No More Learning

2. If the Aryans certainly abstain from strong liquor, it is not because
it is a transgression by its very nature, but because they are filled with the
150 151
force of modesty; [if they do not drink in secret ], this is because
strong liquor makes mindfulness fail; even if they do not drink a drop, this is because the inebriating quantity is not determined, as for poison.
3. Scripture considers strong liquor as a bodily misdeed, because strong liquor is a "cause of non-vigilence. " In fact, the rule of training relative to strong liquor includes the expression, "Abandoning the pramddasthdna which is strong liquor, surd and maireya, I renounce pramddasthana. . . " Thisisnotthecasefortheothertransgressions: one does not say "I renounce the pramadasthana which is killing," and that is because the other transgressions are transgressions by their very nature.
The Scripture says that one is reborn in hell through the practice of
152
strong liquor. As a consequence of strong liquor, there is continual
activity of a series of bad thoughts; from whence, there is either projection of a new action retribuable in hell, or else the entry into activity, at the moment of death, of an old action.
of nature, killing, etc
? What is the meaning of the expression suramaireya madya- m
pramadasthana?
Sura is a fermented drink of rice; maireya is a fermented drink of
various ingredients (sugar cane juice, etc).
At a certain moment, the liquor is no longer inebriating; at a certain
moment, it is no longer that: this is why the word madya (inebriating) has been added. Even the areca-nut, the paspale (kodrava, etc. ) are
l54 termed sura and maireya when they inebriate.
Strong liquor is only a transgression of disobedience. The formula thus contains the words pramadasthana in order to have one understand that one should renounce strong liquor because it is the cause of all failures of mindfulness.
***
Do the three discipline have the same object?
35a-b. One acquires the discipline of Kamadhatu relative to all actions, relative to the two types of beings and to the two types of actions, relative to things of the present.
The discipline of Kamadhatu is the Pratimoksa discipline.
This discipline is relative to all actions, preparatory actions, actions
155 themselves, and consecutive action (iv. 68).
This discipline is relative to living beings and to non-living beings, for example persons and trees.
This discipline is relative to the transgressions by nature and to the transgression of disobedience, both of which are capable of relating to living beings (killing; touching the hand of a women when one is a monk) or to non-living beings (cutting the leaves of a tree; accepting gold when one is a monk).
This discipline is relative to things--skandhas, ayatanasand dhatus--of the present, for the things of the past and of the future are
156 neither living beings, nor non-living beings.
35c-d. One acquires the discipline of dhyana and the pure
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discipline relative to actions themselves and to things of the three time periods.
One acquires these two disciplines relative to actions themselves, not relative to preparatory actions or to consecutive action, and not relative to the transgression of disobedience; and relative to the skandhas, ayatanas and dhatus of the past, present and future.
There are thus some skandhas, ayatanas and dhatus relative to which one acquires the Pratimoksa discipline and not the two others. Four cases: 1. Preparatory and consecutive actions, transgressions of disobedience, of the present--alluded to by the Pratimoksa. 2. Courses of action of the past and future--alluded to by the last two disciplines. 3. Courses of actions of the present--alluded to by the three disciplines. 4. Preparatory and consecutive actions of the past and the future, with regard to which one cannot undertake any of the three disciplines.
**#
Objection: It is not correct to say that one undertakes the discipline relative to the course of aaion of the present time: for, when one undertakes the discipline, no bad course of action is present relative to which one could undertake the discipline. One should say, "One undertakes the discipline relative to the course of action whose object is present. " I can abstain from a future aaion relative to a person or to a thing existing at the present time, but I cannot abstain from a past or future aaion.
***
Does one acquire discipline or undiscipline with regard to all beings, relative to all of their parts, and by reason of all causes?
36a-b. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings; one must distinguish regarding the parts and the causes.
1. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings, not with regard to only some of them.
The discipline of the Bhiksu is acquired relative to all parts:
? abstention from the ten courses of action. The other disciplines are acquired relative to four parts: abstention from killing, from stealing, from forbidden sexuality, from lying, for, by parts of the discipline, one should understand abstention from the courses of action.
If, by cause of the acquisition of discipline, one understands the three roots of good (non-desire, non-hatred, non-delusion), then the dis- cipline is acquired by reason of all these causes. If one understands by cause--the cause of the origin, samutthapaka (iv. 9b)--the mind by which one acquires the discipline, then this cause is considered as threefold: strong mind, mediocre mind, weak mind. The discipline is acquired by reason of one of these three minds.
From this last point of view, four alternatives can be distinguished (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 608a20).
1. There is a person abiding in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, but not disciplined relative to all the parts, nor disciplined by reason of all causes: he who, through a strong, or mediocre, or weak mind, has acquired the discipline of the Upasaka, the Upavasastha or the Sramanera. 2. There is a person abiding in the discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings and relative to all the parts, but not disciplined by reason of all causes: he who has acquired the discipline of the Bhiksu through a strong, mediocre, or weak mind. 3. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, relative to all the parts, by reason of all the causes: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upasaka, the Sramanera and the Bhiksu through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong. 4. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, disciplined by reason of all the causes, but not disciplined relative to all the parts: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upasaka, the Upavasastha and the Sramanera through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong.
N o one abides in discipline who is not disciplined with regard to all beings: he acquires the discipline through a good mind having for its object all beings. The person who makes a restriction is not completely rid of the intention of transgression.
The Pratimoksa discipline includes the absence of the fivefold restriction: 1. with regard to beings, "I renounce transgressions with regard to certain beings;" 2. with regard to parts of the discipline, "I
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renounce certain actions;" 3. with regard to place, "I renounce committing transgressions in a certain place;" 4. with regard to time, "I renounce transgressions for a month;" 5. with regard to circumstances, "I renounce transgressions except in the case of a quarrel. " He who undertakes such undertakings does not acquire the discipline; rather, he
157 does a good action similar to the acquisition of the discipline.
ii. How can one acquire the discipline with regard to all beings? How can one acquire the discipline with regard to beings who are out of range, or with regard to beings whom one cannot kill?
Because, we believe, one acquires the discipline through the intention of not killing any being.
The Vaibhasikas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 623M9, second masters) give a different explanation. If the discipline was acquired only with regard to beings who are within range, the discipline would be liable to augmentation and to diminution: for some humans, who are now within range*, will be reborn as gods, which are out of range; and vice versa. The discipline would thus be acquired with regard to gods who become human, and lost with regard to humans who become gods, without there being any cause either of the acquisition, or of the loss of the discipline.
This argument does not move us: the transmigration of beings within range and out of range does not entail the augmentation or the diminution of the discipline. For the discipline that one undertakes with regard to grass neither increases nor diminishes when new grass arises, nor when old grass dries up.
The Vaibhasikas deny the value of this comparison. Grass exists after having been nonexistent, and no longer exists after having existed Living beings, on the contrary, continue to exist, sometimes as humans, and sometimes as gods. Humans, becoming gods, only pass out of range, whereas grass is annihilated.
But when living beings enter into Nirvana, they no longer exist, exactly like grass, so the discipline acquired with regard to living beings is subject to diminution. Thus the explanation of the Vaibhasikas is invalid
If one objects, "In the case where the Pratimoksa discipline would be acquired with regard to all beings, then the discipline of later Buddhas would be reduced in comparason with that of former Buddhas, for it
? would not be relative to beings who have already entered into Nirvana,
158
to former Buddhas and their disciples", we would reply: all the
Buddhas discipline all beings; and if former Buddhas were to exist again, later Buddhas would be disciplined by them.
36c-d Undiscipline, with regard to all, relative to all parts, and not by reason of all causes.
One acquires undiscipline with regard to all beings and relative to all courses of aaion. No one is undisciplined with an incomplete undiscipline. One is not undisciplined by reason of all causes, un- discipline being undertaken by a weak, mediocre, or strong mind. Let us suppose that an undisciplined person has undertaken his undiscipline with a weak mind and commits a murder with a strong mind: his undiscipline remains weak, but he is adorned with a strong vijnapti, with a strong murder.
The term "undisciplined" is explained etymologically as one "who resides in undiscipline (asamvara), one who possesses undiscipline. " The butchers of sheep, bird-catchers, the butchers of pigs, fisher-
man, hunters, bandits, exceutioners, jailers, elephant hunters, the slaughterers of dogs, and the vagurikas are all undisciplined. It also holds that kings, office holders, judges, etc, are undisciplined.
