“ Being," as the
generalisation
of the concept
“ Life" (breath), “to be animate," “ to will,” “ to act
i upon," " become.
“ Life" (breath), “to be animate," “ to will,” “ to act
i upon," " become.
Nietzsche - v15 - Will to Power - b
The distinction between
the thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, is based
upon
that older and artless observation which
would fain grant energy to things : but analysis
revealed that even force was only ascribed to them
by our fancy, as was also substance.
“The thing
affects a subject ? " Thus the root of the idea of
substance is in language, not in things outside our-
selves! The thing-in-itself is not a problem at all!
Being will have to be conceived as a sensation
which is no longer based upon anything quite
devoid of sensation.
In movement no new meaning is given to feel-
ing. That which is, cannot be the substance of
movement: it is therefore a form of Being.
N. B. -The explanation of life may be sought,
in the first place, through mental images
of phenomena which precede it (purposes);
Secondly, through mental images of pheno-
mena which follow behind it (the mathe-
matico-physical explanation).
The two should not be confounded. Thus: the
physical explanation, which is the symbolisation
of the world by means of feeling and thought,
cannot in itself make feeling and thinking originate
again and show its derivation: physics must rather
construct the world of feeling, consistently without
feeling or purpose-right up to the highest man,
And teleology is only a history of purposes, and is
never physical.
## p. 69 (#99) ##############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
69
s
m
ig
of
563
Our method of acquiring “knowledge” is
limited to a process of establishing quantities; but
we can by no means help feeling the differences of
quantity as differences of quality. Quality is merely
a relative truth for us; it is not a “thing-in-itself. ”
r
Our senses have a certain definite quantum as
a mean, within the limits of which they perform
their functions—that is to say, we become conscious
of bigness and smallness in accordance with the con-
ditions of our existence. If we sharpened or blunted
our senses tenfold, we should perish—that is to say,
we feel even proportions as qualities in regard to
our possibilities of existence.
ur-
all !
ion
uite
feel-
e of
ught,
nages
poses);
pheno-
nathe-
564
But could not all quantities be merely tokens
of qualities? Another consciousness and scale of
desires must correspond to greater power—in fact,
another point of view; growth in itself is the ex-
pression of a desire to become more; the desire for
a greater quantum springs from a certain quale; in
a purely quantitative world, everything would be
dead, stiff, and motionless. --The reduction of all
qualities to quantities is nonsense: it is discovered
that they can only stand together, an analogy-
us: the
lisation
hought,
riginate
st rather
565.
Qualities are our insurmountable barriers; we
cannot possibly help feeling mere differences of
quantity as something fundamentally different from
quantity—that is to say, as qualities, which we
without
est man.
s, and is
## p. 70 (#100) #############################################
70
THE WILL TO POWER.
can no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But
everything in regard to which the word "know-
ledge” has any sense at all, belongs to the realm
of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity :
whereas, conversely, all our valuations (that is to
say, our sensations) belong precisely to the realm
of qualities, i. e. to those truths which belong to
us alone and to our point of view, and which
absolutely cannot be "known. ” It is obvious that
every one of us, different creatures, must feel
different qualities, and must therefore live in a
different world from the rest. Qualities are an
idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand
that these our human interpretations and values,
should be general and perhaps real values, belongs
to the hereditary madnesses of human pride.
566.
The "real world," in whatever form it has been
conceived hitherto—was always the world of ap-
pearance over again.
567.
The world of appearance, i. e. a world regarded
in the light of values; ordered, selected according
to values--that is to say, in this case, according to
the standpoint of utility in regard to the preserva-
tion and the increase of power of a certain species
of animals.
It is the point of view, then, which accounts for
the character of“ appearance. ” As if a world could
remain over, when the point of view is cancelled !
By such means relativity would also be cancelled !
## p. 71 (#101) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
71
Every centre of energy has its point of view of
the whole of the remainder of the world that is
to say, its perfectly definite valuation, its mode of
action, its mode of resistance. The “ world of ap-
pearance” is thus reduced to a specific kind of
action on the world proceeding from a centre.
But there is no other kind of action: and the
“world” is only a word for the collective play of
these actions. Reality consists precisely in this
particular action and reaction of every isolated
factor against the whole.
There no longer remains a shadow of a right to
speak here of “appearance. "
The specific way of reacting is the only way of
reacting; we do not know how many kinds and
what sort of kinds there are.
But there is no “other," no "real," no essential
being,—for thus a world without action and re-
action would be expressed.
The antithesis: world of appearance and real
world, is thus reduced to the antitheses "world"
and “nonentity. "
n
d
s,
gs
.
.
.
een
ap-
ded
ling
g to
rya-
ecies
568.
A criticism of the concept "real and apparent
world. ”—Of these two the first is a mere fiction,
formed out of a host of imaginary things.
" Appearance" itself belongs to reality: it is a
form of its being; i. e. in a world where there is no
such thing as being, a certain calculable world of
identical cases must first be created through appear-
ance; a tempo in which observation and comparison
is possible, etc.
s for
could
lled!
elled!
## p. 72 (#102) #############################################
72
THE WILL TO POWER.
Appearance” is an adjusted and simplified
world, in which our practical instincts have worked:
for us it is perfectly true: for we live in it, we can
live in it: this is the proof of its truth as far as we
are concerned. . . .
The world, apart from the fact that we have to
live in it—the world, which we have not adjusted to
our being, our logic, and our psychological preju-
dices-does not exist as a world “in-itself”; it is
essentially a world of relations : under certain cir-
cumstances it has a different aspect from every differ-
ent point at which it is seen : it presses against
every point, and every point resists it—and these
collective relations are in every case incongruent.
The measure of power determines what being
possesses the other measure of power : under what
form, force, or constraint, it acts or resists.
Our particular case is interesting enough: we
have created a conception in order to be able to
live in a world, in order to perceive just enough to
enable us to endure life in that world. . . .
569.
The nature of our psychological vision is deter-
mined by the fact-
(1) That communication is necessary, and that
for communication to be possible something must be
stable, simplified, and capable of being stated pre-
cisely (above all, in the so-called identical case). In
order that it may be communicable, it must be felt as
something adjusted, as“ recognisable. ” The material
of the senses, arranged by the understanding, re-
## p. 73 (#103) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
73
duced to coarse leading features, made similar to
other things, and classified with its like. Thus :
the indefiniteness and the chaos of sense-impres-
sions are, as it were, made logical.
(2) The phenomenal world is the adjusted world
which we believe to be real. Its “reality” lies in
.
the constant return of similar, familiar, and related
things, in their rationalised character, and in the be-
lief that we are here able to reckon and determine.
(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world is
not “the real world,” but the amorphous and un-
adjustable world consisting of the chaos of sensa-
tions—that is to say, another kind of phenomenal
world, a world which to us is “unknowable. "
(4) The question how “things-in-themselves" are
constituted, quite apart from our sense-receptivity
and from the activity of our understanding, must
be answered by the further question : how were
we able to know that things existed? “ Thingness
is one of our own inventions. The question is
whether there are not a good many more ways of
creating such a world of appearance—and whether
this creating, rationalising, adjusting, and falsifying
be not the best-guaranteed reality itself: in short,
whether that which "fixes the meaning of things
is not the only reality: and whether the "effect
of environment upon us " be not merely the result
of such will-exercising subjects. The other
"creatures" act upon us; our adjusted world of
appearance is an arrangement and an overpowering
of its activities: a sort of defensive measure. The
subject alone is demonstrable; the hypothesis might
be advanced that subjects are all that exist,—that
"
## p. 74 (#104) #############################################
74
THE WILL TO POWER.
“object " is only a form of action of subject upon
subject. a modus of the subject.
