the main
thing about the new plan which must appeal universally to the
people of India is that it has been accepted by the Congress, the
Moslem League and the Sikhs.
thing about the new plan which must appeal universally to the
people of India is that it has been accepted by the Congress, the
Moslem League and the Sikhs.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
Jinnah sent a reply
in which he observed that "it will be fatal to leave the entire field
of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the
Congress”, and therefore "we have decided to nominate five (mem-
bers of the Interim Government) on behalf of the Muslim League".
On the same day, the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Jinnah: “I am glad to
know that the Muslim League has decided to join the Interim Gov-
ernment” and requested Mr. Jinnah to send the names of five re-
presentatives. The names sent by Mr. Jinnah were Liaquat Ali
Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, A. R. Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and
Jogendra Nath Mandal. Mr. Jinnah carefully selected only those
persons who were likely to put up fight for the Muslim League and
Pakistan in the Interim Government. He did not include men like
Nawab Ismail Khan and Choudury Khaliquzzaman because they
were moderates and were anxious to come to terms with the Con-
gress. Even Husain Imam who was the leader of the Muslim
League Party in the Council of State was not selected. Even
Nazimuddin was not included as Jogendra Nath Mandal,
Scheduled Caste Minister in the Muslim League Ministry of Bengal,
was to be taken.
With regard to the distribution of the important portfolios, Mr.
Jinnah played the game skilfully. The impression given by him
was that he was not interested in other portfolios but was concerned
about the position of the Vice-President of the Executive Council
of the Viceroy. He rightly came to the conclusion that he would
get the best bargain if he allowed the Viceroy to do the bargaining
for him. The Viceroy suggested to the Congress to give up the
Home Department which was held by Sardar Patel. However, the
Congress was not prepared to give to the Muslim League the port-
folios of Home and Defence. The Congress thought that if the
portfolio of Finance was offered to the Muslim League, the latter
would refuse it on account of the proverbial Muslim inability to
handle Finance. If the League accepted it, they would make fools
of themselves. The League demanded that the Office of the Vice-
President should go by rotation to the Congress and the League
but the League was offered the Vice Chairmanship of the Co-
ordination Committee of the Cabinet. Experience showed that the
Congress was in the wrong. Liaquat Ali Khan was able to manage
the Department of Finance with the help of Choudhuri Mohammad
Ali. With the Department of Finance under its control, the
Muslim League was able to give the maximum trouble to the Con-
gress Ministers, Sardar Patel is set to have observed: “Whatever
proposal he made was either rejected or modified beyond recogni-
## p. 862 (#904) ############################################
862
PAKISTAN
tion by Liaquat Ali. ” With the help of Choudhri Mohammad Ali,
Liaquat Ali Khan prepared a Budget by which he imposed heavy
taxes on the high incomes of the rich Hindu industrialists who were
supporting the Congress. Liaquat Ali also proposed the setting up
of a Commission to investigate charges of tax evasion made against
industrialists and businessmen. Cleverly, Liaquat Ali did not dis-
close the details of the Budget to the members of the Cabinet but
got its assent only to the general principles of the Budget. The
result was that when the Budget was presented in the Central
Assembly, there was a lot of hue and cry. It was contended that
the object of the Budget was to cripple commerce and industry
which was largely in the hands of the Hindus. What applied to
the Department of Finance equally applied to other Departments
under the control of the nominees of the Muslim League. It was
found that the Muslim League ministers were trying to create the
greatest amount of friction and disharmony in the Government.
Every Department of theirs became a cell of the Muslim League.
It appeared that there were two hostile camps in the Government
of India. There was absolutely no co-operation. It was difficult
to say how long such a state of affairs could continue without a
break-down.
Outside the Government, there were serious differences between
the Congress and the Muslim League with regard to the inter-
pretation of the Cabinet Mission Scheme with regard to the group-
ing of the Provinces. The contention of the Muslim League was
that the grouping was compulsory. Mahatma Gandhi openly ex-
pressed the opinion that the grouping was optional. A similar
view was held by Jawaharlal Nehru, K. M. Munshi and other
constitutional experts of India. The situation became so serious
that the British Government invited the Congress and Muslim
League leaders to London. The London meeting was attended
ky Jawaharlal Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan.
The final decision of the British Government was in favour of the
Muslim League. The British Government issued the following state-
ment on 6 December, 1946: "The Cabinet Mission have through-
out maintained the view that decisions of the Sections should, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, be taken by a simple
majority vote of the representatives in the Sections. This view has
been accepted by the Muslim League, but the Congress have put
forward a different view. They have asserted that the true mean-
ing of the statement, read as a whole, is that the Provinces have the
right to decide both as to grouping and as to their own Constitu-
tions.
"His Majesty's Government have had legal advice which confirms
## p. 863 (#905) ############################################
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
863
that the statement of 16 May means what the Cabinet Mission
have always stated was their intention. This part of the state-
ment, as so interpreted, must, therefore, be considered an essential
part of the scheme of 16 May for enabling the Indian people to
formulate a Constitution which His Majesty's Government would
be prepared to submit to Parliament. It should, therefore, be ac-
cepted by all parties in the Constituent Assembly. ”
The first session of the Constituent Assembly was held on 9
December, 1946 but the same was boycotted by the Muslim League.
The resolutions passed by the Constituent Assembly were denounc-
ed by the Muslim League as ultra vires, invalid and illegal. The
Congress demanded the resignation of the Muslim League nominees
in the interim Government on the ground that the League was not
taking part in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly and was
also committed to a programme of Direct Action. A similar de-
mand was made by the Muslim League for the resignation
Congress nominees. A very serious situation arose in the country.
The Viceroy did not know what to do. It was difficult to pick
and choose between the Congress and the Muslim League. Which-
ever party was favoured, the other party was bound to create mis-
chief.
of
ANNOUNCEMENT OF 20 FEBRUARY, 1947
some
It was under these circumstances that the British Government
made an epoch-making statement on 20 February, 1947 in which
it was declared that the British Government would transfer power
into the hands of the Indians by a date not later than June 1948.
It was declared that the British Government shall have to decide
to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India
were to be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to
some form of Central Government for British India or in
areas to existing Provincial Governments or in such other way as
might seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian
people. The British Government also announced that Lord
Mountbatten was to succeed Lord Wavell as the Viceroy of India.
It was stated that Lord Mountbatten was to be entrusted with the
task of transferring into the hands of the Indians the responsibility
for the Government of British India in a manner that would best
ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India.
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
Lord Mountbatten arrived in India on 22 March, 1947. On
## p. 864 (#906) ############################################
864
PAKISTAN
SO.
23 March, the Muslim League observed the Pakistan Day. On
27 March, Mr. Jinnah declared: “I am fighting for Pakistan, which
means I am fighting for the freedom of India. I am fighting for
Pakistan because it is the only practical solution for solving the
problem and the other ideal of a United India and a rule based on
parliamentary system of Government is a vain dream and an impos-
sibility. India is neither a country nor a nation, but is a score of
nations. ” There were serious riots in the Punjab in the month of
March. These riots were preceded by a very virulent agitation by
the Muslim League in the Punjab, Sind and the North-Western
Frontier Province. The Muslim League volunteers were given a
free hand to do whatever they pleased. They were allowed to go
to the roofs of the Government buildings and hoist the Muslim
League flags and there was none to ask them why they were doing
Whatever the Muslim League did was watched with patience
and internal satisfaction by the British bureaucracy. Even when
the riots broke out in March, 1947, there was no Government
machinery to stop them. The eye witness accounts of the havoc
brought about by the Muslim rioters at Rawalpindi and its neigh-
bourhood were simply disgusting. Hindus and Sikhs were mur-
dered and burnt and thrown into the drains. There was none to
care for their dead bodies. In the foundations of present Islama-
bad near Rawalpindi lies the blood of the innocent Hindus and
Sikhs who had done nothing to deserve their fate. Alan Campbell
Johnson who accompanied Lord Mountbatten on a visit to Kahuta
near Rawalpindi, writes: "We arrived to find that the havoc in
the small town was very great. Picking our way through the rub-
ble, we could see that the devastation was as thorough as any pro-
duced by fire-bomb raids in the war. This particular communal
orgy involved the destruction of Sikhs and their livelihood by
Moslems who were proving difficult to track down. The Muslims
in the area seemed to be quite pleased with themselves, and to be
unable to appreciate that the local Sikh traders were one of the
principal sources of their own prosperity. . . . . One is really
amazed how such a thing could happen in the neighbourhood of
Rawalpindi which was one of the biggest Military Headquarters
of the Government of India. There was no dearth of the soldiers
who could be sent from the Cantonment to the scene of the riots
at a moment's notice. There was the Chaklala Aerodrome at
hand from where the bombers could fly to control the situation and
stop the rioters. One cannot help observing that at this critical
time, the Englishmen forgot their duties and behaved like partisans.