A butcher of sheep (aurabhrika) is the person whose profession is to kill sheep (urabfora). . The same etymology holds for the names of the
159 other professions.
ii. We understand that discipline, undertaken with the intention of universal benevolence, would be acquired with regard to all beings. But the butchers of sheep do not have the intention of maltreating their parents, their children, or their servants; they would not want to kill them, even at the price of their lifes. How, [ask the Sautrantikas], can one say that they are undisciplined with regard to all beings? (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 608b20).
The Vaibhasikas: Because they have the intention of killing with regard to their parents who have become sheep through trans-
160
migration.
But they do not kill their parents who have become sheep knowing
that they are their parents! Furthermore, if their parents obtain the quality of an Aryan, these parents will not be reborn as sheep or as
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animals: hence the butcher is not undisciplined with regard to them. Finally, the argument turns against you: if the butcher is undisciplined with regard to his present parents because he will kill his parents who have become sheep, one would say as well that he is not undisciplined with regard to some other sheep since he is not disposed to kill the sheep which are reborn as humans, as his own children.
The Vaibhasikas: He who has the intention to kill his parents who have become sheep is certainly undisciplined with regard to them.
But, [the Sautrantikas say,] he who does not have the intention of killing the sheep who have become his children is certainly not undisciplined in their regard Another point: how can the butcher who does not steal, who is not an adulterer, and who is mute, be undisciplined relative to all these transgressions?
The Vaibhasikas: Because his intention is perverted. A mute can express himself through gestures.
But what is there to say of a man who has accepted two or three parts of morality?
For the Vaibhasikas, nondiscipline is never incomplete, that is, relative only to certain parts; nor is it partial, that is, including restrictions (time, place, etc) in the practice of a certain transgression.
For the Sautrantikas, discipline and undiscipline with the exception
of the Pratimoksa discipline can be incomplete and partial. This
depends on the manner in which one undertakes discipline or
,f
undiscipline: one binds" oneself to a part of immorality, or to a certain
part of morality.
***
How does one acquire undiscipline? How does one acquire the avijnaptis which are neither discipline, nor undiscipline?
37a-b. One acquires undiscipline through action or through
161 accepting it.
Persons born in a family of undisciplined persons acquire un- discipline when they accomplish the actions preparatory to killing (iv. 68c). Persons born in other families acquire undiscipline when they adopt such a style of life, thinking "We too shall live in this manner. "
? 37c-d One acquires the other avijnaptis by reason of the field, of 162
undertaking, of an action seriously undertakea
1. Certain persons are a field of such a nature that by offering them a garden, etc, one reduces avijnapti. [See below, iv. 112, the doarine of good material works. ]
2. One produces avijnapti by undertaking vows, for example, "I shall not eat unless I have paid homage to the Buddha," "I shall give alms
163
3. Action undertaken seriously, with a burning faith, with a burning
food on the fast day, for a fortnight, for a month, for a year," etc passion (iv. 22d), produces avijOapti.
***
How does one lose discipline?
38. The Pratimok? a discipline is lost through abjuration, through death, through hermaphroditism, through the cutting off of the roots, and by the night coming to an end.
The stanza calls the Pratimoksa discipline dama because it subdues (damyati) the six organs.
Excluding the discipline of the fast, the Pratimoksa discipline is lost:
164
1. through abjuration, intentionally renouncing the rule in the
presence of a person capable of understanding it; 2. through the death or abandonment of the nikdyasabhaga (ii. 41); 3. through the ap- pearance of the male or the female organ according to the case; and 4. through the cutting off of the roots of good (iv. 79).
The discipline of fast is lost through these four causes and, further, when night come to an end.
Abjuration constitutes a vijnapti in contradiction to the under- taking; death and hermaphroditism constitute the abandoning and the overturning of the personality who undertook the Pratimoksa (see iv. 27a); the cutting off of the roots is the cutting off of the foundation of the discipline itself. Finally the discipline of the fast has been created, or projected, for a day and a night: it comes to its end when the night is finished.
39a. Some say through a patamya.
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According to the Sautrantikas, the discipline of the Bhiksu and the
novice is also lost through any one of the four polarityas, or 165
transgressions involving a falling away.
39b. Through the disappearance of the Good Law, say some other masters.
According to the Dharmaguptakas, the Pratimoksa discipline is lost when the Good Law disappears: there are no longer any rules, any boundaries, nor any ecclesiastic actions.
39c-d The Ka? mlreans believe that the transgressor possesses morality and immoraltity, in the manner that a person can have riches and debts.
i. The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir say: A monk guilty of a grave transgression, that is, of 2, pataniya, does not lose his Bhiksu discipline. It is not admissible that one loses the entire discipline by destroying only a
166
part of the discipline. He who commits a transgression other than a
pataniya is not immoral. He who commits a pataniya is at one and the same time moral and immoral: as a person who has both riches and debts; but when this transgressor has confessed his transgression, he is no longer immoral, but solely moral: as a person who has paid his debts.
ii. But the Blessed One has said, "He is not a Bhiksu, he is not a monk; he no longer belongs to the sons of Sakya; he falls from the quality of Bhiksu; his quality of monkhood is cut off, fallen, erased,
167 tumbled down, annihilated. "
The Vaibhasikas: In this text "Bhiksu" signifies a "true Bhiksu:" the transgressor, being incapable of seeing the Truths, is not a true Bhiksu.
An inadmissable explanation: you avoid the question that the Blessed One made "in a clear sense:" furthermore, you lead defiled persons to the practice of immorality.
The Vaibhasikas: How can you prove that this quotation is of clear sense and should be taken literally?
The Blessed One has explained this himself. "There are four
Bhiksus: a samjnabhiksu, a Bhiksu in name only, is a person who is
called Bhiksu without his having been ordained; a pratijriabhiksu, a
self-styled Bhiksu, is one who is immoral, unchaste, etc; a person called
168
Bhiksu because he begs, is a begger only; and the person who is called
? Bhiksu because he has cut off the defilements, that is to say, the
169 17
Arhat. " In the text which concerns us ? ("He is not a Bhiksu, he is
not a monk. . . "), this refers to a fifth Bhiksu, namely a person who has been properly ordained but who, thtov^ipatantya, loses this quality and this discipline; it is certainly not a question of his being a true Bhiksu, an Arhat, for one capable of a polaritya is not a true Bhiksu, an Arhat, but is susceptible of losing the quality of being a true Bhiksu.
iii. The argument that one does not lose the entire discipline through the losing of one part of it, is refuted by the Master himself who in fact compares a transgressor monk to a palm tree whose head is cut off, henceforth incapable of becoming green, of growing, of developing,
m
or of growing larger:
the part which is the root of the discipline, is cut off, the rest of the discipline is incapable of growing. The potantya or the mauliapattt is in contradiaion to the state required of being a Bhiksu; he embraces an extreme absence of fear of transgression (anapatrapya, ii. 32a-b); he breaks off the root of discipline: all his discipline is lost.
The Master excludes persons guilty of pataniya from all com-
172
merce
them for even one mouthful of food, he forbids them from even setting one foot into the monastery. He says, "He who is not a Bhiksu but who has the aspect of a Bhiksu--destroy this tare, uproot this rotten tree,
173
drive out this plant without seed! " What indeed can be the Bhiksu
quality of this criminal?
iv. The Kasmireans answer: He possesses the quality which consists
of his quality of Bhiksu. For the Blessed One said, "Cunda, there are four
monks and not a fifth: the mdrgajina, who triumphs through the Path;
the margadaisika, who teaches the Path; the margajivin, who lives in
this means that, when one part of the discipline,
with the Bhiksus, he prohibits them from participating with
the Path; and the mdrgadusin, who soils the Path, the immoral 174
monk. "
We believe that the Blessed One gives the name of "monk" to an
immoral monk because his external form is that of a monk. Does one not speak of burning wood, of a dried up pond, of a parrot-nose (a motif of architectural decoration), of rotten seed, of a circle of fire, or of a dead being?
v. Answer of the Kasmireans: One does not lose the quality of monkhood through pataniya, since the Blessed One admits a monk
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175 guilty of unchastity as a penitent.
We do not say that any Bhiksu guilty of unchastity is a pdrdjika, a fallen or destroyed Bhik? u. But whoever is a pdrdjika is no longer a Bhiksu. It is the idea of hiding the crime which is decisive here: if, thanks to the excellence of his moral dispositions, thanks to the excellence of his "series," the guilty one does not have the thought of concealing his fault for an instant, then the King of the Law admits him as a penitant.
The Ka?
mlreans: If a pdrdjika is no longer a Bhiksu, why is he not again admitted to ordination?
Because he is susceptible to discipline: his mental dispositions are ruined and overturned by the excess of imprudence (anapatrdpya, ii32a-b). Also, even if he had renounced the rules {niksiptafiksa, iv. 38) [after his transgression], he cannot be ordained again. To what good does this discussion lead? If a similar Bhiksu is a Bhiksu, we pay homage
176 to this quality of Bhiksu.
vi. When the Good Law disappears, all ecclesiastical acts become impossible, and as a consequence also all acquisition of the discipline. But he who possesses the discipline will not lose it (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 608cll).
***
How does one lose the discipline of dhydna (iv. l7b) and the pure discipline?
40a-b. The "good" of the sphere of dhydna is lost through a 177
change of state and through falling.
All of the good of the sphere of dhydna, that is, material and non-material good, is lost through two causes: 1. through arising in a superior or inferior stage: this refers to the "good" which appears to persons arisen in the heavens of Rupadhatu; 2. through falling away: when the ascetic falls away from this absorption.
One should add a third cause, [according to vi. 21:] the Prthagjana loses certain gpod dharmas through death even when he is reborn in the same heavenly stage from whence he died
40c The same for the gpod of Arupyadhatu.
? It is lost through the changing of the stage or through falling away. Note that discipline does not exist in this sphere.
40c-d Pure good is lost through the obtaining of a result, through perfection of the faculties, or through falling away.
1. By obtaining a result, the Aryan abandones the good dharmas of the path of the candidate (pratipamakamdrga, which is threefold, prayoga, anantarya, vimukti, vi. 65b); 2. when he perfects his faculties (indriyasamcdra, vi. 29), he abandons the path of weak faculties; and 3. when he falls, he abandons the result or the path of a superior result (vL32).
41 a-b. Undiscipline is lost through the acquisition of discipline, through death, or through hermaphroditism.
i. Acquisition of the discipline: either he ritually undertakes the
Pratimoksa discipline; or, through the efficacy of an internal cause
{hetu-sabhagahetu, ii. 52) or an external cause (the teaching of another),
one obtains the absorption which constitutes the discipline of
178
dhydna. The discipline of dhydna cuts off undiscipline, being a
threefold change hostile to undiscipline.
Death and hermaphroditism are, respectively, the abandoning and
the overturning of the person through which undiscipline had been undertaken.
it An undisciplined person who rejects the tools of his work, dagger and net, even with the intention of no longer committing murder, does not by this cut off his undiscipline if he does not undertake the discipline. Illness does not improve without medicine, even though one may avoid the causes of illness.
iii. Does an undisciplined person who undertakes the discipline of the fast remain undisciplined when he departs from the fast, or rather, does he find himself in the intermediary state, neither-disciplined-nor- undisciplined?
179
Opinions differ. For some, he is found to be undisciplined, for the
person who undertakes the fast does not have the intention of definitively renouncing transgressions: a mass of iron turned red
returns to its original state.
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For others, once an undisciplined person has departed from the
fast, he is no longer undisciplined, for the acquisition of indiscipline supposes a physical or vocal action (vijnapti).
***
How does one lose avijnapti which is neither discipline nor undiscipline (iv. l31-b)?
41c-d Intermediate avijnapti is lost through the cutting off of the force, the undertaking, the action, the object, the life, and the roots.
We have seen (iv. 37c-d) how one acquires avijnnapti which differs from discipline and from indiscipline.
This avijnapti is lost by reason of six causes: (1) when the intense force of faith, or the defilements which have projected the avijnapti, come to an end Example: the movement of the arrow and the potter's wheel; (2) when one renounces the undertaking, "From this moment
181 onward, I shall no longer do that which I was engaged in doing;" (3)
when one cuts off the action, that is to say, when one does not do that which one was engaged in doing, [for example: venerating the Buddha,
l82
making a manddaka before eating (see note 163)];
(4) when the
object is cut off: the caitya, the garden, the monastery, the bed, the seat,
which one was in engaged in venerating or in giving; the instrument,
42a-b. Good non-material aaion, of the sphere of Kamadhatu, is lost through the cutting off of the roots, and through arising in a superior sphere.
We have explained how material aaion, namely bodily aaion, vocal aaion, and the avijnapati, is cut off. Good non-material aaion of Kamadhatu is lost thorough the cutting off of the roots of good, and
185 through birth in Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu.
42c-d That which is defiled and non-material is lost through the arising of its opposite.
183 the roots of good.
the net, etc;
(5) when life is cut off; and (6) when one begins to cut off 184
? All that which is defiled, of whatever sphere, is lost through the
arising of the Path which opposes this defilement. This refers to a path
of abandoning (prahdnamdrga, distinct from vimuktimdrga, vi. 65b)
which can be Seeing or Meditation, and which can be worldly or
transworldly. This Path causes the abandonment of a certain category of 186
upaklesa and, with it, all its attendant prdptis, etc *#*
What beings are susceptible to discipline and to undiscipline?
43a-d Humans--with the exception of the two categories of eunuchs, hermaphrodites, and the Kurus--are susceptible of undiscipline; the same for the discipline which pertains also to the gods.
Undiscipline exists only among humans. One must furthermore 187
except sandhas and pandakas, hermaphrodites and beings in Uttarakuru.
Discipline exists among humans, with the above-mentioned
188
exception, and among the gods: thus, it exists in two realms of
rebirth.
1. Eunuchs are not susceptible of discipline: this results from the
Sutra, "Oh Mahanama, white clothed laymen, male and possessing the male organ. . . " (iv. 30a-b), and from the Vinaya, "One must expel such a person. "
. Why is this?
Because they possess, to an extreme degree, the defilements of the
two sexes; because they are incapable of the reflection necessary to combat these defilements; and because the vigor of respect and fear (hn, apatrapya, ii. 32a-b) is absent in them.
Why are they not susceptible to undiscipline?
Because the intention of committing transgressions is not strong among them; because undiscipline is opposed to discipline; and only one who is susceptible to disciplined susceptible to undiscipline.
2. The Uttarakurus are lacking the undertaking of any discipline,
from whence there is an absence of the Pratimoksa discipline; and they
189
lack absorption, from whence there is an absence of the other two
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disciplines. On the other hand, the intention of committing trans- gressions is absent in them.
3. In the painful realms of rebirth there is no vigor of respect and fear: now a vigorous respect and fear are necessary for discipline; in order for there to be indiscipline, it is necessary to destroy respect and fear (iv. 97b).
Neither discipline nor undiscipline can arise in the bodies, or in the persons, of eunuchs, hermaphordites, and beings in the realms of painful rebirth, for these bodies are similar to soil saturated with salt wherein there can neither grow wheat, nor bad herbs.
Objection: The Sutra says, "Oh Bhiksu, there is a Naga born from an egg (iii. 9a) which, each eighth day of the fortnight, leaves its dwelling, and comes to undertake the eightfold fast. " (Samyutta, iii. ,241; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 648cl9; compare with Visuddhimagga, 300).
This refers, for the Nagas, not to discipline, but to good actions. Discipline exists thus solely among humans and among the gods.
43d. The three disciplines exist among humans.
These three are the Pratimoksa discipline, discipline arisen from
dhydna, and pure discipline.
44a-b. Discipline of dhydna exists among the gods of Kama-
19 dhatuandRupadhata ?
Not in higher spheres.
44b-d So too the pure discipline, with the exception of the gods
of the intermediate dhydna and the Asamjnisattvas; and also in 191
It exists in Rupadhata with the exception of the dhydndntarikas of
beings arisen in intermediate dhydna, and the Asamjnisattvas; and in
Arupyadhatu. The gods of Arupyadhatu never in faa manifest this
Arupyadhatu.
discipline, since discipline is matter, mpa; but they can "possess" it (see 192
iv. 82).
Following the examination of action, the author now defines the
diverse categories of action which are taught in different Sutras.
***
? There are three actions, good, bad, and neutral (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 263a6).
45a-b. Good action is salutary, bad action is pernicious, and action differing from good and bad is different from the salutary and the pernicious.
Such is the definition of good action, etc
Good aaion is salutary, because it is of agreeable retribution and as a consequence it protects one from suffering for a time (: this is good, but impure aaion); or rather, because it brings about the attainment of Nirvana and, as a consequence, definitively protects one from suffering (: this is good, pure action).
Bad aaion is pernicious: this is action of disagreeable retribution.
Aaion concerning which the Blessed One does not say whether it is gpod or bad, that is, morally neutral aaion, is neither salutary nor pernicious.
45c-d There are meritorious actions, demeritorious aaions, and non-agitated aaions; and three aaions of which the aaion of agreeable feeling is the first.
There are three aaions: meritorious aaion, demeritorious aaion, and non-agitated aaion. There are three aaions: aaion of agreeable feeling, aaion of disagreeable feeling, and aaion of neither disagreeable nor agreeable feeling.
46a-b. Meritorious aaion is a good aaion in Kamadhatu; non-
193 agitated aaion is a gpod aaion above there.
Good aaion of the sphere of Kamadhatu is called "meritorious"
aaion, because it purifies, and because it produces an agreeable
194 retribution.
"Good aaion above there," that is to say, of the two higher spheres,
195 is called "non-agitated. "
But did not the Blessed One say that the first three Dhyanas are
agitated? Did he not say that "the Aryans say that the vitarkita and the 196
vicarita of the First Dhyana are agitation? "
The Blessed One said in faa that the first three Dhyanas are
agitated, but he is saying this from the point of view of the corrupted
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characteristics of these dhyanas (iitlOlc, vi. 24a, and the full explanation 197
viii. ll); their vices are what agitate them. But in the Injitasutra, the Blessed One declared that these dhyanas are non-agitated because he
198 considerd them a pathway favorable to non-agitation.
l But why term that which is agitated non-agitated? "
46c-d Because, with regard to that which concerns its retribu- tion, aaion of the domain of the higher stages does not vary.
Aaion of the sphere of Kamadhatu is agitated in its retributioa The place of retribution is not fixed: one aaion which produces, naturally, a certain realm of rebirth, can be retributed in another one; an aaion which produces a heavenly realm of rebirth can be retributed in another heavenly realm of rebirth. In faa it happens that aaions which produce power, a good figure, beauty, or objects of enjoyqient, instead of being retributed in a heavenly realm of rebirth, are retributed in a human, animal, or Preta realm of rebirth through the efficacy of certain causes. But no cause can make an aaion of the sphere of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu be retributed in any but the sphere which is proper to it.
Bad aaion is demeritorious. This is well known in the world and there is no good reason to insist on what is well known in the world
As for aaions of^agreeable feeling, etc:
47a-b. Good action, up to the Third Dhyana, is of agreeable
200 feeling.
201
Agreeable sensation does not exist above the Third Dhyanas: it
thus has Kamadhatu and the first three Dhyanas for its domain. Hence the retribution of good aaion is of agreeable feeling up to the Third Dhyana. Aaion having such a retribution is called "of agreeable sensation" (see iv. 49).
47b-c Above, it is of neither agreeable nor disagreeable
202 sensation.
Agreeable and disagreeable sensation do not exist above the Third Dhyana. There only remains the sensation of indifference, which is the only retribution of good aaion retributed above the Third Dhyana.
47c-d Bad aaion, here below, is of disagreeable sensation.
? Bad aaion is of disagreeable sensation. The kdrikd says "here below" in order to indicate that this aaion exists only in Kamadhatu.
Is the result of all these aaions only sensation?
No; they also have the apparatus of sensation as their (retributive)
204 result.
48a. According to some, intermediary aaion also exists
205 below.
According to others, intermediary aaion--that is, aaion which has for its retribution neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation--also exists below the Fourth Dhyana, (contrary to the doarine iv. 47a-c; see Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 596bl3; two arguments, 48b and 48c-d)
206 48b. Since there is no retribution with regard to dhydnantara.
If intermediary aaion is absent below the Fourth Dhyana, there 207 208
would not be any retribution of dhydnantara aaion, or rather, there would not be any retribution of any aaion whatsoever in
209
dhydnantara, for there are no agreeable and disagreeable sensations
therein.
[Responding to this argument,] some say that the retribution of
dhydnantara aaion is the sensation of pleasure (sukhendrtya, ii. 7; 210
viii. 9b) of the dhyana itself; some others say that the retribution of
211
this aaion is not sensation, (but rupa, etc).
These two opinions are in contradiaion to the Sastra (Jndna-
prasthdna, TD 26, p. 973a20), "Does it happen that an aaion is solely mental sensation? Yes, the retribution of a good aaion which was free
112 from vitarka"
48c-d Because it is admitted that the retribution of the three types of aaion takes place at the one and same time.
This is the second reason why one should admit that intermediary aaion exists below the Fourth Dhyana.
The Sastra says in the same place, "Does it happen that there is at one and the same time retribution of the three types of aaion? Yes.
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There can take place at the same time: (1) the retribution of an aaion of agreeable sensation, namely of material dharmas, [the organ of seeing, etc]; (2) the retribution of an aaion of disagreeable sensation, namely the mind and the mental states [excluding dissatisfaction, iL10b>>c]; (3) the retribution of an aaion of neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation, namely the dharmas dissociated from the mind, [vital organ, etc, iL35]. "
Now, the three types of aaion cannot be retributed simultaneously
outside of Kamadhatu, for the retribution of aaion of disagreeable
sensation takes place only in Kamadhatu (Vibhdfd, TD 27, p. 6l5c4). T
Is the aaion of neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation [when it belongs to a stage lower than the Fourth Dhyana] good or bad?
It is good, but of weak force,
But didn't you say that "good aaion, up to the Third Dhyana, is of agreeable sensation (iv. 47a)? "
This definition refers to cases in general
*#*
But how can one say that aaion is of agreeable sensation? Aaion, by
213 its nature, is not sensation.
One expresses oneself in this way because aaion is favorable to agreeable sensation; or rather, because its retribution is agreeably sensed In the same way that one calls bathing clothes, snaniyakasaya, "the clothes with which one bathes," in that same way one terms "to be sensed" (vedaniya) aaion through which one senses a retribution,
Further,
49. There are five ways of being vedaniya, "sensed," "ex- perienced:" of itself, through sensation, as an objea, by being
214 retributed, and by the faa of its presence.
1. Sensation, by its nature, is feeling. Agreeable sensation is agreeable experience, etc (il4c; ii24).
2. Contact is feeling because it is associated with sensation: contact
? of agreeable sensation, etc (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 88a4 et passim, Samyutta, v. 211; Kofa, it trans, p. 169 and 180).
3. The six objects (visaya) of the six organs are feeling in the role of object (Mambana), "Seeing color with the eye, he experiences, he feels
215
the color, but he does not feel the color with affection. " Color is thus
the object of sensation.
4. Action is feeling in its role of being retributed, "an action
experienced in the present existence" (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 433all). 5. Sensation is feeling through the fact of its appearance. "When he
feels, when he experiences agreeable sensation, two sensations, the
216 disagreeable and the neutral, are then found to be obstructed by it:"
hence when agreeable sensation is funaioning, there is no other sensation through which one would feel it Thus if one says that this sensation is "to be felt" (vedaniya), this is because it is present.
217 50a. This action is determinate or indeterminate.
The action (agreeable sensation, etc) that we have just described is either determinate, that is, "which will necessarily be felt," or indeterminate, "which will next be necessarily felt. "
50b-c Determinate action is of three types, to be experienced in
218
Determinate action is: (1) to be experienced in the present life; (2) to be experienced after having been reborn, in other words in the next immediate life; and (3) to be experienced later.
By adding indeterminate action, this makes, from the point of view of the modality of retribution, four types.
219 50c-d According to one opinion, action is of five types.
By dividing indeterminate action into two categories: that which is indeterminate with regard to the period of its retribution, but whose retribution is in any case certain; and that which is indeterminate with regard to its retribution, which can be not retributed.
***
Action experienced in the present life is action which ripens or is
the present life, etc
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retributed in the same existence in which it was accomplished Action experienced after being reborn is aaion which is retributed In the existence which follows that in which it was accomplished. Aaion experienced later is aaion which is retributed in a later existence, from the third existence on.
But, some other masters, [the Sautrantikas], cannot admit that a very strong aaion has a weak retributioa Consequently, the retribution of an aaion experienced in the present life can continue into other existences; yet, as this retribution begins in the present life, this aaion is said "to be experienced in the present life.