No More Learning

Now that Caecina and Valens had joined forces, the Vitellians had no
longer any reason to avoid a decisive battle. Otho accordingly held a
council to decide whether they should prolong the war or put their
fortune to the test. Suetonius Paulinus, who was considered the 32
most experienced general of his day,[283] now felt it was due to his
reputation to deliver his views on the general conduct of the war. His
contention was that the enemy's interests were best served by haste,
Otho's by delay. He argued thus: 'The whole of Vitellius' force has
now arrived and he has few reinforcements in his rear, for the Gallic
provinces are in a ferment, and it would be fatal to abandon the Rhine
with all those hostile tribes ready to swarm across it. The troops in
Britain are busy with their own foes and cut off by the sea: the
Spanish provinces can scarcely spare any troops: the Narbonese are
seriously alarmed by their recent reverse and the inroads of our
fleet. The country across the Po is shut in by the Alps and denied all
supplies by sea,[284] and, besides, its resources have been already
exhausted by the passage of their army. Nowhere can they get supplies,
and without commissariat no army can be kept together. The German
troops are their strongest fighting arm, but their constitutions will
not be strong enough to stand the change of weather, if we protract
the war into the summer. It has often happened that a force, which
seemed irresistible at first, has dwindled to nothing through the
tedium of forced inaction.

'On the other hand, our resources are rich and reliable. We have on
our side Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia, and the East; the armies there
are fresh and strong; we have Italy and Rome, the Queen of the World,
and the Roman Senate and People: those titles always mean something,
though their glory may sometimes be obscured. We have large public and
private resources, and in civil war a vast quantity of money is
stronger than the sword. Our soldiers are inured to the Italian
climate or, at any rate, to heat. We are entrenched behind the
Po:[285] its cities are protected by strong walls and willing hands,
and the defence of Placentia has shown that none of them will yield to
the enemy. ' Therefore Otho must remain on the defensive. In a few days
the Fourteenth legion would arrive: its fame alone was great, and the
Moesian forces[286] would be with it. He should, at any rate, postpone
his deliberations until then, and fight, if fight he must, with
augmented strength.

Marius Celsus supported Paulinus. Annius Gallus had been hurt a 33
few days before by a fall from his horse, but messengers were sent to
inquire his views, and they reported that he too agreed. Otho inclined
to a decisive engagement. His brother Titianus and Proculus, the
prefect of the Guard, with all the impatience of inexperience, stoutly
maintained that fortune and Providence, and Otho's own good genius
inspired his policy, and would inspire its performance. They had
descended to flattery by way of checking opposition. When it was
decided to take the offensive, the question arose whether Otho in
person should take part in the battle or hold himself in reserve. His
evil counsellors again carried their point. Otho was to retire to
Brixellum,[287] and, by withdrawing from the hazards of the field,
reserve himself for the supreme control of the campaign and of the
empire. To this Paulinus and Celsus offered no further opposition, for
fear of seeming to endanger the person of their prince. From this day
dates the decline of Otho's party. Not only did he take with him a
considerable force of the Guards, Body Guard, and cavalry, but the
spirit of the troops who remained behind was broken. The men trusted
no one but Otho, and Otho no one but the men. His generals were under
suspicion and their authority left in doubt. [288]

None of these arrangements failed to reach the ears of the 34
Vitellians. Desertions were frequent, as they always are in civil war,
and the scouts in their eagerness to discover the enemy's plans always
failed to conceal their own. Caecina and Valens, counting on the fatal
impatience of the enemy, remained quietly on their guard to see what
they would do: for it is always wisdom to profit by another's folly.
Feigning an intention of crossing the Po, they began to construct a
bridge, partly as a demonstration against the gladiators[289] on the
opposite bank, partly to find something for their idle troops to do.
Boats were placed at equal intervals with their heads up stream and
fastened together by strong wooden planks. They also cast anchors from
them to ensure the solidity of the bridge, but they allowed the
hawsers to drift slack, so that when the river rose the boats might
all rise with it without the line being broken. To guard the bridge a
high tower was built out on the end boat, from which they could
repulse the enemy with various artillery. Meanwhile the Othonians had
built a tower on the bank and kept up a steady shower of stones and
torches.

In midstream there was an island, to which the gladiators tried to 35
make their way in boats, but the Germans swam over and got there
first. When a good number of them had swam across, Macer manned some
Liburnian cruisers[290] and attacked them with the bravest of his
gladiators. But they fought with less courage than soldiers, and from
their unsteady boats they could not shoot so well as the others, who
had a firm footing on the bank. Swaying this way and that in their
alarm, the sailors and the marines were beginning to get in each
other's way, when the Germans actually leapt into the shallows, caught
hold of the boats by the stern, and either clambered up by the
gangways or sunk them bodily with their own hands. All this took place
before the eyes of both armies[291], and the higher rose the spirits
of the Vitellians, the greater became the indignation of the Othonians
against Macer, the author and cause of their disaster. The 36
remainder of the boats were eventually dragged off,[292] and the
battle ended in flight. The army demanded Macer's execution. He had
been actually wounded by a lance that had been flung at him, and the
soldiers were rushing on him with drawn swords when some tribunes and
centurions intervened and rescued him.

Soon after this, Vestricius Spurinna, on Otho's orders, brought up a
reinforcement of the Guards, leaving behind a small garrison at
Placentia, and before long, Otho sent the consul-elect, Flavius
Sabinus,[293] to take command of Macer's force. This change pleased
the soldiers, but the frequent mutinies made the generals unwilling to
assume such a perilous command.

In some of my authorities[294] I find a statement that either a 37
growing fear of war or dislike of the two emperors, whose
discreditable misconduct grew daily more notorious, led the armies to
hesitate whether they should not give up the struggle and either
themselves combine to choose an emperor or refer the choice to the
senate. This, it is suggested, was the motive of Otho's generals in
advising delay, and Paulinus in particular had high hopes, since he
was the senior ex-consul, and a distinguished general who had earned
a brilliant reputation by his operations in Britain. For my own part,
while I am ready to admit that a few people may have tacitly wished
for peace instead of civil war, or for a good and virtuous emperor
instead of two who were the worst of criminals, yet I imagine that
Paulinus was much too wise to hope that in a time of universal
corruption the people would show such moderation. Those who had
sacrificed peace in a passion for war were not likely to stop the war
from any affection for peace. Nor was it possible that armies whose
language and characteristics differed so widely should ever come to
such an agreement. As for the officers; nearly all of them were
extravagant, bankrupt, and guilty of some crime: they had not a good
enough conscience to put up with any emperor who was not as vicious as
themselves and under an obligation for their services.

The old ingrained human passion for power matured and burst into 38
prominence with the growth of the empire. With straiter resources
equality was easily preserved. But when once we had brought the world
to our feet and exterminated every rival state or king, we were left
free to covet power without fear of interruption. It was then that
strife first broke out between patricians and plebeians: at one time
arose seditious tribunes,[295] at another tyrannous consuls:[296] in
the Forum at Rome were sown the first seeds of civil war. Before long,
Marius, rising from the lowest ranks of the people, and Sulla, the
most cruel of all the nobles, crushed our liberty by force of arms and
substituted a despotism. Then came Pompey, whose aims, though less
patent, were no better than theirs. From that time onwards the one end
sought was supreme power in the state. Even at Pharsalia and Philippi
the citizen armies did not lay down their arms. How then can we
suppose that the troops of Otho and Vitellius would have willingly
stopped the war? The same anger of heaven, the same human passions,
the same criminal motives drove them into discord. True these wars
were each settled by a single battle, but that was due to the
generals' cowardice. However, my reflections on the ancient and the
modern character have carried me too far: I must now resume the thread
of our narrative.

When Otho started for Brixellum, he left his brother Titianus in 39
nominal command, though the real power lay with the prefect Proculus.
As for Celsus and Paulinus, no use was made of their experience, and
their empty titles were used as a screen for other people's blunders.
The tribunes and centurions felt themselves in an ambiguous position,
seeing the better generals sacrificed and the worst in command. The
men were full of spirit, but preferred criticizing to carrying out
their officers' orders. It was decided to advance and encamp four
miles west of Bedriacum. Though it was spring, and rivers abounded,
the men were very foolishly allowed to suffer from want of water. Here
a council of war was held, for Otho kept sending dispatches urging
haste, and the soldiers kept clamouring for their emperor to lead
them. Many demanded that the troops stationed across the Po[297]
should be brought up. It is not so easy to decide what was the best
thing they could have done as to be sure that what they did do was the
worst. They were in marching order, not fighting trim, and their 40
objective was the confluence of the Po and the Arda,[298] sixteen
miles away. Celsus and Paulinus refused to expose their troops,
fatigued by the march and under heavy kit, to the assault of an enemy
who, while still fresh after covering barely four miles, would
certainly attack them, either while they were in the disorder of a
marching column, or when they had broken up to dig trenches. However,
Titianus and Proculus, worsted in argument, appealed to their
authority: and there arrived post-haste a Numidian orderly with a
peremptory dispatch from Otho, criticizing his generals' inaction, and
ordering them to bring matters to a head. He was sick of delay and too
impatient to live on hope.

On that same day, while Caecina was busy with the bridge-building 41
operations,[299] two officers of the Guards came and demanded an
interview. He was preparing to hear and answer their proposals, when
some scouts burst in with the news that the enemy were close at hand.
The officers' conversation was thus interrupted, and it was left
uncertain whether they were broaching a hostile plot or a piece of
treachery, or some honest plan. Caecina, dismissing the officers, rode
back to the camp, where he found that Valens had given orders to sound
for battle, and the troops were already under arms. While the legions
were balloting for the order in which they were to take the field, the
cavalry rode out and charged. Strange to say, they would have been
hurtled back upon the trenches by a smaller force of Othonians, had
not the Italian legion bravely stopped them by drawing their swords
and forcing them to go back and resume the fight. The Vitellian
legions formed without any disorder, for though the enemy were close
at hand, thick plantations hid the approaching force. In the Othonian
army the generals were nervous and the men ill-disposed towards them:
their march was hindered by carts and camp-followers, and the high
road,[300] with its deep ditches on either side, was too narrow even
for a peaceful march. Some of the men formed round their standards,
others went searching for their place: on every side there was an
uproar as men ran about shouting to each other: the boldest kept
pressing on to the front, while the tide of the timid ebbed to the
rear.

Amid the confusion of this sudden panic somebody invented a story 42
that Vitellius' army had abandoned his cause, whereupon an
unwarrantable glee relaxed their efforts. It was never fully known
whether this report was spread by Vitellian scouts or whether it was
started on Otho's side, either by treachery or chance. Losing all
their thirst for battle the Othonians actually broke into a cheer. The
enemy answered with angry shouts, and most of Otho's soldiers, having
no idea what caused the cheering, feared treachery. At this point the
Vitellian line charged. They were fresh, and in good order, stronger
and more numerous. However, the Othonians, despite their disorder,
fewer numbers, and fatigue, offered a stubborn resistance. The ground
was encumbered with orchards and vineyards, and the character of the
battle varied accordingly. They fought now from a distance, now at
close quarters, and charged sometimes in detachment, sometimes in
column. [301] On the raised high-road they fought hand to hand, using
the weight of their bodies and their shields. They gave up throwing
their javelins and cut through helmet and breastplate with sword and
axe. Each man knew his foe; they were in view of the other
troops;[302] and they fought as if the whole issue of the war depended
on them.

It happened that two legions met in the open fields between the 43
high road and the Po. These were: for Vitellius the Twenty-first,
commonly called Rapax,[303] a regiment of old renown; and for Otho the
First Adiutrix,[304] which had never been in battle before, but was
full of spirit and eager to win its first laurels. Their charge
overthrew the front ranks of the Twenty-first, and they carried off
its eagle. Fired with indignation, the Twenty-first rallied and
charged the front of the enemy, killing the commanding officer,
Orfidius Benignus, and capturing many of their colours.

On the other flank the Fifth[305] drove the Thirteenth[306] off the
field. The Fourteenth[307] were surrounded by the numbers that
attacked them. Otho's generals had long ago fled. Caecina and Valens
began to bring up the reserves to the support of their men, and, as a
fresh reinforcement, there arrived Varus Alfenus[308] with his
Batavians. They had routed the gladiators[309] by confronting them and
cutting them to pieces in the river before their transports could
land, and flushed by their victory came charging in upon the flank of
the enemy.

Their centre broken, the Othonians fled in disorder, making for 44
Bedriacum. The distance was immense;[310] the road encumbered with
heaps of dead. This made the slaughter all the greater, for in civil
war captives cannot be turned to profit. [311] Suetonius Paulinus and
Licinius Proculus avoided the camp at Bedriacum by diverse routes.
Vedius Aquila, who commanded the Thirteenth legion, was so paralysed
by fear that he allowed himself to fall into the hands of the
indignant troops. It was still broad daylight when he entered the
camp. Immediately a crowd of mutinous fugitives came clamouring round
him. They spared neither abuse nor violence, assailing him as a
deserter and a traitor. They could bring no special charge against
him, but the mob always lay their own disgrace on some one else. Night
came to the aid of Titianus and Celsus, for Annius Gallus[312] had
already placed sentinels on guard and got the men under control. Using
remonstrances, prayers, and commands, he had induced them not to add
to the disaster of their defeat by murdering their own friends.
Whether the war was over, or whether they wanted to fight again, in
defeat, he told them, union was the one thing that could help them.
All the other troops[313] were crushed by the blow. The Guards
complained that they had been beaten, not by the enemy's valour, but
by sheer treachery. 'Why,' they said, 'even the Vitellians have won no
bloodless victory. We beat their cavalry and captured a standard from
one of their legions. We still have Otho left and all the troops with
him on the other side of the Po. The Moesian legions[314] are on their
way. There is a large force left at Bedriacum. These, at any rate,
have not been defeated yet. Better fall, if need be, on the field. '
Now exasperated, now depressed by these reflections, they were in a
state of blank despair, which more often aroused their anger than
their fear.

The Vitellian army halted at the fifth mile-stone on the road from 45
Bedriacum. Their generals would not venture to storm the camp that
same day, and hoped the enemy would consent to surrender. However,
although they were in fighting trim, and had no implements for digging
trenches, they felt safe with their arms and the pride of victory. On
the next day there was no doubt about the wishes of the Othonians.
Even those who showed most spirit had now changed their minds. So they
sent a deputation. The Vitellian generals had no hesitation in
granting terms. However, they detained the deputation for a short
time, which caused some qualms to those who did not know whether it
had been successful. At length the envoys returned, and the gates of
the camp were opened. Then both victors and vanquished burst into
tears, and with a sort of sorrowful satisfaction cursed their fate of
civil war. There in one tent were men of both armies, nursing a
wounded brother or some other relative. Their hopes of recompense were
doubtful: all that was certain was bereavement and grief, for no one
was so fortunate as to mourn no loss. They searched for the body of
the fallen officer, Orfidius, and burnt it with due solemnity. Of the
other dead, some were buried by their relatives, the rest were left
lying on the ground.

Otho[315] was awaiting news of the battle with perfect confidence 46
and firm resolve. First came a disquieting rumour. Soon fugitives from
the field revealed the ruin of his cause. But the soldiers in their
zeal did not wait to hear their emperor speak. 'Keep a good heart,'
they said, 'you still have fresh forces left, and, as for us, we are
ready to risk everything and suffer everything. ' Nor was this
flattery. In a wild passion of enthusiasm they urged him to march to
the field and restore the fortunes of his party. Those who were near
him clasped his knees, while those who stood further off stretched out
their arms to him. [316] The most eager of all was Plotius Firmus, the
Prefect of the Guard, who besought Otho again and again not to desert
a supremely faithful army, men who had done him such great service. He
told him that it showed more courage to bear misfortune than to give
in: that men of vigour and courage cling to their hopes even in the
face of disaster: it is only cowards who let their terror hurry them
into despair. Amid all these appeals the soldiers now cheered, now
groaned, according as Otho's expression showed signs of yielding or
seemed to harden. Nor were these feelings confined to Otho's own
Guards. The first arrivals from Moesia assured him that the spirit of
the advancing force was just as firm, and that they had already
entered Aquileia. [317] There is no room for doubt that it was still
possible to revive this cruel and pitiable war, so full of uncertainty
to both parties. [318]

Otho himself disliked the policy of fighting. 'Am I,' he said, 'to 47
expose all your splendid courage and devotion to further risks? That
would be too great a price to pay for my life. Your high hopes of
succeeding, if I were minded to live, will only swell the glory of my
death. We have learnt to know each other, Fortune and I. Do not reckon
the length of my reign. Self-control is all the harder when a man
knows that his fortune cannot last. It was Vitellius who began the
civil war. He originated the policy of fighting for the throne. But
one battle is enough. This is the precedent that I will set. Let
posterity judge me by it. I do not grudge Vitellius his brother, or
wife, or children. I want neither revenge nor consolation. Others may
have held the sceptre longer, but no one can ever have laid it down so
bravely. Am I the man to allow the flower of Rome in all these famous
armies to be mown down once again and lost to the country? Let me take
with me the consciousness that you would have died for me. But you
must stay and live. No more delay. I must no longer interfere with
your chance of pardon, nor you with my resolve. It is a sort of
cowardice to go on talking about the end. Here is your best proof of
my determination: I complain of no one. To blame gods or men is his
alone who fain would keep his life. '

After some such speech as this he urged them courteously to hurry 48
away and not to exasperate the victor by their hesitation. To each
man's age and position he paid due regard, using his authority with
the young and persuasion with his elders, while his quiet looks and
firm speech helped to control their ill-timed tears. He gave orders
for boats and carriages to be provided for their departure. All
petitions and letters containing any compliments to himself, or marked
insults to Vitellius, he destroyed, and distributed his money
carefully, not like a man at the point of death. He then actually
tried to comfort the sorrowful fears of his nephew, Salvius
Cocceianus,[319] by praising his attachment and chiding his alarm. 'Do
you imagine,' he said, 'that Vitellius will be so hard-hearted as not
to show me some gratitude for saving his whole household? By promptly
putting an end to myself, I deserve to earn some mercy for my family.
For it is not in blank despair, but with my army clamouring for
battle, that I determine to save my country from the last calamities.
I have won enough fame for myself and ennoblement for my posterity;
for, after the line of the Julians, Claudians, Servians,[320] I have
been the first to bring the principate into a new family. So rouse
yourself and go on with your life. Never forget that Otho was your
uncle, yet keep your remembrance within bounds. '


After this he made them all retire and rested for a while. But his 49
last reflections were interrupted by a sudden disturbance and the news
of a mutinous outbreak among the troops. They were threatening to kill
all those who were leaving, and turned with especial violence against
Verginius,[321] whose house was in a state of siege. Otho rebuked the
ringleaders and returned, consenting to receive the adieux of those
who were going, until it was time for them to depart in safety. As the
day deepened into evening he quenched his thirst with a drink of iced
water. Two daggers were brought to him and, after trying them both, he
put one under his pillow.
Being assured on inquiry that his friends
had started, he spent a peaceful night, not, it is said, without
sleep. At break of day[322] he fell upon his dagger. Hearing his dying
groan, his slaves and freedmen entered with Plotius Firmus, the
Prefect of the Guards, and found a single wound in his breast. The
funeral was hurried forward out of respect for his own earnest
entreaties, for he had been afraid his head might be cut off and
subjected to outrage. The Guard carried the body, sounding his praises
with tears in their eyes, and covering his hands and wounded breast
with kisses. Some of the soldiers killed themselves beside the pyre,
not because they had harmed Vitellius or feared reprisals, but from
love of their emperor, and to follow his noble example. Similar
suicides became common afterwards at Bedriacum and Placentia, and in
other encampments. [323] An inconspicuous tomb was built for Otho, as
being less likely to be disturbed: and thus he ended his life in his
thirty-seventh year.

Otho came originally from the borough of Ferentium. [324] His 50
father had been consul and his grandfather praetor. His mother's
family was inferior, but not without distinction. [325] His boyhood and
youth were such as we have seen. By his two great acts,[326] one most
criminal and the other heroic, he earned in equal measure the praise
and the reprobation of posterity. It would certainly be beneath the
dignity of my task to collect fabulous rumours for the amusement of my
readers, but there are certain popular traditions which I cannot
venture to contradict. On the day of the battle of Bedriacum,
according to the account of the local peasants, a strange bird
appeared in a much-frequented grove near Regium Lepidum. [327] There it
sat, unterrified and unmoved, either by the crowds of people or by the
birds which fluttered round it, until the moment at which Otho killed
himself. Then it vanished. A calculation of the time showed that the
prodigy's appearance and disappearance coincided with the beginning of
the battle[328] and Otho's death.

At his funeral the rage and grief of the soldiers broke out into 51
another mutiny. This time there was no one to control them. They
turned to Verginius and begged him with threats now to accept the
principate, now to head a deputation to Caecina and Valens. However,
Verginius escaped them, slipping out by the back door of his house
just as they broke in at the front. Rubrius Gallus carried a petition
from the Guards at Brixellum, and obtained immediate pardon.
Simultaneously Flavius Sabinus surrendered to the victor the troops
under his command. [329]

FOOTNOTES:

[273] Pavia.

[274] i. 66.

[275] i. 59 and 64.

[276] See chap. 14.

[277] It is Tacitus who has mixed the metaphors.

[278] See i. 66.

[279] i. e. he pretended that not all but only a few were to
blame (cp. i. 84).

[280] Valens had by now Legion V, I Italica, detachments from
I, XV, XVI, and Taurus' Horse: Caecina had Legion XXI and
detachments from IV and VII.

[281] Cp. i. 53.

[282] Cp. i. 66.

[283] He had made his name in a Moorish war (A. D. 42), when he
had penetrated as far as Mount Atlas, and increased his
reputation by suppressing the rebellion of Boadicea when he
was governor of Britain (A. D. 59).

[284] Otho held the fleets.

[285] He means that they would be, if they took his advice and
retired across the Po to the south bank.

[286] According to the rumours quoted in chap. 46 they were
already at Aquileia, near Venice, but Suetonius, whose father
was at this time a tribune in the Thirteenth, says that they
heard of Otho's death before arriving at Aquileia.

[287] Brescello.

[288] No one knew for certain who was in command. We are told
in chap. 39 that he left Titianus in nominal command, though
the real authority lay with Proculus.

[289] Macer's, see chap. 23.

[290] See note 247.

[291] i. e. of Macer's gladiators on one bank and the
detachment employed by Caecina for bridge-building, &c. , on
the other. The main armies were Otho's at Bedriacum and
Vitellius' at Cremona.

[292] i. e. from the Germans who were trying to board or sink them.

[293] See i. 77.

[294] Plutarch, in his Life of Otho, after quoting the view of
the emperor's secretary, Secundus, that Otho was over-strained
and desperate, goes on to give the explanation of 'others'.
This agrees exactly with the story given here. Plutarch and
Tacitus are apparently quoting from the same authority,
unknown to us, perhaps Cluvius Rufus.

[295] e. g. the brothers Gracchus, Saturninus, and Drusus.

[296] e. g. Appius Claudius and L. Opimius, of whom Plutarch
says that in suppressing C. Gracchus he used his consular
authority like that of a dictator.

[297] At Brixellum.

[298] About seven miles below Cremona. The Medicean MS. has
Adua, but as the mouth of the Adua is seven miles west of
Cremona and Bedriacum twenty-two miles east of Cremona, the
figures given do not suit. For Tacitus says that they marched
first four miles and then sixteen. Mr. Henderson proposes to
solve the difficulty by reading _quartum decimum_ for
_quartum_ in chap. 39. But his reasons are purely _a priori_.
If the confluence was that of the _Arda_ with the Po, Tacitus'
_quartum_ is still unsatisfactory, but the distances given in
Plutarch's Life of Otho would suit the facts. He makes the
first march a little over six miles. From the camp then
pitched to the mouth of the Arda would be by road about
sixteen miles. Thus Tacitus' first figure may be a slight
underestimate and his second figure correct. The second day's
march, according to Plutarch, was rather more than twelve
miles, so we may suppose that the armies met about four miles
short of the confluence, which was the Othonians' objective.
This suits Paulinus' suggestion a few lines lower that the
Vitellians need only march four miles to catch them in
marching column. The whole question is fully discussed by Mr.
Henderson (op. cit. ) and by Mr. E. G. Hardy in the _Journal of
Philology_, vol. xxxi, no. 61.

[299] See 34 and 35.

[300] Via Postumia.

[301] The word here used, _cuneus_ (a wedge), should mean
strictly a V-shaped formation, which the troops also called
'pig's-head'. But it is also used more generally of any
attacking column advancing to pierce the enemy's line, or
indeed of any body of men in close order.

[302] Because they were on the raised Postumian road.

[303] i. e. The Irresistibles.

[304] The quondam marines (cp. i. 6, &c. ).

[305] From Lower Germany (cp. i. 55 and 61).

[306] From Pannonia (cp. chap. 24).

[307] Only a detachment of the Fourteenth was present at this
battle, as is explained below, chap. 66.

[308] The camp-prefect (chap. 29). The Batavians are the
detachment which had left the Fourteenth (chap. 27).

[309] This is not an allusion to the fight described in chap.
35. The gladiators, now under Sabinus (ch. 36) seem to have
suffered a second defeat.

[310] The fixing of this distance rests on the doubtful
figures in chap. 39. In any case it must have been between
fourteen and twenty miles.

[311] Plutarch in describing this rout makes the same rather
cynical comment. Dio puts the total loss on both sides at
40,000.

[312] He had remained behind in camp (cp. chap. 33).

[313] i. e. other than the Guards.

[314] See chap. 32.

[315] At Brixellum.

[316] Plutarch adds a picturesque detail: 'One of the common
soldiers held up his sword and saying, "See, Caesar, we are
all prepared to do _this_ for you," he stabbed himself. '

[317] See note 286.

[318] According to Plutarch, Otho's generals, Celsus, Gallus,
and Titianus, capitulated at once and admitted Caecina to the
camp. Tacitus would doubtless have condemned Plutarch's story
for its lack of tragic pathos. The facts, however, are against
Tacitus. Now that his main force had capitulated at Bedriacum,
Otho had no sufficient army to fight with, since the
Vitellians lay between him and his Danube army at Aquileia.

[319] Titianus' son. He was eventually executed by Domitian
for keeping Otho's birthday.

[320] _Servius_ Sulpicius Galba.

[321] The conqueror of Vindex, now consul-elect (cp. i. 77).

[322] April 17.

[323] Cp. note 316.

[324] Ferento in Etruria.

[325] Albia Terentia was the daughter of a knight who had not
risen to office.

[326] Galba's murder and his own suicide.

[327] Reggio.

[328] Accepting Meiser's suggestion _cum initio pugnae et cum
Othonis exitu_.


VITELLIUS' PRINCIPATE

Now that the war was everywhere ended, a large number of senators, 52
who had quitted Rome with Otho and been left behind at Mutina,[330]
found themselves in a critical position. When the news of the defeat
reached Mutina, the soldiers paid no heed to what they took for a
baseless rumour, and, believing the senators to be hostile to Otho,
they treasured up their conversation and put the worst interpretation
on their looks and behaviour. In time they broke into abusive
reproaches, seeking a pretext for starting a general massacre, while
the senators suffered at the same time from another source of alarm,
for they were afraid of seeming to be slow in welcoming the victory of
the now predominant Vitellian party. Terrified at their double danger,
they held a meeting. For no one dared to form any policy for himself;
each felt safer in sharing his guilt with others. The town-council of
Mutina, too, kept adding to their anxiety by offering them arms and
money, styling them with ill-timed respect 'Conscript Fathers'. A 53
remarkable quarrel arose at this meeting. Licinius Caecina attacked
Eprius Marcellus[331] for the ambiguity of his language. Not that the
others disclosed their sentiments, but Caecina, who was still a
nobody, recently raised to the senate, sought to distinguish himself
by quarrelling with some one of importance, and selected Marcellus,
because the memory of his career as an informer made him an object of
loathing. They were parted by the prudent intervention of their
betters, and all then retired to Bononia,[332] intending to continue
the discussion there, and hoping for more news in the meantime. At
Bononia they dispatched men along the roads in every direction to
question all new-comers. From one of Otho's freedmen they inquired why
he had come away, and were told he was carrying his master's last
instructions: the man said that when he had left, Otho was still
indeed alive, but had renounced the pleasures of life and was devoting
all his thoughts to posterity. This filled them with admiration. They
felt ashamed to ask any more questions--and declared unanimously for
Vitellius.

Vitellius' brother Lucius was present at their discussion, and now 54
displayed his willingness to receive their flattery, but one of Nero's
freedmen, called Coenus, suddenly startled them all by inventing the
atrocious falsehood that the Fourteenth legion had joined forces with
the troops at Brixellum, and that their sudden arrival had turned the
fortune of the day: the victorious army had been cut to pieces. He
hoped by inventing this good news to regain some authority for Otho's
passports,[333] which were beginning to be disregarded. He did,
indeed, thus insure for himself a quick journey to Rome, but was
executed by order of Vitellius a few days later. However, the senate's
danger was augmented because the soldiers believed the news. Their
fears were the more acute, because it looked as if their departure
from Mutina was an official move of the Council of State, which thus
seemed to have deserted the party. So they refrained from holding any
more meetings, and each shifted for himself, until a letter arrived
from Fabius Valens which quieted their fears. Besides, the news of
Otho's death travelled all the more quickly because it excited
admiration.

At Rome, however, there was no sign of panic. The festival of 55
Ceres[334] was celebrated by the usual crowds. When it was reported in
the theatre on reliable authority that Otho had renounced his
claim,[335] and that Flavius Sabinus,[336] the City Prefect, had made
all the troops in Rome swear allegiance to Vitellius, the audience
cheered Vitellius. The populace decked all the busts of Galba with
laurel-leaves and flowers, and carried them round from temple to
temple. The garlands were eventually piled up into a sort of tomb near
Lake Curtius,[337] on the spot which Galba had stained with his
life-blood. In the senate the distinctions devised during the long
reigns of other emperors were all conferred on Vitellius at once. [338]
To these was added a vote of thanks and congratulation to the German
army, and a deputation was dispatched to express the senate's
satisfaction. Letters were read which Fabius Valens had addressed to
the consuls in very moderate terms. But Caecina's moderation was still
more gratifying: he had not written at all. [339]

However, Italy found peace a more ghastly burden than the war. 56
Vitellius' soldiers scattered through all the boroughs and colonial
towns, indulging in plunder, violence, and rape.