India had a Governor-General in Lord Wavell who was every inch
a General but even he kept quiet. Even he could do nothing at
## p. 865 (#907) ############################################
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
865
the time of the Calcutta killing or at the time of Rawalpindi riots.
The fact of the matter is that when Lord Mountbatten reached
India, the situation in the country was drifting towards a civil war.
There was no love lost between the Hindus and the Muslims in the
country. In the cities where the Hindus and the Muslims lived,
each was determined to destroy the other. A Hindu would not
live in the area where the Muslims predominated and vice versa.
There was no security of life or property. People were disposing
of properties in areas inhabited by the other community. The
whole situation was volcanic. The Government officials were
taking sides. Barring noble exceptions, the general trend was that
no Muslim was prepared to do anything for a Hindu who was
formerly his friend or neighbour. The country was divided into
hostile camps.
When Lord Mountbatten was faced with such a situation, he
came to the inevitable conclusion that the only solution for India
was the partitioning of the country. He found that even Con-
gress leaders like Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru were forced
by the circumstances to admit that there was no other way. The
unity of India was very dear to them but it was found that the
circumstances were such that the same could not be maintained.
Mahatma Gandhi was of the definite opinion that it was better to
face a civil war than to have partition of the country. He is stated
to have declared that the partition “will be over my dead body. ”
However, the situation in the country bcame so horrible that even
he was converted to the point of view that the only solution for the
country was its partition. It appears that both Patel and Nehru
were impressed by the argument that it was better to have a smal-
ler India where they could do what they pleased than to have a
bigger India where the Muslim League will not allow them to do
anything. Within hardly two weeks of the arrival of Mountbatten
in India, it became clear that India was going to be partitioned.
It is pointed out that Lord Mountbatten was not enamoured of the
Cabinet Mission plan as it was not his own child. The circums-
tances dictated the partitioning of the country. We are told that
on 8 April 1947, Lord Mountbatten was discussing Liaquat Ali
Khan's paper on the division of the Armed Forces. On 19 April,
Lord Ismay, Chief of the Viceroy's Staff, emphasised the difficulty
of East Pakistan and West Pakistan who were so much separated
from each other. The reply of Mountbatten was that “Whatever
its implications, he was beginning to think that Pakistan was in-
evitable. ” On 27 April, the news leaked out in the press that the
Government of India was thinking of the partitioning of the coun-
try. The reaction of Lord Mountbatten was: “The more the
## p. 866 (#908) ############################################
866
PAKISTAN
papers speculate about partition, the more they are preparing pub-
lic opinion for its arrival. ” It appears that even before the arrival
of Lord Mountbatten, the Cabinet Mission plan had already col-
lapsed.
The first plan of Lord Mountbatten was to hand over power to
the Provinces or to such confederations of Provinces as the latter
might decide to form. He also was in favour of partitioning the
Provinces of Bengal and Punjab with a view to separate the predo-
minantly Muslim areas from the predominantly non-Muslim areas.
He was also in favour of allowing the Muslim district of Sylhet the
option of joining the Muslim Province of Bengal. In the case of
North-Western Frontier Province, fresh elections were to be held
to ascertain the wishes of the people.
There was opposition to his proposals. Sir Evan Jenkins, Gover-
nor of the Punjab, opposed the partition on the ground that the
divided Provinces would still be having minorities. The conten-
tion of the Governor of Bengal was that the division of Bengal
would make East Bengal a rural slum. Mr. Jinnah contended
that the division of the Punjab and Bengal would destroy the ad-
ministrative and economic fabric of the Provinces which had been
built up during the last century. He contended that ultimately
there would be exchange of populations between India and Pakis-
tan and the problem of the minorities would be automatically solv-
ed in that manner. Mr. Jinnah's argument was that if the Punjab
and Bengal were to be partitioned, then the other Provinces where
the Muslims lived in large numbers must also be partitioned.
Lord Mountbatten sent his plan to London on 2 May with Lord
Ismay and his secretary, George Abell. He requested the British
Government to send their approval by 10 May, 1947. He was
thinking of putting his plan before a meeting of the party leaders
on 17 May, 1947. However, when his plan came back from
London, many changes had been made in it. It is said that when
he showed the same to Jawaharlal Nehru, he told the Viceroy frank-
ly that the Congress would not accept it. The scheme was likely
to result in the Balkanization of India. When Lord Mountbatten
found that Nehru was opposed to the draft he had received from
London, he decided to make another attempt. The plan of V. P.
Menon was examined. According to that plan, the transfer of
power was to take place on the basis of Dominion Status to India
and such other areas as wanted to separate from India and form
another state. Lord Mountbatten found that Nehru was not
opposed to a plan according to which power was to be transferred
to two Central Governments on the basis of Dominion Status. The
provisions with regard to the partitioning of the Punjab, Bengal and
## p. 867 (#909) ############################################
3 JUNE PLAN
867
Assam were already known. The wishes of the Muslim areas of
the Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the North-Western Frontier Province
could also be ascertained. The great merit of the scherre of V. P.
Menon was that as an able draftsman, he was able to put together
many ideas into one plan. Lord Mountbatten left for London on
18 May, 1947 and came back to India after getting the approval
of the British Government. The final plan that emerged is known
as “Statement regarding the method of transfer of power, 3 June,
1947. "
3 JUNE PLAN
According to 3 June Plan, the Provinces of the Punja', and Ben-
gal were to be partitioned into two parts, one part representing the
predominantly Muslim areas and the other part representing the
predominantly Hindu areas. In order to ascertain the wishes of
the people of these two provinces, the members of two parts of each
Legislative Assembly were to sit separately and vote whether or not
the Provinces should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either
part decided in favour of partition, partition was to take place and
arrangements were to be made accordingly. A Boundary Commis-
sion was to settle the details of the boundaries in case partition of
the Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab was decided upon. The
Legislative Assembly of Sind was to make its own decision at a spe-
cial meeting. Provision was made for a referendum in the case
of the North-Western Frontier Province and the Muslim-majority
district of Sylhet in Assam. It is well known that the Legislative
Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab decided in favour of partition
and a Boundary Commission was appointed to decide which parts
of these provinces were to go to Pakistan and which parts to remain
in India. The referendum in the case of North-Western Frontier
Province went in favour of the Muslim League. Likewise, the dis-
trict of Sylhet decided to join East Bengal.
The 3 June Plan was broadcast to the people of India by Lord
Mountbatten on 3 June 1947. In his broadcast to the nation,
Jawaharlal Nehru, Vice-President of the Interim Government,
endorsed the Plan and said: “It is with no joy in my heart that I
commend these proposals to you, though I have no doubt in my
mind that this is the right course. For generations we have dreamt
and struggled for a free and independent united India.
posal to allow certain parts to secede if they so will is painful for
any of us to contemplate. Nevertheless, I am convinced that our
present decision is the right one even from the larger viewpoint. . . .
In his broadcast on the same day, Mr. Jinnah said: “It is clear
the Plan does not meet in some important respects our point of
The pro-
## p. 868 (#910) ############################################
868
PAKISTAN
view. . . . . . But so far as I have been able to gather, on the whole,
the reaction in the Muslim circles in Delhi has been hopeful. ” It
is obvious that Mr. Jinnah did not say in so many words that he
accepted the 3 June Plan on behalf of the Muslim League. This
he did in spite of the fact that Lord Mountbatten requested him to
make a categorical statement with regard to the acceptance of the
Plan by the Muslim League.
On behalf of the Sikh Community, Sardar Baldev Singh who
was the Defence Member in the Interim Government, observed thus
in his broadcast: “The Plan that has now been announced. . .
is not a compromise. I prefer to call it a settlement. It does not
please everybody, not the Sikh Community anyway, but it is cer-
tainly something worthwhile. Let us take it at that. "
The comment of the Hindustan Times was that the 3 June Plan
was the “most impartial and carefully thoughtout plan devised for
the quickest and most peaceful transfer of power. . . . . .
the main
thing about the new plan which must appeal universally to the
people of India is that it has been accepted by the Congress, the
Moslem League and the Sikhs. This new hope of agreement among
conflicting parties should itself commend the plan to the people. . '
On 8 June, 1947, a meeting of the All India Hindu Mahasabha
was held in New Delhi to consider the Plan and it was resolved:
“This Committee deeply deplores the fact that the Indian National
Congress, after having given a solemn assurance to the Hindu elec-
torate that it stood by the unity of India and would oppose the dis-
integration of India, has betrayed the country by agreeing to the
partition of India without a reference. . . . .
