No More Learning

Objection 3: Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of
devotion, it would follow that those who are most apt for
contemplation, are also most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to
be noticed, for devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and
members of the female sex, who are defective in contemplation.
Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire
shall flame out. " But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore
meditation is the cause of devotion.

I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of
Whom Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:55, says that "God calls whom He
deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane
Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout. " But the
intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or contemplation.
For it was stated above [3004](A[1]) that devotion is an act of the
will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the service
of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some consideration,
since the object of the will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine
says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that "the will arises from the
intelligence. " Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of
devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives the thought of
surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a twofold consideration
leads him thereto. The one is the consideration of God's goodness and
loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, "It is good for me to adhere
to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and this consideration
wakens love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. Q[27]] which
is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that of
man's own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on God,
according to Ps. 120:1,2, "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains,
from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, Who made
heaven and earth"; and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby
man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His
strength.

Reply to Objection 1: The consideration of such things as are of a
nature to awaken our love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity;
cf. Q[27]] of God, causes devotion; whereas the consideration of
foreign matters that distract the mind from such things is a hindrance
to devotion.

Reply to Objection 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in
themselves, the strongest incentive to love ['dilectio,' the interior
act of charity; cf. Q[27]] and consequently to devotion, because God is
supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it
needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to the love
of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects known to us.
Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words of
the Preface [*Preface for Christmastide], "that through knowing God
visibly, we may be caught up to the love of things invisible. "
Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity are the chief incentive
to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion
itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead.

Reply to Objection 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness,
is to man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly
surrender himself to God. The result is that such like things sometimes
occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women
devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly
submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this very fact
his devotion is increased.
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Whether joy is an effect of devotion?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As
stated above (A[3], ad 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive to
devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the
soul, according to Lam. 3:19, "Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood
and the gall," which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam. 3:20)
it is said: "I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall languish
within me. " Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of devotion.

Objection 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior
sacrifice of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): "A sacrifice to
God is an afflicted spirit. " Therefore affliction is the effect of
devotion rather than gladness or joy.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat.
funebr. de Placilla Imp. ] that "just as laughter proceeds from joy, so
tears and groans are signs of sorrow. " But devotion makes some people
shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of devotion.

On the contrary, We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth Sunday
of Lent]: "That we who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a
holy devotion. "

I answer that, The direct and principal effect of devotion is the
spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and indirect
effect. For it has been stated [3005](A[3]) that devotion is caused by
a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of God's
goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it were,
of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and the
direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps. 76:4, "I
remembered God, and was delighted"; but accidentally this consideration
causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy God fully,
according to Ps. 41:3, "My soul hath thirsted after the strong living
God," and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my
bread," etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated [3006](A[3]), by
the consideration of one's own failings; for this consideration regards
the term from which man withdraws by the movement of his devout will,
in that he trusts not in himself, but subjects himself to God. This
consideration has an opposite tendency to the first: for it is of a
nature to cause sorrow directly (when one thinks over one's own
failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through hope of the Divine
assistance. It is accordingly evident that the first and direct effect
of devotion is joy, while the secondary and accidental effect is that
"sorrow which is according to God" [*2 Cor. 7:10].

Reply to Objection 1: In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is
something that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal of
which made it necessary for Christ to suffer [*Lk. 24:25]; and there is
something that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to us in
giving us such a deliverance.

Reply to Objection 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on
account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is
rejoiced, by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of
the Divine help.

Reply to Objection 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but
also through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when
one considers something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are
wont to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover
their children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this
way tears arise from devotion.
__________________________________________________________________

OF PRAYER (SEVENTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive
power?

(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?

(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?

(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?

(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?

(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?

(7) Whether we ought to pray for others?

(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?

(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer;

(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?

(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?

(12) Whether prayer should be vocal?

(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?

(14) Whether prayer should last a long time?

(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]

(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art. 15]

(17) of the different kinds of prayer.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive
power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is
heard by God, according to Ps. 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire of
the poor. " Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the
appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to
begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves to
God and unite ourselves to Him. " Now union with God is effected by love
which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs to the
appetitive power.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that
there are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first
is "the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend
what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis,"
whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be
added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to the
unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations.
Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the
appetitive power.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak. " Now
speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not of the
appetitive, but of the intellective power.

