No More Learning

Objection 2: Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the
invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because
progress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or
decreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the
invisible mission is not to all who share in grace.

Objection 3: Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace.
But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas
Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God.
Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace.

Objection 4: Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and
it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore
the invisible mission is not to all that have grace.

On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27), the
invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every
creature that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission
is to every such creature.

I answer that, As above stated ([369]AA[3],4,5), mission in its very
meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was
not before, as occurs to creatures; or begins to exist where he was
before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to the
divine persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent
implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal by
grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be
found these two conditions.

Reply to Objection 1: The invisible mission was directed to the Old
Testament Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv,
20), that the invisible mission of the Son "is in man and with men.
This was done in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets. " Thus
the words, "the Spirit was not yet given," are to be applied to that
giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day of
Pentecost.

Reply to Objection 2: The invisible mission takes place also as regards
progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
iv, 20), that "the Son is sent to each one when He is known and
perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according
to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united
perfectly to Him. " Such invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as
regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the
acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for example, the proficiency
in reference to the gift of miracles or of prophecy, or in the fervor
of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom,
or to renounce his possessions, or to undertake any arduous work.

Reply to Objection 3: The invisible mission is directed to the blessed
at the very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made
to them subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further
revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such
an increase is by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a
greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent at
the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, since from the
beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace.

Reply to Objection 4: Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of
the New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments
of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent to
the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to its
term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the
sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in
a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said to
be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be less
than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a
visible manner.

Objection 2: Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union
to a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But
the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot
be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in others,
unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the sacraments,
and in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost is either not
sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place in all these
things.

Objection 3: Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth
the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason of
those visible creatures more than any other person.

Objection 4: Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest
kind of creature---namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy
Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational
creatures.

Objection 5: Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by
the ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So
visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the
angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.

Objection 6: Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner is
only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as invisible
things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the invisible
mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible mission; and to
all who received the invisible mission, whether in the New or in the
Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise to be sent; and this
is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent visibly.

On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 3:16) that, when our Lord was
baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove.

I answer that, God provides for all things according to the nature of
each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the
invisible by visible things, as explained above ([370]Q[12], A[12]).
Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by
the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has
demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible
creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the
invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest
by some visible creatures.

This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to
the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love,
to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the
Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus the
Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy
Ghost as the sign of sanctification.

Reply to Objection 1: The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He
appeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said of
that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the
nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the Holy
Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into
the unity of His person; so that what is said of it cannot be
predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the Father by
reason of any visible creature.

Reply to Objection 2: The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not
apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as
Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 6): "The prophetic vision is not displayed
to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by
the spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire,
saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same
relation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because it is
said, "The rock was Christ" (1 Cor. 10:4). For that rock was already
created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it
typified; whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify
only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame of
the burning bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people
followed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing forth
when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily
appearances of those things was that they might signify, and then pass
away. " Thus the visible mission is neither displayed by prophetic
vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the body, nor by
the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament, wherein certain
pre-existing things are employed to signify something. But the Holy
Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed Himself in
certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures,
still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or
that person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by
diverse names, so also can They each one be signified by different
things; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.

Reply to Objection 4: It was necessary for the Son to be declared as
the author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible
mission of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational
nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of
sanctification; whereas any other creature could be the sign of
sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a
purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His
person, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action, but
only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not required to
last beyond what its use required.

Reply to Objection 5: Those visible creatures were formed by the
ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to
signify the Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided
in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that
account the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel.

Reply to Objection 6: It is not necessary that the invisible mission
should always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as
is said (1 Cor. 12:7)---"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to
every man unto profit"---that is, of the Church. This utility consists
in the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible signs.
This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles, according to
Heb. 2:3, "which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed
unto us by them that heard. "

Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to
Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the
Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the
visible mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission
made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of
His conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time
of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show
forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual
regeneration; hence the Father's voice spoke, "This is My beloved Son"
(Mat. 3:17), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the
only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of
a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it was
said, "Hear ye Him" (Mat. 17:5). To the apostles the mission was
directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their
ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said,
"Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven" (Jn. 20:23): and
again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of
teaching; whence it is said that, "they began to speak with divers
tongues" (Acts 2:4). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was
fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the
visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the
Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son
manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine persons were,
however, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed,
cannot be called visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De
Trin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the
divine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds
eternally?

Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one
whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), "The
Father is sent by no one because He is from no one. " Therefore if a
divine person is sent by another, He must be from that other.

