No More Learning

Now the matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or
present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become
unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but
the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be
directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the matter
of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of change, so
that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful,
and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath
admits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the matter of
an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept about the keeping of
oaths.

Reply to Objection 2: One man may promise something under oath to
another in two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit:
for instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and
from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made
it: for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when
he acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises
another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of
others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will
enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case the
person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made the
promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God: unless
perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided he give
his consent" or some such like condition.

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a
promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is
a sin, as when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an
obstacle to a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter a
religion: and such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former
case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is
lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A[7],
ad 2). Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong,
useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. In this
case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is
promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of
this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, when
there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in which
case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope,
who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation,
for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters regarding
the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to
any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that
come under his authority: for instance, a father may annul his
daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Num. 30:6, seqq. ), as stated
above with regard to vows ([3088]Q[88], AA[8],9).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an oath is voided by a condition of person or time?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of
person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is
employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to anyone
to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that
an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.

Objection 2: Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the
Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason
for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great thing
to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be said:
Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for the sake
of the Scriptures. " Now men of all conditions and at all times are wont
to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to swear by the
Gospels.

Objection 3: Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary
causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are
debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children,
for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already
committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person ought not to
be debarred from swearing either on account of his dignity, as clerics,
or on account of the solemnity of the time.

Objection 4: Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity
to an angel: for it is written (Mat. 11:11) that "he that is the lesser
in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the
Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it
is written (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for
ever and ever. " Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, on
account of his dignity.

On the contrary, It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter): "Let
a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of being put
on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in
ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman. "

I answer that, Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is on
the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect we
should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason children
before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths [*Caus. XXII,
qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear, because they
have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to
take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from taking
an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will
not treat an oath with the reverence due to it. For this same reason,
in order that oaths might be treated with due reverence the law says
(22, qu. v, can. Honestum): "It is becoming that he who ventures to
swear on holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and fear
of God. "

The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose
assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no
confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates
from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what
he says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear. "
For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter) that
"priests should not swear for trifling reasons. " Nevertheless it is
lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, or if great good may
result therefrom. Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs,
when moreover it is becoming that they should take oath on days of
solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves to spiritual
matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths temporal matters,
except perhaps in cases grave necessity.

Reply to Objection 1: Some are unable to confirm their own assertions
on account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should
be so certain that they need no confirmation.

Reply to Objection 2: The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and
the more binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states
(Ad Public. , Ep. xlvii): and accordingly is a graver matter to swear by
God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account of
the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might be
taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God frivolously
and without deliberation.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out
of contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this
way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great
authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are of
such little authority that their oaths have no standing.

Reply to Objection 4: The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any
defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word,
but in order to show that the statement made issues from God's
infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by
Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His
word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17).
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration:
under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?

(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?

(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man.
Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth. ): "I deem that a man who wishes
to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For if,
according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear, it
is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and consequently it is
manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured Jesus by the living
God. "

Objection 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a
fashion. But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore
seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man.

Objection 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it
belongs to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior
imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure their
superiors.

On the contrary, Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain holy
things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy of God"
(Rom. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is
lawful to adjure.

I answer that, A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his
reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of his
promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so orders
himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man can order
himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others, by
beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as stated
above ([3089]Q[83], A[1]). Accordingly when either of these orderings
is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this
difference between them, that man is master of his own actions but not
of those of others; wherefore he can put himself under an obligation by
invoking the Divine name, whereas he cannot put others under such an
obligation unless they be his subjects, whom he can compel on the
strength of the oath they have taken.

Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing,
intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an
obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind
himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps over
another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their
inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.

If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name or
of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without
putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully
employed in respect of anyone.

Reply to Objection 1: Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man
intends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he would
bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure
our Lord Jesus Christ [*Mat. 26:63].

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the adjuration which
imposes an obligation.

Reply to Objection 3: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to
employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a
certain thing.

Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we
adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence
for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of
God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through
His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says
(Tract. xxxv, super Matth. ): "To adjure the demons is not accordance
with the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice. "
Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power
given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

Objection 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when
invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration.
Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make
use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore
the antecedent is false also.

Objection 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact
associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship
with the demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, "I would not that you
should be made partakers with devils. " Therefore it is not lawful to
adjure the demons.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:17): "In My name they shall cast
out devils. " Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of
God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons.

I answer that, As stated in the preceding article, there are two ways
of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence of
some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the first way it is
not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of
benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear towards the
demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which is by compulsion, we
may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not for others. For during
the course of this life the demons are our adversaries: and their
actions are not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy
angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), "the rebel spirit
is ruled by the just spirit. " Accordingly we may repulse the demons, as
being our enemies, by adjuring them through the power of God's name,
lest they do us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power
given by Christ, as recorded by Lk. 10:19: "Behold, I have given you
power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of
the enemy: and nothing shall hurt you. "

It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning
something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this
would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when
certain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use of
the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we read of
the Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N. T. , Hist. Certam.
Apost. vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the
instrumentality of the demons.

Reply to Objection 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not
authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly
appeal.

Reply to Objection 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in
order to obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as
stated above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to
the unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), "Speak no more, and go out of the man,"
says: "A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the
demons, however much they speak the truth. "

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby
the demon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this
savors of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the
demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.
An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to
one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore it
is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible,
swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an
irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ
adjuration towards one.

Objection 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained
above ([3090]AA[1],2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be
employed towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of
their own actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of
compulsion: and, seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards
them, because we have not the power to command irrational creatures,
but only He of Whom it was said (Mat. 8:27): "For the winds and the sea
obey Him. " Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure
irrational creatures.

On the contrary, Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons and
to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the
apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19. ]

I answer that, Irrational creatures are directed to their own actions
by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and moved is
also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement of the
arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation of the
irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to
God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also ascribed to
the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of irrational creatures
in order to inflict harm on man.

Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two
kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational
creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an
irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director
and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of
this kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to
God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God:
secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses
the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration
used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is
expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to adjure
the demons by beseeching them to help us.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________

OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF PRAISE
(TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of
invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken
(Q[83] ). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there
are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?

(2) Whether God should be praised with song?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God should be praised with the lips?

Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the
lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,12): "The best of men ere accorded
not praise, but something greater. " But God transcends the very best of
all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, but something
greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus. 43:33) to be "above
all praise. "

Objection 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it
is an act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than
with the lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the words
of Is. 29:13, "This people . . . honors [Vulg. : 'glorifies'] Me with
their lips, but their heart is far from Me. " Therefore the praise of
God lies in the heart rather than on the lips.

Objection 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be
encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked
proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is
written (Prov. 27:21): "As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so a
man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth. " But God is not incited
to better things by man's words, both because He is unchangeable, and
because He is supremely good, and it is not possible for Him to grow
better. Therefore God should not be praised with the lips.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 62:6): "My mouth shall praise Thee
with joyful lips. "

I answer that, We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason, and in
speaking to man, for another reason.
For when speaking to man we use
words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to him.
Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or others may
learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in consequence we may
incite him to yet better things; and that we may induce others, who
hear him praised, to think well of him, to reverence him, and to
imitate him. On the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not
indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who is the searcher of hearts,
but that we may bring ourselves and our hearers to reverence Him.

Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His
sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is
aroused towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: "The sacrifice of praise
shall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the
salvation of God. " And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in
his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed
to God, according to Is. 48:9, "For My praise I will bridle thee lest
thou shouldst perish. " The praise of the lips is also profitable to
others by inciting their affections towards God, wherefore it is
written (Ps. 33:2): "His praise shall always be in my mouth," and
farther on: "Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with
me. "

Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with
regard to His essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and
ineffable, He is above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence
and the honor of latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in
his Psalter [*Translated from the Hebrew]: "Praise to Thee is
speechless, O God," as regards the first, and as to the second, "A vow
shall be paid to Thee. " Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects
which are ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise;
wherefore it is written (Is. 63:7): "I will remember the tender mercies
of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that the Lord
hath bestowed upon us. " Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Thou wilt
find that all the sacred hymns," i. e. divine praises "of the sacred
writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed Processions of the
Thearchy," i. e. of the Godhead, "showing forth and praising the names
of God. "

Reply to Objection 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if
one praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when
it fervently recalls "the glorious things of His works" [*Cf. Ecclus.
17:7,8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the inward
fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise God, as
stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours
as stated.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God should be praised with song?

Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song.
For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): "Teaching and admonishing one another
in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles. " Now we should employ nothing
in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on the authority of
Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising God, we should
employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, "Singing
and making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men
whose duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung not
with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like play-actors,
ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the church resound
with theatrical measures and airs. " Therefore God should not be praised
with song.

Objection 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and
great, according to Apoc. 14, "Give praise to our God, all ye His
servants; and you that fear Him, little and great. " But the great, who
are in the church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep.
44): "I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred
altar must not sing" (Cf. Decret. , dist. xcii. , cap. In sancta Romana
Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.

Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical
instruments and human song, according to Ps. 32:2,3: "Give praise to
the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument of
ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle. " But the Church does not make
use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the divine
praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in like
manner neither should song be used in the divine praises.

Objection 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than
the praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by
singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from
the consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all
their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to
understand the thing that are sung than if they were recited without
chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.

On the contrary, Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church of
Milan, a Augustine relates (Confess. ix).

I answer that, As stated above [3091](A[1]), the praise of the voice is
necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore
whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted in
the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in
various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the Philosopher
state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica, prologue). Hence
the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that
the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion.
Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): "I am inclined to approve of
the usage of singing in the church, that so by the delight of the ears
the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of devotion": and he says of
himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched
to the quick by the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church. "

Reply to Objection 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not
only to those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that
are sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles
arouse spiritual devotion.