(k) THE METAPHYSICAL NEED.
570.
If one resembles all the philosophers that have
gone before, one can have no eyes for what has
existed and what will exist-one sees only what
is. But as there is no such thing as Being; all
that the philosophers had to deal with was a host
of fancies, this was their "world. "
571.
To assert the existence as a whole of things con-
cerning which we know nothing, simply because
there is an advantage in not being able to know
anything of them, was a piece of artlessness on
Kant's part, and the result of the recoil-stroke of
certain needs—especially in the realm of morals
and metaphysics.
572.
An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away
or back from it: his earnest opinion is that the
worth of a thing consists in that nebulous residue
of it which one derives from colour, form, sound,
and thought; he believes that the more subtle, at-
tenuated, and volatile, a thing or a man becomes,
the more valuable he becomes: the less real, the
greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato
was guilty of yet further audacity in the matter of
## p. 75 (#105) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
75
-
turning tables-he measured the degree of reality
according to the degree of value, and said: The
more there is of “idea ” the more there is of Being.
He twisted the concept "reality” round and said:
What ye regard as real is an error, and the nearer
we get to the idea 'the nearer we are to‘truth. '
Is this understood ? It was the greatest of all re-
christenings : and because Christianity adopted it,
we are blind to its astounding features. At botton,
Plato, like the artist he was, placed appearance before
Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth!
unreality before actuality ! -He was, however, so
convinced of the value of appearance, that he
granted it the attributes of " Being," "causality,”
goodness,” and “truth," and, in short, all those
things which are associated with value.
The concept value itself regarded as a cause:
first standpoint.
The ideal granted all attributes, conferring
honour: second standpoint.
5
573.
")
ay
che
Aue
nd,
The idea of the “true world” or of “God” as
absolutely spiritual, intellectual, and good, is an
emergency measure to the extent to which the
antagonistic instincts are all-powerful.
Moderation and existing humanity is reflected
exactly in the humanisation of the gods. The
Greeks of the strongest period, who entertained no
fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary
were pleased with themselves, brought down their
gods to all their emotions.
at-
mes,
the
Plato
ter of
i
## p. 76 (#106) #############################################
76
THE WILL TO POWER.
The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus
very far from being a sign of progress : one is
heartily conscious of this when one reads Goethe
-in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue
and spirit is felt as being upon a lower plane.
574.
The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside
in the derivation of the conditioned out of the
unconditioned.
It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds
the unconditioned to the conditioned, that it invents
it-just as it thought of and invented the "ego” to
cover the multifariousness of its processes : it meas-
ures the world according to a host of self-devised
measurements - according to its fundamental
-
fictions “the unconditioned," "end and means,"
,
"things," "substances,” and according to logical
laws, figures, and forms.
There would be nothing which could be called
knowledge, if thought did not first so re-create the
world into "things" which are in its own image.
It is only through thought that there is untruth.
The origin of thought, like that of feelings,
cannot be traced: but that is no proof of its
primordiality or absoluteness ! It simply shows
that we cannot get behind it, because we have
nothing else save thought and feeling.
575.
To know is to point to past experience: in its
nature it is a regressus in infinitum. That which
## p. 77 (#107) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
77
halts (in the face of a so-called causa prima or the
unconditioned, etc. ) is laziness, weariness-
576.
Concerning the psychology of metaphysics—the
influence of fear. That which has been most
feared, the cause of the greatest suffering (lust of
power, voluptuousness, etc. ), has been treated with
the greatest amount of hostility by men, and
eliminated from the “real” world. Thus the
passions have been step by step struck out, God
posited as the opposite of evil—that is to say, reality
is conceived to be the negation of the passions and
the emotions (i. e. nonentity).
Irrationality, impulsive action, accidental action,
is, moreover, hated by them (as the cause of incal-
culable suffering). Consequently they denied this ele-
ment in the absolute, and interpreted it as absolute
“rationality” and “conformity of means to ends. "
Change and perishability were also feared ; and
by this fear an oppressed soul is revealed, full of
distrust and painful experiences (the case with
Spinoza : a man differently constituted would have
regarded this change as a charm).
A nature overflowing and playing with energy,
would call precisely the passions, irrationality and
change, good in a eudemonistic sense, together
with their consequences : danger, contrast, ruin, etc.
.
e
e.
gs,
its
WS
ave
577.
Against the value of that which always remains
the same (remember Spinoza's artlessness and
mits
which
## p. 78 (#108) #############################################
78
THE WILL TO POWER.
Descartes' likewise), the value of the shortest and
of the most perishable, the seductive flash of gold
on the belly of the serpent vita-
)
578.
Moral values in epistemology itself :-
The faith in reason-why not mistrust?
The "real world” is the good world-why?
Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle,
regarded as immoral: the desire for a
world which knows nothing of these things.
The transcendental world discovered, so that
a place may be kept for “moral freedom"
(as in Kant).
Dialectics as the road to virtue (in Plato and
Socrates : probably because sophistry was
held to be the road to immorality).
Time and space are ideal : consequently
there is unity in the essence of things ;
consequently no "sin," no evil, no imper-
fection,-a justification of God.
Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge,
in order to keep the moral (particularly the
hedonistic) values as the highest.
Augustine does the same, and later Pascal
("corrupted reason"), in favour of Christian
values.
Descartes' contempt for everything variable;
likewise Spinoza's.
579.
Concerning the psychology of metaphysics. This
world is only apparent: therefore there must be a
## p. 79 (#109) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
79
real world ;-this world is conditioned: conse-
quently there must be an unconditioned world ;-
this world is contradictory : consequently there is
a world free from contradiction ;-this world is
evolving: consequently there is somewhere a static
world :-a host of false conclusions (blind faith in
reason : if A exists, then its opposite B must also
exist). Pain inspires these conclusions: at bottom
they are wishes that such a world might exist; the
hatred of a world which leads to suffering is like-
wise revealed by the fact that another and better
world is imagined: the resentment of the meta-
physician against reality is creative here.
The second series of questions : wherefore suffer?
and from this a conclusion is derived con-
cerning the relation of the real world to our
apparent, changing, suffering, and contradictory
world : (1) Suffering as the consequence of error:
:
how is error possible ? (2) Suffering as the conse-
quence of guilt: how is guilt possible? (A host
of experiences drawn from the sphere of nature or
society, universalised and made absolute. ) But if
the conditioned world be causally determined by
the unconditioned, then the freedom to err, to be
sinful, must also be derived from the same quarter :
and once more the question arises, to what purpose ?
. . The world of appearance, of Becoming, of
contradiction, of suffering, is therefore willed; to
what purpose ?
The error of these conclusions: two contradictory
concepts are formed-because one of them corre-
sponds to a reality, the other "must" also corre-
spond to a reality. “Whence" would one otherwise
.
:
1
in
.
.
le;
This
be a
## p. 80 (#110) #############################################
80
THE WILL TO POWER.
C
derive its contradictory concept? Reason is thus
a source of revelation concerning the absolute.
But the origin of the above contradictions need
not necessarily be a supernatural source of reason:
it is sufficient to oppose the real genesis of the
concepts:—this springs from practical spheres, from
utilitarian spheres, hence the strong faith it com-
mands (one is threatened with ruin if one's con-
clusions are not in conformity with this reason; but
this fact is no "proof” of what the latter asserts).
The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain,
is quite artless. “ Eternal blessedness”: psycho-
logical nonsense. Brave and creative men never
make pleasure and pain ultimate questions—they
are incidental conditions: both of them must be
desired when one will attain to something. It
is a sign of fatigue and illness in these meta-
physicians and religious men, that they should
press questions of pleasure and pain into the
foreground. Even morality in their eyes derives
its great importance only from the fact that it is
regarded as an essential condition for abolishing
pain.
The same holds good of the preoccupation with
appearance and error: the cause of pain. A
superstition that happiness and truth are related
(confusion : happiness in “certainty,” in “faith").
580.
To what extent are the various epistemological
positions (materialism, sensualism, idealism) conse-
quences of valuations ? The source of the highest
## p. 81 (#111) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE
81
feelings of pleasure (“ feelings of value”) may also
judge concerning the problem of reality!
The measure of positive knowledge is quite a
matter of indifference and beside the point : as
witness the development of India.
The Buddhistic negation of reality in general
(appearance = pain) is perfectly consistent: un-
demonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of categories,
not only for an “absolute world,” but a recogni-
tion of the erroneous procedures by means of which
the whole concept has been reached. “ Absolute
reality,” “ Being in itself,” a contradiction. In a
world of Becoming, reality is merely a simplification
for the purpose of practical ends, or a deception
resulting from the coarseness of certain organs, or
à variation in the tempo of Becoming.
The logical denial of the world and Nihilism is
a consequence of the fact that we must oppose
nonentity with Being, and that “ Becoming” is
denied. (“Something” becomes. )
i
S
th'
ط ق
ted
581.
Being and Becoming. -" Reason a developed
-"
upon a sensualistic basis upon the prejudices of
the senses-that is to say, with the belief in the
truth of the judgment of the senses.
“ Being," as the generalisation of the concept
“ Life" (breath), “to be animate," “ to will,” “ to act
i upon," " become. ”
.
The opposite is : "to be inanimate," " not to
become," " not to will. " Thus: “ Being” is not
opposed to “not-Being," to " appearance," nor is
"
>
gical
onse.
ghest
VOL. II.
F
## p. 82 (#112) #############################################
82
THE WILL TO POWER.
it opposed to death (for only that can be dead
which can also live).
The “soul,” the "ego," posited as primeval
facts; and introduced wherever there is Becoming.
582.
Being—we have no other idea of it than that
which we derive from "living. ”—How then can
“
everything “be” dead ?
583.
A.
I see with astonishment that science resigns
itself to-day to the fate of being reduced to the
world of appearance: we certainly have no organ
of knowledge for the real world-be it what it
may.
At this point we may well ask: With what
organ of knowledge is this contradiction estab-
lished ? . . .
The fact that a world which is accessible to
our organs is also understood to be dependent
upon these organs, and the fact that we should
understand a world as subjectively conditioned,
are no proofs of the actual possibility of an
objective world. Who urges us to believe that
subjectivity is real or essential?
· The absolute is even an absurd concept: an
“absolute mode of existence" is nonsense, the
concept "being," " thing,” is always relative to us.
)
## p. 83 (#113) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE
83
<0
a
.
The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis
apparent" and "real,” the correlative valuations
" of little value” and “absolutely valuable” have
been spread abroad.
The world of appearance does not strike us as
“valuable” world; appearance is on a lower
plane than the highest value. Only a “real”
world can be absolutely "valuable. "
Prejudice of prejudices! It is perfectly possible
in itself that the real nature of things would be
so unfriendly, so opposed to the first conditions of
life, that appearance is necessary in order to make
life possible. . . . This is certainly the case in
a large number of situations—for instance, mar-
riage.
Our empirical world would thus be conditioned,
even in its limits to knowledge, by the instinct of
self-preservation : we regard that as good, valu-
able, and true, which favours the preservation of
the species. .
(a) We have no categories which allow us to
distinguish between a real and an apparent world.
(At the most, there could exist a world of appear-
ance, but not our world of appearance. )
.
(6) Taking the real world for granted, it might
still be the less valuable to us: for the quantum
of illusion might be of the highest order, owing to
its value to us as preservative measure. (Unless
appearance in itself were sufficient to condemn
anything ? )
(c) That there exists a correlation between the
degrees of value and the degrees of reality (so that
the highest values also possessed the greatest
2
it
at
b-
to
ent
ould
ned,
an
that
:: an
, the
to us.
## p. 84 (#114) #############################################
84
THE WILL TO POWER.
degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate
which starts out with the hypothesis that we know
the order of rank among values; and that this
order is a inoral one. . . It is only on this
hypothesis that truth is necessary as a definition
of all that is of a superior value.
B.
It is of cardinal importance that the real world
should be suppressed. It is the most formidable
inspirer of doubts, and depreciator of values,
concerning the world which we are: it was our
most dangerous attempt heretofore on the life of Life.
War against all the hypotheses upon which a
real world has been imagined. The notion that
moral values are the highest values, belongs to
this hypothesis.
The superiority of the moral valuation would
be refuted, if it could be shown to be the result
of an immoral valuation—a specific case of real
immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an
appearance, and as an appearance it would cease
from having any right to condemn appearance.
:
C.
»
Then the “Will to Truth would have to be
examined psychologically: it is not a moral
power, but a form of the Will to Power. This
would have to be proved by the fact that it avails
itself of every immoral means there is; above all,
of the metaphysicians.
## p. 85 (#115) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
85
2
At the present moment we are face to face
with the necessity of testing the assumption that
moral values are the highest values. Method in
research is attained caly when all moral prejudices
have been overcome: it represents a conquest
over morality. ,
584.
The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome
of the fact that, instead of recognising in logic
and the categories of reason merely a means to
the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends
(that is to say, “especially," a useful falsification),
they were taken to be the criterion of truth-
particularly of reality. The “criterion of truth
was, as a matter of fact, merely the biological utility
of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle:
and, since a species of animals knows nothing
more important than its own preservation, it was
indeed allowable here to speak of“ truth. ” Where
the artlessness came in, however, was in taking
this anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure
of things, as the canon for recognising the “real”
and the “unreal”: in short, in making a relative
thing absolute. And behold, all at once, the
world fell into the two halves, "real" and
apparent"; and precisely that world which
:
man's reason had arranged for him to live and
to settle in, was discredited. Instead of using
.
the forms as mere instruments for making the
world manageable and calculable, the mad fancy
of philosophers intervened, and saw that in these
categories the concept of that world is given which
2
be
I
oral
Chis
rails
= all
,
## p. 86 (#116) #############################################
86
THE WILL TO POWER.
does not correspond to the concept of the world
in which man lives. . . . The means were mis-
understood as measures of value, and even used
as a condemnation of their original purpose. . . .
The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a use-
ful way: the means thereto was the invention of
forms and signs, with the help of which the
confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced
to ą useful and wieldy scheme.
But woe! a moral category was now brought
into the game: no creature would deceive itself,
no creature may deceive itself-consequently there
is only a will to truth. What is “ truth”?
The principle of contradiction provided the
scheme: the real world to which the way is
being sought cannot be in contradiction with
itself, cannot change, cannot evolve, has
beginning and no end.
That is the greatest error which has ever been
committed, the really fatal error of the world: it
was believed that in the forms of reason a criterion
of reality had been found—whereas their only
no
1
7
و مدل
## p. 87 (#117) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
87
as possible from the world of appearance? (the
concept of the perfect being as a contrast to the
real being; or, more correctly still, as the contra-
diction of life. . . . ).
The whole direction of values was towards the
slander of life; people deliberately confounded
ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so
that the opposing parties also began to reject
science with horror.
Thus the road to science was doubly barred :
first, by the belief in the real world; and secondly,
by the opponents of this belief. Natural science
and psychology were (1) condemned in their
objects, (2) deprived of their artlessness.
Everything is so absolutely bound and related
to everything else in the real world, that to
condemn, or to think away anything, means to
condemn and think away the whole. The words
“this should not be," "this ought not to be," are
a farce. . . . If one imagines the consequences,
one would ruin the very source of Life by sup-
Dressing everything which is in any sense what-
Physiology proves
## p. 88 (#118) #############################################
88
THE WILL TO POWER.
585.
The awful recovery of our consciousness: not
of the individual, but of the human species. Let
us reflect; let us think backwards ; let us follow
the narrow and broad highway.
A.
Man seeks “the truth": a world that does not
contradict itself, that does not deceive, that does
not change, a real world—a world in which there
is no suffering : contradiction, deception, varia-
bility—the causes of suffering! He does not
doubt that there is such a thing as a world as it
ought to be; he would fain find a read to it. (Indian
criticism : even the ego is apparent and not real. )
Whence does man derive the concept of reality?
-Why does he make variability, deception, con-
tradiction, the origin of suffering; why not rather
of his happiness? .
The contempt and hatred of all that perishes,
changes, and varies: whence comes this valuation
of stability? Obviously, the will to truth is
merely the longing for a stable world,
The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors:
therefore, it was concluded, reason is the road to
a static state; the most spiritual ideas must be
nearest to the “real world. ”—It is from the
senses that the greatest number of misfortunes
come-they are cheats, deluders, and destroyers.
Happiness can be promised only by Being :
change and happiness exclude each other. The
>
## p. 89 (#119) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
89
.
loftiest desire is thus to be one with Being. That
is the formula for the way to happiness.
In summa: The world as it ought to be exists;
this world in which we live is an error—this our
world should not exist.
The belief in Reing shows itself only as a result:
the real primum mobile is the disbelief in Becom-
ing, the mistrust of Becoming, the scorn of all
Becoming
What kind of a man reflects in this way? An
unfruitful, suffering kind, a world - weary kind.
If we try and fancy what the opposite kind of man
would be like, we have a picture of a creature
who would not require the belief in Being; he
would rather despise it as dead, tedious, and in-
different.
The belief that the world which ought to be, is,
really exists, is a belief proper to the unfruitful,
who do not wish to create a world as it should be.
They take it for granted, they seek for means and
1
tavs
## p. 90 (#120) #############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
The same species of men, grown one degree
poorer, no longer possessed of the power to inter-
pret and to create fictions, produces the Nihilists.
A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it
is, that it ought not to exist, and of the world as
it ought to be, that it does not exist. According
to this, existence (action, suffering, willing, and
feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the “in vain ”
is the Nihilist's pathos—and as pathos it is more-
over an inconsistency on the part of the Nihilist.
He who is not able to introduce his will into
things, the man without either will or energy, at
least invests them with some meaning, i. e. he
believes that a will is already in them.
The degree of a man's will-power may be
measured from the extent to which he can dis-
pense with the meaning in things, from the extent
to which he is able to endure a world without
meaning: because he himself arranges a small
## p. 91 (#121) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
91
(they attribute the highest degree of reality to the
things which are valued highest).
The connection between philosophers and moral
men and their evaluations (the moral interpreta-
tion of the world as the sense of the world : after
the collapse of the religious sense).
The overcoming of philosophers by the annihila-
tion of the world of being : intermediary period of
Nihilism; before there is sufficient strength present
to transvalue values, and to make the world of
becoming, and of appearance, the only world to be
deified and called good.
B.
Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a
symptom of increasing strength or of increasing
weakness :
Partly owing to the fact that the strength to
create and to will has grown to such an extent,
## p. 92 (#122) #############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
C.
The belief in truth, the need of holding to some-
thing which is believed to be true: psychological
reduction apart from the valuations that have
existed hitherto. Fear and laziness.
At the same time unbelief: Reduction. In
what way does it acquire a new value, if a real
world does not exist at all (by this means the
capacity of valuing, which hitherto has been
lavished upon the world of being, becomes free
once more)
586.
The real and the " apparent" world.
A.
-
. );
.
.
The erroneous concepts which proceed from this
concept are of three kinds :
(a) An unknown world :-we are adventurers,
we are inquisitive, that which is known to us
makes us weary (the danger of the concept lies
in the fact it suggests that “this " world is known
to us:
(6) Another world, where things are different:-
something in us draws comparisons, and thereby
our calm submission and our silence lose their
value-perhaps all will be for the best, we have
not hoped in vain. . . . The world where things
are different-who knows where we ourselves
will be different. . .
(c) A real world :—that is the most singular
.
## p. 93 (#123) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
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1
a
blow and attack which we have ever received; so
many things have become encrusted in the word
"true," that we involuntarily give these to the
“ real world”: the real world must also be a truth-
ful world, such a one as would not deceive us or
make fools of us: to believe in it in this way is to
be almost forced to believe (from convention, as
is the case among people worthy of confidence).
The concept, “the unknown world,” suggests
that this world is known to us (is tedious);
The concept, “the other world," suggests that this
world might be different,-it suppresses necessity
and fate (it is useless to submit and to adapt
one's self);
The concept, the true world, suggests that this
world is untruthful, deceitful, dishonest, not
genuine, and not essential,--and consequently not
a world calculated to be useful to us (it is un-
advisable to become adapted to it; better resist it).
9
Thus we escape from “this" world in three
different ways >
(a) With our curiosity—as though the interest-
ing part was somewhere else;
(6) With our submission—as though it was not
necessary to submit, as though this world was
not an ultimate necessity;
(c) With our sympathy and respect—as though
this world did not deserve them, as though it was
mean and dishonest towards us.
In summa: we have become revolutionaries in
í
## p. 94 (#124) #############################################
94
THE WILL TO POWER.
made X our
three different ways; we
have
criticism of the “known world. "
B.
The first step to reason : to understand to what
extent we have been seduced,—for it might be
precisely the reverse :
(a) The unknown world could be so constituted
as to give us a liking for “this” world—it may
be a more stupid and meaner form of existence.
(6) The other world, very far from taking
account of our desires which were never realised
here, might be part of the mass of things which
this world makes possible for us; to learn to know
this world would be a means of satisfying us.
(C) The true world: but who actually says that
the apparent world must be of less value than the
true world? Do not our instincts contradict this
judgment ? Is not man eternally orror
moci
.
## p. 95 (#125) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
95
.
good as “knowing something about it,"—that is
the contrary of the assumption of an x-world.
In short, the world x might be in every way a
more tedious, a more inhuman, and a less dignified
world than this one.
It would be quite another matter if it were
assumed that there were several x-worlds—that
is to say, every possible kind of world besides our
own. But this has never been assumed. . .
C.
Problem: why has the image of the other world
always been to the disadvantage of “ this ” one-
that is to say, always stood as a criticism of it;
what does this point to?
A people that are proud of themselves, and
who are on the ascending path of Life, always
picture another existence as lower and less valu-
able than theirs; they regard the strange unknown
world as their enemy, as their opposite; they feel
no curiosity, but rather repugnance in regard to
what is strange to them. . . . Such a body of men
would never admit that another people were the
true people. "
The very fact that such a distinction is possible,
--that this world should be called the world of
appearance, and that the other should be called
the "true" world, is symptomatic.
The places of origin of the idea of “another
world":
The philosopher who invents a rational world
where reason and logical functions are
a
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96
THE WILL TO POWER.
G
adequate :—this is the root of the "true"
world.
The religious man who invents a "divine
world": this is the root of the “de-
naturalised” and the "anti-natural” world.
The moral man who invents a “ free world":
-this is the root of the good, the perfect,
the just, and the holy world.
The common factor in the three places of origin:
psychological error, physiological confusion.
With what attributes is the “other world," as
it actually appears in history, characterised?
With the stigmata of philosophical, religious, and
moral prejudices.
The "other world” as it appears in the light
of these facts, is synonymous with not-Being, with
not-living, with the will not to live. . .
General aspect: it was the instinct of the fatigue
of living, and not that of life, which created the
“ other world.
the thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, is based
upon
that older and artless observation which
would fain grant energy to things : but analysis
revealed that even force was only ascribed to them
by our fancy, as was also substance.
“The thing
affects a subject ? " Thus the root of the idea of
substance is in language, not in things outside our-
selves! The thing-in-itself is not a problem at all!
Being will have to be conceived as a sensation
which is no longer based upon anything quite
devoid of sensation.
In movement no new meaning is given to feel-
ing. That which is, cannot be the substance of
movement: it is therefore a form of Being.
N. B. -The explanation of life may be sought,
in the first place, through mental images
of phenomena which precede it (purposes);
Secondly, through mental images of pheno-
mena which follow behind it (the mathe-
matico-physical explanation).
The two should not be confounded. Thus: the
physical explanation, which is the symbolisation
of the world by means of feeling and thought,
cannot in itself make feeling and thinking originate
again and show its derivation: physics must rather
construct the world of feeling, consistently without
feeling or purpose-right up to the highest man,
And teleology is only a history of purposes, and is
never physical.
## p. 69 (#99) ##############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
69
s
m
ig
of
563
Our method of acquiring “knowledge” is
limited to a process of establishing quantities; but
we can by no means help feeling the differences of
quantity as differences of quality. Quality is merely
a relative truth for us; it is not a “thing-in-itself. ”
r
Our senses have a certain definite quantum as
a mean, within the limits of which they perform
their functions—that is to say, we become conscious
of bigness and smallness in accordance with the con-
ditions of our existence. If we sharpened or blunted
our senses tenfold, we should perish—that is to say,
we feel even proportions as qualities in regard to
our possibilities of existence.
ur-
all !
ion
uite
feel-
e of
ught,
nages
poses);
pheno-
nathe-
564
But could not all quantities be merely tokens
of qualities? Another consciousness and scale of
desires must correspond to greater power—in fact,
another point of view; growth in itself is the ex-
pression of a desire to become more; the desire for
a greater quantum springs from a certain quale; in
a purely quantitative world, everything would be
dead, stiff, and motionless. --The reduction of all
qualities to quantities is nonsense: it is discovered
that they can only stand together, an analogy-
us: the
lisation
hought,
riginate
st rather
565.
Qualities are our insurmountable barriers; we
cannot possibly help feeling mere differences of
quantity as something fundamentally different from
quantity—that is to say, as qualities, which we
without
est man.
s, and is
## p. 70 (#100) #############################################
70
THE WILL TO POWER.
can no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But
everything in regard to which the word "know-
ledge” has any sense at all, belongs to the realm
of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity :
whereas, conversely, all our valuations (that is to
say, our sensations) belong precisely to the realm
of qualities, i. e. to those truths which belong to
us alone and to our point of view, and which
absolutely cannot be "known. ” It is obvious that
every one of us, different creatures, must feel
different qualities, and must therefore live in a
different world from the rest. Qualities are an
idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand
that these our human interpretations and values,
should be general and perhaps real values, belongs
to the hereditary madnesses of human pride.
566.
The "real world," in whatever form it has been
conceived hitherto—was always the world of ap-
pearance over again.
567.
The world of appearance, i. e. a world regarded
in the light of values; ordered, selected according
to values--that is to say, in this case, according to
the standpoint of utility in regard to the preserva-
tion and the increase of power of a certain species
of animals.
It is the point of view, then, which accounts for
the character of“ appearance. ” As if a world could
remain over, when the point of view is cancelled !
By such means relativity would also be cancelled !
## p. 71 (#101) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
71
Every centre of energy has its point of view of
the whole of the remainder of the world that is
to say, its perfectly definite valuation, its mode of
action, its mode of resistance. The “ world of ap-
pearance” is thus reduced to a specific kind of
action on the world proceeding from a centre.
But there is no other kind of action: and the
“world” is only a word for the collective play of
these actions. Reality consists precisely in this
particular action and reaction of every isolated
factor against the whole.
There no longer remains a shadow of a right to
speak here of “appearance. "
The specific way of reacting is the only way of
reacting; we do not know how many kinds and
what sort of kinds there are.
But there is no “other," no "real," no essential
being,—for thus a world without action and re-
action would be expressed.
The antithesis: world of appearance and real
world, is thus reduced to the antitheses "world"
and “nonentity. "
n
d
s,
gs
.
.
.
een
ap-
ded
ling
g to
rya-
ecies
568.
A criticism of the concept "real and apparent
world. ”—Of these two the first is a mere fiction,
formed out of a host of imaginary things.
" Appearance" itself belongs to reality: it is a
form of its being; i. e. in a world where there is no
such thing as being, a certain calculable world of
identical cases must first be created through appear-
ance; a tempo in which observation and comparison
is possible, etc.
s for
could
lled!
elled!
## p. 72 (#102) #############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
Appearance” is an adjusted and simplified
world, in which our practical instincts have worked:
for us it is perfectly true: for we live in it, we can
live in it: this is the proof of its truth as far as we
are concerned. . . .
The world, apart from the fact that we have to
live in it—the world, which we have not adjusted to
our being, our logic, and our psychological preju-
dices-does not exist as a world “in-itself”; it is
essentially a world of relations : under certain cir-
cumstances it has a different aspect from every differ-
ent point at which it is seen : it presses against
every point, and every point resists it—and these
collective relations are in every case incongruent.
The measure of power determines what being
possesses the other measure of power : under what
form, force, or constraint, it acts or resists.
Our particular case is interesting enough: we
have created a conception in order to be able to
live in a world, in order to perceive just enough to
enable us to endure life in that world. . . .
569.
The nature of our psychological vision is deter-
mined by the fact-
(1) That communication is necessary, and that
for communication to be possible something must be
stable, simplified, and capable of being stated pre-
cisely (above all, in the so-called identical case). In
order that it may be communicable, it must be felt as
something adjusted, as“ recognisable. ” The material
of the senses, arranged by the understanding, re-
## p. 73 (#103) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
73
duced to coarse leading features, made similar to
other things, and classified with its like. Thus :
the indefiniteness and the chaos of sense-impres-
sions are, as it were, made logical.
(2) The phenomenal world is the adjusted world
which we believe to be real. Its “reality” lies in
.
the constant return of similar, familiar, and related
things, in their rationalised character, and in the be-
lief that we are here able to reckon and determine.
(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world is
not “the real world,” but the amorphous and un-
adjustable world consisting of the chaos of sensa-
tions—that is to say, another kind of phenomenal
world, a world which to us is “unknowable. "
(4) The question how “things-in-themselves" are
constituted, quite apart from our sense-receptivity
and from the activity of our understanding, must
be answered by the further question : how were
we able to know that things existed? “ Thingness
is one of our own inventions. The question is
whether there are not a good many more ways of
creating such a world of appearance—and whether
this creating, rationalising, adjusting, and falsifying
be not the best-guaranteed reality itself: in short,
whether that which "fixes the meaning of things
is not the only reality: and whether the "effect
of environment upon us " be not merely the result
of such will-exercising subjects. The other
"creatures" act upon us; our adjusted world of
appearance is an arrangement and an overpowering
of its activities: a sort of defensive measure. The
subject alone is demonstrable; the hypothesis might
be advanced that subjects are all that exist,—that
"
## p. 74 (#104) #############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
“object " is only a form of action of subject upon
subject. a modus of the subject.
(k) THE METAPHYSICAL NEED.
570.
If one resembles all the philosophers that have
gone before, one can have no eyes for what has
existed and what will exist-one sees only what
is. But as there is no such thing as Being; all
that the philosophers had to deal with was a host
of fancies, this was their "world. "
571.
To assert the existence as a whole of things con-
cerning which we know nothing, simply because
there is an advantage in not being able to know
anything of them, was a piece of artlessness on
Kant's part, and the result of the recoil-stroke of
certain needs—especially in the realm of morals
and metaphysics.
572.
An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away
or back from it: his earnest opinion is that the
worth of a thing consists in that nebulous residue
of it which one derives from colour, form, sound,
and thought; he believes that the more subtle, at-
tenuated, and volatile, a thing or a man becomes,
the more valuable he becomes: the less real, the
greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato
was guilty of yet further audacity in the matter of
## p. 75 (#105) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
75
-
turning tables-he measured the degree of reality
according to the degree of value, and said: The
more there is of “idea ” the more there is of Being.
He twisted the concept "reality” round and said:
What ye regard as real is an error, and the nearer
we get to the idea 'the nearer we are to‘truth. '
Is this understood ? It was the greatest of all re-
christenings : and because Christianity adopted it,
we are blind to its astounding features. At botton,
Plato, like the artist he was, placed appearance before
Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth!
unreality before actuality ! -He was, however, so
convinced of the value of appearance, that he
granted it the attributes of " Being," "causality,”
goodness,” and “truth," and, in short, all those
things which are associated with value.
The concept value itself regarded as a cause:
first standpoint.
The ideal granted all attributes, conferring
honour: second standpoint.
5
573.
")
ay
che
Aue
nd,
The idea of the “true world” or of “God” as
absolutely spiritual, intellectual, and good, is an
emergency measure to the extent to which the
antagonistic instincts are all-powerful.
Moderation and existing humanity is reflected
exactly in the humanisation of the gods. The
Greeks of the strongest period, who entertained no
fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary
were pleased with themselves, brought down their
gods to all their emotions.
at-
mes,
the
Plato
ter of
i
## p. 76 (#106) #############################################
76
THE WILL TO POWER.
The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus
very far from being a sign of progress : one is
heartily conscious of this when one reads Goethe
-in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue
and spirit is felt as being upon a lower plane.
574.
The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside
in the derivation of the conditioned out of the
unconditioned.
It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds
the unconditioned to the conditioned, that it invents
it-just as it thought of and invented the "ego” to
cover the multifariousness of its processes : it meas-
ures the world according to a host of self-devised
measurements - according to its fundamental
-
fictions “the unconditioned," "end and means,"
,
"things," "substances,” and according to logical
laws, figures, and forms.
There would be nothing which could be called
knowledge, if thought did not first so re-create the
world into "things" which are in its own image.
It is only through thought that there is untruth.
The origin of thought, like that of feelings,
cannot be traced: but that is no proof of its
primordiality or absoluteness ! It simply shows
that we cannot get behind it, because we have
nothing else save thought and feeling.
575.
To know is to point to past experience: in its
nature it is a regressus in infinitum. That which
## p. 77 (#107) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
77
halts (in the face of a so-called causa prima or the
unconditioned, etc. ) is laziness, weariness-
576.
Concerning the psychology of metaphysics—the
influence of fear. That which has been most
feared, the cause of the greatest suffering (lust of
power, voluptuousness, etc. ), has been treated with
the greatest amount of hostility by men, and
eliminated from the “real” world. Thus the
passions have been step by step struck out, God
posited as the opposite of evil—that is to say, reality
is conceived to be the negation of the passions and
the emotions (i. e. nonentity).
Irrationality, impulsive action, accidental action,
is, moreover, hated by them (as the cause of incal-
culable suffering). Consequently they denied this ele-
ment in the absolute, and interpreted it as absolute
“rationality” and “conformity of means to ends. "
Change and perishability were also feared ; and
by this fear an oppressed soul is revealed, full of
distrust and painful experiences (the case with
Spinoza : a man differently constituted would have
regarded this change as a charm).
A nature overflowing and playing with energy,
would call precisely the passions, irrationality and
change, good in a eudemonistic sense, together
with their consequences : danger, contrast, ruin, etc.
.
e
e.
gs,
its
WS
ave
577.
Against the value of that which always remains
the same (remember Spinoza's artlessness and
mits
which
## p. 78 (#108) #############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
Descartes' likewise), the value of the shortest and
of the most perishable, the seductive flash of gold
on the belly of the serpent vita-
)
578.
Moral values in epistemology itself :-
The faith in reason-why not mistrust?
The "real world” is the good world-why?
Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle,
regarded as immoral: the desire for a
world which knows nothing of these things.
The transcendental world discovered, so that
a place may be kept for “moral freedom"
(as in Kant).
Dialectics as the road to virtue (in Plato and
Socrates : probably because sophistry was
held to be the road to immorality).
Time and space are ideal : consequently
there is unity in the essence of things ;
consequently no "sin," no evil, no imper-
fection,-a justification of God.
Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge,
in order to keep the moral (particularly the
hedonistic) values as the highest.
Augustine does the same, and later Pascal
("corrupted reason"), in favour of Christian
values.
Descartes' contempt for everything variable;
likewise Spinoza's.
579.
Concerning the psychology of metaphysics. This
world is only apparent: therefore there must be a
## p. 79 (#109) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
79
real world ;-this world is conditioned: conse-
quently there must be an unconditioned world ;-
this world is contradictory : consequently there is
a world free from contradiction ;-this world is
evolving: consequently there is somewhere a static
world :-a host of false conclusions (blind faith in
reason : if A exists, then its opposite B must also
exist). Pain inspires these conclusions: at bottom
they are wishes that such a world might exist; the
hatred of a world which leads to suffering is like-
wise revealed by the fact that another and better
world is imagined: the resentment of the meta-
physician against reality is creative here.
The second series of questions : wherefore suffer?
and from this a conclusion is derived con-
cerning the relation of the real world to our
apparent, changing, suffering, and contradictory
world : (1) Suffering as the consequence of error:
:
how is error possible ? (2) Suffering as the conse-
quence of guilt: how is guilt possible? (A host
of experiences drawn from the sphere of nature or
society, universalised and made absolute. ) But if
the conditioned world be causally determined by
the unconditioned, then the freedom to err, to be
sinful, must also be derived from the same quarter :
and once more the question arises, to what purpose ?
. . The world of appearance, of Becoming, of
contradiction, of suffering, is therefore willed; to
what purpose ?
The error of these conclusions: two contradictory
concepts are formed-because one of them corre-
sponds to a reality, the other "must" also corre-
spond to a reality. “Whence" would one otherwise
.
:
1
in
.
.
le;
This
be a
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THE WILL TO POWER.
C
derive its contradictory concept? Reason is thus
a source of revelation concerning the absolute.
But the origin of the above contradictions need
not necessarily be a supernatural source of reason:
it is sufficient to oppose the real genesis of the
concepts:—this springs from practical spheres, from
utilitarian spheres, hence the strong faith it com-
mands (one is threatened with ruin if one's con-
clusions are not in conformity with this reason; but
this fact is no "proof” of what the latter asserts).
The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain,
is quite artless. “ Eternal blessedness”: psycho-
logical nonsense. Brave and creative men never
make pleasure and pain ultimate questions—they
are incidental conditions: both of them must be
desired when one will attain to something. It
is a sign of fatigue and illness in these meta-
physicians and religious men, that they should
press questions of pleasure and pain into the
foreground. Even morality in their eyes derives
its great importance only from the fact that it is
regarded as an essential condition for abolishing
pain.
The same holds good of the preoccupation with
appearance and error: the cause of pain. A
superstition that happiness and truth are related
(confusion : happiness in “certainty,” in “faith").
580.
To what extent are the various epistemological
positions (materialism, sensualism, idealism) conse-
quences of valuations ? The source of the highest
## p. 81 (#111) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE
81
feelings of pleasure (“ feelings of value”) may also
judge concerning the problem of reality!
The measure of positive knowledge is quite a
matter of indifference and beside the point : as
witness the development of India.
The Buddhistic negation of reality in general
(appearance = pain) is perfectly consistent: un-
demonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of categories,
not only for an “absolute world,” but a recogni-
tion of the erroneous procedures by means of which
the whole concept has been reached. “ Absolute
reality,” “ Being in itself,” a contradiction. In a
world of Becoming, reality is merely a simplification
for the purpose of practical ends, or a deception
resulting from the coarseness of certain organs, or
à variation in the tempo of Becoming.
The logical denial of the world and Nihilism is
a consequence of the fact that we must oppose
nonentity with Being, and that “ Becoming” is
denied. (“Something” becomes. )
i
S
th'
ط ق
ted
581.
Being and Becoming. -" Reason a developed
-"
upon a sensualistic basis upon the prejudices of
the senses-that is to say, with the belief in the
truth of the judgment of the senses.
“ Being," as the generalisation of the concept
“ Life" (breath), “to be animate," “ to will,” “ to act
i upon," " become. ”
.
The opposite is : "to be inanimate," " not to
become," " not to will. " Thus: “ Being” is not
opposed to “not-Being," to " appearance," nor is
"
>
gical
onse.
ghest
VOL. II.
F
## p. 82 (#112) #############################################
82
THE WILL TO POWER.
it opposed to death (for only that can be dead
which can also live).
The “soul,” the "ego," posited as primeval
facts; and introduced wherever there is Becoming.
582.
Being—we have no other idea of it than that
which we derive from "living. ”—How then can
“
everything “be” dead ?
583.
A.
I see with astonishment that science resigns
itself to-day to the fate of being reduced to the
world of appearance: we certainly have no organ
of knowledge for the real world-be it what it
may.
At this point we may well ask: With what
organ of knowledge is this contradiction estab-
lished ? . . .
The fact that a world which is accessible to
our organs is also understood to be dependent
upon these organs, and the fact that we should
understand a world as subjectively conditioned,
are no proofs of the actual possibility of an
objective world. Who urges us to believe that
subjectivity is real or essential?
· The absolute is even an absurd concept: an
“absolute mode of existence" is nonsense, the
concept "being," " thing,” is always relative to us.
)
## p. 83 (#113) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE
83
<0
a
.
The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis
apparent" and "real,” the correlative valuations
" of little value” and “absolutely valuable” have
been spread abroad.
The world of appearance does not strike us as
“valuable” world; appearance is on a lower
plane than the highest value. Only a “real”
world can be absolutely "valuable. "
Prejudice of prejudices! It is perfectly possible
in itself that the real nature of things would be
so unfriendly, so opposed to the first conditions of
life, that appearance is necessary in order to make
life possible. . . . This is certainly the case in
a large number of situations—for instance, mar-
riage.
Our empirical world would thus be conditioned,
even in its limits to knowledge, by the instinct of
self-preservation : we regard that as good, valu-
able, and true, which favours the preservation of
the species. .
(a) We have no categories which allow us to
distinguish between a real and an apparent world.
(At the most, there could exist a world of appear-
ance, but not our world of appearance. )
.
(6) Taking the real world for granted, it might
still be the less valuable to us: for the quantum
of illusion might be of the highest order, owing to
its value to us as preservative measure. (Unless
appearance in itself were sufficient to condemn
anything ? )
(c) That there exists a correlation between the
degrees of value and the degrees of reality (so that
the highest values also possessed the greatest
2
it
at
b-
to
ent
ould
ned,
an
that
:: an
, the
to us.
## p. 84 (#114) #############################################
84
THE WILL TO POWER.
degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate
which starts out with the hypothesis that we know
the order of rank among values; and that this
order is a inoral one. . . It is only on this
hypothesis that truth is necessary as a definition
of all that is of a superior value.
B.
It is of cardinal importance that the real world
should be suppressed. It is the most formidable
inspirer of doubts, and depreciator of values,
concerning the world which we are: it was our
most dangerous attempt heretofore on the life of Life.
War against all the hypotheses upon which a
real world has been imagined. The notion that
moral values are the highest values, belongs to
this hypothesis.
The superiority of the moral valuation would
be refuted, if it could be shown to be the result
of an immoral valuation—a specific case of real
immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an
appearance, and as an appearance it would cease
from having any right to condemn appearance.
:
C.
»
Then the “Will to Truth would have to be
examined psychologically: it is not a moral
power, but a form of the Will to Power. This
would have to be proved by the fact that it avails
itself of every immoral means there is; above all,
of the metaphysicians.
## p. 85 (#115) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
85
2
At the present moment we are face to face
with the necessity of testing the assumption that
moral values are the highest values. Method in
research is attained caly when all moral prejudices
have been overcome: it represents a conquest
over morality. ,
584.
The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome
of the fact that, instead of recognising in logic
and the categories of reason merely a means to
the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends
(that is to say, “especially," a useful falsification),
they were taken to be the criterion of truth-
particularly of reality. The “criterion of truth
was, as a matter of fact, merely the biological utility
of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle:
and, since a species of animals knows nothing
more important than its own preservation, it was
indeed allowable here to speak of“ truth. ” Where
the artlessness came in, however, was in taking
this anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure
of things, as the canon for recognising the “real”
and the “unreal”: in short, in making a relative
thing absolute. And behold, all at once, the
world fell into the two halves, "real" and
apparent"; and precisely that world which
:
man's reason had arranged for him to live and
to settle in, was discredited. Instead of using
.
the forms as mere instruments for making the
world manageable and calculable, the mad fancy
of philosophers intervened, and saw that in these
categories the concept of that world is given which
2
be
I
oral
Chis
rails
= all
,
## p. 86 (#116) #############################################
86
THE WILL TO POWER.
does not correspond to the concept of the world
in which man lives. . . . The means were mis-
understood as measures of value, and even used
as a condemnation of their original purpose. . . .
The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a use-
ful way: the means thereto was the invention of
forms and signs, with the help of which the
confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced
to ą useful and wieldy scheme.
But woe! a moral category was now brought
into the game: no creature would deceive itself,
no creature may deceive itself-consequently there
is only a will to truth. What is “ truth”?
The principle of contradiction provided the
scheme: the real world to which the way is
being sought cannot be in contradiction with
itself, cannot change, cannot evolve, has
beginning and no end.
That is the greatest error which has ever been
committed, the really fatal error of the world: it
was believed that in the forms of reason a criterion
of reality had been found—whereas their only
no
1
7
و مدل
## p. 87 (#117) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
87
as possible from the world of appearance? (the
concept of the perfect being as a contrast to the
real being; or, more correctly still, as the contra-
diction of life. . . . ).
The whole direction of values was towards the
slander of life; people deliberately confounded
ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so
that the opposing parties also began to reject
science with horror.
Thus the road to science was doubly barred :
first, by the belief in the real world; and secondly,
by the opponents of this belief. Natural science
and psychology were (1) condemned in their
objects, (2) deprived of their artlessness.
Everything is so absolutely bound and related
to everything else in the real world, that to
condemn, or to think away anything, means to
condemn and think away the whole. The words
“this should not be," "this ought not to be," are
a farce. . . . If one imagines the consequences,
one would ruin the very source of Life by sup-
Dressing everything which is in any sense what-
Physiology proves
## p. 88 (#118) #############################################
88
THE WILL TO POWER.
585.
The awful recovery of our consciousness: not
of the individual, but of the human species. Let
us reflect; let us think backwards ; let us follow
the narrow and broad highway.
A.
Man seeks “the truth": a world that does not
contradict itself, that does not deceive, that does
not change, a real world—a world in which there
is no suffering : contradiction, deception, varia-
bility—the causes of suffering! He does not
doubt that there is such a thing as a world as it
ought to be; he would fain find a read to it. (Indian
criticism : even the ego is apparent and not real. )
Whence does man derive the concept of reality?
-Why does he make variability, deception, con-
tradiction, the origin of suffering; why not rather
of his happiness? .
The contempt and hatred of all that perishes,
changes, and varies: whence comes this valuation
of stability? Obviously, the will to truth is
merely the longing for a stable world,
The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors:
therefore, it was concluded, reason is the road to
a static state; the most spiritual ideas must be
nearest to the “real world. ”—It is from the
senses that the greatest number of misfortunes
come-they are cheats, deluders, and destroyers.
Happiness can be promised only by Being :
change and happiness exclude each other. The
>
## p. 89 (#119) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
89
.
loftiest desire is thus to be one with Being. That
is the formula for the way to happiness.
In summa: The world as it ought to be exists;
this world in which we live is an error—this our
world should not exist.
The belief in Reing shows itself only as a result:
the real primum mobile is the disbelief in Becom-
ing, the mistrust of Becoming, the scorn of all
Becoming
What kind of a man reflects in this way? An
unfruitful, suffering kind, a world - weary kind.
If we try and fancy what the opposite kind of man
would be like, we have a picture of a creature
who would not require the belief in Being; he
would rather despise it as dead, tedious, and in-
different.
The belief that the world which ought to be, is,
really exists, is a belief proper to the unfruitful,
who do not wish to create a world as it should be.
They take it for granted, they seek for means and
1
tavs
## p. 90 (#120) #############################################
90
THE WILL TO POWER.
The same species of men, grown one degree
poorer, no longer possessed of the power to inter-
pret and to create fictions, produces the Nihilists.
A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it
is, that it ought not to exist, and of the world as
it ought to be, that it does not exist. According
to this, existence (action, suffering, willing, and
feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the “in vain ”
is the Nihilist's pathos—and as pathos it is more-
over an inconsistency on the part of the Nihilist.
He who is not able to introduce his will into
things, the man without either will or energy, at
least invests them with some meaning, i. e. he
believes that a will is already in them.
The degree of a man's will-power may be
measured from the extent to which he can dis-
pense with the meaning in things, from the extent
to which he is able to endure a world without
meaning: because he himself arranges a small
## p. 91 (#121) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
91
(they attribute the highest degree of reality to the
things which are valued highest).
The connection between philosophers and moral
men and their evaluations (the moral interpreta-
tion of the world as the sense of the world : after
the collapse of the religious sense).
The overcoming of philosophers by the annihila-
tion of the world of being : intermediary period of
Nihilism; before there is sufficient strength present
to transvalue values, and to make the world of
becoming, and of appearance, the only world to be
deified and called good.
B.
Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a
symptom of increasing strength or of increasing
weakness :
Partly owing to the fact that the strength to
create and to will has grown to such an extent,
## p. 92 (#122) #############################################
92
THE WILL TO POWER.
C.
The belief in truth, the need of holding to some-
thing which is believed to be true: psychological
reduction apart from the valuations that have
existed hitherto. Fear and laziness.
At the same time unbelief: Reduction. In
what way does it acquire a new value, if a real
world does not exist at all (by this means the
capacity of valuing, which hitherto has been
lavished upon the world of being, becomes free
once more)
586.
The real and the " apparent" world.
A.
-
. );
.
.
The erroneous concepts which proceed from this
concept are of three kinds :
(a) An unknown world :-we are adventurers,
we are inquisitive, that which is known to us
makes us weary (the danger of the concept lies
in the fact it suggests that “this " world is known
to us:
(6) Another world, where things are different:-
something in us draws comparisons, and thereby
our calm submission and our silence lose their
value-perhaps all will be for the best, we have
not hoped in vain. . . . The world where things
are different-who knows where we ourselves
will be different. . .
(c) A real world :—that is the most singular
.
## p. 93 (#123) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
93
1
a
blow and attack which we have ever received; so
many things have become encrusted in the word
"true," that we involuntarily give these to the
“ real world”: the real world must also be a truth-
ful world, such a one as would not deceive us or
make fools of us: to believe in it in this way is to
be almost forced to believe (from convention, as
is the case among people worthy of confidence).
The concept, “the unknown world,” suggests
that this world is known to us (is tedious);
The concept, “the other world," suggests that this
world might be different,-it suppresses necessity
and fate (it is useless to submit and to adapt
one's self);
The concept, the true world, suggests that this
world is untruthful, deceitful, dishonest, not
genuine, and not essential,--and consequently not
a world calculated to be useful to us (it is un-
advisable to become adapted to it; better resist it).
9
Thus we escape from “this" world in three
different ways >
(a) With our curiosity—as though the interest-
ing part was somewhere else;
(6) With our submission—as though it was not
necessary to submit, as though this world was
not an ultimate necessity;
(c) With our sympathy and respect—as though
this world did not deserve them, as though it was
mean and dishonest towards us.
In summa: we have become revolutionaries in
í
## p. 94 (#124) #############################################
94
THE WILL TO POWER.
made X our
three different ways; we
have
criticism of the “known world. "
B.
The first step to reason : to understand to what
extent we have been seduced,—for it might be
precisely the reverse :
(a) The unknown world could be so constituted
as to give us a liking for “this” world—it may
be a more stupid and meaner form of existence.
(6) The other world, very far from taking
account of our desires which were never realised
here, might be part of the mass of things which
this world makes possible for us; to learn to know
this world would be a means of satisfying us.
(C) The true world: but who actually says that
the apparent world must be of less value than the
true world? Do not our instincts contradict this
judgment ? Is not man eternally orror
moci
.
## p. 95 (#125) #############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
95
.
good as “knowing something about it,"—that is
the contrary of the assumption of an x-world.
In short, the world x might be in every way a
more tedious, a more inhuman, and a less dignified
world than this one.
It would be quite another matter if it were
assumed that there were several x-worlds—that
is to say, every possible kind of world besides our
own. But this has never been assumed. . .
C.
Problem: why has the image of the other world
always been to the disadvantage of “ this ” one-
that is to say, always stood as a criticism of it;
what does this point to?
A people that are proud of themselves, and
who are on the ascending path of Life, always
picture another existence as lower and less valu-
able than theirs; they regard the strange unknown
world as their enemy, as their opposite; they feel
no curiosity, but rather repugnance in regard to
what is strange to them. . . . Such a body of men
would never admit that another people were the
true people. "
The very fact that such a distinction is possible,
--that this world should be called the world of
appearance, and that the other should be called
the "true" world, is symptomatic.
The places of origin of the idea of “another
world":
The philosopher who invents a rational world
where reason and logical functions are
a
## p. 96 (#126) #############################################
96
THE WILL TO POWER.
G
adequate :—this is the root of the "true"
world.
The religious man who invents a "divine
world": this is the root of the “de-
naturalised” and the "anti-natural” world.
The moral man who invents a “ free world":
-this is the root of the good, the perfect,
the just, and the holy world.
The common factor in the three places of origin:
psychological error, physiological confusion.
With what attributes is the “other world," as
it actually appears in history, characterised?
With the stigmata of philosophical, religious, and
moral prejudices.
The "other world” as it appears in the light
of these facts, is synonymous with not-Being, with
not-living, with the will not to live. . .
General aspect: it was the instinct of the fatigue
of living, and not that of life, which created the
“ other world.
