No More Learning

From about 1597, he had come
to be employed regularly as one of the queen’s learned counsel.
In 1604, he was made one of his ordinary counsel by king James,
with a salary of £40; and this, Bacon reckoned as his first prefer-
ment He was made solicitor-general in 1607, attorney-general
in 1613, privy councillor in 1616, lord keeper in 1617, lord-
chancellor in 1618. He was knighted in 1603, but, to his chagrin,
along with a crowd of three hundred others; he was created baron
Verulam in 1618, and viscount St Albans in 1621. A few weeks
later, charges of having received bribes from suitors in his court
were brought against him in the newly-summoned House of
Commons; these were remitted to the House of Lords for trial;
he was convicted on his own confession, and sentenced to depriva-
tion of all his offices, to imprisonment in the tower during the
king's pleasure, to a fine of £40,000, to exclusion from the verge
of the court and to incapacity from sitting in parliament. The
imprisonment lasted a few days only; the fine was made over to
trustees for Bacon's benefit; the exclusion from the verge was
soon removed; but, in spite of many entreaties, he was never
allowed to sit in parliament again.
In the midst of the legal and political work which crowded
these years, Bacon never lost sight of his larger ambitions. He
published the first edition of his Essays in 1597, the second (en-
larged) edition appearing in 1612 and the third (completed) edition
in 1625. The Advancement of Learning was published in 1605,
addressed to king James, De Sapientia Veterum in 1609, Novum
Organum in 1620. After his disgrace, he lived at Gorhambury,
the paternal estate to which he had succeeded on the death of his
brother Anthony in 1601, and there he devoted himself to writing.
The History of Henry VII appeared in 1622, and De Augmentis


## p. 280 (#302) ############################################

280 The Beginnings of English Philosophy
Scientiarum in 1623; the New Atlantis was written in 1624; at
his death, he was at work on Sylva Sylvarum; and he left behind
him many sketches and detached portions of his great but incom-
plete design. Bacon had been married in 1606 to Alice Barnham,
the daughter of an alderman. He died on 9 April 1626, from
the effects of a chill caught by moving out of his carriage in order
a
to try an experiment on the antiseptic properties of snow.
Bacon's plan for the renewal of the sciences was never fully
elaborated by himself, and it has never been deliberately followed
by others. In his personal career, too, there are some events that
still remain obscure. But material is not lacking for forming a
judgment on his philosophy and on his life. We cannot expect to
remove either from the range of controversy. But the life-long
devotion of Spedding may be said with confidence to have made
one thing clear. Pope's famous epigram—the wisest, brightest,
meanest of mankind'-and the brilliant elaboration of the same
in Macaulay's essay are false, and cannot be made to fit the facts.
We can understand Bacon aright only if we do not assume any
such absurd antithesis, but remember that life and philosophy are
revelations of the same mind, and allow for one shedding light on
the other. It is on this account that it is necessary to attempt an
estimate of Bacon's character and to touch upon the disputed
events in his career, although the questions cannot be discussed at
length, and little more can be done than to indicate results.
In a fragment? written about 1603, and, apparently, intended as
a preface to his great work, Bacon set forth the ambitions which
guided his life; and there is no reason for doubting the substantial
accuracy of his account. Believing (he begins) that he was born
for the service of mankind, he set himself to consider for what
service nature had fitted him best. He saw that the good effects
wrought by practical statesmen
extend over narrow spaces and last but for short times; whereas the work of
the Inventor, though a thing of less pomp and shew, is felt everywhere and
lasts for ever.
And for this end he thought nature had destined him.
I found that I was fitted for nothing so well as for the study of Truth; as
having a mind nimble and versatile enough to catch the resemblances of
things (which is the chief point), and at the same time steady enough to fix
and distinguish their subtler differences; as being gifted by nature with
1 De interpretatione naturæ proæmium, Works, III, pp. 518-520. In this and other
quotations from the Latin works the translations contained in Ellis and Spedding's
edition have been used.


## p. 281 (#303) ############################################

Bacon's Character and Career
281
desire to seek, patience to doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to assert,
readiness to consider, carefulness to dispose and set in order; and as being a
man that neither affects what is new nor admires what is old, and that hates
every kind of imposture. So I thought my nature had a kind of familiarity
and relationship with Truth.
6
His first object, therefore, was the knowledge that would extend
and establish the empire of man over nature. But birth and
education had introduced him to the service of the state ; and 'a
man's own country has some special claims upon him. ' For these
reasons, he sought civil employment: the service of the state may
be said to have been his second object in life. Finally, he adds
I was not without hope (the condition of Religion being at that time not
very prosperous) that if I came to hold office in the state, I might get some-
thing done too for the good of men's souls.
According to Bacon's own account, therefore, the service of man-
kind to which he held himself born was to be carried out by
devotion to three objects: the discovery of truth, the welfare of
his country and the reform of religion. And of these three objects
the first always held the highest place in his thoughts. 'I confess'
he wrote to Burghley about 1592, 'that I have as vast contem-
plative ends as I have moderate civil ends : for I have taken all
knowledge to be my province. '
This greatness of design was characteristic of the mind of the
period as well as of Bacon personally. But it was accompanied by
inadequate preparation in the methods and principles of the exact
sciences as understood at the time, and often by an imperfect
grasp of details. If the latter defect may be traced in his in-
tellectual work, it is still more apparent in his practical activity.
It is not fanciful to connect with this characteristic some of the
actions for which he has been most censured. Throughout his
career he was never free from financial difficulties; and, when he
had obtained high preferment, he maintained a magnificent style
of living without exercising any effective control over the ex-
penditure of his household. When the charge of taking bribes
was made against him he was much surprised, but he had no
defence. It may be true, as he asserted, that he never allowed a
present from a suitor to influence his decision ; nor do any of his
judgments appear to have been reversed on this ground. It may
be true, also, that Bacon only followed the custom of his time:
though, on this point, it is difficult to get evidence. But he himself
saw the impropriety of a judge being 'twice paid'—to quote the mild
term of censure used in his New Atlantis. And he took no care