I answer that, According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13]
"prayer [oratio] is spoken reason [oris ratio]. " Now the speculative
and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely
apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends
but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first
perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the
effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly
imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the
effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly in
this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways: first, by
imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs to reason, to command
not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human
subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by leading up
to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the
reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it,
whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now both of these, namely,
to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that
man proposes something to be effected by something else, wherefore they
pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this
reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us
to do what is best. "

Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last
paragraph refers to the Latin word 'oratio' [prayer] which originally
signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from 'os,'
'oris' (the mouth). ] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which
sense Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom. ) that
"prayer is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24)
that "to pray is to ask becoming things of God. " Accordingly it is
evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor,
either because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition
is like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily
they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God
hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Is.
65:24, "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will hear. "

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3007]FP, Q[82], A[4]; [3008]FS,
Q[9], A[1], ad 3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore
nothing hinders the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from
tending to an end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer
tends to God through being moved by the will of charity, as it were,
and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition,
because when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God,
according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I
seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of
my life. " Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to
approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he
petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God in our prayers, we
unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up of the mind to
God. "

Reply to Objection 3: These three acts belong to the speculative
reason, but to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause
something by way of command or of petition, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is becoming to pray?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems
to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the person
to whom we pray. But according to Mat. 6:32, "Your Father knoweth that
you have need of all these things. " Therefore it is not becoming to
pray to God.

Objection 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom
we pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is
unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, "But the
Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to
repentance. " Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.

Objection 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not,
than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1),
"nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers. " But
God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to
God.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:1): "We ought always to pray,
and not to faint. "

I answer that, Among the ancients there was a threefold error
concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine
providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to
worship God at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): "You have
said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God. " Another opinion held that
all things, even in human affairs, happen of necessity, whether by
reason of the unchangeableness of Divine providence, or through the
compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of
causes: and this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was
a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled
by Divine providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet
they deemed the disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, and
that it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the
worship of God. All these opinions were disproved in the [3009]FP,
Q[19], AA[7],8; [3010]FP, Q[22], AA[2],4; [3011]FP, Q[115], A[6];
[3012]FP, Q[116]. Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the
utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs
subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part
of the Divine disposition.

In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine
providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also
from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now
among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects.
Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions, not that thereby they
may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions they may
achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine
disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is it
with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the Divine
disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to
be fulfilled by our prayers in other words "that by asking, men may
deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to
give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8)

Reply to Objection 1: We need to pray to God, not in order to make
known to Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded
of the necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not
Divine disposition, we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by
our prayers, we may obtain what God has appointed.

Reply to Objection 3: God bestows many things on us out of His
liberality, even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to
bestow certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good,
namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and
that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence Chrysostom
says [*Implicitly [Hom. ii, de Orat. : Hom. xxx in Genes. ]; Cf. Caten.
Aur. on Lk. 18]: "Think what happiness is granted thee, what honor
bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer, when thou
talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou
desirest. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether prayer is an act of religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion. Since
religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its
subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above
[3013](A[1]). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but
of the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God.

Objection 2: Further, the act of "latria" falls under a necessity of
precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept,
but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a
petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of
religion.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers
worship end ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53].
But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to. ask to obtain
something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 140:2): "Let my prayer be directed
as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the passage says that "it was
to signify this that under the old Law incense was said to be offered
for a sweet smell to the Lord. " Now this belongs to religion. Therefore
prayer is an act of religion.

I answer that, As stated above ([3014]Q[81], AA[2],4), it belongs
properly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things
through which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man
shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects
himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the
Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an act
of religion.

Reply to Objection 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to
its end, as stated above ([3015]Q[82], A[1], ad 1), and therefore
religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to
the reverence of God. Now among the other powers of the soul the
intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently
after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the
intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it
religion directs man's intellect to God.

Reply to Objection 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should
ask for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to
desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a
precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Mat. 7:7, where it
is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [*Vulg. : 'Ask and it shall be given
you. '].
Reply to Objection 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since
he subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to
Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A[1],
OBJ[2]). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things,
whether bodily members, or those external things that are employed for
God's service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether we ought to pray to God alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer
is an act of religion, as stated above [3016](A[3]). But God alone is
to be worshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone.

