No More Learning

(_See Plates 25 and 26_. ) It is an entirely isolated mountain, which
rises 150 to 160 mètres above the surrounding valleys (_erat oppidum
Alesia in colle summo, admodum edito loco . . . _). Two rivers bathe the
foot of the mountain on two opposite sides: they are the Ose and the
Oserain (_cujus collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina
subluebant_). To the west of Mont Auxois the plain of Laumes extends,
the greatest dimension of which, between the village of Laumes and that
of Pouillenay, is 3,000 paces or 4,400 mètres (_ante oppidum planities
circiter millia passuum III in longitudinem patebat_). On all other
sides, at a distance varying from 1,100 to 1,600 mètres, rises a belt of
hills, the plateaux of which are at the same height (_reliquis ex
omnibus partibus colles, mediocri interjecto spatio, pari altitudinis
fastigio oppidum cingebant_).

The summit of Mont Auxois has the form of an ellipse, 2,100 mètres in
length, and 800 mètres broad in its greatest diameter. Including the
first spurs which surround the principal mass, it is found to contain a
superficies of 1,400,000 square mètres, 973,100 mètres of which for the
upper plateau and 400,000 mètres for the terraces and spurs. (_See Plate
25_. ) The town appears to have crowned the whole of the plateau, which
was protected by scarped rocks against all attack. [522]

This _oppidum_ could, apparently, only be reduced by a complete
investment. The Gaulish troops covered, at the foot of the wall, all the
slopes of the eastern part of the mountain; they were there protected by
a fosse and by a wall of unhewn stones six feet high. Cæsar established
his camps in favourable positions, the infantry on the heights, the
cavalry near the watercourses. These camps, and twenty-three redoubts or
blockhouses,[523] formed a line of investment of 11,000 paces (sixteen
kilomètres). [524] The redoubts were occupied in the day by small posts,
to prevent any surprise; by night, strong detachments bivouacked in
them.

The works were hardly begun, when a cavalry engagement took place in the
plain of Laumes. The combat was very hot on both sides. The Romans were
giving way, when Cæsar sent the Germans to their assistance, and ranged
the legions in order of battle in front of the camps, so that the
enemy’s infantry, kept in awe, should not come to the assistance of the
cavalry. That of the Romans recovered confidence on seeing that they
were supported by the legions. The Gauls, obliged to fly, became
embarrassed by their own numbers, and rushed to the openings left in the
wall of unhewn stones, which were too narrow for the occasion. Pursued
with fury by the Germans up to the fortifications, some were slain, and
others, abandoning their horses, attempted to cross the fosse and climb
over the wall. Cæsar then ordered the legions, who were drawn up before
his retrenchments, to advance a little. This movement carried disorder
into the Gaulish camp. The troops within feared a serious attack, and
the cry to arms rose on all sides. Some, struck with terror, threw
themselves into the _oppidum_; Vercingetorix was obliged to order the
gates to be closed, for fear the camp should be abandoned. The Germans
retired, after having killed a great number of the cavalry, and taken a
great number of horses.

Vercingetorix resolved to send away all his cavalry by night, before the
Romans had completed the investment. He urges the cavalry, on their
departure, to return each to his country, and recruit the men able to
carry arms; he reminds them of his services, and implores them to think
of his safety, and not to deliver him as a prey to the enemies, him who
has done so much for the general liberty: their indifference would
entail with his loss that of 80,000 picked men. On an exact calculation,
he has only provisions for one month; by husbanding them carefully, he
may hold out some time longer. After these recommendations, he causes
his cavalry to leave in silence, at the second watch (nine o’clock). It
is probable that they escaped by ascending the valleys of the Ose and
the Oserain. Then he orders, on pain of death, all the corn to be
brought to him. He divides among the soldiers individually the numerous
cattle which had been collected by the Mandubii; but as to the grain,
he reserves the power of distributing it gradually and in small
quantities. All the troops encamped outside withdraw into the _oppidum_.
By these dispositions he prepares to wait for the succour of Gaul, and
to sustain the war.

As soon as Cæsar was informed of these measures by the prisoners and
deserters, he resolved to form lines of countervallation and
circumvallation, and adopted the following system of fortifications: he
ordered first of all to be dug, in the plain of Laumes, a fosse twenty
feet wide, with vertical walls, that is, as wide at the bottom as at the
level of the ground (_see Plates 25 and 28_), so as to prevent lines so
extensive, and so difficult to guard with soldiers along their whole
extent, from being attacked suddenly by night, and also to protect the
workmen from the darts of the enemy during the day. Four hundred feet
behind this fosse, he formed the countervallation. He then made two
fosses of fifteen feet wide, of equal depth,[525] and filled the
interior fosse--that is, the one nearest to the town--with water derived
from the river Oserain. Behind these fosses he raised a rampart and a
palisade (_aggerem ac vallum_), having together a height of twelve feet.
Against this was placed a fence of hurdles with battlements (_loricam
pinnasque_); strong forked branches were placed horizontally at the
junction of the hurdle-fence and the rampart, so as to render them more
difficult to scale. (_See Plate 27. _) Lastly, he established towers on
all this part of the countervallation, with a distance of eighty feet
between them.

It was necessary at the same time to work at widely extended
fortifications, and to fetch in wood and provisions, so that these
distant and toilsome expeditions diminished incessantly the effective
force of the combatants; and the Gauls, too, often attempted to harass
the workmen, and even made vigorous sallies, through several gates at a
time. Cæsar judged it necessary to increase the strength of the works,
so that they might be defended with a smaller number of men. He ordered
trees or large branches to be taken, the extremities of which were
sharpened and cut to a point;[526] they were placed in a fosse five feet
deep; and, that they might not be torn up, they were tied together at
the lower part; the other part, furnished with branches, rose above
ground. There were five rows of these, contiguous and interlaced;
whoever ventured amongst them would be wounded by their sharp points;
they were called _cippi_. In front of these sorts of _abatis_ were dug
wolves’ pits (_scrobes_), trunconic fosses, of three feet deep, disposed
in the form of a quincunx. In the centre of each hole was planted a
round stake, of the thickness of a man’s thigh, hardened in the fire,
and pointed at the top; it only rose about four inches above ground. In
order to render these stakes firmer, they were surrounded at the base
with earth well stamped down; the rest of the excavation was covered
with thorns and brushwood, so as to conceal the trap. There were eight
rows of holes, three feet distant from each other: they were called
_lilies_ (_lilia_), on account of their resemblance to the flower of
that name. Lastly, in front of these defences were fixed, level with
the ground, stakes of a foot long, to which were fixed irons in the
shape of hooks. These kind of caltrops, to which they gave the name of
_stimuli_,[527] were placed everywhere, and very near each other.

