No More Learning

Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we
adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence
for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of
God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through
His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says
(Tract. xxxv, super Matth. ): "To adjure the demons is not accordance
with the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice. "
Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power
given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

Objection 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when
invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration.
Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make
use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore
the antecedent is false also.

Objection 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact
associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship
with the demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, "I would not that you
should be made partakers with devils. " Therefore it is not lawful to
adjure the demons.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:17): "In My name they shall cast
out devils. " Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of
God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons.

I answer that, As stated in the preceding article, there are two ways
of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence of
some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the first way it is
not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of
benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear towards the
demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which is by compulsion, we
may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not for others. For during
the course of this life the demons are our adversaries: and their
actions are not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy
angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), "the rebel spirit
is ruled by the just spirit. " Accordingly we may repulse the demons, as
being our enemies, by adjuring them through the power of God's name,
lest they do us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power
given by Christ, as recorded by Lk. 10:19: "Behold, I have given you
power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of
the enemy: and nothing shall hurt you. "

It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning
something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this
would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when
certain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use of
the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we read of
the Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N. T. , Hist. Certam.
Apost. vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the
instrumentality of the demons.

Reply to Objection 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not
authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly
appeal.

Reply to Objection 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in
order to obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as
stated above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to
the unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), "Speak no more, and go out of the man,"
says: "A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the
demons, however much they speak the truth. "

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby
the demon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this
savors of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the
demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.
An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to
one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore it
is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible,
swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an
irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ
adjuration towards one.

Objection 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained
above ([3090]AA[1],2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be
employed towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of
their own actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of
compulsion: and, seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards
them, because we have not the power to command irrational creatures,
but only He of Whom it was said (Mat. 8:27): "For the winds and the sea
obey Him. " Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure
irrational creatures.

On the contrary, Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons and
to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the
apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19. ]

I answer that, Irrational creatures are directed to their own actions
by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and moved is
also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement of the
arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation of the
irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to
God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also ascribed to
the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of irrational creatures
in order to inflict harm on man.

Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two
kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational
creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an
irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director
and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of
this kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to
God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God:
secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses
the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration
used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is
expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to adjure
the demons by beseeching them to help us.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________

OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF PRAISE
(TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of
invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken
(Q[83] ). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there
are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?

(2) Whether God should be praised with song?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God should be praised with the lips?

Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the
lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,12): "The best of men ere accorded
not praise, but something greater. " But God transcends the very best of
all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, but something
greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus. 43:33) to be "above
all praise. "

Objection 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it
is an act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than
with the lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the words
of Is. 29:13, "This people . . . honors [Vulg. : 'glorifies'] Me with
their lips, but their heart is far from Me. " Therefore the praise of
God lies in the heart rather than on the lips.

Objection 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be
encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked
proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is
written (Prov. 27:21): "As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so a
man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth. " But God is not incited
to better things by man's words, both because He is unchangeable, and
because He is supremely good, and it is not possible for Him to grow
better. Therefore God should not be praised with the lips.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 62:6): "My mouth shall praise Thee
with joyful lips. "

I answer that, We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason, and in
speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man we use
words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to him.
Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or others may
learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in consequence we may
incite him to yet better things; and that we may induce others, who
hear him praised, to think well of him, to reverence him, and to
imitate him. On the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not
indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who is the searcher of hearts,
but that we may bring ourselves and our hearers to reverence Him.

Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His
sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is
aroused towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: "The sacrifice of praise
shall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the
salvation of God. " And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in
his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed
to God, according to Is. 48:9, "For My praise I will bridle thee lest
thou shouldst perish. " The praise of the lips is also profitable to
others by inciting their affections towards God, wherefore it is
written (Ps. 33:2): "His praise shall always be in my mouth," and
farther on: "Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with
me. "

Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with
regard to His essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and
ineffable, He is above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence
and the honor of latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in
his Psalter [*Translated from the Hebrew]: "Praise to Thee is
speechless, O God," as regards the first, and as to the second, "A vow
shall be paid to Thee. " Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects
which are ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise;
wherefore it is written (Is. 63:7): "I will remember the tender mercies
of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that the Lord
hath bestowed upon us. " Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Thou wilt
find that all the sacred hymns," i. e. divine praises "of the sacred
writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed Processions of the
Thearchy," i. e. of the Godhead, "showing forth and praising the names
of God. "

Reply to Objection 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if
one praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when
it fervently recalls "the glorious things of His works" [*Cf. Ecclus.
17:7,8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the inward
fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise God, as
stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours
as stated.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God should be praised with song?

Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song.
For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): "Teaching and admonishing one another
in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles. " Now we should employ nothing
in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on the authority of
Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising God, we should
employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, "Singing
and making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men
whose duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung not
with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like play-actors,
ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the church resound
with theatrical measures and airs. " Therefore God should not be praised
with song.

Objection 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and
great, according to Apoc. 14, "Give praise to our God, all ye His
servants; and you that fear Him, little and great. " But the great, who
are in the church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep.
44): "I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred
altar must not sing" (Cf. Decret. , dist. xcii. , cap. In sancta Romana
Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.

Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical
instruments and human song, according to Ps. 32:2,3: "Give praise to
the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument of
ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle. " But the Church does not make
use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the divine
praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in like
manner neither should song be used in the divine praises.

Objection 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than
the praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by
singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from
the consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all
their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to
understand the thing that are sung than if they were recited without
chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.

On the contrary, Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church of
Milan, a Augustine relates (Confess. ix).

I answer that, As stated above [3091](A[1]), the praise of the voice is
necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore
whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted in
the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in
various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the Philosopher
state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica, prologue). Hence
the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that
the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion.
Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): "I am inclined to approve of
the usage of singing in the church, that so by the delight of the ears
the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of devotion": and he says of
himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched
to the quick by the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church. "

Reply to Objection 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not
only to those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that
are sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles
arouse spiritual devotion.

Reply to Objection 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but
reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse
devotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved
by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally,
and then had rather not hear the singer. "

Reply to Objection 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and
preaching is a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons
and prelates, whom it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by
means of preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing,
lest thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says
(Regist. iv, ep. 44): "It is a most discreditable custom for those who
have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it
behooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and to
taking charge of the alms. "

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6),
"Teaching should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial
instrument such as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only
with such things as make good hearers. " For such like musical
instruments move the soul to pleasure rather than create a good
disposition within it. In the Old Testament instruments of this
description were employed, both because the people were more coarse and
carnal---so that they needed to be aroused by such instruments as also
by earthly promises---and because these material instruments were
figures of something else.

Reply to Objection 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by
a chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the
singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what
he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as
Augustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit,
according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the voice,
and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is stirred. "
The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them understand
not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung, namely, for God's
glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion.
__________________________________________________________________

OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to
religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in
giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which
are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those
things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the
head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly
we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and
afterwards irreligion and its parts.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?

(2) Whether it has several parts or species?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to
religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other.
But religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the
latter is defined as being "immoderate observance of religion,"
according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have indeed a show of
wisdom in superstition. " Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary
to religion.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura
Deorum ii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because
they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their
children might survive [superstites] them.
" But this may be done even
in accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is
not a vice opposed to religion.

Objection 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But
religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above ([3092]Q[81],
A[5], ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion,
the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice
contrary to religion.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou
strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of
superstition hath fallen. " Now the worship of one God belongs to
religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]), religion is a moral
virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above
([3093]FS, Q[64], A[1]). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral
virtue. One by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again,
the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the
circumstance called "how much," but also with regard to other
circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and
magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to
something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and
yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom
it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other
circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,2,3).

Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not
that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but
because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a
manner it ought not.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among
evil things---thus we speak of a good thief---so too sometimes the
names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense.
Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Lk.
16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in
their generation than the children of light. " It is in this way that
superstition is described as religion.

Reply to Objection 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning.
For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of
signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is
applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ
sometimes: for "lapis" [a stone] takes its name from hurting the foot
[laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts
the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that
"superstition" means that from which the word is derived.

Reply to Objection 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of
absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of
proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in
divine worship that ought not to be done.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there are various species of superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of
superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one
contrary includes many kinds, so does the other. " Now religion, to
which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but
all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has
superstition various species.

Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion,
to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we
are directed to God, as stated above ([3094]Q[81], A[1]). Therefore
superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according
to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain
human actions.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have . . . a
show of wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to say in a
hypocritical religion. " Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a
species of superstition.

On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various species of superstition
(De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).

I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion consist in going
beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances
[3095](A[1]). For as we have stated ([3096]FS, Q[72], A[9]), not every
diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a sin,
but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends:
since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified
specifically, as stated above ([3097]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3098]FS, Q[18],
AA[2],6).

Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on
the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the
divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given,
namely, to the true God, but "in an undue mode," and this is the first
species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely,
to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstition,
divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine
worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first place to give
reverence to God, and in this respect the first species of this genus
is "idolatry," which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The
second end of religion is that man may be taught by God Whom he
worships; and to this must be referred "divinatory" superstition, which
consults the demons through compacts made with them, whether tacit or
explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship is a certain direction of
human acts according to the precepts of God the object of that worship:
and to this must be referred the superstition of certain "observances. "

Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he
says that "anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols is
superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on
to say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the
purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to the
second species; and a little further on he adds: "To this kind belong
all sorts of amulets and such like," and this refers to the third
species.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results
from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each
single defect. " Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as
stated above [3099](A[1]; Q[10], A[5]). The saying of the Philosopher
is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.

Reply to Objection 2: Divinations and certain observances come under
the head of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions
of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.

Reply to Objection 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for "religion
as applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to explain.
Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given
to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time
of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law.
It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.
__________________________________________________________________

OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of
the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true
God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory
superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true
God?

(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in
the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): "Everyone that
shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. " Now whoever
worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is
conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.

Objection 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just
in any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just
worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing
mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special
kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no
worship of God is pernicious.

Objection 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church.
Yet the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore
Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep.
64), who stated that there existed in the churches various customs in
the celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose carefully
whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the
Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the
Church. " Therefore no way of worshiping God is pernicious.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug. ) See Opp.
August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in
a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that "after the Gospel truth had been
preached the legal observances became deadly," and yet these
observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be
something deadly in the divine worship.

I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most
pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to
Christian religion. " Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that
which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by
word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that
the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above ([3100]Q[81],
A[7]). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship,
this worship will be pernicious.

Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the
part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something
discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the
mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to
make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of
Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be
pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the
second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of the
worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by
ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be
guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer
things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the guilt
of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to God
contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine authority,
and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose [*Comment. in 1
ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard] says: "He is
unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered
it. " For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says that superstition
is "the use of human observances under the name of religion. "

Reply to Objection 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship
Him in spirit and truth, according to Jn. 4:23. Hence a worship that
contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.

Reply to Objection 2: Before the time of the Law the just were
instructed by an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and
others followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward
precepts about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.

Reply to Objection 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine
worship are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe
them, and to disregard them is unlawful.
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Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship
of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): "Glorify the Lord as much as
ever you can, for He will yet far exceed. " Now the divine worship is
directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess
in it.

Objection 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward
worship, "whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity," as
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in faith,
hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of
God.

Objection 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what
we have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God.
Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there will
be no excess in the divine worship.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) "that the
good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies, from Holy
Writ. " But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be
superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.

I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with
regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in
the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God.
Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion,
through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end of divine
worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to Him in mind
and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God's glory,
and subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate
curbing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine worship,
provided it be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the
Church, and in keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives.

On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to
God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate
concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the
commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the
general custom---which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep.
xxxvi], "has the force of law"---all this must be reckoned excessive
and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals,
it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine
(De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Lk. 17:21, "The kingdom of God
is within you," against the "superstitious," those, to wit, who pay
more attention to externals.

Reply to Objection 1: The glorification of God implies that what is
done is done for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by
superstition.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God,
so that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with
external acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute
quantity.
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OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) Whether it is the gravest sin?

(4) Of the cause of this sin.
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Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a
species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are
idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above
([3101]Q[11], A[1]). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief
and not of superstition.

Objection 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to
which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally
applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For
just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of
the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of
the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship
of the true God, which is the latria of true religion. Therefore
idolatry is not a species of superstition.

Objection 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of
any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 8:4): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and
further on (1 Cor. 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered in
sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything? " implying
an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs
properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it
cannot be a species of superstition.

Objection 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor
to whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just
as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are
reproached (Rom. 1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the
creature rather than the Creator. " Therefore this species of
superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be named
"worship of creatures. "

On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited
Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him seeing
the whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22) he says:
"Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too
superstitious. " Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.

I answer that, As stated above ([3102]Q[92], A[2]), it belongs to
superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done
chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given.
Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated
above ([3103]Q[81], A[1]) when we were treating of religion. Therefore
it is superstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever.

Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by
means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so
too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or
shape, which is called an "idol. " Yet divine worship was given to idols
in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed
images which produced certain effects by the power of the demons:
wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained something
God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This
was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep],
as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine
worship not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby.
The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23, 25). For, as regards
the former, he says: "They changed the glory of the incorruptible God
into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and
of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things," and of the latter he
says: "Who worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator. "

These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain
men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men:
for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the
whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, but
by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God
to be nothing else than a soul governing the world by movement and
reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but
of his soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given
to the whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to all
such things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as
Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly,
others, namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the
cause of all things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances
created by the supreme god. These they called "gods," on account of
their having a share of the godhead; but we call them "angels. " After
these they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these
the demons which they stated to be certain animal denizens of the air,
and beneath these again they placed human souls, which they believed to
be taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason
of the merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as
Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).

The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which
the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in
the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was said
to belong to "mythical theology" which was wont to be represented on
the stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion
relating to images was held to belong to "civil theology," which was
celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De Civ. Dei vi, 5].

Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything invented
by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship
to a creature or any part of a creature, is superstitious. "

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession
of faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief
by external worship.