Objection 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of
the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both
because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God alone
knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1
Cor. 14:15), "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the
understanding": and again because, as Augustine says (De Cura pro
mortuis xiii) the "dead, even the saints, know not what the living,
even their own children, are doing. " Therefore we ought to pray to God
alone.

Objection 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only
because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or
even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace, and
yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the
saints who are in Paradise.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1), "Call . . . if there be any
that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints. "

I answer that, Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as to
be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In the
first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers ought to
be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone
gives, according to Ps. 83:12, "The Lord will give grace and glory. "
But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels or men, not
that God may through them know our petitions, but that our prayers may
be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written
(Apoc. 8:4) that "the smoke of the incense," namely "the prayers of the
saints ascended up before God. " This is also clear from the very style
employed by the Church in praying: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity
"to have mercy on us," while we ask any of the saints "to pray for us. "

Reply to Objection 1: To Him alone do we offer religious worship when
praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so
doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those
whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence.

Reply to Objection 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition,
do not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior
movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. xii,
21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what happens
to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, is made
known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their exalted
position that they should know the petitions we make to them by word or
thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to them are
known to them through Divine manifestation.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do
not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we
think or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to
them, but ask it of the living by speaking to them.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything
definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
iii, 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God"; wherefore it is
useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, "You
ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss. " Now according to Rom.
8:26, "we know not what we should pray for as we ought. " Therefore we
ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray.

Objection 2: Further, those who ask another person for something
definite strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves.
But we ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the
contrary, we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a
gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just. " Therefore we ought
not to ask God for anything definite when we pray.

Objection 3: Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as
to good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless
to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we
ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers.

On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 6 and Lk. 11) taught His disciples to
ask definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of
the Lord's Prayer.

I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus [*Fact. et Dict. Memor.
vii, 2], "Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods for
nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because they at
any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray we
frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain. " This
opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which may have
an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as "riches, by
which," as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2),
"many have come to an evil end; honors, which have ruined many; power,
of which we frequently witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages,
which sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family. " Nevertheless
there are certain goods which man cannot ill use, because they cannot
have an evil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude
and whereby we merit it: and these the saints seek absolutely when they
pray, as in Ps. 79:4, "Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved," and
again in Ps. 118:35, "Lead me into the path of Thy commandments. "

Reply to Objection 1: Although man cannot by himself know what he ought
to pray for, "the Spirit," as stated in the same passage, "helpeth our
infirmity," since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask
for what is right. Hence our Lord said (Jn. 4:24) that true adorers
"must adore . . . in spirit and in truth. "

Reply to Objection 2: When in our prayers we ask for things concerning
our salvation, we conform our will to God's, of Whom it is written (1
Tim. 2:4) that "He will have all men to be saved. "

Reply to Objection 3: God so invites us to take good things, that we
may approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires
and devout prayers.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays?

Objection 1: It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal
things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we should
not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Mat. 6:33): "Seek ye .
. . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things
shall be added unto you," that is to say, temporal things, which, says
He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to what we seek.
Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in prayer.

Objection 2: Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous
about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things,
according to the saying of Mat. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life,
what you shall eat. " Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things
when we pray.

Objection 3: Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God.
But by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it,
against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18), "While we look not at
the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For
the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not
seen are eternal. " Therefore man ought not to ask God for temporal
things when he prays.

Objection 4: Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and
useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are
harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense.
Therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 30:8): "Give me only the
necessaries of life. "

I answer that, As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx,
12): "It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire. " Now it is
lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally, by placing
our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending
towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means of
supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as
instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad Probam,
de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6,7) when he states that "it is not
unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no more;
for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for the
welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a way
befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping with those
among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that we may
keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not, that we may
gain possession of them. "

Reply to Objection 1: We should seek temporal things not in the first
but in the second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
ii, 16): "When He says that this" (i. e. the kingdom of God) "is to be
sought first, He implies that the other" (i. e. temporal goods) "is to
be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being our
good, the other as our need. "

Reply to Objection 2: Not all solicitude about temporal things is
forbidden, but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated
above ([3017]Q[55], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 3: When our mind is intent on temporal things in
order that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when
it is intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is
not lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level.