## p. 282 (#304) ############################################

282 The Beginnings of English Philosophy
to guard against the impropriety in his own conduct. In the main,
he was probably a just, as well as an efficient, judge. But he was
too tenacious of his office as he had been too eager to obtain it;
and it is hardly possible to resist the evidence for the conclusion
that, on one occasion at least? , he allowed the court favourite
Buckingham to influence his decision. In another matter—that of
the trial of the earl of Essex-Bacon's conduct has been unjustly
blamed. The benefits which he had received at the hands of Essex
would not have been a sufficient reason for his standing aside
when the need arose for his taking part in the prosecution. The
rebellion of Essex had been a real danger to the state and not
merely an explosion of bad temper. It was essential that the
prosecution should not fail through the case being badly presented;
and Bacon's intervention was not merely excusable: it was his
duty to safeguard the interests of the state, and to subordinate to
them the claims of private friendship and gratitude, in spite of the
tragedy of the personal situation. At the same time, it has to be
said that the record of the trial does not suggest that he felt the
tragedy. Judging from the manner in which he pressed home the
charge, the personal factor seems to have touched him but slightly.
And this, perhaps, is characteristic. He was capable of high
enthusiasm for ideas and for causes. His philosophical works are
inspired by the former; and his writings on public affairs show a
spirit of devotion to the common weal as well as political wisdom.
But, on the side of personal sentiment, his nature seems to have
been not easily stirred to the love or hate which unite and divide
mankind.
Bacon intended that his Great Instauration or Renewal of the
Sciences should be set forth in six parts. These, he enumerated as
follows: (1) The Division of the Sciences; (2) The New Organon,
or Directions concerning the Interpretation of Nature; (3) The
Phenomena of the Universe, or a Natural and Experimental History
for the foundation of Philosophy; (4) The Ladder of the Intellect;
(5) The Forerunners, or Anticipations of the New Philosophy;
(6) The New Philosophy, or Active Science. Of these parts, the last
was to be the work of future ages; for the fourth and fifth only pre-
faces were written; the first three are represented by considerable
works, although in none of them is the original design carried out
with completeness. Latin was to be the language of them all. The
Advancement of Learning, which, in great part, covers the ground
? See the letter of D. D. Heath (one of the editors of the Works) in Bacon's Letters
and Life, vir, pp. 579—588.


## p. 283 (#305) ############################################

The Great Instauration 283
of the first division, was not written as part of the plan; but De
Augmentis, which takes its place in the scheme, is little more
than an extended Latin translation of the Advancement. Bacon's
last work, Sylva Sylvarum, which belongs to the third part, was
written in English.
Bacon, as he said himself, took all knowledge as his province;
his concern was not so much with particular branches of science
as with principles, method and system. For this purpose, he sets
out by reviewing the existing state of knowledge, dwelling on its
defects and pointing out remedies for them. This is the burden
of the first book of the Advancement and of De Augmentis. In
the second book, he proceeds to expound his division of the
sciences. The principle with which he starts in his classification is
psychological:
The parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of man's
understanding, which is the seat of learning: history to his memory, poesy
to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason. .
The subdivisions of these, however, are based on differences in the
objects, not in the mental faculty employed. History is divided
into natural and civil. To the latter of these, ecclesiastical and
literary history are regarded as subordinate (although made co-
ordinate in the Advancement). Poetry is held to be ‘nothing else
but feigned history,' and is subdivided into narrative, representative
and allusive or parabolical. But it is with the last of the three
main divisions of learning that Bacon is chiefly concerned.
In Philosophy the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God,
or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out
of which several enquiries there do arise three knowledges, Divine philosophy,
Natural philosophy, and Human philosophy or Humanity. For all things
are marked and stamped with this triple character, of the power of God, the
difference of nature, and the use of man.
But, as the three divisions all spring from a common root, and
certain observations and axioms are common to all, the receptacle
for these must constitute 'one universal science, by the name of
Philosophia Prima, Primitive or Summary Philosophy. ' Among
the three divisions of philosophy, Bacon's most important thoughts
concern natural philosophy. One of his fundamental ideas is
expressed by its distinction into two parts-'the inquisition of
causes, and the production of effects; Speculative, and Operative;
Natural Science, and Natural Prudence. More subtle is the dis-
tinction of natural science into physic and metaphysic. The
latter term is not used in its traditional sense, nor is it synonymous


## p. 284 (#306) ############################################

284 The Beginnings of English Philosophy
with what Bacon calls summary philosophy, which deals with
axioms common to several sciences. Both physic and metaphysic
deal with natural objects : physic with their material and efficient
causes, inetaphysic with their formal and final causes. Thus,
Physic is situate in a middle term or distance between Natural History and
Metaphysic. For Natural History describeth the variety of things; Physic,
the causes, but variable and respective causes; and Metaphysic, the fixed and
constant causes.
In elaborating this view, Bacon covers ground traversed again in
Novum Organum.
Both for its style and for the importance of the ideas which it
conveys, Novum Organum ranks as Bacon's greatest work. To
its composition he devoted the most minute care. Rawley tells us
that he had seen no less than twelve drafts of it in Bacon's own
handwriting, re-written from year to year. As it was at last
published, its stately diction is a fit vehicle for the prophetic
message it contains. The aphorisms into which the matter is
thrown add impressiveness to the leading ideas, without seriously
interfering with the sequence of the argument.
It is chiefly to Novum Organum that we must go if we would
understand the message and the influence of Bacon. And this
understanding will be facilitated if we distinguish, as he himself
never did, between certain leading ideas which he, more than any-
one else, impressed upon the mind of succeeding ages, and his own
more special conception of nature and of the true method for its
investigation.
Of those leading and general ideas, two have been already
indicated. One of these is the belief in the unity of science. His
classification of the sciences had in view not only their differences
but, also, their essential oneness. *The divisions of knowledge,' he
says, “are like branches of a tree that meet in one stem (which
stem grows for some distance entire and continuous, before it
divide itself into arms and boughs). ' They are to be accepted
‘rather for lines and veins, than for sections and separations. '
The second of these leading ideas is the practical aim of know-
ledge. This is a constantly recurring thought, and is, in his own
mind, the most fundamental ; it is the first distinction which he
draws between his own new logic and the old, and it was meant to
characterise the new philosophy of which he claims to have made
only the beginning.
The matter in hand is no mere felicity of speculation, but the real business
and fortunes of the human race, and all power of operation. For inan is but


## p. 285 (#307) ############################################

Classes of Idols
285
the servant and interpreter of nature: what he does and what he knows is
only what he has observed of nature's order in fact or in thought; beyond
this he knows nothing and can do nothing. For the chain of causes cannot
by any force be loosed or broken, nor can nature be commanded except by
being obeyed. And so those twin objects, human knowledge and human
power, do really meet in one; and it is from ignorance of causes that operation
fails.
Bacon's object was to establish or restore the empire of man
over nature. This empire depends upon knowledge; but, in the
mind of man, there are certain obstacles to knowledge which pre-
dispose it to ignorance and error. The doctrine of the tendencies
to error inherent in the human mind is another of his fundamental
thoughts. These tendencies to error he called idola mentis,
images or phantoms by which the mind is misled. The name is
taken from Plato and contrasted with the Platonic 'idea’; and
emphasis is laid on the difference between the idols of the human
mind, which are abstractions that distort and misrepresent reality,
and the ideas of the divine mind, which are 'the creator's own
stamp upon reality, impressed and defined in matter by true and
exquisite lines. ' This doctrine had long occupied Bacon's thought;
it was stated in the Advancement, where, however, the last of the
four classes of idols is wanting ; and it was completely set forth for
the first time in Novum Organum. In the latter work, four classes
of idols are distinguished: idols of the tribe, idols of the cave, idols
of the market-place and idols of the theatre. Under these graphic
titles, Bacon works out a doctrine which shows both originality
and insight. The originality is conspicuous in what he says con-
cerning the idols of the tribe. They are deceptive tendencies
which are inherent in the mind of man as such and belong to the
whole human race. The understanding, he says, is like a false
mirror that distorts and discolours the nature of things. Thus, it
supposes more order and regularity in the world than it finds, as
when it assigns circular motion to the celestial bodies; it is more
moved and excited by instances that agree with its preconceptions
than by those that differ from them; it is unquiet, and cannot rest
in a limit without seeking to press beyond it, or in an ultimate
principle without asking for a cause; it 'is no dry light, but
receives an infusion from the will and affections'; it depends on
the senses, and they are 'dull, incompetent and deceptive'; and it
is 'prone to abstractions and gives a substance and reality to things
which are fleeting. The idols of the cave belong not to the race
but to the individual. They take their rise in his peculiar consti-
tution, and are modified by education, habit and accident. Thus
6


## p. 286 (#308) ############################################

286 The Beginnings of of
a
English Philosophy
some minds are apt to mark differences, others resemblances, and
both tend to err in opposite ways; or, again, devotion to a par-
ticular science or speculation may so colour a man's thoughts that
everything is interpreted by its light. The idols of the market-
place are those due to the use of language, and they are the most
troublesome of all.
For men believe that their reason governs words; but it is also true that
words react on the understanding; and this it is that has rendered philosophy
and the sciences sophistical and inactive.
Finally, the idols of the theatre are due to 'philosophical
systems and the perverted rules of demonstration. In this con-
nection, Bacon classifies 'false philosophies’ as sophistical, em-
pirical and superstitious. In his amplification of this division,
his adverse judgment upon Aristotle may be discounted; his want
of appreciation of Gilbert is a more reasonable matter of regret ;
but, at bottom, his view is sound that it is an error either to
'fashion the world out of categories' or to base a system on the
narrowness and darkness of a few experiments. '
This criticism of the sources and kinds of error leads directly to
an explanation of that “just and methodical process' of arriving at
truth which Bacon calls the interpretation of nature. The process
is elaborate and precisely defined ; and it rests on a special view
of the constitution of nature. Neither this view nor the details
of the method have exerted much influence upon the progress of
science. But underlying them both was the more general idea of
the importance of an objective attitude to nature and of the need
of systematic experiment; and of this general idea Bacon was,
not indeed the originator, but the most brilliant and influential
exponent. In the study of nature, all preconceptions must be set
aside; we must be on our guard against the tendency to premature
‘anticipations' of nature: 'the subtlety of nature is greater many
times over than the subtlety of argument'; men must be led back
to the particular facts of experience, and pass from them to
general truths by gradual and unbroken ascent; we must begin
anew from the very foundation,' for 'into the kingdom of nature as
into the kingdom of grace entrance can only be obtained sub
persona infantis. '
These general but fruitful ideas do not exhaust Bacon's teach-
ing. He looked forward to the speedy establishment of a new
philosophy which should be distinguished from the old by the
completeness of its account of reality and by the certainty of its
results. His new method seemed to give him a key to the subtlety


## p. 287 (#309) ############################################

Bacon's Definitions of Form' 287
of nature; and this method would have the incidental result of
levelling intellectual capacities so that all minds who followed it
with care and patience would be able to find truth and use it for
fruitful works.
'It is a correct position' says Bacon,'that true knowledge is know-
ledge by causes. ' But the way in which he understands this posi-
tion is significant. He adopts the Aristotelian division of causes
into four kinds: material, formal, efficient and final. Physic deals
with the efficient and material; but these, apart from their relation
to the formal cause, 'are but slight and superficial, and contribute
little, if anything, to true and active science. ' The enquiry into
the other two belongs to that branch of natural philosophy which
he calls metaphysic. “But of these the final cause rather corrupts
than advances the sciences, except such as have to do with human
action,' and 'the discovery of the formal is dispaired of. ' Yet
forms must be investigated if nature is to be understood and con-
trolled. Thus, the second book of Novum Organum opens with
the aphorism
On a given body to generate and superinduce a new nature is the work
and aim of human power. Of a given nature to discover the form . . . is the
work and aim of human knowledge.
What, then, does Bacon mean by 'form'? He gives many answers
to this question, and yet the meaning is not altogether easy to
grasp. Form is not something mental; it is not an idea, nor is it
a mere abstraction; it is itself physical. According to Bacon,
nothing really exists in nature except individual bodies. But a
body has several qualities perceptible by our senses (these qualities
he calls ‘natures'); the form is the condition or cause of these
natures : its presence determines the presence of the relative
nature; with its absence the nature vanishes. Again, a thing acts
by certain fixed laws: these laws are forms.
"When I speak of forms,' he says, “I mean nothing more than those laws
and determinations of absolute actuality which govern and constitute any
simple nature, as heat, light, weight, in every kind of matter and subject that
is susceptible of them. Thus the form of heat or the form of light is the
same thing as the law of heat or the law of light. '
And, again,
the form of a thing is the very thing itself, and the thing differs from the
form no otherwise than as the apparent differs from the real, or the external
from the internal, or the thing in reference to man from the thing in reference
to the universe.
Further, the form is itself a manifestation of a still more general
property which is inherent in a still greater number of objects.


## p. 288 (#310) ############################################

288 The Beginnings of English Philosophy
The complexity of the physical universe is thus due to the
combination, in varied ways, of a limited number of forms which
are manifested to us in sensible qualities. If we know the form,
we know what must be done to superinduce the quality upon a
given body. Hence, the practical character of Bacon's theory.
Here, also, is brought out an idea that lies at the basis of his
speculative doctrine—the idea that the forms are limited in
number. They are, as it were, the alphabet of nature; when they
are understood, the whole language will be clear. Philosophy is
not an indefinite striving after an ever-receding goal. Its comple-
tion may be expected in the near future, if only the appropriate
method is followed.
The new method leads to certainty. Bacon is almost as con-
temptuous of the old induction, which proceeded from a few
experiments to general laws, as he is of the syllogism. His new
induction is to advance by gradual stages of increasing generality,
and it is to be based on an exhaustive collection of instances.
This collection of instances is the work of what Bacon called
natural history, and he laboured to give specimens of the collec-
tions required. He always recognised that the collaboration of
other workers was needed for their completion and that the work
would take time. His sense of its magnitude seems to have
deepened as it progressed; but he never realised that the constant
process of development in nature made an exhaustive collection
of instances a thing impossible.
Given the requisite collection of instances, the inductive method
may be employed without risk of error. For the form is always
present where the nature (or sensible quality) is present, absent where
it is absent and increases or decreases with it. The first list of in-
stances will consist of cases in which the nature is present : this is
called the table of essence and presence. Next come the instances
most akin to these, in which, nevertheless, the nature is absent: this
is called the table of absence in proximity. Thirdly, a list is made
of instances in which the nature is found in different degrees, and
this is the table of degrees or comparison. True induction begins
here, and consists in a ‘rejection or exclusion of the several
natures which do not agree in these respects with the nature under
investigation. The non-essential are eliminated; and, provided
our instances are complete and our notions of the different natures
adequate, the elimination will proceed with mechanical precision.
Bacon saw, however, that the way was more intricate than this
statement suggests—especially owing to the initial difficulty of


## p. 289 (#311) ############################################

The New Method
289
getting sound and true notions of simple natures. Aids, therefore,
must be provided. In the first place, he will allow the under-
standing to essay the interpretation of nature on the strength
of the instances given. This commencement of interpretation,'
which, to some extent, plays the part of hypothesis (otherwise
absent from his method), receives the quaint designation of First
Vintage. Other helps are then enumerated which Bacon pro-
poses to treat under nine heads: prerogative instances; supports
of induction; rectification of induction; varying the investiga-
tion according to the nature of the subject; prerogative natures
(or what should be enquired first and what last); limits of in-
vestigation (or a synopsis of all natures in the universe); applica-
tion to practise; preparations for investigation; ascending and
descending scale of axioms. Only as regards the first of these
is the plan carried out. The remainder of Novum Organum is
taken up with the discussion of twenty-seven kinds of prerogative
instances; and here are to be found many of his most valuable
suggestions, such as his discussion of solitary instances and of
crucial instances.
Although the new method was never expounded in its com-
pleteness, it is possible to form a judgment on its value.
In spite
of the importance and truth of the general ideas on which it rests,
it has two serious defects, of which Bacon himself was not
unaware. It gives no security for the validity and accuracy of the
conceptions with which the investigator works, and it requires a
complete collection of instances, which, in the nature of things, is
impossible. Coupled with these defects, and resulting from them,
are Bacon's misunderstanding of the true nature and function of
hypothesis, upon which all scientific advances depend, and his
condemnation of the deductive method, which is an essential in-
strument in experimental verification. The method of scientific
discovery and proof cannot be reduced to the formulae of the
second book of Novum Organum.
In spite of the width of his interests, especially in the domain
of science, Bacon himself did not contribute any new discovery.
His suggestions sometimes show insight, but also a certain crudity
of conception which is connected with his inadequate general view
of nature. The exposition of his method in the second book of
Novum Organum is illustrated throughout by an investigation
into the form or cause of heat. The result to which he permits
himself to arrive as the first vintage' of the enquiry exhibits this
combination of insight and crudity. He reaches the conclusion
19
6
E. L. IV.
CH. XIV.


## p. 290 (#312) ############################################

290 The Beginnings of English Philosophy
that heat is a particular case of motion. The specific differences
which distinguish it from its genus are that it is an expansive
motion; that its direction is towards the circumference of the
body, provided the body itself has a motion upwards ; that it is a
}
motion in the smaller parts of the body; and that this motion is a
rapid motion of fine (but not the finest) particles of the body.
This and other investigations of his own were abandoned without
reaching a clear result. His knowledge of science was also deficient,
especially in the region of the exact sciences. He looked for an
increase of astronomical knowledge from Galileo's telescope, but
he appears to have been ignorant of the work of Kepler; he
ignored Napier's invention of logarithms and Galileo's advances in
mechanical theory; and his judgment on the Copernican theory
became more adverse at the very time when that theory was being
confirmed by Galileo and Kepler? . These defects in his own
scientific equipment were closely connected with some of the
peculiarities in detail of the method he recommended. And the
two things together may explain the sneer of his contemporary
Harvey, that he wrote philosophy like a lord chancellor. Nor is it
very
difficult to understand the attitude of most subsequent men
of science, who have honoured him as the originator of the ex-
perimental method, but silently ignored his special precepts. His
method was not the method of the laboratory. When the objects
investigated can be observed only directly as they occur in nature,
greater importance must be assigned to the exhaustive enumera-
tion of facts upon which Bacon insisted. Darwin, for example,
has recorded that, in starting his enquiry, he worked on true
Baconian principles, and, without any theory, collected facts on a
wholesale scale. ' But Bacon did not recognise that, in investiga-
tions of this sort also, the enumeration must be guided by an idea
or hypothesis, the validity of which is capable of being tested by
the facts. He overlooked the function of the scientific imagination
-a power with which he himself was richly endowed.
According to Bacon, ‘human knowledge and human power
meet in one'; and the stress which he laid upon this doctrine
lends interest to his discussions on practical principles. His views
on ethical and political theory, however, were never set forth
systematically or with completeness. They are to be found in the
second book of the Advancement and in the seventh and eighth
books of De Augmentis, as well as in the Essays and in some of
his occasional writings. His observations on private and public
1 Compare Spedding, in Bacon's Works, III, pp. 511, 725.


## p. 291 (#313) ############################################

Bacon's Philosophical Position
291
affairs are full of practical wisdom, for the most part of the kind
commonly called 'worldly. He was under no illusions about the
'
ordinary motives of men, and he thought that 'we are much
beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do and
not what they ought to do. ' Fundamental principles are dealt
with less frequently, but they are not altogether neglected. A
preference is expressed for the active over the contemplative life,
for 'men must know that in this theatre of man's life it is reserved
only for God and angels to be lookers on. ' Aristotle's reasons for
preferring the contemplative life have respect to private good
only. But the 'exemplar or platform of good' discloses a double
nature: 'the one, as everything is a total or substantive in itself;
the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body; whereof
the later is in degree the greater and the worthier. In this way,
Bacon introduced into English ethics the distinction, on which
many controversies have turned, between private and public good.
But the nature of this good is not subjected to philosophical
analysis. A similar remark has to be made regarding Bacon's
contributions to political theory. There is much discussion of
matters of detail, but first principles are barely mentioned. The
'arts of government' are said to contain three duties: the pre-
servation, the happiness and prosperity and the extension, of
empire; but only the last is discussed. Bacon maintained the
independence of the civil power, and, at the same time, defended
the royal prerogative; nevertheless, his ideal of the state was not
arbitrary government, but the rule of law. In the Advancement,
he had noted that
all those which have written of laws have written either as philosophers or as
lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary
laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars,
which give little light because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write
according to the states where they live, what is received law, and not what
ought to be law.
And he goes on to say that 'there are in nature certain fountains
of justice, whence all civil laws are derived but as streams. ' To
this subject he returns in the eighth book of De Augmentis, which
closes with a series of aphorisms on universal justice. In these
aphorisms, all civil authority is made to depend on the sovereign
power of the government, the structure of the constitution, and
the fundamental laws'; law does not merely protect private rights;
it extends to 'everything that regards the well-being of the state'; ,
its end is or should be the happiness of the citizen : and that law
6
19-2


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292 The Beginnings of English Philosophy
may be set down as good which is certain in meaning, just in
precept, convenient in execution, agreeable to the form of govern-
ment, and productive of virtue in those that live under it. '
Bacon's contributions to 'human philosophy do not rank in
importance with his reforming work in natural philosophy; and
his influence on the moral sciences was later in making itself felt,
though it was similar in character to his influence on natural science.
He often appealed for help in carrying out his new philosophy;
but, neither in natural science, nor in moral science, nor in
philosophy generally, did he found a school. Harvey's unfavour-
able judgment has been already quoted. Hobbes, who acted for
a time as his secretary, does not seem to have been influenced by
him in any important manner. And yet it is the leading thinkers
-men such as Leibniz and Hume and Kant—who acknowledge
most fully the greatness of Bacon. His real contribution to in-
tellectual progress does not consist in scientific discoveries or in
philosophical system; nor does it depend on the value of all the
details of his method. But he had the insight to discover, the
varied learning to illustrate and the eloquence to enforce, certain
principles, regulative of the mind's attitude to the world, which,
once grasped, became a permanent possession. He did more
than anyone else to help to free the intellect from preconceived
notions and to direct it to the unbiassed study of facts, whether
of nature, of mind, or of society; he vindicated an independent
position for the positive sciences; and to this, in the main, he
owes his position in the history of modern thought.
While Bacon was engaged upon his plan for the renewal of the
sciences, his younger contemporary Edward Herbert was at work
upon a similar problem. But the two men had little in common
except their vaunted independence of tradition and their interest
in the question of method. And their thinking diverged in result.
Bacon is claimed as the father of empirical or realistic philosophy;
Herbert influenced, and, to some extent, anticipated, the charac-
teristic doctrines of the rationalist or intellectualist school of
thought.
Edward Herbert, the representative of a branch of the noble
Welsh family of that name, and elder brother of George Herbert
the poet, was born at Eyton in Shropshire on 3 March 1583,
matriculated at University college, Oxford, in 1595, married in
1599 and continued to reside at Oxford till about 1600, when he
removed to London. He was made a knight of the Bath soon


## p. 293 (#315) ############################################

Herbert of Cherbury
293
after the accession of king James. From 1608 to 1618, he spent
most of his time on the continent, as a soldier of fortune; seeking,
occasionally, the society of scholars, in the intervals of the cam-
paign, the chase, or the duel. In 1619, he was appointed ambas-
sador at Paris ; after his recall, in 1624, king James rewarded him
with an Irish peerage. He was created an English peer as baron
Herbert of Cherbury in 1629. The civil war found him unprepared
for decision ; but he ultimately saved his property by siding with
the parliament. He died in London on 20 August 1648.
His works were historical, literary and philosophical. His
account of the duke of Buckingham's expedition to Rhé and his
history of Henry VIII were written with a view to royal favour.
The latter was published in 1649; a Latin version of the former
appeared in 1658, the English original not till 1860. His literary
works-poems and autobiography-are of much higher merit.
The former were published by his son in 1665; the latter was first
printed by Horace Walpole in 1764. His philosophical works give
him a distinct and interesting place in the history of thought.
His greatest work, De Veritate, was, he tells us, begun in England
and 'formed there in all its principal parts. ' Hugo Grotius, to
whom he submitted the manuscript, advised its publication; but
it was not till this advice had been sanctioned (as he thought) by a
sign from heaven that he had the work printed (Paris, 1624). To the
third edition (London, 1645) he added a short treatise De Causis
Errorum, a dissertation entitled Religio Laici and an Appendix
ad Sacerdotes. In 1663 appeared his De Religione Gentilium-
a treatise on what is now called comparative religion. A popular
account of his views on religion was published in 1768 under the
title A Dialogue between a Tutor and his Pupil, by Edward Lord
Herbert of Chirbury; and, although the external evidence is
incomplete, it may have been from his pen.
Herbert does not stand in the front rank of speculative thinkers;
but his claims as a philosopher are worthy of note. In the first
place, he attempted a far deeper investigation of the nature of
truth than Bacon had given ; for he based it on an enquiry into
the conditions of knowledge. Here, his fundamental thought is
that of a harmony between faculty and object. Mind corresponds
with things not only in their general nature but in all their dif-
ferences of kind. The root of all error is in confusion-in the
inappropriate connection of faculty and object. Underlying all
experience and belonging to the nature of intelligence itself
are certain common notions. In the second place, Herbert's


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294 The Beginnings of English Philosophy
treatment of these common notions made him the precursor of the
philosophy of common sense afterwards elaborated by Reid and
the Scottish school. Some of his tests of common notions are
logical: knowledge of particulars depends upon them. But others
of them are psychological : they are prior in time, and all sane
minds possess them. And it is this last test—that of universality-
that he uses most frequently. "What is in all men's ears,' he says,
‘that we accept as true'; and he adds that this universal consent
is the highest philosophy and theology. In the third place, the
common notions which he discovered in all minds determined the
scope and character of English Deism. He attempted no complete
account of them, except in the sphere of religion. These common
notions of religion are: (1) that there is a supreme Deity; (2) that
this Deity ought to be worshipped ; (3) that virtue combined with
piety is the chief part of divine worship; (4) that men should
repent of their sins and turn from them; (5) that reward and
punishment follow from the goodness and justice of God, both in
this life and after it. These five articles contain the whole doctrine
of the true catholic church, that is to say, of the religion of
reason. They also formed the primitive religion before the people
‘gave ear to the covetous and crafty sacerdotal order. ' In the
fourth place, Herbert was one of the first-if not the first-to
make a systematic effort after a comparative study of religions ;
but he had no idea of the historical development of belief, and he
looked upon all actual religions—in so far as they went beyond his
five articles—as simply corruptions of the pure and primitive
rational worship.


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CHAPTER XV
EARLY WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
THE political and economic life of England has had an enormous
effect on the whole modern world; her constitutional monarchy
and her parliamentary government have been consciously imitated
by one nation after another, since the time when Montesquieu
held them up to admiration. The political ideas which have had
such far-reaching influence were taking definite shape in our own
country in the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods. They have left
their mark on our literature in many ways; but, in attempting to
survey these early writings on politics and economics, and to group
them conveniently, it is important to remember that the views
they embodied were finding their fullest expression in political
action and fiery debate, rather than in graceful literary form. The
first essays in English political and economic literature can be best
appreciated when they are viewed in connection with contemporary
struggles and experience.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, England was really
anticipating the movement which occurred in many continental
countries at a subsequent time; she was taking the lead in the rise
of nationalities, and her literature, at that era, illustrates the
various phases of conscious life which this revolution seems to
involve wherever it occurs. In the first place, there was an intense
patriotic sentiment, and a keen interest in national history and
traditional custom. Secondly, with the aim of advocating increased
opportunity for popular self-government, reflection was directed to
the basis on which existing authority rested and the limits within
which it should be exercised. Lastly, much consideration was
given to the material means of gratifying national ambitions for
such political objects as the maintaining of English independence
and the expansion of English influence.
Taking these three divisions, we may say that the literary
expression of patriotic sentiment and the discussions as to natural


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296 Early Writings on Politics and Economics
resources and the means of developing them were intensely, though
not exclusively, insular; while the discussions on the power of the
prince and the nature of sovereignty were much more easily
applicable to the circumstances of other countries, and were rela-
tively cosmopolitan. England was working out her own destiny ;
and the form of democratic doctrine which was eventually popu-
larised in this country attracted attention both in the old world
and in the new. But history has repeated itself in regard to the
other elements of national consciousness. Similar patriotic senti-
ment, which may be stigmatised as narrow, and jealous care for
material resources, have been developed, in one country after
another, among the rising nationalities. The special importance
of our literature lies in the fact that it not only reflects the first
emergence of this modern type of community, but that this early
example had a complexity of its own: Great Britain was the
scene of the simultaneous rise of two nationalities. Throughout
the seventeenth century, with the exception of the years of the
protectorate, this island was governed as a dual monarchy.
England and Scotland were each prepared in turn to expand
and to assimilate her neighbour, and each has exercised an
important influence on the political development of the other.
The reaction of these two nationalities upon one another, during
the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, is a political feature that
can be best brought into full light by the study of the literature
of the day.
It might seem to follow that this political and economic writing,
as a direct expression of actual political experience, would be
little affected by foreign influence; but this is only true with
considerable qualifications. Even as regards the expression of
patriotic sentiment, the influence of foreign models may be seen in
the form that was adopted, as in the case of the Debate Betwene
the Heraldes. Further, England was a backward country, both
commercially and industrially, in Tudor times; and the economic
literature of the day is full of suggestions for copying expedients
that had been devised in Holland or in France. It is also notice-
able that the reflection on the problem of sovereignty, though the
forms in which it was raised were dictated by English experience,
was yet concerned with issues that had been defined by Jesuits
and Calvinists in France. Still, when all this is admitted, it is
true to say that English thought seems to have been but little
affected by the writers who were chiefly making their mark in
Italy and France. Bodin's great work had, indeed, been translated
7


## p. 297 (#319) ############################################

Foreign Influences
297
and was used as a text-book at Oxford, but it does not appear
to have had more than academic influence. The Prince of Machia-
velli may, possibly, have influenced the careers of particular men
such as Edmund Dudley or Thomas Cromwell ; but, for the most
part, the great Florentine lay outside the circle of English thought.
He was very frequently alluded to as though he had been the evil
genius of political life; but, even as a bugbear, he did not obtain
such a tribute of antagonism as was paid in the latter part of the
seventeenth century to the commanding figure of Hobbes.
The early writers on political and economic subjects did not
confine themselves to formal treatises; of these, there were very few.
The thought of the day found incidental expression in literature of
every sort : in plays and sermons, as well as in essays, satires and
pamphlets. There can be no attempt to deal exhaustively with all
the references in contemporary English literature to political and
economic topics. On the other hand, some question may be raised
as to how far all the fugitive pieces dealing with political and
economical subjects which have survived attained to the dignity
of literature. It certainly is difficult to find any criterion, and to
say with confidence what should be dismissed as merely technical;
but it is at least to be remembered that Malynes and Misselden
and other writers on such highly technical subjects as foreign
exchanges were anxious to obtain attention for their writings in
polite and courtly circles ; they attempted to deck their argument
with literary graces in the fashion of the day. It would be
churlish to refuse them a place among English authors.
Students of political science in recent times have been inclined
to classify and compare different types of polity, with the view
of elucidating the strong points of each and of noting their various
contributions to the sum of political wisdom; but the early writers
in England on political subjects seem to have felt no need of
adopting this method. They concentrated their attention on
England, almost as if it were the only type of polity worthy of
consideration, and they discussed its characteristics. The example
was set by Fortescue in his De Laudibus Legum Angliae', but the
same tone prevailed among Elizabethan and Jacobean writers.
Sir Thomas Smith, who, like Sir Henry Wotton after him, had seen
much of foreign lands, does, indeed, in his Discourse on the Common-
wealth of England recognise a more general study of politics and
alludes to other states, ancient and modern; he has some difficulty
1 See vol. II of the present work, p. 297.


## p. 298 (#320) ############################################

298 Early Writings on Politics and Economics
in classifying the realm of England under any of the Aristotelian
divisions; but, while he assigns a very high place to regal power,
he does not, like Bodin, treat England as an example of monarchy,
but includes it among the democracies. On the whole, he is pre-
pared to justify the institutions of his country as superior to those
of any other land, and to regard it as a well organised common-
wealth, in which the crown, the nobility and gentry, the burgesses
and yeomen, have each their part to play. The free cooperation of
distinct classes for the good of the community is a characteristic
feature on which he insists; and a similar political ideal appears
to have been in Shakespeare's mind. There is a striking speech in
Troilus and Cressida, act I, sc. 3, in which Ulysses insists on the
importance of degree, and its necessity in well ordered society:
Degrees in schools and brotherhoods in cities,
Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
The primogenitive and due of birth,
Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels,
But by degree, stand in authentic place?
Take but degree away, untune that string,
And, bark, what discord follows! each thing meets
In mere oppugnancy: the bounded waters
Should lift their bosoms higher than the shores
And make a sop of all this solid globe:
Strength should be lord of imbecility,
And the rude son should strike his father dead:
Force should be right; or rather, right and wrong,
Between whose endless jar justice resides,
Should lose their names, and so should justice too.
Then every thing includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself.
Shakespeare, too, seems to recognise the supreme importance of
the kingly office in a well-ordered community. The conversation
between king Henry and his soldiers on the eve of Agincourt is
very instructive on this point; and it is clear that his political
ideals were closely connected with his conception of the English
constitution. The glory and greatness of the English monarchy, as
a controlling power in the English realm, is eloquently set forth in
the speech assigned to Cranmer at the baptism of queen Elizabeth.
A similar conception runs through Bacon's writings; and he also calls
attention to the importance of the personal qualities of the prince,
since, 'in the great frame of kingdoms and commonwealth, it is in the
power of princes or estates to add amplitude and greatness to their


## p. 299 (#321) ############################################

299
a
Patriotic Feeling
kingdoms. ' Selden, who was by no means inclined to exalt the
kingly office unduly, yet recognises it as the source from which the
various titles of honour and grades in the higher ranks of society
spring. This well-ordered community, with a monarch at the
head, was habitually spoken of as the respublica or commonwealth;
and this last was a current term for the English realm long before
it was officially adopted under the Long parliament. The im-
portance of a strong personality at the head of a state was apparent
in the reigns of Henry VIII and his children; the personality of
Elizabeth, in particular, and her success in rallying round her the
loyalty of her subjects and in guiding the affairs of state, continued
to give actual shape to the vague political ideas of cultivated
Englishmen, so that Massinger, in The Maid of Honour, pointed
to the English monarchy as a model for less fortunate peoples.
This view as to the exceptional merit of the English régime
was strengthened by the religious sentiment, and the belief that
England was called by God to a high destiny. In looking out on
the nations of the world, and on the tyrannies and internecine
struggles in Spain and in France, Englishmen of the Elizabethan
and Jacobean periods felt as if there had been direct divine
intervention on behalf of England and, hence, divine approval of
the English type of polity. The success of England, in holding her
own against the power of Spain and against the dangers which
beset the realm from foreign plots, was referred to by archbishop
Sandys and others as a token that the course which England
had pursued was divinely sanctioned. Such historical writings
as Camden's Annales are full of patriotic sentiment; and this
faith also inspired many of the efforts for expansion which were
made by Sir Francis Drake and Sir Walter Ralegh. In reading
the journal in which the first of these empire builders recorded his
adventures in sailing round the world, we see how keenly he felt
that it would be a crime against God and man to leave the newly
discovered lands to be dominated by Spanish influence, and that
there was a positive duty in striving to bring about the expansion
of England.
So far as internal political problems are concerned, discussion
in Tudor times turned almost exclusively on the conflict between
public and private interests. The doctrines of Mandeville, that
private vices were public virtues, and of Bastiat, that private
interests necessarily cooperated for public good, were unknown,
and would have been wholly repugnant, to Elizabethan writers.
Private interest appeared to be diametrically opposed to patriotic