On 10 June, 1947, the Council of the All India Muslim League
inet in New Delhi and passed a resolution accepting the 3 June
Plan. It resolved “to give full authority to the President of the
All India Muslim League, Qaide-Azam Jinnah, to accept the
fundamental principles of the plan as a compromise and to leave
it to him, with full authority to work out all the details of the Plan
in an equitable and just manner with regard to carrying out the
complete division of India on the basis and fundamental principles
embodied in His Majesty's Government's Plan, including Defence,
Finance and Communications. . . . . . " It is to be noted that the
resolution of the Muslim League did not say in so many words that
it accepted the 3 June Plan but rather it authorised Mr. Jinnah
"to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan. ” The resolu-
tion of the Muslim League was forwarded to the Viceroy.
On the same day, the National Executive of the Socialist Party
of India met in New Delhi and resolved that it "expresses its dis-
>
## p. 869 (#911) ############################################
3 JUNE PLAN
869
>
>
approval of and grief at the proposed division of the Country” as
envisaged by the 3 June Plan.
A joint conference of the Sikhs was held at Lahore and it passed
a resolution on 12 June in these words: “This joint Conference dis-
approves of the scheme for the division of India into two sovereign
States. In its opinion, the only redeeming feature of the plan is
the acceptance of the principle of partition of the Punjab. . .
while the plan is designed to carve out a sovereign Muslim State to
satisfy Muslim demands, it fails to provide for the Sikhs any posi-
tion of power or status or any means for the protection of their
interests in the constitution-making machinery. .
The Working Committee of the All India Majlis-e-Ahrar passed
on 13 June, 1947, a resolution in which it declared that the 3 June
Plan would result in the “political subjugation of Pakistan in the
shape of economics and Defence alliances. Ahrars have always
stood for complete independence and as such the Majlis cannot lend
its support to it. "
An emergency meeting of the All India Congress Conimittee was
held in New Delhi in the Constitution House to consider the 3 June
Plan under the presidentship of Acharya Kripalani. _On 15 June,
it passed a resolution by 157 votes to 29 votes. The resolution
read: “The All India Congress Committee accept the proposals
embodied in the announcement of June 3 which have laid down a
procedure for ascertaining the will of the people concerned. . . . . .
The Proposals of June 3, 1947, are likely to lead to the secession
cf some parts of the country from India. However much this may
be regretted, the All India Congress Committee accepts this possi-
bility in the circumstances now prevailing. "
Speaking on the resolution, Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized the
fact that "It must be realised that it is not possible to coerce un-
willing parts to remain in the Indian domain. ” Sardar Patel ob-
served that India had to choose between “partition or complete
Balkanisation and anarchy. " What Gandhiji said was that al-
though he had previously opposed Pakistan, "sometimes certain
decisions however unpalatable they may be, have to be taken. "
At the end of a ten-day session, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of India passed the following resolution in New
Delhi on 20 June, 1947: "The Mountbatten Award of June 3 does
not give India real independence but is the culmination of a double-
faced imperial policy, which while making concessions to the nation-
al demand to transfer power, sets in motion disruptive and reac-
tionary forces to obstruct the realisation of real independence. The
British policy of divide and rule, exploiting Hindu-Muslim differ-
ences, produced an unprecedented civil war and has now culminated
>
## p. 870 (#912) ############################################
870
PAKISTAN
in the final act of partition of the country into two hostile States
which they plan to control by entering into new alliances with
reactionary forces in the different partitioned areas.
In order to give effect to the 3 June Plan, the Indian Indepen-
dence Bill was introduced into British Parliament on 4 July, 1947
and the same was passed on 18 July, 1947. The Indian Indepen-
dence Act, 1947, provided for the partition of India and the estab-
lishment of the two dominions of India and Pakistan from the
appointed day, i. e. , 15th August, 1947. The Act also provided for
the Legislative supremacy of the two Dominions. The Legislatures
of the two Dominions were given full powers to make laws having
extra-territorial jurisdiction. The British Government was to have
no control over the affairs of the two Dominions after 15 August,
1947. Until a new Constitution was framed for each Dominion,
the Indian Independence Act made the existing Constituent Assem-
blies of India and Pakistan the Dominion Legislatures for the time
being. The Dominion Legislatures were to exercise all the powers
which were formerly exercised by the Central Legislature in addi-
tion to their power with regard to the framing of the Constitution.
Pending the framing of a new Constitution, each Dominion was to
be governed in accordance with the provisions of the Government
of India Act, 1935. Each Dominion was authorised to make
modifications in the Government of India Act, 1935, according to
its own requirements. The Governor-General was given the power
to modify or adapt the Government of India Act, 1935 as might be
considered necessary till 31 March, 1948. After that date, the
power was to be exercised by the Constituent Assembly of each
Dominion. The right of the King to veto laws or to reserve laws
for his pleasure was given up. That right was given to the
Governor-General of the Dominion. He was given the full autho-
rity to assent in the name of His Majesty to any law of the Domi-
nion Legislature made in its ordinary legislative capacity. The
Office of the Secretary of State for India was abolished.
PARTITION OF INDIA
The partition of India in 1947 was the outcome of many forces,
although the main cause was the isolationist policy of the Muslims
in India. Under the influence of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the
Muslims in India began to think and dream separately from the
Hindus. They started feeling that their interests were different
from those of the Hindus and they had nothing in common with
them. They went to the extent of saying that their interests were
opposed to those of the Hindus. If India was given a responsible
## p. 871 (#913) ############################################
PARTITION OF INDIA
871
government, Hindu majority was bound to dominate the Muslims
in India who were in a minority in the whole country. The Mus-
lims also felt that they were educationally backward and conse-
quently could not compete with the Hindus. With the
With the passage of
time, they drifted more and more away from the Hindus. The
Muslim League ideology also estranged the Muslims from the
Hindus. Sir Mohammad Iqbal and Mr. Jinnah also played their
part in taking the Muslims away from the Hindus. Particularly
after 1940, the Muslims insisted that they wanted a separate home-
land and they were not prepared to come to any compromise with
the Hindus. This isolationist policy of the Muslims ultimately led
to the partitioning of India.
There is no denying the fact that the Muslims were helped
immensely by the British Government in India. After the revolt
of 1857, the Government of India was in search of allies in the
country to stabilize its position against those who were out to drive
them away and they found the Indian princes, zamindars and the
Indian Muslims ready to cooperate with them. The Government
of India followed a policy of “divide and rule” and kept on favour-
ing the Muslims even at the cost of other communities in India.
Bengal was partitioned in 1905 to please the Muslims. In 1909,
the Muslims were given separate representation. They were given
weightage in the legislatures. Seats were reserved for them on the
Indian Council and the Governor-General's Executive Council.
Whatever was offered by the Congress to win over the Muslims,
the Government of India and the British Government was always
ready to offer them more. Under the circumstances, the Muslims
of India began to look to the British Government for everything
and were not in a mood to come to any compromise with the Con-
gress or the Hindus. This is what happened on the occasion of the
Second Round Table Conference and on many other occasions.
The British bureaucracy was determined to have its revenge against
the Hindus who were clamouring for the liberation of their country.
They were determined to crush the nationalist movement in India
and if they failed in their effort, they were determined to divide the
country in such a way that it was not worthwhile for the Hindus to
have their freedom. It was this attitude which was responsible
for the partition of India. It is a well-known fact that the British
bureaucracy in India helped the Muslim League agitation in 1946
and 1947. As a matter of fact, it was this encouragement that
helped the Muslim Leaguers to hold their demonstrations without
any interference or oppression from the side of the Government.
This attitude may be compared with the treatment meted out to
## p. 872 (#914) ############################################
872
PAKISTAN
9
the Hindu agitators who were not only beaten mercilessly but also
actually shot dead on many occasions.
It is pointed out that the Indian National Congress was also
partly responsible for the partition of India. Dr. Lal Bahadur
says: "It (Congress) adopted an attitude of appeasement towards
the Mussalmans and thus encouraged them, without wishing it, to
go on adding to their unreasonable claims. In its passion to woo
the Mussalmans, it frequently made sacrifices of principles. The
communal malady grew into unproportioned height and ultimately
led to the division of India. The Congress unfortunately never
tried to understand the Muslim character of isolation :ind aggres-
sion and, to the end, continued to dally with the false hopes that
somehow or other some turn of event would remove communal
problem. ” The same author points out that even in the hour of
the division of India, the Congress preferred to induige in self-
deception: “The All India Congress Committee trusted that when
present passions subsided, India's problems would be viewed in
their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations would
be discredited and discarded by all. ” The initial mistake was
made by the Indian National Congress in 1916 when it signed the
Lucknow Pact. It ought not to have conceded separate electorates
to the Muslims. It ought not to have agreed to give the Muslims
a fixed percentage of representatives in the legislatures. The Con-
gress attitude towards the Communal Award of 1932 also helped the
isolationist policy of the Muslims. Nobody doubts the patriotism of
the Congressmen but the fact remains that the Congress policy of
appeasement of the Muslims ultimately led to the partitioning of
India.
It is true that the Cabinet Mission scheme ruled out the idea of
Pakistan and made provision for a Constituent Assembly which was
to frame a constitution for free India. However, certain events
helped the Muslim League. The Muslim League was allowed to
join the Interim Government without agreeing to take part in the
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. Its members in the
Interim Government refused to cooperate with the other members.
They proclaimed their loyalty to the Viceroy whose appointees and
nominees they considered themselves to be. They openly talked of
carving out a Pakistan.
The division among the members of the Interim Government was
reflected in the whole administrative machinery. According to the
Report of the General Secretaries of the Indian National Congress,
“If the Civil Services, the police and the army became divided in
their loyalty and their members functioned on communal lines,
nothing but mischief and chaos in the administration cyuld result.
## p. 873 (#915) ############################################
PARTITION OF INDIA
873
And this was happening. . . . . . for the League, this situation was
in the nature of pressure tactics for its demand for Pakistan. " The
Muslim League members of the Interim Government removed the
Hindu and Sikh officers from the key positions in thcir Depart-
ments and put in their places Muslims who could be depended
upon to help the cause of Pakistan.
It was during the period of the Interim Government that com-
munal riots took place on a very large scale. “The ever-increasing
and ever-deepening chain of communal disturbances involving mass
murder, arson or loot accompanied by unthinkable atrocities and
horrors obliged the Working Committee of the Indian National
Congress to consider the whole communal and political situation
afresh. ” The only way out of the difficulty appeared to be the
partitioning of India. Jawaharlal Nehru referred to this fact in
these words on June 3, 1947: “There has been violence, shameful,
degrading and revolting violence, in various parts of this country.
This must end. " The Congress was not happy about the partition-
ing of the country as it had consistently fought for the liberation
of united India. The following words of Jawaharlal Nehru give
an idea of the working of his inner mind: “For generations we have
dreamt and struggled for a free and independent, united India.
The proposal to allow certain parts to secede, if they so will, is pain-
ful for any of us to contemplate. "
The announcement of the British Government in February 1947
that it was determined to put power into the hands of the Indians
at a very early date worsened the communal situation in the coun-
try and helped the cause of Pakistan. While making the declara-
tion, "His Majesty's Government had hoped that it would be pos-
sible for the major parties to cooperate in the working out of the
Cabinet Mission's Plan of May 1946 and evolve for India a consti-
tution acceptable to all concerned. ” However, that hope was not
fulfilled as no pressure was put on the Muslim League to take part
in the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. The British Gov-
ernment also accepted the point of view of the Muslim League that
the grouping of the provinces under the Cabinet Mission scheme was
compulsory. It appears that it was felt by the Congress leaders in the
month of May 1947 that the partition of India was absolutely inevi-
table. “The Congress had to choose between partition and continu-
ance of a state of affairs which was becoming more and more intoler-
able. ” According to Sardar Patel, “I felt that if we did not accept
partition, India would be split into many bits and would be com-
pletely ruined. My experience of office for one year convinced me
that the way we have been proceeding would lead us to disaster. We
would not have had one Pakistan but several. We would have
## p. 874 (#916) ############################################
874
PAKISTAN
In my
had Pakistan cells in every office. ” Again, “It was then that I was
made fully conscious of the extent to which our interests were
being prejudiced everywhere by the machination of the Political
Department, and came to the conclusion that the best course was
to hasten the departure of these foreigners even at the cost of the
partition of the country. It was also then that I felt that there
was the unification of the rest of India. "
Prof. Percival Spear says: “Was partition inevitable?
opinion it was as soon as Jinnah resorted to direct action in 1946,
for the only alternatives then were the frightful excesses of civil
commotion and anarchy. But the die was probably cast much
earlier, when the Congress failed to realize the new strength of the
League in 1945 or to take office under the Cripps proposals of
1942. The Simla talks in 1945 were probably the last chance of
getting the League to accept something short of full Pakistan; the
Cripps offer of 1942 the last chance for the Congress to smother
the League before it became a formidable mass movement. But
there is another point to remember before too much regret is felt
for the lost unity of India. The federal provisions of the Cripps
and later proposals so reduced the powers of the Central Govern-
ment that it is very doubtful if the great developments of Nehru's
India would have been possible under them. It is probable that
the centre would have been weak, and political energy spent by the
communities in jostling for position instead of re-organising the
country. Industrial development would have waited on party tac-
.
tics, and five-year plans on political polemics. Only a joint direc-
torate of the two parties could have achieved the kind of develop-
ment which has actually occurred, and of this there was never any
sign. However much partition may be regretted in principle, it
was perhaps necessary, on this account, in the larger interests of the
country. ” The views of Dr. Lal Bahadur are: “The partition of
India was an event of great importance. It ushered in an era of
independence, though the enthusiasm for it was somewhat diminish-
ed due to division. But even the partition is not without advant-
age.
Had India remained a united whole, the Mussalmans would
surely have dominated and would have shared in the amenities of
life more than their due. Right traditions could never have deve-
loped as at every step special claims of the Mussalmans would have
been advanced. They would have taken roots only if homage
were not paid to Muslim appeasement. But seeing thc history of
the Indian National Congress this would have been impossible.
But as it never understood Muslim mind and character, it also
never adhered to principles in its dealing with Mussalmans. Expe-
diency always came in operation in its treatment with the Muslims.
## p. 875 (#917) ############################################
PAKISTAN SINCE 1947
875
The territorial integrity of India could be a benefit to the country
only in the event of equal treatment to all and in the absence of
Muslim appeasement policy. Since the Congress was incapable of
doing it, the division of the country cannot be seriously lamented.
It was choosing between the two evils---Muslim domination over
the whole of the country and vivisection of Mother India—and in
accepting the latter position, perhaps a better evil was chosen. "
(The Muslim League, p. 345).
PAKISTAN SINCE 1947
The Dominion of Pakistan came into existence on 14 August
1947 when Lord Mountbatten went to Karachi to transfer power
into the hands of the leaders of Pakistan. The Quad-i-Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah was appointed the first Governor-General
of Pakistan. While assuming office on 14 August 1947, Mr. Jin-
nah observed: "Such voluntary and absolute transfer of power and
rule by one nation over others is unknown in the history of the
world. It is the translation and realization of the great ideals of
the Commonwealth which now has been effected; and hence both
Pakistan and Hindustan have remained members of the Common-
wealth, which shows how truly we appreciate the high and noble
ideals by which the Commonwealth has been and will be guided
in the future. " As a symbol of goodwill towards Great Britain,
Pakistan retained many British Officers in the Central and Provin-
cial Governments. There were Governors of Provinces and heads
of the Armed Forces in Pakistan who were drawn from the ranks
of British administrators.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was universally respected in Pakistan and he
directed practically every Department of the Govern. nent. His
was the final word on every matter. He did not occupy the posi-
tion of a constitutional head and the real power did not vest in Prime
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. However, it was immaterial whether
a thing was done by Mr. Jinnah or by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan as both
worked in harmony and co-operation. This state of affairs conti-
nued till September 1948 when Mr. Jinnah died. The only impor-
tant event of the regime of Mr. Jinnah was the attack of the tribal
raiders on Kashmir in October 1947 but nothing came out of it
as the State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India and the
Indian armed forces were sent to Kashmir to clear the valley from
the invaders and the latter succeeded in doing so.
On the death of Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din be-
came the Governor-General of Pakistan on 14 September 1948 and
occupied that office up to 17 October 1951. During his regime, the
## p. 876 (#918) ############################################
876
PAKISTAN
real power came in the hands of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan.
However, when Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on 16 October
1951, Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din became the Prime Minister of Pakis-
tan and Gulam Mohammad became the Governor-General of Pak-
istan. There were no differences between the Prime Minister and
the Governor-General on matters of domestic or foreign policy.
