In Scripture, it is not only the vedana sukha (agreeable
sensation)
which is called sukha; some other dharmas receive this name.
AbhidharmakosabhasyamVol-4VasubandhuPoussinPruden1991
431?
5: Objection of the Vibhajyavudins: If there is absolutely no rupa or physical matter in Arupyadhatu, then the rupa of beings who die in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu and who are reborn in Arupyadhatu, and who, later, die in Arupyadhatu and are reborn below, will have been cut off for 20,000,40,000, and 80,000 kalpas.
How is their rupa produced anew?
If, as you suppose, their rupa, having been cut off, abandoned {prahina), is produced anew, what would prevent us from saying that the samskdras, even though cut off and abandoned upon the obtaining of Nirvana, would reappear later?
In order to avoid this problem, one should admit that rupa exists in Arupyadhatu.
39. Paramartha: "Because it is perfumed (ydsita) by a former cause which should ripen in rupa, the mind has the efficacy to now produce rupa. "
It indeed appears that the expression vdsand (Kofa, iv. 27d, p. 594, vii. 28c,p. 1137, 30c, 32d) is foreign to the Sarvastivada. However this may be, Samghabhadra does not use it.
Samghabhadra, in his Prakaranafdsana (TD 29, p 964b26) says, "What is the meaning of the expression drupya? It means that there is no rupa there. When one dies [in Arupyadhatu] and is born below, the rupa arises from citta. We maintain that, in this world, material and non-material (rupin, arupin) dharmas are produced in fact in reciprocal dependence: from the change of the mind there arises the diversity of rupa; when the material organs are modified, the vijHana is likewise different. Thus, when a being dying in Arupyadhatu arises below, the series of his mind (cittasamtatt) is found to be favorable to the production of rupa, and, by its force, the rupa of a lower existence if favorable to this arising. However it is not permissible to say that rupa arises solely from the mind. It also exists by reason of the series-of-mind-accompanied-by-f>>^ of a former existence: the rupa, destroyed for a long time, is its own seed. We maintain in fact that sabhdgahetu is at one and
? the same time past and present (ii. 52a, p. 262). For the Arhats who have already attained Nirvana have cut off without residue the series of the skandhas; there does not remain any cause which could produce the arising of new skandhas: there is no case to which one could applytheexampleofabeingwhodiesinArupyadhatu[andtakesupanewrupa\ (Seethe argument of the Vibhajyavadins, note 38).
In his Nydydnusdra (TD 29, p. 757cl7), Samghabhadra says, "The dgamas quoted by our adversary do not prove that rupa exists in Arupyadhatu. His argument from reason has no value, for, even though there is no rupa in Arupyadhatu, the rupa of a being of Arupadhatu who has just died and is about to be reborn below comes from the mind. We state that in this world. . .
40. iii. 3c-d: nikdyam jivitam cdtra niiritd cittasamtatih; see ii, 41,45.
41. Vydkhyd: prayogakdla dkdiddiny dkambanani. Hsuan-tsang: The ascetic, in his preparatory exercise, thinks "Space is infinite," "The sixfold vijfidna is infinite," "There is nothing. "
On the drapyas, and how one obtains them, see Majjhima, i. 164, Sutta 121, Visuddhimagga, 326 and following.
Vibhasd (TD 27, p. 432c23): "It is not by reason of its nature or by reason of its object, but by reason of its prayoga that dkdsanantya receives its name. The beginner (ddikdrmika) considers the characteristic of emptiness of the top of a wall, of a tree, of a house; when he has 'grasped' this characteristic of infinite dkdsa. " In the drupyas, the ascetic considers anitya, pratyaya, etc.
Vasumitra explains how, in dkimcanya (preparatory stage), the notion of subject and object is dispelled; see above Chap. VII note 323.
42. This is a question as to whether or not there is samjfid in the fourth drupya, the sphere of "non-samjfid and neither non-samjfid" Anguttara, iv. 426; Kathdvatthu, xiii. 12; Vasumitra and Bhavya.
The "absorption of the cessation of samjfid and vedand" can be obtained only by an ascetic who has entered into this drupya (ii. 44d, English trans, p. 229 and iii. 6c). From this fact, one can conclude that samjfid exists there. (On the subtle-subtle mind, viii. 33b).
43. Compare Majjhima, i. 435, ii. 230; Anguttara, iv. 422> Visuddhimagga, 335. This refers to the samjfids of the lower absorptions. In fact one enters into the fourth drupya by being disgusted with it, by a meditation practiced in the sdmantaka of the third drupya.
AA. That is to say "a cause of stupidity" (sammohakdrana).
45- kasmdt tu tais tad evath grhyate, that is to say, according to the Vydkyd: tair iti tatsamdpattibhis tad iti naivasamjfidndsamjndyatanam evam grhyata iti naiva samjfid ndsamjfieti grhyata ity arthah /
46. Hsuan-tsang: The maulasamdpattis, dhydnas and drupyas, explained above are eight in number . . .
Paramartha: The maulasamdpattis, considered as real dharmas (or dravyas), are solely eight dravyas: four rUpasamapattis and four drUpyasamdpattis.
Vydkhyd: samdpattidravydni mauldniti fdkhds tesdm nopanyasyanta ity abhiprdyah. The Sakhas or "branches" are the sdmantakas (viii. 22a) and dhydndntara, or asamjfiisamdpatti and nirodhasamdpatti.
47. Here we should give up translating andsrava by "pure," a translation justified elsewhere by the synonym amala, nirmala.
Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 821cl7. Andsrava samdpatti is pure in the proper sense of the word; why not call it /uddhaka? . . . Some say: The name is established by reason of the difference of meaning. The samdpatti which is at one and the same time good (ku/aka) and
Footnotes 1287
? 1288 Chapter Eight
possessing-*iT*f<w (sdsrava, laukika), is the first contradiction of the defiled dharmas: it is called ? uddha because the sense of purity is dominant in it. The sense of andsrava is dominant in the Noble Path.
Suddhaka means kusala sdsrava; andsrava is the Path. But the kuiala sdsrava absorption is samala, sakasdya, savisa, sakantaka, sdsrava, and sadosa: how can one call it suddhaka? Now it is called thus, even though it is not absolutely pure, because it is partially so, because it is not mixed with kleia; because it opposes the klesas; because it favors the andsrava absorption which is pure in the true sense of the word; because it is favorable {anukula) to the Path; and because it is the escort of the andsravas.
48. That is to say, "one cannot, having entered into this eighth absorption, meditate on the Path. " Vibhdsd, 162. 11. One cannot practice the Path in Kamadhatu, nor in Bhavagra. See Foreword to Chapters V-VI.
49. Mahdvyutpatti, 85. 7: dsvddanasamprayuktadhydna. Anguttara, ii. 126: "A person . . . enters and abides in the First Dhyana; he tastes it, loves it, and finds therein sensible delight (tarnassddetitarnnikdmetitena cavittirhdpajjati). Ifhedieswithouthavingfallenfromit, he is reborn in the world of the Brahmakayikas. " The same for the other Dhyanas, with rebirth in the heaven which is suitable to it.
This text is invoked by the Andhakas against the Theravadins in the Kathdvatthu, siii. 7.
50. One will find in F. Heiler, Buddhistische Versenkung, 1922, a very complete European bibliography. The most notable Pali sources are Vibhanga, 257, Visuddhi, 139. Among the European works, Burnouf, lotus, 800, Senart, Mahavastu, i. 552 (forgotten by Heiler). It is quite evident that the canonical definitions remain obscure, in spite of the efforts of the Abhidharmikas-Abhidhammikas.
51. In the Bhdsya of the first line, Hsuan-tsang says, "The kdrikd designates teng- ch'ih ? ? (= samddhi) by the word ting ^ (fixed, set): the words differ, but the meaning is the same. This is why the Sutra (Samyukta, 28. 21; see also Madhyama, TD 1, p. 788c19) says "The ting /? ? (sthiti) of the mind, the teng-ting ? *? ~_ (samsthiti) of the mind, is what is called samyaksamddhi\ it is also called subhaikdgrya. "
In the Bhdsya of the third line, Paramartha says, "By chu ft (sthiti) one should understand subhaikdgrya, because chu ft is another name for samddhi. The Sutra says, 'What is samddhi} It is the chu ft (fixedness) of the mind in a correct object (samyagvisaya), correct condition (avasthd). '"
The First Dhyana: contains vitarka, vicdra, priti (= saumanasya, agreeable sensation of the manas, "satisfaction," ii. 8a), sukha (- pra/rabdhi, forming part of the samskdraskandha, ii. 25, English trans, p. 191), and samddhi.
The Second Dhyana: contains adhydtmasamprasdda (-? raddhendriya),priti (=saumana- sya),sukha(=pra/rabdhi) andsamddhi.
The Third Dhyana: contains upeksd (= samskdropeksd, ii. 25, English trans, p. 192), smrti, samprajanya, sukha (agreable sensation, vedand, ii. 7c), and samddhi.
The Fourth Dhyana: contains upeksd (neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable sensation), upeksd-parisuddhi (- samskdropeksd), smrtipatisuddhi, and samddhi.
52. Here Paramartha adds 'These five in absorption are capable of bringing about opposing
prairabdhi. "
53. Caturangasenavdt: compare Samantapdsddikd, i. 146: "In the same way that one understands by "army" the parts of the army and no other (yathd senangesu eva sandsammuti), in this way one understands by Dhyana the fine parts and nothing else . . . The Vibhangha says: "Dhyana contains vitarka, vicdra, pritisukha, and cittasya ekdgratd";. . . thus cittaikdgratd is also a part. " In this same way the School teaches that dharmapravicaya is at one and the same time both Bodhi and a part of Bodhi, that samyagdrsti is both the
? Path and a part of the Path, and that absorption from food is both Upavasa and a part of Upavasa (iv. 29, English trans, p. 597).
54. The formula of this upeksd is given in Vydkhyd, iii. 35: caksusd rupdni drstvd naiva sumand bhavati[- ndnuniyate] na durmand bhavati/= napratihanyate] upeksako bhavati[- ndbhujati / katham ndbhujati kim pratisamkhydya dhosvid apratisamkhydya iti visesayann aba] smrtimdn samprajdnan [- smrtisamprayuktayd prajnayd pratisamiksamdnah]. As is the case of visual consciousness and its objects, so too for the five other consciousnesses. This sixfold equanimity is the sixfold sdtata, satatavihdra. See vii. 32, note 186.
This is "majjhatta" of the mind, in the Vibhanga; Visuddhimagga, 659. Samantapdsddikd, i. 150, commentary on upekkhako vihdsim.
55. It is for this reason that it is said that the Buddha is never apratisamkhydya upeksd. How one can expell bad upeksd by good upeksd, iii. 35d.
56. Vibhdsd {TD 27, p. 4l2a26): The parts of the dhydnas have eighteen different names; but how many actual entities are there? Only eleven. In the First Dhyana, there are five names and five things. In the Second Dhyana, the parts are four in number, three as in the First and adhydtmasamprasdda. In the Third Dhyana, five parts: but the fifth has already been mentioned; and four new ones. In the Fourth Dhyana, four parts; the last three have been mentioned; one adds the first. . .
In the first two Dhyanas, there is prasrabdhisukha, that is, sukha consisting of prafrabdhi; in the Third, there is vedandsukha, sukha consisting of sensation. The sukha of the first two Dhyanas forms part of the samskdraskandha; the sukha of the Third is part of the vedandskandha. . .
The unity of the object of the mind {cittaikdgrya) is dhyana because dhyana is by nature samddhi (that is to say cittaikdgrya). The samddhi and the other [dharmas] so enumerated are parts of the dhyana.
See Kosa, vi. trans, p. 922.
57. In the Vibhanga, the sukha of the First Dhyana is cetasika sukha, cetosamphassaja sukha; this sukha is accompanied by piti and is thus called pitisukha; piti is pdmojja . . . attamanatd cittassa.
On prasrabdhi, ii. l7c, 25, English trans, p. 191, iv. 48 {samskdraskandha).
Vibhdsd quoted note 56.
Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 76la2: In our system it is not said that prasrabdhi is sukhendriya (=agreeable sensation), rather prasrabdhi is the cause of sukha, the sukha part of the first two Dhyanas . . .
In Scripture, it is not only the vedana sukha (agreeable sensation) which is called sukha; some other dharmas receive this name. Thus it is said that there are three sukhas, prahdnasukha, virdgasukha (? ), and nirodhasukha; elsewhere it is said that sukha is fivefold, pravrajydsukha, vivekasukha, samathasukha, bodhisukha (see vi. 50b, p. 1006), and nirvdnasukha. The term sukha thus designates, in the Sutras, all types of dharmas . . .
58. Vydkhyd ad iii. 32c. The sukha of the Third Dhyana rests only on the manas, not on the other organs {mana evdsritam). Kamadhatu has no sukha of the sphere of manas {manobhumika sukha).
59. "Agreeable sensation having for its support the five organs made up of the atoms, sensation associated with the five consciousnesses (visual. . . touch). " ii 25, English trans, p. 191.
60. Beings arisen in the heaven of the First Dhyana possess visual consciousness, etc. ; but not the persons who have entered into the absorption of the First Dhyana.
61. Vydkhyd: samdhitdvasthdntardlasamuddcdrdt / ddrstantikdndm kilaisa paksah / tesdm hi na dvibhumikam eva sukhendriyam kdmaprathamadhydnabhumikam kim tarhi caturbhumikam
Footnotes 1289
? 1290 Chapter Eight
(= Sukhendriya not only belongs to the two "spheres", to Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, but also to the Second and to the Third Dhyana). Ata eva ca vibhdsdydm bhadantena sautrdntikenoktam dbhidhdrmikdndm paramapeneva (? ) caksurvijndnddikam adhastdd urdhvam dkrsyata iti tad evarh asyestam bhavati caksurvijndnddikam dvitiyddidhydnabhu- mikam api bhavatity api. The Abhidharmikas think that visual consciousness exists only in Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana (i. 46, viii. l3a); but they admit that beings in higher Dhyanas see by means of a tower visual consciousness: "the visual consciousness is drawn from below to above as with a machine" (? ). In the Vibhdsd, the Sautrantika Bhadanta thinks that it is simpler to admit that the visual consciousness is of the sphere of the Second Dhyana . . .
62. How can a mental (caitasika) sensation be felt by the body (kdyena)?
63. The Vibhanga (p. 259) here understands sukha as cetasika sukha (as do the Vaibhasikas), and it explains kdya as the three skandhas of sanfid, samkhdra, and vninana.
Kdyena sdksdtkaroti, vi. 43c, 58b, viii. 9, 35n. SBE. 45, p. 23.
64. Vydkhyd: caturthe dhydne pra/rabdhisukham bhuyo bhavati bahutaram bhavati dhydndntarebhya/ caturbhasya pra/rabdhataravdt / tadbhuyastv 'pi sukhasydvacanam / caturthe dhydne sukham nocyate / tasya sukhasydvacandd vedand sukham eva trtrya dhydne na caturthe sukha vedandstiti tatra nocyata ity abhiptdyah.
In the Fourth Dhyana the sukha which consists of pra/rabdhi, "well-being," is greater than in the lower stages, and yet one does not attribute sukha to this stage: hence it results that, in the lower stages the part of sukha signifies the sensation of sukha, the sukha of sensation [and not pra/rabdhisukha\ and that, in the Fourth Dhyana, there is no sensation of sukha.
65. According to the Vydkhyd. The Bhdsya only gives the first words of the Sutra (as we see in the version of Paramartha).
a. Hsuan-tsang: Further, because the Sutra (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 123al3) says: yasmin samaye drya/rdvakah pravivekajdm prttim kdyena sdkasdtkrtvopasampadya viharati pancdsya dharmds tasmin samaye prahiyante panca dharmd bhavandparipurifh gacchanti [iti vistarah ydvad bhdvaniyd dharmdh katame / tadyathd prdmodyam (? ) pritih pra/rabdhih sukham samddhi/ ca. ]
Compare the list in Samyutta, iv. 76. Anguttara, v. l, etc. (prdmodyddayah).
b. Paramartha: "Further, because the Sutra distinguishes pra/rabdhi and sukha. As the Sutra says:yasmin samaye drya/ravdvakah pra/rabdhijdm prttim kdyena sdksdtkrtvd upasampadya viharati. In the Sutra pra/rabdhi is named separately from sukha. We know thus that they differ. " [The reading prafrabdhijd is perhaps a mistake. ]
66. Vydkhd: "Thus, in the first three Dhyanas, sukha is only bodily sukha. "
67. Vydkhyd: samddhijasya abahirbhutasya kayavijn*dnasamprayuktasya veditasukhasya
samddhyanukulatvdt.
68. Vydkhyd: A touch consciousness of the sphere of Kamadhatu cannot grasp a tangible of the sphere of Rupadhatu from whence it results that the touch consciousness which grasps pra/rabdhi is of the sphere of Rupadhatu, and that the agreeable sensation (sukha) associated with this consciousness can be a "part of dhyana. "
69. According to Hsuan-tsang: naisa dosah / pra/rabdhipratyayasya vijndnasya utpatteh; according to Paramartha: naiso'rthah svayam pra/rabdhivijnanasya utpatteh.
The Vydkhyd gives a very satisfying explanation: "The organ of touch of the person in absorption [even though it is of the sphere of Kamadhatu], passes into a state such [tarn anastham gatam yad. . . ] that it can be the support of a touch consciousness of a higher sphere.
Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 761? 0. The Vaibhasika: Further, it is inadmissible that, having
? for its support (diraya) an organ of touch {kdyendriya) of Kamadhatu, there arises a consciousness of a tangible of the sphere of Rupadhatu. Thus one cannot say that the touch consciousness {kdyavijudna) of a Kamadhatu body would grasp a tangible of prairabdhi arisen from dhydna. If one answers us that even though this tangible is produced internally (by supporting itself on an internal object), it is capable of producing a similar consciousness [of a tangible of Rupadhatu] even though this latter is supported on a body in Kamadhatu, this response is nothing more than vain words, without reason or texts to sustain it. What reason or text establishes that a body of Kamadhatu would grasp a rupa which is prairabdhi, and not another tangible? This thesis contradicts the authorities; only the doctrine of the Abhidharma is irreproachable. Here the Sthavira says: How do you know that prairabdhi is called of sukha} . . .
70. To the Vaibhasikas, prairabdhi (=the part of dhydna called sukha) is a samskdra which can be andsrava. For his opponent, the said part of dhydna is the sensation associated with touch consciousness which knows prairabdhi, a certain tangible.
71. This question is discussed ii. 25, English trans, p. 191.
72. Hsuan-tsang adds: "It is said in the Sutra fifteen dhaius are solely sdsrava"; Koia,
i. 31c-d: English trans, p. 95, in the note; see Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 871cll. 73. ii. 33, p. 202-4, seei. 33, English trans. 97; iv. lld; viii. , note 74, 27c-28.
74. The Vhydkhd mentions two readings: vitarkavicdrayor ayaugapadyam dosavacandc ca and dosdvacandt (= asamavadhdnena ca na kaicid dosa ucyata ity arthah). Paramartha follows the second reading.
75. The Sautrantikas, according to Saeki; above, the Dar? tantikas.
76. Paramartha (p. 298c24): the ancient masters do not say this. One cannot, according to
their authority, know which dharmas are parts of the Path(? pu sui k'o chih >^|? ffpj? n ,)?
77. Vydkhya: yogdcarabhumidarsanena vicdryam etat. Then there follows an exposition of the doctrine of Samghabhadra: tatra kautuhalam pdtayety dcdryasamghabhadrah / ayarh cdtrdrthasamksepo drastavyah.
The dhydnas contain a large number of dharmas: why are certain dharmas considered as parts (anga)? The dharmas which are pratipaksdnga or opposition, anuiamsdnga or excellence, and tadubhdydnga or both opposition and excellence are considered as parts, [In the absorptions of Arupyadhatu one does not distinguish parts, because the taste of all of them is calmness, iamathaikarasatd]. In the First Dhyana: 1. vitarka and vicdra are opposed to the bad minds {vitarka) of Kamadhatu (kdma or lust, vydpdda or injury, and vihimsa or killing); 2. prtti and sukha are obtained when vitarka and vicdra have expelled their opposites (vipaksa)t and through the fact of the separation from these opposites; and 3. samddhi or cittaikdgratd, concentration or one-pointedness-of-mind through whose force the four other parts exist. In the Second Dhyana: the adhydtmasamprasdda is opposed to vitarka and vicdra; prfti and sukha constitute the part of excellence. In the Third Dhyana: upeksd, smrti and samprajanya are opposed to prtti; sukha is the part of excellence. In the Fourth Dhyana: upeksapariiuddhi and smrtipariiuddhi are opposed to sukha; aduhkhdsuk- havedand is the part of excellence. See Vibhanga, 263.
78. Yogasutra, i. 47.
79. Sraddhd prasddah; ii. 25, English trans, p. 191.
Vasumitra (in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 4l5c28) compares vitarka-vicdra to waves which
trouble the waters; when they have been expelled the mind is samprasanna, like the water which becomes clear when the waves have been calmed; thus faith (fraddhd) is called adhydtmasamprasdda.
Footnotes 1291
? 1292 Chapter Eight
80. Paramartha omits these explanations.
81. The Vydkhyd gives some examples: paryesakamanojalpdvasthd vitarkah / pratyavekasa- kamanojalpdvasthd vicdrah (see Kosa, ii, English trans, p. 203) / vdksamutthdpikdvastha- v it ark ah / tadanydvasthd vicdra iti bhagavadvifesah / aviksiptdvasthd samddhih / praidntavdhitavastha cittasyddhydtmasamprasdda iti / On the existence of caitasikas distinct from the citta (and of bhautikas distinct from the mahdbhutas), see ii, English trans, p. 188.
82. Hsiian-tsang: "However reasonable this may be, this is not my system. "
83. The Sthaviras, according to P'u-kang (TD 41, p. 424c5) and Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 792c29). Hsiian-tsang: How does another school maintain that priti is not saumanasya? It says that there is a separate priti, a caitasika dharma; as the sukha of the Three Dhyanas is totally
saumanasya, priti and saumanasya are distinct. 84. See ii. 7c-8a, p. 161, on priti.
85. Paramartha (TD 29, p, 299a9) transcribes pi-p'o-li-to ching&fcm&m See also Kosa, v. 9a, Madhydma (TD 1, p. ? 5? 4), Samyutta, v. 213, Majjhima, iii. 26, Atthasdlini, 175.
Hsiian-tsang translates: "The Buddha, in the Sutra of the Explanation of the Viparydsas, teached the gradual disappearance of the five indriyas of sensation, daurmanasya, etc. [In the First Dhyana, the destruction of the daurmanasya, in the Second of duhkha], in the Third of saumanasya, in the Fourth of sukha. Thus priti is saumanasya. "
86. Definition of the Fourth Dhyana: sa sukhasya ca prahdndd duhkhasya caprahdnat purvam eva saumanasyadaurmanasyayor astamgamdd aduhkham asukham upeksdsmrtipa- ri/uddham caturtham dhydnam . . .
87. The problem of senjiia and dninjua is examined iv. 46, English trans, p. 621-3, (vi. 24a-b); the apaksdlas, iii. 101. Madhyama, 5. 1, Majjihima, i. 454, ii. 261 (dnanjasappdya- sutta), Anguttara, v. 135 (kantaka- apaksdla).