When this work was finished, Cæsar ordered retrenchments to be dug,
almost similar, but on the opposite side, in order to resist attacks
from the exterior. This line of circumvallation, of fourteen miles in
circuit (twenty-one kilomètres), had been formed on the most favourable
ground, in conforming to the nature of the locality. If the Gaulish
cavalry brought back an army of succour, he sought by these means to
prevent it, however numerous it might be, from surrounding the posts
established along the circumvallation. In order to avoid the danger
which the soldiers would have run in quitting the camps, he ordered that
every man should provide himself with provisions and forage for thirty
days. Notwithstanding this precaution, the Roman army suffered from
want. [528]

Whilst Cæsar adopted these measures, the Gauls, having convoked an
assembly of their principal chiefs, probably at Bibracte, decided not to
collect all their men able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix wished, but to
demand from each people a certain contingent, for they dreaded the
difficulty of providing for so large and so confused a multitude, and of
maintaining order and discipline. The different states were required to
send contingents, the total of which was to amount to 283,000 men; but,
in reality, it did not exceed 240,000. The cavalry amounted to
8,000. [529]

The Bellovaci refused their contingent, declaring that they intended to
make war on their own account, at their own will, without submitting to
anybody’s orders. Nevertheless, at the instance of Commius, their host,
they sent 2,000 men.

This same Commius, we have seen, had in previous years rendered signal
service to Cæsar in Britain. In return for which, his land, that of the
Atrebates, freed from all tribute, had recovered its privileges, and
obtained the supremacy over the Morini. But such was then the eagerness
of the Gauls to re-conquer their liberty and their ancient glory, that
all feelings of gratitude and friendship had vanished from their memory,
and all devoted themselves body and soul to the war.

The numbering and the review of the troops took place on the territory
of the Ædui. The chiefs were named; the general command was given to the
Atrebatan Commius; to the Æduans Viridomarus and Eporedorix, and to the
Arvernan Vercasivellaunus, cousin of Vercingetorix. With them were
joined delegates from each country, who formed a council of direction
for the war. They began their march towards Alesia, full of ardour and
confidence: each was convinced that the Romans would retreat at the mere
sight of such imposing forces, especially when they found themselves
threatened at the same time by the sallies of the besieged, and by an
exterior army powerful in infantry and in cavalry.

Meanwhile, the day on which the besieged expected succour was past, and
their provisions were exhausted; ignorant, moreover, of what was taking
place among the Ædui, they assembled to deliberate on a final
resolution. The opinions were divided: some proposed to surrender,
others to make a sally, without waiting till their vigour would be
exhausted. But Critognatus, an Arvernan distinguished by his birth and
credit, in a discourse of singular and frightful atrocity, proposed to
follow the example of their ancestors, who, in the time of the war of
the Cimbri, being shut up in their fortresses, and a prey to want, ate
the men who were unable to bear arms, rather than surrender. When the
opinions were gathered, it was decided that that of Critognatus should
only be adopted at the last extremity, and that for the present they
would confine themselves to sending out of the place all useless mouths.
The Mandubii, who had received the Gaulish army within their walls,
were compelled to leave with their wives and children. They approached
the Roman lines, begged to be taken for slaves and supplied with bread.
Cæsar placed guards along the _vallum_, with orders not to admit them.

At length Commius and the other chiefs, followed by their troops, appear
before Alesia; they halt upon a neighbouring hill, scarcely 1,000 paces
from the circumvallation (the hill of Mussy-la-Fosse). The following day
they draw their cavalry out of their camp; it covered the whole plain of
Laumes. Their infantry establishes itself at a short distance on the
heights. The plateau of Alesia commanded the plain. At the sight of the
army of succour, the besieged meet together, congratulate each other,
yield to excess of joy, and then they rush out of the town, fill the
first fosse with fascines and earth, and all prepare for a general and
decisive sally.

Cæsar, obliged to face the enemy on two sides at once, disposed his army
on the two opposite lines of the retrenchments, and assigned to each his
post; he then ordered the cavalry to leave its camps, and to give
battle. From all the camps placed on the top of the surrounding hills,
the view extended over the plain, and the soldiers, in suspense, waited
for the issue of the event. The Gauls had mixed with their cavalry a
small number of archers and light-armed soldiers, to support them if
they gave way, and arrest the attack of the cavalry of the enemy. A good
number of the latter, wounded by these foot-soldiers, whom they had not
perceived until then, were obliged to retire from the battle. Then the
Gauls, confident in their numerical superiority, and in the valour of
their cavalry, believed themselves sure of victory; and from all sides,
from the besieged, as well as from the army of succour, there arose an
immense cry to encourage the combatants. The engagement was in view of
them all; no trait of courage or of cowardice remained unknown; on both
sides, all were excited by the desire of glory and the fear of
dishonour. From noon till sunset the victory remained uncertain, when
the Germans in Cæsar’s pay, formed in close squadrons, charged the
enemy, and put them to the rout; in their flight they abandoned the
archers, who were surrounded; then, from all parts of the plain, the
cavalry pursued the Gauls up to their camp without giving them time to
rally. The besieged, who had sallied out of Alesia, returned in
consternation, and almost despairing of safety.

After a day employed in making a great number of hurdles, ladders, and
hooks, the Gauls of the army of succour left their camp in silence
towards the middle of the night, and approached the works in the plain.
Then, suddenly uttering loud cries, in order to warn the besieged, they
throw their fascines, to fill up the fosse, attack the defenders of the
_vallum_ with a shower of sling-balls, arrows, and stones, and prepare
everything for an assault. At the same time, Vercingetorix, hearing the
cries from without, gives the signal with the trumpet, and leads his
troops out of the place. The Romans take in the retrenchments the places
assigned to them beforehand, and they spread disorder among the Gauls by
throwing leaden balls, stones of a pound weight, and employing the
stakes placed in the works beforehand; the machines rain down upon the
enemy a shower of darts. As they fought in the dark (the shields being
useless), there were in both armies many wounded. The lieutenants M.
Antony and C. Trebonius, to whom was entrusted the defence of the
threatened points, supported the troops that were too hardly pressed by
means of reserves drawn from the neighbouring redoubts. So long as the
Gauls kept far from the circumvallation, the multitude of their missiles
gave them the advantage; but when they approached, some became suddenly
entangled in the _stimuli_; others fell bruised into the _scrobes_;
others again were transpierced by the heavy _pila_ used in sieges, which
were thrown from the tops of the _vallum_ and the towers. They had many
disabled, and nowhere succeeded in forcing the Roman lines. When day
began to break, the army of succour retired, fearing to be taken in
their uncovered flank (the right side) by a sally from the camps
established on the mountain of Flavigny. On their side, the besieged,
after losing much valuable time in transporting the material for the
attack, and in making efforts to fill up the first fosse (the one which
was twenty feet wide), learnt the retreat of the army of succour before
they had reached the real retrenchment. This attempt having failed, like
the other, they returned into the town.