Objection 2: Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But
there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from
origin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one
sending.

Objection 3: Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He
does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although
He proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De
Trin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence
He proceeds.

On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to Is.
48:16, "Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit. " But the Son is
not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from
Whom He does not proceed.

I answer that, There are different opinions on this point. Some say
that the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds
eternally; and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the
Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by
reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine,
however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by
the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son;
so that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to
the person proceeding from

another, whereas to send belongs to each person.

There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person is
described as being sent, the person Himself existing from another is
designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the
mission of the divine person. Thus if the sender be designated as the
principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but
that person only Who is the principle of that person who is sent; and
thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by the
Father and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as
the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the
whole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a
man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect
of grace.

The answers to the objections appear from the above.
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TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-46)
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THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS
(FOUR ARTICLES)

After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must
consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will
be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the
distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government.
Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1)
the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from
the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?

(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent
coordinate principle with Him?

(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are
other exemplar causes?

(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?
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Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be
created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be
found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its
cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be
understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and
therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by God.

Objection 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to
exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an
efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever
necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many
necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from
God.

Objection 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated
by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the
efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3);
therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.

On the contrary, It is said (Rom. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and in
Him are all things. "

I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing is
from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be
caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes
ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above ([371]Q[3], A[4]) when
treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially
self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown ([372]Q[11], AA[3],4) that
subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it
would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients.
Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are
beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are
diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or
less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most
perfectly.

Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude;
and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in
being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every
truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all
heat.

Reply to Objection 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of
the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence,
on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has
being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a
being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without
having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter
into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to
find a being uncaused.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection has led some to say that what is
necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly
false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the
causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph.
v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of
their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is
not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect
might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is
true, whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.

Reply to Objection 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as
though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not
abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an
efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object
of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that
cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of
the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from
its efficient cause.
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Whether primary matter is created by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God.
For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
(Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore
primary matter cannot have been made by God.

Objection 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a
division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first
passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two
principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the
other.

Objection 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since
every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in
potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against
the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast
Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other
nigh unto nothing"---viz. primary matter.

I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step
by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser
mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible
bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it
except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to
rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as
they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they assigned
certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity,
discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when
they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial
form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when
they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to
essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain
universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according
to Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must
take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a
determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is
contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being;
for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore,
considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or as
"such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things.
Then others there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as
being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as
"such," but as "beings. "

Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be
the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by
accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial
forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in
any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is
created by the universal cause of things.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking
of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either
accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according
to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which
emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from
the former mode of being made.

Reply to Objection 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is
reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the
first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one
perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
says (Metaph. xii, text 40).

Reply to Objection 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is
not created, but that it is not created without form; for though
everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is
necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all
that belongs to its being is created.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides
God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far
from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to
something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as
stated above [373](A[1]). But whatever exists in sensible things exists
only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that
in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species,
but also individuating principles added to the principles of the
species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as
for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which
are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.

Objection 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with
species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because
there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there
are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular
things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion
follows as above.

Objection 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says
(Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting
life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.

On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas,
according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which
are contained in the divine intelligence. " Therefore the exemplars of
things are not outside God.

I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof
whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an
exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a
determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in
matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar
beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind.
Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate
forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom
as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the
universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore
we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things,
which types we have called ideas---i. e. exemplar forms existing in the
divine mind ([374]Q[15], A[1]). And these ideas, though multiplied by
their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine
essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared
diversely by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is
the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may
be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness
thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of
imitation.

Reply to Objection 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural
likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten
is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him,
forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is
like to the house in the architect's mind.

Reply to Objection 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a
man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular
man is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to
anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species,
such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.

Reply to Objection 3: Although every science and definition is
concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing
should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our
understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active
intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that
the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be
their exemplars.

Reply to Objection 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by
"self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God
Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any
self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
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Whether God is the final cause of all things?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all
things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.

Objection 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing
generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But
God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the
final cause of all things.

Objection 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do
not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the
end of all things.

Objection 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If,
therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows
that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.

On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has made all things
for Himself. "

I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would
not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it
were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered
as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the
impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient
intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are
both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents,
and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition
of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent
only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to
communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature
intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the
divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the
end of all things.

Reply to Objection 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect
agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not
belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal
giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own
goodness.

Reply to Objection 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of
generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the
generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the
form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator,
since the end is more noble than the means to the end.

