complete
ingenuousness
reigns: the falseness never even occurs to the mind of
those concerned.
those concerned.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
?
to be
It
on to
in
of
it
is is, in
to
a in
? 288 THE WILL TO POWER.
position
short, conditions in which he would no longer
stand in the highest sphere, which requires other qualities.
354.
The "good man" as a tyrant--Mankind has always repeated the same error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the measure and standard of life;--instead of seeking the
standard in the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, it takes the
Preservative measures of a very definite kind of
life, and uses them to exclude all other kinds of
life, and even to criticise Life itself and to select
from among its forms. That is to say, man
ultimately forgets that measures are a means to
an end, and gets to like them for themselves:
they take the place of a goal in his mind, and
even become the standard of goals to him-- that is to say, a given species of man regards his
means of existence as the only legitimate means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as "truth," "goodness," "perfection": the given species, in fact, begins to tyrannise. . . . It is a
form of faith, of instinct, when a certain species
of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned, when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate, any species
of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights,
and no longer desires to be master.
of a "useful instrument"--an "ideal or at best a herdsman: in
gregarious animal,"
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
355.
289
"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.
>k
"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb.
356.
Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate:
thus you would that men were ? --that good men were ? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future.
357.
The metamorphoses of slavery, its disguise in the cloak of religion; its transfiguration through morality.
358.
The ideal slave (the "good man"). --He who
cannot regard himself as a "purpose," and who
cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, in
stinctively honours the morality of unselfishness. Everything urges him to this morality: his
prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And even faith is a form of self-denial.
:k
Atavism: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for once.
sk VOL. I. T
? ? ? ? 29O
THE WILL TO POWER.
Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance,
are just so many obstacles in the way of sovereign sentiments, of great ingenuity, of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.
sk
\: /
It is not a question of going ahead (to that end all that is required is to be at best a herdsman,
\ that is to say, the prime need of the herd), it is
a matter of getting along alone, of being able to be another.
? 359.
We must realise all that has been accumulated as the result of the highest moral idealism: how almost all other values have crystallised round
very long time and with the strongest passions--and
This shows that has been desired for
that has not yet been attained: otherwise would have disappointed everybody (that say,
would have been followed by more moderate
valuation). The saint
natural seemed the
the most powerful type man: which has elevated the value
high. One would think that the whole science had been engaged proving that the moral man the most powerful and most
this ideal
moral perfection
godly. --The conquest
passions--everything inspired terror;--the
natural and
transcendental,
the senses and the un spectators super
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, ,
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to be
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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
36O.
29I
Francis of Assisi : amorous and popular, a poet
who combats the order of rank among souls, in
favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual
man, the saint, the sage, the just man. O Marcus
? Aurelius !
361.
I have declared war against the anaemic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate but only put an end its tyranny and clear the way for other ideals, for more robust ideals.
The continuance the Christian ideal belongs
the most desirable desiderata: only for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their
stand beside and perhaps above it--they must have opponents, and strong ones too, order
grow strong themselves. That why we im
alike before God. "
Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish
morality: our
insists upon our strength -- all
them.
the so-called
Egoism and problem
gloominess La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism
moralists require the power instinct self-preservation opponents maintaining their requires
become master
Concerning the Slander Evil Qualities.
362.
The Christian
*~.
? ? ? of
its
is to
of
it
to
!
of
of
is
C.
it
to
of
in
if
it,
to . .
of of
to
? |
|
Egoism But no one has yet asked: what is the ego like? Everybody is rather inclined to see all egos alike. This is the result of the slave theory, of universal suffrage, and of "equality. "
292
THE WILL TO POWER.
in everything, and imagined that he had therefore
reduced the worth of things and virtues ! In
opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that
nothing else could exist save egoism,--that in
those men whose ego is weak and thin, the power > to love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers
* are such owing to the strength of their ego,--that
love is an expression egoism,
of etc. As a matter
of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the cause of uni versal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of men.
363.
Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest
regards his habits as more important than his advantage.
364.
? 365.
The behaviour of a higher man is the result of
a very complex set of motives: any word such as "pity" betrays nothing of this complexity. The
? ? ? possible
France standing below where
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
293
most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other relative to me? "--Thus the
valuing spirit is continually active.
366.
To think that the history of all moral pheno mena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought,
--that is to say, that pity is to be found at the
root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,-is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense
and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which the Germans, from
Herder to Hegel, have undergone.
367.
