'tis then by the
Gymnastick
Art that w e thhetT * takecareofourFeet?
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
And isitthisthatmakes particularpersons accord one with another, and each one with himself>
Alcib. Without doubt.
Socrat. AndhowdoyoucallthatArtwhichmakes each one agree with himself about the length of a SpanorCubit,isitnottheArtofMeasuring>
Alcib. Yes doubtless.
Socrat. Then Cities and particular persons accord bymeansofthisArt. Andisitnotthefamething about Weight >
Alcib. Theveryfame;
Socrat. And what is that Concord of which you speak, in what does it consist; and What is the Art that
? ? io8
7be First Alcibiades ? or,
that produces it> Is the Concord of a City the lame that makes a particular person accord with himself and others ?
Alcib. I think Ib;
Socrat. What isit? Don't be weary in answering me, butcharitablyinstruct:me.
Alcib. I think it is this Amity and Concord, that makesParentsagreewiththeirChildren, oneBrother with another, and the Wife with her Husband.
y. Socrat. Butdoyou. thinkaHusbandcanagreewell with his Wife, and that they will accord perfectly about theTapistry which she works, and he knows nothowtomake? '?
Alcib. No, certainly.
Socrat. Nor is there any need of it; for 'tis W o men'swork. No moreisitpossiblethataWoman should agree with her Husband about the use of Arms j for (he knows not what belongs to it: This being a Science which appertains only to Men.
Alcib. 'Tistrue.
Socrat. You agreethenthattherearesomeScien ceswhich aredeitin'd only for Women, and others which are reserv'd for Men.
A'cib. Whocandenyit?
Socrat. ItisnotpossiblethatWomen shouldaccord with their Husbands about all these Sciences.
Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat. And consequentlythere will be no Amity, seeing Amity is nothing but Concord.
Alcib. Iamofyourmind. Socrat. SothatwhenaWoman doeswhatsheought
t o d o , s h e w i l l n o t b e l o v e d b y h e r h u s b a n d ? , a n d w h e n
a husband does what he ought to do, he will not be loved by his Wife ?
Alcib. This is a certain consequence
Soc. ThenthatwhichmakeCitieswellpolicied,is n o t , f o r e v e r y o n e t o f o l l o w h i s o w n e m p l o y m e n t isl 'em.
Alcib. However Socrates^ methiriks *'? " >>"? ? '? ? -^>>
Socrat!
? ? ? : O s t h e N a t u r e o f M a n ,
2 0 9
Socrtt. Howdoyousay? CanaCitybewellpo- licied without having Amity in it,are we not agreed that it is by Amity that a City isweil regulated, and that otherwise there is nothing but Disorder and C o n fusion ?
Ak'tb. But yet methinks, 'tis this very thing that produces Amity, namely that every one mind his own Business. ? , .
Socrtt. Yousaidthecontrarybutjustnow. But I must endeavour to understand you, what do you say > That Concord welt establishedproducesAmity ? What cantherebeConcordaboutthingswhichsome know, and others don't understand ?
Alcib. That's impossible. l\\t ,
Stcrat. When every one does what he ought to
do, does every one do what is justor what is unjust > ?
Alcib. A oretty Question ! every pne then does what is just. -,. -, ?
Socrat. Hence it follows that when all the Citi zens do what is Just, yet they can't love one ano
ther. -,. -. Alcib. * Ths consequence isnecessary. .
Socrat. What then isthis Amity or Concord, that
can accomplish and make us capable of giving good C o u n s e l ? , i b t h a t w e m a y b e o f t h e N u m b e r o f t h o s e
whom you callyourbestCitizens? forIcan'tcom prehend whatitis,or inwhom 'tistobefound. Sometimes 'tistobefoundincertainpersons,and
* This consequence is very certain : Alcibi&iu acknowledges ic>> buthe'doesnOcyetunderstandtheReasonofit. Ihavegivena h i n t o f it i n t h e A r g u m e n t ; b u t 'tis sic t o e x p l a i n S o c r a t t s h i s t h o u g h t hereatlength; hisdesignistoshewthatwhen Menpreciselydo onlytheirownbusiness,theyonlytakecareofwhatbelongsto themselves ; and so limit themselves to the knowledge of par ticular things and do notrise up to that of the essenceof universal things; whichistheonlyknowledge thatproducesUnionandCon cord, whereas the Knowledge meiely of particular things produ cesDisorderandDivision. ThereforetomakeConcordreignin 1state'tisnotenoughforeveryonetotakecareofwhathehas ;he . musttakecareofhimselftoo. Thiscarewillteachhimtolove hisNeighbourashimself; and 'tisonlythisLove,whichhasGod foritsprinciple, thatcan produce Concord and Union,
P some
? ? #>K> TU FirstAtcibktftesv? )ox]
? sometimes 'tis not to be found- ini'em, as if fBems W y O u ^ W b r AE ? , 1 - W - '"? '? ' '-" 0s:j; ? ' ' i-J- - ; J->4/frft. - #*<<***, I solemnly protestW'vtoi' I
"fcrtownb'mhat IsayafyselfrAnd haverul^a'great risque in being a long time in an illCondition r*w<<h-
OutfSfcei^iTg ft. - c 7 <^J. i(--3rn : . ;; . ? . -n -.
