In any case,
whatever
the rule of the Rohillas had been, it
was better than that of the nawabs of Oudh, which, especially in
the time of Shuja-ud-daula's successor, was unspeakably bad and vile.
was better than that of the nawabs of Oudh, which, especially in
the time of Shuja-ud-daula's successor, was unspeakably bad and vile.
Cambridge History of India - v5 - British India
“I am little more”,
said Hastings on one occasion, “than the compiler of other men's
opinions. ” But what is also clear beyond any doubt, is the immense
ability, the cact, the urbanity with which they were carried. In every
period of history any notable political or social improvements, if
carefully investigated, will be found to be largely derived from a
common stock of enlightened contemporary opinion. Many of them
are in the air of the time. But to argue from this that credit must be
withheld from the statesman who finally carries them into actuality
is extremely unfair. The general impression forced upon any enquirer
by a perusal of the innumerable minutes, letters, consultations and
dispatches of these two years is that Hastings carried along parallel
lines, and contemporaneously, a great series of reforms, economic,
fiscal, judicial and social. They form a fine record of devoted and
laborious work and reveal in their author administrative capacities
of a unique kind. He is master of every branch of the enquiry, end-
lessly fertile in resource, convincing in argument, reasonable in
discussion. He toiled ceaselessly and encountered all opposition
dauntlessly. Yet the bitter tragedy of the whole thing was that,
before the work could be completed, power and authority were
snatched away from him, and years that would naturally have been
devoted to the further development of his great task were spent in
a desperate and sometimes almost a despairing effort to protect his
position, career and honour against a vindictive and cruel assault. He
speaks of his work by the metaphor of an unfinished building, “a
great and weighty fabric, of which all the parts were yet loose and
destitute of the superior weight, which was to give them their mutual
support and their . . . collateral strength". 2
1 Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, p. 151.
2 Selections from the State Papers of the Governors-General
Hastings, ed. Forrest, II, 64.
Warren
## p. 215 (#243) ############################################
CHAPTER XII
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE
ROHILLA WAR
HAVING abolished the dual government set up by Clive,
Hastings had next to overhaul the system of relations established with
Indian princes. Clive's policy in this field had worked well for five
years, but changing circumstances had made revision necessary. At
the time of Clive's settlement northern India had been temporarily
free from the Maratha terror. It was the imminent renewal of that
menace which entirely altered the whole situation. The Marathas,
who in 1761 had been driven headlong into the Deccan after their
terrible rout at Panipat at the hands of Ahmad Shah, once more
recrossed the Narbada in 1769, and came surging northward again
to occupy Delhi in 1771. They offered to restore Shah 'Alam to his
throne and make his imperial title a reality. The emperor consulted
the English, who implored him to reject so dangerous and deceptive
a proposal. In spite of this, he agreed to the Maratha terms, and left
Allahabad in May, 1771. Though the English had protested, they
parted with him amicably. It was to prove a momentous and
calamitous decision, and the misguided emperor was never again to
return to British territory. For thirty-two years he was practically
a state prisoner in the hands of the Marathas or the Afghans. A year
after his restoration, the Marathas forced upon him a minister of
their own choice, and obliged him to make over to them the districts
of Kora and Allahabad. A new and delicate problem now con-
fronted the Company's servants. To continue to pay the tribute was
practically to subsidize its most formidable enemies. The Company
was bound to suffer for its own quixotic generosity. It had bound
itself to pay tribute, as Hastings said, to an idol of its own creation,
"not one of his natural subjects offered any kind of submission to his
authority, when we first fell down and worshipped it”. 1 With regard
to the districts there were four possible courses; to let the Marathas
occupy them, to take them ourselves, to keep them for Shah 'Alam,
or to give them back to Oudh. It was finally decided to discontinue
paying the tribute of twenty-six lakhs to Shah 'Alam on the ground
that "his desertion of us, and union with our enemies, leaves us
without a pretence to throw away more of the Company's property
upon him", and to restore Kora and Allahabad to the nawah of Oudh
(by the treaty of Benares) for fifty lakhs of rupees.