Reply to Objection 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but
reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse
devotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved
by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally,
and then had rather not hear the singer. "

Reply to Objection 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and
preaching is a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons
and prelates, whom it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by
means of preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing,
lest thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says
(Regist. iv, ep. 44): "It is a most discreditable custom for those who
have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it
behooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and to
taking charge of the alms. "

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6),
"Teaching should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial
instrument such as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only
with such things as make good hearers. " For such like musical
instruments move the soul to pleasure rather than create a good
disposition within it. In the Old Testament instruments of this
description were employed, both because the people were more coarse and
carnal---so that they needed to be aroused by such instruments as also
by earthly promises---and because these material instruments were
figures of something else.

Reply to Objection 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by
a chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the
singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what
he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as
Augustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit,
according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the voice,
and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is stirred. "
The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them understand
not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung, namely, for God's
glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion.
__________________________________________________________________

OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to
religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in
giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which
are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those
things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the
head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly
we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and
afterwards irreligion and its parts.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?

(2) Whether it has several parts or species?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to
religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other.
But religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the
latter is defined as being "immoderate observance of religion,"
according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have indeed a show of
wisdom in superstition. " Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary
to religion.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura
Deorum ii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because
they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their
children might survive [superstites] them. " But this may be done even
in accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is
not a vice opposed to religion.

Objection 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But
religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above ([3092]Q[81],
A[5], ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion,
the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice
contrary to religion.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou
strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of
superstition hath fallen. " Now the worship of one God belongs to
religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]), religion is a moral
virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above
([3093]FS, Q[64], A[1]). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral
virtue. One by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again,
the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the
circumstance called "how much," but also with regard to other
circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and
magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to
something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and
yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom
it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other
circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,2,3).

Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not
that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but
because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a
manner it ought not.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among
evil things---thus we speak of a good thief---so too sometimes the
names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense.
Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Lk.
16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in
their generation than the children of light. " It is in this way that
superstition is described as religion.

Reply to Objection 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning.
For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of
signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is
applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ
sometimes: for "lapis" [a stone] takes its name from hurting the foot
[laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts
the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that
"superstition" means that from which the word is derived.

Reply to Objection 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of
absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of
proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in
divine worship that ought not to be done.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there are various species of superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of
superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one
contrary includes many kinds, so does the other. " Now religion, to
which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but
all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has
superstition various species.

Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion,
to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we
are directed to God, as stated above ([3094]Q[81], A[1]). Therefore
superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according
to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain
human actions.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have . . . a
show of wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to say in a
hypocritical religion. " Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a
species of superstition.

On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various species of superstition
(De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).

I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion consist in going
beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances
[3095](A[1]). For as we have stated ([3096]FS, Q[72], A[9]), not every
diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a sin,
but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends:
since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified
specifically, as stated above ([3097]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3098]FS, Q[18],
AA[2],6).

Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on
the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the
divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given,
namely, to the true God, but "in an undue mode," and this is the first
species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely,
to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstition,
divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine
worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first place to give
reverence to God, and in this respect the first species of this genus
is "idolatry," which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The
second end of religion is that man may be taught by God Whom he
worships; and to this must be referred "divinatory" superstition, which
consults the demons through compacts made with them, whether tacit or
explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship is a certain direction of
human acts according to the precepts of God the object of that worship:
and to this must be referred the superstition of certain "observances. "

Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he
says that "anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols is
superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on
to say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the
purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to the
second species; and a little further on he adds: "To this kind belong
all sorts of amulets and such like," and this refers to the third
species.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results
from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each
single defect. " Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as
stated above [3099](A[1]; Q[10], A[5]). The saying of the Philosopher
is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.

Reply to Objection 2: Divinations and certain observances come under
the head of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions
of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.

Reply to Objection 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for "religion
as applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to explain.
Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given
to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time
of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law.
It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.
__________________________________________________________________

OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of
the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true
God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory
superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true
God?

(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in
the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): "Everyone that
shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. " Now whoever
worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is
conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.

Objection 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just
in any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just
worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing
mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special
kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no
worship of God is pernicious.

Objection 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church.
Yet the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore
Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep.
64), who stated that there existed in the churches various customs in
the celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose carefully
whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the
Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the
Church. " Therefore no way of worshiping God is pernicious.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug. ) See Opp.
August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in
a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that "after the Gospel truth had been
preached the legal observances became deadly," and yet these
observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be
something deadly in the divine worship.

I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most
pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to
Christian religion. " Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that
which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by
word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that
the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above ([3100]Q[81],
A[7]). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship,
this worship will be pernicious.

Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the
part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something
discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the
mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to
make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of
Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be
pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the
second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of the
worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by
ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be
guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer
things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the guilt
of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to God
contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine authority,
and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose [*Comment. in 1
ad1 Cor.