For fire is
the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
cause of a house, because he wills to build it.
the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
cause of a house, because he wills to build it.
Summa Theologica
Thus in the arts we see that the
art of using a ship, i. e. the art of navigation, rules the art of
ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only
concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are
supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and
the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to
some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be
moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is
its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not
determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such
is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher
concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that
God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most
perfect and always in act.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold.
Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut;
whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand,
to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the
former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the
thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent.
Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter
action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its
movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing
moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although
movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in
potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is
to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense,
therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands
itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also
taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an
act of the imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: As God is His own very existence and
understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He
has not principle of life.
Reply to Objection 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a
corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and
nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not
found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
good with incorruptible natures.
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Whether all things are life in God?
Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is
said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be. " But not all
things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
Objection 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But
things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all
things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life
in God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living
substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore,
things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems
that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears
to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God
potentially.
Objection 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are
known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but
never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch
as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will
never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears
inadmissible.
On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was
life. " But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are
life in God.
I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated
[126](A[3]). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of
understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all
things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it
follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold
sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by
the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are
in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in
their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the
Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being,
living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense
things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense
they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not
distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are
the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not
movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not
movement, but life.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing modelled must be like the model
according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form
has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the
thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the
architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that
exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas
of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine
mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.
Reply to Objection 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural
things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in
the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which
reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man;
and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But
since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that
those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in
themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in
themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or
horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in
the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material,
which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has
nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material
house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
Reply to Objection 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as
being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as
created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him.
They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot
be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in
time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding
only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as
life implies a principle of operation.
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THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we
consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is
about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to
His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to
His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in God?
(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?
(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?
(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?
(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?
(10) Whether God has free will?
(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?
(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the
divine will?
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Whether there is will in God?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of
will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.
Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it
is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot
be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54),
the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,
and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is
not will in God.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove what
is the will of God. "
I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will
follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by
their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its
intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural
form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it,
it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection,
which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without
knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures
have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so
as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to
possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every
intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there
is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is
intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet
He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this
by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above
([127]Q[6], A[3]): for the end has the aspect of good.
Reply to Objection 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what
it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it
does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having
always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not
distinct from His essence.
Reply to Objection 3: A will of which the principal object is a good
outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine
will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of
God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by
itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said
to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first
mover moves itself.
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Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself.
For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than
Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
Objection 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the
appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which
is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks
nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
Himself.
Objection 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the
number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold,
and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is
impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
God, your sanctification. "
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from
Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
[128](A[1]). For natural things have a natural inclination not only
towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if
possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good
amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in
so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains,
therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible
to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the
divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of
likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect,
communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the
divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much
as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things
to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that
end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should
be partakers therein.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine will is God's own existence
essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways
of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has
already been said ([129]Q[13], A[4]). For when we say that God exists,
no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say
that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from
Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the
whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves
the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of
the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills
nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is
different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own
sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the
sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that
anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence,
so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
essence knows other things.
Reply to Objection 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the
many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and
simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its
own goodness.
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Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For
everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from
eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as
He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is
necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
all necessity, as above shown ([130]Q[2], A[3]). But it belongs to His
nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing
over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is
possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does
not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not
to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not
will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two
things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and
mutable.
Objection 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one
or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to
one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]
says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard
to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from
another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
Objection 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as
the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will. " Now, what we work according to
the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does
not will necessarily whatever He wills.
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is
absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it
is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary
absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is
sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly
as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of
absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the
divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that
is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily,
even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty
has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance
the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God
wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His
own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily
will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end
cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve
life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not
necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a
horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the
journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the
goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch
as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His
willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it
can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing,
then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity
whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
except by supposition.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness,
He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness;
for it can exist without other things.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those
other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary
relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in
the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to
some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the
solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the
cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the
things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will,
but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely,
that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect
accompanies all created good.
Reply to Objection 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined
to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
necessary relation.
Reply to Objection 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so
is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge
has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the
thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as
they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they
exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary
existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so
as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in
themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills,
but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
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Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by
pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can
participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours
the rays of goodness upon everything that exists. " But every voluntary
agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by
will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
Objection 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is
essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first
which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He
acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature,
and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
Objection 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being
"such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will.
For fire is
the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist. " Therefore God
is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.
Objection 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created
things is the knowledge of God, as said before ([131]Q[14], A[8]).
Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure,
if Thou wouldst not? "
I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of
things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed,
by a necessity of His nature.
This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active
causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in
Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary
means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and
definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence
the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts
by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must
act by intellect and will.
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of
which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature
operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is
because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent;
and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance
with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being.
Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity
of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and
indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown
([132]Q[7], A[2]). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His
nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
according to the determination of His will and intellect.
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For
effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they
pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now
effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore
since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him
after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the
same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived
appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of
things.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to
exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in
so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain
things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
Reply to Objection 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and
will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He
acts after the mode of intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: Good is the object of the will. The words,
therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His
goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before
(A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect
is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is
conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the
intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the
effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has
nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the
effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in
God all these things are one.
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Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine
will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say
that God made all things irrationally? " But to a voluntary agent, what
is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will
of God has some cause.
Objection 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and
whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause
of all things, as has been already shown [133](A[4]). If, then, there
is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any
cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain,
since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems
inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine
will.
Objection 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no
cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has
no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will,
and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient
cause is greater than the thing effected. " But nothing is greater than
the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of
which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect,
there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as
there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands.
The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its
conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding
the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the
understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself,
apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this
case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding
the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would
be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause
of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which
the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means
to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the
means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and
means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say
that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by
one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills
all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is
not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the
effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His
willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end.
Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this
on account of that.
Reply to Objection 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because
anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one
thing to be on account of another.
Reply to Objection 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite
causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not
unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would,
however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary,
and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says
(De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to
attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to
perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all
effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the
will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect
depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that
God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and
intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might
enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be
reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on
the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.
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Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and
to come to the knowledge of the truth. " But this does not happen.
Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is
that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills
all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might
exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does
not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be
hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive
power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect
of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes.
The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things,
whatsoever He would. "
I answer that, The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof
of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the
agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as
with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing
may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the
universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man
or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same
must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of
any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal
cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any
particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance
of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the
universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order
of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects;
yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this
hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate
causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the
will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that
the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems
to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another
order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will
as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will,
when by its justice he is punished.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men
to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a
restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine
says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be
saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will. " Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they
mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved,
males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of
every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the
consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the
divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor
consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is
good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some
additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent
consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should
live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely
considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer
or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an
evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills
all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In
the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but
consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we
will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a
qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular
qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it
when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is
meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge
wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a
qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute
will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place;
although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as
the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty
is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can
have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it
does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth;
but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in
Whom all good virtually exists.
Reply to Objection 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by
deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first
cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in
no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said
above.
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Whether the will of God is changeable?
Objection 1: It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord
says (Gn. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man. " But whoever
repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a
changeable will.
Objection 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will
speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull
down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I
also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jer.
18:7,8) Therefore God has a changeable will.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God
does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law
to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a
changeable will.
Objection 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as
said before [134](A[3]). Therefore He can both will and not will the
same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is
changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in
that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as
regards His will.
On the contrary, It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie,
nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19).
I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point
we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that
certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a
thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will
to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if
one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to
will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we
presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the
substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in
two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be
good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him.
Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire;
though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first
time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has
already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are
entirely unchangeable ([135]Q[9], A[1]; [136]Q[14], A[15]). Therefore
His will must be entirely unchangeable.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood
metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when
we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so
without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the
same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have
repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by
the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had
made.
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal
cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce
certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in
power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power,
knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior
causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only
on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not rise again," but
looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise
again. " And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior
cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause
it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that
God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls
under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet
does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher
cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for
thou shalt die, and not live" (Is. 38:1). Yet this did not take place,
since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge
and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5):
"The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say,
the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent,"
His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent,
when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow from this argument that God
has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
change.
Reply to Objection 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute
necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the
unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above
[137](A[3]).
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Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the
things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to
will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be. "
Objection 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its
effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84)
"Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder
it. " But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom.
9:19): "Who resisteth His will? " Therefore the will of God imposes
necessity on the things willed.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is
necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die,
being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are
related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have
necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a
thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is
necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary
absolutely.
On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If
therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that
all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,
counsel, and all other such things.
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed
but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to
intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes
is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of
the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause
is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is
hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause
can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if
the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the
divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better
therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the
divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows
upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its
manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in
the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in
accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the
divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things
are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in
the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done
necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for
the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible
and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is
not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed
by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes
for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
Reply to Objection 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a
necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but
conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it
must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the
divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God
wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently
according to His will.
art of using a ship, i. e. the art of navigation, rules the art of
ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only
concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are
supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and
the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to
some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be
moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is
its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not
determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such
is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher
concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that
God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most
perfect and always in act.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold.
Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut;
whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand,
to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the
former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the
thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent.
Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter
action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its
movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing
moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although
movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in
potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is
to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense,
therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands
itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also
taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an
act of the imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: As God is His own very existence and
understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He
has not principle of life.
Reply to Objection 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a
corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and
nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not
found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
good with incorruptible natures.
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Whether all things are life in God?
Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is
said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be. " But not all
things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
Objection 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But
things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all
things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life
in God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living
substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore,
things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems
that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears
to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God
potentially.
Objection 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are
known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but
never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch
as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will
never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears
inadmissible.
On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was
life. " But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are
life in God.
I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated
[126](A[3]). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of
understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all
things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it
follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold
sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by
the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are
in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in
their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the
Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being,
living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense
things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense
they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not
distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are
the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not
movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not
movement, but life.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing modelled must be like the model
according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form
has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the
thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the
architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that
exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas
of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine
mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.
Reply to Objection 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural
things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in
the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which
reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man;
and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But
since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that
those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in
themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in
themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or
horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in
the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material,
which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has
nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material
house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
Reply to Objection 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as
being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as
created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him.
They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot
be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in
time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding
only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as
life implies a principle of operation.
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THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we
consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is
about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to
His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to
His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in God?
(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?
(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?
(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?
(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?
(10) Whether God has free will?
(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?
(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the
divine will?
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Whether there is will in God?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of
will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.
Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it
is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot
be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54),
the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,
and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is
not will in God.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove what
is the will of God. "
I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will
follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by
their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its
intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural
form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it,
it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection,
which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without
knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures
have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so
as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to
possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every
intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there
is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is
intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet
He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this
by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above
([127]Q[6], A[3]): for the end has the aspect of good.
Reply to Objection 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what
it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it
does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having
always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not
distinct from His essence.
Reply to Objection 3: A will of which the principal object is a good
outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine
will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of
God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by
itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said
to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first
mover moves itself.
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Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself.
For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than
Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
Objection 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the
appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which
is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks
nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
Himself.
Objection 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the
number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold,
and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is
impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
God, your sanctification. "
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from
Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
[128](A[1]). For natural things have a natural inclination not only
towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if
possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good
amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in
so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains,
therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible
to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the
divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of
likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect,
communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the
divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much
as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things
to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that
end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should
be partakers therein.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine will is God's own existence
essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways
of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has
already been said ([129]Q[13], A[4]). For when we say that God exists,
no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say
that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from
Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the
whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves
the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of
the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills
nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is
different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own
sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the
sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that
anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence,
so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
essence knows other things.
Reply to Objection 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the
many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and
simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its
own goodness.
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Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For
everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from
eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as
He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is
necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
all necessity, as above shown ([130]Q[2], A[3]). But it belongs to His
nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing
over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is
possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does
not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not
to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not
will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two
things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and
mutable.
Objection 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one
or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to
one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]
says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard
to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from
another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
Objection 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as
the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will. " Now, what we work according to
the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does
not will necessarily whatever He wills.
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is
absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it
is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary
absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is
sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly
as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of
absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the
divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that
is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily,
even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty
has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance
the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God
wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His
own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily
will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end
cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve
life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not
necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a
horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the
journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the
goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch
as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His
willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it
can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing,
then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity
whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
except by supposition.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness,
He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness;
for it can exist without other things.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those
other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary
relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in
the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to
some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the
solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the
cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the
things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will,
but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely,
that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect
accompanies all created good.
Reply to Objection 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined
to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
necessary relation.
Reply to Objection 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so
is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge
has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the
thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as
they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they
exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary
existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so
as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in
themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills,
but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
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Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by
pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can
participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours
the rays of goodness upon everything that exists. " But every voluntary
agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by
will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
Objection 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is
essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first
which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He
acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature,
and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
Objection 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being
"such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will.
For fire is
the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist. " Therefore God
is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.
Objection 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created
things is the knowledge of God, as said before ([131]Q[14], A[8]).
Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure,
if Thou wouldst not? "
I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of
things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed,
by a necessity of His nature.