The public statements and speeches of Gulam Mohammed did not
give even the faintest hint of rift between him and Khwaja Nazim-
ud-Din. In spite of this, the Khwaja was dismissed by the Governor-
General on 17 April 1953. It is pointed out that the Khwaja did not
prove to be a strong Prime Minister.
in which he observed that "it will be fatal to leave the entire field
of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the
Congress”, and therefore "we have decided to nominate five (mem-
bers of the Interim Government) on behalf of the Muslim League".
On the same day, the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Jinnah: “I am glad to
know that the Muslim League has decided to join the Interim Gov-
ernment” and requested Mr. Jinnah to send the names of five re-
presentatives. The names sent by Mr. Jinnah were Liaquat Ali
Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, A. R. Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and
Jogendra Nath Mandal. Mr. Jinnah carefully selected only those
persons who were likely to put up fight for the Muslim League and
Pakistan in the Interim Government. He did not include men like
Nawab Ismail Khan and Choudury Khaliquzzaman because they
were moderates and were anxious to come to terms with the Con-
gress. Even Husain Imam who was the leader of the Muslim
League Party in the Council of State was not selected. Even
Nazimuddin was not included as Jogendra Nath Mandal,
Scheduled Caste Minister in the Muslim League Ministry of Bengal,
was to be taken.
With regard to the distribution of the important portfolios, Mr.
Jinnah played the game skilfully. The impression given by him
was that he was not interested in other portfolios but was concerned
about the position of the Vice-President of the Executive Council
of the Viceroy. He rightly came to the conclusion that he would
get the best bargain if he allowed the Viceroy to do the bargaining
for him. The Viceroy suggested to the Congress to give up the
Home Department which was held by Sardar Patel. However, the
Congress was not prepared to give to the Muslim League the port-
folios of Home and Defence. The Congress thought that if the
portfolio of Finance was offered to the Muslim League, the latter
would refuse it on account of the proverbial Muslim inability to
handle Finance. If the League accepted it, they would make fools
of themselves. The League demanded that the Office of the Vice-
President should go by rotation to the Congress and the League
but the League was offered the Vice Chairmanship of the Co-
ordination Committee of the Cabinet. Experience showed that the
Congress was in the wrong. Liaquat Ali Khan was able to manage
the Department of Finance with the help of Choudhuri Mohammad
Ali. With the Department of Finance under its control, the
Muslim League was able to give the maximum trouble to the Con-
gress Ministers, Sardar Patel is set to have observed: “Whatever
proposal he made was either rejected or modified beyond recogni-
## p. 862 (#904) ############################################
862
PAKISTAN
tion by Liaquat Ali. ” With the help of Choudhri Mohammad Ali,
Liaquat Ali Khan prepared a Budget by which he imposed heavy
taxes on the high incomes of the rich Hindu industrialists who were
supporting the Congress. Liaquat Ali also proposed the setting up
of a Commission to investigate charges of tax evasion made against
industrialists and businessmen. Cleverly, Liaquat Ali did not dis-
close the details of the Budget to the members of the Cabinet but
got its assent only to the general principles of the Budget. The
result was that when the Budget was presented in the Central
Assembly, there was a lot of hue and cry. It was contended that
the object of the Budget was to cripple commerce and industry
which was largely in the hands of the Hindus. What applied to
the Department of Finance equally applied to other Departments
under the control of the nominees of the Muslim League. It was
found that the Muslim League ministers were trying to create the
greatest amount of friction and disharmony in the Government.
Every Department of theirs became a cell of the Muslim League.
It appeared that there were two hostile camps in the Government
of India. There was absolutely no co-operation. It was difficult
to say how long such a state of affairs could continue without a
break-down.
Outside the Government, there were serious differences between
the Congress and the Muslim League with regard to the inter-
pretation of the Cabinet Mission Scheme with regard to the group-
ing of the Provinces. The contention of the Muslim League was
that the grouping was compulsory. Mahatma Gandhi openly ex-
pressed the opinion that the grouping was optional. A similar
view was held by Jawaharlal Nehru, K. M. Munshi and other
constitutional experts of India. The situation became so serious
that the British Government invited the Congress and Muslim
League leaders to London. The London meeting was attended
ky Jawaharlal Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan.
The final decision of the British Government was in favour of the
Muslim League. The British Government issued the following state-
ment on 6 December, 1946: "The Cabinet Mission have through-
out maintained the view that decisions of the Sections should, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, be taken by a simple
majority vote of the representatives in the Sections. This view has
been accepted by the Muslim League, but the Congress have put
forward a different view. They have asserted that the true mean-
ing of the statement, read as a whole, is that the Provinces have the
right to decide both as to grouping and as to their own Constitu-
tions.
"His Majesty's Government have had legal advice which confirms
## p. 863 (#905) ############################################
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
863
that the statement of 16 May means what the Cabinet Mission
have always stated was their intention. This part of the state-
ment, as so interpreted, must, therefore, be considered an essential
part of the scheme of 16 May for enabling the Indian people to
formulate a Constitution which His Majesty's Government would
be prepared to submit to Parliament. It should, therefore, be ac-
cepted by all parties in the Constituent Assembly. ”
The first session of the Constituent Assembly was held on 9
December, 1946 but the same was boycotted by the Muslim League.
The resolutions passed by the Constituent Assembly were denounc-
ed by the Muslim League as ultra vires, invalid and illegal. The
Congress demanded the resignation of the Muslim League nominees
in the interim Government on the ground that the League was not
taking part in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly and was
also committed to a programme of Direct Action. A similar de-
mand was made by the Muslim League for the resignation
Congress nominees. A very serious situation arose in the country.
The Viceroy did not know what to do. It was difficult to pick
and choose between the Congress and the Muslim League. Which-
ever party was favoured, the other party was bound to create mis-
chief.
of
ANNOUNCEMENT OF 20 FEBRUARY, 1947
some
It was under these circumstances that the British Government
made an epoch-making statement on 20 February, 1947 in which
it was declared that the British Government would transfer power
into the hands of the Indians by a date not later than June 1948.
It was declared that the British Government shall have to decide
to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India
were to be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to
some form of Central Government for British India or in
areas to existing Provincial Governments or in such other way as
might seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian
people. The British Government also announced that Lord
Mountbatten was to succeed Lord Wavell as the Viceroy of India.
It was stated that Lord Mountbatten was to be entrusted with the
task of transferring into the hands of the Indians the responsibility
for the Government of British India in a manner that would best
ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India.
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
Lord Mountbatten arrived in India on 22 March, 1947. On
## p. 864 (#906) ############################################
864
PAKISTAN
SO.
23 March, the Muslim League observed the Pakistan Day. On
27 March, Mr. Jinnah declared: “I am fighting for Pakistan, which
means I am fighting for the freedom of India. I am fighting for
Pakistan because it is the only practical solution for solving the
problem and the other ideal of a United India and a rule based on
parliamentary system of Government is a vain dream and an impos-
sibility. India is neither a country nor a nation, but is a score of
nations. ” There were serious riots in the Punjab in the month of
March. These riots were preceded by a very virulent agitation by
the Muslim League in the Punjab, Sind and the North-Western
Frontier Province. The Muslim League volunteers were given a
free hand to do whatever they pleased. They were allowed to go
to the roofs of the Government buildings and hoist the Muslim
League flags and there was none to ask them why they were doing
Whatever the Muslim League did was watched with patience
and internal satisfaction by the British bureaucracy. Even when
the riots broke out in March, 1947, there was no Government
machinery to stop them. The eye witness accounts of the havoc
brought about by the Muslim rioters at Rawalpindi and its neigh-
bourhood were simply disgusting. Hindus and Sikhs were mur-
dered and burnt and thrown into the drains. There was none to
care for their dead bodies. In the foundations of present Islama-
bad near Rawalpindi lies the blood of the innocent Hindus and
Sikhs who had done nothing to deserve their fate. Alan Campbell
Johnson who accompanied Lord Mountbatten on a visit to Kahuta
near Rawalpindi, writes: "We arrived to find that the havoc in
the small town was very great. Picking our way through the rub-
ble, we could see that the devastation was as thorough as any pro-
duced by fire-bomb raids in the war. This particular communal
orgy involved the destruction of Sikhs and their livelihood by
Moslems who were proving difficult to track down. The Muslims
in the area seemed to be quite pleased with themselves, and to be
unable to appreciate that the local Sikh traders were one of the
principal sources of their own prosperity. . . . . One is really
amazed how such a thing could happen in the neighbourhood of
Rawalpindi which was one of the biggest Military Headquarters
of the Government of India. There was no dearth of the soldiers
who could be sent from the Cantonment to the scene of the riots
at a moment's notice. There was the Chaklala Aerodrome at
hand from where the bombers could fly to control the situation and
stop the rioters. One cannot help observing that at this critical
time, the Englishmen forgot their duties and behaved like partisans.