88. Compare iii. 101.
89. See Ko/a, i. 30b (above p. 1232) and ii. 31 on the dhdtus and the caittas which exist in Rupadhatu.
90. Hsiian-tsang: "and because mental satisfaction is gross there" [Thus there is sukha of the sphere of manas there].
39. Paramartha: "Because it is perfumed (ydsita) by a former cause which should ripen in rupa, the mind has the efficacy to now produce rupa. "
It indeed appears that the expression vdsand (Kofa, iv. 27d, p. 594, vii. 28c,p. 1137, 30c, 32d) is foreign to the Sarvastivada. However this may be, Samghabhadra does not use it.
Samghabhadra, in his Prakaranafdsana (TD 29, p 964b26) says, "What is the meaning of the expression drupya? It means that there is no rupa there. When one dies [in Arupyadhatu] and is born below, the rupa arises from citta. We maintain that, in this world, material and non-material (rupin, arupin) dharmas are produced in fact in reciprocal dependence: from the change of the mind there arises the diversity of rupa; when the material organs are modified, the vijHana is likewise different. Thus, when a being dying in Arupyadhatu arises below, the series of his mind (cittasamtatt) is found to be favorable to the production of rupa, and, by its force, the rupa of a lower existence if favorable to this arising. However it is not permissible to say that rupa arises solely from the mind. It also exists by reason of the series-of-mind-accompanied-by-f>>^ of a former existence: the rupa, destroyed for a long time, is its own seed. We maintain in fact that sabhdgahetu is at one and
? the same time past and present (ii. 52a, p. 262). For the Arhats who have already attained Nirvana have cut off without residue the series of the skandhas; there does not remain any cause which could produce the arising of new skandhas: there is no case to which one could applytheexampleofabeingwhodiesinArupyadhatu[andtakesupanewrupa\ (Seethe argument of the Vibhajyavadins, note 38).
In his Nydydnusdra (TD 29, p. 757cl7), Samghabhadra says, "The dgamas quoted by our adversary do not prove that rupa exists in Arupyadhatu. His argument from reason has no value, for, even though there is no rupa in Arupyadhatu, the rupa of a being of Arupadhatu who has just died and is about to be reborn below comes from the mind. We state that in this world. . .
40. iii. 3c-d: nikdyam jivitam cdtra niiritd cittasamtatih; see ii, 41,45.
41. Vydkhyd: prayogakdla dkdiddiny dkambanani. Hsuan-tsang: The ascetic, in his preparatory exercise, thinks "Space is infinite," "The sixfold vijfidna is infinite," "There is nothing. "
On the drapyas, and how one obtains them, see Majjhima, i. 164, Sutta 121, Visuddhimagga, 326 and following.
Vibhasd (TD 27, p. 432c23): "It is not by reason of its nature or by reason of its object, but by reason of its prayoga that dkdsanantya receives its name. The beginner (ddikdrmika) considers the characteristic of emptiness of the top of a wall, of a tree, of a house; when he has 'grasped' this characteristic of infinite dkdsa. " In the drupyas, the ascetic considers anitya, pratyaya, etc.
Vasumitra explains how, in dkimcanya (preparatory stage), the notion of subject and object is dispelled; see above Chap. VII note 323.
42. This is a question as to whether or not there is samjfid in the fourth drupya, the sphere of "non-samjfid and neither non-samjfid" Anguttara, iv. 426; Kathdvatthu, xiii. 12; Vasumitra and Bhavya.
The "absorption of the cessation of samjfid and vedand" can be obtained only by an ascetic who has entered into this drupya (ii. 44d, English trans, p. 229 and iii. 6c). From this fact, one can conclude that samjfid exists there. (On the subtle-subtle mind, viii. 33b).
43. Compare Majjhima, i. 435, ii. 230; Anguttara, iv. 422> Visuddhimagga, 335. This refers to the samjfids of the lower absorptions. In fact one enters into the fourth drupya by being disgusted with it, by a meditation practiced in the sdmantaka of the third drupya.
AA. That is to say "a cause of stupidity" (sammohakdrana).
45- kasmdt tu tais tad evath grhyate, that is to say, according to the Vydkyd: tair iti tatsamdpattibhis tad iti naivasamjfidndsamjndyatanam evam grhyata iti naiva samjfid ndsamjfieti grhyata ity arthah /
46. Hsuan-tsang: The maulasamdpattis, dhydnas and drupyas, explained above are eight in number . . .
Paramartha: The maulasamdpattis, considered as real dharmas (or dravyas), are solely eight dravyas: four rUpasamapattis and four drUpyasamdpattis.
Vydkhyd: samdpattidravydni mauldniti fdkhds tesdm nopanyasyanta ity abhiprdyah. The Sakhas or "branches" are the sdmantakas (viii. 22a) and dhydndntara, or asamjfiisamdpatti and nirodhasamdpatti.
47. Here we should give up translating andsrava by "pure," a translation justified elsewhere by the synonym amala, nirmala.
Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 821cl7. Andsrava samdpatti is pure in the proper sense of the word; why not call it /uddhaka? . . . Some say: The name is established by reason of the difference of meaning. The samdpatti which is at one and the same time good (ku/aka) and
Footnotes 1287
? 1288 Chapter Eight
possessing-*iT*f<w (sdsrava, laukika), is the first contradiction of the defiled dharmas: it is called ? uddha because the sense of purity is dominant in it. The sense of andsrava is dominant in the Noble Path.
Suddhaka means kusala sdsrava; andsrava is the Path. But the kuiala sdsrava absorption is samala, sakasdya, savisa, sakantaka, sdsrava, and sadosa: how can one call it suddhaka? Now it is called thus, even though it is not absolutely pure, because it is partially so, because it is not mixed with kleia; because it opposes the klesas; because it favors the andsrava absorption which is pure in the true sense of the word; because it is favorable {anukula) to the Path; and because it is the escort of the andsravas.
48. That is to say, "one cannot, having entered into this eighth absorption, meditate on the Path. " Vibhdsd, 162. 11. One cannot practice the Path in Kamadhatu, nor in Bhavagra. See Foreword to Chapters V-VI.
49. Mahdvyutpatti, 85. 7: dsvddanasamprayuktadhydna. Anguttara, ii. 126: "A person . . . enters and abides in the First Dhyana; he tastes it, loves it, and finds therein sensible delight (tarnassddetitarnnikdmetitena cavittirhdpajjati). Ifhedieswithouthavingfallenfromit, he is reborn in the world of the Brahmakayikas. " The same for the other Dhyanas, with rebirth in the heaven which is suitable to it.
This text is invoked by the Andhakas against the Theravadins in the Kathdvatthu, siii. 7.
50. One will find in F. Heiler, Buddhistische Versenkung, 1922, a very complete European bibliography. The most notable Pali sources are Vibhanga, 257, Visuddhi, 139. Among the European works, Burnouf, lotus, 800, Senart, Mahavastu, i. 552 (forgotten by Heiler). It is quite evident that the canonical definitions remain obscure, in spite of the efforts of the Abhidharmikas-Abhidhammikas.
51. In the Bhdsya of the first line, Hsuan-tsang says, "The kdrikd designates teng- ch'ih ? ? (= samddhi) by the word ting ^ (fixed, set): the words differ, but the meaning is the same. This is why the Sutra (Samyukta, 28. 21; see also Madhyama, TD 1, p. 788c19) says "The ting /? ? (sthiti) of the mind, the teng-ting ? *? ~_ (samsthiti) of the mind, is what is called samyaksamddhi\ it is also called subhaikdgrya. "
In the Bhdsya of the third line, Paramartha says, "By chu ft (sthiti) one should understand subhaikdgrya, because chu ft is another name for samddhi. The Sutra says, 'What is samddhi} It is the chu ft (fixedness) of the mind in a correct object (samyagvisaya), correct condition (avasthd). '"
The First Dhyana: contains vitarka, vicdra, priti (= saumanasya, agreeable sensation of the manas, "satisfaction," ii. 8a), sukha (- pra/rabdhi, forming part of the samskdraskandha, ii. 25, English trans, p. 191), and samddhi.
The Second Dhyana: contains adhydtmasamprasdda (-? raddhendriya),priti (=saumana- sya),sukha(=pra/rabdhi) andsamddhi.
The Third Dhyana: contains upeksd (= samskdropeksd, ii. 25, English trans, p. 192), smrti, samprajanya, sukha (agreable sensation, vedand, ii. 7c), and samddhi.
The Fourth Dhyana: contains upeksd (neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable sensation), upeksd-parisuddhi (- samskdropeksd), smrtipatisuddhi, and samddhi.
52. Here Paramartha adds 'These five in absorption are capable of bringing about opposing
prairabdhi. "
53. Caturangasenavdt: compare Samantapdsddikd, i. 146: "In the same way that one understands by "army" the parts of the army and no other (yathd senangesu eva sandsammuti), in this way one understands by Dhyana the fine parts and nothing else . . . The Vibhangha says: "Dhyana contains vitarka, vicdra, pritisukha, and cittasya ekdgratd";. . . thus cittaikdgratd is also a part. " In this same way the School teaches that dharmapravicaya is at one and the same time both Bodhi and a part of Bodhi, that samyagdrsti is both the
? Path and a part of the Path, and that absorption from food is both Upavasa and a part of Upavasa (iv. 29, English trans, p. 597).
54. The formula of this upeksd is given in Vydkhyd, iii. 35: caksusd rupdni drstvd naiva sumand bhavati[- ndnuniyate] na durmand bhavati/= napratihanyate] upeksako bhavati[- ndbhujati / katham ndbhujati kim pratisamkhydya dhosvid apratisamkhydya iti visesayann aba] smrtimdn samprajdnan [- smrtisamprayuktayd prajnayd pratisamiksamdnah]. As is the case of visual consciousness and its objects, so too for the five other consciousnesses. This sixfold equanimity is the sixfold sdtata, satatavihdra. See vii. 32, note 186.
This is "majjhatta" of the mind, in the Vibhanga; Visuddhimagga, 659. Samantapdsddikd, i. 150, commentary on upekkhako vihdsim.
55. It is for this reason that it is said that the Buddha is never apratisamkhydya upeksd. How one can expell bad upeksd by good upeksd, iii. 35d.
56. Vibhdsd {TD 27, p. 4l2a26): The parts of the dhydnas have eighteen different names; but how many actual entities are there? Only eleven. In the First Dhyana, there are five names and five things. In the Second Dhyana, the parts are four in number, three as in the First and adhydtmasamprasdda. In the Third Dhyana, five parts: but the fifth has already been mentioned; and four new ones. In the Fourth Dhyana, four parts; the last three have been mentioned; one adds the first. . .
In the first two Dhyanas, there is prasrabdhisukha, that is, sukha consisting of prafrabdhi; in the Third, there is vedandsukha, sukha consisting of sensation. The sukha of the first two Dhyanas forms part of the samskdraskandha; the sukha of the Third is part of the vedandskandha. . .
The unity of the object of the mind {cittaikdgrya) is dhyana because dhyana is by nature samddhi (that is to say cittaikdgrya). The samddhi and the other [dharmas] so enumerated are parts of the dhyana.
See Kosa, vi. trans, p. 922.
57. In the Vibhanga, the sukha of the First Dhyana is cetasika sukha, cetosamphassaja sukha; this sukha is accompanied by piti and is thus called pitisukha; piti is pdmojja . . . attamanatd cittassa.
On prasrabdhi, ii. l7c, 25, English trans, p. 191, iv. 48 {samskdraskandha).
Vibhdsd quoted note 56.
Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 76la2: In our system it is not said that prasrabdhi is sukhendriya (=agreeable sensation), rather prasrabdhi is the cause of sukha, the sukha part of the first two Dhyanas . . .
In Scripture, it is not only the vedana sukha (agreeable sensation) which is called sukha; some other dharmas receive this name. Thus it is said that there are three sukhas, prahdnasukha, virdgasukha (? ), and nirodhasukha; elsewhere it is said that sukha is fivefold, pravrajydsukha, vivekasukha, samathasukha, bodhisukha (see vi. 50b, p. 1006), and nirvdnasukha. The term sukha thus designates, in the Sutras, all types of dharmas . . .
58. Vydkhyd ad iii. 32c. The sukha of the Third Dhyana rests only on the manas, not on the other organs {mana evdsritam). Kamadhatu has no sukha of the sphere of manas {manobhumika sukha).
59. "Agreeable sensation having for its support the five organs made up of the atoms, sensation associated with the five consciousnesses (visual. . . touch). " ii 25, English trans, p. 191.
60. Beings arisen in the heaven of the First Dhyana possess visual consciousness, etc. ; but not the persons who have entered into the absorption of the First Dhyana.
61. Vydkhyd: samdhitdvasthdntardlasamuddcdrdt / ddrstantikdndm kilaisa paksah / tesdm hi na dvibhumikam eva sukhendriyam kdmaprathamadhydnabhumikam kim tarhi caturbhumikam
Footnotes 1289
? 1290 Chapter Eight
(= Sukhendriya not only belongs to the two "spheres", to Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, but also to the Second and to the Third Dhyana). Ata eva ca vibhdsdydm bhadantena sautrdntikenoktam dbhidhdrmikdndm paramapeneva (? ) caksurvijndnddikam adhastdd urdhvam dkrsyata iti tad evarh asyestam bhavati caksurvijndnddikam dvitiyddidhydnabhu- mikam api bhavatity api. The Abhidharmikas think that visual consciousness exists only in Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana (i. 46, viii. l3a); but they admit that beings in higher Dhyanas see by means of a tower visual consciousness: "the visual consciousness is drawn from below to above as with a machine" (? ). In the Vibhdsd, the Sautrantika Bhadanta thinks that it is simpler to admit that the visual consciousness is of the sphere of the Second Dhyana . . .
62. How can a mental (caitasika) sensation be felt by the body (kdyena)?
63. The Vibhanga (p. 259) here understands sukha as cetasika sukha (as do the Vaibhasikas), and it explains kdya as the three skandhas of sanfid, samkhdra, and vninana.
Kdyena sdksdtkaroti, vi. 43c, 58b, viii. 9, 35n. SBE. 45, p. 23.
64. Vydkhyd: caturthe dhydne pra/rabdhisukham bhuyo bhavati bahutaram bhavati dhydndntarebhya/ caturbhasya pra/rabdhataravdt / tadbhuyastv 'pi sukhasydvacanam / caturthe dhydne sukham nocyate / tasya sukhasydvacandd vedand sukham eva trtrya dhydne na caturthe sukha vedandstiti tatra nocyata ity abhiptdyah.
In the Fourth Dhyana the sukha which consists of pra/rabdhi, "well-being," is greater than in the lower stages, and yet one does not attribute sukha to this stage: hence it results that, in the lower stages the part of sukha signifies the sensation of sukha, the sukha of sensation [and not pra/rabdhisukha\ and that, in the Fourth Dhyana, there is no sensation of sukha.
65. According to the Vydkhyd. The Bhdsya only gives the first words of the Sutra (as we see in the version of Paramartha).
a. Hsuan-tsang: Further, because the Sutra (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 123al3) says: yasmin samaye drya/rdvakah pravivekajdm prttim kdyena sdkasdtkrtvopasampadya viharati pancdsya dharmds tasmin samaye prahiyante panca dharmd bhavandparipurifh gacchanti [iti vistarah ydvad bhdvaniyd dharmdh katame / tadyathd prdmodyam (? ) pritih pra/rabdhih sukham samddhi/ ca. ]
Compare the list in Samyutta, iv. 76. Anguttara, v. l, etc. (prdmodyddayah).
b. Paramartha: "Further, because the Sutra distinguishes pra/rabdhi and sukha. As the Sutra says:yasmin samaye drya/ravdvakah pra/rabdhijdm prttim kdyena sdksdtkrtvd upasampadya viharati. In the Sutra pra/rabdhi is named separately from sukha. We know thus that they differ. " [The reading prafrabdhijd is perhaps a mistake. ]
66. Vydkhd: "Thus, in the first three Dhyanas, sukha is only bodily sukha. "
67. Vydkhyd: samddhijasya abahirbhutasya kayavijn*dnasamprayuktasya veditasukhasya
samddhyanukulatvdt.
68. Vydkhyd: A touch consciousness of the sphere of Kamadhatu cannot grasp a tangible of the sphere of Rupadhatu from whence it results that the touch consciousness which grasps pra/rabdhi is of the sphere of Rupadhatu, and that the agreeable sensation (sukha) associated with this consciousness can be a "part of dhyana. "
69. According to Hsuan-tsang: naisa dosah / pra/rabdhipratyayasya vijndnasya utpatteh; according to Paramartha: naiso'rthah svayam pra/rabdhivijnanasya utpatteh.
The Vydkhyd gives a very satisfying explanation: "The organ of touch of the person in absorption [even though it is of the sphere of Kamadhatu], passes into a state such [tarn anastham gatam yad. . . ] that it can be the support of a touch consciousness of a higher sphere.
Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 761? 0. The Vaibhasika: Further, it is inadmissible that, having
? for its support (diraya) an organ of touch {kdyendriya) of Kamadhatu, there arises a consciousness of a tangible of the sphere of Rupadhatu. Thus one cannot say that the touch consciousness {kdyavijudna) of a Kamadhatu body would grasp a tangible of prairabdhi arisen from dhydna. If one answers us that even though this tangible is produced internally (by supporting itself on an internal object), it is capable of producing a similar consciousness [of a tangible of Rupadhatu] even though this latter is supported on a body in Kamadhatu, this response is nothing more than vain words, without reason or texts to sustain it. What reason or text establishes that a body of Kamadhatu would grasp a rupa which is prairabdhi, and not another tangible? This thesis contradicts the authorities; only the doctrine of the Abhidharma is irreproachable. Here the Sthavira says: How do you know that prairabdhi is called of sukha} . . .
70. To the Vaibhasikas, prairabdhi (=the part of dhydna called sukha) is a samskdra which can be andsrava. For his opponent, the said part of dhydna is the sensation associated with touch consciousness which knows prairabdhi, a certain tangible.
71. This question is discussed ii. 25, English trans, p. 191.
72. Hsuan-tsang adds: "It is said in the Sutra fifteen dhaius are solely sdsrava"; Koia,
i. 31c-d: English trans, p. 95, in the note; see Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 871cll. 73. ii. 33, p. 202-4, seei. 33, English trans. 97; iv. lld; viii. , note 74, 27c-28.
74. The Vhydkhd mentions two readings: vitarkavicdrayor ayaugapadyam dosavacandc ca and dosdvacandt (= asamavadhdnena ca na kaicid dosa ucyata ity arthah). Paramartha follows the second reading.
75. The Sautrantikas, according to Saeki; above, the Dar? tantikas.
76. Paramartha (p. 298c24): the ancient masters do not say this. One cannot, according to
their authority, know which dharmas are parts of the Path(? pu sui k'o chih >^|? ffpj? n ,)?
77. Vydkhya: yogdcarabhumidarsanena vicdryam etat. Then there follows an exposition of the doctrine of Samghabhadra: tatra kautuhalam pdtayety dcdryasamghabhadrah / ayarh cdtrdrthasamksepo drastavyah.
The dhydnas contain a large number of dharmas: why are certain dharmas considered as parts (anga)? The dharmas which are pratipaksdnga or opposition, anuiamsdnga or excellence, and tadubhdydnga or both opposition and excellence are considered as parts, [In the absorptions of Arupyadhatu one does not distinguish parts, because the taste of all of them is calmness, iamathaikarasatd]. In the First Dhyana: 1. vitarka and vicdra are opposed to the bad minds {vitarka) of Kamadhatu (kdma or lust, vydpdda or injury, and vihimsa or killing); 2. prtti and sukha are obtained when vitarka and vicdra have expelled their opposites (vipaksa)t and through the fact of the separation from these opposites; and 3. samddhi or cittaikdgratd, concentration or one-pointedness-of-mind through whose force the four other parts exist. In the Second Dhyana: the adhydtmasamprasdda is opposed to vitarka and vicdra; prfti and sukha constitute the part of excellence. In the Third Dhyana: upeksd, smrti and samprajanya are opposed to prtti; sukha is the part of excellence. In the Fourth Dhyana: upeksapariiuddhi and smrtipariiuddhi are opposed to sukha; aduhkhdsuk- havedand is the part of excellence. See Vibhanga, 263.
78. Yogasutra, i. 47.
79. Sraddhd prasddah; ii. 25, English trans, p. 191.
Vasumitra (in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 4l5c28) compares vitarka-vicdra to waves which
trouble the waters; when they have been expelled the mind is samprasanna, like the water which becomes clear when the waves have been calmed; thus faith (fraddhd) is called adhydtmasamprasdda.
Footnotes 1291
? 1292 Chapter Eight
80. Paramartha omits these explanations.
81. The Vydkhyd gives some examples: paryesakamanojalpdvasthd vitarkah / pratyavekasa- kamanojalpdvasthd vicdrah (see Kosa, ii, English trans, p. 203) / vdksamutthdpikdvastha- v it ark ah / tadanydvasthd vicdra iti bhagavadvifesah / aviksiptdvasthd samddhih / praidntavdhitavastha cittasyddhydtmasamprasdda iti / On the existence of caitasikas distinct from the citta (and of bhautikas distinct from the mahdbhutas), see ii, English trans, p. 188.
82. Hsiian-tsang: "However reasonable this may be, this is not my system. "
83. The Sthaviras, according to P'u-kang (TD 41, p. 424c5) and Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 792c29). Hsiian-tsang: How does another school maintain that priti is not saumanasya? It says that there is a separate priti, a caitasika dharma; as the sukha of the Three Dhyanas is totally
saumanasya, priti and saumanasya are distinct. 84. See ii. 7c-8a, p. 161, on priti.
85. Paramartha (TD 29, p, 299a9) transcribes pi-p'o-li-to ching&fcm&m See also Kosa, v. 9a, Madhydma (TD 1, p. ? 5? 4), Samyutta, v. 213, Majjhima, iii. 26, Atthasdlini, 175.
Hsiian-tsang translates: "The Buddha, in the Sutra of the Explanation of the Viparydsas, teached the gradual disappearance of the five indriyas of sensation, daurmanasya, etc. [In the First Dhyana, the destruction of the daurmanasya, in the Second of duhkha], in the Third of saumanasya, in the Fourth of sukha. Thus priti is saumanasya. "
86. Definition of the Fourth Dhyana: sa sukhasya ca prahdndd duhkhasya caprahdnat purvam eva saumanasyadaurmanasyayor astamgamdd aduhkham asukham upeksdsmrtipa- ri/uddham caturtham dhydnam . . .
87. The problem of senjiia and dninjua is examined iv. 46, English trans, p. 621-3, (vi. 24a-b); the apaksdlas, iii. 101. Madhyama, 5. 1, Majjihima, i. 454, ii. 261 (dnanjasappdya- sutta), Anguttara, v. 135 (kantaka- apaksdla).
88. Compare iii. 101.
89. See Ko/a, i. 30b (above p. 1232) and ii. 31 on the dhdtus and the caittas which exist in Rupadhatu.
90. Hsiian-tsang: "and because mental satisfaction is gross there" [Thus there is sukha of the sphere of manas there].
