No More Learning

Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to
some supreme evil.

Objection 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is
essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially,
but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential
evil, which is the cause of every evil.

Objection 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which
is "per se. " But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we
must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils.
Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause, but only an
accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in
the many, but only in the few.

Objection 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of
the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause,
as was said above ([441]AA[1],2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in
this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of
every evil.

On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was
shown above ([442]Q[2], A[3]; [443]Q[6], A[4]). Therefore there cannot
be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.

I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first
principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.

First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good,
as was shown above ([444]Q[6], AA[3],4). But nothing can be essentially
bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good
([445]Q[5], A[3]); and that evil can exist only in good as in its
subject ([446]Q[48], A[3]).

Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and
perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above
([447]Q[6], A[2]). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was
shown above ([448]Q[48], A[4]), although evil always lessens good, yet
it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing
can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy
itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for
something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since
its subject is good.

Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first
principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown
above [449](A[1]), and because evil can be only an accidental cause,
and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is
subsequent to the direct cause.

Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other
evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other
strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to
consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the
particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they
found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they
thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance,
if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the
house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything
does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon
what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein
every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above
([450]Q[47], A[2], ad 1).

Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two
contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these
contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore
they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles.
But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to
search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper
causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the
power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter
how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above
([451]Q[2], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also
agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have
contrary particular cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one
first common cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same
subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as
was said above ([452]Q[48], A[3]). Hence, since evil is privation of
good, as appears from what was said above ([453]Q[48], AA[1], 2,3), it
is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the
supreme good, who is pure act.

Reply to Objection 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the
nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation
removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is
intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by
receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and
worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it
is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.

Reply to Objection 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by
privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to
any essential evil.

Reply to Objection 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was
shown above [454](A[1]). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil
is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply
false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can
there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And
again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number.
In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number; because the
good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man---that
is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses
than good according to reason.

Reply to Objection 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to
infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows
accidentally.
__________________________________________________________________

TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)

Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures:
firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is
called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the
composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their
substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what
belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.

Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal
things.

Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether
incorporeal?

(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of
matter and form?

(3) We ask concerning their number.

(4) Of their difference from each other.

(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal.
For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation
to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as
regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore
he is not simply incorporeal. "

Objection 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii) that "an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance. "
Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.

Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every
creature is limited within its own nature. " But to be limited belongs
to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's
creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His
angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were made;
He commanded, and they were created. " Therefore angels are corporeal.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels
spirits. "

I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is
principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in
assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect
to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according
to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now,
God produces the creature by His intellect and will ([455]Q[14], A[8];
[456]Q[19], A[4] ). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that
there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the
action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is
limited to "here" and "now. " Hence the perfection of the universe
requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.

The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of
intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense
and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could
be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall
under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies,
as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the
error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8).

But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof
that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect
alone.

Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and
corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to
be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be
cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material
and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.

Reply to Objection 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it
is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an
ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not
as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are.
Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.

Reply to Objection 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to
bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to
all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De
Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in
corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their
substance. "
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Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and
form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of
the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the
species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from
the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a
genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of
substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.

Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is
matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;
whence Boethius says (De Trin. ) that "a simple form cannot be a
subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an
angel is composed of matter and form.

Objection 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act.
But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore
an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.

Objection 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter.
So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of
an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the
form of an angel is in matter.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first creatures
are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal. "

I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and
form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of
the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are
distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards
incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which
distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in
common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal
from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is
subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is
its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and
corporeal things is the same; so that it must be understood that the
form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual
things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the
matter of corporeal things.

But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of
spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a
spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of
matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and
spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the
corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter,
however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity;
and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys.
i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual
things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is
impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same
matter.

It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any
kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to
the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether
immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act
receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to
its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are
individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it
must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.

But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily
distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend
things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence
material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in
a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on
the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot
attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own
mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also
it apprehends God [457](Q[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: It is difference which constitutes the species.
Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is
determined to some special grade of being because "the species of
things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of
unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material
things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that
is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the
matter; and hence from the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the
former the "difference. " Whereas in immaterial things there is no
separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self
holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them "genus" and
"difference" are not derived from different things, but from one and
the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for,
inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the
idea of their "genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately,
it derives the idea of their "difference. "

Reply to Objection 2: This reason is given in the book on the Fount of
Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the
intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For
matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some
species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the
intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the
opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the
effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the
intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a
form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of
receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.