Thus twice repulsed with great loss, the Gauls of the army of succour
deliberated on what was to be done. They interrogate the inhabitants of
the country, who inform them of the position and the sort of defences
of the Roman camps placed on the heights.

To the north of Alesia there was a hill (Mont Réa) which had not been
enclosed in the lines, because it would have given them too great an
extent; the camp necessary on that side had, for this reason, to be
established on a slope, and in a disadvantageous position (_see Plate
25, camp D_); the lieutenants C. Antistius Reginus and C. Caninius
Rebilus occupied it with two legions. The enemy’s chiefs resolved to
attack this camp with one part of their troops, whilst the other should
assail the circumvallation in the plain of Laumes. Having decided on
this plan, they send their scouts to reconnoitre the localities,
secretly arrange among themselves the plan and the means of execution,
and decide that the attack shall take place at noon. They choose 60,000
men amongst the nations most renowned for their valour.
Vercasivellaunus, one of the four chiefs, is placed at their head. They
sally at the first watch, towards nightfall, proceed by the heights of
Grignon and by Fain towards Mont Réa, arrive there at break of day,
conceal themselves in the depressions of the ground to the north of that
hill, and repose from the fatigues of the night. At the hour appointed,
Vercasivellaunus descends the slopes and rushes upon the camp of Reginus
and Rebilus; at the same moment, the cavalry of the army of succour
approaches the retrenchments in the plain, and the other troops,
sallying from their camps, move forwards.

When, from the top of the citadel of Alesia, Vercingetorix saw these
movements, he left the town, carrying with him the poles, the small
covered galleries (_musculos_), the iron hooks (_falces_),[530] and
everything which had been prepared for a sally, and proceeded towards
the plain. An obstinate struggle follows;, everywhere the greatest
efforts are made, and wherever the defence appears weakest, the Gauls
rush to the attack. Scattered over extensive lines, the Romans defend
only with difficulty several points at the same time, and are obliged to
face two attacks from opposite sides. Fighting, as it were, back to
back, everybody is agitated by the cries he hears, and by the thought
that his safety depends upon those that are behind him; “it lies in
human nature,” says Cæsar, “to be struck more deeply with the danger one
cannot see. ”[531]

On the northern slopes of the mountain of Flavigny (at the point marked
_J C_, _Plate 25_), Cæsar had chosen the most convenient spot for
observing each incident of the action, and for sending assistance to the
places which were most threatened. Both sides were convinced that the
moment of the decisive struggle had arrived. If the Gauls do not force
the lines, they have no further hope of safety; if the Romans obtain the
advantage, they have reached the end of their labours. It is especially
at the retrenchments on the slopes of Mont Réa that the Romans run the
greatest danger, for the commanding position of the enemy gives them an
immense disadvantage (_iniquum loci ad declivitatem fastigium, magnum
habet momentum_). One part of the assailants throw darts; another
advances, forming the tortoise; fresh troops incessantly relieve the
soldiers who are weary. All strive desperately to fill the fosses, to
render useless the accessory defences by covering them with earth, and
to scale the rampart. Already the Romans begin to feel the want of arms
and strength. Cæsar, informed of this state of things, sends Labienus to
their succour with six cohorts, and orders him, if the troops cannot
maintain themselves behind the retrenchments, to withdraw them and make
a sally, but only at the last extremity. Labienus, encamped on the
mountain of Bussy, descends from the heights to proceed to the place of
combat. Cæsar, passing between the two lines, repairs to the plain,
where he encourages the soldiers to persevere, for this day, this hour
will decide whether they are to gather the fruit of their former
victories.

Meanwhile the besieged, having abandoned the hope of forcing the
formidable retrenchments of the plain, direct their attack against the
works situated at the foot of the precipitous heights of the mountain of
Flavigny, and transport thither all their materials of attack; with a
shower of arrows they drive away the Roman soldiers who fight from the
top of the towers; they fill the fosses with earth and fascines, clear a
passage for themselves, and, by means of iron hooks, tear down the
wattling of the parapet and the palisade. Young Brutus is first sent
thither with several cohorts, and after him the lieutenant C. Fabius
with seven more; at last, as the action becomes still hotter, Cæsar
himself hurries to them with new reserves.

After the fortune of the fight has been restored, and the enemies driven
back, he proceeds towards the place where he had sent Labienus, draws
four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, orders a part of the cavalry to
follow him, and the other part to go round by the exterior lines, to
take the enemy in the rear by issuing from the camp of Grésigny. On his
side, Labienus, seeing that neither the fosses nor the ramparts can
arrest the efforts of the Gauls, rallies thirty-nine cohorts which have
arrived from the neighbouring redoubts, and which chance offers to him,
and informs Cæsar that, according to what had been agreed, he is going
to make a sally. [532] Cæsar hastens his march in order to share in the
combat. As soon as, from the heights on which they stood, the
legionaries recognise their general by the colour of the garment which
he was in the habit of wearing in battle (the purple-coloured
_paludamentum_),[533] and see him followed by cohorts and detachments of
cavalry, they sally from the retrenchments and begin the attack. Shouts
arise on both sides, and are repeated from the _vallum_ to the other
works. When Cæsar arrives, he sees the lines abandoned, and the battle
raging in the plain of Grésigny, on the banks of the Ose. The Roman
soldiers throw away the _pilum_, and draw their swords. At the same
time, the cavalry of the camp of Grésigny appears in the rear of the
enemy; other cohorts approach. The Gauls are put to the rout, and in
their flight encounter the cavalry, who make great slaughter among them.
Sedulius, chief and prince of the Lemovices, is slain; the Arvernan
Vercasivellaunus is taken prisoner. Seventy-four ensigns are brought to
Cæsar. Of all this army, so numerous as it was, few combatants return to
their camp safe and sound.

Witnesses, from the top of their walls, of this sanguinary defeat, the
besieged despaired of their safety, and called in the troops who were
attacking the countervallation. [534] As the result of these reverses,
the Gauls of the army of succour fly from their camp; and if the Romans,
compelled to defend so many points at one time, and to assist each other
mutually, had not been worn out by the labours of a whole day, the
entire mass of the enemies might have been annihilated. Towards the
middle of the night the cavalry sent in pursuit came up with their
rear-guard; a great part of them were taken prisoners or killed; the
others dispersed, to return to their countries.

Next day, Vercingetorix convokes a council. He declares that he has not
undertaken this war out of personal interest, but for the cause of the
liberty of all. “Since they must yield to fate, he places himself at the
discretion of his fellow-citizens, and offers them, in order to appease
the Romans, to be delivered up, dead or alive. ” A deputation is at once
sent to Cæsar, who requires that the arms and the chiefs be delivered to
him. He places himself in front of his camp, inside the retrenchments;
the chiefs are brought, the arms are laid down, and Vercingetorix
surrenders to the conqueror. This valiant defender of Gaul arrives on
horseback, clad in his finest arms, makes the circuit of Cæsar’s
tribunal, dismounts, and laying down his sword and his military ensigns,
exclaims: “Thou hast vanquished a brave man, thou, the bravest of
all! ”[535] The prisoners were distributed by head to each soldier, by
way of booty, except the 20,000 who belonged to the Ædui and Arverni,
and whom Cæsar restored in the hope of bringing back those people to his
cause.

Dio Cassius relates the surrender of the Gaulish chief as follows:
“After this defeat, Vercingetorix, who had neither been taken nor
wounded, might have fled; but, hoping that the friendship which had
formerly bound him to Cæsar would procure his pardon, he repaired to the
proconsul, without having sent a herald to ask for peace, and appeared
suddenly in his presence, at the moment he was sitting on his tribunal.
His appearance inspired some fear, for he was of tall stature, and had a
very imposing aspect under arms. There was a deep silence: the Gaulish
chief fell at Cæsar’s knees, and implored him by pressing his hands,
without uttering a word. This scene excited the pity of the by-standers,
by the remembrance of Vercingetorix’s former fortune compared to his
present misfortune. Cæsar, on the contrary, upbraided him with the
recollections on which he had hoped for his safety. He compared his
recent struggle with the friendship of which he reminded him, and by
that means pointed out more vividly the odiousness of his conduct. And
thus, far from being touched with his misfortune at that moment, he
threw him at once in fetters, and afterwards ordered him to be put to
death, after having exhibited him in his triumph. ” By acting thus, Cæsar
believed that he was obeying state policy and the cruel customs of the
time. It is to be regretted for his glory that he did not use, towards
Vercingetorix, the illustrious Gaulish chief, the same clemency which,
during the Civil War, he showed towards the vanquished who were his
fellow-citizens.

When these events were accomplished, Cæsar proceeded towards the Ædui,
and received their submission. There he met the envoys of the Arverni,
who promised to pay deference to his orders: he required from them a
great number of hostages. Afterwards, he placed his legions in winter
quarters. T. Labienus, with two legions and some cavalry, among the
Sequani (Sempronius Rutilius was given him as a colleague); C. Fabius
and L. Minucius Basilius, with two legions, among the Remi, in order to
protect them against the Bellovaci, their neighbours; C. Antistius
Reginus amongst the Ambluareti; T. Sextius among the Bituriges; C.
Caninius Rebilus among the Ruteni, each with one legion. Q. Tullius
Cicero and P. Sulpicius were established at Cabillonum (_Chalon_) and
Matisco (_Mâcon_), in the land of the Ædui, on the Saône, to ensure the
supply of provisions. Cæsar resolved to pass the winter at
Bibracte. [536] He announced those events at Rome, where twenty days of
public thanksgivings were decreed.


[Sidenote: Details of the Excavations at Mont Auxois. ]

XIII. The excavations earned on round Mont Auxois, from 1862 to 1863,
have brought to light, in nearly all points, the fosses of the Roman
retrenchments. The following is the result:--

CAMPS. --Cæsar debouched upon Alesia by the mountain of Bussy (_see Plate
25_), and distributed his army round Mont Auxois: the legions encamped
on the heights, and the cavalry was established on the lower grounds,
near the streams.

There were four camps of infantry, two of them, _A_ and _B_, on the
mountain of Flavigny. Their form depends on that of the ground: they
were shaped in such a manner that the retrenchments should, as far as
possible, command the ground situated before them. On the side where it
could have been attacked, that is, to the south, the camp _A_ presented
formidable defences, to judge from the triple line of fosses which
surround this part. (_See Plates 25 and 28. _) We must, perhaps, suppose
that it was occupied by Cæsar in person. The camp _B_ is more extensive.
The vestiges of its _remblai_ are still visible at the present day, in
the greatest part of its circuit, in consequence of this land having
never been touched by the plough. It is the only known example of
visible traces of a camp made by Cæsar. None of the camps of the
mountain of Flavigny having been attacked, the excavations have only
brought to light in the fosses a small number of objects. The entrances
to the camps are at the places marked by arrows on _Plate 25_. A third
camp of infantry was situated on the mountain of Bussy, at _C_.

The fourth infantry camp was established on the lower slopes of Mont
Réa, at _D_. It is the one occupied by the two legions of Reginus and
Rebilus, and which Vercasivellaunus attacked with 60,000 men. Indeed, it
will be observed that the spur situated to the north of Mont Auxois,
between the Rabutin and the Brenne, is much farther from Alesia than the
other mountains which surround it, and Mont Réa, which is the nearest
part of it, is still more than 2,000 mètres distant from it. Hence it
follows that Cæsar could not have included Mont Réa in his lines without
giving them an excessive development. Consequently, he was obliged to
establish one of his camps on the southern slope of that hill. This
camp was on the point of being forced, and an obstinate battle was
fought there.
The excavations have led to the discovery in the fosses of
a multitude of interesting objects, and, among them, more than 600 Roman
and Gaulish coins. (See the list in _Appendix C_. )[537] The extremity of
the upper fosse, represented by dots on _Plates 25_ and _28_, has not
been discovered, because earthfalls have taken place on that part of
Mont Réa, which would have obliged the excavators to dig too deep to
arrive at the bottom of the fosse. The strength of the retrenchments of
the infantry camps was very variable, as may be seen by inspecting the
various profiles of the fosses. (_See Plate 28. _) For each camp, they
have larger dimensions on the side which is not defended by the
escarpments, as may easily be conceived.

