No More Learning

Objection 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater
good," as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to
which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above
(Q[61], A[5]). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues,
such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are
more grievous sins than pride.

Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser
evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom.
1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men
of science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things
which are not convenient. " Therefore pride is not the most grievous of
sins.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, "The proud did iniquitously,"
says: "The greatest sin in man is pride. "

I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a
mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from
the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and
complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for
pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets
inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the good of
virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity,
because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance
or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever;
whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling
to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de
Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that "while all vices flee from God, pride
alone withstands God"; for which reason it is specially stated (James
4:6) that "God resisteth the proud. " Wherefore aversion from God and
His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins,
belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of
God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of
greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it
follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because
it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.

Reply to Objection 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First,
on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in
its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more difficult
is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality," as
stated in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin
diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more
grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12,15).

Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being
hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes
occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A[5], ad 3). Hence Augustine
says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good deeds"; and it is written
(Ps. 141:4): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud [*Cf. Ps. 139:6,
'The proud have hidden a net for me. '] [Vulg. : 'they'] have hidden a
snare for me. " Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of
pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the
judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily
avoided, both by considering one's own infirmity, according to Ecclus.
10:9, "Why is earth and ashes proud? " and by considering God's
greatness, according to Job 15:13, "Why doth thy spirit swell against
God? " as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which
man prides himself, according to Is. 40:6, "All flesh is grass, and all
the glory thereof as the flower of the field"; and farther on (Is.
64:6), "all our justices" are become "like the rag of a menstruous
woman. "

Reply to Objection 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is
inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of
conversion. In this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins,
as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the
greatest on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other
sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud
contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of
ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible
conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more
evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God
punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh,
which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the worst of all
vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest
and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous
deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. on the other hand, carnal
lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful
nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less grievous than
pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls
into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from
his abasement. "

From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a
wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to
contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be
more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to
fall into other sins.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether pride is the first sin of all?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For
the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not
accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De
Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not done
with pride. " Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the "beginning
of . . . pride is to fall off from God. " Therefore falling away from
God precedes pride.

Objection 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to
the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all
virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): "Evil men and
seducers shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's
beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the
greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is
not the first sin.

Objection 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality.
Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and
daring. " Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin. "

I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is
essential. Now it has been stated above [3616](A[6]) that aversion from
God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride
essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride
fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all
sins," as stated above ([3617]FS, Q[84], A[2]), when we were treating
of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief
part of sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin,"
not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of
sin is naturally liable to arise from pride.

Reply to Objection 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning
of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being
the first part of pride. For it has been said above [3618](A[5]) that
pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in
consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be
the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that
which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore
as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to
which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7,
"Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by
heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief," and the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 1:19) that "some rejecting a good conscience have made
shipwreck concerning the faith. "

Reply to Objection 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins
because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence
pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to
pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed
through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is
pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And
as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the
withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, "I shall be cleansed from
the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the
last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw
from God. "

Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned
fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man
thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be
daring or brave.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital
vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst.
Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.

Objection 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since
both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice.
Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride
begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion. " Now envy is
reckoned a capital vice, as stated above ([3619]Q[36], A[4]). Much more
therefore is pride a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among
the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above ([3620]AA[2],5, ad 1) pride may be
considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin;
secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the
capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds
of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of a
special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But
Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all
vices, as explained above (A[2], OBJ[3]), did not place it among the
capital vices, but held it to be the "queen and mother of all the
vices. " Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices,
when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it
into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they
may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds. "

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the
cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while
vainglory covets the outward show of excellence.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice,
arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but
that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his
sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?

(2) What the first man coveted by sinning?

(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?

(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether pride was the first man's first sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man's first
sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of one
man many were made sinners. " Now the first man's first sin is the one
by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin.
Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Lk. 4:3, "And the
devil said to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same
order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to
gluttony, as appears from Mat. 4:3, where it was said to Him: "If thou
be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread. " Therefore
the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony.

Objection 3: Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the
devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gn. 3:5). Therefore
inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which
pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the
first sin.