Reply to Objection 4: From the very fact that we ask for temporal
things not as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate
to something else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be
granted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation.
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Whether we ought to pray for others?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In
praying we ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now in
the Lord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus
we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," etc. Therefore we should
not pray for others.

Objection 2: Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one
of the conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one
pray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on Jn. 16:23, "If
you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you," says
(Tract. cii): "Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when he
prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,' but
'He will give it you. '" Therefore it would seem that we ought not to
pray for others, but only for ourselves.

Objection 3: Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are
wicked, according to Jer. 7:16, "Therefore do not then pray for this
people . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee. " On the
other hand we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are heard
when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we ought
not to pray for others.

On the contrary, It is written (James 5:16): "Pray one for another,
that you may be saved. "

I answer that, As stated above [3018](A[6]), when we pray we ought to
ask for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not
only for ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the
love which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (Q[25], AA[1],12;
Q[27], A[2]; Q[31], A[1]). Therefore charity requires us to pray for
others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth. ) [*Opus Imperfectum,
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "Necessity binds us to pray
for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray for others: and the
prayer that fraternal charity proffers is sweeter to God than that
which is the outcome of necessity. "

Reply to Objection 1: As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom. ), "We say 'Our
Father' and not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the
Master of unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for
ourselves alone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He
Himself bore all in one. "

Reply to Objection 2: It is a condition of prayer that one pray for
oneself: not as though it were necessary in order that prayer be
meritorious, but as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail
in its effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for
another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to his
salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle on the
part of the person we are praying for, according to Jer. 15:1, "If
Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this
people. " And yet the prayer will be meritorious for the person who
prays thus out of charity, according to Ps. 34:13, "My prayer shall be
turned into my bosom, i. e. though it profit them not, I am not deprived
of my reward," as the gloss expounds it.

Reply to Objection 3: We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may
be converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in
holiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for
some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who
are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the
brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate,
according to Eccles. 7:14, "No man can correct whom God hath despised. "
Hence it is written (1 Jn. 5:16): "He that knoweth his brother to sin a
sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him,
who sinneth not to death. " Now just as the benefit of correction must
not be refused to any man so long as he lives here below, because we
cannot distinguish the predestined from the reprobate, as Augustine
says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no man should be denied the help
of prayer.

We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because
the prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss on
Rom. 15:30, "Help me in your prayers," says: "The Apostle rightly tells
the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if they be
united together in one mind, become great, and it is impossible for the
prayers of a multitude not to obtain" that which is possible to be
obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank God for the graces
conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the profit of many,
according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that the more perfect
may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they need the prayers of
the less perfect.
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Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies.
According to Rom. 15:4, "what things soever were written, were written
for our learning. " Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations against
enemies; thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): "Let all my enemies be ashamed
and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled very
speedily [*Vulg. : 'Let them be turned back and be ashamed. ']. "
Therefore we too should pray against rather than for our enemies.

Objection 2: Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to
them. But holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apoc.
6:10, "How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them
that dwell on earth? " Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their
enemies, according to Ps. 57:11, "The just shall rejoice when he shall
see the revenge. " Therefore we should not pray for our enemies, but
against them.

Objection 3: Further, man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer.
Now sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be
unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above ([3019]Q[40],
A[1]). Therefore we should not pray for our enemies.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:44): "Pray for them that
persecute and calumniate you. "

I answer that, To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated
above [3020](A[7]). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in
the same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained
above in the treatise on charity (Q[25], AA[8],9), how we are bound to
love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not
their sin. and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of
precept, while to love them in the individual is not a matter of
precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must be
prepared to love his enemy even in the individual and to help him in a
case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness. But to
love one's enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist them, is
an act of perfection.

In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not exclude
our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for others: but
it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to pray for them
individually, except in certain special cases.

Reply to Objection 1: The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be
understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the prophets
"to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation," as Augustine
states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21]. Secondly, in the sense that
certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on the wicked for
their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood to be
pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the kingdom of
sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the correction of
men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the Divine justice
with regard to the damnation of those who are obstinate in sin.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm.