Therefore
God is in a genus of substance.
Summa Theologica
Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been
already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but
postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own
necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in
others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the
like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things,
according as they resemble in their different ways something which is
the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something
which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest
in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the
maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which
is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there
must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end,
and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the
same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever
lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is
shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists
by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we
call God.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is
the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works,
unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out
of evil. " This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should
allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
Reply to Objection 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under
the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs
be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things
that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an
immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body
of the Article.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather
how He is not.
Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by
us; (3) How He is named.
Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed
to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore
(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him;
and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a
part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His
infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a body?
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature,
and subject?
(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
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Whether God is a body?
Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has
the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three
dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and
what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The
measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job
11:8,9). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since
figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Now
a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the
brightness of His glory and the figure," i. e. the image, "of His
substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now
Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
God? " (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.
33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.
117:16). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something
which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
Lord sitting" (Is. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Is. 3:13).
Therefore God is a body.
Objection 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local
term "wherefrom" or "whereto. " But in the Scriptures God is spoken of
as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and
be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that
depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). Therefore
God is a body.
On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (Jn. 4:24):
"God is a spirit. "
I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
already proved ([3]Q[2], A[3]), that God is the First Mover, and is
Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.
Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in
no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes
from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to
the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to
potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into
actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already
proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality
because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is
therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is
the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the
most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate;
and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But
an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies
would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other
thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by
which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore
it is impossible that God should be a body.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([4]Q[1], A[9]), Holy Writ
puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of
corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions
under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual
quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden
things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length,
the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or,
as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the
incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His
all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch
as all things lie under His protection.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as
regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.
Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it
is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (Gn.
1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence
it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal,
that man is said to be according to the image of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in
Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not
sensibly; and so on with the other parts.
Reply to Objection 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only
attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting,
on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on
account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
Reply to Objection 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since
He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions
of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to
withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of
local motion.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For
whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is
the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is
mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man
liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My
soul. " Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the
composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But
God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for
dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a
body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed
of matter and form.
I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First,
because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ([5]Q[2], A[3])
that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible
that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because
everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness
to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter
participates the form. Now the first good and the best---viz. God---is
not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the
participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed
of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form;
hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is
an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must
be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He
is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form;
and not composed of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts
resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on
account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
as His anger.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms which can be received in matter are
individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject
since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,
unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is
individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject;
and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or
nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
God---i. e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
God is not the same as His essence or nature.
Objection 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every
agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not
identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity.
Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only
that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn.
14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the
relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very
Godhead.
I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the
essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of
the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this
that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not
included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,
these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc. , are not included in the
definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the
accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not
included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is
man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has
humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but
humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal
constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand,
in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization
is not due to individual matter---that is to say, to "this"
matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is
necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita. "
Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God
then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead,
His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
Reply to Objection 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they
were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge.
Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His
subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are
composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In
saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we
indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not
that there is any composition in God.
Reply to Objection 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly,
but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective,
precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by
divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and
therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether essence and existence are the same in God?
Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in
God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.
Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is
predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in
general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For
men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21).
Therefore God's existence is not His essence.
Objection 2: Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above
([6]Q[2], A[2]); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's
existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or
nature.
On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
accidental quality, but subsisting truth. " Therefore what subsists in
God is His existence.
I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the
preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in
several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be
caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a
property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of
laughing is proper to a man---and is caused by the constituent
principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is
caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs
from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior
agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a
thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles,
for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its
existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from
its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot
be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause.
Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from
His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or
nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only
because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be
compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality
to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as
shown above [7](A[1]), it follows that in Him essence does not differ
from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly,
because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on
fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not
existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as
shown above [8](A[3]) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He
will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be
the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence,
and not merely His own essence.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of
two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for
example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without
reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,
inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added
to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of
the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the
first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the
second sense.
Reply to Objection 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may
mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a
proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.
Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence
nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this
proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and
this we know from His effects ([9]Q[2], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is contained in a genus?
Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance
is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God.
Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its
own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But
God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph.
x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not
in any genus.
I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely
and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being
reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and
unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while
blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit.
But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of
any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is
constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference
constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from
which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality.
For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were,
for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on
the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is
rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is
compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument
holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added
to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a
species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God
were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus
is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But
the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus,
for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now
no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a
difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly,
because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus
which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their
existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as
also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus,
existence and quiddity---i. e. essence---must differ. But in God they do
not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain
that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is
also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any
definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of
Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a
demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible
to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible
to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the
principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous
quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not
contained in any genus as its principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The word substance signifies not only what exists
of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the
body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the
property of existing in this way---namely, of existing of itself; this
existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is
not in the genus of substance.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure
which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a
measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of
all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it
resembles Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in God there are any accidents?
Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance
cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that
which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus
it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because
it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like,
which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God
there are accidents.
Objection 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But
there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members
of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other
than God---which is absurd.
On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
Trin. ). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no
accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made
actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as
was shown ([10]Q[2], A[3]). Secondly, because God is His own existence;
and as Boethius says (Hebdom. ), although every essence may have
something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a
heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as
whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat.
Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental.
Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing
accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the
capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such
accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now
there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence
it follows that there is no accident in God.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and
of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in
God as there are in us.
Reply to Objection 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the
principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the
substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if
contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all
being, outside of every genus.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is altogether simple?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever
is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings;
and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has
made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether
simple.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But
with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals
than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God
is altogether simple.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
absolutely simple. "
I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many
ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a
body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ
from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is
there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and
accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is
altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to
its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
being, as shown above ([11]Q[2], A[3]). Thirdly, because every
composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
above ([12]Q[2], A[3]), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.
Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one
of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar
parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot,
a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something
which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part
of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain
things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of
the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no
part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is
something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of
whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself,
as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the
essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing
besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute
being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument,
when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of
things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that
are dim. "
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ([13]Q[4], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 2: With us composite things are better than simple
things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
goodness is found in one simple thing ([14]Q[4], A[1] and [15]Q[6],
A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God enters into the composition of other things?
Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other
things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
is that which is above being---the Godhead. " But the being of all
things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters
into the composition of other things.
Objection 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. ,
[*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated
form. " But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some
compound.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from
each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no
way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But
primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does
God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some
differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary
matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each
other.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i. e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part
with part. "
Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).
I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those
who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others
have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of
Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all
these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to
enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a
material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.
Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of
the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But
primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical
with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the
latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient
cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which
enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and
essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not
act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God
cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound
can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form,
though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is
merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to
actuality, as is clear from the foregoing ([16]Q[3], A[1]): while a
form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that
which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise
is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior
to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is
absolutely primal being ([17]Q[2], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as
their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that
is part of a compound.
Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by added
differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse
differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which
differences, however, do not differ from each other by other
differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they
are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but
things which are different differ by something. " Therefore, strictly
speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very
being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.
__________________________________________________________________
THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's
perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called
good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the
divine goodness.
Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is perfect?
(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the
perfections of all things?
(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is perfect?
Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we
say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit
God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
Objection 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the
beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of
animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
Objection 3: Further, as shown above ([18]Q[3], A[4]), God's essence is
existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most
universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is
imperfect.
On the contrary, It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48).
I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient
philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate
"best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that
the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a
material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is
merely potential, the first material principle must be simply
potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not
material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most
perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as
such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle
must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is
perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that
perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our
lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God. " For that
which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because
created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are
brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not
wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.
Reply to Objection 2: The material principle which with us is found to
be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by
something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life
reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from
which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
act by some being already actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for
it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for
nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is
that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not
compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather
as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the
existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a
formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which
exists.
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Whether the perfections of all things are in God?
Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in
God. For God is simple, as shown above ([19]Q[3], A[7]); whereas the
perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections
of all things are not in God.
Objection 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of
things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its
specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided,
and "species" constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because
opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the
perfections of all things are not in God.
Objection 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely
exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life
is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the
essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the
perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
existence prepossesses all things. "
I answer that, All created perfections are in God.
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been
already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but
postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own
necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in
others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the
like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things,
according as they resemble in their different ways something which is
the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something
which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest
in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the
maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which
is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there
must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end,
and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the
same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever
lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is
shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists
by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we
call God.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is
the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works,
unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out
of evil. " This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should
allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
Reply to Objection 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under
the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs
be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things
that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an
immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body
of the Article.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather
how He is not.
Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by
us; (3) How He is named.
Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed
to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore
(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him;
and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a
part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His
infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a body?
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature,
and subject?
(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is a body?
Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has
the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three
dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and
what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The
measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job
11:8,9). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since
figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Now
a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the
brightness of His glory and the figure," i. e. the image, "of His
substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now
Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
God? " (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.
33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.
117:16). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something
which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
Lord sitting" (Is. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Is. 3:13).
Therefore God is a body.
Objection 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local
term "wherefrom" or "whereto. " But in the Scriptures God is spoken of
as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and
be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that
depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). Therefore
God is a body.
On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (Jn. 4:24):
"God is a spirit. "
I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
already proved ([3]Q[2], A[3]), that God is the First Mover, and is
Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.
Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in
no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes
from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to
the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to
potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into
actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already
proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality
because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is
therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is
the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the
most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate;
and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But
an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies
would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other
thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by
which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore
it is impossible that God should be a body.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([4]Q[1], A[9]), Holy Writ
puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of
corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions
under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual
quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden
things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length,
the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or,
as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the
incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His
all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch
as all things lie under His protection.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as
regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.
Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it
is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (Gn.
1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence
it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal,
that man is said to be according to the image of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in
Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not
sensibly; and so on with the other parts.
Reply to Objection 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only
attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting,
on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on
account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
Reply to Objection 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since
He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions
of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to
withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of
local motion.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For
whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is
the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is
mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man
liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My
soul. " Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the
composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But
God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for
dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a
body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed
of matter and form.
I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First,
because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ([5]Q[2], A[3])
that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible
that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because
everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness
to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter
participates the form. Now the first good and the best---viz. God---is
not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the
participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed
of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form;
hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is
an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must
be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He
is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form;
and not composed of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts
resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on
account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
as His anger.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms which can be received in matter are
individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject
since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,
unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is
individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject;
and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or
nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
God---i. e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
God is not the same as His essence or nature.
Objection 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every
agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not
identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity.
Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only
that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn.
14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the
relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very
Godhead.
I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the
essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of
the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this
that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not
included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,
these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc. , are not included in the
definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the
accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not
included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is
man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has
humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but
humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal
constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand,
in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization
is not due to individual matter---that is to say, to "this"
matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is
necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita. "
Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God
then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead,
His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
Reply to Objection 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they
were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge.
Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His
subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are
composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In
saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we
indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not
that there is any composition in God.
Reply to Objection 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly,
but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective,
precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by
divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and
therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether essence and existence are the same in God?
Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in
God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.
Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is
predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in
general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For
men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21).
Therefore God's existence is not His essence.
Objection 2: Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above
([6]Q[2], A[2]); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's
existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or
nature.
On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
accidental quality, but subsisting truth. " Therefore what subsists in
God is His existence.
I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the
preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in
several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be
caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a
property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of
laughing is proper to a man---and is caused by the constituent
principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is
caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs
from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior
agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a
thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles,
for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its
existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from
its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot
be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause.
Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from
His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or
nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only
because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be
compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality
to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as
shown above [7](A[1]), it follows that in Him essence does not differ
from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly,
because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on
fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not
existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as
shown above [8](A[3]) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He
will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be
the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence,
and not merely His own essence.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of
two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for
example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without
reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,
inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added
to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of
the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the
first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the
second sense.
Reply to Objection 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may
mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a
proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.
Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence
nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this
proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and
this we know from His effects ([9]Q[2], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is contained in a genus?
Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance
is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God.
Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its
own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But
God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph.
x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not
in any genus.
I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely
and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being
reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and
unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while
blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit.