India had a Governor-General in Lord Wavell who was every inch
a General but even he kept quiet. Even he could do nothing at
## p. 865 (#907) ############################################
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
865
the time of the Calcutta killing or at the time of Rawalpindi riots.
The fact of the matter is that when Lord Mountbatten reached
India, the situation in the country was drifting towards a civil war.
There was no love lost between the Hindus and the Muslims in the
country. In the cities where the Hindus and the Muslims lived,
each was determined to destroy the other. A Hindu would not
live in the area where the Muslims predominated and vice versa.
There was no security of life or property. People were disposing
of properties in areas inhabited by the other community. The
whole situation was volcanic. The Government officials were
taking sides. Barring noble exceptions, the general trend was that
no Muslim was prepared to do anything for a Hindu who was
formerly his friend or neighbour. The country was divided into
hostile camps.
When Lord Mountbatten was faced with such a situation, he
came to the inevitable conclusion that the only solution for India
was the partitioning of the country. He found that even Con-
gress leaders like Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru were forced
by the circumstances to admit that there was no other way. The
unity of India was very dear to them but it was found that the
circumstances were such that the same could not be maintained.
Mahatma Gandhi was of the definite opinion that it was better to
face a civil war than to have partition of the country. He is stated
to have declared that the partition “will be over my dead body. ”
However, the situation in the country bcame so horrible that even
he was converted to the point of view that the only solution for the
country was its partition. It appears that both Patel and Nehru
were impressed by the argument that it was better to have a smal-
ler India where they could do what they pleased than to have a
bigger India where the Muslim League will not allow them to do
anything. Within hardly two weeks of the arrival of Mountbatten
in India, it became clear that India was going to be partitioned.
It is pointed out that Lord Mountbatten was not enamoured of the
Cabinet Mission plan as it was not his own child. The circums-
tances dictated the partitioning of the country. We are told that
on 8 April 1947, Lord Mountbatten was discussing Liaquat Ali
Khan's paper on the division of the Armed Forces. On 19 April,
Lord Ismay, Chief of the Viceroy's Staff, emphasised the difficulty
of East Pakistan and West Pakistan who were so much separated
from each other. The reply of Mountbatten was that “Whatever
its implications, he was beginning to think that Pakistan was in-
evitable. ” On 27 April, the news leaked out in the press that the
Government of India was thinking of the partitioning of the coun-
try. The reaction of Lord Mountbatten was: “The more the
## p. 866 (#908) ############################################
866
PAKISTAN
papers speculate about partition, the more they are preparing pub-
lic opinion for its arrival. ” It appears that even before the arrival
of Lord Mountbatten, the Cabinet Mission plan had already col-
lapsed.
The first plan of Lord Mountbatten was to hand over power to
the Provinces or to such confederations of Provinces as the latter
might decide to form. He also was in favour of partitioning the
Provinces of Bengal and Punjab with a view to separate the predo-
minantly Muslim areas from the predominantly non-Muslim areas.
He was also in favour of allowing the Muslim district of Sylhet the
option of joining the Muslim Province of Bengal. In the case of
North-Western Frontier Province, fresh elections were to be held
to ascertain the wishes of the people.
There was opposition to his proposals. Sir Evan Jenkins, Gover-
nor of the Punjab, opposed the partition on the ground that the
divided Provinces would still be having minorities. The conten-
tion of the Governor of Bengal was that the division of Bengal
would make East Bengal a rural slum. Mr. Jinnah contended
that the division of the Punjab and Bengal would destroy the ad-
ministrative and economic fabric of the Provinces which had been
built up during the last century. He contended that ultimately
there would be exchange of populations between India and Pakis-
tan and the problem of the minorities would be automatically solv-
ed in that manner. Mr. Jinnah's argument was that if the Punjab
and Bengal were to be partitioned, then the other Provinces where
the Muslims lived in large numbers must also be partitioned.
Lord Mountbatten sent his plan to London on 2 May with Lord
Ismay and his secretary, George Abell. He requested the British
Government to send their approval by 10 May, 1947. He was
thinking of putting his plan before a meeting of the party leaders
on 17 May, 1947. However, when his plan came back from
London, many changes had been made in it. It is said that when
he showed the same to Jawaharlal Nehru, he told the Viceroy frank-
ly that the Congress would not accept it. The scheme was likely
to result in the Balkanization of India. When Lord Mountbatten
found that Nehru was opposed to the draft he had received from
London, he decided to make another attempt. The plan of V. P.
Menon was examined. According to that plan, the transfer of
power was to take place on the basis of Dominion Status to India
and such other areas as wanted to separate from India and form
another state. Lord Mountbatten found that Nehru was not
opposed to a plan according to which power was to be transferred
to two Central Governments on the basis of Dominion Status. The
provisions with regard to the partitioning of the Punjab, Bengal and
## p. 867 (#909) ############################################
3 JUNE PLAN
867
Assam were already known. The wishes of the Muslim areas of
the Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the North-Western Frontier Province
could also be ascertained. The great merit of the scherre of V. P.
Menon was that as an able draftsman, he was able to put together
many ideas into one plan. Lord Mountbatten left for London on
18 May, 1947 and came back to India after getting the approval
of the British Government. The final plan that emerged is known
as “Statement regarding the method of transfer of power, 3 June,
1947. "
3 JUNE PLAN
According to 3 June Plan, the Provinces of the Punja', and Ben-
gal were to be partitioned into two parts, one part representing the
predominantly Muslim areas and the other part representing the
predominantly Hindu areas. In order to ascertain the wishes of
the people of these two provinces, the members of two parts of each
Legislative Assembly were to sit separately and vote whether or not
the Provinces should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either
part decided in favour of partition, partition was to take place and
arrangements were to be made accordingly. A Boundary Commis-
sion was to settle the details of the boundaries in case partition of
the Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab was decided upon. The
Legislative Assembly of Sind was to make its own decision at a spe-
cial meeting. Provision was made for a referendum in the case
of the North-Western Frontier Province and the Muslim-majority
district of Sylhet in Assam. It is well known that the Legislative
Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab decided in favour of partition
and a Boundary Commission was appointed to decide which parts
of these provinces were to go to Pakistan and which parts to remain
in India. The referendum in the case of North-Western Frontier
Province went in favour of the Muslim League. Likewise, the dis-
trict of Sylhet decided to join East Bengal.
The 3 June Plan was broadcast to the people of India by Lord
Mountbatten on 3 June 1947. In his broadcast to the nation,
Jawaharlal Nehru, Vice-President of the Interim Government,
endorsed the Plan and said: “It is with no joy in my heart that I
commend these proposals to you, though I have no doubt in my
mind that this is the right course. For generations we have dreamt
and struggled for a free and independent united India.
posal to allow certain parts to secede if they so will is painful for
any of us to contemplate. Nevertheless, I am convinced that our
present decision is the right one even from the larger viewpoint. . . .
In his broadcast on the same day, Mr. Jinnah said: “It is clear
the Plan does not meet in some important respects our point of
The pro-
## p. 868 (#910) ############################################
868
PAKISTAN
view. . . . . . But so far as I have been able to gather, on the whole,
the reaction in the Muslim circles in Delhi has been hopeful. ” It
is obvious that Mr. Jinnah did not say in so many words that he
accepted the 3 June Plan on behalf of the Muslim League. This
he did in spite of the fact that Lord Mountbatten requested him to
make a categorical statement with regard to the acceptance of the
Plan by the Muslim League.
On behalf of the Sikh Community, Sardar Baldev Singh who
was the Defence Member in the Interim Government, observed thus
in his broadcast: “The Plan that has now been announced. . .
is not a compromise. I prefer to call it a settlement. It does not
please everybody, not the Sikh Community anyway, but it is cer-
tainly something worthwhile. Let us take it at that. "
The comment of the Hindustan Times was that the 3 June Plan
was the “most impartial and carefully thoughtout plan devised for
the quickest and most peaceful transfer of power. . . . . .
the main
thing about the new plan which must appeal universally to the
people of India is that it has been accepted by the Congress, the
Moslem League and the Sikhs. This new hope of agreement among
conflicting parties should itself commend the plan to the people. . '
On 8 June, 1947, a meeting of the All India Hindu Mahasabha
was held in New Delhi to consider the Plan and it was resolved:
“This Committee deeply deplores the fact that the Indian National
Congress, after having given a solemn assurance to the Hindu elec-
torate that it stood by the unity of India and would oppose the dis-
integration of India, has betrayed the country by agreeing to the
partition of India without a reference. . . . .
On 10 June, 1947, the Council of the All India Muslim League
inet in New Delhi and passed a resolution accepting the 3 June
Plan. It resolved “to give full authority to the President of the
All India Muslim League, Qaide-Azam Jinnah, to accept the
fundamental principles of the plan as a compromise and to leave
it to him, with full authority to work out all the details of the Plan
in an equitable and just manner with regard to carrying out the
complete division of India on the basis and fundamental principles
embodied in His Majesty's Government's Plan, including Defence,
Finance and Communications. . . . . . " It is to be noted that the
resolution of the Muslim League did not say in so many words that
it accepted the 3 June Plan but rather it authorised Mr. Jinnah
"to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan. ” The resolu-
tion of the Muslim League was forwarded to the Viceroy.
On the same day, the National Executive of the Socialist Party
of India met in New Delhi and resolved that it "expresses its dis-
>
## p. 869 (#911) ############################################
3 JUNE PLAN
869
>
>
approval of and grief at the proposed division of the Country” as
envisaged by the 3 June Plan.
A joint conference of the Sikhs was held at Lahore and it passed
a resolution on 12 June in these words: “This joint Conference dis-
approves of the scheme for the division of India into two sovereign
States. In its opinion, the only redeeming feature of the plan is
the acceptance of the principle of partition of the Punjab. . .
while the plan is designed to carve out a sovereign Muslim State to
satisfy Muslim demands, it fails to provide for the Sikhs any posi-
tion of power or status or any means for the protection of their
interests in the constitution-making machinery. .
The Working Committee of the All India Majlis-e-Ahrar passed
on 13 June, 1947, a resolution in which it declared that the 3 June
Plan would result in the “political subjugation of Pakistan in the
shape of economics and Defence alliances. Ahrars have always
stood for complete independence and as such the Majlis cannot lend
its support to it. "
An emergency meeting of the All India Congress Conimittee was
held in New Delhi in the Constitution House to consider the 3 June
Plan under the presidentship of Acharya Kripalani. _On 15 June,
it passed a resolution by 157 votes to 29 votes. The resolution
read: “The All India Congress Committee accept the proposals
embodied in the announcement of June 3 which have laid down a
procedure for ascertaining the will of the people concerned. . . . . .
The Proposals of June 3, 1947, are likely to lead to the secession
cf some parts of the country from India. However much this may
be regretted, the All India Congress Committee accepts this possi-
bility in the circumstances now prevailing. "
Speaking on the resolution, Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized the
fact that "It must be realised that it is not possible to coerce un-
willing parts to remain in the Indian domain. ” Sardar Patel ob-
served that India had to choose between “partition or complete
Balkanisation and anarchy. " What Gandhiji said was that al-
though he had previously opposed Pakistan, "sometimes certain
decisions however unpalatable they may be, have to be taken. "
At the end of a ten-day session, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of India passed the following resolution in New
Delhi on 20 June, 1947: "The Mountbatten Award of June 3 does
not give India real independence but is the culmination of a double-
faced imperial policy, which while making concessions to the nation-
al demand to transfer power, sets in motion disruptive and reac-
tionary forces to obstruct the realisation of real independence. The
British policy of divide and rule, exploiting Hindu-Muslim differ-
ences, produced an unprecedented civil war and has now culminated
>
## p. 870 (#912) ############################################
870
PAKISTAN
in the final act of partition of the country into two hostile States
which they plan to control by entering into new alliances with
reactionary forces in the different partitioned areas.
In order to give effect to the 3 June Plan, the Indian Indepen-
dence Bill was introduced into British Parliament on 4 July, 1947
and the same was passed on 18 July, 1947. The Indian Indepen-
dence Act, 1947, provided for the partition of India and the estab-
lishment of the two dominions of India and Pakistan from the
appointed day, i. e. , 15th August, 1947. The Act also provided for
the Legislative supremacy of the two Dominions. The Legislatures
of the two Dominions were given full powers to make laws having
extra-territorial jurisdiction. The British Government was to have
no control over the affairs of the two Dominions after 15 August,
1947. Until a new Constitution was framed for each Dominion,
the Indian Independence Act made the existing Constituent Assem-
blies of India and Pakistan the Dominion Legislatures for the time
being. The Dominion Legislatures were to exercise all the powers
which were formerly exercised by the Central Legislature in addi-
tion to their power with regard to the framing of the Constitution.
Pending the framing of a new Constitution, each Dominion was to
be governed in accordance with the provisions of the Government
of India Act, 1935. Each Dominion was authorised to make
modifications in the Government of India Act, 1935, according to
its own requirements. The Governor-General was given the power
to modify or adapt the Government of India Act, 1935 as might be
considered necessary till 31 March, 1948. After that date, the
power was to be exercised by the Constituent Assembly of each
Dominion. The right of the King to veto laws or to reserve laws
for his pleasure was given up. That right was given to the
Governor-General of the Dominion. He was given the full autho-
rity to assent in the name of His Majesty to any law of the Domi-
nion Legislature made in its ordinary legislative capacity. The
Office of the Secretary of State for India was abolished.
PARTITION OF INDIA
The partition of India in 1947 was the outcome of many forces,
although the main cause was the isolationist policy of the Muslims
in India. Under the influence of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the
Muslims in India began to think and dream separately from the
Hindus. They started feeling that their interests were different
from those of the Hindus and they had nothing in common with
them. They went to the extent of saying that their interests were
opposed to those of the Hindus. If India was given a responsible
## p. 871 (#913) ############################################
PARTITION OF INDIA
871
government, Hindu majority was bound to dominate the Muslims
in India who were in a minority in the whole country. The Mus-
lims also felt that they were educationally backward and conse-
quently could not compete with the Hindus. With the
With the passage of
time, they drifted more and more away from the Hindus. The
Muslim League ideology also estranged the Muslims from the
Hindus. Sir Mohammad Iqbal and Mr. Jinnah also played their
part in taking the Muslims away from the Hindus. Particularly
after 1940, the Muslims insisted that they wanted a separate home-
land and they were not prepared to come to any compromise with
the Hindus. This isolationist policy of the Muslims ultimately led
to the partitioning of India.
There is no denying the fact that the Muslims were helped
immensely by the British Government in India. After the revolt
of 1857, the Government of India was in search of allies in the
country to stabilize its position against those who were out to drive
them away and they found the Indian princes, zamindars and the
Indian Muslims ready to cooperate with them. The Government
of India followed a policy of “divide and rule” and kept on favour-
ing the Muslims even at the cost of other communities in India.
Bengal was partitioned in 1905 to please the Muslims. In 1909,
the Muslims were given separate representation. They were given
weightage in the legislatures. Seats were reserved for them on the
Indian Council and the Governor-General's Executive Council.
Whatever was offered by the Congress to win over the Muslims,
the Government of India and the British Government was always
ready to offer them more. Under the circumstances, the Muslims
of India began to look to the British Government for everything
and were not in a mood to come to any compromise with the Con-
gress or the Hindus. This is what happened on the occasion of the
Second Round Table Conference and on many other occasions.
The British bureaucracy was determined to have its revenge against
the Hindus who were clamouring for the liberation of their country.
They were determined to crush the nationalist movement in India
and if they failed in their effort, they were determined to divide the
country in such a way that it was not worthwhile for the Hindus to
have their freedom. It was this attitude which was responsible
for the partition of India. It is a well-known fact that the British
bureaucracy in India helped the Muslim League agitation in 1946
and 1947. As a matter of fact, it was this encouragement that
helped the Muslim Leaguers to hold their demonstrations without
any interference or oppression from the side of the Government.
This attitude may be compared with the treatment meted out to
## p. 872 (#914) ############################################
872
PAKISTAN
9
the Hindu agitators who were not only beaten mercilessly but also
actually shot dead on many occasions.
It is pointed out that the Indian National Congress was also
partly responsible for the partition of India. Dr. Lal Bahadur
says: "It (Congress) adopted an attitude of appeasement towards
the Mussalmans and thus encouraged them, without wishing it, to
go on adding to their unreasonable claims. In its passion to woo
the Mussalmans, it frequently made sacrifices of principles. The
communal malady grew into unproportioned height and ultimately
led to the division of India. The Congress unfortunately never
tried to understand the Muslim character of isolation :ind aggres-
sion and, to the end, continued to dally with the false hopes that
somehow or other some turn of event would remove communal
problem. ” The same author points out that even in the hour of
the division of India, the Congress preferred to induige in self-
deception: “The All India Congress Committee trusted that when
present passions subsided, India's problems would be viewed in
their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations would
be discredited and discarded by all. ” The initial mistake was
made by the Indian National Congress in 1916 when it signed the
Lucknow Pact. It ought not to have conceded separate electorates
to the Muslims. It ought not to have agreed to give the Muslims
a fixed percentage of representatives in the legislatures. The Con-
gress attitude towards the Communal Award of 1932 also helped the
isolationist policy of the Muslims. Nobody doubts the patriotism of
the Congressmen but the fact remains that the Congress policy of
appeasement of the Muslims ultimately led to the partitioning of
India.