This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active
causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in
Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary
means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and
definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence
the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts
by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must
act by intellect and will.
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of
which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature
operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is
because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent;
and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance
with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being.
Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity
of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and
indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown
([132]Q[7], A[2]). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His
nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
according to the determination of His will and intellect.
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For
effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they
pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now
effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore
since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him
after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the
same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived
appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of
things.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to
exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in
so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain
things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
Reply to Objection 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and
will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He
acts after the mode of intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: Good is the object of the will. The words,
therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His
goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before
(A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect
is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is
conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the
intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the
effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has
nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the
effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in
God all these things are one.
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Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine
will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say
that God made all things irrationally? " But to a voluntary agent, what
is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will
of God has some cause.
Objection 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and
whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause
of all things, as has been already shown [133](A[4]). If, then, there
is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any
cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain,
since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems
inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine
will.
Objection 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no
cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has
no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will,
and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient
cause is greater than the thing effected. " But nothing is greater than
the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of
which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect,
there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as
there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands.
The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its
conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding
the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the
understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself,
apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this
case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding
the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would
be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause
of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which
the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means
to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the
means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and
means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say
that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by
one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills
all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is
not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the
effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His
willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end.
Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this
on account of that.
Reply to Objection 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because
anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one
thing to be on account of another.
Reply to Objection 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite
causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not
unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would,
however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary,
and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says
(De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to
attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to
perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all
effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the
will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect
depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that
God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and
intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might
enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be
reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on
the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.
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Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and
to come to the knowledge of the truth. " But this does not happen.
Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is
that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills
all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might
exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does
not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be
hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive
power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect
of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes.
The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things,
whatsoever He would. "
I answer that, The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof
of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the
agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as
with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing
may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the
universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man
or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same
must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of
any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal
cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any
particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance
of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the
universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order
of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects;
yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this
hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate
causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the
will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that
the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems
to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another
order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will
as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will,
when by its justice he is punished.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men
to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a
restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine
says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be
saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will. " Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they
mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved,
males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of
every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the
consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the
divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor
consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is
good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some
additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent
consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should
live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely
considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer
or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an
evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills
all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In
the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but
consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we
will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a
qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular
qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it
when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is
meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge
wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a
qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute
will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place;
although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as
the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty
is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can
have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it
does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth;
but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in
Whom all good virtually exists.
Reply to Objection 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by
deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first
cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in
no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said
above.
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Whether the will of God is changeable?
Objection 1: It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord
says (Gn. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man. " But whoever
repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a
changeable will.
Objection 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will
speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull
down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I
also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jer.
18:7,8) Therefore God has a changeable will.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God
does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law
to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a
changeable will.
Objection 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as
said before [134](A[3]). Therefore He can both will and not will the
same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is
changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in
that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as
regards His will.
On the contrary, It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie,
nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19).
I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point
we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that
certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a
thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will
to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if
one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to
will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we
presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the
substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in
two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be
good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him.
Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire;
though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first
time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has
already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are
entirely unchangeable ([135]Q[9], A[1]; [136]Q[14], A[15]). Therefore
His will must be entirely unchangeable.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood
metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when
we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so
without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the
same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have
repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by
the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had
made.
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal
cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce
certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in
power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power,
knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior
causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only
on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not rise again," but
looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise
again. " And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior
cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause
it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that
God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls
under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet
does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher
cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for
thou shalt die, and not live" (Is. 38:1). Yet this did not take place,
since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge
and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5):
"The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say,
the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent,"
His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent,
when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow from this argument that God
has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
change.
Reply to Objection 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute
necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the
unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above
[137](A[3]).
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Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the
things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to
will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be. "
Objection 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its
effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84)
"Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder
it. " But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom.
9:19): "Who resisteth His will? " Therefore the will of God imposes
necessity on the things willed.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is
necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die,
being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are
related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have
necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a
thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is
necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary
absolutely.
On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If
therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that
all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,
counsel, and all other such things.
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed
but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to
intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes
is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of
the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause
is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is
hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause
can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if
the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the
divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better
therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the
divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows
upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its
manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in
the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in
accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the
divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things
are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in
the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done
necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for
the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible
and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is
not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed
by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes
for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
Reply to Objection 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a
necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but
conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it
must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the
divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God
wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently
according to His will.