Objection 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1
Tim. 2:14, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says:
"The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to
accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to
touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be
like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead .
. . " Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore
man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin. " Now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin, according
to Rom. 5:12, "By one man sin entered into this world. " Therefore man's
first sin was pride.

I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the
character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first
found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement
of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not
forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the
inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being
moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and
consequently man's first sin was where it was possible for his appetite
to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the
state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against
the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness
in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to
which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason.
It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human
appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good.
Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according
to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that
man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his
measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's
first sin was pride.

Reply to Objection 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not
willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one
presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he
willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he
coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his
disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the
statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) that
"man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and scorned
God's commands. "

Reply to Objection 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first
parents. For it is written (Gn. 3:6): "The woman saw that the tree was
good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she
took of the fruit thereof, and did eat. " Yet the very goodness and
beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the
persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gn. 3:5): "Your eyes shall
be opened and you shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting this that
the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the
sin of pride.

Reply to Objection 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first
parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent
began by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and
evil. "

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30),
"the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were
debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already
filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud
self-presumption. " This does not mean that pride preceded the
promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken
his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that
she believed the demon to have spoken truly.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the first man's pride consisted in his coveting God's likeness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist
in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that
which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness
is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gn.
1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness. " Therefore he did
not sin by coveting God's likeness.

Objection 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in
order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the
serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil. " Now
the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of
the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: "All men
naturally desire knowledge. " Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's
likeness.

Objection 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first
man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled them
with the knowledge of understanding. " Since then every sin consists in
a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the
first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is
impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex.
15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord? " Therefore the
first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps. 68],
"Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away," says:
"Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness. "

I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute
equality [*Cf. [3621]FP, Q[93], A[1]]: and such a likeness to God our
first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not
conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.

The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a
creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God; like,
according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike,
according as an effect falls short of its cause. " Now every good
existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.

Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above
his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he
coveted God's likeness inordinately.

It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is
a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational
creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in
reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this
likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on
man---of whom it is written (Gn. 1:26) that God made man "to His image
and likeness"---and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezech. 28:12):
"Thou wast the seal of resemblance. " Secondly, as to knowledge: and
this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore
immediately after the words just quoted, "Thou wast the seal of
resemblance," we read: "Full of wisdom. " But the first man, at his
creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in
potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of operation: and neither angel
nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his
creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby
to obtain happiness.

Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted
God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a
likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's
likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to the
serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might
decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he
should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him.
Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own
power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act
so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30)
that "the woman's mind was filled with love of her own power. " On the
other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards
power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that "he wished to
enjoy his own power rather than God's. " Nevertheless both coveted
somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on
himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature:
and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to
knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that
is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on
Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee? " says: "He who desires to be of
himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus
did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who
refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command. "

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more
grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15):
"Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid
sin. " Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because
they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of
our first parents was more grievous than other sins.

Objection 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin
of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death
entered into this world," as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore
that sin was more grievous than other sins.

Objection 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the
greatest (Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first
parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.

On the contrary, Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a man
who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall
suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little. " Now
our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.
Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.

I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one
results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is
a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results
from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is
more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to
be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other.
Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin was not graver than
all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though
pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet
the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the
pride whereby one covets God's likeness inordinately, such as the pride
of our first parents, as stated [3622](A[2]).

But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that
sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must
accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not
simply.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as
resulting from the person of the sinner.

Reply to Objection 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that
first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its
species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed
the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence
brought disorder upon the whole human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first
must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one
follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the
first sin is the greatest.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than
Eve's. For it is written (1 Tim. 2:14): "Adam was not seduced, but the
woman being seduced was in the transgression": and so it would seem
that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through assured
knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to Lk. 12:47,48,
"That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according
to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not,
and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. "
Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix;
xcvi de Temp. ]): "If the man is the head, he should live better, and
give an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him. "
Now he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a
sin. Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

Objection 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be
the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost,
because while sinning he relied on God's mercy [*Cf. [3623] Q[21], A[2],
OBJ[3]. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard
quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption. Therefore
it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was
more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gn. 3. Therefore
she sinned more grievously than the man.

I answer that, As stated [3624](A[3]), the gravity of a sin depends on
the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we
must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these
persons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more
perfect than the woman.