My "pity. "--This is a feeling for which I can
find no adequate term : I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what
power and what tasteless problems for back woodsmen (At time when the brave and light
? hearted scepticism
the development
Montaigne was already
Or when see some one might have stood, thanks
set perfectly senseless
accidents. Or even when, with the thought man's destiny my mind, contemplate with
horror and contempt the whole system modern European politics, which creating the circum
? ? in
)a of
is
I of
of
of
to
in
l
of
a he
a
I
fit
? THE WILL TO POWER.
stances and weaving the fabric of the whole future
294
of mankind. attain, if
Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to the health, "it cannot possibly
be our duty to increase the evil in the world. " If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self
and not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon
emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an infection.
369.
There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and does not exceed them--
consequently, the "allowable," the "morally in
different" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.
"One is continually promoting the interests of one's "ego" at the cost of other people"; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself.
37O.
The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the ego of
which every one speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.
This is sympathise in this way.
my "pity"; despite
the
Yes, to what could not "mankind"
!
fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I
368.
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
295
37 I.
Our "ego"--which is not one with the unitary controlling force of our beings! --is really only an
imagined synthesis; "egoistic" actions.
372.
Since instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent standpoint far they are concerned.
Every instinct, when active, sacrifices strength
and other instincts into the bargain: the end stemmed, otherwise would be the end of
everything owing the waste would bring
about. Thus: that which "unegoistic," self sacrificing, and imprudent nothing particular
--it common all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare the whole ego (because they
simply not think they act counter our interests, against the ego; and often for the ego-- innocent both cases
373.
The origin of moral values. --Selfishness has
much value the physiological value him who
possesses Each individual represents the whole course Evolution, and he not, morals teach,
something that begins his birth. re present the ascent the line mankind, his value fact, very great; and the concern about his maintenance and the promoting his growth may even be extreme. (It the concern about
therefore there can be no -
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of
is as
is
as
is, in
is is
of
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of inin
of
! /),of
to
at
it as is itis
of
it.
do
a all
he
as
to
as
in
to
it
? THE WILL TO POWER.
296
the promise of the future in him which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism. ) If he represent descending development, decay, chronic sickening, he has
little worth : and the greatest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as
possible from the well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to suppress egoism (for the latter
may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion of "love," the curbing of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, re signation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and
deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy, -feelings which are only
too natural in the bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty,
of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why
the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness,
the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross. " The preponderance of an altruistic way of
? valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon ex
amination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much," simply a psychological valua
tion; more plainly still: it is the feeling of im potence, of the lack of the great self-asserting
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
297
impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation gets translated, according to the
particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or
moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-con fidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate
condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the
Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their
existence is something for which some one must be guilty, they are very closely related to the Christian,
who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he
has found some one whom he can hold responsible
? for appears life,
favour shown The hatred the case
The instinct revenge and resentment both cases here means enduring
self-preservative measure,
also the altruistic theory and practice.
egoism, whether one's own (as
the Christian), another's (as the Socialists), thus appears valua
the case
tion reached under the predominance revenge;
and also act prudence on the part the preservative instinct the suffering, the form
*
? ? of of
of
in
ofas a
as
is of
as of an
of of to
of
in
in
it.
or it be
as a
as a
in
? 298
THE WILL TO POWER.
of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity. . . . At bottom, as I have already suggested,
the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism
(one's own or that of others) is yet another self preservative instinct on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly
appears under certain definite physiological cir CumstanceS.
When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it
only shows that he is oppressed by his inade
quate culture, and is unable to understand why
he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;--if
he were more at ease he would take jolly good
care not to cry in. that way: in that case he
would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same
holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even
except himself. But that is no reason for taking
him seriously. In both cases we are in the
presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.
374.
Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures,--at least in its own
aristocratic order of values, the Jew was reduced
? imagination,--as
also to starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our "criminal. " In the midst of the Roman and
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
299
to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while
among pious people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it
is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in my books becomes a caricature.
375.
All the instincts and forces which
praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the service of the will to power.
376.
The turning of man's nature inwards. The
process of turning a nature inwards arises when,
owing to the establishment of peace and society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting
themselves outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagi nation. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence is reverted, "it steps backwards";
in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the
powers
scope; the instincts are thus transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.
of dissimulation and falsehood find their
377. Falsity--Every sovereign
instinct makes the others instruments, retainers and syco
morality
? ? ? its
its
its
? 300
THE WILL TO POWER.
phants: it never allows itself to be called by more hateful name: and brooks no terms of
praise which cannot indirectly find its share. Around every sovereign instinct all praise and
blame general crystallises form ceremonial and etiquette.
into rigorous This one
dominion, but
falsity.
the causes
Every instinct which aspires
which finds itself under yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the most generally accepted values strengthen and support its
self-esteem, and this explains why rule dares to come forward under the name of the
"master" combating and from whom would free (for instance, under the domination
Christian values, the desires the flesh and of
power act this way). This the other cause falsity.
