Dharma and adharma would both
be causes of arising and of destruction: dharma would cause the flame to
arise and cause it to perish, accordingly as the flame is favorable or
unfavorable; adharma, accordingly as it is unfavorable or favorable.
be causes of arising and of destruction: dharma would cause the flame to
arise and cause it to perish, accordingly as the flame is favorable or
unfavorable; adharma, accordingly as it is unfavorable or favorable.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
Tbey take up sharp arms and kil oneanother.
.
.
Itnolongerrains,thereishunger.
.
.
(.
.
.
micchddhammaparetdnam[manussdnam] yakkha vd amanmse osajjanti .
.
.
yd is unlikely; we have a variant vale)" This passes into the eschatologkal plan oiDigba, iii70, the Cakkavattisihandda.
(Famine and illness are absent, there is only satthantarakappa).
557. Pali sources. Anguttara, i. 160, dubbhikkham hoti dussassam setoffhikath saldkavuttam tena bahu mantissa kalarh karonti. Samyutta, iv. 323: The Bhagavat passes through the country with a great following of Bhikkhus when famine was reigning, dubbhikkhe dvihitike setoffhike satdkdvutteln the Suttavibhanga {Vinaya, ed Oldenberg, iii. 6. 15,87): in such a country duddhikhd hoti dvihitikd setoffhikd saldkdvuttd na sukard uHchena paggahena ydpetum; commentary in Samantapdsddikd, i. 175 (where Buddhaghosa gives many explanations; some are in agreement with those of Vasubandhu). Buddhaghosa gives the variant setoffikd, a sickness of rice, that we find in Anguttara, iv. 269: women will have a similar sickness, as manjeffhikd (from maHjiffbd, madder-root) is the sickness of sugar-cane, as setoffikd a type of wheat blight, is the sickness of rice. Rhys Davids-Stede discuss the expression dvihitikaduhkika {Samyutta, iv. 195).
558. Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang translatesamudga(ka)by chU-chi^%,x. o accumulate, bring together; 'du-ba has the same meaning. The version of Hsiian-tsang is very free; Paramartha appears more literal: Now chU-chi, at that period was called chan-cbe %$$$? ,. {p. 223c). Further lien-che (perfume box, etc, Couvreur, 1904, p. 197) ^ called chan-che.
[In Mahdvyutpatti, 233 (list of utensils) we have: 6. samudga {-za ma tog), 25. cafica {-gab-tse, ga-ba-tse). For gab-tse {ga-ba-tshe, tse), the word lists give: "table for magical operations", Sarad Chandra, Desgodins, etc]
b! Divydvaddna, 131 (the story of Mendhaka, excerpted from the Dulva, voL iii, Chap, on Medicines, S. Levi, Elements de formation du Divya, Toung-Pao, 1907,11, note): dvddafavarsikd andvrsfir vydkrtd / trividham durbhiksam bhavisyati carlcu ivetdsthi faldkdvrtti ca / tatra cafteu ucyatesamudgake/ tasmmmanusydbijdnipraksipyaandgatasattvdpeksaydsthdpayantimrtdndm anena te btjakd[r]yam karisyanti / idam samudgakam baddhvd cancu ucyate. . .
559. This second explanation is slightly closer to that of the Divya.
560. Divya: vilebhyo dhdnyagudakdni /aldkaydkfsya bahudakasthdlydm kvdthayitvd pibanti.
561. Dirgha, TD1, p. 137bl2; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 690al4, examines whence come the suns (created at the origin of the world? created at the end of the kalpa by the actions of beings? ), the water, the wind; examine that which becomes things; is there parindma (iii. 40d)? is there transformation in fire, in water? Above, note 497.
562. [In the same way that, at the end of the world, the flame of Karnadhatu provokes the arising of the flame of Rupadhatu, above p. 477].
<<563. SaekimentionshereDirgha,TD1,p. I47c2,onthefivetypesofseeds;thesametheVydkhyd: parka btjajatdni mitiabtjam phahtbijam btjabijam agrabtjam skandhabtjam.
Digha, i. 5, iiL44,47; Sumangaktvildsini, i-81, etc (Rhys Davids and Stede, s. voc. btja): mSla, khandha, phalu, agga, bijabija; Fragments Stein, JRAS. 1913, 574, Rockhill in Revue Histoire Religions, ix. 168.
564. For nimittakdrana, samavdyikdrana, see Ui, Vaiiesika Philosophy, 136,139,141,146.
565. Guna [dharma] and dravya [dharma] are defined Vaifesikasutra, il. 15-16, see Ui, Vaiiesika Philosophy, p. 122.
Footnotes 549
? Footnotes 550
566. Vaifesikasutra, ii. 1. 1: "The earth has smell, taste, smell, touch".
567. The Pailukas maintain that things (avayavidravya)y wool, etc are not consumed, or burned up; the old attributes disappear; new attributes, arisen from the cooking, arise; but the things, which are the support (ds'raya) of the attributes, remain as they are (tadavastha) (Vydkhyd).
We have in Nydyabindu, Calcutta, 1889, p. 86, a Pailuka, a disciple of Kanada; in the Nydyavdrttikatdtpatya, 355 (ad 3. 1. 4) a Pailukantha.
568. According to Madhyama, 58.
569. We shall see in viii. ll that there are eight apaksdlas and that the first three Dhyanas are sa-injita. (See also iv. 46).
Anguttara, v. 135: the thorn (kanfaka) of the First Dhyana is sadda; of the Second, vitakkavicaras; of the Third, piti; and of the Fourth, assdsapassdsas. Kanpaka is that which destroys the Dhyana, that which is incompatible with the Dhyana (Kathdvatthu, ii. 5), as the mind of women
is the kanfaka of the chaste life; apaksdla, on the contrary, is a certain vice, an imperfeaion or lack, essential to a Dhyana.
Tibetan: skyon; Chinese versions: tsai 5& = calamity; vipatti, tsai-wo #? j|J| calamity-obstacle, and also kuoiOh fault, defect, in Mahdvyutpatti, 245, 664 (see the notes to Sasaki's edition: apaksdla, apaksala, apaksana, apdcara), Siksasamuccaya, 145 and Bodhisattvabhumi in Wogihara.
570. See iv. p. 107, vL24a, viillOlb.
571. Paramartha adds: They obtain Nirvana in this sphere.
572. Same doctrine and phraseology in Visuddhimagga, 421: evam vinassanto'pi ca [loko] nirantaram eva satta vdre aggina vinassati. . . vdto panpunnacatusatthikappdyuke Subhakinhe viddhamsento lokam vindseti.