Hastings had no doubts and no reservations as to the desirability
2
1 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 59.
2 Gleig, op. cit. I, 360.
## p. 216 (#244) ############################################
216
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
of this course : “I am not apt to attribute a large share of merit to my
own actions, but I own that this is one of the few to which I can with
confidence affix my own approbation”. 1 He thus sums up the
advantages of his policy :
By ceding them to the (Nawab of Oudh), we strengthen our alliance with
him, we make him more dependent upon us, as he is more exposed to the
hostilities of the Marathas; we render a junction between him and them, which
has been sometimes apprehended, morally impossible, since their pretensions to
Korah will be a constant source of animosity between them; we free ourselves
from the expense and all the dangers attending either a remote property, or a
remote connection; we adhere literally to the limited system laid down by the
Honourable Court of Directors we provide effectually for the protection of
our frontier, and reduce the expenses of our army, even in employing it; and
lastly we acquire a nett sum of 50 lacs of rupees most seasonably obtained for
the relief of the Company's necessities. 2
This solution met with the support both of the council and the
directors, and it is difficult to see what other course was possible.
Yet it has been condemned, and was opposed by Sir Robert Barker.
Burke described it as a “shocking, horrible, and outrageous breach
of faith". 3 Mill says:
Generosity, had it any place in such arrangements, pleaded with almost
unexampled strength in behalf of the forlorn Emperor, the representative
of so illustrious a race, who now possessed hardly a roof to cover him. Justice
too, or something not easily distinguished from justice, spoke on the same side. 4
But Hastings and his council clearly require no defence. The districts
and the tribute, which was purely eleemosynary, had only been
granted to Shah 'Alam to support his imperial dignity while under
the protection of the British. When he handed them over to the
Marathas, morally—if not legally–ha forfeited his right to retain
them. The Company's course would no doubt have been clearer, and
its case stronger, if it had definitely warned the emperor, as it might
well have done, when he marched away to Delhi, that it would not
continue to pay tribute or allow him to retain the districts, should
he become dependent upon its enemies. It should also be remem-
bered that, before the decision to withhold the revenues was taken,
Shah 'Alam was asked to send representatives to Benares to state his
case, but that he omitted to do so.
The only other question worth consideration is whether there
was any possible alternative. Might not the Company have retained
Kora and Allahabad for itself? To this Hastings had two objections;
in the first place, it would be unwise to retain in our own hands the
administration of provinces entirely separated from the rest of our
territories. Secondly, as he afterwards said before the House of
i Gleig, op. cit. I, 355.
2 Forrest, Selections from State Papers in the Foreign Department of the
Government of India, I, 50.
3 Bond, Speeches in the Trial of Warren Hastings, IV, 759.
4 Mill, History of India, m, 397.
>
## p. 217 (#245) ############################################
THE ROHILLAS AND OUDH
217
Commons, we should then have excited the jealousy of the nawab
of Oudh, to whom the districts had formerly belonged, and so have
endangered our alliance with him. It is always worth while to
remember that the central pillar of Hastings's foreign policy was the
alliance with Oudh.
The other important problem of foreign affairs before the arrival
of the new council was the Rohilla War. Rohilkhand, a fertile country
lying along the base of the Himalayas, marched with the north-west
frontier of Oudh. Its area was about 12,000 square miles and its
population about 6,000,000. The bulk of the people were Hindus,
but the ruling race were Rohillas, that is mountaineers, or Pathans;
or Afghans, the words signifying much the same thing. The country
was governed by a loose confederacy of chiefs under the headship of
Rahmat Khan, generally known as Hafiz Rahmat Khan because he
had been guardian (hafiz) of the sons of the late ruler 'Ali Muham-
mad and had ultimately usurped their rights. The Rohillas had
established their power early in the eighteenth century.