Reply to Objection 3: All things desire God as their end, when they
desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or
sensible, or natural, i. e. without knowledge; because nothing is good
and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to
God.

Reply to Objection 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the
final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it
follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But
this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him,
some of which come into our mind before others.
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THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the
First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points
of inquiry:

(1) What is creation?

(2) Whether God can create anything?

(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?

(4) To what things it belongs to be created?

(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?

(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any
one Person?

(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?

(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature
and of the will?
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Whether to create is to make something from nothing?

Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from
nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To make
concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something
by bringing forth something from what was already. "

Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is
considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to
good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But
creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all
actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from
being to being.

Objection 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of
some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a
statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being,
nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something
from nothing.

On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God created,"
etc. , the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing. "

I answer that, As said above ([375]Q[44], A[2]), we must consider not
only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but
also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God;
and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what
proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation;
as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from
"not-man," and white from "not-white. " Hence if the emanation of the
whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is
impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation.
For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a
man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is
the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is "nothing. "

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal
sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as
when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of
creation in that way here, but as it is described above.

Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the
term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto. " Therefore a change is
more perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is
more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding
to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply
nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form
is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the
substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more
imperfect than the contrary, which is the term "wherefrom" in
alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than
generation and alteration, because the term "whereto" is the whole
substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term
"wherefrom" is simply not-being.

Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing,
this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but
only order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i. e. after
morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition "from"
[ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing,"
or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm
the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous
non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the
order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made from nothing---i. e. it
is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of
nothing," because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified
in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But
in the first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has
been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material
cause, which is denied.
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Whether God can create anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because,
according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient
philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing
is made from nothing. " But the power of God does not extend to the
contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make
the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation
are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from
nothing, or create.

Objection 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing,
to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears
by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in
potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of
nothing by God.

Objection 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been
becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time,
is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is
becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it would
follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore
when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But
this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is
sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from
nothing.

Objection 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite
distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen
that something is made from nothing.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. "

I answer that, Not only is it not impossible that anything should be
created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created
by God, as appears from what has been said ([376]Q[44], A[1]). For when
anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he
makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action;
thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which
are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So
also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but
presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something
presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be
caused by Him. Now it has been shown above ([377]Q[44], AA[1],2), that
nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of
all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into
being from nothing.

Reply to Objection 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above
([378]Q[44], A[2]), considered only the emanation of particular effects
from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their
action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from
nothing. " But this has no place in the first emanation from the
universal principle of things.

Reply to Objection 2: Creation is not change, except according to a
mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should
be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the
same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is
the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the
subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as
different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so
that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards
as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of
motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text
20,21), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse
relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the
mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said
above ([379]Q[13], A[1]), creation is signified by mode of change; and
on this account it is said that to create is to make something from
nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable
expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to
make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of
effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.

Reply to Objection 3: In things which are made without movement, to
become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is
the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated
and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of
movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same
time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its
being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not previously.
Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and
is already created at the same time.

Reply to Objection 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination,
as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken
to signify a change existing between two forms.
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Whether creation is anything in the creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the
creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the
creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the
Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator,
because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something
temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the
creature.

Objection 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the
creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the
creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same
reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity.
Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.

Objection 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created
substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of
creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term
of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the
accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the
action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.

On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made according to its
entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or
accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby
anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form,
is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation,
whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in
the thing created.

I answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according
to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or
by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from
something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular
productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all
being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by
creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed
from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above
(A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation
to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion,
which implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of
motion.

Reply to Objection 1: Creation signified actively means the divine
action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in
God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a
relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a
real relation, as was said above ([380]Q[13], A[7]) in treating of the
divine names.

Reply to Objection 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was
said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the
mover and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium
between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is
in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further
creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature
being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations,
but by themselves; as was also shown above ([381]Q[42], A[1], ad 4), in
treating of the equality of the Persons.

Reply to Objection 3: The creature is the term of creation as
signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real
relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the
accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the
part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of
the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it
should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature
to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
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Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?

Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to
composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv)
it is said, "The first of creatures is being. " But the being of a thing
created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does
not belong to subsisting and composite things.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But
composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.

Objection 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is
properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the
thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and
not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. " But heaven and earth are subsisting composite
things. Therefore creation belongs to them.

I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown
above ([382]Q[44], A[2], ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the
being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to
whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting
things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate
substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances.