstances; (3) of the things which
follow it.

Among the things which precede the resurrection we must consider (1)
the places appointed for the reception of bodies after death; (2) the
quality of separated souls, and the punishment inflicted on them by
fire; (3) the suffrages whereby the souls of the departed are assisted
by the living; (4) the prayers of the saints in heaven; (5) the signs
preceding the general judgment; (6) the fire of the world's final
conflagration which will precede the appearance of the Judge.

Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any places are appointed to receive souls after death?

(2) Whether souls are conveyed thither immediately after death?

(3) Whether they are able to leave those places?

(4) Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?

(5) Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?

(6) Whether the limbo of the patriarchs is the same as the limbo of
children?

(7) Whether so many places should be distinguished?
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Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death?

Objection 1: It would seem that places are not appointed to receive
souls after death. For as Boethius says (De Hebdom. ): "Wise men are
agreed that incorporeal things are not in a place," and this agrees
with the words of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): "We can answer
without hesitation that the soul is not conveyed to corporeal places,
except with a body, or that it is not conveyed locally. " Now the soul
separated from the body is without a body, as Augustine also says (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 32). Therefore it is absurd to assign any places for the
reception of souls.

Objection 2: Further, whatever has a definite place has more in common
with that place than with any other. Now separated souls, like certain
other spiritual substances, are indifferent to all places; for it
cannot be said that they agree with certain bodies, and differ from
others, since they are utterly removed from all corporeal conditions.
Therefore places should not be assigned for their reception.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is assigned to separated souls after
death, except what conduces to their punishment or to their reward. But
a corporeal place cannot conduce to their punishment or reward, since
they receive nothing from bodies. Therefore definite places should not
be assigned to receive them.

On the contrary, The empyrean heaven is a corporeal place, and yet as
soon as it was made it was filled with the holy angels, as Bede
[*Hexaem. i, ad Gn. 1:2] says. Since then angels even as separated
souls are incorporeal, it would seem that some place should also be
assigned to receive separated souls.

Further, this appears from Gregory's statement (Dial. iv) that souls
after death are conveyed to various corporeal places, as in the case of
Paschasius whom Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found at the baths, and of
the soul of King Theodoric, which he asserts to have been conveyed to
hell. Therefore after death souls have certain places for their
reception.

I answer that, Although spiritual substances do not depend on a body in
respect of their being, nevertheless the corporeal world is governed by
God by means of the spiritual world, as asserted by Augustine (De Trin.
iii, 4) and Gregory (Dial. iv, 6). Hence it is that there is a certain
fittingness by way of congruity of spiritual substances to corporeal
substances, in that the more noble bodies are adapted to the more noble
substances: wherefore also the philosophers held that the order of
separate substances is according to the order of movables. And though
after death souls have no bodies assigned to them whereof they be the
forms or determinate motors, nevertheless certain corporeal places are
appointed to them by way of congruity in reference to their degree of
nobility (wherein they are as though in a place, after the manner in
which incorporeal things can be in a place), according as they more or
less approach to the first substance (to which the highest place it
fittingly assigned), namely God, whose throne the Scriptures proclaim
heaven to be (Ps. 102:19, Is. 66:1). Wherefore we hold that those souls
that have a perfect share of the Godhead are in heaven, and that those
souls that are deprived of that share are assigned to a contrary place.

Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal things are not in place after a
manner known and familiar to us, in which way we say that bodies are
properly in place; but they are in place after a manner befitting
spiritual substances, a manner that cannot be fully manifest to us.

Reply to Objection 2: Things have something in common with or a
likeness to one another in two ways. First, by sharing a same quality:
thus hot things have something in common, and incorporeal things can
have nothing in common with corporeal things in this way. Secondly, by
a kind of proportionateness, by reason of which the Scriptures apply
the corporeal world to the spiritual metaphorically. Thus the
Scriptures speak of God as the sun, because He is the principle of
spiritual life, as the sun is of corporeal life. In this way certain
souls have more in common with certain places: for instance, souls that
are spiritually enlightened, with luminous bodies, and souls that are
plunged in darkness by sin, with dark places.

Reply to Objection 3: The separated soul receives nothing directly from
corporeal places in the same way as bodies which are maintained by
their respective places: yet these same souls, through knowing
themselves to be appointed to such places, gather joy or sorrow
therefrom; and thus their place conduces to their punishment or reward.
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Whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death?

Objection 1: It would seem that no souls are conveyed to heaven or hell
immediately after death. For a gloss on Ps. 36:10, "Yet a little while
and the wicked shall not be," says that "the saints are delivered at
the end of life; yet after this life they will not yet be where the
saints will be when it is said to them: Come ye blessed of My Father. "
Now those saints will be in heaven. Therefore after this life the
saints do not go immediately up to heaven.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cix) that "the time
which lies between man's death and the final resurrection holds the
souls in secret receptacles according as each one is worthy of rest or
of suffering. " Now these secret abodes cannot denote heaven and hell,
since also after the final resurrection the souls will be there
together with their bodies: so that he would have no reason to
distinguish between the time before and the time after the
resurrection. Therefore they will be neither in hell nor in heaven
until the day of judgment.

Objection 3: Further, the glory of the soul is greater than that of
bodies. Now the glory of the body is awarded to all at the same time,
so that each one may have the greater joy in the common rejoicing of
all, as appears from a gloss on Heb. 11:40, "God providing some better
thing for us---that the common joy may make each one rejoice the more. "
Much more, therefore, ought the glory of souls to be deferred until the
end, so as to be awarded to all at the same time.

Objection 4: Further, punishment and reward, being pronounced by the
sentence of the judge, should not precede the judgment. Now hell fire
and the joys of heaven will be awarded to all by the sentence of Christ
judging them, namely at the last judgment, according to Mat. 25.
Therefore no one will go up to heaven or down to hell before the day of
judgment.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 5:1): "If our earthly house of
this habitation be dissolved, that we have . . . a house not made with
hands, but reserved in heaven [*Vulg. : 'eternal in heaven'; cf. 1 Pet.
1:4]. " Therefore, after the body's dissolution, the soul has an abode,
which had been reserved for it in heaven.

Further, the Apostle says (Phil. 1:23): "I desire [Vulg. : 'Having a
desire'] to be dissolved and to be with Christ. " From these words
Gregory argues as follows (Dial. iv, 25): "If there is no doubt that
Christ is in heaven, it cannot be denied that Paul's soul is in heaven
likewise. " Now it cannot be gainsaid that Christ is in heaven, since
this is an article of faith. Therefore neither is it to be denied that
the souls of the saints are borne to heaven. That also some souls go
down to hell immediately after death is evident from Lk. 16:22, "And
the rich man died, and he was buried in hell. "

I answer that, Even as in bodies there is gravity or levity whereby
they are borne to their own place which is the end of their movement,
so in souls there is merit or demerit whereby they reach their reward
or punishment, which are the ends of their deeds. Wherefore just as a
body is conveyed at once to its place, by its gravity or levity, unless
there be an obstacle, so too the soul, the bonds of the flesh being
broken, whereby it was detained in the state of the way, receives at
once its reward or punishment, unless there be an obstacle. Thus
sometimes venial sin, though needing first of all to be cleansed, is an
obstacle to the receiving of the reward; the result being that the
reward is delayed. And since a place is assigned to souls in keeping
with their reward or punishment, as soon as the soul is set free from
the body it is either plunged into hell or soars to heaven, unless it
be held back by some debt, for which its flight must needs be delayed
until the soul is first of all cleansed. This truth is attested by the
manifest authority of the canonical Scriptures and the doctrine of the
holy Fathers; wherefore the contrary must be judged heretical as stated
in Dial. iv, 25, and in De Eccl. Dogm. xlvi.

Reply to Objection 1: The gloss explains itself: for it expounds the
words, "They will not yet be where the saints will be," etc. , by saying
immediately afterwards: "That is to say, they will not have the double
stole which the saints will have at the resurrection. "

Reply to Objection 2: Among the secret abodes of which Augustine
speaks, we must also reckon hell and heaven, where some souls are
detained before the resurrection. The reason why a distinction is drawn
between the time before and the time after the resurrection is because
before the resurrection they are there without the body whereas
afterwards they are with the body, and because in certain places there
are souls now which will not be there after the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: There is a kind of continuity among men as
regards the body, because in respect thereof is verified the saying of
Acts 17:24,26, "God . . . hath made of one all mankind": whereas He has
fashioned souls independently of one another. Consequently it is not so
fitting that all men should be glorified together in the soul as that
they should be glorified together in the body. Moreover the glory of
the body is not so essential as the glory of the soul; wherefore it
would be more derogatory to the saints if the glory of the soul were
delayed, than that the glory of the body be deferred: nor could this
detriment to their glory be compensated on account of the joy of each
one being increased by the common joy.

Reply to Objection 4: Gregory proposes and solves this very difficulty
(Dial. iv, 25): "If then," he says, "the souls of the just are in
heaven now, what will they receive in reward for their justice on the
judgment day? " And he answers: "Surely it will be a gain to them at the
judgment, that whereas now they enjoy only the happiness of the soul,
afterwards they will enjoy also that of the body, so as to rejoice also
in the flesh wherein they bore sorrow and torments for the Lord. " The
same is to be said in reference to the damned.
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Whether the souls who are in heaven or hell are able to go from thence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in heaven or hell are unable
to go from thence. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii): "If the
souls of the dead took any part in the affairs of the living, to say
nothing of others, there is myself whom not for a single night would my
loving mother fail to visit since she followed me by land and sea in
order to abide with me": and from this he concludes that the souls of
the departed do not mingle in the affairs of the living. But they would
be able to do so if they were to leave their abode. Therefore they do
not go forth from their abode.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 26:4): "That I may dwell in
the house of the Lord all the days of my life," and (Job 7:9): "He that
shall go down to hell shall not come up. " Therefore neither the good
nor the wicked quit their abode.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above [5027](A[2]), abodes are awarded
to souls after death as a reward or punishment. Now after death neither
the rewards of the saints nor the punishments of the damned are
increased. Therefore they do not quit their abodes.