There were four cavalry camps, _G H I K_, placed near the different
streams: three in the plain of Laumes, and one in the valley of the
Rabutin. The fosses of these camps took greatly varied shapes. (_See
Plate 28. _) In general, their dimensions were decidedly less than those
of the fosses of the infantry camps. Camp _G_, however, had rather deep
fosses; no doubt because it was farthest from the lines. The fosse which
enclosed camp _I_ towards the side of the Brenne has disappeared by the
inundations of the river.

REDOUBTS, OR CASTELLA. --Of the twenty-three redoubts or blockhouses
(_castella_), five only have been discovered; they were the most
considerable; they are represented on _Plate 25_, by the numbers 10, 11,
15, 18, 22. The others, built of wood, and forming blockhouses, would
not have left any trace; they are marked by circles on the most
convenient places.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LINE OF INVESTMENT. --We
know, from the “Commentaries,” that camp _D_, on the slopes of Mont Réa,
contained two legions. By comparing its superficies with that of the
other camps, we may admit that these were occupied in the following
manner: in camp _A_, one legion; in camp _B_, two legions; in camp _C_,
three legions; total, eight legions. The three remaining legions would
have been distributed in the twenty-three redoubts. As we have said, the
number of 11,000 paces can evidently only apply to the line of
investment formed by the eight camps and the twenty-three redoubts
established round Alesia immediately after the arrival of the army, and
not, as has been believed, to the countervallation properly so called,
which was only constructed subsequently (VII. 72). This number is
rigorously exact, for the circuit of ground surrounded by the camps
measures a little more than sixteen kilomètres, which represents 11,000
Roman paces.

THE FOSSE OF TWENTY FEET. --This fosse has been discovered in its whole
extent: it barred the plain of Laumes, following a direction
perpendicular to the course of the Ose and the Oserain, and did not go
round Mont Auxois. _Plate 28_ represents two of its most remarkable
sections. It was not exactly twenty feet in width, as stated in the
“Commentaries;” neither was it everywhere 400 paces distant from the
countervallation. This measurement is only exact towards the extremities
of the fosse, near the two rivers.

COUNTERVALLATION. --Vercingetorix, having retired to the plateau of
Alesia, could only have escaped by the plain of Laumes, and, at the
worst, by the valley of the Rabutin; for the spurs situated to the
south, the east, and the north of Mont Auxois are surmounted by a belt
of perpendicular rocks, which form insurmountable barriers, and the
valleys of the Oserain and the Ose, which divide them, constitute
veritable defiles. It became important, therefore, to bar the plain of
Laumes with impregnable works. Hence Cæsar accumulated there the means
of defence; but he simplified them everywhere else, as the excavations
have shown.

These are the works, peculiar to the plain of Laumes, which Cæsar
describes in chapters 72 and 73. The traces of the two fosses exist
over the whole extent of the plain, from one river to the other. They
had not the same form: the one nearest to Mont Auxois is
square-bottomed; the other is triangular. (_See Plates 27 and 28. _) The
width of the first is fifteen feet, as stated in the text; that of the
triangular fosse is fifteen feet at certain points, but more frequently
a little less. The two fosses have the same depth; but it does not reach
fifteen feet, as the translators have wrongly understood it. To dig a
fosse of fifteen feet deep is so considerable a work, on account of the
two stages of workmen which it requires, that it has, perhaps, never
been executed for a temporary fortification. Moreover, the result of the
excavations leaves no doubt on this subject: the two fosses of the
countervallation have both only a depth of from eight to nine feet.

The fosse which is nearest Mont Auxois was filled with water. The Romans
had naturally introduced the water into that of the two fosses which,
owing to its square bottom, could contain the most considerable volume.
A careful level made in the plain of Laumes has proved that this water
was derived from the Oserain. During the excavations, the gravel has
been found which the water of this river had carried with it, at the
time of the investment of Alesia, almost to the middle of the length of
the fosse.

To the left of the Oserain, the countervallation cut the first slopes of
the hill of Flavigny for a length of 800 mètres; thence it continued,
having but one fosse, the various sections of which are indicated on
_Plate 28_. It ran at first along the left bank of the river, at a mean
distance of fifty mètres, as far as the mill of Chantrier, then cut the
western extremity of Mont Penneville, between the Oserain and the Ose,
followed the right bank of the latter river, along the slopes of the
mountain of Bussy, and, after having crossed the small plain of
Grésigny, joined the camp established at the foot of Mont Réa. Nearly
everywhere the Romans had the advantage of a commanding position to
defend the countervallation. The excavations have proved that in the
plain of Grésigny the fosse of the countervallation had been filled with
water from the Rabutin. They have led to the discovery in the ancient
bed of this stream (_see Plate 25_), at the very point where the fosse
joined it, of a wall of unhewn stones, which barred the waters so as to
conduct them into this fosse. [538]

CIRCUMVALLATION. --Over the extent of the plain of Laumes, and on the
slopes of the mountain of Flavigny, the circumvallation was parallel to
the countervallation, at a mean distance of 200 mètres. It had only one
single fosse, which in the plain was square-bottomed, so as to allow
more soil to be dug out; everywhere else its form was triangular. (_See
Plate_ 28. ) The circumvallation of the mountain of Flavigny ceased
towards the escarpments, where the defences became useless; then, again,
it continued on the plateau, where it formed the connection between the
camps. After this, it descended towards the Oserain, cut the point of
Mont Penneville, re-ascended the slopes of the mountain of Bussy, where
it similarly united the camps, descended into the plain of Grésigny,
which it crossed in a direction parallel to the countervallation, and
ended at camp _D_. On the heights it was made to follow the undulations
of the ground, so that its defenders should occupy as much as possible a
commanding position with respect to that of the assailants. Moreover,
the works of the circumvallation were not everywhere the same. Thus,
near the escarpments and ravines which cut this line, the Romans had
made no fosse with epaulment, but only accessory defences, such as
_abatis_ and wolf-pits, which even alternated on divers points.

Above the _castellum_ 21, between Grésigny and Mont Réa, the excavations
have brought to light a fosse of great dimensions, the bottom of which
was full of bones of animals of divers kinds. Its position, near a small
ravine in which runs a brook, may lead us to suppose that here was the
_abattoir_ of the Roman army. In considering this fosse, and those which
have been discovered on the top and on the slopes of Mont Réa, as
forming part of the circumvallation, there will be found for the
development of this line about twenty kilomètres, which represents with
sufficient accuracy the fourteen miles of the text of the
“Commentaries. ”[539]

WOLF-PITS. --In the plain of Laumes, at the top of the circumvallation,
and close to the exterior bank of the fosse, there have been counted
more than fifty wolf-pits, in five rows. Others have been cleared out on
the heights--nine between the camp _A_ and the escarpments, twenty-seven
on the mountain of Bussy, near the _castellum_ 15; they are dug in the
rock, and in such a perfect state of preservation that they appear as
though they had been made but yesterday. At the bottom of some of these
last, fifteen arrow-heads were picked up. All these wolf-pits are three
feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and a little less than one
foot at the bottom.

