When the whole state hurts us, the
whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf.
whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf.
Summa Theologica
Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing
in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we
understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when
we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these
ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a
simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and
adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire,
hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as
when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or
being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This
is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so
far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far
as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when
a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement
of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it
desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in
it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something
contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between
anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first
difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and
hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love
wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is,
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to
someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects
of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes
evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger
regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person,
on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat
made up of contrary passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of
"desire. " But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger
is too.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows
into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is
inveterate anger. " But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion.
Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. ] say that "anger is made up of
sorrow and desire. " Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty.
Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.
On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible
faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the
irascible would not take its name from it.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the
irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty,
in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil
absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions
are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has
been stated [1418](A[2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the
vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and
in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the
movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about
both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught
or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is
therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the
irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of
craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is
arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind
of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense,
however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though
the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by
becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it
lasts a long time engenders hatred.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and
desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its
causes: and it has been said above ([1419]Q[25], A[2]) that the
concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger requires an act of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of
reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite.
But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but
of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they
are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is
conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger
listens to reason somewhat. "
I answer that, As stated above [1420](A[2]), anger is a desire for
vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to
be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to
quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated. " Now
to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore
anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow
an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason
in so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason,
wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it
follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger
follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that
"anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a
result of reason's denouncing the injury. " Because the sensitive
appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the
will.
Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to
them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with
movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as
stated above ([1421]Q[40], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens
somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted,
"but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of
reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an
act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk,
so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those
who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though
hampered, to form a judgment of reason.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is more natural than desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire.
Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But
"gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to
be altogether unnatural to man.
Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those
things that act according to reason, are not said to act according to
nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is
a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch,
viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these
things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more
natural than anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is
more natural than desire. "
I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as
stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a
particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without
reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as
stated above ([1422]Q[36], A[2]), may be considered in two ways: first,
on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If
then we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the
object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of
sexual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these
pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject,
thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is
more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered
either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to
the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the
generic nature, i. e. the nature of this man considered as an animal;
thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very
generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend
to preserve in him the life both of the species and of the individual.
If, however, we consider the specific nature, i. e. the nature of this
man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire,
in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger
"is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything
to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the
nature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament,
thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is
prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or
any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which
tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because
disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the
humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he
that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with
anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed
with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6)
that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from
parent to child, than a disposition to desire.
Reply to Objection 1: We may consider in man both the natural
temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the
bodily temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally
excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the
moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their
temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an extreme
disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of passion, such as
the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth.
On the part of reason, however, it is natural to man, both to be angry
and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by
denouncing the injury which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger,
in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of
reason," as stated above (A[4], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man:
wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it
follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the
part of the object.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For
it is written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it
breaketh forth. " But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is
more grievous than hatred.
Objection 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it,
than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the
object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not
satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved
thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is
more grievous than hatred.
Objection 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm
according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the
more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused
by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above [1423](A[1]):
whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more
grievous than hatred.
On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam,"
but anger to "a mote. "
I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its
object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object
of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates,
so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there
is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as
evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry,
not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so
far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance.
Wherefore also it has been said above [1424](A[2]) that hatred implies
application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good
to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of
justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because
to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according
to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of
reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept
of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently it is evident that hatred
is far worse and graver than anger.
Reply to Objection 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered:
namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the
thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred
desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no
particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for
their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states
(Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity,
will not be satisfied with blood. " Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil
only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when
the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the
estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils
befall, whereas the hater is never appeased. "
As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than
hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through
the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can
bear the violence of one provoked? "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to
someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now
vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature
of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and
inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that
the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know
that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the
other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he
desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, that an evil
is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence,
although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not grieve those in whom they
are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more
settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause
prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause
than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due
to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a
man, by reason of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary
and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than
disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although
hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than
anger. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of
justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom
one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between man
and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational
beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider
strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom
one has an obligation of justice.
Objection 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is
there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man is
angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin;
hence it is written (Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not. " Therefore
anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards
an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state
injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only
towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4).
Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one
is in relation of justice or injustice.
The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii,
2,3).
I answer that, As stated above [1425](A[6]), anger desires evil as
being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those
to whom we are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice,
and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of
the cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the
vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns
those to whom one is just or unjust.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it
follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are
devoid of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are
moved by their imagination to something like rational action. Since
then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger
can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination
denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of
anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is
like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures them.
Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to
the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be angry with
insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain,
which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is
angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since
they can do us no harm.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11),
"metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice
between a man and himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible
and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to
be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But
properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a man is never
angry with himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one
difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a
class, as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is
directed only towards an individual. " The reason is that hatred arises
from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and
this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the
other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action. Now
all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is
always pointed at an individual.