On the contrary, Jerome writing against Vigilantius addresses him thus:
"For thou sayest that the souls of the apostles and martyrs have taken
up their abode either in Abraham's bosom or in the place of
refreshment, or under the altar of God, and that they are unable to
visit their graves when they will. Wouldst thou then lay down the law
for God? Wouldst thou put the apostles in chains, imprison them until
the day of judgment, and forbid them to be with their lord, them of
whom it is written: They follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth? And if
the Lamb is everywhere, therefore we must believe that those also who
are with Him are everywhere. " Therefore it is absurd to say that the
souls of the departed do not leave their abode.

Further, Jerome argues as follows: "Since the devil and the demons
wander throughout the whole world, and are everywhere present with
wondrous speed, why should the martyrs, after shedding their blood be
imprisoned and unable to go forth? " Hence we may infer that not only
the good sometimes leave their abode, but also the wicked, since their
damnation does not exceed that of the demons who wander about
everywhere.

Further, the same conclusion may be gathered from Gregory (Dial. iv),
where he relates many cases of the dead having appeared to the living.

I answer that, There are two ways of understanding a person to leave
hell or heaven. First, that he goes from thence simply, so that heaven
or hell be no longer his place: and in this way no one who is finally
consigned to hell or heaven can go from thence, as we shall state
further on ([5028]Q[71], A[5], ad 5). Secondly, they may be understood
to go forth for a time: and here we must distinguish what befits them
according to the order of nature, and what according to the order of
Divine providence; for as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi):
"Human affairs have their limits other than have the wonders of the
Divine power, nature's works differ from those which are done
miraculously. " Consequently, according to the natural course, the
separated souls consigned to their respective abodes are utterly cut
off from communication with the living. For according to the course of
nature men living in mortal bodies are not immediately united to
separate substances, since their entire knowledge arises from the
senses: nor would it be fitting for them to leave their abode for any
purpose other than to take part in the affairs of the living.
Nevertheless, according to the disposition of Divine providence
separated souls sometimes come forth from their abode and appear to
men, as Augustine, in the book quoted above, relates of the martyr
Felix who appeared visibly to the people of Nola when they were
besieged by the barbarians. It is also credible that this may occur
sometimes to the damned, and that for man's instruction and
intimidation they be permitted to appear to the living; or again in
order to seek our suffrages, as to those who are detained in purgatory,
as evidenced by many instances related in the fourth book of the
Dialogues. There is, however, this difference between the saints and
the damned, that the saints can appear when they will to the living,
but not the damned; for even as the saints while living in the flesh
are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to heal and work wonders,
which can only be done miraculously by the Divine power, and cannot be
done by those who lack this gift, so it is not unfitting for the souls
of the saints to be endowed with a power in virtue of their glory, so
that they are able to appear wondrously to the living, when they will:
while others are unable to do so unless they be sometimes permitted.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine, as may be gathered from what he says
afterwards, is speaking according to the common course of nature, And
yet it does not follow, although the dead be able to appear to the
living as they will, that they appear as often as when living in the
flesh: because when they are separated from the flesh, they are either
wholly conformed to the divine will, so that they may do nothing but
what they see to be agreeable with the Divine disposition, or else they
are so overwhelmed by their punishments that their grief for their
unhappiness surpasses their desire to appear to others.

Reply to Objection 2: The authorities quoted speak in the sense that no
one comes forth from heaven or hell simply, and do not imply that one
may not come forth for a time.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 3) the soul's place
conduces to its punishment or reward in so far as the soul, through
being consigned to that place, is affected either by joy or by grief.
Now this joy or grief at being consigned to such a place remains in the
soul even when it is outside that place. Thus a bishop who is given the
honor of sitting on a throne in the church incurs no dishonor when he
leaves the throne, for though he sits not therein actually, the place
remains assigned to him.

We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary sense.

Reply to Objection 4: Jerome is speaking of the apostles and martyrs in
reference to that which they gain from their power of glory, and not to
that which befits them as due to them by nature. And when he says that
they are everywhere, he does not mean that they are in several places
or everywhere at once, but that they can be wherever they will.