Reply to Objection 3: Although there is no composition of matter and
form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be
made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain
a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby
the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own
existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related
to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no
matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter,
there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very
existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is
understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an
angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence,"
and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself
subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as
the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and
"what is" are not different as was explained above ([458]Q[3], A[4]).
Hence God alone is pure act.

Reply to Objection 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its
existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature
to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being
considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the
part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the
matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite
in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms
are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example,
that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of
whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while
its "being" is finite as determined to some one special nature.

Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite
from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is "infinite
from below," as not received in any matter.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the angels exist in any great number?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers.
For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a
continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are
incorporeal, as was shown above [459](A[1]). Therefore the angels
cannot exist in any great number.

Objection 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the
less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other
created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore
since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible
number in the angelic nature.

Objection 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances
seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of
the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we
can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the
movements of the heavenly bodies.

Objection 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and
intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
goodness. " But a ray is only multiplied according to the different
things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is
receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are
immaterial, as was shown above [460](A[2]). Therefore it seems that the
multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the
requirements of the first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so
that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be
terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as
before.

On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands
ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood
before Him. "

I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the
number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to
maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and
according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number
of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible
things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)
because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things.
Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of
these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are
higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held
(Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to
these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he
strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to
the number of the first movements.

But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred
Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony,
held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial
substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly
movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he
contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are
styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which
manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the
custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be
designated as angels.

Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are
immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all
material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv):
"There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences,
surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers. " The
reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the
universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more
perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created
by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their
magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their
multitude.
We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed
corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire
sphere of things active and passive is something very small in
comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude
that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably exceed material
substances as to multitude.

Reply to Objection 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete
quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that
which is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is
reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above ([461]Q[30],
A[3]; [462]Q[11]).

Reply to Objection 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto
God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not
so as to be found in few subjects.

Reply to Objection 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text
44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were
made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances would
exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in
corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances
exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is nobler than the
means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this
is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make
use of this argument, since only through sensible things can we come to
know intelligible ones.

Reply to Objection 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as
hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this
was refuted above ([463]Q[47], A[1]). Accordingly, the multiplication
of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to
bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders
of immaterial substances.
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Whether the angels differ in species?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species.
For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things which
agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate
constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species.
But all angels agree in what is noblest in them---that is to say, in
intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species.

Objection 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the
angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and
less---namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect.
Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.

Objection 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually
from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are
the angels.

Objection 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more
ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but
one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of
one species.

On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as
"first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there
are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x).
Therefore the angels are not of the same species.

I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even
souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are
of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the
angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.

But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ
in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If,
therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said
above [464](A[2]), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to
be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be
several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are
not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. And if
the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of
one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the principle
of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the
division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the
diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes
diversity not merely of species, but of genus.

Reply to Objection 1: "Difference" is nobler than "genus," as the
determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the
common, but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it
would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species;
or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the
sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according
to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like
manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse
degrees of intellectual nature.

Reply to Objection 2: More and less change the species, not according
as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but
according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance,
if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the
angels are diversified according to more or less.

Reply to Objection 3: The good of the species preponderates over the
good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be
multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the
one species.

Reply to Objection 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn
out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific
multiplication, as was said above ([465]Q[47], A[3]). Hence the
perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species,
but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the angels are incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for
Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is
"an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not
by nature. "

Objection 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose
maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature,
yet indissoluble because I so will it. " But gods such as these can only
be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by
their nature

Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things
would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved
them. " But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore,
since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are
corruptible of their own nature.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual
substances "have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death,
matter, and generation. "

I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are
incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing
is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence,
since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said
above [466](A[2]), it is impossible for its substance to be
corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can
never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in
relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else
is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never
be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a
bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its
circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for
everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is
an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter
and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the
matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the
angels, as was said above [467](A[2]), it cannot lose its being.
Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is
incorruptible by its own nature.