?
complete ingenuousness reigns: the falseness never even occurs to the mind of
those concerned. the sign broken instinct when man sees the motive force and its
"expression" ("the mask") separate things--
sign
both cases
inner contradiction and much less
bearing, word, and passion, "good conscience" falseness,
formidable. Absolute innocence
and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and
most pompous words and attitudes are appro priated--all these things are necessary for
victory.
the other case: that say, when extreme clearsightedness present, the genius the actor
needful well tremendous discipline self
? ? is
it of of
in
a a is it it of
In is In a
of in
it
as
isa isto
as
It
of
it
of
is
is a
it
to
as is of
it
in
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be in
in
to
its
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3OI
control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why priests are the cleverest and most conscious hypo crites; and then come princes, in whom their position
in life and their antecedents account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists come third, and women fourth.
The fundamental thought: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and the will is directed so
inexorably against perfect self-knowledge accurate self-classification, that one is very pro
bably right in supposing that Truth and the will to truth are perhaps something quite different and
only disguises. (The need of faith is the greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness. )
378.
"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood":
insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledg ment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be
lied to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the unreality of this popular "truthfulness. " There is too much or too little being said continually: to insist upon people's exposing themselves with every word they say, is a piece of naivete? .
People say what they think, they are "truth
ful"; but only under certain circumstances: that is to say, provided they be understood (inter pares),
and understood with good will into the bargain (once more inter pares). One conceals one's self in the presence of the unfamiliar: and he who would attain to something, says what he would fain have
and
? people
? ? ? 302
THE WILL TO POWER.
people think about him, but not what he thinks. ("The powerful man is always a liar. ")
379.
The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism con. cealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values:--
(a) Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.
Only the most impersonal intellect ("the philosopher") can know the truth, "the true
things. "
(c) Genius, great men are great, because they
essence and nature
do not strive to further their own interests: the
? value man increases himself.
(d) Art the work subject"; misunderstanding
proportion effaces
the "pure free-willed "objectivity. "
(e) Happiness the object life: virtue means to an end.
The pessimistic condemnation life by Scho
penhauer
gregarious
physics. *
moral one. Transference the standards into the realm meta
The "individual" lacks sense, he must there fore have his origin "the thing itself" (and the significance his existence must be shown
"error"); parents are only "accidental cause. "--The mistake on the part science
considering the individual the result all past life instead the epitome all past life, now becoming known,
? ? of
of
as
as
of
in
of of
of
is in
of
of
of an
as he
to be
(b)
in
of
is a
of as
as a
of
in of
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
38o.
3O3
1. Systematic falsification of history; so that it may present a proof of the moral valua tions:
(a) The decline of a people and corruption.
(b) The rise of a people and virtue.
(c) The zenith of a people ("its culture")
regarded as the result of high moral excellence. 2. Systematic falsification of great men, great
creators, and great periods. The desire is to make
faith that which distinguishes great men: whereas
carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immoral ity," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to
greatness (Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe).
The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed.
381.
A great lie in history; as if the corruption of
the Church were the cause of the Reformation |
This was only the pretext and self-deception of
the agitators--very strong needs were making
themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely re quired a spiritual dressing.
382.
Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the emancipation from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral pre judices which is coincident with the emancipation
? ? ? ? 3O4
THE WILL TO POWER.
of a great mind; he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived
to set up the only moral value he honoured-- self-effacement, as the one condition of highest
intellectual
activity: "objective" contemplation.
"Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the withdrawal of the will. . . .
Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a
fundamentally different valuation. Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will, of morality and immorality, I know nothing about at all. The moral is a lower kind of animal than
the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type
of his own. He is a copy; at the best, a good
copy--the standard of his worth lies without him. I value a man according to the quantum of power
and fullness of his will : not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I con
sider that a philosophy which teaches the denial
of will is both defamatory and slanderous. . . . I
test the power of a will according to the amount
of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn
to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil
and pain of existence with the finger of reproach,
but rather entertain the hope that life may one
day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.
The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what the good man already does instinctively. . . .
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
305
He denies that there can be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a non plus
ultra. . . . Here intellectuality is placed much
lower than goodness; highest value (as art, for
instance) would lead and advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predomin ance of moral values.
Next Schopenhauer will now characterise
Kant: there was nothing Greek Kant; was
quite anti-historical (cf his attitude regard
the French Revolution) and moral fanatic (see Goethe's words concerning the radically evil
element human nature *). Saintliness also
? lurked somewhere his soul. criticism the saintly type.
Hegel's value: "Passion. "
require
Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man.
*TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. --This doubtless reference
passage letter written by Goethe Herder, on 7th June 1793, from the camp Marienborn, near Mainz, which
the following words occur:--"Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem ein langes
AMenschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudel haften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem Schand. fleck des radikalen Bo? sen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu kissen. "-- ("Kant, on the other hand, after had tried throughout his life keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul pre judices, wantonly dirtied the end with the disreputable
stain the 'radical evil' human nature, order that Christians too might lured into kissing hem. ") From
this passage will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view Kant namely, that he was Christian
disguise. VOL.
? ? U
in in
its
in
of I.
to
in a
it of
be
; it
at
in
be to
in a
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its
. era I
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he to a up
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to
to
a a to
.
in to,
? 306
THE WILL TO POWER.
philosophers, historians, and psychologists: everything of value in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and
technology must be shown to be morally valuable and morally conditioned, in its aim, means, and
result. Everything is seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow
better? "--a funny question, for the reverse is
obvious, and is a fact which speaks in favour of civilisation.
383.
Religious morality. --Passion, great desire; the passions of power, love, revenge, and property:
the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out of it.
The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they are evil and ought to be
This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out. " In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity," the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be only the loss of a parti cular member, but the actual castration of the whole of the man's character. . . . And the same
applies to the moral mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for
Fundamental instinct of all
? condemned. Man must wring himself free from them, otherwise he cannot be a good man. . . .
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
307
their extirpation. conclusion always only
the emasculated man good man.
Instead making use and economising
the great sources passion, those torrents the
dangerous, overwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted
soul which are often
and most corrupted mental attitudes--would
fain make them dry up.
384.
-
Conquest over the passions 3-No, not
to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation.
this
? They must
end may
deal (not
etc. ). At length we should trust them enough
enlisted our service and this necessary tyrannise them good
individuals, but communities, races,
restore their freedom them: they love like good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.
385.
Intolerance the part morality sign
man's weakness: he frightened his own "immorality," he must deny his strongest instincts,
because he does not yet know how use them. Thus the most fruitful quarters the globe remain uncultivated longest: the power lack ing that might become master here.
386.
There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous fine weather would be
? ? . ofto
. of is
:
of
of is:
on
is to of
in
of
is Its
isa if us ato
of
to is
as
it
as be be
of of so
to
a of
? THE WILL TO POWER.
308
a desirable thing: they still believe to-day in rebus moralibus, that the "good man" alone and
nothing else than the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's evolution will
be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that it is only to that end that all efforts
highest
degree an uneconomical thought; as we have already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity,
and it is nothing more than the expression of the
agreeableness which the "good man" creates (he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, -
he gives what one is able to take).
With a more educated eye one learns to desire
exactly the reverse -- that is to say, an ever greater dominion of evil, man's gradual emancipa
tion from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the growth of power around the greatest
forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the
passions
The whole idea of the hierarchy of the passions:
as if the only right and normal thing were to be
led by reason--whereas the passions are abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as
their end is concerned, nothing more than desires for pleasure. . . . .
Passion is deprived of dignity (1)
only manifested itself an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the motive force,
should be directed). This is in the
? in one's service.
387.
? ? in
its
as if it
-
-
---* - ***- -
=-
-------------"
-
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
309
(2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high purpose--merely at pleasure. . . .
The misinterpretation of passion and reason, as
if the latter were an independent entity, and not
a state of relationship between all the various | passions and desires; and as though every passion : did not possess its quantum of reason. . . .
388.
How it was that, under the pressure of the
dominion of an ascetic and self-effacing morality, it was precisely the passions--love, goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were
necessarily misunderstood:
It is the richness of a personality, the fullness of
its power flow over and bestow, its instinctive feeling ease, and its affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love
and great sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism surely do
? obtrude, and the inner right everything. The the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing give, and perfectly useless
the desire be master,
certainty that one has opposite views, according
stretch out one's hand either support others.
protect
How was possible transform these instincts to such an extent that man could feel that to be
value which directed against himself, that he could sacrifice himself for another self! the
? ? of
to
it,
is
. .
to
to
O so
or
as
it
to
to
to to
is to
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it
to
as
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of
? 3IO
THE WILL TO POWER.
psychological baseness and falseness which hither to has laid down the law in the Church and in
Church-infected philosophy !
If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do
is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought
not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he does himself; the love of man requires a justifi
cation,
commanded it. --From this it follows that all the
and it is found in the fact that God
natural instincts of man (to love, etc. ) appear to him to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he
re-acquires a right to them only after having
denied them as an obedient worshipper of God. . . . Pascal, the admirable logician of Christianity,
went as far as this ! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make one's self
loved," seemed Christian to him,
389.
Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal") makes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The "egoists. ")
The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in
The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, the creature who is an
instrument).
Pangs
? La Rochefoucauld)--inner en
Europe (Pascal,
feeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption of the non-gregarious man.
of conscience associated with all that
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3II
is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the unhappiness--the gloominess of the world from
the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men
Gregarious
transferred to philosophy and religion.
It
on to
in
of
it
is is, in
to
a in
? 288 THE WILL TO POWER.
position
short, conditions in which he would no longer
stand in the highest sphere, which requires other qualities.
354.
The "good man" as a tyrant--Mankind has always repeated the same error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the measure and standard of life;--instead of seeking the
standard in the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, it takes the
Preservative measures of a very definite kind of
life, and uses them to exclude all other kinds of
life, and even to criticise Life itself and to select
from among its forms. That is to say, man
ultimately forgets that measures are a means to
an end, and gets to like them for themselves:
they take the place of a goal in his mind, and
even become the standard of goals to him-- that is to say, a given species of man regards his
means of existence as the only legitimate means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as "truth," "goodness," "perfection": the given species, in fact, begins to tyrannise. . . . It is a
form of faith, of instinct, when a certain species
of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned, when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate, any species
of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights,
and no longer desires to be master.
of a "useful instrument"--an "ideal or at best a herdsman: in
gregarious animal,"
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
355.
289
"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.
>k
"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb.
356.
Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate:
thus you would that men were ? --that good men were ? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future.
357.
The metamorphoses of slavery, its disguise in the cloak of religion; its transfiguration through morality.
358.
The ideal slave (the "good man"). --He who
cannot regard himself as a "purpose," and who
cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, in
stinctively honours the morality of unselfishness. Everything urges him to this morality: his
prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And even faith is a form of self-denial.
:k
Atavism: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for once.
sk VOL. I. T
? ? ? ? 29O
THE WILL TO POWER.
Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance,
are just so many obstacles in the way of sovereign sentiments, of great ingenuity, of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.
sk
\: /
It is not a question of going ahead (to that end all that is required is to be at best a herdsman,
\ that is to say, the prime need of the herd), it is
a matter of getting along alone, of being able to be another.
? 359.
We must realise all that has been accumulated as the result of the highest moral idealism: how almost all other values have crystallised round
very long time and with the strongest passions--and
This shows that has been desired for
that has not yet been attained: otherwise would have disappointed everybody (that say,
would have been followed by more moderate
valuation). The saint
natural seemed the
the most powerful type man: which has elevated the value
high. One would think that the whole science had been engaged proving that the moral man the most powerful and most
this ideal
moral perfection
godly. --The conquest
passions--everything inspired terror;--the
natural and
transcendental,
the senses and the un spectators super
? ? to
is
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it
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, ,
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to be
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? hierarchy--"all
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
36O.
29I
Francis of Assisi : amorous and popular, a poet
who combats the order of rank among souls, in
favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual
man, the saint, the sage, the just man. O Marcus
? Aurelius !
361.
I have declared war against the anaemic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate but only put an end its tyranny and clear the way for other ideals, for more robust ideals.
The continuance the Christian ideal belongs
the most desirable desiderata: only for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their
stand beside and perhaps above it--they must have opponents, and strong ones too, order
grow strong themselves. That why we im
alike before God. "
Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish
morality: our
insists upon our strength -- all
them.
the so-called
Egoism and problem
gloominess La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism
moralists require the power instinct self-preservation opponents maintaining their requires
become master
Concerning the Slander Evil Qualities.
362.
The Christian
*~.
? ? ? of
its
is to
of
it
to
!
of
of
is
C.
it
to
of
in
if
it,
to . .
of of
to
? |
|
Egoism But no one has yet asked: what is the ego like? Everybody is rather inclined to see all egos alike. This is the result of the slave theory, of universal suffrage, and of "equality. "
292
THE WILL TO POWER.
in everything, and imagined that he had therefore
reduced the worth of things and virtues ! In
opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that
nothing else could exist save egoism,--that in
those men whose ego is weak and thin, the power > to love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers
* are such owing to the strength of their ego,--that
love is an expression egoism,
of etc. As a matter
of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the cause of uni versal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of men.
363.
Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest
regards his habits as more important than his advantage.
364.
? 365.
The behaviour of a higher man is the result of
a very complex set of motives: any word such as "pity" betrays nothing of this complexity. The
? ? ? possible
France standing below where
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
293
most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other relative to me? "--Thus the
valuing spirit is continually active.
366.
To think that the history of all moral pheno mena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought,
--that is to say, that pity is to be found at the
root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,-is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense
and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which the Germans, from
Herder to Hegel, have undergone.
367.
My "pity. "--This is a feeling for which I can
find no adequate term : I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what
power and what tasteless problems for back woodsmen (At time when the brave and light
? hearted scepticism
the development
Montaigne was already
Or when see some one might have stood, thanks
set perfectly senseless
accidents. Or even when, with the thought man's destiny my mind, contemplate with
horror and contempt the whole system modern European politics, which creating the circum
? ? in
)a of
is
I of
of
of
to
in
l
of
a he
a
I
fit
? THE WILL TO POWER.
stances and weaving the fabric of the whole future
294
of mankind. attain, if
Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to the health, "it cannot possibly
be our duty to increase the evil in the world. " If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self
and not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon
emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an infection.
369.
There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and does not exceed them--
consequently, the "allowable," the "morally in
different" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.
"One is continually promoting the interests of one's "ego" at the cost of other people"; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself.
37O.
The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the ego of
which every one speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.
This is sympathise in this way.
my "pity"; despite
the
Yes, to what could not "mankind"
!
fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I
368.
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
295
37 I.
Our "ego"--which is not one with the unitary controlling force of our beings! --is really only an
imagined synthesis; "egoistic" actions.
372.
Since instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent standpoint far they are concerned.
Every instinct, when active, sacrifices strength
and other instincts into the bargain: the end stemmed, otherwise would be the end of
everything owing the waste would bring
about. Thus: that which "unegoistic," self sacrificing, and imprudent nothing particular
--it common all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare the whole ego (because they
simply not think they act counter our interests, against the ego; and often for the ego-- innocent both cases
373.
The origin of moral values. --Selfishness has
much value the physiological value him who
possesses Each individual represents the whole course Evolution, and he not, morals teach,
something that begins his birth. re present the ascent the line mankind, his value fact, very great; and the concern about his maintenance and the promoting his growth may even be extreme. (It the concern about
therefore there can be no -
? ? ? is
of
is as
is
as
is, in
is is
of
If
it
of inin
of
! /),of
to
at
it as is itis
of
it.
do
a all
he
as
to
as
in
to
it
? THE WILL TO POWER.
296
the promise of the future in him which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism. ) If he represent descending development, decay, chronic sickening, he has
little worth : and the greatest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as
possible from the well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to suppress egoism (for the latter
may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion of "love," the curbing of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, re signation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and
deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy, -feelings which are only
too natural in the bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty,
of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why
the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness,
the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross. " The preponderance of an altruistic way of
? valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon ex
amination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much," simply a psychological valua
tion; more plainly still: it is the feeling of im potence, of the lack of the great self-asserting
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
297
impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation gets translated, according to the
particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or
moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-con fidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate
condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the
Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their
existence is something for which some one must be guilty, they are very closely related to the Christian,
who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he
has found some one whom he can hold responsible
? for appears life,
favour shown The hatred the case
The instinct revenge and resentment both cases here means enduring
self-preservative measure,
also the altruistic theory and practice.
egoism, whether one's own (as
the Christian), another's (as the Socialists), thus appears valua
the case
tion reached under the predominance revenge;
and also act prudence on the part the preservative instinct the suffering, the form
*
? ? of of
of
in
ofas a
as
is of
as of an
of of to
of
in
in
it.
or it be
as a
as a
in
? 298
THE WILL TO POWER.
of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity. . . . At bottom, as I have already suggested,
the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism
(one's own or that of others) is yet another self preservative instinct on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly
appears under certain definite physiological cir CumstanceS.
When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it
only shows that he is oppressed by his inade
quate culture, and is unable to understand why
he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;--if
he were more at ease he would take jolly good
care not to cry in. that way: in that case he
would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same
holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even
except himself. But that is no reason for taking
him seriously. In both cases we are in the
presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.
374.
Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures,--at least in its own
aristocratic order of values, the Jew was reduced
? imagination,--as
also to starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our "criminal. " In the midst of the Roman and
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
299
to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while
among pious people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it
is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in my books becomes a caricature.
375.
All the instincts and forces which
praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the service of the will to power.
376.
The turning of man's nature inwards. The
process of turning a nature inwards arises when,
owing to the establishment of peace and society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting
themselves outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagi nation. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence is reverted, "it steps backwards";
in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the
powers
scope; the instincts are thus transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.
of dissimulation and falsehood find their
377. Falsity--Every sovereign
instinct makes the others instruments, retainers and syco
morality
? ? ? its
its
its
? 300
THE WILL TO POWER.
phants: it never allows itself to be called by more hateful name: and brooks no terms of
praise which cannot indirectly find its share. Around every sovereign instinct all praise and
blame general crystallises form ceremonial and etiquette.
into rigorous This one
dominion, but
falsity.
the causes
Every instinct which aspires
which finds itself under yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the most generally accepted values strengthen and support its
self-esteem, and this explains why rule dares to come forward under the name of the
"master" combating and from whom would free (for instance, under the domination
Christian values, the desires the flesh and of
power act this way). This the other cause falsity.
?
complete ingenuousness reigns: the falseness never even occurs to the mind of
those concerned. the sign broken instinct when man sees the motive force and its
"expression" ("the mask") separate things--
sign
both cases
inner contradiction and much less
bearing, word, and passion, "good conscience" falseness,
formidable. Absolute innocence
and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and
most pompous words and attitudes are appro priated--all these things are necessary for
victory.
the other case: that say, when extreme clearsightedness present, the genius the actor
needful well tremendous discipline self
? ? is
it of of
in
a a is it it of
In is In a
of in
it
as
isa isto
as
It
of
it
of
is
is a
it
to
as is of
it
in
ofinisof astoa
be in
in
to
its
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3OI
control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why priests are the cleverest and most conscious hypo crites; and then come princes, in whom their position
in life and their antecedents account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists come third, and women fourth.
The fundamental thought: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and the will is directed so
inexorably against perfect self-knowledge accurate self-classification, that one is very pro
bably right in supposing that Truth and the will to truth are perhaps something quite different and
only disguises. (The need of faith is the greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness. )
378.
"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood":
insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledg ment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be
lied to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the unreality of this popular "truthfulness. " There is too much or too little being said continually: to insist upon people's exposing themselves with every word they say, is a piece of naivete? .
People say what they think, they are "truth
ful"; but only under certain circumstances: that is to say, provided they be understood (inter pares),
and understood with good will into the bargain (once more inter pares). One conceals one's self in the presence of the unfamiliar: and he who would attain to something, says what he would fain have
and
? people
? ? ? 302
THE WILL TO POWER.
people think about him, but not what he thinks. ("The powerful man is always a liar. ")
379.
The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism con. cealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values:--
(a) Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.
Only the most impersonal intellect ("the philosopher") can know the truth, "the true
things. "
(c) Genius, great men are great, because they
essence and nature
do not strive to further their own interests: the
? value man increases himself.
(d) Art the work subject"; misunderstanding
proportion effaces
the "pure free-willed "objectivity. "
(e) Happiness the object life: virtue means to an end.
The pessimistic condemnation life by Scho
penhauer
gregarious
physics. *
moral one. Transference the standards into the realm meta
The "individual" lacks sense, he must there fore have his origin "the thing itself" (and the significance his existence must be shown
"error"); parents are only "accidental cause. "--The mistake on the part science
considering the individual the result all past life instead the epitome all past life, now becoming known,
? ? of
of
as
as
of
in
of of
of
is in
of
of
of an
as he
to be
(b)
in
of
is a
of as
as a
of
in of
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
38o.
3O3
1. Systematic falsification of history; so that it may present a proof of the moral valua tions:
(a) The decline of a people and corruption.
(b) The rise of a people and virtue.
(c) The zenith of a people ("its culture")
regarded as the result of high moral excellence. 2. Systematic falsification of great men, great
creators, and great periods. The desire is to make
faith that which distinguishes great men: whereas
carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immoral ity," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to
greatness (Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe).
The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed.
381.
A great lie in history; as if the corruption of
the Church were the cause of the Reformation |
This was only the pretext and self-deception of
the agitators--very strong needs were making
themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely re quired a spiritual dressing.
382.
Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the emancipation from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral pre judices which is coincident with the emancipation
? ? ? ? 3O4
THE WILL TO POWER.
of a great mind; he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived
to set up the only moral value he honoured-- self-effacement, as the one condition of highest
intellectual
activity: "objective" contemplation.
"Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the withdrawal of the will. . . .
Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a
fundamentally different valuation. Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will, of morality and immorality, I know nothing about at all. The moral is a lower kind of animal than
the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type
of his own. He is a copy; at the best, a good
copy--the standard of his worth lies without him. I value a man according to the quantum of power
and fullness of his will : not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I con
sider that a philosophy which teaches the denial
of will is both defamatory and slanderous. . . . I
test the power of a will according to the amount
of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn
to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil
and pain of existence with the finger of reproach,
but rather entertain the hope that life may one
day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.
The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what the good man already does instinctively. . . .
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
305
He denies that there can be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a non plus
ultra. . . . Here intellectuality is placed much
lower than goodness; highest value (as art, for
instance) would lead and advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predomin ance of moral values.
Next Schopenhauer will now characterise
Kant: there was nothing Greek Kant; was
quite anti-historical (cf his attitude regard
the French Revolution) and moral fanatic (see Goethe's words concerning the radically evil
element human nature *). Saintliness also
? lurked somewhere his soul. criticism the saintly type.
Hegel's value: "Passion. "
require
Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man.
*TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. --This doubtless reference
passage letter written by Goethe Herder, on 7th June 1793, from the camp Marienborn, near Mainz, which
the following words occur:--"Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem ein langes
AMenschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudel haften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem Schand. fleck des radikalen Bo? sen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu kissen. "-- ("Kant, on the other hand, after had tried throughout his life keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul pre judices, wantonly dirtied the end with the disreputable
stain the 'radical evil' human nature, order that Christians too might lured into kissing hem. ") From
this passage will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view Kant namely, that he was Christian
disguise. VOL.
? ? U
in in
its
in
of I.
to
in a
it of
be
; it
at
in
be to
in a
to he
its
. era I
in
is I
he to a up
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in
to
to
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.
in to,
? 306
THE WILL TO POWER.
philosophers, historians, and psychologists: everything of value in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and
technology must be shown to be morally valuable and morally conditioned, in its aim, means, and
result. Everything is seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow
better? "--a funny question, for the reverse is
obvious, and is a fact which speaks in favour of civilisation.
383.
Religious morality. --Passion, great desire; the passions of power, love, revenge, and property:
the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out of it.
The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they are evil and ought to be
This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out. " In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity," the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be only the loss of a parti cular member, but the actual castration of the whole of the man's character. . . . And the same
applies to the moral mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for
Fundamental instinct of all
? condemned. Man must wring himself free from them, otherwise he cannot be a good man. . . .
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
307
their extirpation. conclusion always only
the emasculated man good man.
Instead making use and economising
the great sources passion, those torrents the
dangerous, overwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted
soul which are often
and most corrupted mental attitudes--would
fain make them dry up.
384.
-
Conquest over the passions 3-No, not
to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation.
this
? They must
end may
deal (not
etc. ). At length we should trust them enough
enlisted our service and this necessary tyrannise them good
individuals, but communities, races,
restore their freedom them: they love like good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.
385.
Intolerance the part morality sign
man's weakness: he frightened his own "immorality," he must deny his strongest instincts,
because he does not yet know how use them. Thus the most fruitful quarters the globe remain uncultivated longest: the power lack ing that might become master here.
386.
There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous fine weather would be
? ? . ofto
. of is
:
of
of is:
on
is to of
in
of
is Its
isa if us ato
of
to is
as
it
as be be
of of so
to
a of
? THE WILL TO POWER.
308
a desirable thing: they still believe to-day in rebus moralibus, that the "good man" alone and
nothing else than the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's evolution will
be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that it is only to that end that all efforts
highest
degree an uneconomical thought; as we have already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity,
and it is nothing more than the expression of the
agreeableness which the "good man" creates (he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, -
he gives what one is able to take).
With a more educated eye one learns to desire
exactly the reverse -- that is to say, an ever greater dominion of evil, man's gradual emancipa
tion from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the growth of power around the greatest
forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the
passions
The whole idea of the hierarchy of the passions:
as if the only right and normal thing were to be
led by reason--whereas the passions are abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as
their end is concerned, nothing more than desires for pleasure. . . . .
Passion is deprived of dignity (1)
only manifested itself an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the motive force,
should be directed). This is in the
? in one's service.
387.
? ? in
its
as if it
-
-
---* - ***- -
=-
-------------"
-
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
309
(2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high purpose--merely at pleasure. . . .
The misinterpretation of passion and reason, as
if the latter were an independent entity, and not
a state of relationship between all the various | passions and desires; and as though every passion : did not possess its quantum of reason. . . .
388.
How it was that, under the pressure of the
dominion of an ascetic and self-effacing morality, it was precisely the passions--love, goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were
necessarily misunderstood:
It is the richness of a personality, the fullness of
its power flow over and bestow, its instinctive feeling ease, and its affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love
and great sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism surely do
? obtrude, and the inner right everything. The the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing give, and perfectly useless
the desire be master,
certainty that one has opposite views, according
stretch out one's hand either support others.
protect
How was possible transform these instincts to such an extent that man could feel that to be
value which directed against himself, that he could sacrifice himself for another self! the
? ? of
to
it,
is
. .
to
to
O so
or
as
it
to
to
to to
is to
to
it
to
as
if to
a
of
? 3IO
THE WILL TO POWER.
psychological baseness and falseness which hither to has laid down the law in the Church and in
Church-infected philosophy !
If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do
is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought
not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he does himself; the love of man requires a justifi
cation,
commanded it. --From this it follows that all the
and it is found in the fact that God
natural instincts of man (to love, etc. ) appear to him to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he
re-acquires a right to them only after having
denied them as an obedient worshipper of God. . . . Pascal, the admirable logician of Christianity,
went as far as this ! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make one's self
loved," seemed Christian to him,
389.
Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal") makes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The "egoists. ")
The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in
The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, the creature who is an
instrument).
Pangs
? La Rochefoucauld)--inner en
Europe (Pascal,
feeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption of the non-gregarious man.
of conscience associated with all that
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3II
is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the unhappiness--the gloominess of the world from
the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men
Gregarious
transferred to philosophy and religion.
