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On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none but God and our
neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational
creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life.
Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.

I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([2536]Q[13],
A[1]) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is
twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship
is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for
our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be
loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer
in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational
creature for its object: first because friendship is towards one to
whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good
things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly
speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature
which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good
it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not
speak of good or evil befalling such like things, except
metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship is based on some
fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to friendship as to
live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5). Now
irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is
regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is
impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper
to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting
happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we
cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature.

Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we
regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to
wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use;
thus too does God love them out of charity.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the
capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and
so the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true,
whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a
natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.
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Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to love himself out of
charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there "can
be no charity between less than two. " Therefore no man has charity
towards himself.

Objection 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual
love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man
towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2537]Q[23], A[1]). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards
himself.

Objection 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be
blameworthy, since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now
a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2
Tim. 3:1,2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be
lovers of themselves. " Therefore a man cannot love himself out of
charity.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
friend as thyself. " Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore
we should love ourselves too out of charity.

I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2538]Q[23], A[1]), we may consider charity from two standpoints:
first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must
hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but
something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a
man is one with himself which is more than being united to another.
Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which
a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have
friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto
ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that "the origin of
friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves. "
Thus too with regard to principles we have something greater than
science, namely understanding.

Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,
namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and,
consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself
who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of
charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of
charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general
notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the
same sense.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so
far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which
they humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's
rational nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which
pertain to the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is
through charity that a man loves himself.
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Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out of
charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to
associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body,
according to Rom. 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this
death? " and Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with
Christ. " Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship
in the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that
enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.

Objection 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is
towards those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot
love us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of
charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23,26) that there
are four things that we should love out of charity, and among them he
reckons our own body.

I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of sin
and its punishment.

Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as
the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's
service, according to Rom. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as
instruments of justice unto God. " Consequently, out of the love of
charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but
we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of
punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for the
removal of such things.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of
his body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he
was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would not
be unclothed, but clothed over. " He did, however, wish to escape from
the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from the
corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it
from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of this
death. "

Reply to Objection 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by
knowing and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body,
we are able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the
enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the
body, viz. , "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine states
(Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a fashion, a
share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is
for another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in
respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.
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Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of
charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): "I have hated the unjust. "
But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated rather
than loved, out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a
homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the
unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of
hate, according to Ps. 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the
wicked of the land": and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt
not suffer to live. " Therefore sinners should not be loved out of
charity.

Objection 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire
and wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity,
desire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: "May the
wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V. : 'The wicked shall be,'
etc. See Reply to this Objection. ]. " Therefore sinners should not be
loved out of charity.

Objection 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will
the same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will,
nor to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary.
Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.

Objection 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together,
according to Ethic. viii. But we ought not to associate with sinners,
according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them. " Therefore we
should not love sinners out of charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that "when it
is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that we ought to
look upon every man as our neighbor. " Now sinners do not cease to be
men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love
sinners out of charity.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature
and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a
capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as
stated above [2539](A[3]; Q[23], AA[1],5), wherefore we ought to love
sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.

On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to
happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are
opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or
mother or kindred, according to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate,
in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man
capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for
God's sake.

Reply to Objection 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the
object of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such
hatred is perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated
them with a perfect hatred. " Now hatred of a person's evil is
equivalent to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs
to charity.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when
our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of
friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and
we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money
to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great wickedness, and
become incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is
for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like
sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of
their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the
judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out
of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good
to the life of the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the
judge profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his
crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to put an end to
the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any
more.

Reply to Objection 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in
Holy Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of
prediction, not by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked
be," that is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell. " Secondly, by way
of wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the
man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to Ps.
57:11: "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," since,
according to Wis. 1:13, not even God "hath pleasure in the destruction
of the wicked [Vulg. : 'living']" when He punishes them, but He rejoices
in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is just and hath loved
justice. " Thirdly, so that this desire is referred to the removal of
the sin, and not to the punishment itself, to the effect, namely, that
the sin be destroyed, but that the man may live.

Reply to Objection 4: We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will
what they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make
them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is
written (Jer. 15:19): "They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not
to be turned to them. "

Reply to Objection 5: The weak should avoid associating with sinners,
on account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by
them. But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there
is no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For
thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Mat.
9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards
fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): "Go out
from among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing," i. e. by
consenting to sin.
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Whether sinners love themselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that which
is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love of self
is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28)
that it "builds up the city of Babylon. " Therefore sinners most of all
love themselves.

Objection 2: Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping
with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even
irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance, the
preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love
themselves.

Objection 3: Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div.
Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore many
sinners love themselves.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity,
hateth his own soul. "

I answer that, Love of self is common to all, in one way; in another
way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the
wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks
himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first, in
respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all think themselves
to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and body. In this way
too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, in so far as they
love their own preservation.

Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some
predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the
state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In
this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the
reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive and
corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the
Apostle calls the "inward man," and the latter, the "outward man" (2
Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward
man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think
themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon
their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, to hold the
first place. Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do
not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be.
But the good know themselves truly, and therefore truly love
themselves.

The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to
friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to
be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he
does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company;
fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost
the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to the inward
man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its integrity, they
desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods, indeed they do
their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in entering into
their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the present,
the memory of past good, and the hope of future good, all of which are
sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no clashing of wills,
since their whole soul tends to one thing.

On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the
integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for
him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in their
own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever they
find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor do they
agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of conscience,
according to Ps. 49:21: "I will reprove thee and set before thy face. "

In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves, as
regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not love
themselves thus.

Reply to Objection 1: The love of self which is the principle of sin is
that which is proper to the wicked, and reaches "to the contempt of
God," as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire
external goods as to despise spiritual goods.

Reply to Objection 2: Although natural love is not altogether forfeited
by wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: The wicked have some share of self-love, in so
far as they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true
but apparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very
wicked.
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Whether charity requires that we should love our enemies?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love our
enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great
good," namely, the love of our enemies, is "not so universal in its
application, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us our
trespasses. " Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity,
because, according to Prov. 10:12, "charity covereth all sins.
"
Therefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies.

Objection 2: Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now
everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary, as
a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not make us
love our enemies.

Objection 3: Further, charity "doth nothing perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4).
Now it seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate
one's friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6):
"Thou lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee. "
Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 4:44): "Love your enemies. "

I answer that, Love of one's enemies may be understood in three ways.
First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is perverse,
and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that which is evil in
another.

Secondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their
nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we
should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor,
we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor
in general.

Thirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially directed
to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of love towards
our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely, because it does
not require that we should have a special movement of love to every
individual man, since this would be impossible. Nevertheless charity
does require this, in respect of our being prepared in mind, namely,
that we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the
necessity were to occur. That man should actually do so, and love his
enemy for God's sake, without it being necessary for him to do so,
belongs to the perfection of charity. For since man loves his neighbor,
out of charity, for God's sake, the more he loves God, the more does he
put enmities aside and show love towards his neighbor: thus if we loved
a certain man very much, we would love his children though they were
unfriendly towards us. This is the sense in which Augustine speaks in
the passage quoted in the First Objection, the Reply to which is
therefore evident.

Reply to Objection 2: Everything naturally hates its contrary as such.
Now our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself
should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They are
not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it
is as such that we are bound to love them.

Reply to Objection 3: It is wrong to love one's enemies as such:
charity does not do this, as stated above.
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Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the
signs and effects of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his
enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:18):
"Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth. " Now
a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects of
love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such signs
and effects of love.

Objection 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Mat. 5:44):
"Love your enemies," and, "Do good to them that hate you. " Now charity
demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we
should "do good to them. "

Objection 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object
of charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx),
that "love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great
things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love. " Hence charity
towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity
requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he be an
enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and effects of
love towards our enemies.

On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 5:44, "Do good to them that hate you,"
says: "To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection"
[*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to do
that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not
require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.

I answer that, The effects and signs of charity are the result of
inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely
necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly
love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards
the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above [2540](A[8]).

We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and signs
of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to our
neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or for a
whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole community: and
the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like
favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we did not so, it
would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to what is written
(Lev. 19:18): "Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy
citizens. " But there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows
to certain persons in particular: and it is not necessary for salvation
that we show our enemies such like favors and signs of love, except as
regards being ready in our minds, for instance to come to their
assistance in a case of urgency, according to Prov. 25:21: "If thy
enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him . . . drink. "
Outside cases of urgency, to show such like favors to an enemy belongs
to the perfection of charity, whereby we not only beware, as in duty
bound, of being overcome by evil, but also wish to overcome evil by
good [*Rom. 12:21], which belongs to perfection: for then we not only
beware of being drawn into hatred on account of the hurt done to us,
but purpose to induce our enemy to love us on account of our
kindliness.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels out
of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity is a
twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of the
angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are created
substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our
neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species.
Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the
angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do.
But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above
[2541](A[3]). Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship
with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our
companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give
them the friendship of charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): "If the name
of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those who pity
us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our neighbor
includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many merciful
favors. "

I answer that, As stated above ([2542]Q[23], A[1]), the friendship of
charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in
which men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Mat.
22:30) that "in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of
God in heaven. " It is therefore evident that the friendship of charity
extends also to the angels.

Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us
in a common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the
blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter
fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.

Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate
genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers of
everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our
rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.

Reply to Objection 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist
in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive
nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in
this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above ([2543]Q[23], A[1],
ad 1).
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Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of
charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their fellowship
with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in our fellowship
thus, since natural gifts, such as life and understanding, remain in
them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore we ought
to love the demons out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the
matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves
the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also
out of charity.

Objection 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our
neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the
passage of Augustine quoted above [2544](A[9]). Now the demons are
useful to us in many things, for "by tempting us they work crowns for
us," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love
the demons out of charity.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 28:18): "Your league with death
shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not stand. " Now
the perfection of a peace and covenant is through charity. Therefore we
ought not to have charity for the demons who live in hell and compass
death.

I answer that, As stated above [2545](A[6]), in the sinner, we are
bound, out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the
name of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore
demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying
stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called
demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance
with the statement made above ([2546]AA[2],3), that a thing may be
loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as the
person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have the
friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential part
of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one's friend;
and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the good of
everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those spirits whom
God has condemned eternally, since this would be in opposition to our
charity towards God whereby we approve of His justice.

Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be enduring
as another's good. In this way we love irrational creatures out of
charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory to God and
be useful to man, as stated above [2547](A[3]): and in this way too we
can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as we
desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, unto God's
glory.

Reply to Objection 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not
impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon;
consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship
of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of nature, is
possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.

Reply to Objection 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the
possibility of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are
lost in hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.

Reply to Objection 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to
their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this
leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their
perverse intention to our profit.
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Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, viz.
God, our neighbor, our body and ourselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly
reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor, our
body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan.
lxxxiii), "he that loveth not God, loveth not himself. " Hence love of
oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is
not distinct from the love of God.

Objection 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole.
But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be
condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.

Objection 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor.
Since then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct
from the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a
man loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with
which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not
rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There are
four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely God, "another,
which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely our neighbor,
"and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own body.

I answer that, As stated above ([2548]Q[23], AA[1],5), the friendship
of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this
fellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which
happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes
of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which
happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.

Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its
being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness,
can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being
identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in
partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to be
loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his
neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: The different relations between a lover and the
various things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly,
since the relation between the human lover and God is different from
his relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of
love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, so
that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.

Reply to Objection 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that
can be capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach
directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind
which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves himself
in one way, and his own body in another.

Reply to Objection 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and
as to his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness.
Wherefore, on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for
loving him; and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object
of love.
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OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are
thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is an order in charity?

(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?

(3) Whether more than himself?

(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?

(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?

(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?

(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who
is more closely united to him?

(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or
one who is united to him by other ties?

(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his
father ?

(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?

(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?

(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those
whom we are kind to?

(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
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Whether there is order in charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For
charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues.
Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.

Objection 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth,
so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is
appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither,
therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.

Objection 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs,
not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be
ascribed to charity.

On the contrary, It is written (Cant 2:4): "He brought me into the
cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me. "

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms
"before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle. Now order
implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence
wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some
kind. But it has been said above ([2549]Q[23], A[1];[2550] Q[25],
A[12]) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of
happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is
based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved out
of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that
love, which is God.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as
last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above
([2551]Q[23], A[6] ). Now the end has the character of principle in
matters of appetite and action, as was shown above ([2552]Q[23], A[7],
ad 2; FS, A[1], ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation
to the First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find
an order in reference to the First Principle.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose
operation depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other
hand, charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in
the soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in
things themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order
is more appropriate to charity than to faith.

And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly
about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that
orders, and to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered.
It is in this way that order is stated to be in charity.
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Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our
neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 4:20): "He that loveth not his
brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not? " Whence
it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it
is, since loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now
God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable,
out of charity, than our neighbor.

Objection 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19:
"Every beast loveth its like. " Now man bears more likeness to his
neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity,
more than he loves God.

Objection 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God,
according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27). Now God is not
greater in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more
to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to
love God more than our neighbor.

On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be
hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's sake,
if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Lk. 14:26: "If
any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end
children, and brethren, and sisters . .