" Therefore no
works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.
works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.
Summa Theologica
But his desire is
not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack
nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore
either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be
greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in
Joan. ) signify "the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal
life. " But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to
merit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of
Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
I answer that, As stated above ([1033]Q[1], A[8];[1034] Q[2], A[7]),
Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i. e. the
Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As
to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one
Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one
Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But
as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier
than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he
is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his
being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this
sense one man can be happier than another.
Reply to Objection 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in
its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
divers degrees of enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good,
inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme
Good.
Reply to Objection 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good;
since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all
good," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be
happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same
good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness,
since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others
besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing
Thee alone. "
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Whether one can be happy in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For
it is written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who
walk in the law of the Lord. " But this happens in this life. Therefore
one can be happy in this life.
Objection 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good
does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be
happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in
this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man
can be happy in this life.
Objection 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false:
since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does
not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this
life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: "They have called the people happy
that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life.
Therefore one can be happy in this life.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, living
for a short time, is filled with many miseries. " But Happiness excludes
misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.
I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this
life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This
may be seen from a twofold consideration.
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a
"perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils
every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this
present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the
part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the
appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine
sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for
good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good,
which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass
away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have,
and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death.
Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness,
viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this
life, as was shown in the [1035]FP, Q[12], A[11]. Hence it is evident
that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on
account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come,
according to Rom. 8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a
certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of
the Sovereign Good.
Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due
to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness,
which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the
nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part
of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in
itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way
in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the
true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as
stated above ([1036]Q[3], A[2]), the true nature of Happiness is taken
from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
Reply to Objection 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness
to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true
Happiness. And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
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Whether happiness once had can be lost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is
a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according
to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature,
changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a
changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect;
and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed
to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation
whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
Objection 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it
seems that it has an end.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the righteous that "they
shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
[1037](A[2]), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal
ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had
in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of
contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for
instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed
so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness
principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired,
outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as
they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away
altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man
bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of
this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to
the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i,
10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose
nature is subject to change.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this
life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following
the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after
the final Happiness.
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the
general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and
sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude
every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has,
and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be
troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that
he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man
have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If
this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but
if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false
opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the
true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no
longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of
Happiness. For it has been shown above ([1038]Q[3], A[8]) that man's
perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it
is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see
It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without,
is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its
stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of
which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills
the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all
goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when
Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i. e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like
manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is
written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation
hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness. " It is thus
evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord.
Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away
from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment,
it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault;
and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above
([1039]Q[4], A[4]). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent.
Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other
things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that
union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should
pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like
vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time
and movement.
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which
excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has
happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine
power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which
transcends all change.
Reply to Objection 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things
which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural
necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is
unable not to wish to be happy.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition
of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of
the good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the
beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
another.
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Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural
powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so
necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore
this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness
by his natural powers.
Objection 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational
creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But
irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much
more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs
to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the
imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is
subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own
actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i. e.
Happiness, by his natural powers.
On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his
intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints,
surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into
the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love
Him. " Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be
acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in
whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on
(Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]),
consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's
Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every
creature, as was shown in the [1040]FP, Q[12], A[4]. For the natural
knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his
substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii)
that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it,
according to the mode of its substance. " But every knowledge that is
according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision
of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created
substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final
Happiness by his natural powers.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries,
although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it
provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with
which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it
fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal
to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him
free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy.
"For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by
ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although
it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble
condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains
some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to
attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better
disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of
medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help
of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the
perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the
purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not
capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its
natural powers.
Reply to Objection 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same
species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow
of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that
can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power,
is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's
happiness: since operation takes its species from its object.
Consequently the argument does not prove.
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Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the
action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a
twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one
another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside
the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end
(Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is
dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the
parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the
lower, as stated in the [1041]FP, Q[109], A[2]: while happiness
consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe,
i. e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz.
an angel, acting on him.
Objection 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be
reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is
potentially hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually
hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually
happy by an angel who is actually happy.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the
intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten
man's intellect as shown in the [1042]FP, Q[111], A[1]. Therefore an
angel can make a man happy.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace
and glory. "
I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature,
from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which
surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature.
Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is
done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring
sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been shown above
[1043](A[5]) that Happiness is a good surpassing created nature.
Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of
any creature: but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of
perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the
same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.
