which it has ever produced, during the happy
and glorious reigns of his Majesty's royal progenitors,
- not doubting but.
and glorious reigns of his Majesty's royal progenitors,
- not doubting but.
Edmund Burke
X.
p.
392.
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 545
favor of those privileges which it preserves and enforces, by keeping in that course which has been
found the most effectual for answering their ends.
His Majesty may receive the opinions and wishes of
individuals under their signatures, and of bodies corporate under their seals, as:expressing their own particular sense; and he may grant such redress as the legal powers of the crown enable the crown to afford.
This, and the other House of Parliament, may also
receive the wishes of such corporations and individuals by petition. The collective sense of his people
his Majesty is to receive from his Commons in Parliament assembled. It would destroy the whole spirit
of the Cohstitution? if his Commons were to receive
that sense from the ministers of the crown, or to admit them to be a proper or a regular channel for
conveying it.
That the ministers in the said speech declare, " His. Majesty has a just and confident reliance that we (his
faithful Commons) are animated with the same sentiments of loyalty, and the same attachment to our
excellent Constitution which he had the happiness to
see so fully manifested in every part of the kingdom. "'To represent, that his faithful Commons have never
failed in loyalty to his Majesty. It is new to them
to be reminded of it. It is unnecessary and invidious to press it upon them by any example. This
recommendation* of loyalty, after his Majesty has sat
for so many years, with the full support of all descriptions of his subjects, on the throne of this kingdom,
at a time of profound peace, and without any pretence of the existence or apprehension of war or conspiracy, becomes in itself a source of no small jealousy to his faithful Commons; as many circumstances lead
VOL. II. 35
? ? ? ? :546:MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
-us to apprehendthat therein the ministers have referenee to some other measures and principles of loyalty,, and to sosme other ideas of the Constitution, than the,laws. require, or the practice of Parliament will. addmit. . ',,. . . . Io: regular: communication of the proofs of loyalty
tahnd attachment to the Constitution, alluded to in the
speech from. the throne, have been laid before this
H. Iouse, in order to enable us to judge of the nature,
tendency, or occasion of them, or in what particular
acts they were; displayed;ibut if we are to suppose. the. mianifestations of loyalty (which are held out to
uis. as an example for. imitation) consist in certain ad-:dresses delivered to. his Majesty; promising support to. his,Majesty in the exercise of his prerogative, and ~thanking. his Majesty for removing certain of his ministers, on account of the votes they havegiven upon
bills- depending:in Parliament, - if. this be the ex-. ample of loyalty alluded to in the speech from the
throne,. then we must beg leave to express our seri~ous concern: forA the impression which has been made. on. any of our fellow-subjects by misrepresentations which have seduced them into a seeming approbation
of. proceedings subversive of their own freedom. We
conceive that the opinions delivered in these papers
were not well considered; nor were the parties duly
informed of the nature. of the matters on. which they
were called todetermine, nor of those proceedings' of
Parliament which they. were led to censure.
We. shall act more advisedly. - The loyalty we
shall,manifest. will not be the same with theirs; but,
we. tr;ust, it will be equally sincere, and more enlightened. It is no slight. authority which shall persuade
us. (by receiving as proofs of' loyalty the. mistaken
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 5'47
principles lightly taken up in these addresses) obliquely to- criminate, with the heavy and ungrounded
charge. of: disloyalty and disaffection, an uncorrupt,
independent, and. . reforming Parliament. * Above
all, we shall take care that. none:of the rights and
privileges,. always claimed, and. since the accession of
his. Majesty's illustrious. family constantly exercised
by this Iouse,'(and which. we hold and exercise in
trust for: the Commons of Great Britain,:. and for. their
benefit,) shall be. constructively surrendered,: or even
weakened and impaired,. . under: ambiguous phrases
and implications of censure -on the late Parliamentary
proceedings. i If: these. , claims. are,not well founded,
they ought to. be honestly. abandoned; if they. are
just,- they ought to be steadily and resolutely main-;. tained. . . . . . .
Of his. . Majesty's own gracious. disposition towards
the true principles of our. free: Constitution his faith-* In that Parliament the House: of Commons by -two. several- resolutions put an end to:ithe American. war. Immediately, on the
change of. ministry, which ensued,. in order to secure their own inde-,pendence, and- to. prevent the. accumulation of new burdens on the
people by the:growth of a civil list debt, they passed the Establishment Bill. By that:bill thirty-six offices tenable by members of Parliament were suppressed, and an-order. . of payment was framed by which the growth of any fresh debt was rendered impracticable. The
debt on -the. civil list from the beginning of. the. . present reign had
amounted to one million three. hundred thousand pounds and-upwards.
Another act. was passed for regulating the office. of the PaymasterGeneral and the offices subordinate to it. . . A million of public money
had sometimes. been in the hands of the paymasters: this act-prevented
the possibility of any money whatsoever being'accumulated in that office in:future. The offices of the Exchequer, whose. emoluments in time
of war were. excessive, and grew in. exact proportion to:the public burdens, were regulated, -. some of them. suppressed, and the rest reduced
to fixed salaries. . To secure the freedom of election against the crown)
a bill was passed to disqualify all officers concerned in the collection
? ? ? ? 548 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
ful Commons never did or could entertain a doubt;
but we humbly beg leave to express to his Majesty
our uneasiness concerning other new and unusual
expressions of his ministers, declaratory of a resolu-tion "to support in their just balance the rights and
privileges of every branch of the legislature. "
It were desirable that all hazardous theories concerning a balance of rights and privileges (a mode of
expression wholly foreign to Parliamentary usage)
might have been forborne. His Majesty's faithful
Commons are well instructed in their own rights and
privileges, which they are determined to maintain on
the footing upon which they were handed down from
their ancestors; they are not unacquainted with the
rights and privileges of the House, of Peers; and
they know and respect the lawful prerogatives of the
crown: but they do not think it safe to admit. anything concerning the existence of a balance of those
of the revenue in any of its branches from voting in elections: a most
important act, not only with regard to its primary object, the freedom
of election, but as materially forwarding the due collection of revenue. 'For the same end, (the preserving the freedom of election,) the House
rescinded the famous judgment relative to the Middlesex election, and
expunged it from the journals. -On the principle of reformation of
their own House, connected with a principle of public economy,; an act
passed for rendering contractors with government incapable of a seat
in-Parliament. The India Bill (unfortunately lost in the House of
Lords) pursued the same idea to its completion, and disabled all servants of the East India Company from a seat in that House: for a certain time, and until their conduct was examined into and cleared. The remedy of infinite corruptions and of infinite disorders and oppressions,'as well as the security of the most important objects of public
economy, perished with that bill and that Parliament. That Parliament also instituted a committee to inquire into the collection of the
revenue in all its branches, which prosecuted its duty with great
vigor, and suggested several material improvements.
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 549
rights, privileges, and prerogatives; nor are they able
to discern to what objects ministers would apply their
fiction of a balance, nor what they would consider
as a just one. These unauthorized doctrines have a
tendency to stir improper discussions, and to lead to'mischievous innovations in the Constitution. '*
* If these speculations are let loose, the House of Lords may quarrel with their share of the legislature, as being limited with regard to the origination of grants to the crown and the origination of money
bills. The advisers of the crown may think proper to bring its negative into ordinary use, - and even to dispute, whether a mere nega-: tive, compared with the deliberative power exercised in the other
Houses, be such a share in the legislature as to produce a due balance
in favor of that branch, and thus justify the previous interference of
the crown in the manner lately used. The following will serve to
show how much foundation there is for. great caution concerning
these novel speculations. Lord Shelburne, in his celebrated speech,
April 8th, 1778, expresses himself as follows. (Vide Parliamentary
Register, Vol. X. )
"The noble and learned lord on the woolsack, in the debate which
opened the business of this day, asserted that your Lordships were incompetent to make any alteration in a money bill or a bill of supply. I should be glad to see the matter fairly and fully discussed, and
the subject brought forward and argued upon precedent, as well as
all its collateral relations. I should be pleased to see the question
fairly committed, were it for no other reason but to hear the sleek,
smooth contractors from the other House come to this bar and declare, that they, and they only, could frame a money bill, and they,
and they only, could dispose of the property of the peers of Great Britain. Perhaps some arguments more plausible than those I heard this day from the wodlsack, to show that the Commons have an uncontrollable, unqualified right to bind your Lordships' property, may be urged by them. At present, I beg leave to differ from the noble
and learned lord; for, until the claim, after a solemn discussion of
this House, is openly and directly relinquished, I shall continue to be
of opinion that your Lordships have a right to alter, amend, or reject
a money bill. "
The Duke of Richmond also, in his letter to the volunteers of
Ireland, speaks of several of the powers exercised by the House of
? ? ? ? 550 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
That his -faithful, Commons most humbly recommend,' instead:of the inconsiderate speculations. of:
unexperienced. men, that, on all occasions, resort
should be had to the happy. practice of Parliament,
and to those solid maxims of government which have
prevailed since: the accession of his Majesty's illustrious family, as furnishing the only safe principles on
which the crown and Parliament can proceed.
We think it the more necessary to be cautious
on this head, as, in the last Parliament, the present
ministers had thought proper to countenance, if not
to suggest, an attack upon the most clear and undoubted rights and privileges of this House. *
Commons in the light of usurpations; and his Grace is of opinion,'
that, when the people are restored to what he conceives to be their
rights, in electing the House of Commons, the other branches of the
legislature ought to be restored to theirs. - Vide Remembrancer, Vol.
XVI.
* By an act of Parliament, the Directors of the East India Company are restrained from acceptance of bills drawn from India, beyond
a certain amount, without the consent of the Commissioners of the,
Treasury. The late House, f Commons, finding bills to an immense
amount drawn upon that'body by their servants abroad, and knowing'their circumstances to be exceedingly doubtful, came to a resolution providently cautioning the Lords of the Treasury against the acceptance of these bills, until the House should otherwise direct.
The Court Lords then took occasion to declare against the resolution
as illegal, by the Commons undertaking to direct in the execution of
a trust created by act of Parliament. The House, justly alarmed at
this resolution, which went to the destruction of the whole of its superintending capacity, and particularly in matters relative to its own province of money, directed a committee to search the journals, and they found a regular series of'precedents, commencing from the'remotest
of those records, and carried on to that day, by which it appeared'
that the House interfered, by an authoritative advice and admonition, upon every act of executive government without exception,
and in many much stronger cases than that which the Lords thought
proper to quarrel with.
? ? ? ? SPEECH. FROM THE THRONE. 551
Fearing, from these extraordinary admonitions, and
from the new doctrines, which seem. to have dictated,
several unusual expressions, that his Majesty has
been abused by false representations of the late proceedings in Parliament, we think it our duty respectfully: to inform his Majesty, that no attempt whatever has been' made against his lawful prerogatives, or
against the rights -and privileges of the Peers, by the
late House of Commons, in any of their addresses,
votes, or resolutions; neither do we know of any
proceeding by bill, in which it was proposed to
abridge the extent of his royal prerogative: but, if
such provision had existed in any bill, we protest,
and we declare, against all speeches, acts, or addresses, from any persons whatsoever, which have a
tendency to consider such bills, or the persons con
cerned in them,'as just objects of any kind of censure and punishment from the throne. Necessary
reformations may hereafter require, as they have frequently done in former times, limitations and abridgments, and in some cases an entire extinction, of some branch of prerogative. If bills should be improper. in the form in which they appear in the
House where they originate, they are liable, by the
wisdom of this Constitution, to be corrected, and even
to be totally set aside, elsewhere. This is the known,
the legal, and the safe remedy; but whatever, by the
manifestation of the royal displeasure, tends to intimidate individual members from proposing, or this
House from receiving, debating, and passing bills,
tends to prevent even the beginning of every reformation in the state, and utterly destroys the deliberative
capacity of Parliament. We therefore claim, demand, and insist upon it, as our undoubted right,
? ? ? ? 552 MOTION' RELATIVE TO THE
that no persons. shall be deemed proper objects of
animadversion by the crown, in any mode whatever,
for the votes which. they give or the propositions
which they make in Parliament.
*. We humbly conceive, that besides its share of the
legislative power, and its right of impeachment, that,
by the law and usage of Parliament, this House has
other powers and capacities, which it is bound to
maintain. This House is assured that our humble
advice on the exercise of prerogative will be heard
with- the same attention with which it has ever been
regarded, and that it will be followed by the same
effects.
which it has ever produced, during the happy
and glorious reigns of his Majesty's royal progenitors,
- not doubting but. that, in all those points, we shall
be considered as a council of wisdom and weight to
advise, and not merely as an accuser of competence to
criminate. * This House claims both capacities; and
we trust that we shall be left to our free discretion
which of them. we shall employ as best calculated for
his Majesty's and the national service. Whenever we
shall see it expedient to offer our advice concerning
his Majesty's servants, who are those of the public,
we confidently hope that the personal favor of any
minister, or any set of ministers, will not be more
dear to his Majesty than the credit and character of
a House of Commons. It is an experiment full of
peril to put the representative wisdom and justice of
his Majesty's people in the wrong; it is a crooked
and desperate design, leading to mischief, the extent
3 "I observe, at the same time, that there is no charge or complaint suggested against my present ministers. " - The King's Answer, 25th February, 1784, to the Address of the House of Commons. Vide Resolutions of the House of Commons, printed for Debrett, p. 31.
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 553
ot which no human wisdom can foresee, to attempt to
form a prerogative party in the nation, to be resorted
to as occasion shall require, in derogation from the
authority of the Commons of Great Britain in'Parliament assembled; it is a contrivance full of danger,
for ministers to set up the representative and constituent bodies of the Commons of this kingdom as two
separate and distinct powers, formed to counterpoise
each other, leaving the preference in the hands of
secret advisers of the crown. In such a situation of
things, these advisers, taking advantage of the differences which may accidentally arise or may purposely be fomented between them, will have it in their choice to resort to the one or the other, as may best
suit the purposes of their sinister ambition. By
exciting an emulation and contest between the representative and the constituent bodies, as parties
contending for credit and influence at the throne,
sacrifices will be made by both; and the whole can
end in nothing else than the destruction of the dearest rights and liberties of the nation. '. If there must
be another mode of conveying the collective sense of
the people to the throne than that by the House of
Commons, it ought to be fixed and defined, and its
authority ought to be settled: it ought not to exist
in so precarious and dependent a state as that ministers should have it in their power, at their own mere
pleasure, to acknowledge it with respect or to reject
it with scorn.
It is the undoubted prerogative of the crown to
dissolve Parliament; but we beg leave to lay before
his Majesty, that it is, of all the trusts vested in his
Majesty, the most critical and delicate, and that in
which this House. has the most reason to require, not
? ? ? ? 554 MOTION, RELATIVE TO THE
only the good faith, but the favor of the crown, His
Commons are not always - upon a par with his ministers in an application to popular judgment; it is not in the power of the members of this House to go to. their election at. the moment the most favorable. for them. It is in the power of the crown to choose a
-time for their dissolution whilst great and arduous
matters of state and legislation are depending, which
may be easily misunderstood, and which cannot be
fully explained:before that misunderstanding may
prove fatal to the honor that belongs and to the consideration that is due to members of Parliament. With his Majesty is the gift of all the rewards, the
honors, distinctions, favors, and graces of the state;
with his Majesty is the mitigation of all the rigors of
the law: and we rejoice to see the crown possessed
of trusts calculated to obtain good-will, and charged
with duties which are popular and pleasing. Our
trusts are of a different kind. Our duties are harsh
and invidious in their nature; and justice and safety
is all we call expect in the exercise of them. : We
are to offer salutary, which is not always pleasing
counsel: we are to inquire and to accuse; and the
objects of our inquiry: and charge will be for the
most part persons of wealth, power, and extensive
connections: we are to make rigid laws for the preservation of revenue, which of necessity more or less confine some action or restrain some function which
before was free: what is the most critical and invidious of all, the whole body of the public impositions originate from us, and the hand of the House of Commons is seen and felt in every burden that presses on the people. Whilst' ultimately we are serving
them, and in the first instance whilst we are serving
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 555
his Majesty, it will be hard indeed, if we, should see
a House of Commons: the victim of its zeal and fidelity, sacrificed by his ministers to those very popular
discontents which shall be excited by our dutiful endeavors for the security and greatness of his throne.
No other consequence can result from such an example, but that, in future, the House of Commons, consulting its safety at the expense of its duties, and suffering the whole energy of the state to be relaxed,
will shrink from every service-which, however necessaryj is of a great and arduous nature,- or that, willing to provide for the'public necessities, and at. the same time to secure the means of -performing that
task, they will exchange independence for protection,
and will court a subservient existence through the
favor of those ministers of state or those secret advisers: who ought themselves to stand in awe of the
Commons of this realm.
A House of Commons respected by his ministers is
essential to his Majesty's service: it is fit that they
should yield to Parliament, and not that Parliament
should be new-modelled until it is fitted to their purposes. If our authority is only to be held up when
we coincide in opinion with his Majesty's advisers,
but is to be set at nought the moment it differs from
them, the House of Commons will sink into a mere
appendage of administration, and will lose that independent character which, inseparably connecting the
honor and reputation with the acts of this House, enables us to afford a real, effective, and substantial support to his government. : It is the deference shown to our opinion, when we dissent from the servants of the
crown, which alone can give authority to the proceedings of this House, when it concurs with their
measures.
? ? ? ? 556 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
That authority once lost, the credit of his Mtajesty's crown will be impaired in the eyes of all nations.
Foreign powers, who may yet wish to revive a friendly
intercourse with this nation, will look in vain for that
hold which gave a connection with Great Britain the
preference to an alliance with any other state. A
HIouse of Commons of which ministers were known
to stand in awe, where everything was necessarily
discussed on principles fit to be openly and publicly
avowed, and which could not be retracted or varied
without danger, furnished a ground of confidence in
the public faith which the engagement of no state
dependent on the fluctuation of personal favor and
private advice can ever pretend to. If faith with
the House of Cdmmons, the grand security for the
national faith itself, can be broken with impunity, a
wound is given to the political importance of Great
Britain which will not easily be healed.
That there was a great variance between the late
House of Commons and certain persons, whom his
Majesty has been advised to make and continue asministers, in defiance of the advice of that House2 is
notorious to the world. That House did not confide
in those ministers; and they withheld their confidence from them for reasons for which posterity will
honor and respect the names of those who composed
that House of Commons, distinguished for its independence. They could not confide in persons who. have shown a disposition to dark and dangerous intrigues. By these intrigues they have weakened,
if not destroyed, the clear assurance which his Majesty's people, and which all nations, ought to have of
what are and what are not the real acts of his government.
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 557
If it should be seen. that his ministers may continue in their offices' without any signification to. them of his Majesty's displeasure at-any of their
-measures, whilst persons considerable for their rank,
and known to have had access to his Majesty's sacred
person, can with impunity abuse that advantage, and. employ his Majesty's name to disavow and counteract the proceedings of his official servants, nothing but distrust, discord, debility, contempt of all authority, and general confusion,: can prevail in his government.
*This we lay before his Majesty, with humility and
concern, as the inevitable. effect of a spirit of intrigue
in his executive government: an evil'which we have
but too much reason to be persuaded exists and increases. During the course of the last session it
broke out in a manner the most alarming. This evil
was infinitely aggravated by the unauthorized, but
not disavowed,. use which has been made of his Majesty's name, for the. purpose of the most unconstitutional, corrupt, and dishonorable influence on the minds of the members of Parliament that ever was
practised in this kingdom. No attention even to
exterior decorum, in the practice of corruption and
intimidation employed on peers, was observed: several peers were obliged under menaces to retract
their declarations and:to recall their proxies.
The Commons have the deepest interest in the
purity and integrity of the Peerage. The Peers dispose of all the property in the kingdom, in the last
resort; and they dispose of it on their honor, and not
on their oaths, as all the members of every other
tribunal in the kingdom must do, - though in them
the proceeding is not conclusive. We have, there
? ? ? ? -558 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
fore, a right to:demand that no application shall be
made to peers of such a:nature as may give room. to
call in question, much less, to attaint, our sole security for all that we possess. This corrupt proceeding appeared to the House of Commons, who are the natural guardians of the purity of Parliament,
and of the. purity of every branch of judicature, a
most reprehensible and dangerous practice, tending
to shake the very foundation of the. authority of the
House of Peers; and they branded it as such by their
resolution.
The House had not sufficient evidence to enable
them legally to punish this practice, but they had
enough to caution them against all confidence in the
authors and abettors of it. They performed their
duty in humbly advising his Majesty against the employment of such' ministers; but his Majesty was
advised to keep those ministers, and to dissolve that
Parliament. The House, aware of the importance
and urgency of its duty with regard to the British
interests in India, which were and are in the utmost
disorder, and in the utmost peril, most humbly requested his Majesty not to dissolve the Parliament
during the course of their very critical proceedings
on that subject. His Majesty's gracious condescension to that request was conveyed in the royal faith,
pledged to a House of Parliament, and solemnly
delivered from the throne. It was but a very few
days after a committee had been, with the consent
and concurrence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, appointed for an inquiry into certain accounts
delivered. to the House by the Court of Directors,
and then actually engaged in that inquiry, that the
ministers, regardless of the assurance given from the
? ? ? ? SPEECHi FROM THE THRONE. 559
crown:to a House of Commons, did dissolve that
Parliament. We most humbly submit to his Majesty's consideration the consequences of this their
breach of public faith.
Whilst the members of the House of Commons,
under that security, were. engaged in his Majesty's
and:the national business,:endeavors were industriously used to calumniate those whom it was found
impracticable to corrupt. The reputation of the
members, and. the reputation of the Ho-use itself,
was. undermined in every part of the kingdom,
In the speech from the throne relative to India, we
are cautioned by the ministers "not to lose sight of
the: effect any measure may have on the Constitution
of our country. ":We are apprehensive that a calumnious report,: spread:abroad, of an attack upon his
Majesty's prerogative by the late House of Commons,
may have' made an impression on his royal mind, and
have given occasion to this unusual admonition to the
present. This attack is charged to have been made
in the late Parliament by a bill which passed the
House of Commons, in the late session of fthat Parliament, for the regulation of the affairs, for the preservation of the commerce, and for the amendment of the government of this nation, in the East Indies.
That his Majesty and his people may have an opportunity of entering into the ground of this injurious charge, we beg leave humbly to acquaint his
Majesty, that, far from having made any infringement whatsoever on any part of his royal prerogative,
that bill did, for a limited time, give to his Majesty
certain powers never before possessed by the crown;
and;fr this his present ministers (who, rather than
fall short in the number of their calumnies, employ
? ? ? ? 560 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
some that are contradictory) have slandered this
House, as aiming at the extension of an unconstitutional influence in his Majesty's crown. This pretended attempt to increase the influence of the crown they were weak enough to endeavor to persuade' his
Majesty's people was amongst the causes which excited his Majesty's resentment against his late ministers.
Further, to remove the impressions of this calumny concerning an attempt in the House of Commons
against his prerogative, it is proper to inform his Majesty, that the territorial possessions in the East Indies
never have been declared by any public judgment,
act, or instrument, or any resolution of Parliament
whatsoever, to be the subject matter of his Majesty's
prerogative; nor have they ever been understood as
belonging to his ordinary administration, or to be
annexed or united to his crown; but that they are
acquisitions of a new and peculiar description,* unknown to the ancient executive constitution of this
country.
From time to time, therefore, Parliament provided
for their government according to its discretion, and
to its opinion of what was required by the public ne* The territorial possessions in the East Indies were acquired to
the Company, in virtue of grants from the Great Mogul, in the nature
of offices and jurisdictions, to be held under him, and dependent upon
his crown, with the express condition of being obedient to orders from
his court, and of paying an annual tribute to his treasury. It is true
that no obedience is yielded to these orders, and for some time past
there has been no payment made of this tribute. But it is under a
grant so conditioned that they still hold. To subject the King of
Great Britain as tributary to a foreign power by the acts of his subjects; to suppose the grant valid, and yet the condition void; to
suppose it good for the king, and insufficient for the Company; to
suppose it an interest divisible between the parties: these are some
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 561
cessities. We do not know that his. Majesty was entitled, by prerogative, to exercise any act of authority
whatsoever in the Companys affairs:, or that, in effect,
such authority has ever, been exer6cised. His Majesty's patronage was not takenii. awalby that bill; because it'is notorious that hi:MIjtesty never originally
had the appointment of a single officer, civil or military, in the Company's establishment in India: nor
has the least degree of patronage ever been acquired
to the crown in any other manner or measure than
as the power was thought expedient to be granted by
act of Parliament, - that is, by the very same authority by which the offices were disposed of and regulated
in the bill which his Majesty's servants have falsely
and injuriously represented as infringing upon the
prerogative of the crown.
Before the year 1773 the whole administration of
India, and the whole patronage to office there, was in.
the hands of the East India Compafiy. The East India Company is not a branch of his Majesty's prerogative administration, nor does that body exercise any
species of authority under it, nor indeed from any
British title that does not derive all its legal validity
from acts of Parliament.
few of the many legal difficulties to be surmounted, before the Common Law of England can acknowledge the East India Company's Asiatic affairs to be a subject matter of prerogative, so as to bring it within the verge of English jurisprudence. It is. a verv anomalous species of power and property which is held by the East: India Company.
Our English prerogative law does not furnish principles, much less
precedents, by which it can be defined or adjusted. Nothing but the
eminent dominion of Parliament over every British subject, in every
concern, and in every circumstance in which he is placed, can adjust
this new, intricate matter. Parliament may act wisely or unwisely,
justly or unjustly; but. Parliament alone is competent to it.
VOL. II. 36
? ? ? ? 562 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
~ When a claim was asserted to the India territorial
possessions in the occupation of the Company, these
possessions were not claimed as parcel of his Majesty's
patrimonial estate, or as a fruit of the ancient inheritance of his crown: they were claimed for the public. And when agreements were made with the East
India Company concerning any composition for the
holding, or any participation of the profits, of those
territories, the agreement was made with the public;
and the preambles of the several acts have uniformly
so stated it. These agreements were not made (even
nominally) with his Majesty, but with Parliament:
and the bills making and establishing such agreements always originated in this House; which appropriated the money to await the disposition of Parliament, without the ceremony of previous consent from the crown even so much as suggested by any of his
ministers: which previous consent is an observance
of decorum, not indeed of strict right, but generally
paid, when a new appropriation takes place in any
part of his Majesty's prerogative revenues.
In pursuance of a right thus: uniformly recognized
and uniformly acted on, when Parliament undertook
the reformation of the East India Company in 1773,
a commission was appointed, as the commission in the
late bill was appointed; and it was made to continue
for a term of years, as the commission in the late bill
was to continie; all the commissioners were named
in Parliament, as in the late bill they. were named.
As they received, so they held their offices, wholly
independent of the crown; they held them for a
fixed term; they were not removable by an address
of either House or even of both Houses of Parliament, a precaution observed in the late bill relative
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 563'to the commissioners proposed therein; nor were they bound by the strict rules of proceeding which
regulated and restrained the late commissioners
against all possible abuse'of a power which could
not fail of being diligently and zealously watched by the ministers of the crown, and the proprietors of the stock,. as well as by Parliament. Their proceedings were, in that bill, directed to be of such a nature as easily to subject them to the strictest revision of both, in case of any malversation.
In the year 1780, an act of Parliament again made
provision for the government of those territories for
another four years; without any sort of reference to
prerogative; nor was the least objection taken at the
second, more than at the first of those periods, as if
an infringement had been made upon the rights of
the crown: yet his Majesty's ministers have thought-'fit to represent the late commission as an entire inno-,vation on. the Constitution, and the setting up a new order and estate in the nation, tending to the subversion of the monarchy itself.
If the government of the East Indies, other' than
by his Majesty's prerogative, be in effect a fourth order in the commonwealth, this order has long existed; because the East India Company has. for many years.
enjoyed it in the fullest extent, and does at this day
enjoy the whole administration of those provinces,
and the patronage to offices throughout that great
empire, except as it is controlled by act of Parliament.
It was the ill condition and ill administration of
the Company's affairs which induced. this House
(merely as a temporary establishment) to. . vest the
same powers which the Company did before possess.
? ? ? ? 564 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
(and no other,) for a -limited time, and under very,strict directions,'in proper hands, until they could be
restored,'or further provision made concerning them.
It was therefore no creation whatever of a new power,
but the removal of an old power, long since created,
and then existing, from the management of those
persons who had manifestly and dangerously abused
their trust. This House, which well knows the Parliamentary origin of. all the Company's powers and
privileges, and is -not ignorant or negligent of the
authority which may vest those powers and: privileges in others, if justice and. the public safety so
require, is conscious to itself that it no more creates
a new order in the state, by making occasional
trustees for the direction of the Company, than it
originally did in giving a much more permanent
trust to the Directors or to the General Court of that
body. The monopoly of the East India Company
was a derogation from the general freedom of trade
belonging to his Majesty's people. The powers of
government, and of peace and war, are parts of prerogative of the highest order. Of our competence to
restrain the rights of all his subjects by act of Parliament, and to vest those high and eminent prerogatives even in a particular company of merchants, there has been no question. We beg leave most
humbly to claim as our right, and as a right which
this House has always used, to frame such bills for
the regulation of that commerce, and of the territories held by the East India Company, and everything relating to them, as to our discretion shall seem fit; and we assert and maintain that therein
we follow, and do not innovate on, the Constitution.
That his Majesty's ministers, misled by their am
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 565
bition, have endeavored, if possible, to form a faction
in the country against the popular part of the Constitution; and have therefore thought proper to add to
their slanderous accusation against a House of Parliament, relative to his Majesty's'prerogative, another
of a different nature, calculated for the purpose of
raising fears and jealousies' among the corporate bodies of the kingdom, and of persuading uninformed
persons 1~elonging to those corporations to look to
and to make addresses to them, as protectors of. their
rights, under their several charters, from the designs
which they, without any ground, charged the then
House of Comlnons to have formed against charters
in general. For this purpose they have not scrupled
to assert that the exertion of his Majesty's prerogative in the late precipitate change in his administration, and the dissolution of the late Parliament, were
measures adopted in order to rescue the people and
their rights out of the hands of the House of Commons, their representatives.
We trust that his Majesty's subjects are not yet so
far deluded as to believe that the charters, or that
any other of their local or general privileges, can
have a solid security in any place but where that
security has always been looked for, and always
found, -- in the House of Commons. Miserable and
precarious indeed would be the state of their franchises, if they were to find no defence but from
that quarter from whence they have always been attacked! But the late House of Commons, in pass* The attempt upon charters and the privileges of the corporate bodies of the kingdom in the reigns of Charles the Second and James
the Second was made by the crown. It was carried on by the ordinary course of law, in courts instituted for the security of the prop
? ? ? ? 566 MOTION'RELATIVE TO THE
in g that bill, made no attack upon any powers or
pivileges, except such as a House of Commons has
frequently attacked; and will attack, (and they trust,
in the end, with their wonted success,) - that is, upon
those which are corruptly and oppressively adminiserty and franchises of the people. This attempt made by the crown
was attended with complete success. The corporate rights of the city
of London, and of all the companies it contains, were by solemn judgment of'law declared forfeited, and all their franchises, privileges, properties, and estates were of course seized into the hands of the
crown. The injury was fiom the crown: the redress was by Parliament. A bill was brought into the House of Commons, by which the judgment against the city of London, and against the companies,
was reversed: and this bill. passed the House of Lords without any
complaint of trespass on their jurisdiction, although the bill was for a
reversal of a judgment in law. By this act, which is in' the second of
William and Mary, chap. 8, the question. of forfeiture of that charter.
is forever taken out of the power of any court of law: no cognizance
can be taken of it except in Parliament.
Although the act above mentioned has declared the judgment
against the corporation of London to be illegal, yet Blackstone
makes no scruple of asserting, that, "perhaps, in strictness of law,
the proceedings in most of them [the Quo Warranto causes] were
sufficiently regular," leaving it in doubt, whether this regularity did
not apply to the corporation of London, as well as to any of the rest;
and he seems to blame the proceeding (as most blamable it was) not
so much on account of illegality as for the crown's having employed
a legal proceeding for political purposes. He calls it "an exertion
of an act of law for the purposes of the state.
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 545
favor of those privileges which it preserves and enforces, by keeping in that course which has been
found the most effectual for answering their ends.
His Majesty may receive the opinions and wishes of
individuals under their signatures, and of bodies corporate under their seals, as:expressing their own particular sense; and he may grant such redress as the legal powers of the crown enable the crown to afford.
This, and the other House of Parliament, may also
receive the wishes of such corporations and individuals by petition. The collective sense of his people
his Majesty is to receive from his Commons in Parliament assembled. It would destroy the whole spirit
of the Cohstitution? if his Commons were to receive
that sense from the ministers of the crown, or to admit them to be a proper or a regular channel for
conveying it.
That the ministers in the said speech declare, " His. Majesty has a just and confident reliance that we (his
faithful Commons) are animated with the same sentiments of loyalty, and the same attachment to our
excellent Constitution which he had the happiness to
see so fully manifested in every part of the kingdom. "'To represent, that his faithful Commons have never
failed in loyalty to his Majesty. It is new to them
to be reminded of it. It is unnecessary and invidious to press it upon them by any example. This
recommendation* of loyalty, after his Majesty has sat
for so many years, with the full support of all descriptions of his subjects, on the throne of this kingdom,
at a time of profound peace, and without any pretence of the existence or apprehension of war or conspiracy, becomes in itself a source of no small jealousy to his faithful Commons; as many circumstances lead
VOL. II. 35
? ? ? ? :546:MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
-us to apprehendthat therein the ministers have referenee to some other measures and principles of loyalty,, and to sosme other ideas of the Constitution, than the,laws. require, or the practice of Parliament will. addmit. . ',,. . . . Io: regular: communication of the proofs of loyalty
tahnd attachment to the Constitution, alluded to in the
speech from. the throne, have been laid before this
H. Iouse, in order to enable us to judge of the nature,
tendency, or occasion of them, or in what particular
acts they were; displayed;ibut if we are to suppose. the. mianifestations of loyalty (which are held out to
uis. as an example for. imitation) consist in certain ad-:dresses delivered to. his Majesty; promising support to. his,Majesty in the exercise of his prerogative, and ~thanking. his Majesty for removing certain of his ministers, on account of the votes they havegiven upon
bills- depending:in Parliament, - if. this be the ex-. ample of loyalty alluded to in the speech from the
throne,. then we must beg leave to express our seri~ous concern: forA the impression which has been made. on. any of our fellow-subjects by misrepresentations which have seduced them into a seeming approbation
of. proceedings subversive of their own freedom. We
conceive that the opinions delivered in these papers
were not well considered; nor were the parties duly
informed of the nature. of the matters on. which they
were called todetermine, nor of those proceedings' of
Parliament which they. were led to censure.
We. shall act more advisedly. - The loyalty we
shall,manifest. will not be the same with theirs; but,
we. tr;ust, it will be equally sincere, and more enlightened. It is no slight. authority which shall persuade
us. (by receiving as proofs of' loyalty the. mistaken
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 5'47
principles lightly taken up in these addresses) obliquely to- criminate, with the heavy and ungrounded
charge. of: disloyalty and disaffection, an uncorrupt,
independent, and. . reforming Parliament. * Above
all, we shall take care that. none:of the rights and
privileges,. always claimed, and. since the accession of
his. Majesty's illustrious. family constantly exercised
by this Iouse,'(and which. we hold and exercise in
trust for: the Commons of Great Britain,:. and for. their
benefit,) shall be. constructively surrendered,: or even
weakened and impaired,. . under: ambiguous phrases
and implications of censure -on the late Parliamentary
proceedings. i If: these. , claims. are,not well founded,
they ought to. be honestly. abandoned; if they. are
just,- they ought to be steadily and resolutely main-;. tained. . . . . . .
Of his. . Majesty's own gracious. disposition towards
the true principles of our. free: Constitution his faith-* In that Parliament the House: of Commons by -two. several- resolutions put an end to:ithe American. war. Immediately, on the
change of. ministry, which ensued,. in order to secure their own inde-,pendence, and- to. prevent the. accumulation of new burdens on the
people by the:growth of a civil list debt, they passed the Establishment Bill. By that:bill thirty-six offices tenable by members of Parliament were suppressed, and an-order. . of payment was framed by which the growth of any fresh debt was rendered impracticable. The
debt on -the. civil list from the beginning of. the. . present reign had
amounted to one million three. hundred thousand pounds and-upwards.
Another act. was passed for regulating the office. of the PaymasterGeneral and the offices subordinate to it. . . A million of public money
had sometimes. been in the hands of the paymasters: this act-prevented
the possibility of any money whatsoever being'accumulated in that office in:future. The offices of the Exchequer, whose. emoluments in time
of war were. excessive, and grew in. exact proportion to:the public burdens, were regulated, -. some of them. suppressed, and the rest reduced
to fixed salaries. . To secure the freedom of election against the crown)
a bill was passed to disqualify all officers concerned in the collection
? ? ? ? 548 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
ful Commons never did or could entertain a doubt;
but we humbly beg leave to express to his Majesty
our uneasiness concerning other new and unusual
expressions of his ministers, declaratory of a resolu-tion "to support in their just balance the rights and
privileges of every branch of the legislature. "
It were desirable that all hazardous theories concerning a balance of rights and privileges (a mode of
expression wholly foreign to Parliamentary usage)
might have been forborne. His Majesty's faithful
Commons are well instructed in their own rights and
privileges, which they are determined to maintain on
the footing upon which they were handed down from
their ancestors; they are not unacquainted with the
rights and privileges of the House, of Peers; and
they know and respect the lawful prerogatives of the
crown: but they do not think it safe to admit. anything concerning the existence of a balance of those
of the revenue in any of its branches from voting in elections: a most
important act, not only with regard to its primary object, the freedom
of election, but as materially forwarding the due collection of revenue. 'For the same end, (the preserving the freedom of election,) the House
rescinded the famous judgment relative to the Middlesex election, and
expunged it from the journals. -On the principle of reformation of
their own House, connected with a principle of public economy,; an act
passed for rendering contractors with government incapable of a seat
in-Parliament. The India Bill (unfortunately lost in the House of
Lords) pursued the same idea to its completion, and disabled all servants of the East India Company from a seat in that House: for a certain time, and until their conduct was examined into and cleared. The remedy of infinite corruptions and of infinite disorders and oppressions,'as well as the security of the most important objects of public
economy, perished with that bill and that Parliament. That Parliament also instituted a committee to inquire into the collection of the
revenue in all its branches, which prosecuted its duty with great
vigor, and suggested several material improvements.
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 549
rights, privileges, and prerogatives; nor are they able
to discern to what objects ministers would apply their
fiction of a balance, nor what they would consider
as a just one. These unauthorized doctrines have a
tendency to stir improper discussions, and to lead to'mischievous innovations in the Constitution. '*
* If these speculations are let loose, the House of Lords may quarrel with their share of the legislature, as being limited with regard to the origination of grants to the crown and the origination of money
bills. The advisers of the crown may think proper to bring its negative into ordinary use, - and even to dispute, whether a mere nega-: tive, compared with the deliberative power exercised in the other
Houses, be such a share in the legislature as to produce a due balance
in favor of that branch, and thus justify the previous interference of
the crown in the manner lately used. The following will serve to
show how much foundation there is for. great caution concerning
these novel speculations. Lord Shelburne, in his celebrated speech,
April 8th, 1778, expresses himself as follows. (Vide Parliamentary
Register, Vol. X. )
"The noble and learned lord on the woolsack, in the debate which
opened the business of this day, asserted that your Lordships were incompetent to make any alteration in a money bill or a bill of supply. I should be glad to see the matter fairly and fully discussed, and
the subject brought forward and argued upon precedent, as well as
all its collateral relations. I should be pleased to see the question
fairly committed, were it for no other reason but to hear the sleek,
smooth contractors from the other House come to this bar and declare, that they, and they only, could frame a money bill, and they,
and they only, could dispose of the property of the peers of Great Britain. Perhaps some arguments more plausible than those I heard this day from the wodlsack, to show that the Commons have an uncontrollable, unqualified right to bind your Lordships' property, may be urged by them. At present, I beg leave to differ from the noble
and learned lord; for, until the claim, after a solemn discussion of
this House, is openly and directly relinquished, I shall continue to be
of opinion that your Lordships have a right to alter, amend, or reject
a money bill. "
The Duke of Richmond also, in his letter to the volunteers of
Ireland, speaks of several of the powers exercised by the House of
? ? ? ? 550 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
That his -faithful, Commons most humbly recommend,' instead:of the inconsiderate speculations. of:
unexperienced. men, that, on all occasions, resort
should be had to the happy. practice of Parliament,
and to those solid maxims of government which have
prevailed since: the accession of his Majesty's illustrious family, as furnishing the only safe principles on
which the crown and Parliament can proceed.
We think it the more necessary to be cautious
on this head, as, in the last Parliament, the present
ministers had thought proper to countenance, if not
to suggest, an attack upon the most clear and undoubted rights and privileges of this House. *
Commons in the light of usurpations; and his Grace is of opinion,'
that, when the people are restored to what he conceives to be their
rights, in electing the House of Commons, the other branches of the
legislature ought to be restored to theirs. - Vide Remembrancer, Vol.
XVI.
* By an act of Parliament, the Directors of the East India Company are restrained from acceptance of bills drawn from India, beyond
a certain amount, without the consent of the Commissioners of the,
Treasury. The late House, f Commons, finding bills to an immense
amount drawn upon that'body by their servants abroad, and knowing'their circumstances to be exceedingly doubtful, came to a resolution providently cautioning the Lords of the Treasury against the acceptance of these bills, until the House should otherwise direct.
The Court Lords then took occasion to declare against the resolution
as illegal, by the Commons undertaking to direct in the execution of
a trust created by act of Parliament. The House, justly alarmed at
this resolution, which went to the destruction of the whole of its superintending capacity, and particularly in matters relative to its own province of money, directed a committee to search the journals, and they found a regular series of'precedents, commencing from the'remotest
of those records, and carried on to that day, by which it appeared'
that the House interfered, by an authoritative advice and admonition, upon every act of executive government without exception,
and in many much stronger cases than that which the Lords thought
proper to quarrel with.
? ? ? ? SPEECH. FROM THE THRONE. 551
Fearing, from these extraordinary admonitions, and
from the new doctrines, which seem. to have dictated,
several unusual expressions, that his Majesty has
been abused by false representations of the late proceedings in Parliament, we think it our duty respectfully: to inform his Majesty, that no attempt whatever has been' made against his lawful prerogatives, or
against the rights -and privileges of the Peers, by the
late House of Commons, in any of their addresses,
votes, or resolutions; neither do we know of any
proceeding by bill, in which it was proposed to
abridge the extent of his royal prerogative: but, if
such provision had existed in any bill, we protest,
and we declare, against all speeches, acts, or addresses, from any persons whatsoever, which have a
tendency to consider such bills, or the persons con
cerned in them,'as just objects of any kind of censure and punishment from the throne. Necessary
reformations may hereafter require, as they have frequently done in former times, limitations and abridgments, and in some cases an entire extinction, of some branch of prerogative. If bills should be improper. in the form in which they appear in the
House where they originate, they are liable, by the
wisdom of this Constitution, to be corrected, and even
to be totally set aside, elsewhere. This is the known,
the legal, and the safe remedy; but whatever, by the
manifestation of the royal displeasure, tends to intimidate individual members from proposing, or this
House from receiving, debating, and passing bills,
tends to prevent even the beginning of every reformation in the state, and utterly destroys the deliberative
capacity of Parliament. We therefore claim, demand, and insist upon it, as our undoubted right,
? ? ? ? 552 MOTION' RELATIVE TO THE
that no persons. shall be deemed proper objects of
animadversion by the crown, in any mode whatever,
for the votes which. they give or the propositions
which they make in Parliament.
*. We humbly conceive, that besides its share of the
legislative power, and its right of impeachment, that,
by the law and usage of Parliament, this House has
other powers and capacities, which it is bound to
maintain. This House is assured that our humble
advice on the exercise of prerogative will be heard
with- the same attention with which it has ever been
regarded, and that it will be followed by the same
effects.
which it has ever produced, during the happy
and glorious reigns of his Majesty's royal progenitors,
- not doubting but. that, in all those points, we shall
be considered as a council of wisdom and weight to
advise, and not merely as an accuser of competence to
criminate. * This House claims both capacities; and
we trust that we shall be left to our free discretion
which of them. we shall employ as best calculated for
his Majesty's and the national service. Whenever we
shall see it expedient to offer our advice concerning
his Majesty's servants, who are those of the public,
we confidently hope that the personal favor of any
minister, or any set of ministers, will not be more
dear to his Majesty than the credit and character of
a House of Commons. It is an experiment full of
peril to put the representative wisdom and justice of
his Majesty's people in the wrong; it is a crooked
and desperate design, leading to mischief, the extent
3 "I observe, at the same time, that there is no charge or complaint suggested against my present ministers. " - The King's Answer, 25th February, 1784, to the Address of the House of Commons. Vide Resolutions of the House of Commons, printed for Debrett, p. 31.
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 553
ot which no human wisdom can foresee, to attempt to
form a prerogative party in the nation, to be resorted
to as occasion shall require, in derogation from the
authority of the Commons of Great Britain in'Parliament assembled; it is a contrivance full of danger,
for ministers to set up the representative and constituent bodies of the Commons of this kingdom as two
separate and distinct powers, formed to counterpoise
each other, leaving the preference in the hands of
secret advisers of the crown. In such a situation of
things, these advisers, taking advantage of the differences which may accidentally arise or may purposely be fomented between them, will have it in their choice to resort to the one or the other, as may best
suit the purposes of their sinister ambition. By
exciting an emulation and contest between the representative and the constituent bodies, as parties
contending for credit and influence at the throne,
sacrifices will be made by both; and the whole can
end in nothing else than the destruction of the dearest rights and liberties of the nation. '. If there must
be another mode of conveying the collective sense of
the people to the throne than that by the House of
Commons, it ought to be fixed and defined, and its
authority ought to be settled: it ought not to exist
in so precarious and dependent a state as that ministers should have it in their power, at their own mere
pleasure, to acknowledge it with respect or to reject
it with scorn.
It is the undoubted prerogative of the crown to
dissolve Parliament; but we beg leave to lay before
his Majesty, that it is, of all the trusts vested in his
Majesty, the most critical and delicate, and that in
which this House. has the most reason to require, not
? ? ? ? 554 MOTION, RELATIVE TO THE
only the good faith, but the favor of the crown, His
Commons are not always - upon a par with his ministers in an application to popular judgment; it is not in the power of the members of this House to go to. their election at. the moment the most favorable. for them. It is in the power of the crown to choose a
-time for their dissolution whilst great and arduous
matters of state and legislation are depending, which
may be easily misunderstood, and which cannot be
fully explained:before that misunderstanding may
prove fatal to the honor that belongs and to the consideration that is due to members of Parliament. With his Majesty is the gift of all the rewards, the
honors, distinctions, favors, and graces of the state;
with his Majesty is the mitigation of all the rigors of
the law: and we rejoice to see the crown possessed
of trusts calculated to obtain good-will, and charged
with duties which are popular and pleasing. Our
trusts are of a different kind. Our duties are harsh
and invidious in their nature; and justice and safety
is all we call expect in the exercise of them. : We
are to offer salutary, which is not always pleasing
counsel: we are to inquire and to accuse; and the
objects of our inquiry: and charge will be for the
most part persons of wealth, power, and extensive
connections: we are to make rigid laws for the preservation of revenue, which of necessity more or less confine some action or restrain some function which
before was free: what is the most critical and invidious of all, the whole body of the public impositions originate from us, and the hand of the House of Commons is seen and felt in every burden that presses on the people. Whilst' ultimately we are serving
them, and in the first instance whilst we are serving
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 555
his Majesty, it will be hard indeed, if we, should see
a House of Commons: the victim of its zeal and fidelity, sacrificed by his ministers to those very popular
discontents which shall be excited by our dutiful endeavors for the security and greatness of his throne.
No other consequence can result from such an example, but that, in future, the House of Commons, consulting its safety at the expense of its duties, and suffering the whole energy of the state to be relaxed,
will shrink from every service-which, however necessaryj is of a great and arduous nature,- or that, willing to provide for the'public necessities, and at. the same time to secure the means of -performing that
task, they will exchange independence for protection,
and will court a subservient existence through the
favor of those ministers of state or those secret advisers: who ought themselves to stand in awe of the
Commons of this realm.
A House of Commons respected by his ministers is
essential to his Majesty's service: it is fit that they
should yield to Parliament, and not that Parliament
should be new-modelled until it is fitted to their purposes. If our authority is only to be held up when
we coincide in opinion with his Majesty's advisers,
but is to be set at nought the moment it differs from
them, the House of Commons will sink into a mere
appendage of administration, and will lose that independent character which, inseparably connecting the
honor and reputation with the acts of this House, enables us to afford a real, effective, and substantial support to his government. : It is the deference shown to our opinion, when we dissent from the servants of the
crown, which alone can give authority to the proceedings of this House, when it concurs with their
measures.
? ? ? ? 556 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
That authority once lost, the credit of his Mtajesty's crown will be impaired in the eyes of all nations.
Foreign powers, who may yet wish to revive a friendly
intercourse with this nation, will look in vain for that
hold which gave a connection with Great Britain the
preference to an alliance with any other state. A
HIouse of Commons of which ministers were known
to stand in awe, where everything was necessarily
discussed on principles fit to be openly and publicly
avowed, and which could not be retracted or varied
without danger, furnished a ground of confidence in
the public faith which the engagement of no state
dependent on the fluctuation of personal favor and
private advice can ever pretend to. If faith with
the House of Cdmmons, the grand security for the
national faith itself, can be broken with impunity, a
wound is given to the political importance of Great
Britain which will not easily be healed.
That there was a great variance between the late
House of Commons and certain persons, whom his
Majesty has been advised to make and continue asministers, in defiance of the advice of that House2 is
notorious to the world. That House did not confide
in those ministers; and they withheld their confidence from them for reasons for which posterity will
honor and respect the names of those who composed
that House of Commons, distinguished for its independence. They could not confide in persons who. have shown a disposition to dark and dangerous intrigues. By these intrigues they have weakened,
if not destroyed, the clear assurance which his Majesty's people, and which all nations, ought to have of
what are and what are not the real acts of his government.
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 557
If it should be seen. that his ministers may continue in their offices' without any signification to. them of his Majesty's displeasure at-any of their
-measures, whilst persons considerable for their rank,
and known to have had access to his Majesty's sacred
person, can with impunity abuse that advantage, and. employ his Majesty's name to disavow and counteract the proceedings of his official servants, nothing but distrust, discord, debility, contempt of all authority, and general confusion,: can prevail in his government.
*This we lay before his Majesty, with humility and
concern, as the inevitable. effect of a spirit of intrigue
in his executive government: an evil'which we have
but too much reason to be persuaded exists and increases. During the course of the last session it
broke out in a manner the most alarming. This evil
was infinitely aggravated by the unauthorized, but
not disavowed,. use which has been made of his Majesty's name, for the. purpose of the most unconstitutional, corrupt, and dishonorable influence on the minds of the members of Parliament that ever was
practised in this kingdom. No attention even to
exterior decorum, in the practice of corruption and
intimidation employed on peers, was observed: several peers were obliged under menaces to retract
their declarations and:to recall their proxies.
The Commons have the deepest interest in the
purity and integrity of the Peerage. The Peers dispose of all the property in the kingdom, in the last
resort; and they dispose of it on their honor, and not
on their oaths, as all the members of every other
tribunal in the kingdom must do, - though in them
the proceeding is not conclusive. We have, there
? ? ? ? -558 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
fore, a right to:demand that no application shall be
made to peers of such a:nature as may give room. to
call in question, much less, to attaint, our sole security for all that we possess. This corrupt proceeding appeared to the House of Commons, who are the natural guardians of the purity of Parliament,
and of the. purity of every branch of judicature, a
most reprehensible and dangerous practice, tending
to shake the very foundation of the. authority of the
House of Peers; and they branded it as such by their
resolution.
The House had not sufficient evidence to enable
them legally to punish this practice, but they had
enough to caution them against all confidence in the
authors and abettors of it. They performed their
duty in humbly advising his Majesty against the employment of such' ministers; but his Majesty was
advised to keep those ministers, and to dissolve that
Parliament. The House, aware of the importance
and urgency of its duty with regard to the British
interests in India, which were and are in the utmost
disorder, and in the utmost peril, most humbly requested his Majesty not to dissolve the Parliament
during the course of their very critical proceedings
on that subject. His Majesty's gracious condescension to that request was conveyed in the royal faith,
pledged to a House of Parliament, and solemnly
delivered from the throne. It was but a very few
days after a committee had been, with the consent
and concurrence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, appointed for an inquiry into certain accounts
delivered. to the House by the Court of Directors,
and then actually engaged in that inquiry, that the
ministers, regardless of the assurance given from the
? ? ? ? SPEECHi FROM THE THRONE. 559
crown:to a House of Commons, did dissolve that
Parliament. We most humbly submit to his Majesty's consideration the consequences of this their
breach of public faith.
Whilst the members of the House of Commons,
under that security, were. engaged in his Majesty's
and:the national business,:endeavors were industriously used to calumniate those whom it was found
impracticable to corrupt. The reputation of the
members, and. the reputation of the Ho-use itself,
was. undermined in every part of the kingdom,
In the speech from the throne relative to India, we
are cautioned by the ministers "not to lose sight of
the: effect any measure may have on the Constitution
of our country. ":We are apprehensive that a calumnious report,: spread:abroad, of an attack upon his
Majesty's prerogative by the late House of Commons,
may have' made an impression on his royal mind, and
have given occasion to this unusual admonition to the
present. This attack is charged to have been made
in the late Parliament by a bill which passed the
House of Commons, in the late session of fthat Parliament, for the regulation of the affairs, for the preservation of the commerce, and for the amendment of the government of this nation, in the East Indies.
That his Majesty and his people may have an opportunity of entering into the ground of this injurious charge, we beg leave humbly to acquaint his
Majesty, that, far from having made any infringement whatsoever on any part of his royal prerogative,
that bill did, for a limited time, give to his Majesty
certain powers never before possessed by the crown;
and;fr this his present ministers (who, rather than
fall short in the number of their calumnies, employ
? ? ? ? 560 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
some that are contradictory) have slandered this
House, as aiming at the extension of an unconstitutional influence in his Majesty's crown. This pretended attempt to increase the influence of the crown they were weak enough to endeavor to persuade' his
Majesty's people was amongst the causes which excited his Majesty's resentment against his late ministers.
Further, to remove the impressions of this calumny concerning an attempt in the House of Commons
against his prerogative, it is proper to inform his Majesty, that the territorial possessions in the East Indies
never have been declared by any public judgment,
act, or instrument, or any resolution of Parliament
whatsoever, to be the subject matter of his Majesty's
prerogative; nor have they ever been understood as
belonging to his ordinary administration, or to be
annexed or united to his crown; but that they are
acquisitions of a new and peculiar description,* unknown to the ancient executive constitution of this
country.
From time to time, therefore, Parliament provided
for their government according to its discretion, and
to its opinion of what was required by the public ne* The territorial possessions in the East Indies were acquired to
the Company, in virtue of grants from the Great Mogul, in the nature
of offices and jurisdictions, to be held under him, and dependent upon
his crown, with the express condition of being obedient to orders from
his court, and of paying an annual tribute to his treasury. It is true
that no obedience is yielded to these orders, and for some time past
there has been no payment made of this tribute. But it is under a
grant so conditioned that they still hold. To subject the King of
Great Britain as tributary to a foreign power by the acts of his subjects; to suppose the grant valid, and yet the condition void; to
suppose it good for the king, and insufficient for the Company; to
suppose it an interest divisible between the parties: these are some
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 561
cessities. We do not know that his. Majesty was entitled, by prerogative, to exercise any act of authority
whatsoever in the Companys affairs:, or that, in effect,
such authority has ever, been exer6cised. His Majesty's patronage was not takenii. awalby that bill; because it'is notorious that hi:MIjtesty never originally
had the appointment of a single officer, civil or military, in the Company's establishment in India: nor
has the least degree of patronage ever been acquired
to the crown in any other manner or measure than
as the power was thought expedient to be granted by
act of Parliament, - that is, by the very same authority by which the offices were disposed of and regulated
in the bill which his Majesty's servants have falsely
and injuriously represented as infringing upon the
prerogative of the crown.
Before the year 1773 the whole administration of
India, and the whole patronage to office there, was in.
the hands of the East India Compafiy. The East India Company is not a branch of his Majesty's prerogative administration, nor does that body exercise any
species of authority under it, nor indeed from any
British title that does not derive all its legal validity
from acts of Parliament.
few of the many legal difficulties to be surmounted, before the Common Law of England can acknowledge the East India Company's Asiatic affairs to be a subject matter of prerogative, so as to bring it within the verge of English jurisprudence. It is. a verv anomalous species of power and property which is held by the East: India Company.
Our English prerogative law does not furnish principles, much less
precedents, by which it can be defined or adjusted. Nothing but the
eminent dominion of Parliament over every British subject, in every
concern, and in every circumstance in which he is placed, can adjust
this new, intricate matter. Parliament may act wisely or unwisely,
justly or unjustly; but. Parliament alone is competent to it.
VOL. II. 36
? ? ? ? 562 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
~ When a claim was asserted to the India territorial
possessions in the occupation of the Company, these
possessions were not claimed as parcel of his Majesty's
patrimonial estate, or as a fruit of the ancient inheritance of his crown: they were claimed for the public. And when agreements were made with the East
India Company concerning any composition for the
holding, or any participation of the profits, of those
territories, the agreement was made with the public;
and the preambles of the several acts have uniformly
so stated it. These agreements were not made (even
nominally) with his Majesty, but with Parliament:
and the bills making and establishing such agreements always originated in this House; which appropriated the money to await the disposition of Parliament, without the ceremony of previous consent from the crown even so much as suggested by any of his
ministers: which previous consent is an observance
of decorum, not indeed of strict right, but generally
paid, when a new appropriation takes place in any
part of his Majesty's prerogative revenues.
In pursuance of a right thus: uniformly recognized
and uniformly acted on, when Parliament undertook
the reformation of the East India Company in 1773,
a commission was appointed, as the commission in the
late bill was appointed; and it was made to continue
for a term of years, as the commission in the late bill
was to continie; all the commissioners were named
in Parliament, as in the late bill they. were named.
As they received, so they held their offices, wholly
independent of the crown; they held them for a
fixed term; they were not removable by an address
of either House or even of both Houses of Parliament, a precaution observed in the late bill relative
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 563'to the commissioners proposed therein; nor were they bound by the strict rules of proceeding which
regulated and restrained the late commissioners
against all possible abuse'of a power which could
not fail of being diligently and zealously watched by the ministers of the crown, and the proprietors of the stock,. as well as by Parliament. Their proceedings were, in that bill, directed to be of such a nature as easily to subject them to the strictest revision of both, in case of any malversation.
In the year 1780, an act of Parliament again made
provision for the government of those territories for
another four years; without any sort of reference to
prerogative; nor was the least objection taken at the
second, more than at the first of those periods, as if
an infringement had been made upon the rights of
the crown: yet his Majesty's ministers have thought-'fit to represent the late commission as an entire inno-,vation on. the Constitution, and the setting up a new order and estate in the nation, tending to the subversion of the monarchy itself.
If the government of the East Indies, other' than
by his Majesty's prerogative, be in effect a fourth order in the commonwealth, this order has long existed; because the East India Company has. for many years.
enjoyed it in the fullest extent, and does at this day
enjoy the whole administration of those provinces,
and the patronage to offices throughout that great
empire, except as it is controlled by act of Parliament.
It was the ill condition and ill administration of
the Company's affairs which induced. this House
(merely as a temporary establishment) to. . vest the
same powers which the Company did before possess.
? ? ? ? 564 MOTION RELATIVE TO THE
(and no other,) for a -limited time, and under very,strict directions,'in proper hands, until they could be
restored,'or further provision made concerning them.
It was therefore no creation whatever of a new power,
but the removal of an old power, long since created,
and then existing, from the management of those
persons who had manifestly and dangerously abused
their trust. This House, which well knows the Parliamentary origin of. all the Company's powers and
privileges, and is -not ignorant or negligent of the
authority which may vest those powers and: privileges in others, if justice and. the public safety so
require, is conscious to itself that it no more creates
a new order in the state, by making occasional
trustees for the direction of the Company, than it
originally did in giving a much more permanent
trust to the Directors or to the General Court of that
body. The monopoly of the East India Company
was a derogation from the general freedom of trade
belonging to his Majesty's people. The powers of
government, and of peace and war, are parts of prerogative of the highest order. Of our competence to
restrain the rights of all his subjects by act of Parliament, and to vest those high and eminent prerogatives even in a particular company of merchants, there has been no question. We beg leave most
humbly to claim as our right, and as a right which
this House has always used, to frame such bills for
the regulation of that commerce, and of the territories held by the East India Company, and everything relating to them, as to our discretion shall seem fit; and we assert and maintain that therein
we follow, and do not innovate on, the Constitution.
That his Majesty's ministers, misled by their am
? ? ? ? SPEECH FROM THE THRONE. 565
bition, have endeavored, if possible, to form a faction
in the country against the popular part of the Constitution; and have therefore thought proper to add to
their slanderous accusation against a House of Parliament, relative to his Majesty's'prerogative, another
of a different nature, calculated for the purpose of
raising fears and jealousies' among the corporate bodies of the kingdom, and of persuading uninformed
persons 1~elonging to those corporations to look to
and to make addresses to them, as protectors of. their
rights, under their several charters, from the designs
which they, without any ground, charged the then
House of Comlnons to have formed against charters
in general. For this purpose they have not scrupled
to assert that the exertion of his Majesty's prerogative in the late precipitate change in his administration, and the dissolution of the late Parliament, were
measures adopted in order to rescue the people and
their rights out of the hands of the House of Commons, their representatives.
We trust that his Majesty's subjects are not yet so
far deluded as to believe that the charters, or that
any other of their local or general privileges, can
have a solid security in any place but where that
security has always been looked for, and always
found, -- in the House of Commons. Miserable and
precarious indeed would be the state of their franchises, if they were to find no defence but from
that quarter from whence they have always been attacked! But the late House of Commons, in pass* The attempt upon charters and the privileges of the corporate bodies of the kingdom in the reigns of Charles the Second and James
the Second was made by the crown. It was carried on by the ordinary course of law, in courts instituted for the security of the prop
? ? ? ? 566 MOTION'RELATIVE TO THE
in g that bill, made no attack upon any powers or
pivileges, except such as a House of Commons has
frequently attacked; and will attack, (and they trust,
in the end, with their wonted success,) - that is, upon
those which are corruptly and oppressively adminiserty and franchises of the people. This attempt made by the crown
was attended with complete success. The corporate rights of the city
of London, and of all the companies it contains, were by solemn judgment of'law declared forfeited, and all their franchises, privileges, properties, and estates were of course seized into the hands of the
crown. The injury was fiom the crown: the redress was by Parliament. A bill was brought into the House of Commons, by which the judgment against the city of London, and against the companies,
was reversed: and this bill. passed the House of Lords without any
complaint of trespass on their jurisdiction, although the bill was for a
reversal of a judgment in law. By this act, which is in' the second of
William and Mary, chap. 8, the question. of forfeiture of that charter.
is forever taken out of the power of any court of law: no cognizance
can be taken of it except in Parliament.
Although the act above mentioned has declared the judgment
against the corporation of London to be illegal, yet Blackstone
makes no scruple of asserting, that, "perhaps, in strictness of law,
the proceedings in most of them [the Quo Warranto causes] were
sufficiently regular," leaving it in doubt, whether this regularity did
not apply to the corporation of London, as well as to any of the rest;
and he seems to blame the proceeding (as most blamable it was) not
so much on account of illegality as for the crown's having employed
a legal proceeding for political purposes. He calls it "an exertion
of an act of law for the purposes of the state.