The events leading up to the war must be briefly summarised. In
1772 the Marathas invaded and ravaged Rohilkhand. The Rohillas
thereupon appealed to the nawab of Oudh. They did so reluctantly,
for there was no cordiality between him and them. The nawab had
long notoriously coveted their territory. They knew that if it paid
him to do so, he would not hesitate to combine with the Marathas
against them, just as they in their turn had considered the possibility
of making peace with the invaders, by giving them a free passage
through their territory into Oudh. But both parties for the moment
dreaded a Maratha invasion more than anything in the world, and
this drove them into an uneasy alliance. In reality, as Sir John
Strachey observes, "The Vazier, the Rohillas and the Marathas were
all utterly unscrupulous and each knew that no trust could be placed
in either of the others". 1 We find, for instance, that the nawab asked
Hastings "whether he should persuade the Rohillas to attack the
Marathas . . . and take his advantage of both when they should have
weakened each other by mutual hostilities". British officers of a later
date would probably have improved the occasion by a homily on
political rectitude, and it is rather typical of Hastings—both of his
cynicism and his frankness—that, in his own words, "I commended
the project, but expressed my apprehension of the consequences”. 2
Finally, after the usual interval of intrigue and finesse, during
which the advice of Sir Robert Barker just availed to prevent the
nawab from joining the Marathas, a treaty of alliance was made, 17
June, 1772, between the Rohillas and Shuja-ud-daula. The Rohillas
agreed to pay him forty lakhs on his obliging the Marathas to retire
from their country “either by peace or war". The treaty was really
due to the initiative and intervention of Sir Robert Barker, the British
1 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 49.
2 Idem, p. 113.
## p. 218 (#246) ############################################
218
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
.
commander-in-chief, an intervention not at first welcomed by
nọt
Hastings and the Select Committee, and was signed in his presence.
Almost before the signatures. were appended, the Marathas evacuated
Rohilkhand, and the Rohillas reoccupied the country.
The casus foederis arose in 1773. In the spring the Marathas
re-entered Rohilkhand at Ramghat. The nawab of Oudh, with a
British brigade in support under Sir Robert Barker, advanced to
repel the invasion. After some, manoeuvring and counter-marching
the detachments of the Marathas which had crossed the Ganges (the
Inain body seem to have remained on the other bank) recrossed the
river on 28 March. In May the revolution at Poona, which broke
out on the death of the Peshwa, Madhu Rao, caused the Marathas
to return to the Deccan, leaving only a few small garrisons in Northern
India. The nawab of Oudh now demanded from the Rohillas the sum
due to him, but they refused to pay. They claimed that the Marathas
had really retired of their own accord, and that there had been no
collision with the allies.
It seems clear that the nawab and the British protected Rohil-
khand mainly by their presence on the spot, for Hastings on one
occasion acknowledged that “the Marathas (i. e. the main body) lay
during the whole campaign of 1773 in the neighbourhood of our army,
but without daring either to cross the river or to approach the borders
of Kora". 1 It was claimed-and technically no doubt the claim was
indisputable—that the Rohillas still owed the forty lakhs, for the
treaty stipulated that they were liable if the Marathas retreated
"efther by peace or war". The Rohillas, however, fell back upon a
second line of defence by questioning whether the Marathas had
really been driven out at all : "they might return the next year,
when our joint forces were not in the Rohilla country, to defend
them; that we had done little, meaning that we had not destroyed
the Maratha armies". Legally no doubt the Rohillas were in the
wrong, but it must be admitted that European nations have often
evaded treaty obligations on no better grounds.
Nothing further was done till Hastings held his conference with
the nawab of Oudh at Benares in August and September, 1773. There
he' concluded a public treaty which made no direct mention of the
Rohillas. By it Kora and Allahabad, as already mentioned, were
ceded to the nawab in return for fifty lakhs of rupees, and it was
stipulated that, whenever he employed a British brigade, he should
pay a subsidy of 210,000 rupees a month. At the same time a secret
agreement was made by which the British were to furnish a brigade,
to help the "nawab punish the Rohillas for their evasion, and conquer
the country for him. In return the nawab was to bear all the expenses
of the campaign andato pay a sum of forty lakhs. Almost as soon,
Warren
1 Selections from the State Papers of the Governors General
Hastings, ed. Forrest, I, 311.