573. Hsiian-tsang: the text (wen ~$t ) of the Prajndptipada. Par2Ltr&rth2i: fen-pieh li-shih /*<<^g! ji? ttffl(p. 225a).
? CHAPTER FOUR
Karma
V/m. Homage to the Buddha
Who created the variety of the world of living beings and the
receptacle-world which we have described in the preceding chapter? It was not a god (ii. 64d) who intelligently created it.
la. The variety of the world arises from aaion.
The variety of the world arises from the actions of living beings.
But, in this hypothesis, how does it happen that actions produce at one and the same time, pleasing things,--saffron, sandalwood, etc. --on the one hand, and bodies of quite opposite qualities on the other?
The actions of beings whose conduct is a mixture of good and bad actions (vydmisrakarm, iv. 60) produce bodies resembling abscesses whose impurities flow out through the nine gates, and, in order to serve as a remedy to these bodies, they also produce objeas of pleasing enjoyment, colors and shapes, odors, tastes and tangibles.
But the gods have accomplished only good actions: their bodies and their objeas of enjoyment are equally pleasing.
***
What is aaion?
lb. It is volition and that which is produced through volition.
The sutra says that there are two types of aaion, volition (cetand)
l
and the action after having been willed. Aaion after having been
? 552 Chopper Four
willed (cetayitvd) is what the kdrikd designates by the words "that which is produced through volition. "
These two aaions form three aaions: bodily aaion, vocal aaion, and mental aaion.
How do you establish this division, according to the support of its aaion, according to its nature, or according to its original cause?
To what does this question tend? If one were to regard its support,
there is nothing but an aaion, for all aaions are supported on a physical
support, a body. If one were to regard its nature, there is only vocal
aaion, for, of these three,--body, speech and manas,--only the voice is 2
ultimatelyaaionbyitsnature. Ifoneweretoregarditsorigionalcause, we have only mental aaion, for all aaions have their origin in the mind The Vaibhasikas say that the three types of aaion are established by reason of all of these three causes, support, nature and original cause, in this order.
Ic-d. Volition is mental aaion: it gives rise to two aaions, bodily and vocal aaioa
3 Volition is called mental aaion; that which arises from volition,
4
namely aaion which has been willed, is made up of the two other
aaions, bodily and vocal aaion.
***
2a. These two aaions are informative and non-informative. Bodily aaion and vocal aaion are informative (vijnapti) and non-
informative (avijnapti, i. 11, iv. 4); we then have bodily informative 5
aaion, vocal informative aaion, bodily non-informative aaion, and vocal non-informative aaion.
What aaion is "bodily informative aaion? "
2b-3b. Bodily vijnapti is shape. It is not movement because all conditioned things are momentary, since they perish: on the other hand, nothing does not perish without a cause and the creative cause would be at the same time destruaive.
Bodily vijnapti is such and such a shape (samsthana, i,10a) of the
? body by reason of a volition
6
According to others, (the Vatslputriyas,) bodily vijnapti is dis-
7
placement, forittakesplacewhenthereismovement,andnotwhen
8 there is no movement.
The author answers: This is not so, because all conditioned things are momentary.
What is understood by "momentary" (ksanika)!
Ksana means to perish immediately after having acquired its being; ksanika is a dharma that has ksana, as a dandika is one who has a staff
9 (danda).
A conditioned thing does not exist beyond the acquisition of its being: it perishes on the spot where it arises; it cannot go from this spot to another. Consequently bodily vijnapti is not movement.
The Vatslputriyas: If conditioned things are momentary, we would admit that they are not susceptible of displacement.
It is proven that they are momentary, "since they necessarily
10
perish;" for the destruction of conditioned things is spontaneous; it
does not come from anything; it does not depend on a cause.
1. That which depends oh a cause is an effect, something "done," "created" Destruction is a negation: how can a negation "be done" or
"created? " Therefore destruction does not depend on a cause.
2. Destruction does not depend on a cause: hence a conditioned thing perishes as soon as it arises; if it did not perish immediately, it
would not perish later, since it would then remain the same. Since you
n
admit that it perishes, you must admit that it immediately perishes. 3. Would you say that a conditioned thing changes and that,
consequently, it is later subject to destruction? It is absurd to say that a certain thing changes, becoming another thing, staying the same thing that you say shows its modified characteristics (ii. 46a, p. 245).
4. Would you say that there is no means of correct knowledge more decisive than direct perception; would you say that everyone holds that kindling perishes through its relationship with fire; and that, con- sequently, it is false that all things perish without a cause? There are many remarks to make with respect to this.
In fact, people do not directly perceive the destruction of kindling by reason of fire. If you think that kindling perishes through its relationship to fire because we no longer see the kindling when this
Karma 553
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relationship has taken place, then your thesis rests on an inference, and not on direct perception, and your reasoning is not conclusive.
The fact that we no longer see kindling after its relationship with fire is open to two interpretations: either the kindling perishes by reason of this relationship, or it unceasingly perishes in and of itself, and under normal conditions is unceasingly reborn in and of itself, but stops renewing itself by virtue of its relationship with the fire.
You admit that the destruction of the flame is spontaneous. When, after a relationship with wind, the flame is no longer visible, you admit that this relationship is not the cause of the destruction of the flame; but you admit that the flame, by virtue of this relationship, stops renewing itself. The same for the sound of the bell: a hand, laid on the bell, prevents a renewing of its sound; but it does not destroy the sound that you admit is momentary.
Therefore it is inference that should determine this question.
5. The Vatsiputriyas: What reasons do you bring to bear in favor of the thesis of spontaneous destruction?
We have already said that destruction, being a negative state, cannot be caused. We would further say that if destruction is the effect of a cause, nothing would not perish without a cause.
If, like arising, destruction proceeds from a cause, it would never take place without a cause. Now we hold that intelligence, a flame, or a sound, which are momentary, perish without their destruction de- pending on a cause. Hence the destruction of the kindling, etc. , is spontaneous.
The Vaibhasikas maintain that an earlier thought perishes by reason of a later thought, that earlier sound perishes by reason of later sound.
But the two thoughts in question are not simultaneous. Some contradictory thoughts,--doubt and certainty, pleasure and suffering, love and hate,--do not displace one another; and the same holds for non-contradictory thoughts. And if you suppose that they do contradict one another, then how can weak dharmas destroy strong dharmas of the same type--as when weak thoughts or sounds immediately follow strong thoughts or sounds?
12
6. Some [the Sthavira Vasubandhu] think that a flame perishes
through the absence of a cause of duratioa But an absence cannot be a
? cause.
According to the Vaisesikas, a flame perishes by reason of dharma
and adharma, merit and demerit.
This explanation is inadmissible.
Dharma and adharma would both
be causes of arising and of destruction: dharma would cause the flame to
arise and cause it to perish, accordingly as the flame is favorable or
unfavorable; adharma, accordingly as it is unfavorable or favorable.
Now we cannot admit that dharma and adharma enter into activity and
13
cease being active from moment to moment.
Furthermore since this manner of explaining destruction would
hold for all conditioned things, it is useless to pursue the discussion. You
do not have the right to say that kindling perishes through its
14 relationship with the flame.
7. If one holds that the destruction of the kindling, etc. , has for its cause the relationship of this kindling with fire, one would then be forced to acknowledge that a cause that engenders is at the same time a cause that destroys.
Cooking (paka), or a relationship with fire, produces different products (pakaja), of deeper and deeper color. The same cause that produces the first color destroys this first color, or, at least--if you object that it refers to a new relationship with fire, since the fire is momentary--the cause that destroys the first color is similar to the cause that produces it. Now it is impossible that a certain cause would produce a certain effect and that later this same cause, or a parallel cause, would destroy this same effect. (Compare Tarka-samgraha, xxiii).
Would you say that, if the successive flames are different,--long,
short, large and small,--our conclusion does not become indispensable?
Let us use another example. By the prolonged action of ashes, snow,
caustics, sun, water, or earth, there arises and disappears in turn
different "products of cooking. " But you do not attribute the character-
istic of momentariness to these diverse factors of cooking.
15
ask why water diminishes when it is heated if a
8. Some
relationship with fire is not destruction of the water?
By reason of its relationship with fire, through the force of the fire, the heat element--which is present in water (ii. 22, p. 186)--increases and, increasing, causes the mass of water to be reborn in quantities more and more reduced, until being totally reduced, the water ceases renewing
1<s itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.
Karma 555
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16 itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.
9. Let us conclude. The destruction of things is spontaneous. Things perish in and of themselves, because it is their nature to perish. As they perish in and of themselves, they perish upon arising. As they perish upon arising, they are momentary. Thus there is no movement, no displacement; there is only arising in another place of the second moment of the series: this is the case, even in the opinion of our opponent, for the fire which consumes firewood The idea of movement is a false conception.
Hence bodily vijnapti is not displacement, movement; rather bodily vijnapti is shape.
###
The Sautrantikas say that shape is not a distinct thing, a thing in and of itself. [For the Vaibhasikas, rupayatana, visible physical matter is both varnarupa or color: blue, etc. , and samsthdnarupa or shape: long, etc. (i. 10a). For the Sautrantikas, shape does not exist as a substance, but only as a designation. ]
When there arises, in one direction, a large mass of color, this mass is called "long. " When, by comparison, a mass of color is small, it is called "short. " When a color arises in a great quantity in the four directions, it is called "square. " When it arises equally in all directions, it is called "circular. " The other figures,--high, low, etc,--are explained in the same manner, when a color arises in a great quantity in the direction of the zenith, it is called "high," etc Shape is thus not a thing in and of itself, a rupa.
1. First argument. If shape were a thing in and of itself, 3c It would be perceived by two organs.
In fact, seeing through the organ of sight, one has the idea of length, etc. ; touching through the tactile organ, one has the idea of length. Thus if length, or any other shape, were a thing in and of itself, it would be perceived by two organs. Now, according to the scriptural definition, rupayatana, the visible physical matter, is perceived by only the eye.
The Vaibhasikas answer that touch does not perceive length relative to softness or hardness, arranged in a certain manner, without length
? forming part of the tangible.
This is quite right: but exactly the same holds for the visible. Length
is not visible: one calls a visible (color) or a tangible (softness, etc) arranged in a certain manner "long. "
The Vaibhasikas: When we have the idea of length after having touched something, we are not perceiving shape through touch; we remember the shape, because it is associated with a tangible. It is the same when we see the color (visible) of fire, for we then remember heat (tangible); and when we smell the odor of flower, we then remember its color.
In the two cases that you allege, one imagines that a color recalls a tangible, or that an odor recalls a color, because the dharmas as cause are closely associated: all fire is hot, and certain odors belong to certain flowers. But a tangible (softness, etc. ) is not invariably associated with a certain shape: how then does the perception of a tangible provoke the rememberance of a certain shape? If a similar remembrance is produced without there having been an invariable association between a tangible and its shape, one would in this same manner remember color after having touched something. But such is not the case. Hence, one must not say that the perception of a tangible provokes the remembrance of its shape.
2. Second argument. One sees many shapes in a multicolored piece of cloth. Thus, there would be, according to you, many rupas, in the category of shape in one and the same piece: this is impossible, as it was for color. If shape were a real thing, that which, in the cloth, forms part of a long line cannot at the same time form a part of a short line.
3. Third argument. All "real" rupa, susceptible of being struck (sapratigha, i. 29b),--blue, etc. ,--is made up of real atoms of a certain nature: color rupa (blue, etc. ) necessarily exists in the octuple atom, etc. (ii. 22, trans, p. 185). Now
3c. Shape does not exist in an atom.
There is no atom of length. In fact, when a long mass diminishes, we arrive at the moment when we no longer have the idea of long with regard to it, but rather the idea of short: hence this idea does not proceed from a rupa "shape" existing in the thing. Therefore what we designate as long is a number of real things,--atoms of color,--arranged in a
Karma 557
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certain manner.
If you maintain that the expressions, "long," etc. refer to some
atoms of shape arranged in a certain manner, and that some atoms that would not be "shape" by nature could not be designated as "long," etc. --this is merely repeating your affirmation without the support of any argument. In fact, if the existence of special atoms of shape were proved, you would be able to maintain that united, arranged in a certain fashion, they constitute length: but since the existence of these atoms has not been proved, as the existence of the atoms of color has been
17 proved, how could they be united and arranged?
[4. Objection of the Sarvastivadins:] If a shape is not distinct in color, if a shape is nothing other than a certain color, then shapes would not differ when their color is the same: now some jugs of the same color have different shapes.
Have we not said that one designates a number of real things arranged in a certain manner as "long? " Some ants, all similar, arrange themselves in a straight line or in a circle, and so present different shapes. In the same way the shapes of jugs differ without their color differing.
[5. Objection of the Sarvastivadins:] But, in darkness or at a distance, one sees the shape of an object,--a column, a person, etc,-- without seeing its color. Hence shape exists separate from color.
In fact, one first sees color in an indistinct manner; one then forms--through the mental consciousness--the idea of shape, in the same way that one forms the idea of a line, or the idea of an army accordingly as one has seen, indistinctly, some birds, some ants, some
18
elephants, etc. : "This army is arranged in a circle. " Or rather it
happens that one does not clearly distinguish either color or shape; one only knows,--through the mental consciousness--a mass.
[6. The Sarvastivadins criticize the Sautrantikas,] You Sautrantikas negate both movement and shape. Then what is designated by the term "bodily vijnapti? "
We say that bodily vijnapti is shape [thus separating ourselves from the Vatsiputriyas-Sarhmitlyas] but we do not say that shape is a thing in and of itself [thus separating ourselves from the Sarvastivadins. ]
{The Sarvastivadins:] If you maintain that bodily vijnapti is not a real thing, but solely a shape that exists as designation, what then is the
? real dharma that constitutes bodily aaion?
Bodily aaion is the aaion which has for its objea the body: that is to
say, the volition that puts a body into motion in diverse ways: it proceeds by being supported on this gate which is the body, and is thus called bodily aaion. Other aaions should be defined according to their natures: [i. e. , vocal aaion is the aaion which has the voice for its objea; mental aaion is the aaion of the manas or aaion associated with the manas (see iv. 78c-d). ]
[The Sarvastivadins:] A scripture says that "aaion is volition and willed aaion. " If bodily aaion and vocal aaion are volition, what difference is there between the two types of aaion defined in this saipture?
19
There are two types of volition. First, the initial or preparatory
stage, wherein one produces a volition which is pure volition, "I must do such and such an aaion": this is what the Scripture calls cetandkarmany aaion which is volition. Then, after this stage of pure volition, one produces a volition of aaion, the volition of doing an aaion in conformity with what has been previously willed, to move the body or to emit a voice: this is what the Scripture calls cetayitva karman, aaion after having been willed, or willed aaion.
[The Sarvastivadins:] If this is the case, then informative (vijnapti)
action does not exist: bodily-vocal action, according to you, is only
volition; there is no place for the vijnapti which is matter (rupa) by its
nature. And if vijnapti does not exist, then avijnapti, "non-information" 20
of the sphere of Kamadhatu, does not exist. From whence there would be a great number of difficulties which will be enumerated later (i. e. , samvarasamvardbhdva, etc. , see below 4a-b).
These difficulties can be refuted. Avijnapti is explained very well in our system. We admit two types of volition bearing on bodily aaions and vocal sounds which are the bodily and vocal vijnaptis. These two types of volitions--which bear the names of bodily action and vocal aaion--are capable of producing a volition sui generis which is the avijnapti. Where is the difficulty in this?
[The Sarvastivadins:] This sui generis volition is subordinate to the mind (cittdnuparivartin, ii. 31), like the avijnapti which in our system arises from dhydna, for the avijnapti of Kamadhatu develops during sleep, etc. (i. 11)
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No, for this sui generis volition is projected by a certain volition of decision (pure cetand), its distant cause, and by a certain volition of action and voice, its near cause. Now however you would have it that the vijnapti, if it exists, would depend, like the projection of the avijnapti, on the force of the thought: for it is itself nonintelligent.
***
The Vaibhasikas say that shape exists in and of itself, and that bodily vijnapti is shape.
3d. Vocal vijnapti is vocal sound.
Sound which is discourse by nature--that is, articulated sound (ii.
47)--is vocal vijnapti.
*#*
Avijnapti has already been defined ( i l l ; above n. 5).
The Sautrantikas say that the avijnapti does not really exist as a substance: (1) because it solely consists of not doing an action after
having undertaken not to do it; (2) because one designates a thing which would exist by reason of past primary elements (i. 11) as avijnapti; now past dharmas no longer exist (v. 25); and (3) because avijnapti does not have the nature of rupa: the nature of rupa is rupyate and since the avijnapti is not "susceptible of destruaion" (apratigha), it cannot be rupa (i. 13).
[The Vaibhasikas prove the existence of avijnapti:]
4a-b. Scripture says that rupa is of three types and that there is a pure rupa; there is increase of merit; and there is a course of aaion for him who is not concerned with himself, etc.
[By the word et cetera, theKarika refers to reasons 5 to 8 below. ] 1. A scripture says that there are three types of rupa: "Rupa is embraced within a threefold rupa: there is visible rupa susceptible of
destruaion (visible physical matter); there is an invisible r&pa susceptible of destruaion (the eye, etc); and there is an invisible rupa,
21 free from destruction," and this latter can only be the avijnapti.
? f
tf 2. TheBlessedOnesaidinascripturethatthereispurerupa: What
are the pure dharmas? All rupa of the past, the future and the present. . . all consciousness of the past, future, present, concerning which there arises neither affection nor antipathy: these are the pure dharmas. " (see Ekottardgama, TD 2, p. 13b-c).
Now, apart from avijnapti, there exists no rupa which can be invisible and free from destruction, and no rupa which is pure. [For bodily and vocal action does not pertain to one who has entered into the Truth of the Way, mdrgasatyasamdpanna. ]
3. A scripture says that there is an increase of merit,". . . There are
seven material meritorious works, (aupadhikapunyakriydvastu, iv. 113)
. . . when a believer, son or daughter of good family, who is endowed,
walks, stands still, sleeps or is awake, his merit increases with intensity,
without ceasing;merit continues adding to itself. What are these seven
material works? . . . In this same way there are seven non-material
22 meritorious works. . "
By reason of what dharma, other than the avijnapti, could merit increase even when the mind is not good, or when one is without thought?
4. If avijnapti does not exist, he who does not himself act, who gives orders to others, will not be endowed with a course of action (iv. 66). For a vocal action that consists of giving an order cannnot constitute a course of action, killing etc; this action in fact does not actually accomplish the action to be accomplished.
Would one say that when the action is accomplished the action that consists of giving the order becomes a course of action?
But it is evident that the nature of this action is not modified by the execution of the order.
5. The Blessed One said, "Monks, the dharmas, the external sources of consciousness not included within the eleven ayatanas, are invisible, and are free from destruction" (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 91cl9). He did not say that the dharmayatana is non-rupa.
If the Blessed One did not intend to refer to the avijnapti, which is rupa and so included in the dharmayatana [and not in rupdyatana\ then what is the rupa that is included in the dharmayatana?
6. If avijnapti does not exist, the Way no longer has eight parts, for the parts, samyagvdc, samyakkarmdnta, and samyagdjtva (correct
Karma
561
? Chapter Four
speech, correct action, and correct livelihood, iv. 86), are incompatible with absorption (samadhi). (lf the ascetic, in a state of absorption, possesses these three, it is because these three are by nature avijnapti vi. 67, 68).
But, one would answer, a scripture says, "When he knows thus, when he. sees thus, samyagdrsti, samyaksamkalpa, samyagvyayama, samyaksmrti, and samyaksamadhi are cultivated and achieved; sam-
yagvdc, samyakkarmanta and samyagajiva have been previously puri- fied. " Thus the last three are considered as vijnapti and as previous to absorption.
This text, the Vaibhasikas say, does not refer to the last three parts of the Way, but rather to speech, action, and livelihood in a state of detachment which have been obtained through the worldly path. This does not prevent speech, etc. , from not forming part of the Way under the aspect of avijnapti
7. If the avijnapti does not exist, the Pratimoksa discipline (samvara, 23
iv. l4a) would disappear. For a person who has assumed the vows of religion is still a Bhiksu or Bhiksuni, when his mind is bad or neutral.
8. A scripture teaches that the renouncing of sin is a dike which 24
arrests immorality.
557. Pali sources. Anguttara, i. 160, dubbhikkham hoti dussassam setoffhikath saldkavuttam tena bahu mantissa kalarh karonti. Samyutta, iv. 323: The Bhagavat passes through the country with a great following of Bhikkhus when famine was reigning, dubbhikkhe dvihitike setoffhike satdkdvutteln the Suttavibhanga {Vinaya, ed Oldenberg, iii. 6. 15,87): in such a country duddhikhd hoti dvihitikd setoffhikd saldkdvuttd na sukard uHchena paggahena ydpetum; commentary in Samantapdsddikd, i. 175 (where Buddhaghosa gives many explanations; some are in agreement with those of Vasubandhu). Buddhaghosa gives the variant setoffikd, a sickness of rice, that we find in Anguttara, iv. 269: women will have a similar sickness, as manjeffhikd (from maHjiffbd, madder-root) is the sickness of sugar-cane, as setoffikd a type of wheat blight, is the sickness of rice. Rhys Davids-Stede discuss the expression dvihitikaduhkika {Samyutta, iv. 195).
558. Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang translatesamudga(ka)by chU-chi^%,x. o accumulate, bring together; 'du-ba has the same meaning. The version of Hsiian-tsang is very free; Paramartha appears more literal: Now chU-chi, at that period was called chan-cbe %$$$? ,. {p. 223c). Further lien-che (perfume box, etc, Couvreur, 1904, p. 197) ^ called chan-che.
[In Mahdvyutpatti, 233 (list of utensils) we have: 6. samudga {-za ma tog), 25. cafica {-gab-tse, ga-ba-tse). For gab-tse {ga-ba-tshe, tse), the word lists give: "table for magical operations", Sarad Chandra, Desgodins, etc]
b! Divydvaddna, 131 (the story of Mendhaka, excerpted from the Dulva, voL iii, Chap, on Medicines, S. Levi, Elements de formation du Divya, Toung-Pao, 1907,11, note): dvddafavarsikd andvrsfir vydkrtd / trividham durbhiksam bhavisyati carlcu ivetdsthi faldkdvrtti ca / tatra cafteu ucyatesamudgake/ tasmmmanusydbijdnipraksipyaandgatasattvdpeksaydsthdpayantimrtdndm anena te btjakd[r]yam karisyanti / idam samudgakam baddhvd cancu ucyate. . .
559. This second explanation is slightly closer to that of the Divya.
560. Divya: vilebhyo dhdnyagudakdni /aldkaydkfsya bahudakasthdlydm kvdthayitvd pibanti.
561. Dirgha, TD1, p. 137bl2; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 690al4, examines whence come the suns (created at the origin of the world? created at the end of the kalpa by the actions of beings? ), the water, the wind; examine that which becomes things; is there parindma (iii. 40d)? is there transformation in fire, in water? Above, note 497.
562. [In the same way that, at the end of the world, the flame of Karnadhatu provokes the arising of the flame of Rupadhatu, above p. 477].
<<563. SaekimentionshereDirgha,TD1,p. I47c2,onthefivetypesofseeds;thesametheVydkhyd: parka btjajatdni mitiabtjam phahtbijam btjabijam agrabtjam skandhabtjam.
Digha, i. 5, iiL44,47; Sumangaktvildsini, i-81, etc (Rhys Davids and Stede, s. voc. btja): mSla, khandha, phalu, agga, bijabija; Fragments Stein, JRAS. 1913, 574, Rockhill in Revue Histoire Religions, ix. 168.
564. For nimittakdrana, samavdyikdrana, see Ui, Vaiiesika Philosophy, 136,139,141,146.
565. Guna [dharma] and dravya [dharma] are defined Vaifesikasutra, il. 15-16, see Ui, Vaiiesika Philosophy, p. 122.
Footnotes 549
? Footnotes 550
566. Vaifesikasutra, ii. 1. 1: "The earth has smell, taste, smell, touch".
567. The Pailukas maintain that things (avayavidravya)y wool, etc are not consumed, or burned up; the old attributes disappear; new attributes, arisen from the cooking, arise; but the things, which are the support (ds'raya) of the attributes, remain as they are (tadavastha) (Vydkhyd).
We have in Nydyabindu, Calcutta, 1889, p. 86, a Pailuka, a disciple of Kanada; in the Nydyavdrttikatdtpatya, 355 (ad 3. 1. 4) a Pailukantha.
568. According to Madhyama, 58.
569. We shall see in viii. ll that there are eight apaksdlas and that the first three Dhyanas are sa-injita. (See also iv. 46).
Anguttara, v. 135: the thorn (kanfaka) of the First Dhyana is sadda; of the Second, vitakkavicaras; of the Third, piti; and of the Fourth, assdsapassdsas. Kanpaka is that which destroys the Dhyana, that which is incompatible with the Dhyana (Kathdvatthu, ii. 5), as the mind of women
is the kanfaka of the chaste life; apaksdla, on the contrary, is a certain vice, an imperfeaion or lack, essential to a Dhyana.
Tibetan: skyon; Chinese versions: tsai 5& = calamity; vipatti, tsai-wo #? j|J| calamity-obstacle, and also kuoiOh fault, defect, in Mahdvyutpatti, 245, 664 (see the notes to Sasaki's edition: apaksdla, apaksala, apaksana, apdcara), Siksasamuccaya, 145 and Bodhisattvabhumi in Wogihara.
570. See iv. p. 107, vL24a, viillOlb.
571. Paramartha adds: They obtain Nirvana in this sphere.
572. Same doctrine and phraseology in Visuddhimagga, 421: evam vinassanto'pi ca [loko] nirantaram eva satta vdre aggina vinassati. . . vdto panpunnacatusatthikappdyuke Subhakinhe viddhamsento lokam vindseti.
573. Hsiian-tsang: the text (wen ~$t ) of the Prajndptipada. Par2Ltr&rth2i: fen-pieh li-shih /*<<^g! ji? ttffl(p. 225a).
? CHAPTER FOUR
Karma
V/m. Homage to the Buddha
Who created the variety of the world of living beings and the
receptacle-world which we have described in the preceding chapter? It was not a god (ii. 64d) who intelligently created it.
la. The variety of the world arises from aaion.
The variety of the world arises from the actions of living beings.
But, in this hypothesis, how does it happen that actions produce at one and the same time, pleasing things,--saffron, sandalwood, etc. --on the one hand, and bodies of quite opposite qualities on the other?
The actions of beings whose conduct is a mixture of good and bad actions (vydmisrakarm, iv. 60) produce bodies resembling abscesses whose impurities flow out through the nine gates, and, in order to serve as a remedy to these bodies, they also produce objeas of pleasing enjoyment, colors and shapes, odors, tastes and tangibles.
But the gods have accomplished only good actions: their bodies and their objeas of enjoyment are equally pleasing.
***
What is aaion?
lb. It is volition and that which is produced through volition.
The sutra says that there are two types of aaion, volition (cetand)
l
and the action after having been willed. Aaion after having been
? 552 Chopper Four
willed (cetayitvd) is what the kdrikd designates by the words "that which is produced through volition. "
These two aaions form three aaions: bodily aaion, vocal aaion, and mental aaion.
How do you establish this division, according to the support of its aaion, according to its nature, or according to its original cause?
To what does this question tend? If one were to regard its support,
there is nothing but an aaion, for all aaions are supported on a physical
support, a body. If one were to regard its nature, there is only vocal
aaion, for, of these three,--body, speech and manas,--only the voice is 2
ultimatelyaaionbyitsnature. Ifoneweretoregarditsorigionalcause, we have only mental aaion, for all aaions have their origin in the mind The Vaibhasikas say that the three types of aaion are established by reason of all of these three causes, support, nature and original cause, in this order.
Ic-d. Volition is mental aaion: it gives rise to two aaions, bodily and vocal aaioa
3 Volition is called mental aaion; that which arises from volition,
4
namely aaion which has been willed, is made up of the two other
aaions, bodily and vocal aaion.
***
2a. These two aaions are informative and non-informative. Bodily aaion and vocal aaion are informative (vijnapti) and non-
informative (avijnapti, i. 11, iv. 4); we then have bodily informative 5
aaion, vocal informative aaion, bodily non-informative aaion, and vocal non-informative aaion.
What aaion is "bodily informative aaion? "
2b-3b. Bodily vijnapti is shape. It is not movement because all conditioned things are momentary, since they perish: on the other hand, nothing does not perish without a cause and the creative cause would be at the same time destruaive.
Bodily vijnapti is such and such a shape (samsthana, i,10a) of the
? body by reason of a volition
6
According to others, (the Vatslputriyas,) bodily vijnapti is dis-
7
placement, forittakesplacewhenthereismovement,andnotwhen
8 there is no movement.
The author answers: This is not so, because all conditioned things are momentary.
What is understood by "momentary" (ksanika)!
Ksana means to perish immediately after having acquired its being; ksanika is a dharma that has ksana, as a dandika is one who has a staff
9 (danda).
A conditioned thing does not exist beyond the acquisition of its being: it perishes on the spot where it arises; it cannot go from this spot to another. Consequently bodily vijnapti is not movement.
The Vatslputriyas: If conditioned things are momentary, we would admit that they are not susceptible of displacement.
It is proven that they are momentary, "since they necessarily
10
perish;" for the destruction of conditioned things is spontaneous; it
does not come from anything; it does not depend on a cause.
1. That which depends oh a cause is an effect, something "done," "created" Destruction is a negation: how can a negation "be done" or
"created? " Therefore destruction does not depend on a cause.
2. Destruction does not depend on a cause: hence a conditioned thing perishes as soon as it arises; if it did not perish immediately, it
would not perish later, since it would then remain the same. Since you
n
admit that it perishes, you must admit that it immediately perishes. 3. Would you say that a conditioned thing changes and that,
consequently, it is later subject to destruction? It is absurd to say that a certain thing changes, becoming another thing, staying the same thing that you say shows its modified characteristics (ii. 46a, p. 245).
4. Would you say that there is no means of correct knowledge more decisive than direct perception; would you say that everyone holds that kindling perishes through its relationship with fire; and that, con- sequently, it is false that all things perish without a cause? There are many remarks to make with respect to this.
In fact, people do not directly perceive the destruction of kindling by reason of fire. If you think that kindling perishes through its relationship to fire because we no longer see the kindling when this
Karma 553
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relationship has taken place, then your thesis rests on an inference, and not on direct perception, and your reasoning is not conclusive.
The fact that we no longer see kindling after its relationship with fire is open to two interpretations: either the kindling perishes by reason of this relationship, or it unceasingly perishes in and of itself, and under normal conditions is unceasingly reborn in and of itself, but stops renewing itself by virtue of its relationship with the fire.
You admit that the destruction of the flame is spontaneous. When, after a relationship with wind, the flame is no longer visible, you admit that this relationship is not the cause of the destruction of the flame; but you admit that the flame, by virtue of this relationship, stops renewing itself. The same for the sound of the bell: a hand, laid on the bell, prevents a renewing of its sound; but it does not destroy the sound that you admit is momentary.
Therefore it is inference that should determine this question.
5. The Vatsiputriyas: What reasons do you bring to bear in favor of the thesis of spontaneous destruction?
We have already said that destruction, being a negative state, cannot be caused. We would further say that if destruction is the effect of a cause, nothing would not perish without a cause.
If, like arising, destruction proceeds from a cause, it would never take place without a cause. Now we hold that intelligence, a flame, or a sound, which are momentary, perish without their destruction de- pending on a cause. Hence the destruction of the kindling, etc. , is spontaneous.
The Vaibhasikas maintain that an earlier thought perishes by reason of a later thought, that earlier sound perishes by reason of later sound.
But the two thoughts in question are not simultaneous. Some contradictory thoughts,--doubt and certainty, pleasure and suffering, love and hate,--do not displace one another; and the same holds for non-contradictory thoughts. And if you suppose that they do contradict one another, then how can weak dharmas destroy strong dharmas of the same type--as when weak thoughts or sounds immediately follow strong thoughts or sounds?
12
6. Some [the Sthavira Vasubandhu] think that a flame perishes
through the absence of a cause of duratioa But an absence cannot be a
? cause.
According to the Vaisesikas, a flame perishes by reason of dharma
and adharma, merit and demerit.
This explanation is inadmissible.
Dharma and adharma would both
be causes of arising and of destruction: dharma would cause the flame to
arise and cause it to perish, accordingly as the flame is favorable or
unfavorable; adharma, accordingly as it is unfavorable or favorable.
Now we cannot admit that dharma and adharma enter into activity and
13
cease being active from moment to moment.
Furthermore since this manner of explaining destruction would
hold for all conditioned things, it is useless to pursue the discussion. You
do not have the right to say that kindling perishes through its
14 relationship with the flame.
7. If one holds that the destruction of the kindling, etc. , has for its cause the relationship of this kindling with fire, one would then be forced to acknowledge that a cause that engenders is at the same time a cause that destroys.
Cooking (paka), or a relationship with fire, produces different products (pakaja), of deeper and deeper color. The same cause that produces the first color destroys this first color, or, at least--if you object that it refers to a new relationship with fire, since the fire is momentary--the cause that destroys the first color is similar to the cause that produces it. Now it is impossible that a certain cause would produce a certain effect and that later this same cause, or a parallel cause, would destroy this same effect. (Compare Tarka-samgraha, xxiii).
Would you say that, if the successive flames are different,--long,
short, large and small,--our conclusion does not become indispensable?
Let us use another example. By the prolonged action of ashes, snow,
caustics, sun, water, or earth, there arises and disappears in turn
different "products of cooking. " But you do not attribute the character-
istic of momentariness to these diverse factors of cooking.
15
ask why water diminishes when it is heated if a
8. Some
relationship with fire is not destruction of the water?
By reason of its relationship with fire, through the force of the fire, the heat element--which is present in water (ii. 22, p. 186)--increases and, increasing, causes the mass of water to be reborn in quantities more and more reduced, until being totally reduced, the water ceases renewing
1<s itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.
Karma 555
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16 itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.
9. Let us conclude. The destruction of things is spontaneous. Things perish in and of themselves, because it is their nature to perish. As they perish in and of themselves, they perish upon arising. As they perish upon arising, they are momentary. Thus there is no movement, no displacement; there is only arising in another place of the second moment of the series: this is the case, even in the opinion of our opponent, for the fire which consumes firewood The idea of movement is a false conception.
Hence bodily vijnapti is not displacement, movement; rather bodily vijnapti is shape.
###
The Sautrantikas say that shape is not a distinct thing, a thing in and of itself. [For the Vaibhasikas, rupayatana, visible physical matter is both varnarupa or color: blue, etc. , and samsthdnarupa or shape: long, etc. (i. 10a). For the Sautrantikas, shape does not exist as a substance, but only as a designation. ]
When there arises, in one direction, a large mass of color, this mass is called "long. " When, by comparison, a mass of color is small, it is called "short. " When a color arises in a great quantity in the four directions, it is called "square. " When it arises equally in all directions, it is called "circular. " The other figures,--high, low, etc,--are explained in the same manner, when a color arises in a great quantity in the direction of the zenith, it is called "high," etc Shape is thus not a thing in and of itself, a rupa.
1. First argument. If shape were a thing in and of itself, 3c It would be perceived by two organs.
In fact, seeing through the organ of sight, one has the idea of length, etc. ; touching through the tactile organ, one has the idea of length. Thus if length, or any other shape, were a thing in and of itself, it would be perceived by two organs. Now, according to the scriptural definition, rupayatana, the visible physical matter, is perceived by only the eye.
The Vaibhasikas answer that touch does not perceive length relative to softness or hardness, arranged in a certain manner, without length
? forming part of the tangible.
This is quite right: but exactly the same holds for the visible. Length
is not visible: one calls a visible (color) or a tangible (softness, etc) arranged in a certain manner "long. "
The Vaibhasikas: When we have the idea of length after having touched something, we are not perceiving shape through touch; we remember the shape, because it is associated with a tangible. It is the same when we see the color (visible) of fire, for we then remember heat (tangible); and when we smell the odor of flower, we then remember its color.
In the two cases that you allege, one imagines that a color recalls a tangible, or that an odor recalls a color, because the dharmas as cause are closely associated: all fire is hot, and certain odors belong to certain flowers. But a tangible (softness, etc. ) is not invariably associated with a certain shape: how then does the perception of a tangible provoke the rememberance of a certain shape? If a similar remembrance is produced without there having been an invariable association between a tangible and its shape, one would in this same manner remember color after having touched something. But such is not the case. Hence, one must not say that the perception of a tangible provokes the remembrance of its shape.
2. Second argument. One sees many shapes in a multicolored piece of cloth. Thus, there would be, according to you, many rupas, in the category of shape in one and the same piece: this is impossible, as it was for color. If shape were a real thing, that which, in the cloth, forms part of a long line cannot at the same time form a part of a short line.
3. Third argument. All "real" rupa, susceptible of being struck (sapratigha, i. 29b),--blue, etc. ,--is made up of real atoms of a certain nature: color rupa (blue, etc. ) necessarily exists in the octuple atom, etc. (ii. 22, trans, p. 185). Now
3c. Shape does not exist in an atom.
There is no atom of length. In fact, when a long mass diminishes, we arrive at the moment when we no longer have the idea of long with regard to it, but rather the idea of short: hence this idea does not proceed from a rupa "shape" existing in the thing. Therefore what we designate as long is a number of real things,--atoms of color,--arranged in a
Karma 557
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certain manner.
If you maintain that the expressions, "long," etc. refer to some
atoms of shape arranged in a certain manner, and that some atoms that would not be "shape" by nature could not be designated as "long," etc. --this is merely repeating your affirmation without the support of any argument. In fact, if the existence of special atoms of shape were proved, you would be able to maintain that united, arranged in a certain fashion, they constitute length: but since the existence of these atoms has not been proved, as the existence of the atoms of color has been
17 proved, how could they be united and arranged?
[4. Objection of the Sarvastivadins:] If a shape is not distinct in color, if a shape is nothing other than a certain color, then shapes would not differ when their color is the same: now some jugs of the same color have different shapes.
Have we not said that one designates a number of real things arranged in a certain manner as "long? " Some ants, all similar, arrange themselves in a straight line or in a circle, and so present different shapes. In the same way the shapes of jugs differ without their color differing.
[5. Objection of the Sarvastivadins:] But, in darkness or at a distance, one sees the shape of an object,--a column, a person, etc,-- without seeing its color. Hence shape exists separate from color.
In fact, one first sees color in an indistinct manner; one then forms--through the mental consciousness--the idea of shape, in the same way that one forms the idea of a line, or the idea of an army accordingly as one has seen, indistinctly, some birds, some ants, some
18
elephants, etc. : "This army is arranged in a circle. " Or rather it
happens that one does not clearly distinguish either color or shape; one only knows,--through the mental consciousness--a mass.
[6. The Sarvastivadins criticize the Sautrantikas,] You Sautrantikas negate both movement and shape. Then what is designated by the term "bodily vijnapti? "
We say that bodily vijnapti is shape [thus separating ourselves from the Vatsiputriyas-Sarhmitlyas] but we do not say that shape is a thing in and of itself [thus separating ourselves from the Sarvastivadins. ]
{The Sarvastivadins:] If you maintain that bodily vijnapti is not a real thing, but solely a shape that exists as designation, what then is the
? real dharma that constitutes bodily aaion?