Reply to Objection 1: It often happens in the case of active powers
ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach
the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of
that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of
sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a
ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of the
universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his
last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto:
whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which
is God.
Reply to Objection 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in
something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for
instance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in
something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle
whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of
color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can
everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else;
for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity.
But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and
naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness
or participation. Consequently no creature can communicate its
Happiness to another.
Reply to Objection 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man
or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not
as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the [1044]FP,
Q[106], A[1]: since in order to see this, all are immediately
enlightened by God.
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Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he
may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite
power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of
matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works,
since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause
thereof, as stated above [1045](A[6]), can be required only as
dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not require dispositions
before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.
Objection 2: Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness,
so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established
nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or
action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith
in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man
without any previous works.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6) that Happiness is of
the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works.
" Therefore no
works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:17): "If you know these things,
you shall be blessed if you do them. " Therefore Happiness is obtained
through works.
I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is
necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order
of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for
obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to
receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need
precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right
tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as
sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form.
But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for
as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural
capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one
movement, some by several. " Now to possess the perfect good without
movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness
naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not
to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since
Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can
becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby
it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order,
obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement
of a meritorious work, as was explained in the [1046]FP, Q[62], A[5];
whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called
merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9),
happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain
Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power
which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
Reply to Objection 2: God produced the first creatures so that they are
perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the
creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various
species, that through them nature might be propagated to their progeny.
In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through
Christ, who is God and Man, "Who," according to Heb. 2:10, "had brought
many children into glory"; therefore, from the very beginning of His
conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious
operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails
baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no
merits of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of
Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope,
which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on
account of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as
Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends
towards Happiness.
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Whether every man desires happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man
can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object
of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness
is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the
body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in other things. " Therefore
not all desire Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the
Divine Essence, as stated above ([1047]Q[3], A[8]). But some consider
it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire
it not. Therefore all men do not desire Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is
he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss. " But all do not
desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to
desire such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had
said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he
would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his
will. " Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according
to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man
desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the
perfect good, as stated above ([1048]AA[3],4). But since good is the
object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely
satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else
than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this everyone desires.
Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as
to that in which it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness;
because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is
found. And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore
the reply to the first Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the
intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real
distinction, there may be a distinction according to the consideration
of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired in
one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be
considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general notion
of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends
thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other
special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself, or on the
part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the
will does not tend thereto of necessity.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of Happiness given by
some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every
wish is fulfilled" is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate
definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of
all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he
who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing satisfies man's
natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if we
understand it of those things that man desires according to the
apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to Happiness, to
have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to
unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders man
from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason
sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to the knowledge
of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that
Augustine added so as to include perfect Happiness---that he "desires
nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood,
to wit, that "happy is he who has all he desires. "
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TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we
must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts
we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from
obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things
singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it
take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since
it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles;
and secondly matters of detail.
In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves
for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their
principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common
to man and animals. And since Happiness is man's proper good, those
acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness
than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First,
then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly,
those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are
called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold
consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human
acts?
And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary,
because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we
must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.
First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general;
secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the
will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts
which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from
the will through the medium of the other powers.
And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to
which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the
voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of
those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the
first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
(2) Whether in irrational animals?
(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?
(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?
(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?
(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?
(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?
(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
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Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human
acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself. " as
Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii. ], Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the principle
of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's
appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is outside him,
and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is
nothing voluntary in human acts.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in
animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from
without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal.
Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and
therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
Objection 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But
this is not true of man; for it is written (Jn. 15:5): "Without Me you
can do nothing. " Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary
is an act consisting in a rational operation. " Now such are human acts.
Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts.
In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of
some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved;
whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a
stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the
stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this
movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an
intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every
agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated above
([1049]Q[1], A[2]); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic
principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of
movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end,
some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or
is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the
end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only
acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no
knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of
action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved
for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the
principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in
something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is
imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move
themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a
knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in
them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end.
And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit,
that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such
things are said to be voluntary: for the word "voluntary" implies that
their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is
that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and
Damascene [*See Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as
having "a principle within" the agent, but also as implying
"knowledge. " Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work,
and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every principle is a first principle.
Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the
nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or
moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the
voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet
again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be
first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things
subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly
body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is
moved locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the
voluntary act, i. e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first
principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by
an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
Reply to Objection 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a
motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by
means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with
something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite.
Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him,
begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some
extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as in
the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by the
motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the power of
a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens that through
some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of
something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as
stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic
principle are of another genus of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing the
appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also
by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or
of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not
incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the
First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it: so
it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed
from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both
natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it is
essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.
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Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in
irrational animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from "voluntas"
[will]. Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it
cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything
voluntary in them.
Objection 2: Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is
said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not
masters of their actions; for "they act not; rather are they acted
upon," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no
such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that "voluntary
acts lead to praise and blame. " But neither praise nor blame is due to
the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "both
children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary. " The same
is said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii. ].
I answer that, As stated above [1050](A[1]), it is essential to the
voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with
some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect
and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only
apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under
the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And
such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect
knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without
knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to
the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals,
through their senses and their natural estimative power.
Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect
voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from
deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to
gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the
imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does
not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the
voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature:
whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even
irrational animals.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is the name of the rational appetite;
and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word
"voluntary" is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to
those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of
likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to
irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some
kind of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that man is master of his actions, is
due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the
deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the
will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness
is in irrational animals, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary
act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in
irrational animals.
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Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?
Objection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any
act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing
can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of
the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.
Objection 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the
will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But
not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to
voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of
the will ceases.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as
stated above ([1051]AA[1],2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore
voluntariness cannot be without some act.
On the contrary, The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which we
are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to
will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are
voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.
I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing
proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense
something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for
instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense
something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the
sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having ceased
to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows from
want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then
when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to
steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the
sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although it might be
due to his absence from the helm.
Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes
ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and
not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus
it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without
outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not
to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does
not will to act.
Reply to Objection 1: We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that
which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to
that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
Reply to Objection 2: "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as
though it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish. "
Consequently just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is,
"I wish not to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to wish
not to read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness.
Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is
affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply
involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the
same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in
one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to
wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary,
so is it voluntary not to consider.
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Whether violence can be done to the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For
everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there
is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will.
Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
Objection 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active
principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force:
for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is
sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is
compelled.
Objection 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to
nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;
as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature,
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the movement of the
will can be compelled.
not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack
nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore
either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be
greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in
Joan. ) signify "the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal
life. " But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to
merit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of
Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
I answer that, As stated above ([1033]Q[1], A[8];[1034] Q[2], A[7]),
Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i. e. the
Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As
to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one
Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one
Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But
as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier
than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he
is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his
being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this
sense one man can be happier than another.
Reply to Objection 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in
its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
divers degrees of enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good,
inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme
Good.
Reply to Objection 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good;
since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all
good," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be
happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same
good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness,
since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others
besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing
Thee alone. "
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Whether one can be happy in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For
it is written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who
walk in the law of the Lord. " But this happens in this life. Therefore
one can be happy in this life.
Objection 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good
does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be
happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in
this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man
can be happy in this life.
Objection 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false:
since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does
not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this
life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: "They have called the people happy
that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life.
Therefore one can be happy in this life.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, living
for a short time, is filled with many miseries. " But Happiness excludes
misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.
I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this
life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This
may be seen from a twofold consideration.
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a
"perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils
every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this
present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the
part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the
appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine
sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for
good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good,
which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass
away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have,
and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death.
Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness,
viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this
life, as was shown in the [1035]FP, Q[12], A[11]. Hence it is evident
that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on
account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come,
according to Rom. 8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a
certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of
the Sovereign Good.
Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due
to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness,
which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the
nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part
of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in
itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way
in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the
true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as
stated above ([1036]Q[3], A[2]), the true nature of Happiness is taken
from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
Reply to Objection 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness
to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true
Happiness. And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
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Whether happiness once had can be lost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is
a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according
to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature,
changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a
changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect;
and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed
to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation
whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
Objection 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it
seems that it has an end.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the righteous that "they
shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
[1037](A[2]), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal
ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had
in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of
contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for
instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed
so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness
principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired,
outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as
they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away
altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man
bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of
this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to
the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i,
10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose
nature is subject to change.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this
life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following
the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after
the final Happiness.
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the
general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and
sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude
every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has,
and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be
troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that
he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man
have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If
this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but
if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false
opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the
true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no
longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of
Happiness. For it has been shown above ([1038]Q[3], A[8]) that man's
perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it
is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see
It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without,
is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its
stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of
which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills
the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all
goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when
Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i. e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like
manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is
written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation
hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness. " It is thus
evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord.
Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away
from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment,
it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault;
and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above
([1039]Q[4], A[4]). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent.
Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other
things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that
union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should
pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like
vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time
and movement.
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which
excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has
happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine
power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which
transcends all change.
Reply to Objection 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things
which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural
necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is
unable not to wish to be happy.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition
of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of
the good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the
beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
another.
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Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural
powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so
necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore
this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness
by his natural powers.
Objection 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational
creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But
irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much
more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs
to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the
imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is
subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own
actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i. e.
Happiness, by his natural powers.
On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his
intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints,
surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into
the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love
Him. " Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be
acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in
whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on
(Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]),
consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's
Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every
creature, as was shown in the [1040]FP, Q[12], A[4]. For the natural
knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his
substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii)
that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it,
according to the mode of its substance. " But every knowledge that is
according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision
of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created
substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final
Happiness by his natural powers.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries,
although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it
provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with
which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it
fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal
to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him
free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy.
"For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by
ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although
it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble
condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains
some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to
attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better
disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of
medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help
of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the
perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the
purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not
capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its
natural powers.
Reply to Objection 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same
species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow
of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that
can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power,
is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's
happiness: since operation takes its species from its object.
Consequently the argument does not prove.
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Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the
action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a
twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one
another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside
the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end
(Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is
dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the
parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the
lower, as stated in the [1041]FP, Q[109], A[2]: while happiness
consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe,
i. e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz.
an angel, acting on him.
Objection 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be
reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is
potentially hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually
hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually
happy by an angel who is actually happy.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the
intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten
man's intellect as shown in the [1042]FP, Q[111], A[1]. Therefore an
angel can make a man happy.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace
and glory. "
I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature,
from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which
surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature.
Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is
done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring
sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been shown above
[1043](A[5]) that Happiness is a good surpassing created nature.
Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of
any creature: but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of
perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the
same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.
Reply to Objection 1: It often happens in the case of active powers
ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach
the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of
that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of
sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a
ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of the
universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his
last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto:
whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which
is God.
Reply to Objection 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in
something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for
instance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in
something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle
whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of
color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can
everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else;
for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity.
But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and
naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness
or participation. Consequently no creature can communicate its
Happiness to another.
Reply to Objection 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man
or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not
as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the [1044]FP,
Q[106], A[1]: since in order to see this, all are immediately
enlightened by God.
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Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he
may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite
power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of
matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works,
since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause
thereof, as stated above [1045](A[6]), can be required only as
dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not require dispositions
before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.
Objection 2: Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness,
so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established
nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or
action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith
in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man
without any previous works.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6) that Happiness is of
the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works.
" Therefore no
works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:17): "If you know these things,
you shall be blessed if you do them. " Therefore Happiness is obtained
through works.
I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is
necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order
of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for
obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to
receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need
precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right
tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as
sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form.
But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for
as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural
capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one
movement, some by several. " Now to possess the perfect good without
movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness
naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not
to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since
Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can
becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby
it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order,
obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement
of a meritorious work, as was explained in the [1046]FP, Q[62], A[5];
whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called
merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9),
happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain
Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power
which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
Reply to Objection 2: God produced the first creatures so that they are
perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the
creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various
species, that through them nature might be propagated to their progeny.
In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through
Christ, who is God and Man, "Who," according to Heb. 2:10, "had brought
many children into glory"; therefore, from the very beginning of His
conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious
operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails
baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no
merits of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of
Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope,
which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on
account of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as
Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends
towards Happiness.
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Whether every man desires happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man
can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object
of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness
is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the
body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in other things. " Therefore
not all desire Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the
Divine Essence, as stated above ([1047]Q[3], A[8]). But some consider
it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire
it not. Therefore all men do not desire Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is
he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss. " But all do not
desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to
desire such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had
said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he
would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his
will. " Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according
to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man
desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the
perfect good, as stated above ([1048]AA[3],4). But since good is the
object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely
satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else
than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this everyone desires.
Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as
to that in which it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness;
because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is
found. And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore
the reply to the first Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the
intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real
distinction, there may be a distinction according to the consideration
of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired in
one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be
considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general notion
of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends
thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other
special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself, or on the
part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the
will does not tend thereto of necessity.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of Happiness given by
some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every
wish is fulfilled" is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate
definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of
all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he
who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing satisfies man's
natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if we
understand it of those things that man desires according to the
apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to Happiness, to
have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to
unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders man
from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason
sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to the knowledge
of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that
Augustine added so as to include perfect Happiness---that he "desires
nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood,
to wit, that "happy is he who has all he desires. "
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TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we
must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts
we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from
obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things
singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it
take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since
it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles;
and secondly matters of detail.
In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves
for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their
principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common
to man and animals. And since Happiness is man's proper good, those
acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness
than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First,
then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly,
those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are
called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold
consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human
acts?
And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary,
because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we
must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.
First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general;
secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the
will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts
which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from
the will through the medium of the other powers.
And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to
which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the
voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of
those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the
first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
(2) Whether in irrational animals?
(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?
(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?
(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?
(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?
(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?
(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
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Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human
acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself. " as
Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii. ], Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the principle
of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's
appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is outside him,
and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is
nothing voluntary in human acts.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in
animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from
without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal.
Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and
therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
Objection 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But
this is not true of man; for it is written (Jn. 15:5): "Without Me you
can do nothing. " Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary
is an act consisting in a rational operation. " Now such are human acts.
Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts.
In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of
some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved;
whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a
stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the
stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this
movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an
intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every
agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated above
([1049]Q[1], A[2]); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic
principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of
movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end,
some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or
is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the
end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only
acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no
knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of
action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved
for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the
principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in
something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is
imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move
themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a
knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in
them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end.
And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit,
that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such
things are said to be voluntary: for the word "voluntary" implies that
their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is
that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and
Damascene [*See Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as
having "a principle within" the agent, but also as implying
"knowledge. " Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work,
and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every principle is a first principle.
Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the
nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or
moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the
voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet
again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be
first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things
subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly
body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is
moved locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the
voluntary act, i. e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first
principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by
an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
Reply to Objection 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a
motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by
means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with
something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite.
Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him,
begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some
extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as in
the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by the
motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the power of
a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens that through
some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of
something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as
stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic
principle are of another genus of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing the
appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also
by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or
of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not
incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the
First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it: so
it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed
from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both
natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it is
essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.
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Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in
irrational animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from "voluntas"
[will]. Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it
cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything
voluntary in them.
Objection 2: Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is
said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not
masters of their actions; for "they act not; rather are they acted
upon," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no
such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that "voluntary
acts lead to praise and blame. " But neither praise nor blame is due to
the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "both
children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary. " The same
is said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii. ].
I answer that, As stated above [1050](A[1]), it is essential to the
voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with
some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect
and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only
apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under
the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And
such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect
knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without
knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to
the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals,
through their senses and their natural estimative power.
Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect
voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from
deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to
gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the
imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does
not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the
voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature:
whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even
irrational animals.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is the name of the rational appetite;
and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word
"voluntary" is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to
those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of
likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to
irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some
kind of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that man is master of his actions, is
due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the
deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the
will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness
is in irrational animals, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary
act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in
irrational animals.
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Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?
Objection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any
act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing
can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of
the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.
Objection 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the
will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But
not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to
voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of
the will ceases.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as
stated above ([1051]AA[1],2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore
voluntariness cannot be without some act.
On the contrary, The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which we
are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to
will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are
voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.
I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing
proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense
something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for
instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense
something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the
sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having ceased
to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows from
want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then
when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to
steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the
sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although it might be
due to his absence from the helm.
Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes
ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and
not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus
it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without
outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not
to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does
not will to act.
Reply to Objection 1: We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that
which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to
that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
Reply to Objection 2: "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as
though it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish. "
Consequently just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is,
"I wish not to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to wish
not to read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness.
Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is
affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply
involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the
same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in
one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to
wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary,
so is it voluntary not to consider.
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Whether violence can be done to the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For
everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there
is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will.
Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
Objection 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active
principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force:
for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is
sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is
compelled.
Objection 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to
nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;
as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature,
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the movement of the
will can be compelled.