## p. 219 (#247) ############################################
THE WAZIR DEMANDS HELP
219
.
however, as the treaty had been concluded, the nawab began to doubt
whether he could bear the pecuniary burden involved, and since
Hastings had some heart-searchings as to its expediency, they
mutually agreed to postpone the expedition. The thought came to
the governor-general, as he said years afterwards in his defence
before the House of Commons in 1786, that:
all my actions were to be viewed through a very remote medium, with a thou-
sand refractions of private interest, secret misrepresentation, general prejudice,
and the precipitation of unformed judgement. 1
In November, 1773, the nawab having, with his usual fickleness,
changed his mind, asked for the aid stipulated in the treaty. Hastings
laid a minute before the council in which he pointed out the ad-
vantages of intervention and among them that “our ally would
obtain by this acquisition a complete state shut in effectually from
foreign invasions by the Ganges, all the way from the frontiers of
Behar to the mountains of Tibet". On the other hand he expressed
doubts as to its expediency:
arising from the circumstances of the Company at home, exposed to popular
clamour, all its measures liable to be canvassed in Parliament, their charter
drawing to a close and . . . ministers unquestionably ready to take advantage of
every unfavourable circumstance in the negotiation for its renewal. 2
Accordingly he proposed to agree to the expedition but on terms
which were likely to make the nawab relinquish the design. The
council, which, through Hastings and his Select Committee, had been
committed to the whole business without much choice on their part,
declared : "We concur heartily in wishing to avoid the expedition
proposed, without entering into the discussion on the propriety of
such an enterprise on general principles”. 3 They added rather mean-
ingly that they were sensible of the embarrassment that Hastings was
under "from what passed on the subject between him and the Vizier
at Benares”. 3 The upshot was that the nawab on 10 January, 1774,
declined the conditions laid down. But on 3 February, 1774, a letter
arrived from the vacillating nawab agreeing to everything and asking
that the brigade should be sent. So after all the policy of bluff had
broken down, and the Bengal government found themselves com-
mitted to the expedition.
The British army under Colonel Champion marched into Rohil-
khand supported by the forces of Oudh on 17 April. Six days later
a battle took place at Miranpur Katra, called by the victors the battle
of St George because of the date on which it was fought. Hafiz
Rahmat Khan was killed fighting bravely at the head of his troops.
The valour of the Rohillas extorted the admiration of the British
commander. They showed, he said :
1 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 112.
2 Idem, p. 121.
3 Idem, p. 123.
## p. 220 (#248) ############################################
220
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
great bravery and resolution . . . they gave proofs of a good share of military
knowledge by showing inclinations to force both our flanks at the same time and
endeavouring to call off our attention by a brisk fire on our centre . it is im-
possible to describe a more obstinate firmness of resolution than the enemy
displayed. 1
The action was entirely decisive. About 20,000 Rohillas were
driven out of the country, which was incorporated in the dominions
of the nawab of Oudh, a small portion only, together with Rampur,
was left in the possession of Faizulla Khan, son of 'Ali Muhammad,
the founder of the Rohilla power, whose sons had been dispossessed
by their guardian, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, and a treaty was made with
him, 7 October, 1774, before the campaign was over. Champion
brought serious charges against the nawab of Oudh and his troops
for cruelties inflicted on the peasantry and the family of Hafiz
Rahmat Khan.