GAULISH CAMP. --During the first days of the investment, the besieged
encamped on the slopes of Mont Auxois, towards the eastern part of the
hill. They were protected by a fosse and a wall of unhewn stones six
feet high. We have traced the site of this camp at _P Q R S_ on _Plate
25_. The excavations have brought to light, in the direction of _Q R_ on
the slopes which shelve towards the Oserain, traces of fosses and
remains of walls. On the plateau of Mont Auxois it might be interesting
to attempt to discover the ancient Gaulish wall. It has been uncovered
in pieces here and there over the whole space of the declivities; hence
it may be concluded that the town occupied the whole of the plateau.

A remarkable specimen of this wall is visible at a point of Mont Auxois,
near the spot where recently the statue of Vercingetorix has been
erected.

As to the camps of the army of succour, it is probable that the Gauls
did not form any retrenchments on the hills where they established
themselves.




CHAPTER XI.

(Year of Rome 703. )

(BOOK VIII. [540] OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)


[Sidenote: Expedition against the Bituriges and Carnutes. ]

I. The capture of Alesia and that of Vercingetorix, in spite of the
united efforts of all Gaul, naturally gave Cæsar hopes of a general
submission; and he therefore believed that he could leave his army,
during the winter, to rest quietly in its quarters from the hard labours
which had lasted, without interruption, during the whole of the past
summer. But the spirit of insurrection was not extinct among the Gauls;
and convinced by experience that, whatever might be their number, they
could not, in a body, cope with troops inured to war, they resolved, by
partial insurrections, raised on all points at once, to divide the
attention and the forces of the Romans, as their only chance of
resisting them with advantage.

Cæsar was unwilling to leave them time to realise this new plan, but
gave the command of his winter quarters to his quæstor Mark Antony,
quitted Bibracte on the day before the Calends of January (the 25th of
December), with an escort of cavalry, joined the 13th legion, which was
in winter quarters among the Bituriges, not far from the frontier of the
Ædui, and called to him the 11th legion, which was the nearest at hand.
Having left two cohorts of each legion to guard the baggage, he
proceeded towards the fertile country of the Bituriges, a vast
territory, where the presence of a single legion was insufficient to put
a stop to the preparations for insurrection.

His sudden arrival in the midst of men without distrust, who were spread
over the open country, produced the result which he expected. They were
surprised before they could enter into their _oppida_, for Cæsar had
strictly forbidden everything which might have raised their suspicion,
especially the application of fire, which usually betrays the sudden
presence of an enemy. Several thousands of captives were made; those who
succeeded in escaping sought in vain a refuge among the neighbouring
nations. Cæsar, by forced marches, came up with them everywhere, and
obliged each tribe to think of its own safety before that of others.
This activity held the populations in their fidelity, and, through fear,
engaged the wavering to submit to the conditions of peace. Thus the
Bituriges, seeing that Cæsar offered them an easy way to recover his
protection, and that the neighbouring states had suffered no other
chastisement than that of having to deliver hostages, did not hesitate
in submitting.

The soldiers of the 11th and 13th legions had, during the winter,
supported with rare constancy the fatigues of very difficult marches, in
intolerable cold. To reward them, he promised to give, by way of
prize-money, 200 sestertii to each soldier, and 2,000 to each centurion.
He then sent them into their winter quarters, and returned to Bibracte,
after an absence of forty days. Whilst he was there dispensing justice,
the Bituriges came to implore his support against the attacks of the
Carnutes. Although it was only eighteen days since he returned, he
marched again, at the head of two legions, the 6th and the 14th, which
had been placed on the Saône to ensure the supply of provisions.

On his approach, the Carnutes, taught by the fate of others, abandoned
their miserable huts, which they had erected on the site of their burgs
and _oppida_ destroyed in the last campaign, and fled in every
direction. Cæsar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the rigour of the
season, established his camp at Genabum (_Gien_), and lodged his
soldiers partly in the huts which had remained undestroyed, partly in
tents, under penthouses covered with straw. The cavalry and auxiliary
infantry were sent in pursuit of the Carnutes, who, hunted down
everywhere, and without shelter, took refuge in the neighbouring
countries. [541]


[Sidenote: Campaign against the Bellovaci. ]

II. After having dispersed some rebellious meetings and stifled the
germs of an insurrection, Cæsar believed that the summer would pass
without any serious war. He left, therefore, at Genabum, the two legions
he had with him, and gave the command of them to C. Trebonius.
Nevertheless, he learnt, by several intimations from the Remi, that the
Bellovaci and neighbouring peoples, with Correus and Commius at their
head, were collecting troops to make an inroad on the territory of the
Suessiones, who had been placed, since the campaign of 697, under the
dependence of the Remi.

He then considered that it regarded his interest, as well as his
dignity, to protect allies who had deserved so well of the Republic. He
again drew the 11th legion from its winter quarters, sent written orders
to C. Fabius, who was encamped in the country of the Remi, to bring into
that of the Suessiones the two legions under his command, and demanded
one of his legions from Labienus, who was at Besançon. Thus, without
taking any rest himself, he shared the fatigues among the legions by
turns, as far as the position of the winter quarters and the necessities
of the war permitted.

When this army was assembled, he marched against the Bellovaci,
established his camp on their territory, and sent cavalry in every
direction, in order to make some prisoners, and learn from them the
designs of the enemy. The cavalry reported that the emigration was
general, and that the few inhabitants who were to be seen were not
remaining behind in order to apply themselves to agriculture, but to act
as spies upon the Romans. Cæsar, by interrogating the prisoners, learnt
that all the Bellovaci able to fight had assembled on one spot, and that
they had been joined by the Ambiani, the Aulerci,[542] the Caletes, the
Veliocasses, and the Atrebates. Their camp was in a forest, on a height
surrounded by marshes (Mont Saint-Marc, in the forest of Compiègne)
(_see Plate 29_); their baggage had been transported to more distant
woods. The command was divided among several chiefs, but the greater
part obeyed Correus, on account of his well-known hatred to the Romans.
Commius had, a few days before, gone to seek succour from the numerous
Germans who lived in great numbers in the neighbouring countries
(probably those on the banks of the Meuse). The Bellovaci resolved with
one accord to give Cæsar battle, if, as report said, he was advancing
with only three legions, for they would not run the risk of having
afterwards to encounter his entire army. If, on the contrary, the Romans
were advancing with more considerable forces, they proposed to keep
their positions, and confine themselves to intercepting, by means of
ambuscades, the provisions and forage, which were very scarce at that
season.

This plan, confirmed by many reports, seemed to Cæsar full of prudence,
and altogether contrary to the usual rashness of the barbarians. He
took, therefore, every possible care to dissimulate the number of his
troops; he had with him the 7th, 8th, and 9th legions, composed of old
soldiers of tried valour, and the 11th, which, formed of picked young
men who had gone through eight campaigns, deserved his confidence,
although it could not be compared with the others with regard to bravery
and experience in war. In order to deceive the enemies by showing them
only three legions, the only number they were willing to fight, he
placed the 7th, 8th, and 9th in one line; whilst the baggage, which was
not very considerable, was placed behind, under the protection of the
11th legion, which closed the march. In this order, which formed almost
a square, he came unawares in sight of the Bellovaci. At the unexpected
view of the legions, which advanced in order of battle and with a firm
step, they lost their courage; and instead of attacking, as they had
engaged to do, they confined themselves to drawing themselves up before
their camp, without leaving the height. A valley, deeper than it was
wide (_magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente_), separated the
two armies. On account of this obstacle and the numerical superiority of
the barbarians, Cæsar, though he had wished for battle, abandoned the
idea of attacking them, and placed his camp opposite that of the Gauls,
in a strong position (the camp of Saint Pierre-en-Chatre [_in Castris_],
in the forest of Compiègne). [543] (_See Plates 29 and 30. _) He caused it
to be surrounded with a parapet twelve feet high, surmounted with
accessory works, proportioned to the importance of the retrenchment
(_loriculamque pro ratione ejus altitudinis_),[544] and preceded by a
double fosse, fifteen feet wide, with a square bottom;[545] towers of
three stories were constructed from distance to distance, and united
together by covered bridges, the exterior part of which was protected by
hurdle-work. In this manner, the camp was protected not only by a double
fosse, but also by a double row of defenders, some of whom, placed on
the bridges, could, from this elevated and sheltered position, throw
their missiles farther and with a better aim; while the others, placed
on the _vallum_, nearer to the enemy, were protected by the bridges from
the missiles which showered down upon them. The entrances were defended
by means of higher towers, and were closed with gates.

These formidable retrenchments had a double aim: to increase the
confidence of the barbarians, by making them believe that they were
feared; and, next, to allow the number of the garrison to be reduced
with safety, when they had to go far for provisions. For some days there
were no serious engagements, but slight skirmishes in the marshy plain
which extended between the two camps. The capture, however, of a few
foragers did not fail to swell the presumption of the barbarians, which
was still more increased by the arrival of Commius, although he had
brought only 500 German cavalry.

The enemies remained for several days shut up in their impregnable
position. Cæsar judged that an assault would cost too many lives; an
investment alone seemed to him opportune, but it would require a greater
number of troops. He wrote thereupon to Trebonius to send him as soon as
possible the 13th legion, which, under the command of T. Sextius, was in
winter quarters among the Bituriges; to join it with the 6th and the
14th, which the first of these lieutenants commanded at Genabum, and to
come himself with these three legions by forced marches. During this
time he employed the numerous cavalry of the Remi, the Lingones, and the
other allies, to protect the foragers and to prevent surprises. But this
daily service, as is often the case, ended by being negligently
performed; and one day the Remi, pursuing the Bellovaci with too much
ardour, fell into an ambuscade. In withdrawing, they were surrounded by
foot-soldiers, in the midst of whom Vertiscus, their chief, met with his
death. True to his Gaulish manner, he would not allow his age to
dispense him from commanding and mounting on horseback, although he was
hardly able to keep his seat. His death and this feeble advantage raised
the self-confidence of the barbarians still more, but it rendered the
Romans more circumspect. Nevertheless, in one of the skirmishes which
were continually taking place within sight of the two camps, about the
fordable places of the marsh, the German infantry, which Cæsar had sent
for from beyond the Rhine, in order to mix them with the cavalry, joined
in a body, boldly crossed the marsh, and, meeting with little
resistance, continued the pursuit with such impetuosity that fear seized
not only the enemies who fought, but even those who were in reserve.
Instead of availing themselves of the advantages of the ground, all fled
cowardly; they did not stop till they were within their camp, and some
even were not ashamed to fly beyond it. This defeat caused a general
discouragement, for the Gauls were as easily damped by the least reverse
as they became arrogant on the smallest success.

Day after day was passing in this manner, when Cæsar was informed of the
arrival of C. Trebonius and his troops, which raised the number of his
legions to seven. The chiefs of the Bellovaci then feared an investment
like that of Alesia, and resolved to quit their position. They sent away
by night the old men, the infirm, the unarmed men, and the part of the
baggage which they had kept with them. Scarcely was this confused
multitude in motion, embarrassed with its own mass and its numerous
chariots, when daylight surprised it, and the troops had to be drawn up
in line before the camp, to give the column time to move away. Cæsar saw
no advantage either in giving battle to those who were in position, or,
on account of the steepness of the hill, in pursuing those who were
making their retreat; he resolved, nevertheless, to make two legions
advance in order to disturb the enemy in his retreat. Having observed
that the mountain on which the Gauls were established was connected with
another height (Mont Collet), from which it was only separated by a
narrow valley, he ordered bridges to be thrown on the marsh; the legions
crossed over them, and soon attained the summit of the height, which was
defended on both sides by abrupt declivities. There he collected his
troops, and advanced in order of battle up to the extremity of the
plateau, whence the engines, placed in battery, could reach the masses
of the enemy with their missiles.

The barbarians, rendered confident by the advantage of their position,
were ready to accept battle, if the Romans dared to attack the mountain;
besides, they were afraid to withdraw their troops successively, as, if
divided, they might have been thrown into disorder. This attitude led
Cæsar to resolve on leaving twenty cohorts under arms, and on tracing a
camp on this spot, and retrenching it. When the works were completed,
the legions were placed before the retrenchments, and the cavalry
distributed with their horses bridled at the outposts. The Bellovaci had
recourse to a stratagem in order to effect their retreat. They passed
from hand to hand the fascines and the straw on which, according to the
Gaulish custom, they were in the habit of sitting, preserving at the
same time their order of battle, placed them in front of the camp, and,
towards the close of the day, on a preconcerted signal, set fire to
them. Immediately a vast flame concealed from the Romans the Gaulish
troops, who fled in haste.