? 5<w. Dori'ujediseour^'d^kfc/feW^ifyoufhouM not perceive inwhat Condition you are till''you arc ^'o-yeaf^of-Age^ it wbuld^e-a- difficult mattes 'for \fdi to-'t&dreryour selfotft <5f ft' arid to take care;of
your serjyttuYnow atydk 'yeafe'tisthe'fittesttime lofyt)uwF6eIyout]5iitempe^ftet^e'manifer-Jydudo.
Jkib. But wheWMWfeete-toDlsternper'wfct must. he do > ; . 3Jdii! (. ';rr: f? >>! . :! << >;r.
~"SwriiP. ? oa-"rieed drilyanswer to some'Qtteftiens, kSSoli ^'^4KJWriTchif'youdo-,J-hopebythehelpofGod,
Menan't both ytiiiaM'IIballbecomebetterthanwe:afe,at ujom. least; if myTProphesie is to be believ'd.
Ale. ' If'there needs nothing but to answer you to rMi^it-'abbut; I'llpromise jfotfyour Prophefie shall provetrue.
Soc. Comethen-. ;Whatisittotakecafeofone's
selfsothiswhenwe thinkwe takecareofotfr'selves
themost, itmay not-oftenhappento uswithoutour
knowledg to takecareofquiteanotherthing? What
mustaMan dotb'takecareOfhimself? doeshetake
careofhimself, when hetake'stareofthethingsthat Belongtohim> Aktb. *Ithinkso. '? ? '-'? -,l':-i
Sac. How? doesaMan takecare. ofhisfeet,whenhe
takescareofthethingsthatbelongstohis'sees-% ,. ? Alcib. I dotft understand you. ? >? '. ? . :
SocratJTh you k n o w nothing that property belbiigs
t o t h e h a n d ? ' T o w h a t p a r t o f t r i e B o d y d o t h e . R i n g s
appertain,isitnottotheFingers? ',t-',. vnj-r Socrat:\<<tsdoubtless. '-? i. ? <<-:*;'-? ? ? ? '
Soc. And inlikemannertheShoesbelong,tothe Feet. Alqb. ' Very ttu$r '. ',^,. _ J'^-.
* Alcibiadet answers according to the principles that area! most generallyreeeiv'd. Menthinktlicytakcrcareofthemselves;when theytakecareof. ohetfjingsthatbelongto''tin;butthey arc grt. sty mistaken : A n d Socratt i is going to confound this Errcu; with great Sjlidity. Thatwhichisminthnotmjfttf. See.
? ? O s the N a t u r e o s M a n , 1 1 1
Socrat. D o we then take care of our Feet, when we take care of our Shoes ?
Alcib. IndeedSocratesIdon'tyetUnderstandyou.
Soc. Whatdoyoumeanthenbytakingcareofa
thingMs itnottomakeitbetterthanitwas? What
Art is it then that makes our Shoes better ?
Alcib. 'Tisthe Shoemaker's Art. ,lnGreecAm
Socrat. 'Tis by the Shoemaker's Art then that we theshoe- take care of Our Shoes : Is it it by the fame Art too makers
thatwe takecareofourFeet$orisitbysomeother<<? *^ ArtthatwemakeourFeetbetter? m"as
Alcib. Without doubt that's done by another Art. made '<<*.
Socrat, Don't we make our Feetbetterbyanother
Art, which meliorates the whole Body ? And is not For Exer. thistheGymnastickAn> ' cijestrtng-
Alcib. Yfes certainly. . '? ? themal
Socrat.
'tis then by the Gymnastick Art that w e thhetT * takecareofourFeet? ,andbytheShoemaker'sArt,s' h
thatwe takecareofthethingsthatbelongtoourFeet? 'TisbytheGymnastickArtwe takecareofourHands; andbytheGold-smith'sArtthatwe takecareofthe thingsthatbelongtoourHands. 'TisbytheGym nastickArtthatwe takecareofourBodies-,andby theWeaver's Art, and many otherArtsthat we take care of the things that appertain to our Bodies.
Alcib. This is beyond all doubt.
Soc And consequently theArt by which w e take care ofourselvesisnotthefame withthatwherebyw? take care of the things that belongs to us.
Alcib. So itseems. >
Soc. Hence itfollows thatwhen you take care ofths
thingsthatbelongtoyou, you donottakecareofyour self.
;Alcib. That's certain.
'Socrat. For 'tis not by the fame Art that w e take c*reofourselves,andofthethingsthatbelongs tous*
Alab. I ackowledge ic
Socrat. By what Art isitthenthatwe takecareof our selves ? , ;
Alcib. I cannot tell.
P 2 Socrat.
? ? 1 12
Tht First Alcibiades ; or,
Socrat. W e are already agreed that it is not that bywhichwecanmakeanyofthosethingsthatbe longtousbetter:Butthatbywhichwecanmeli orate our selves. Alcib. 'Tis true.
Socrat. CartweknowtheArtofmakingShoesbet ter,ifwedon'tfirstknowwhat aShoeis-,orthe ArtoftakingcareofRings, ifwe don'tknow first what a Ring is>
Alcib. N o that can't be.
? S. CanwethenknowwhatArtitisthatmakesusbet
t e r ; i f w e d o n ' t first k n o w w h a t w e o u r s e l v e s a r e > Alcib. Tis absolutely impossible. Socrat. Butisitaveryeasythingtoknow ones
self-, and was it some ignorant Person that Avrote thatTrivialPrecepton theGate ofJpoltisTemple at D e / p h o s > O r is it o n t h e c o n t r a r y a t h i n g o f g r e a t d i f ficulty,andwhichisnotgiventoeveryMan ?
Alcib. Formy part, Socrates-,Ihaveoftenthonght itwasgiventoallMen :andyetithasoftenfeem'd to m e to be a thing of very great difficulty.
S o c B u t , A l c i b i a d e s ; L e t i t b e e a s y o r d i f f i c u l t ? , ' t i s still c e r t a i n t h a t w h e n o n c e w e k n o w it ? w e i m e d i a t e -
lyandeasilyknowwhatcarewe oughttotakeofour selves. Whereaswhileweareignorantofit-,we(hall nevercome to theknowledg oftheNature ofthis Care.
Alcib. That isbeyondalldoubt.
S o c r a t . C o m e o n t h e n -, b y w h a t m e a n s s h a l l w e f i n d
outthe*Essenceofthingstospeak universally? By * ThisuniversalEssenceofthings,dvrorottvrQ,istheDivine Intelligence, the Eternal Idea, the only cause of Beings, and the
singular Essence, <<Woiva<ti', is the thing form'd on this Idea. Sothattherearctwowaysofknowingone'sself:Thefirstisto know the Divine Intelligence; and to descend from that to the Soul, by foil wing the designs which the All-wife Creator had in creatingit:andtheotherissimplytoknow theSoulasaBeing different Ircm the Eo . y, and to be convine'd that that alone is theMan. Thefirstisthemostperfect:HoweverSocratesleaves t h i s a t p r e s e n t -, a n d a p p l i e s h i m s e l f o n l y t o t h e s e c o n d , w h i c h i s more easy : but he afterwards resumes it, and from the knowledg of the Soul raises Alcibiadis to the Consideration of the Eternal Idea, inwhichalone, asinthetrueLightaManmay perfectlyfee bhSoul,andallthatbelongstoit. ThewholeArgumentofSo-
train isworthy the most solid Theology.
this
? ? Os thefeatureo Man. 21 j thiswe shallsoonfindwhatweareourselves$andif
weareignorantofthisEssencewe shallalwaysbe ignorant of our selves.
Alcib. You fay right.
Socrat. Follow m e close then I conjure you in the NameofGod:Withwhomareyounowdiscours ing,isitwithsomeotherpersonorwithme?
Alcib. N o 'tis with you.
Soc. And. Iinlikemanner discoursewithnonebut You,'TisSocratesthatnow speaks,and ALibiadesthat hears. Alcib. True.
Soc. 'TisbyusingWords thatSocratesspeaksjforto speak, and to use words is one and the fame thing.
Alcib. 'Tis Ib without doubt.
Socrat. ArenotHewho usesathing,andtheThing which he uses, different ?
Alcib. Howdoyoufay>
Socrat. ForExample, a Shoemaker, w h o usesKnives, LastsandotherTools, cutswithhisKnifeandis d ifferent from the Knife with which he cuts. A Man thatplaysontheHarpis notthe famething
with the Harp on which he plays. Alcib. Tharscertain.
Socrat. ThisiswhatIask'dyoujustnow, whe ther he that uses a thing, and the thing he uses, al ways seem to you two different things ?
Alcib. So they seem to me.
Socrat. *ButtheShoemakerdoesnotonlyusehis Tools, but his Hands too.
Alcib. That's beyond all doubt.
Socrat. He also uses his Eyes.
Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat. We areagreedthathewhousesathing,is
always different from the thing he uses.
Alcib. That is agreed between us.
Soc. So thattheShoemaker and theHarper are some o-
ther thing than theHands andEyes which they both ule. Alcib. That's plain.
*Hedesignstoprove,th. ittheBcdy isrolessanInstrument of the Soul, than ill the other remoter Instruments which ituses.
P 3 Socrat.
? ? % 14
7 he Virji Alcibiades ? or,
Socrat. M a n uses his Body.
Alcib. Who doubtsit?
Soc Thatwhichusesathing-isdifferentfromthe
thing which isused.
Alcib. Yes.
Soc. Man thenisadifferentthingfromhisBody ?
Alcib. I believe it.
Socrat. WhatisManthen?
"v. ^Alcib. Indeed, Socrates, I can't tell.
Joe. You canatleasttellme thatMan isthatwhich
usestheBody.
Alcib. That's true.
Socrat. Is there any thing that uses the B o d y besides
the Soul ?
Alcib. N o nothing else.
Socrat. 'Tisthatthatgoverns.
Alcib. Most certainly.
$oc. Ibelieve there'snoMan but isfore'd to confess - Alcib. What ?
Soc, That Man isoneofthesethreethings, either
theSoulortheBody, ortheCompoundof'emboth.
Now weareagreedthatManisthatwhichcommands
the Body.
Alcib. That we are.
Soc. What isMan then? Does theBody command
Itself? No. Forwehavesaid'tistheManthatcom mandsthat. SpthattheBodyisnottheMan.
Alcib. So it seems.
Socrat. Isitthen theCompound that commands theBody? and(hallthisCompoundbetheMan ?
Alcib. That may be.
Socrat. Nothingless. Forsinceoneof'emdoes not command as we have already said, * 'tisimpos sible they both (hould command together.
Alcib. 'Tis very true.
Socrat. SeingthenneithertheBody, northeCom-
* For besides thar this is a Contradiction; feeing that which does ho: comrh n>l would then co martd ? , there isno: a third
tilingforthesetwotocomnundtogether. If heSouland the Bodybothcommand, whatisit,thatisundertheirCommand?
1 pound
? ? OftheNaturevfMan, gj?
ponnd ofSoulandBody aretheMan ;'tisabsolute
lynecessaryeitherthatMan isNothingatall,"or thattheSoulalone istheMan. ,', ? -. ? ,/"\". '?
Alcib. Most certainly.
<SW>vtf. Shall I demonstrate to you yet hapie . clearly that the Soul alone is the. Man ?
Alcib. No, Iprotest,thisissufficientlypfoy'dVH*
Socrat. We havenotyetsoundedthisTrufdiwith all theAccuracy itdeserves jbut 'tissufficiehtlvorov'd, andthatmay serve. ? We (hallsound41farther,,and
penetrateitbetter^whenwe havefound6)d. what
w e just n o w quitted, because it requir'd. a longer In vestigation. ? ','. '. '? '? ',V. , ^ .
Alcib. Whatisthat?
S o c r a t . ' T i s w h a t w e l a i d b u t n o w ? , t h a t . ' t i s ' n e
cessarywewouldfirstseektoknow the:very. essence ofthingstospeak universally;insteadofwhichwe havestop'dtoexamine and know thefesJenceofa particularthing;andperhapsthatis'sufficieht, For wecanfindnothingthatismoreproperly, 'andpre cisely our selves than our Souls.
Alcib. That's very certain.
Socrat. So then this isa principle very well esta blished that when you and!
Alcib. Without doubt.
Socrat. AndhowdoyoucallthatArtwhichmakes each one agree with himself about the length of a SpanorCubit,isitnottheArtofMeasuring>
Alcib. Yes doubtless.
Socrat. Then Cities and particular persons accord bymeansofthisArt. Andisitnotthefamething about Weight >
Alcib. Theveryfame;
Socrat. And what is that Concord of which you speak, in what does it consist; and What is the Art that
? ? io8
7be First Alcibiades ? or,
that produces it> Is the Concord of a City the lame that makes a particular person accord with himself and others ?
Alcib. I think Ib;
Socrat. What isit? Don't be weary in answering me, butcharitablyinstruct:me.
Alcib. I think it is this Amity and Concord, that makesParentsagreewiththeirChildren, oneBrother with another, and the Wife with her Husband.
y. Socrat. Butdoyou. thinkaHusbandcanagreewell with his Wife, and that they will accord perfectly about theTapistry which she works, and he knows nothowtomake? '?
Alcib. No, certainly.
Socrat. Nor is there any need of it; for 'tis W o men'swork. No moreisitpossiblethataWoman should agree with her Husband about the use of Arms j for (he knows not what belongs to it: This being a Science which appertains only to Men.
Alcib. 'Tistrue.
Socrat. You agreethenthattherearesomeScien ceswhich aredeitin'd only for Women, and others which are reserv'd for Men.
A'cib. Whocandenyit?
Socrat. ItisnotpossiblethatWomen shouldaccord with their Husbands about all these Sciences.
Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat. And consequentlythere will be no Amity, seeing Amity is nothing but Concord.
Alcib. Iamofyourmind. Socrat. SothatwhenaWoman doeswhatsheought
t o d o , s h e w i l l n o t b e l o v e d b y h e r h u s b a n d ? , a n d w h e n
a husband does what he ought to do, he will not be loved by his Wife ?
Alcib. This is a certain consequence
Soc. ThenthatwhichmakeCitieswellpolicied,is n o t , f o r e v e r y o n e t o f o l l o w h i s o w n e m p l o y m e n t isl 'em.
Alcib. However Socrates^ methiriks *'? " >>"? ? '? ? -^>>
Socrat!
? ? ? : O s t h e N a t u r e o f M a n ,
2 0 9
Socrtt. Howdoyousay? CanaCitybewellpo- licied without having Amity in it,are we not agreed that it is by Amity that a City isweil regulated, and that otherwise there is nothing but Disorder and C o n fusion ?
Ak'tb. But yet methinks, 'tis this very thing that produces Amity, namely that every one mind his own Business. ? , .
Socrtt. Yousaidthecontrarybutjustnow. But I must endeavour to understand you, what do you say > That Concord welt establishedproducesAmity ? What cantherebeConcordaboutthingswhichsome know, and others don't understand ?
Alcib. That's impossible. l\\t ,
Stcrat. When every one does what he ought to
do, does every one do what is justor what is unjust > ?
Alcib. A oretty Question ! every pne then does what is just. -,. -, ?
Socrat. Hence it follows that when all the Citi zens do what is Just, yet they can't love one ano
ther. -,. -. Alcib. * Ths consequence isnecessary. .
Socrat. What then isthis Amity or Concord, that
can accomplish and make us capable of giving good C o u n s e l ? , i b t h a t w e m a y b e o f t h e N u m b e r o f t h o s e
whom you callyourbestCitizens? forIcan'tcom prehend whatitis,or inwhom 'tistobefound. Sometimes 'tistobefoundincertainpersons,and
* This consequence is very certain : Alcibi&iu acknowledges ic>> buthe'doesnOcyetunderstandtheReasonofit. Ihavegivena h i n t o f it i n t h e A r g u m e n t ; b u t 'tis sic t o e x p l a i n S o c r a t t s h i s t h o u g h t hereatlength; hisdesignistoshewthatwhen Menpreciselydo onlytheirownbusiness,theyonlytakecareofwhatbelongsto themselves ; and so limit themselves to the knowledge of par ticular things and do notrise up to that of the essenceof universal things; whichistheonlyknowledge thatproducesUnionandCon cord, whereas the Knowledge meiely of particular things produ cesDisorderandDivision. ThereforetomakeConcordreignin 1state'tisnotenoughforeveryonetotakecareofwhathehas ;he . musttakecareofhimselftoo. Thiscarewillteachhimtolove hisNeighbourashimself; and 'tisonlythisLove,whichhasGod foritsprinciple, thatcan produce Concord and Union,
P some
? ? #>K> TU FirstAtcibktftesv? )ox]
? sometimes 'tis not to be found- ini'em, as if fBems W y O u ^ W b r AE ? , 1 - W - '"? '? ' '-" 0s:j; ? ' ' i-J- - ; J->4/frft. - #*<<***, I solemnly protestW'vtoi' I
"fcrtownb'mhat IsayafyselfrAnd haverul^a'great risque in being a long time in an illCondition r*w<<h-
OutfSfcei^iTg ft. - c 7 <^J. i(--3rn : . ;; . ? . -n -.
? 5<w. Dori'ujediseour^'d^kfc/feW^ifyoufhouM not perceive inwhat Condition you are till''you arc ^'o-yeaf^of-Age^ it wbuld^e-a- difficult mattes 'for \fdi to-'t&dreryour selfotft <5f ft' arid to take care;of
your serjyttuYnow atydk 'yeafe'tisthe'fittesttime lofyt)uwF6eIyout]5iitempe^ftet^e'manifer-Jydudo.
Jkib. But wheWMWfeete-toDlsternper'wfct must. he do > ; . 3Jdii! (. ';rr: f? >>! . :! << >;r.
~"SwriiP. ? oa-"rieed drilyanswer to some'Qtteftiens, kSSoli ^'^4KJWriTchif'youdo-,J-hopebythehelpofGod,
Menan't both ytiiiaM'IIballbecomebetterthanwe:afe,at ujom. least; if myTProphesie is to be believ'd.
Ale. ' If'there needs nothing but to answer you to rMi^it-'abbut; I'llpromise jfotfyour Prophefie shall provetrue.
Soc. Comethen-. ;Whatisittotakecafeofone's
selfsothiswhenwe thinkwe takecareofotfr'selves
themost, itmay not-oftenhappento uswithoutour
knowledg to takecareofquiteanotherthing? What
mustaMan dotb'takecareOfhimself? doeshetake
careofhimself, when hetake'stareofthethingsthat Belongtohim> Aktb. *Ithinkso. '? ? '-'? -,l':-i
Sac. How? doesaMan takecare. ofhisfeet,whenhe
takescareofthethingsthatbelongstohis'sees-% ,. ? Alcib. I dotft understand you. ? >? '. ? . :
SocratJTh you k n o w nothing that property belbiigs
t o t h e h a n d ? ' T o w h a t p a r t o f t r i e B o d y d o t h e . R i n g s
appertain,isitnottotheFingers? ',t-',. vnj-r Socrat:\<<tsdoubtless. '-? i. ? <<-:*;'-? ? ? ? '
Soc. And inlikemannertheShoesbelong,tothe Feet. Alqb. ' Very ttu$r '. ',^,. _ J'^-.
* Alcibiadet answers according to the principles that area! most generallyreeeiv'd. Menthinktlicytakcrcareofthemselves;when theytakecareof. ohetfjingsthatbelongto''tin;butthey arc grt. sty mistaken : A n d Socratt i is going to confound this Errcu; with great Sjlidity. Thatwhichisminthnotmjfttf. See.
? ? O s the N a t u r e o s M a n , 1 1 1
Socrat. D o we then take care of our Feet, when we take care of our Shoes ?
Alcib. IndeedSocratesIdon'tyetUnderstandyou.
Soc. Whatdoyoumeanthenbytakingcareofa
thingMs itnottomakeitbetterthanitwas? What
Art is it then that makes our Shoes better ?
Alcib. 'Tisthe Shoemaker's Art. ,lnGreecAm
Socrat. 'Tis by the Shoemaker's Art then that we theshoe- take care of Our Shoes : Is it it by the fame Art too makers
thatwe takecareofourFeet$orisitbysomeother<<? *^ ArtthatwemakeourFeetbetter? m"as
Alcib. Without doubt that's done by another Art. made '<<*.
Socrat, Don't we make our Feetbetterbyanother
Art, which meliorates the whole Body ? And is not For Exer. thistheGymnastickAn> ' cijestrtng-
Alcib. Yfes certainly. . '? ? themal
Socrat.
'tis then by the Gymnastick Art that w e thhetT * takecareofourFeet? ,andbytheShoemaker'sArt,s' h
thatwe takecareofthethingsthatbelongtoourFeet? 'TisbytheGymnastickArtwe takecareofourHands; andbytheGold-smith'sArtthatwe takecareofthe thingsthatbelongtoourHands. 'TisbytheGym nastickArtthatwe takecareofourBodies-,andby theWeaver's Art, and many otherArtsthat we take care of the things that appertain to our Bodies.
Alcib. This is beyond all doubt.
Soc And consequently theArt by which w e take care ofourselvesisnotthefame withthatwherebyw? take care of the things that belongs to us.
Alcib. So itseems. >
Soc. Hence itfollows thatwhen you take care ofths
thingsthatbelongtoyou, you donottakecareofyour self.
;Alcib. That's certain.
'Socrat. For 'tis not by the fame Art that w e take c*reofourselves,andofthethingsthatbelongs tous*
Alab. I ackowledge ic
Socrat. By what Art isitthenthatwe takecareof our selves ? , ;
Alcib. I cannot tell.
P 2 Socrat.
? ? 1 12
Tht First Alcibiades ; or,
Socrat. W e are already agreed that it is not that bywhichwecanmakeanyofthosethingsthatbe longtousbetter:Butthatbywhichwecanmeli orate our selves. Alcib. 'Tis true.
Socrat. CartweknowtheArtofmakingShoesbet ter,ifwedon'tfirstknowwhat aShoeis-,orthe ArtoftakingcareofRings, ifwe don'tknow first what a Ring is>
Alcib. N o that can't be.
? S. CanwethenknowwhatArtitisthatmakesusbet
t e r ; i f w e d o n ' t first k n o w w h a t w e o u r s e l v e s a r e > Alcib. Tis absolutely impossible. Socrat. Butisitaveryeasythingtoknow ones
self-, and was it some ignorant Person that Avrote thatTrivialPrecepton theGate ofJpoltisTemple at D e / p h o s > O r is it o n t h e c o n t r a r y a t h i n g o f g r e a t d i f ficulty,andwhichisnotgiventoeveryMan ?
Alcib. Formy part, Socrates-,Ihaveoftenthonght itwasgiventoallMen :andyetithasoftenfeem'd to m e to be a thing of very great difficulty.
S o c B u t , A l c i b i a d e s ; L e t i t b e e a s y o r d i f f i c u l t ? , ' t i s still c e r t a i n t h a t w h e n o n c e w e k n o w it ? w e i m e d i a t e -
lyandeasilyknowwhatcarewe oughttotakeofour selves. Whereaswhileweareignorantofit-,we(hall nevercome to theknowledg oftheNature ofthis Care.
Alcib. That isbeyondalldoubt.
S o c r a t . C o m e o n t h e n -, b y w h a t m e a n s s h a l l w e f i n d
outthe*Essenceofthingstospeak universally? By * ThisuniversalEssenceofthings,dvrorottvrQ,istheDivine Intelligence, the Eternal Idea, the only cause of Beings, and the
singular Essence, <<Woiva<ti', is the thing form'd on this Idea. Sothattherearctwowaysofknowingone'sself:Thefirstisto know the Divine Intelligence; and to descend from that to the Soul, by foil wing the designs which the All-wife Creator had in creatingit:andtheotherissimplytoknow theSoulasaBeing different Ircm the Eo . y, and to be convine'd that that alone is theMan. Thefirstisthemostperfect:HoweverSocratesleaves t h i s a t p r e s e n t -, a n d a p p l i e s h i m s e l f o n l y t o t h e s e c o n d , w h i c h i s more easy : but he afterwards resumes it, and from the knowledg of the Soul raises Alcibiadis to the Consideration of the Eternal Idea, inwhichalone, asinthetrueLightaManmay perfectlyfee bhSoul,andallthatbelongstoit. ThewholeArgumentofSo-
train isworthy the most solid Theology.
this
? ? Os thefeatureo Man. 21 j thiswe shallsoonfindwhatweareourselves$andif
weareignorantofthisEssencewe shallalwaysbe ignorant of our selves.
Alcib. You fay right.
Socrat. Follow m e close then I conjure you in the NameofGod:Withwhomareyounowdiscours ing,isitwithsomeotherpersonorwithme?
Alcib. N o 'tis with you.
Soc. And. Iinlikemanner discoursewithnonebut You,'TisSocratesthatnow speaks,and ALibiadesthat hears. Alcib. True.
Soc. 'TisbyusingWords thatSocratesspeaksjforto speak, and to use words is one and the fame thing.
Alcib. 'Tis Ib without doubt.
Socrat. ArenotHewho usesathing,andtheThing which he uses, different ?
Alcib. Howdoyoufay>
Socrat. ForExample, a Shoemaker, w h o usesKnives, LastsandotherTools, cutswithhisKnifeandis d ifferent from the Knife with which he cuts. A Man thatplaysontheHarpis notthe famething
with the Harp on which he plays. Alcib. Tharscertain.
Socrat. ThisiswhatIask'dyoujustnow, whe ther he that uses a thing, and the thing he uses, al ways seem to you two different things ?
Alcib. So they seem to me.
Socrat. *ButtheShoemakerdoesnotonlyusehis Tools, but his Hands too.
Alcib. That's beyond all doubt.
Socrat. He also uses his Eyes.
Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat. We areagreedthathewhousesathing,is
always different from the thing he uses.
Alcib. That is agreed between us.
Soc. So thattheShoemaker and theHarper are some o-
ther thing than theHands andEyes which they both ule. Alcib. That's plain.
*Hedesignstoprove,th. ittheBcdy isrolessanInstrument of the Soul, than ill the other remoter Instruments which ituses.
P 3 Socrat.
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7 he Virji Alcibiades ? or,
Socrat. M a n uses his Body.
Alcib. Who doubtsit?
Soc Thatwhichusesathing-isdifferentfromthe
thing which isused.
Alcib. Yes.
Soc. Man thenisadifferentthingfromhisBody ?
Alcib. I believe it.
Socrat. WhatisManthen?
"v. ^Alcib. Indeed, Socrates, I can't tell.
Joe. You canatleasttellme thatMan isthatwhich
usestheBody.
Alcib. That's true.
Socrat. Is there any thing that uses the B o d y besides
the Soul ?
Alcib. N o nothing else.
Socrat. 'Tisthatthatgoverns.
Alcib. Most certainly.
$oc. Ibelieve there'snoMan but isfore'd to confess - Alcib. What ?
Soc, That Man isoneofthesethreethings, either
theSoulortheBody, ortheCompoundof'emboth.
Now weareagreedthatManisthatwhichcommands
the Body.
Alcib. That we are.
Soc. What isMan then? Does theBody command
Itself? No. Forwehavesaid'tistheManthatcom mandsthat. SpthattheBodyisnottheMan.
Alcib. So it seems.
Socrat. Isitthen theCompound that commands theBody? and(hallthisCompoundbetheMan ?
Alcib. That may be.
Socrat. Nothingless. Forsinceoneof'emdoes not command as we have already said, * 'tisimpos sible they both (hould command together.
Alcib. 'Tis very true.
Socrat. SeingthenneithertheBody, northeCom-
* For besides thar this is a Contradiction; feeing that which does ho: comrh n>l would then co martd ? , there isno: a third
tilingforthesetwotocomnundtogether. If heSouland the Bodybothcommand, whatisit,thatisundertheirCommand?
1 pound
? ? OftheNaturevfMan, gj?
ponnd ofSoulandBody aretheMan ;'tisabsolute
lynecessaryeitherthatMan isNothingatall,"or thattheSoulalone istheMan. ,', ? -. ? ,/"\". '?
Alcib. Most certainly.
<SW>vtf. Shall I demonstrate to you yet hapie . clearly that the Soul alone is the. Man ?
Alcib. No, Iprotest,thisissufficientlypfoy'dVH*
Socrat. We havenotyetsoundedthisTrufdiwith all theAccuracy itdeserves jbut 'tissufficiehtlvorov'd, andthatmay serve. ? We (hallsound41farther,,and
penetrateitbetter^whenwe havefound6)d. what
w e just n o w quitted, because it requir'd. a longer In vestigation. ? ','. '. '? '? ',V. , ^ .
Alcib. Whatisthat?
S o c r a t . ' T i s w h a t w e l a i d b u t n o w ? , t h a t . ' t i s ' n e
cessarywewouldfirstseektoknow the:very. essence ofthingstospeak universally;insteadofwhichwe havestop'dtoexamine and know thefesJenceofa particularthing;andperhapsthatis'sufficieht, For wecanfindnothingthatismoreproperly, 'andpre cisely our selves than our Souls.
Alcib. That's very certain.
Socrat. So then this isa principle very well esta blished that when you and!