The Rohilla War was the subject of the first attack on Hastings in
Parliament in April, 1786, but as the Commons refused to accept the
charge, it was not made one of the articles in the impeachment. The
war has earned the strong condemnation of all the older school of
Indian historians. Their view, in its extreme presentment, was that
Hastings deliberately sold the lives and liberties of a free people and
condoned horrible atrocities on the part of the armies of the nawab
of Oudh. Sir John Strachey in his Hastings und the Rohilla War has
put forward a complete and elaborate defence. He contends that the
Rohillas were a p! undering Afghan tribe who had only established
their power over the Hindu population of Rohilkhand for about a
quarter of a century. The Rohillas, he says, were as much foreigners
in Rohilkhand as Frenchmen in Spain or Russians in Poland in the
time of Napoleon; that the aim of the nawab of Oudh and the English
was to "exterminate" the Rohillas only in the literal sense of the
term, that is, to drive them over the frontier, not to massacre them;
that Champion failed to substantiate his serious charges against the
conduct of the allies by definite details; that he began the campaign
in a thoroughly discontented frame of mind, and that he was extremely
jealous of the plunder acquired by the soldiers of his ally; that, since
the Rohillas declined to pay the forty lakhs they had promised in the
treaty of 1772, the nawab of Oudh had a good legal and moral case
against them; that Hastings can be entirely defended from the charge
of callousness and brutality, for he took prompt measures to make a
serious protest to the nawab; that as a matter of fact, the campaign
in Rohilkhand "had been carried on with an absence of violence and
bloodshed and generally with a degree of humanity altogether un-
usual in Indian warfare”;2 finally, that Hastings's motives in the war
were statesmanlike and defensible. They were first, to punish the
a
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department
of the Government of India, I, 97.
2 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 233.
## p. 221 (#249) ############################################
HASTINGS'S DEFENCE
221
.
Rohillas for a serious breach of a treaty, secondly to protect Bengal
by giving the nawab, the Company's ally, a scientific and natural
frontier; thirdly, to acquire for the Company the valuable pecuniary
benefit of a subsidy for the maintenance of one-third of our army.
Summing up generally, Strachey asks the question :
Is a British Governor justified in making war upon a confederacy of bar-
barous chiefs, who, not long before, had imposed their rule on a population
foreign to themselves in race and religion; through whose country the only
road lies open for attacks by savage invaders upon a British ally, whose secu-
rity is essential to the security of British possessions; who are too weak and too
treacherous to be relied on to close this road; and who have injured that ally
by breaking a treaty with him, negotiated and attested by the British general,
and approved by the British Government? 1
Clearly he assumes an answer in the affirmative, and we may
certainly admit that we have fought many wars on grounds far less
adequate.
But though Sir John Strachey makes good most of his points, it
is absurd to say that either the policy leading up to the war or the
actual conduct of operations was beyond temperate criticism. Hastings
was obviously himself doubtful about the expediency of the whole
transaction, and his council still more so. He seems to have allowed
himself to be drawn into the matter without having carefully thought
it out. The whole question in its initial stages was weakly handled.
For a statesman to commit himself to a course of action while hoping
that the need for it may not arise, is not the happiest or the most
efficient kind of political expedient. The truth is Hastings w. . . always
tempted by, novel and daring schemes. We shall frequently encounter
the same characteristic in his later history. Sir Alfred Lyall speaks
truly of “the hardy and self-reliant spirit of political enterprise that
is so strongly diffused through his whole career and character". 2
It is no less true that Mill and Macaulay wasted a good deal of
sentiment, and falsified a good deal of history, in painting a picture
of the Rohillas as an ancient people long inhabiting a peaceful and
happy valley, but the fact that the Rohillas had only established
themselves for about twenty-five years has really nothing to do with
the justice or injustice of the war. Their rights were quite as good as
that of most of the ruling powers of India at this time, and quite as
good as those of the East India Company itself. The more important
question is whether the rule of the nawab of Oudh, which we were
now imposing over the peasantry of Rohilkhand, was better or worse
than that of the chieftains we were dispossessing. The evidence as to
the condition of the country under Rohilla sway is conflicting, but
the weight of it is undoubtedly in their favour.
The only writer hostile to them is Charles Hamilton, who depends
mainly on sources inimical to Hafiz Rahmat Khan, and even he only
1 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 260.