A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual
operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the
operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and
nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an
intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every
intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality,
which includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of
death," as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain
perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later [468](Q[62]).

Reply to Objection 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the
heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and
therefore dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever
preserved in existence by the Divine will.

Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above ([469]Q[44], A[1]) there is
a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it
is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for
its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that
all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved
by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle
of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is
dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible
not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing
His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of
corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the
potentiality of matter.
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OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)

We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things;
and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of
the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their
comparison with local movement.

Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?

(2) Whether they assume bodies?

(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
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Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to
them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute
alone---that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,
as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any
material substance and without any companionship of corporeal
addition. " Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant. ): "Let us assign
incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature
alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs
the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created
spirit needs corporeal substance. " Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit.
iii): "The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their
nature is akin to that of aerial bodies. " But the nature of demons and
angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to
them.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev. ) calls an angel a rational
animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels
have bodies naturally united to them.

Objection 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls.
But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the
angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
understood to be incorporeal. "

I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For
whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally
in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of
the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to
understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as
will be shown later ([470]Q[75], A[2]), it follows that to have a body
united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as
such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of
something else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a
body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of
intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own
nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily
senses, as will be explained later on ([471]Q[84], A[6]; [472]Q[89],
A[1]). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must
presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the
intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances,
which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things.
Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but
some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels.

Reply to Objection 1: As was said above ([473]Q[50], A[1]) it was the
opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem
to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing
except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was
the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this
is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above
all things, according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted beyond
the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God,
followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances;
being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following
the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be
explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which
is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be
explained [474](A[2]). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but
merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there
are some aerial animals, which they termed demons.

Reply to Objection 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal
metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.

Reply to Objection 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply
speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kings 2:6): "The Lord
killeth, and maketh alive. " But to give life formally belongs to a
substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself
the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which
is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a
body.
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Whether angels assume bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there
is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of
the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the
angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since
his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not
assume a body.

Objection 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union;
because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a
body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated [475](A[1]);
while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not
said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by
the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume
bodies.

Objection 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or
water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire,
otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from
air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not
assume bodies.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared
to Abraham under assumed bodies.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume
bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels
happened in prophetic vision---that is, according to imagination. But
this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in
imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination, and
consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time
to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all;
just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his
whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the
angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it
is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision,
whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can
accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be
beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they
bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said
[476](A[1]; [477]Q[50], A[1]), it follows that they sometimes assume
bodies.

Reply to Objection 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves,
but on our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may
give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to
have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies
under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God
would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old
Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared in
the flesh.

Reply to Objection 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as
its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the
assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of
intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible,
in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by
angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an
angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body.

Reply to Objection 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of
rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both
be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels
assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is
needful for forming the assumed body.
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Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life
in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But
it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live
and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions.
Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.

Objection 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing
without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the
senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the
angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel
perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of
life.

Objection 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the
functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the
angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was
said (Gn. 18:16) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had
appeared to him, "bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to
the angel (Tob. 5:7,8): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city
of Medes? " he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all
the ways thereof. " Therefore the angels often exercise functions of
life in assumed bodies.

Objection 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for
it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed
from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred
Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their
assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.

Objection 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the
Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having
resumed life (Lk. 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies
they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored
them as God (Gn. 18). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life
in assumed bodies.

Objection 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has
befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: "After
the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth
children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown" (Gn. 6:4).
Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed
bodies.

On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was
stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise
functions of life through assumed bodies.

I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in
common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of
a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so
far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far
as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in
assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such
operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects;
because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that which
has the faculty has the action. " Hence nothing can have a function of
life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such
action.

Reply to Objection 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for
intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible
figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that
intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of
intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through
sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels
that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men,
although they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for
this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may
be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not
so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men; because the
properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels.

Reply to Objection 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function.
Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through
the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned
in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation
through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual
powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power
of the angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other
members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. ).

Reply to Objection 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper
function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus
moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved
accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as
movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is not
moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is
everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the
movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the
movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the
movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change
place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is
there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the
world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but
according to a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is always in
the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.

Reply to Objection 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through
their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as
they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.

Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to
eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the
substance of the eater.

Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the
substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter;
nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be
changed into it; hence it was a true eating.