Reply to Objection 5: There is no parity between demons and angels on
the one hand and the souls of the saints and of the damned on the
other. For the good or bad angels have allotted to them the office of
presiding over men, to watch over them or to try them; but this cannot
be said of the souls of men. Nevertheless, according to the power of
glory, it is competent to the souls of the saints that they can be
where they will; and this is what Jerome means to say.

Reply to Objection 6: Although the souls of the saints or of the damned
are sometimes actually present where they appear, we are not to believe
that this is always so: for sometimes these apparitions occur to
persons whether asleep or awake by the activity of good or wicked
angels in order to instruct or deceive the living. Thus sometimes even
the living appear to others and tell them many things in their sleep;
and yet it is clear that they are not present, as Augustine proves from
many instances (De Cura pro Mort. xi, xii).
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Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?

Objection 1: It would seem that the limbo of hell is not the same as
Abraham's bosom. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): "I
have not yet found Scripture mentioning hell in a favorable sense. " Now
Abraham's bosom is taken in a favorable sense, as Augustine goes on to
say (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): "Surely no one would be allowed to give an
unfavorable signification to Abraham's bosom and the place of rest
whither the godly poor man was carried by the angels. " Therefore
Abraham's bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.

Objection 2: Further, those who are in hell see not God. Yet God is
seen by those who are in Abraham's bosom, as may be gathered from
Augustine (Confess. ix, 3) who, speaking of Nebridius, says: "Whatever
that be, which is signified by thut bosom, there lives my Nebridius,"
and further on: "Now lays he not his ear to my mouth, but his spiritual
mouth unto Thy fountain, and drinketh as much as he can receive wisdom
in proportion to his thirst, endlessly happy. " Therefore Abraham's
bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.

Objection 3: Further, the Church prays not that a man be taken to hell:
and yet she prays that the angels may carry the departed soul to
Abraham's bosom. Therefore it would seem that Abraham's bosom is not
the same as limbo.

On the contrary, The place whither the beggar Lazarus was taken is
called Abraham's bosom. Now he was taken to hell, for as a gloss [*St.
Gregory, Moral. xx] on Job 30:23, "Where a house is appointed for every
one that liveth," says: "Hell was the house of all the living until the
coming of Christ. " Therefore Abraham's bosom is the same as limbo.

Further, Jacob said to his sons (Gn. 44:38): "You will bring down my
grey hairs with sorrow to hell": wherefore Jacob knew that he would be
taken to hell after his death. Therefore Abraham likewise was taken to
hell after his death; and consequently Abraham's bosom would seem to be
a part of hell.

I answer that, After death men's souls cannot find rest save by the
merit of faith, because "he that cometh to God must believe" (Heb.
11:6). Now the first example of faith was given to men in the person of
Abraham, who was the first to sever himself from the body of
unbelievers, and to receive a special sign of faith: for which reason
"the place of rest given to men after death is called Abraham's bosom,"
as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii). But the souls of the saints
have not at all times had the same rest after death; because, since
Christ's coming they have had complete rest through enjoying the vision
of God, whereas before Christ's coming they had rest through being
exempt from punishment, but their desire was not set at rest by their
attaining their end. Consequently the state of the saints before
Christ's coming may be considered both as regards the rest it afforded,
and thus it is called Abraham's bosom, and as regards its lack of rest,
and thus it is called the limbo of hell. Accordingly, before Christ's
coming the limbo of hell and Abraham's bosom were one place
accidentally and not essentially: and consequently, nothing prevents
Abraham's bosom from being after Christ's coming, and from being
altogether distinct from limbo, since things that are one accidentally
may be parted from one another.

Reply to Objection 1: The state of the holy Fathers as regards what was
good in it was called Abraham's bosom, but as regards its deficiencies
it was called hell. Accordingly, neither is Abraham's bosom taken in an
unfavorable sense nor hell in a favorable sense, although in a way they
are one.

Reply to Objection 2: The place of rest of the holy Fathers was called
Abraham's bosom before as well as after Christ's coming, but in
different ways. For since before Christ's coming the saints' rest had a
lack of rest attached to it, it was called both hell and Abraham's
bosom, wherefore God was not seen there. But since after the coming of
Christ the saints' rest is complete through their seeing God, this rest
is called Abraham's bosom, but not hell by any means. It is to this
bosom of Abraham that the Church prays for the faithful to be brought.

Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident: and the same meaning
applies to a gloss on Lk. 16:22, "It came to pass that the beggar
died," etc. , which says: "Abraham's bosom is the rest of the blessed
poor, whose is the kingdom of heaven. "
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Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the limbo of hell is the same as the
hell of the damned.
For Christ is said to have "bitten" [*Allusion to
Osee 13:14] hell, but not to have swallowed it, because He took some
from thence but not all. Now He would not be said to have "bitten" hell
if those whom He set free were not part of the multitude shut up in
hell. Therefore since those whom He set free were shut up in hell, the
same were shut up in limbo and in hell. Therefore limbo is either the
same as hell, or is a part of hell.