Bodily aaion is the aaion which has for its objea the body: that is to
say, the volition that puts a body into motion in diverse ways: it proceeds by being supported on this gate which is the body, and is thus called bodily aaion. Other aaions should be defined according to their natures: [i. e. , vocal aaion is the aaion which has the voice for its objea; mental aaion is the aaion of the manas or aaion associated with the manas (see iv. 78c-d). ]
[The Sarvastivadins:] A scripture says that "aaion is volition and willed aaion. " If bodily aaion and vocal aaion are volition, what difference is there between the two types of aaion defined in this saipture?
19
There are two types of volition. First, the initial or preparatory
stage, wherein one produces a volition which is pure volition, "I must do such and such an aaion": this is what the Scripture calls cetandkarmany aaion which is volition. Then, after this stage of pure volition, one produces a volition of aaion, the volition of doing an aaion in conformity with what has been previously willed, to move the body or to emit a voice: this is what the Scripture calls cetayitva karman, aaion after having been willed, or willed aaion.
[The Sarvastivadins:] If this is the case, then informative (vijnapti)
action does not exist: bodily-vocal action, according to you, is only
volition; there is no place for the vijnapti which is matter (rupa) by its
nature. And if vijnapti does not exist, then avijnapti, "non-information" 20
of the sphere of Kamadhatu, does not exist. From whence there would be a great number of difficulties which will be enumerated later (i. e. , samvarasamvardbhdva, etc. , see below 4a-b).
These difficulties can be refuted. Avijnapti is explained very well in our system. We admit two types of volition bearing on bodily aaions and vocal sounds which are the bodily and vocal vijnaptis. These two types of volitions--which bear the names of bodily action and vocal aaion--are capable of producing a volition sui generis which is the avijnapti. Where is the difficulty in this?
[The Sarvastivadins:] This sui generis volition is subordinate to the mind (cittdnuparivartin, ii. 31), like the avijnapti which in our system arises from dhydna, for the avijnapti of Kamadhatu develops during sleep, etc. (i. 11)
Karma 559
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No, for this sui generis volition is projected by a certain volition of decision (pure cetand), its distant cause, and by a certain volition of action and voice, its near cause. Now however you would have it that the vijnapti, if it exists, would depend, like the projection of the avijnapti, on the force of the thought: for it is itself nonintelligent.
***
The Vaibhasikas say that shape exists in and of itself, and that bodily vijnapti is shape.
3d. Vocal vijnapti is vocal sound.
Sound which is discourse by nature--that is, articulated sound (ii.
47)--is vocal vijnapti.
*#*
Avijnapti has already been defined ( i l l ; above n. 5).
The Sautrantikas say that the avijnapti does not really exist as a substance: (1) because it solely consists of not doing an action after
having undertaken not to do it; (2) because one designates a thing which would exist by reason of past primary elements (i. 11) as avijnapti; now past dharmas no longer exist (v. 25); and (3) because avijnapti does not have the nature of rupa: the nature of rupa is rupyate and since the avijnapti is not "susceptible of destruaion" (apratigha), it cannot be rupa (i. 13).
[The Vaibhasikas prove the existence of avijnapti:]
4a-b. Scripture says that rupa is of three types and that there is a pure rupa; there is increase of merit; and there is a course of aaion for him who is not concerned with himself, etc.
[By the word et cetera, theKarika refers to reasons 5 to 8 below. ] 1. A scripture says that there are three types of rupa: "Rupa is embraced within a threefold rupa: there is visible rupa susceptible of
destruaion (visible physical matter); there is an invisible r&pa susceptible of destruaion (the eye, etc); and there is an invisible rupa,
21 free from destruction," and this latter can only be the avijnapti.
? f
tf 2. TheBlessedOnesaidinascripturethatthereispurerupa: What
are the pure dharmas? All rupa of the past, the future and the present. . . all consciousness of the past, future, present, concerning which there arises neither affection nor antipathy: these are the pure dharmas. " (see Ekottardgama, TD 2, p. 13b-c).
Now, apart from avijnapti, there exists no rupa which can be invisible and free from destruction, and no rupa which is pure. [For bodily and vocal action does not pertain to one who has entered into the Truth of the Way, mdrgasatyasamdpanna. ]
3. A scripture says that there is an increase of merit,". . . There are
seven material meritorious works, (aupadhikapunyakriydvastu, iv. 113)
. . . when a believer, son or daughter of good family, who is endowed,
walks, stands still, sleeps or is awake, his merit increases with intensity,
without ceasing;merit continues adding to itself. What are these seven
material works? . . . In this same way there are seven non-material
22 meritorious works. . "
By reason of what dharma, other than the avijnapti, could merit increase even when the mind is not good, or when one is without thought?
4. If avijnapti does not exist, he who does not himself act, who gives orders to others, will not be endowed with a course of action (iv. 66). For a vocal action that consists of giving an order cannnot constitute a course of action, killing etc; this action in fact does not actually accomplish the action to be accomplished.
Would one say that when the action is accomplished the action that consists of giving the order becomes a course of action?
But it is evident that the nature of this action is not modified by the execution of the order.
5. The Blessed One said, "Monks, the dharmas, the external sources of consciousness not included within the eleven ayatanas, are invisible, and are free from destruction" (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 91cl9). He did not say that the dharmayatana is non-rupa.
If the Blessed One did not intend to refer to the avijnapti, which is rupa and so included in the dharmayatana [and not in rupdyatana\ then what is the rupa that is included in the dharmayatana?
6. If avijnapti does not exist, the Way no longer has eight parts, for the parts, samyagvdc, samyakkarmdnta, and samyagdjtva (correct
Karma
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speech, correct action, and correct livelihood, iv. 86), are incompatible with absorption (samadhi). (lf the ascetic, in a state of absorption, possesses these three, it is because these three are by nature avijnapti vi. 67, 68).
But, one would answer, a scripture says, "When he knows thus, when he. sees thus, samyagdrsti, samyaksamkalpa, samyagvyayama, samyaksmrti, and samyaksamadhi are cultivated and achieved; sam-
yagvdc, samyakkarmanta and samyagajiva have been previously puri- fied. " Thus the last three are considered as vijnapti and as previous to absorption.
This text, the Vaibhasikas say, does not refer to the last three parts of the Way, but rather to speech, action, and livelihood in a state of detachment which have been obtained through the worldly path. This does not prevent speech, etc. , from not forming part of the Way under the aspect of avijnapti
7. If the avijnapti does not exist, the Pratimoksa discipline (samvara, 23
iv. l4a) would disappear. For a person who has assumed the vows of religion is still a Bhiksu or Bhiksuni, when his mind is bad or neutral.
8. A scripture teaches that the renouncing of sin is a dike which 24
arrests immorality.