Although the fire prevented Cæsar from seeing the retreat of the enemy,
he suspected it. He ordered his legions to advance, and sent the cavalry
in pursuit; but he marched only slowly, for fear of some stratagem, as
the barbarians might have formed the design of drawing the Romans to a
disadvantageous ground. Besides, the cavalry did not dare to ride
through the smoke and flames; and thus the Bellovaci were able to pass
over a distance of ten miles, and halt in a place strongly fortified by
nature, Mont Ganelon, where they pitched their camp. In this position,
they confined themselves to placing cavalry and infantry in frequent
ambuscades, thus inflicting great damage on the Romans when they went to
forage. [546]


[Sidenote: Battle on the Aisne. ]

III. After several encounters of this kind, Cæsar learnt by a prisoner
that Correus, chief of the Bellovaci, with 6,000 picked infantry and
1,000 horsemen, were preparing an ambuscade in the places where the
abundance of corn and forage was likely to attract the Romans. In
consequence of this information, he sent forward the cavalry, which was
always employed to protect the foragers, and joined with them some
light-armed auxiliaries; and he himself, with a greater number of
legions, followed them as near as possible.

The enemy had posted themselves in a plain (that of Choisy-au-Bac) of
about 1,000 paces wide in every direction, and surrounded on one side by
forests, on the other by a river which was difficult to pass (the
Aisne). The cavalry were acquainted with the designs of the Gauls;
feeling themselves supported, they advanced resolutely, in squadrons,
towards this plain, which was surrounded with ambushes on all sides.
Correus, seeing them arrive in this manner, believed the opportunity
favourable for the execution of his plan, and began by attacking the
first squadrons with a few men. The Romans sustained the shock, without
concentrating themselves in a mass on the same point, “which,” says
Hirtius, “happens usually in cavalry engagements, and leads always to a
dangerous confusion. ” There, on the contrary, the squadrons remained
separated, fought in detached bodies, and, when one of them advanced,
its flanks were protected by the others. Correus then ordered the rest
of his cavalry to issue from the woods. An obstinate combat began on all
sides, without any decisive result, until the enemy’s infantry,
debouching from the forest in close ranks, forced the Roman cavalry to
fall back. The lightly-armed soldiers, who preceded the legions, placed
themselves between the squadrons, and restored the fortune of the
combat. After a certain time, the troops, animated by the approach of
the legions and the arrival of Cæsar, and ambitious of obtaining alone
the honour of the victory, redoubled their efforts, and gained the
advantage. The enemies, on the other hand, were discouraged and took to
flight; but they were stopped by the very obstacles which they intended
to throw in the way of the Romans. A small number, nevertheless, escaped
through the forest and crossed the river. Correus, who remained unshaken
under this catastrophe, obstinately refused to surrender, and fell
pierced with wounds.

After this success, Cæsar hoped that, if he continued his march, the
enemy, in dismay, would abandon his camp, which was only eight miles
from the field of battle. He therefore crossed the Aisne, though not
without great difficulties.

The Bellovaci and their allies, informed by the fugitives of the death
of Correus, of the loss of their cavalry and the flower of their
infantry, fearing every moment to see the Romans appear, convoked, by
sound of trumpets, a general assembly, and decided by acclamation to
send deputies and hostages to the proconsul. The barbarians implored
forgiveness, alleging that this last defeat had ruined their power, and
that the death of Correus, the instigator of the war, delivered them
from oppression, for during his life it was not the Senate who
governed, but an ignorant multitude. To their prayers, Cæsar replied,
“that last year the Bellovaci had revolted in concert with the other
Gaulish peoples, but that they alone had persisted in the revolt. It was
very convenient to throw their faults upon those who were dead; but how
could it be believed that, with nothing but the help of a weak populace,
a man should have had sufficient influence to raise and sustain a war,
contrary to the will of the chiefs, the decision of the Senate, and the
desire of honest people? However, the evil which they had drawn upon
themselves was for him a sufficient reparation. ”

The following night the Bellovaci and their allies submitted, with the
exception of Commius, who fled to the country whence he had recently
drawn succours. He had not dared to trust the Romans for the following
reason: the year before, in the absence of Cæsar, T. Labienus, informed
that Commius was conspiring and preparing an insurrection, thought that,
without accusing him of bad faith, says Hirtius, he could repress his
treason. Under pretext of an interview, he sent C. Volusenus Quadratus
with some centurions to kill him; but, when they were in the presence of
the Gaulish chief, the centurion who was to strike him missed his blow,
and only wounded him; swords were drawn on both sides, and Commius had
time to escape. [547]


[Sidenote: Devastation of the Country of the Eburones. ]

IV. The most warlike tribes had been vanquished, and none of them dreamt
of further revolt. Nevertheless, many inhabitants of the
newly-conquered countries abandoned the towns and the fields in order to
withdraw themselves from the Roman dominion. Cæsar, in order to put a
stop to this emigration, distributed his army into different countries.
He ordered the quæstor Mark Antony to come to him, with the 12th legion,
and sent the lieutenant Fabius with twenty-five cohorts into an opposite
part of Gaul (to the country situated between the Creuse and the
Vienne), where it was said that several peoples were in arms, and where
the lieutenant Caninius Rebilus, who commanded with two legions,
appeared not to be sufficiently strong;[548] lastly, he ordered T.
Labienus to join him in person, and to send the 15th legion,[549] which
he had under his command, into Cisalpine Gaul, to protect the colonies
of Roman citizens there against the sudden inroads of the barbarians,
who, the summer before, had attacked the Tergestini (the inhabitants of
Trieste).

As for Cæsar, he proceeded with four legions to the territory of the
Eburones, to lay it waste; as he could not secure Ambiorix, who was
still wandering at large, he thought it advisable to destroy everything
by fire and sword, persuaded that this chief would never dare to return
to a country on which he had brought such a terrible calamity: the
legions and the auxiliaries were charged with this execution. Then, he
sent Labienus with two legions to the country of the Treviri, who,
always at war with the Germans, were only kept in obedience by the
presence of a Roman army. [550]


[Sidenote: Expedition against Dumnacus. ]

V. During this time, Caninius Rebilus, who had first been appointed to
go into the country of the Ruteni, but who had been detained by partial
insurrections in the region situated between the Creuse and the Vienne,
learnt that numerous hostile bands were assembling in the country of the
Pictones; he was informed of this by letters from Duratius, their king,
who, amid the defection of a part of his people, had remained invariably
faithful to the Romans.