Objection 2: Further, in the Creed Christ is said to have descended
into hell. But he did not descend save to the limbo of the Fathers.
Therefore the limbo of the Fathers is the same as hell.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 17:16): "All that I have shall
go down into the deepest hell [Douay: 'pit']. " Now since Job was a holy
and just man, he went down to limbo. Therefore limbo is the same as the
deepest hell.

On the contrary, In hell there is no redemption [*Office of the Dead,
Resp. vii]. But the saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore limbo is
not the same as hell.

Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "I do not see how we can
believe that the rest which Lazarus received was in hell. " Now the soul
of Lazarus went down into limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as
hell.

I answer that, The abodes of souls after death may be distinguished in
two ways; either as to their situation, or as to the quality of the
places, inasmuch as souls are punished or rewarded in certain places.
Accordingly if we consider the limbo of the Fathers and hell in respect
of the aforesaid quality of the places, there is no doubt that they are
distinct, both because in hell there is sensible punishment, which was
not in the limbo of the Fathers, and because in hell there is eternal
punishment, whereas the saints were detained but temporally in the
limbo of the Fathers. On the other hand, if we consider them as to the
situation of the place, it is probable that hell and limbo are the same
place, or that they are continuous as it were yet so that some higher
part of hell be called the limbo of the Fathers. For those who are in
hell receive diverse punishments according to the diversity of their
guilt, so that those who are condemned are consigned to darker and
deeper parts of hell according as they have been guilty of graver sins,
and consequently the holy Fathers in whom there was the least amount of
sin were consigned to a higher and less darksome part than all those
who were condemned to punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: When Christ, by His descent, delivered the
Fathers from limbo, He is said to have "bitten" hell and to have
descended into hell, in so far as hell and limbo are the same as to
situation.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Job descended, not to the hell of the damned, but
to the limbo of the Fathers. The latter is called the deepest place not
in reference to the places of punishment, but in comparison with other
places, as including all penal places under one head. Again we may
reply with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii): who says of Jacob: "When Jacob
said to his sons, 'You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to
hell,' he seems to have feared most, lest he should be troubled with so
great a sorrow as to obtain, not the rest of good men, but the hell of
sinners. " The saying of Job may be expounded in the same way, as being
the utterance of one in fear, rather than an assertion.
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Whether the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the limbo of children is the same as
the limbo of the Fathers. For punishment should correspond to sin. Now
the Fathers were detained in limbo for the same sin as children, namely
for original sin. Therefore the place of punishment should be the same
for both.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchir. xciii): "The punishment
of children who die in none but original sin is most lenient. " But no
punishment is more lenient than that of the holy Fathers. Therefore the
place of punishment is the same for both.

On the contrary, Even as temporal punishment in purgatory and eternal
punishment in hell are due to actual sin, so temporal punishment in the
limbo of the Fathers and eternal punishment in the limbo of the
children were due to original sin. If, therefore, hell and purgatory be
not the same it would seem that neither are the limbo of children and
the limbo of the Fathers the same.

I answer that, The limbo of the Fathers and the limbo of children,
without any doubt, differ as to the quality of punishment or reward.
For children have no hope of the blessed life, as the Fathers in limbo
had, in whom, moreover, shone forth the light of faith and grace. But
as regards their situation, there is reason to believe that the place
of both is the same; except that the limbo of the Fathers is placed
higher than the limbo of children, just as we have stated in reference
to limbo and hell [5029](A[5]).

Reply to Objection 1: The Fathers did not stand in the same relation to
original sin as children. For in the Fathers original sin was expiated
in so far as it infected the person, while there remained an obstacle
on the part of nature, on account of which their satisfaction was not
yet complete. On the other hand, in children there is an obstacle both
on the part of the person and on the part of nature: and for this
reason different abodes are appointed to the Fathers and to children.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of punishments due to some
one by reason of his person. Of these the most lenient are due to those
who are burdened with none but original sin. But lighter still is the
punishment due to those who are debarred from the reception of glory by
no personal defect but only by a defect of nature, so that this very
delay of glory is called a kind of punishment.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether so many abodes should be distinguished?

Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish so many
abodes. For after death, just as abodes are due to souls on account of
sin, so are they due on account of merit. Now there is only one abode
due on account of merit, namely paradise. Therefore neither should
there be more than one abode due on account of sin, namely hell.

Objection 2: Further, abodes are appointed to souls after death on
account of merits or demerits. Now there is one place where they merit
or demerit. Therefore only one abode should be assigned to them after
death.

Objection 3: Further, the places of punishment should correspond to the
sins. Now there are only three kinds of sin, namely original, venial,
and mortal. Therefore there should only be three penal abodes.