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300 Early Writings on Politics and Economics
sentiment The writers of the first half of the sixteenth century
who describe the social evils of that period of rapid economic
transition are constantly inveighing against the mischief wrought
by private men who disregarded public welfare. They had little
sympathy with the spirit of competition, since the efforts of indi-
viduals to get on in the world might easily come to be inconsistent
with the maintenance of each man's proper degree, and of the whole
social order. This idea appears to have taken hold of the mind of
Edward VI; it found expression in the prologue of Fitzherbert's
Husbandry and in Caxton's Game and playe of the Chesse as well
as in Starkey's Dialogue between Cardinal Pole and Thomas
Lupset and in More's Utopia. The anarchy which Shakespeare
describes as arising from Cade's rebellion is a picture of the dis-
order which ensues when private interest has free play and the
maintenance of social order is neglected.
In the latter part of the sixteenth century, there was increasing
difficulty in seeing what classes or persons were to be trusted to
act for the public good in the present and in the future, and as
willing to leave in the background private tastes and personal
interests which conflicted with public duty. There are frequent
complaints as to the neglect of country gentlemen to play their
part in the work of local government; the new type of non-
resident proprietors was regarded with special suspicion, and
depopulating and enclosing, which continued to be denounced
from time to time, seemed to be a survival of the ruthless
evictions which had moved the indignation of bishop Latimer,
and of John Hales in his Discourse of the Commonweal. While
the gentry were thus negligent, the mercantile classes and the
burghers in the towns appeared to need direction and guidance,
if the reputation of our manufactures was to be maintained
and the commerce of the country to develop. So far as old
traditions survived among the industrial classes, they favoured
a narrow civic patriotism rather than the good of the realm;
while the merchants concentrated in London were affected by
the new commercial morality, and inclined to commercial enter-
prises, from which political trouble might easily ensue. Every
class needed to be kept up to the sense of public duty; the
clergy and ecclesiastical corporations were not above diminishing
the future value of their livings with a view to immediate
gain. The council, inspired by the ceaseless activity of Burghley,
was continually engaged in putting down abuses at which men,
who ought to have been public-spirited citizens, were accustomed


## p. 301 (#323) ############################################

Public Welfare
301
to connive. Under these circumstances, it was plausible to
look to the crown as the one hope of public-spirited conduct
throughout the realm, and to regard the king as being not only
the source of honour, the fount of justice and the arm of military
power, but as supreme trustee for the public good in all the affairs
of life. This, in substance, is the claim which was put forward by
king James in The True Lawe of Free Monarchies, and it would
probably have been admitted as sound by men who were repelled
by the arguments with which his adherents endeavoured to sup-
port it. The real refutation was a practical one; and it was the
misfortune of James and Charles that many of the undertakings
in which they endeavoured to execute this trusteeship miscarried
disastrously, and not only interfered with private interests, but
proved detrimental to the realm as a whole.
As a consequence, under the early Stewarts, the legitimacy of
giving free play to private interests was advocated in a way in
which it had never been done before; and an attempt was made to
treat as merely private many matters which had hitherto been
regarded as of public concern. It is, of course, true that, in a body
politic, no action can be exclusively private; the interconnection
between individuals in the body politic is so close that wrong
done by an individual may be at least a bad example and injurious
to the community. Religion, which many today regard as a
merely personal affair, was generally thought of in the Elizabethan
and Jacobean periods as of supreme importance to the state.
Christianity, as understood and practised by Englishmen, was
held to be the foundation of Christian morality; and, hence,
was a matter of public concern in which the king might be bound
to interfere. The extreme Erastianism of men like Cranmer, or,
for that matter, of Luther, is a surprise to many in the present
day; but, among Englishmen generally in Elizabeth's time, there
was little sympathy with the scruples of a private conscience which
set itself up against the established order, though sympathy was
growing. While freedom, within limits, for conscientious con-
viction was coming to be regarded as not unreasonable, the freedom
of the individual to carry on his business as he liked, and where he
liked, apart from old moral restrictions or considerations of what
was expedient for the public good, asserted itself more and more.
Under Elizabeth and Burghley, it had been taken as an axiom
that the direction of commercial intercourse between this country
and foreign nations was a matter of public concern, and that even
the internal trade of the country, so far as regards the necessaries


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302 Early Writings on Politics and Economics
of life, ought to be a matter of public regulation. It may be
doubted whether the Elizabethan monarchy, as organised by
Burghley, could have maintained itself in all its activities against
the invading agitations for freedom of conscience and freedom of
enterprise ; but king James and king Charles completely failed to
justify their position as trustees for the public welfare. Under
the Council of State, the machinery for control fell into desuetude;
and individual freedom, both as regards conviction and enterprise,
asserted itself as it had never done before. In this era, there was
a new type of patriotic sentiment, which contained no element of
loyalty to the crown.
Whether they proceeded from a religious or an economic motive,
the attempts to evade interference on the part of the crown with
the consciences or enterprise of individuals demanded some justi-
fication. The writers of the day did not attack the fundamental
question in regard to the meaning and ground of sovereignty as a
mere philosophical problem: the issue was raised by practical
experience and took different forms in England and in Scotland;
and the efforts to organise popular self-government were very
distinct in the two countries.
In England, throughout the reign of Elizabeth, popular opinion,
on the whole, sympathised with the royal claims to very extensive
authority in matters ecclesiastical and in foreign and commercial
policy. The bull of Pius V, which was issued in 1570, had ex-
communicated Elizabeth and released her Roman Catholic subjects
from the obligations of allegiance; it roused fierce indignation
among her subjects, who felt that the maintenance of all they held
dear in church and state depended on the preservation of the
queen's person; and it opened the way for a rigorous persecution,
as the Roman priests, and those who harboured them, were under
suspicion of being traitors. Just, however, because feeling ran
high, there does not seem to have been much printed discussion
of the validity of the pope's claim to release subjects from their
allegiance to the crown. Parsons, the Jesuit, was content to argue
against the claims of the English crown to inherent authority;
and Sir John Hayward, in his answer, insisted on the right of
hereditary succession to the regal power of England. The under-
lying difficulty was scarcely dealt with by English writers of the
period ; if the authority of the crown was not derived from the
papal authority, it would seem that it must either be directly con-
ferred by God, inherent in the princely stock or derived from the


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Scottish Ecclesiasticism 303
subjects. Hooker and other writers who defended the existing
order failed to make their position clear as regards these various
alternatives ; expressions might easily be quoted which would go
to show that they did not always maintain the same standpoint.
In Scotland, during the last half of the sixteenth century,
issues of fundamental principle were raised more definitely.