As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered
to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xi, 35): "Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though
parity of pride. "

But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously,
for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up than the man.
For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive words, namely that
God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like
to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's likeness by eating of the
forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain
something against God's will. On the other hand, the man did not
believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God's
likeness against God's will: but his pride consisted in wishing to
attain thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only herself
sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both
God and her neighbor. Thirdly, the man's sin was diminished by the fact
that, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), "he consented to the sin
out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man
sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That
he ought not to have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine
sentence. "

It is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than the
man's.

Reply to Objection 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of
all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but
aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed
up with still greater pride.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the circumstance of
personal condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous
than the woman's.

Reply to Objection 3: The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach
to contempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy
Ghost, but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv, 11]),
it was due to the fact that, "having had no experience of God's
severity, he thought the sin to be venial," i. e. easily forgiven [*Cf.
[3625]FS, Q[89], A[3], ad 1].
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this
head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common
punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.
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Whether death is the punishment of our first parents' sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our
first parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called a
punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it.
Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the fact
that his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is
included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment
of our first parents' sin.

Objection 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly
found in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19,
"The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both
equal. " But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin. Therefore
neither is it so in men.

Objection 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of
particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature.
Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first
parents' sin.

Objection 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents.
Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin, it
would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this
is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than
others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.

Objection 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated
above ([3626]FP, Q[48], A[6]; [3627]FP, Q[49], A[2]). But death,
apparently, is not from God: for it is written (Wis. 1:13): "God made
not death. " Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.

Objection 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since
merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death is
sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death. Therefore it
would seem that death is not a punishment.

Objection 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death
apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is
dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is
not a punishment of sin.

Objection 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have
followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents
lived a long time after their sin (Gn. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly,
death is not a punishment of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered
into this world, and by sin death. "

I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a
favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment of
that fault. Now as we stated in the [3628]FP, Q[95], A[1]; [3629]FP,
Q[97], A[1], God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state,
that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his
soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul.
But inasmuch as through sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to God,
the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his
reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal
appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the
soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and
soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, as the
perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other
hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to the lack
of the body's subjection to the soul.

It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite
against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents' sin, so also
are death and all defects of the body.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from
the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are
form and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of
itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of
his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of
contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in
this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached to
the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it
was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and
consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible,
were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher states (De Anima
ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the
adaptability of matter to form because, if it were possible, since the
form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In
the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form
and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But that
it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not
according to the agent's choice; for, if the craftsman were able, of
the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the
author of man is all-powerful, wherefore when He first made man, He
conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the necessity resulting
from such a matter: which favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin
of our first parents. Accordingly death is both natural on account of a
condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the
Divine favor preserving man from death [*Cf. [3630]FS, Q[85], A[6]].

Reply to Objection 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a
condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of
contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is
immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.

Reply to Objection 3: Our first parents were made by God not only as
particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human
nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the
Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin the
entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity,
incurred death.

Reply to Objection 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way
of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal
in those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that
which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that one
who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should
fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to the sin,
nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot foresee
chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first
sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the withdrawal of
the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature
was maintained. But the defects resulting from this withdrawal are
death and other penalties of the present life. Wherefore these
punishments need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally
appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all future events, Divine
providence has so disposed that these penalties are apportioned in
different ways to various people. This is not on account of any merits
or demerits previous to this life, as Origen held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]:
for this is contrary to the words of Rom. 9:11, "When they . . . had
not done any good or evil"; and also contrary to statements made in the
[3631]FP, Q[90], A[4]; [3632]FP, Q[118], A[3], namely that the soul is
not created before the body: but either in punishment of their parents'
sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the father,
wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or again it is
for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of the person who
suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from
his sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he may be
crowned for his patience.

Reply to Objection 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an
evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect
befalling man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good,
namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore
Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death,
except in so far as it is a punishment.

Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as
the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the
righteous make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence
it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is
good, while good men die well, although death is an evil. " Wherefore
inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them
meritorious.

Reply to Objection 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as
the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the
privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense
but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the
corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of
corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as being the
term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which life
departs, death is said to be present.