Objection 4: On the other hand, it would seem that there should be many
more than those assigned. For this darksome air is the prison house of
the demons (2 Pet. 2:17), and yet it is not reckoned among the five
abodes which are mentioned by certain authors. Therefore there are more
than five abodes.

Objection 5: Further, the earthly paradise is distinct from the
heavenly paradise. Now some were borne away to the earthly paradise
after this state of life, as is related of Enoch and Elias. Since then
the earthly paradise is not counted among the five abodes, it would
seem that there are more than five.

Objection 6: Further, some penal place should correspond to each state
of sinners. Now if we suppose a person to die in original sin who has
committed only venial sins, none of the assigned abodes will be
befitting to him. For it is clear that he would not be in heaven, since
he would be without grace, and for the same reason neither would he be
in the limbo of the Fathers; nor again, would he be in the limbo of
children, since there is no sensible punishment there, which is due to
such a person by reason of venial sin: nor would he be in purgatory,
where there is none but temporal punishment, whereas everlasting
punishment is due to him: nor would he be in the hell of the damned,
since he is not guilty of actual mortal sin. Therefore a sixth abode
should be assigned.

Objection 7: Further, rewards and punishments vary in quantity
according to the differences of sins and merits. Now the degrees of
merit and sin are infinite. Therefore we should distinguish an infinite
number of abodes, in which souls are punished or rewarded after death.

Objection 8: Further, souls are sometimes punished in the places where
they sinned, as Gregory states (Dial. iv, 55). But they sinned in the
place which we inhabit. Therefore this place should be reckoned among
the abodes, especially since some are punished for their sins in this
world, as the Master said above (Sent. iv, D, 21).

Objection 9: Further, just as some die in a state of grace and have
some venial sins for which they deserve punishment, so some die in
mortal sin and have some good for which they would deserve a reward.
Now to those who die in grace with venial sins an abode is assigned
where they are punished ere they receive their reward, which abode is
purgatory. Therefore, on the other hand, there should be equally an
abode for those who die in mortal sin together with some good works.

Objection 10: Further, just as the Fathers were delayed from obtaining
full glory of the soul before Christ's coming, so are they now detained
from receiving the glory of the body. Therefore as we distinguish an
abode of the saints before the coming of Christ from the one where they
are received now, so ought we to distinguish the one in which they are
received now from the one where they will be received after the
resurrection.

I answer that, The abodes of souls are distinguished according to the
souls' various states. Now the soul united to a mortal body is in the
state of meriting, while the soul separated from the body is in the
state of receiving good or evil for its merits; so that after death it
is either in the state of receiving its final reward, or in the state
of being hindered from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving
its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either in the respect
of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and thus as
regards actual sin it is hell, and as regards original sin it is the
limbo of children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is
hindered from receiving its final reward, this is either on account of
a defect of the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are
detained from receiving their reward at once on account of the sins
they have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature,
and thus we have the limbo of the Fathers, where the Fathers were
detained from obtaining glory on account of the guilt of human nature
which could not yet be expiated.

Reply to Objection 1: Good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
6): wherefore it is not unfitting if there be one place of blissful
reward and several places of punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: The state of meriting and demeriting is one
state, since the same person is able to merit and demerit: wherefore it
is fitting that one place should be assigned to all: whereas of those
who receive according to their merits there are various states, and
consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: One may be punished in two ways for original sin,
as stated above, either in reference to the person, or in reference to
nature only. Consequently there is a twofold limbo corresponding to
that sin.

Reply to Objection 4: This darksome air is assigned to the demons, not
as the place where they receive retribution for their merits, but as a
place befitting their office, in so far as they are appointed to try
us. Hence it is not reckoned among the abodes of which we are treating
now: since hell fire is assigned to them in the first place (Mat. 25).

Reply to Objection 5: The earthly paradise belongs to the state of the
wayfarer rather than to the state of those who receive for their
merits; and consequently it is not reckoned among the abodes whereof we
are treating now.

Reply to Objection 6: This supposition is impossible [*Cf. [5030]FS,
Q[89], A[6]]. If, however, it were possible, such a one would be
punished in hell eternally: for it is accidental to venial sin that it
be punished temporally in purgatory, through its having grace annexed
to it: wherefore if it be annexed to a mortal sin, which is without
grace, it will be punished eternally in hell. And since this one who
dies in original sin has a venial sin without grace, it is not
unfitting to suppose that he be punished eternally.

Reply to Objection 7: Diversity of degrees in punishments or rewards
does not diversify the state, and it is according to the diversity of
state that we distinguish various abodes. Hence the argument does not
prove.