But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of
any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is
constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference
constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from
which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality.
For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were,
for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on
the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is
rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is
compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument
holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added
to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a
species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God
were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus
is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But
the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus,
for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now
no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a
difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly,
because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus
which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their
existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as
also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus,
existence and quiddity---i. e. essence---must differ. But in God they do
not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain
that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is
also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any
definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of
Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a
demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible
to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible
to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the
principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous
quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not
contained in any genus as its principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The word substance signifies not only what exists
of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the
body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the
property of existing in this way---namely, of existing of itself; this
existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is
not in the genus of substance.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure
which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a
measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of
all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it
resembles Him.
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Whether in God there are any accidents?
Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance
cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that
which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus
it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because
it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like,
which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God
there are accidents.
Objection 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But
there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members
of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other
than God---which is absurd.
On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
Trin. ). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no
accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made
actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as
was shown ([10]Q[2], A[3]). Secondly, because God is His own existence;
and as Boethius says (Hebdom. ), although every essence may have
something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a
heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as
whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat.
Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental.
Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing
accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the
capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such
accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now
there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence
it follows that there is no accident in God.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and
of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in
God as there are in us.
Reply to Objection 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the
principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the
substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if
contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all
being, outside of every genus.
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Whether God is altogether simple?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever
is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings;
and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has
made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether
simple.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But
with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals
than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God
is altogether simple.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
absolutely simple. "
I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many
ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a
body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ
from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is
there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and
accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is
altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to
its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
being, as shown above ([11]Q[2], A[3]). Thirdly, because every
composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
above ([12]Q[2], A[3]), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.
Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one
of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar
parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot,
a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something
which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part
of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain
things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of
the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no
part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is
something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of
whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself,
as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the
essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing
besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute
being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument,
when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of
things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that
are dim. "
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ([13]Q[4], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 2: With us composite things are better than simple
things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
goodness is found in one simple thing ([14]Q[4], A[1] and [15]Q[6],
A[2]).
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Whether God enters into the composition of other things?
Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other
things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
is that which is above being---the Godhead. " But the being of all
things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters
into the composition of other things.
Objection 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. ,
[*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated
form. " But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some
compound.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from
each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no
way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But
primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does
God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some
differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary
matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each
other.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i. e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part
with part. "
Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).
I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those
who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others
have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of
Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all
these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to
enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a
material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.
Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of
the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But
primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical
with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the
latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient
cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which
enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and
essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not
act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God
cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound
can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form,
though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is
merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to
actuality, as is clear from the foregoing ([16]Q[3], A[1]): while a
form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that
which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise
is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior
to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is
absolutely primal being ([17]Q[2], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as
their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that
is part of a compound.
Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by added
differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse
differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which
differences, however, do not differ from each other by other
differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they
are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but
things which are different differ by something. " Therefore, strictly
speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very
being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.
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THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's
perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called
good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the
divine goodness.
Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is perfect?
(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the
perfections of all things?
(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
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Whether God is perfect?
Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we
say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit
God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
Objection 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the
beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of
animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
Objection 3: Further, as shown above ([18]Q[3], A[4]), God's essence is
existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most
universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is
imperfect.
On the contrary, It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48).
I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient
philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate
"best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that
the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a
material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is
merely potential, the first material principle must be simply
potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not
material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most
perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as
such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle
must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is
perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that
perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our
lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God. " For that
which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because
created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are
brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not
wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.
Reply to Objection 2: The material principle which with us is found to
be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by
something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life
reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from
which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
act by some being already actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for
it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for
nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is
that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not
compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather
as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the
existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a
formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which
exists.
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Whether the perfections of all things are in God?
Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in
God. For God is simple, as shown above ([19]Q[3], A[7]); whereas the
perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections
of all things are not in God.
Objection 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of
things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its
specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided,
and "species" constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because
opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the
perfections of all things are not in God.
Objection 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely
exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life
is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the
essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the
perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
existence prepossesses all things. "
I answer that, All created perfections are in God.