When the whole state hurts us, the
whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. [1426] Q[29], A[6]].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16)
unsuitably assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and
"rancor. " For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents.
But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because "the
beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger
continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor {kotos} is anger
waiting for an opportunity of vengeance. " Therefore these are not
different species of anger.
Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that
"excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and
is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while
according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek {kotos}
[rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking
vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of
anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and
anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees
mentioned by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his
brother" [thus implying "anger without utterance"], and then,
"whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with
utterance yet without full expression"], and lastly, "whosoever shall
say 'Thou fool'" [where we have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore
Damascene's division is imperfect, since it takes no account of
utterance.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. ].
I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of
Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This
happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and
he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because it quickly aroused.
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells
some time in the memory; this belongs to {menis} [ill-will] which is
derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part of that which
the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos}
[rancor] which never rests until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all
bitterness and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you. "].
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons
{akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls
{pikroi} [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and
some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until
they have retaliated [*Cf. [1427]SS, Q[158], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind of
perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently
nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to
pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain
quickness of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no
reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor,"
should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in
being avenged.
Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to
various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in
the very movement of anger.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
[*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, except in A[4]. ]
We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the
one who is angry?
(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?
(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is
angry.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is
angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always
something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning,
can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy
iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? " And yet God
is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according to
Ps. 105:40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people. " Therefore
it is not always on account of something done against him, that a man
is angry.
Objection 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may
desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not
always angry on account of something done against us.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is
angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest
in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise
philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the
philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us
angry.
Objection 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults
him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii,
in Ep. ad Rom. ). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm.
Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done
against him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise
without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we
think him such. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1428]Q[46], A[6]), anger is the desire
to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some
injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any
injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the
person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its
own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by
anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done
against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always
something done against him.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of
the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take
vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any
actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God
in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments.
Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury
redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's
providence and protection.
Reply to Objection 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and
seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong
in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least
because of the nature we have in common.
Reply to Objection 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we
look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as
though we ourselves were despised and injured.
Reply to Objection 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he
thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a
slight is an action.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole
motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are
angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury. " But
one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore
a slight is not the only motive of anger.
Objection 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to
the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they
are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger,
when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a
slight is not the sole motive of anger.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other
causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others
should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our
evils; being hindered from doing as we like. " Therefore being slighted
is not the only motive for being angry.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a
desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done
unbecomingly. "
I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For
slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt,"
"despiteful treatment," i. e. hindering one from doing one's will, and
"insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two
reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's
hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance
in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that
which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always
something considered in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think
they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account;
because there is no anger at what is just. " Now injury is done to
another in three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion, and
through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he
does an injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as
stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those
who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some
one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion, either
we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do
anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the
notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and
forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose,
seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of
all. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not
angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through
anger, because they do not seem to have acted slightingly. "
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence:
because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (Rhet.
ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods.
Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is
derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
Reply to Objection 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which
a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt
or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of
itself the cause of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as
such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with
anything derogatory thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of
slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the
more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a
man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this
seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show
signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little
about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying out
his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to
care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far
as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger.
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Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of
his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2)
that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance,
the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed. " But these things
seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence
makes one prone to anger.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are
very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing
or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion;
but if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble. " But
a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather
than excellence is a cause of a man being angry.
Objection 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man
agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men
are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor
when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and
well-founded hope. " Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence
makes men prone to anger.
I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus
excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the
motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above [1429](A[2]). Now
it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a
slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently those
who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in
that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in
his eloquence, and so forth.
Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive
aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a
hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a
cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily
hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other
defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he
evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser
thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less
angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly
despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks
that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through
ignorance, or some other like cause.
Reply to Objection 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they
hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke
anger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.
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Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?
Objection 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for
being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble
themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs
bite not those who sit down. " But these things savor of littleness and
defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less
angry with him.
Objection 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger
ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not
provoke anger against him.
Objection 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being
friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they
offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): "If my
enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it. " Therefore a
person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man
is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like
manner the prince is angry with his subject. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1430]AA[2],3) unmerited contempt more
than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency
or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase
our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised.
For just as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is
despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising.
Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if
by a fool; a master, if by a servant.
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited
contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way
those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done
wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according
to Prov. 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they
seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they
humble themselves.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the
sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and
sensation; and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom
they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have
attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who
are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of
just retaliation.
Reply to Objection 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a
greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by
failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which
we are angry with those who are beneath us.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?
(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?
(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?
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Whether anger causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because
sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with
pain. " Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that
"vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for
pain": whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from
vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent
of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect
united with pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is
conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet.
ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that
anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109
[trl.
in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we
understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when
we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these
ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a
simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and
adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire,
hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as
when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or
being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This
is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so
far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far
as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when
a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement
of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it
desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in
it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something
contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between
anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first
difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and
hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love
wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is,
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to
someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects
of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes
evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger
regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person,
on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat
made up of contrary passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of
"desire. " But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger
is too.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows
into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is
inveterate anger. " But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion.
Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. ] say that "anger is made up of
sorrow and desire. " Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty.
Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.
On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible
faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the
irascible would not take its name from it.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the
irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty,
in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil
absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions
are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has
been stated [1418](A[2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the
vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and
in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the
movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about
both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught
or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is
therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the
irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of
craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is
arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind
of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense,
however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though
the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by
becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it
lasts a long time engenders hatred.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and
desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its
causes: and it has been said above ([1419]Q[25], A[2]) that the
concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger requires an act of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of
reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite.
But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but
of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they
are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is
conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger
listens to reason somewhat. "
I answer that, As stated above [1420](A[2]), anger is a desire for
vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to
be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to
quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated. " Now
to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore
anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow
an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason
in so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason,
wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it
follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger
follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that
"anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a
result of reason's denouncing the injury. " Because the sensitive
appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the
will.
Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to
them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with
movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as
stated above ([1421]Q[40], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens
somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted,
"but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of
reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an
act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk,
so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those
who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though
hampered, to form a judgment of reason.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is more natural than desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire.
Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But
"gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to
be altogether unnatural to man.
Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those
things that act according to reason, are not said to act according to
nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is
a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch,
viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these
things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more
natural than anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is
more natural than desire. "
I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as
stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a
particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without
reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as
stated above ([1422]Q[36], A[2]), may be considered in two ways: first,
on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If
then we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the
object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of
sexual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these
pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject,
thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is
more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered
either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to
the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the
generic nature, i. e. the nature of this man considered as an animal;
thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very
generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend
to preserve in him the life both of the species and of the individual.
If, however, we consider the specific nature, i. e. the nature of this
man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire,
in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger
"is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything
to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the
nature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament,
thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is
prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or
any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which
tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because
disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the
humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he
that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with
anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed
with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6)
that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from
parent to child, than a disposition to desire.
Reply to Objection 1: We may consider in man both the natural
temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the
bodily temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally
excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the
moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their
temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an extreme
disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of passion, such as
the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth.
On the part of reason, however, it is natural to man, both to be angry
and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by
denouncing the injury which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger,
in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of
reason," as stated above (A[4], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man:
wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it
follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the
part of the object.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For
it is written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it
breaketh forth. " But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is
more grievous than hatred.
Objection 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it,
than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the
object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not
satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved
thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is
more grievous than hatred.
Objection 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm
according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the
more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused
by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above [1423](A[1]):
whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more
grievous than hatred.
On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam,"
but anger to "a mote. "
I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its
object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object
of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates,
so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there
is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as
evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry,
not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so
far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance.
Wherefore also it has been said above [1424](A[2]) that hatred implies
application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good
to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of
justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because
to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according
to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of
reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept
of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently it is evident that hatred
is far worse and graver than anger.
Reply to Objection 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered:
namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the
thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred
desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no
particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for
their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states
(Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity,
will not be satisfied with blood. " Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil
only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when
the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the
estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils
befall, whereas the hater is never appeased. "
As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than
hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through
the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can
bear the violence of one provoked? "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to
someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now
vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature
of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and
inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that
the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know
that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the
other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he
desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, that an evil
is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence,
although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not grieve those in whom they
are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more
settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause
prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause
than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due
to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a
man, by reason of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary
and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than
disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although
hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than
anger. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of
justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom
one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between man
and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational
beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider
strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom
one has an obligation of justice.
Objection 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is
there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man is
angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin;
hence it is written (Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not. " Therefore
anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards
an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state
injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only
towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4).
Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one
is in relation of justice or injustice.
The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii,
2,3).
I answer that, As stated above [1425](A[6]), anger desires evil as
being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those
to whom we are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice,
and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of
the cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the
vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns
those to whom one is just or unjust.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it
follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are
devoid of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are
moved by their imagination to something like rational action. Since
then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger
can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination
denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of
anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is
like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures them.
Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to
the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be angry with
insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain,
which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is
angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since
they can do us no harm.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11),
"metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice
between a man and himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible
and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to
be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But
properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a man is never
angry with himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one
difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a
class, as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is
directed only towards an individual. " The reason is that hatred arises
from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and
this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the
other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action. Now
all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is
always pointed at an individual.
When the whole state hurts us, the
whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. [1426] Q[29], A[6]].
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Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16)
unsuitably assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and
"rancor. " For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents.
But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because "the
beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger
continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor {kotos} is anger
waiting for an opportunity of vengeance. " Therefore these are not
different species of anger.
Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that
"excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and
is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while
according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek {kotos}
[rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking
vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of
anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and
anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees
mentioned by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his
brother" [thus implying "anger without utterance"], and then,
"whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with
utterance yet without full expression"], and lastly, "whosoever shall
say 'Thou fool'" [where we have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore
Damascene's division is imperfect, since it takes no account of
utterance.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. ].
I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of
Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This
happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and
he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because it quickly aroused.
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells
some time in the memory; this belongs to {menis} [ill-will] which is
derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part of that which
the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos}
[rancor] which never rests until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all
bitterness and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you. "].
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons
{akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls
{pikroi} [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and
some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until
they have retaliated [*Cf. [1427]SS, Q[158], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind of
perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently
nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to
pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain
quickness of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no
reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor,"
should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in
being avenged.
Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to
various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in
the very movement of anger.
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OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
[*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, except in A[4]. ]
We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the
one who is angry?
(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?
(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is
angry.
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Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is
angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always
something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning,
can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy
iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? " And yet God
is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according to
Ps. 105:40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people. " Therefore
it is not always on account of something done against him, that a man
is angry.
Objection 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may
desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not
always angry on account of something done against us.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is
angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest
in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise
philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the
philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us
angry.
Objection 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults
him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii,
in Ep. ad Rom. ). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm.
Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done
against him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise
without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we
think him such. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1428]Q[46], A[6]), anger is the desire
to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some
injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any
injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the
person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its
own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by
anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done
against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always
something done against him.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of
the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take
vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any
actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God
in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments.
Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury
redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's
providence and protection.
Reply to Objection 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and
seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong
in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least
because of the nature we have in common.
Reply to Objection 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we
look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as
though we ourselves were despised and injured.
Reply to Objection 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he
thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a
slight is an action.
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Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole
motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are
angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury. " But
one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore
a slight is not the only motive of anger.
Objection 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to
the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they
are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger,
when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a
slight is not the sole motive of anger.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other
causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others
should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our
evils; being hindered from doing as we like. " Therefore being slighted
is not the only motive for being angry.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a
desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done
unbecomingly. "
I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For
slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt,"
"despiteful treatment," i. e. hindering one from doing one's will, and
"insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two
reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's
hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance
in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that
which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always
something considered in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think
they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account;
because there is no anger at what is just. " Now injury is done to
another in three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion, and
through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he
does an injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as
stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those
who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some
one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion, either
we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do
anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the
notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and
forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose,
seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of
all. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not
angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through
anger, because they do not seem to have acted slightingly. "
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence:
because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (Rhet.
ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods.
Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is
derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
Reply to Objection 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which
a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt
or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of
itself the cause of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as
such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with
anything derogatory thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of
slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the
more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a
man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this
seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show
signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little
about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying out
his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to
care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far
as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger.
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Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of
his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2)
that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance,
the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed. " But these things
seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence
makes one prone to anger.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are
very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing
or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion;
but if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble. " But
a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather
than excellence is a cause of a man being angry.
Objection 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man
agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men
are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor
when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and
well-founded hope. " Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence
makes men prone to anger.
I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus
excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the
motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above [1429](A[2]). Now
it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a
slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently those
who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in
that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in
his eloquence, and so forth.
Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive
aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a
hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a
cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily
hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other
defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he
evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser
thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less
angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly
despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks
that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through
ignorance, or some other like cause.
Reply to Objection 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they
hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke
anger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.
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Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?
Objection 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for
being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble
themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs
bite not those who sit down. " But these things savor of littleness and
defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less
angry with him.
Objection 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger
ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not
provoke anger against him.
Objection 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being
friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they
offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): "If my
enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it. " Therefore a
person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man
is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like
manner the prince is angry with his subject. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1430]AA[2],3) unmerited contempt more
than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency
or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase
our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised.
For just as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is
despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising.
Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if
by a fool; a master, if by a servant.
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited
contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way
those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done
wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according
to Prov. 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they
seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they
humble themselves.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the
sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and
sensation; and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom
they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have
attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who
are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of
just retaliation.
Reply to Objection 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a
greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by
failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which
we are angry with those who are beneath us.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?
(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?
(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because
sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with
pain. " Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that
"vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for
pain": whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from
vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent
of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect
united with pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is
conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet.
ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that
anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109
[trl.