Reply to Objection 8: Although separated souls are sometimes punished
in the place where we dwell, it does not follow that this is their
proper place of punishment: but this is done for our instruction, that
seeing their punishment we may be deterred from sin. That souls while
yet in the flesh are punished here for their sins has nothing to do
with the question, because a punishment of this kind does not place a
man outside the state of meriting or demeriting: whereas we are
treating now of the abodes to which souls are assigned after the state
of merit or demerit.

Reply to Objection 9: It is impossible for evil to be pure and without
the admixture of good, just as the supreme good is without any
admixture of evil. Consequently those who are to be conveyed to
beatitude which is a supreme good must be cleansed of all evil.
wherefore there must needs be a place where such persons are cleansed
if they go hence without being perfectly clean. But those who will be
thrust into hell will not be free from all good: and consequently the
comparison fails, since those who are in hell can receive the reward of
their goods, in so far as their past goods avail for the mitigation of
their punishment.

Reply to Objection 10: The essential reward consists in the glory of
the soul, but the body's glory, since it overflows from the soul, is
entirely founded as it were on the soul: and consequently lack of the
soul's glory causes a difference of state, whereas lack of the body's
glory does not. For this reason, too, the same place, namely the
empyrean, is assigned to the holy souls separated from their bodies and
united to glorious bodies: whereas the same place was not assigned to
the souls of the Fathers both before and after the glorification of
souls.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE BODY, AND OF THE PUNISHMENT
INFLICTED ON IT BY MATERIAL FIRE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the general quality of the soul after leaving the
body, and the punishment inflicted on it by material fire. Under this
head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?

(2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid powers remain in the soul?

(3) Whether the separated soul can suffer from a material fire?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? [*Cf. FP, Q[77],
A[8]]

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive powers remain in the
sensitive soul. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Anim. xv): "The soul
withdraws from the body taking all with itself, sense and imagination,
reason, understanding and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible
powers. " Now sense, imagination, concupiscible and irascible are
sensitive powers. Therefore the sensitive powers remain in the
separated soul.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xvi): "We believe
that man alone has a substantial soul, which lives though separated
from the body, and clings keenly to its senses and wits. " Therefore the
soul retains its senses after being separated from the body.

Objection 3: Further, the soul's powers are either its essential parts
as some maintain, or at least are its natural properties. Now that
which is in a thing essentially cannot be separated from it, nor is a
subject severed from its natural properties. Therefore it is impossible
for the soul to lose any of its powers after being separated from the
body.

Objection 4: Further, a whole is not entire if one of its parts be
lacking. Now the soul's powers are called its parts. Therefore, if the
soul lose any of its powers after death, it will not be entire after
death: and this is unfitting.

Objection 5: Further, the soul's powers co-operate in merit more even
than the body, since the body is a mere instrument of action, while the
powers are principles of action. Now the body must of necessity be
rewarded together with the soul, since it co-operated in merit. Much
more, therefore, is it necessary that the powers of the soul be
rewarded together with it. Therefore the separated soul does not lose
them.

Objection 6: Further, if the soul after separation from the body loses
its sensitive power, that must needs come to naught. For it cannot be
said that it is dissolved into some matter, since it has no matter as a
part of itself. Now that which entirely comes to naught is not restored
in identity; wherefore at the resurrection the soul will not have the
same identical sensitive powers. Now according to the Philosopher (De
Anima ii, 1), as the soul is to the body so are the soul's powers to
the parts of the body, for instance the sight to the eye. But if it
were not identically the same soul that returns to the body, it would
not be identically the same man. Therefore for the same reason it would
not be identically the same eye, if the visual power were not
identically the same; and in like manner no other part would rise again
in identity, and consequently neither would the whole man be
identically the same. Therefore it is impossible for the separated soul
to lose its sensitive powers.

Objection 7: Further, if the sensitive powers were to be corrupted when
the body is corrupted, it would follow that they are weakened when the
body is weakened. Yet this is not the case, for according to De Anima
i, "if an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would, without
doubt, see as well as a young man. " Therefore neither are the sensitive
powers corrupted when the body is corrupted.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xix): "Of two
substances alone does man consist, soul and body: the soul with its
reason, and the body with its senses. " Therefore the sensitive powers
belong to the body: and consequently when the body is corrupted the
sensitive powers remain not in the soul.

Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the separation of the soul,
expresses himself thus (Metaph. xi, 3): "If, however, anything remain
at last, we must ask what this is: because in certain subjects it is
not impossible, for instance if the soul be of such a disposition, not
the whole soul but the intellect; for as regards the whole soul this is
probably impossible. " Hence it seems that the whole soul is not
separated from the body, but only the intellective powers of the soul,
and consequently not the sensitive or vegetative powers.

Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima ii,
2): "This alone is ever separated, as the everlasting from the
corruptible: for it is hereby clear that the remaining parts are not
separable as some maintain. " Therefore the sensitive powers do not
remain in the separated soul.

I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some,
holding the view that all the powers are in the soul in the same way as
color is in a body, hold that the soul separated from the body takes
all its powers away with it: because, if it lacked any one of them, it
would follow that the soul is changed in its natural properties, since
these cannot change so long as their subject remains. But the aforesaid
view is false, for since a power is so called because it enables us to
do or suffer something, and since to do and to be able belong to the
same subject, it follows that the subject of a power is the same as
that which is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et
Vigil. ) that "where we find power there we find action. " Now it is
evident that certain operations, whereof the soul's powers are the
principles, do not belong to the soul properly speaking but to the soul
as united to the body, because they are not performed except through
the medium of the body---such as to see, to hear, and so forth. Hence
it follows that such like powers belong to the united soul and body as
their subject, but to the soul as their quickening principle, just as
the form is the principle of the properties of a composite being. Some
operations, however, are performed by the soul without a bodily
organ---for instance to understand, to consider, to will: wherefore,
since these actions are proper to the soul, the powers that are the
principles thereof belong to the soul not only as their principle but
also as their subject. Therefore, since so long as the proper subject
remains its proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted
they also must be corrupted, it follows that these powers which use no
bodily organ for their actions must needs remain in the separated body,
while those which use a bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the
body is corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the
sensitive and the vegetative soul. On this account some draw a
distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for they say that they
are of two kinds---some being acts of organs and emanating from the
soul into the body are corrupted with the body; others, whence the
former originate, are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes
the body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and these primary powers
remain in the separated soul. But this statement seems unreasonable:
because the soul, by its essence and not through the medium of certain
other powers, is the origin of those powers which are the acts of
organs, even as any form, from the very fact that by its essence it
informs its matter, is the origin of the properties which result
naturally in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose other
powers in the soul, by means of which the powers that perfect the
organs may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same reason it
would be necessary to suppose other powers by means of which these mean
powers flow from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity, and if
we have to stop it is better to do so at the first step.

Hence others say that the sensitive and other like powers do not remain
in the separated soul except in a restricted sense, namely radically,
in the same way as a result is in its principle: because there remains
in the separated soul the ability to produce these powers if it should
be reunited to the body; nor is it necessary for this ability to be
anything in addition to the essence of the soul, as stated above. This
opinion appears to be the more reasonable.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be understood as
meaning that the soul takes away with it some of those powers actually,
namely understanding and intelligence, and some radically, as stated
above [*Cf. [5031]FP, Q[77], A[8], ad 1 and infra A[2], ad 1].

Reply to Objection 2: The senses which the soul takes away with it are
not these external senses, but the internal, those, namely, which
pertain to the intellective part, for the intellect is sometimes called
sense, as Basil states in his commentary on the Proverbs, and again the
Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 11). If, however, he means the external senses
we must reply as above to the first objection.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the sensitive powers are related
to the soul, not as natural passions to their subject, but as compared
to their origin: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 4: The powers of the soul are not called its
integral but its potential parts. Now the nature of such like wholes is
that the entire energy of the whole is found perfectly in one of the
parts, but partially in the others; thus in the soul the soul's energy
is found perfectly in the intellective part, but partially in the
others. Wherefore, as the powers of the intellective part remain in the
separated soul, the latter will remain entire and undiminished,
although the sensitive powers do not remain actually: as neither is the
king's power decreased by the death of a mayor who shared his
authority.

Reply to Objection 5: The body co-operates in merit, as an essential
part of the man who merits. The sensitive powers, however, do not
co-operate thus, since they are of the genus of accidents. Hence the
comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 6: The powers of the sensitive soul are said to be
acts of the organs, not as though they were the essential forms of
those organs, except in reference to the soul whose powers they are.
But they are the acts of the organs, by perfecting them for their
proper operations, as heat is the act of fire by perfecting it for the
purpose of heating. Wherefore, just as a fire would remain identically
the same, although another individual heat were in it (even so the cold
of water that has been heated returns not identically the same,
although the water remains the same in identity), so the organs will be
the same identically, although the powers be not identically the same.

Reply to Objection 7: The Philosopher is speaking there of these powers
as being rooted in the soul. This is clear from his saying that "old
age is an affection not of the soul, but of that in which the soul is,"
namely the body. For in this way the powers of the soul are neither
weakened nor corrupted on account of the body.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the sensitive powers remain
in the separated soul. For Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima xv):
"When the soul leaves the body it derives pleasure or sorrow through
being affected with these" (namely the imagination, and the
concupiscible and irascible faculties) "according to its merits. " But
the imagination, the concupiscible, and the irascible are sensitive
powers. Therefore the separated soul will be affected as regards the
sensitive powers, and consequently will be in some act by reason of
them.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that "the body
feels not, but the soul through the body," and further on: "The soul
feels certain things, not through the body but without the body.