It is true that the Cabinet Mission scheme ruled out the idea of
Pakistan and made provision for a Constituent Assembly which was
to frame a constitution for free India. However, certain events
helped the Muslim League. The Muslim League was allowed to
join the Interim Government without agreeing to take part in the
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. Its members in the
Interim Government refused to cooperate with the other members.
They proclaimed their loyalty to the Viceroy whose appointees and
nominees they considered themselves to be. They openly talked of
carving out a Pakistan.
The division among the members of the Interim Government was
reflected in the whole administrative machinery. According to the
Report of the General Secretaries of the Indian National Congress,
“If the Civil Services, the police and the army became divided in
their loyalty and their members functioned on communal lines,
nothing but mischief and chaos in the administration cyuld result.
## p. 873 (#915) ############################################
PARTITION OF INDIA
873
And this was happening. . . . . . for the League, this situation was
in the nature of pressure tactics for its demand for Pakistan. " The
Muslim League members of the Interim Government removed the
Hindu and Sikh officers from the key positions in thcir Depart-
ments and put in their places Muslims who could be depended
upon to help the cause of Pakistan.
It was during the period of the Interim Government that com-
munal riots took place on a very large scale. “The ever-increasing
and ever-deepening chain of communal disturbances involving mass
murder, arson or loot accompanied by unthinkable atrocities and
horrors obliged the Working Committee of the Indian National
Congress to consider the whole communal and political situation
afresh. ” The only way out of the difficulty appeared to be the
partitioning of India. Jawaharlal Nehru referred to this fact in
these words on June 3, 1947: “There has been violence, shameful,
degrading and revolting violence, in various parts of this country.
This must end. " The Congress was not happy about the partition-
ing of the country as it had consistently fought for the liberation
of united India. The following words of Jawaharlal Nehru give
an idea of the working of his inner mind: “For generations we have
dreamt and struggled for a free and independent, united India.
The proposal to allow certain parts to secede, if they so will, is pain-
ful for any of us to contemplate. "
The announcement of the British Government in February 1947
that it was determined to put power into the hands of the Indians
at a very early date worsened the communal situation in the coun-
try and helped the cause of Pakistan. While making the declara-
tion, "His Majesty's Government had hoped that it would be pos-
sible for the major parties to cooperate in the working out of the
Cabinet Mission's Plan of May 1946 and evolve for India a consti-
tution acceptable to all concerned. ” However, that hope was not
fulfilled as no pressure was put on the Muslim League to take part
in the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. The British Gov-
ernment also accepted the point of view of the Muslim League that
the grouping of the provinces under the Cabinet Mission scheme was
compulsory. It appears that it was felt by the Congress leaders in the
month of May 1947 that the partition of India was absolutely inevi-
table. “The Congress had to choose between partition and continu-
ance of a state of affairs which was becoming more and more intoler-
able. ” According to Sardar Patel, “I felt that if we did not accept
partition, India would be split into many bits and would be com-
pletely ruined. My experience of office for one year convinced me
that the way we have been proceeding would lead us to disaster. We
would not have had one Pakistan but several. We would have
## p. 874 (#916) ############################################
874
PAKISTAN
In my
had Pakistan cells in every office. ” Again, “It was then that I was
made fully conscious of the extent to which our interests were
being prejudiced everywhere by the machination of the Political
Department, and came to the conclusion that the best course was
to hasten the departure of these foreigners even at the cost of the
partition of the country. It was also then that I felt that there
was the unification of the rest of India. "
Prof. Percival Spear says: “Was partition inevitable?
opinion it was as soon as Jinnah resorted to direct action in 1946,
for the only alternatives then were the frightful excesses of civil
commotion and anarchy. But the die was probably cast much
earlier, when the Congress failed to realize the new strength of the
League in 1945 or to take office under the Cripps proposals of
1942. The Simla talks in 1945 were probably the last chance of
getting the League to accept something short of full Pakistan; the
Cripps offer of 1942 the last chance for the Congress to smother
the League before it became a formidable mass movement. But
there is another point to remember before too much regret is felt
for the lost unity of India. The federal provisions of the Cripps
and later proposals so reduced the powers of the Central Govern-
ment that it is very doubtful if the great developments of Nehru's
India would have been possible under them. It is probable that
the centre would have been weak, and political energy spent by the
communities in jostling for position instead of re-organising the
country. Industrial development would have waited on party tac-
.
tics, and five-year plans on political polemics. Only a joint direc-
torate of the two parties could have achieved the kind of develop-
ment which has actually occurred, and of this there was never any
sign. However much partition may be regretted in principle, it
was perhaps necessary, on this account, in the larger interests of the
country. ” The views of Dr. Lal Bahadur are: “The partition of
India was an event of great importance. It ushered in an era of
independence, though the enthusiasm for it was somewhat diminish-
ed due to division. But even the partition is not without advant-
age.
Had India remained a united whole, the Mussalmans would
surely have dominated and would have shared in the amenities of
life more than their due. Right traditions could never have deve-
loped as at every step special claims of the Mussalmans would have
been advanced. They would have taken roots only if homage
were not paid to Muslim appeasement. But seeing thc history of
the Indian National Congress this would have been impossible.
But as it never understood Muslim mind and character, it also
never adhered to principles in its dealing with Mussalmans. Expe-
diency always came in operation in its treatment with the Muslims.
## p. 875 (#917) ############################################
PAKISTAN SINCE 1947
875
The territorial integrity of India could be a benefit to the country
only in the event of equal treatment to all and in the absence of
Muslim appeasement policy. Since the Congress was incapable of
doing it, the division of the country cannot be seriously lamented.
It was choosing between the two evils---Muslim domination over
the whole of the country and vivisection of Mother India—and in
accepting the latter position, perhaps a better evil was chosen. "
(The Muslim League, p. 345).
PAKISTAN SINCE 1947
The Dominion of Pakistan came into existence on 14 August
1947 when Lord Mountbatten went to Karachi to transfer power
into the hands of the leaders of Pakistan. The Quad-i-Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah was appointed the first Governor-General
of Pakistan. While assuming office on 14 August 1947, Mr. Jin-
nah observed: "Such voluntary and absolute transfer of power and
rule by one nation over others is unknown in the history of the
world. It is the translation and realization of the great ideals of
the Commonwealth which now has been effected; and hence both
Pakistan and Hindustan have remained members of the Common-
wealth, which shows how truly we appreciate the high and noble
ideals by which the Commonwealth has been and will be guided
in the future. " As a symbol of goodwill towards Great Britain,
Pakistan retained many British Officers in the Central and Provin-
cial Governments. There were Governors of Provinces and heads
of the Armed Forces in Pakistan who were drawn from the ranks
of British administrators.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was universally respected in Pakistan and he
directed practically every Department of the Govern. nent. His
was the final word on every matter. He did not occupy the posi-
tion of a constitutional head and the real power did not vest in Prime
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. However, it was immaterial whether
a thing was done by Mr. Jinnah or by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan as both
worked in harmony and co-operation. This state of affairs conti-
nued till September 1948 when Mr. Jinnah died. The only impor-
tant event of the regime of Mr. Jinnah was the attack of the tribal
raiders on Kashmir in October 1947 but nothing came out of it
as the State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India and the
Indian armed forces were sent to Kashmir to clear the valley from
the invaders and the latter succeeded in doing so.
On the death of Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din be-
came the Governor-General of Pakistan on 14 September 1948 and
occupied that office up to 17 October 1951. During his regime, the
## p. 876 (#918) ############################################
876
PAKISTAN
real power came in the hands of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan.
However, when Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on 16 October
1951, Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din became the Prime Minister of Pakis-
tan and Gulam Mohammad became the Governor-General of Pak-
istan. There were no differences between the Prime Minister and
the Governor-General on matters of domestic or foreign policy.
The public statements and speeches of Gulam Mohammed did not
give even the faintest hint of rift between him and Khwaja Nazim-
ud-Din. In spite of this, the Khwaja was dismissed by the Governor-
General on 17 April 1953. It is pointed out that the Khwaja did not
prove to be a strong Prime Minister.