2 Sir Alfred Lyall, Warren Hastings, p. 174.
## p. 222 (#250) ############################################
222
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
.
condemns their régime when their control was relaxing. As Hafiz
Rahmat Khan's power weakened, he says, "the Hindu farmers, and
other inhabitants of the country, groaned under the worst species of
military vassalage”. 1 There seems to be no other corroboration of
this view. Hafiz Rahmat Khan was a ruler of ability, courage and
considerable culture. Sir John Strachey himself concludes that under
his strong personal rule and that of his brother chiefs, "the mass of
the Hindu population were treated with greater consideration and
received better protection than was the case in any of the neighbour-
ing provinces, excepting those in the possession of Najib-ud-daula"-
himself, be it noted, a Rohilla. Elphinstone declares that their kind-
ness to their Hindu subjects cannot be denied, and that the state of
improvement to which they had brought their country excited the
admiration of our troops. In 1781 the British Resident at Rampur
described that district as "what the whole of Rohilkhand was under
the government of the Rohillas, a garden without an uncultivated
spot”. Major Hannay in evidence given before the council in 1774
said that “the country appeared to be in good cultivation. . . . It is
in general one of the best cultivated countries I have seen in Hindo-
stan”.
In any case, whatever the rule of the Rohillas had been, it
was better than that of the nawabs of Oudh, which, especially in
the time of Shuja-ud-daula's successor, was unspeakably bad and vile.
As regards the alleged atrocities perpetrated by the nawab and
his army, there is little doubt that Champion greatly exaggerated
them, partly out of pique that he was not allowed to control the poli-
tical relations, which were left in the hands of Middleton, partly from
envy of the booty that fell into the hands of his allies. At the same
time there was probably a modicum of truth in the strong statements
to which he committed himself, that the nawab did not "cease to
overspread the country with flames till three days after the fate of
Hafiz Rahmat Khan was decided";4 that "the whole army were wit-
nesses of scenes that cannot be described";5 and that "I have been
obliged to give a deaf ear to the lamentable cries of the widow and
fatherless, and to shut my eyes against a wanton display of violence
and oppression, of inhumanity and cruelty”. 8 Middleton too, who
was friendly to the nawab, admitted that he could not acquit him of
severe treatment of Hafiz Rahmat Khan's family or of wanton ravages
of the country. But Champion was curiously loth to give details when
Hastings demanded them, and when twelve years later he was inter-
rogated on the matter before the House of Commons, though he
repeated his allegations, he declared that his memory was too much
». 5
1 C. Hamilton, An historical relation of the origin, progress and final disso-
lution of the Government. of the Rohilla Afghans, p. 209.
2 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 30.
Reports from Committees of the House of Commons, VI, 30.
4 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 196.
5 Idem, p. 203.
8 Idem, p. 191.
3
## p. 223 (#251) ############################################
POLICY OF THE WAR
223
"1
» 2
weakened by long illness to recall any definite instances of cruelty.
In any case there can be no doubt that as soon as the reports and
complaints of the commander-in-chief reached him, Hastings took
all possible measures by strong representations to the nawab to ensure
that this conduct should cease. Hastings afterwards was inclined to
speak of the Company's honour as "pledged implicitly by General
Barker's attestation”, but this is not accurate. Barker had merely
witnessed the signatures, though it is probably true enough, as Sir
John Strachey says, that without his "active interference and per-
suasion” i no treaty would have been made. But even supposing that
it was the duty of the British to coerce the Rohillas into payment,
was so drastic a method as the conquest of the whole country neces-
sary? Surely, as Fox suggested, a lesser penalty might have sufficed.
It must be admitted that there is something rather repellent about
the finance of the whole operation. Hastings himself was frank
enough to avow that the question of money was one of his main
motives.
“The absence of the Marathas”, he wrote, "and the weak state of the
Rohillas, promised an easy conquest of them, and I own that such was my idea
of the Company's distress at home, added to my knowledge of their wants
abroad, that I should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces,
that saves so much of their pay and expenses. ”
There is a certain truth in the acrid comment of the majority of the
council : "The expectation in sharing in the spoils of a people who
have given us no cause of quarrel whatsoever, is plainly avowed to
be a motive for invading them".
It seems unlikely that it was really within the power of the
Rohillas to produce the original sum of forty lakhs for the nawab,
and the weight of evidence goes to show that in the end Shuja-ud-
daula was demanding two crores, or five times that sum. Their
country had recently been ravaged by the Marathas. The Rohilla War
was condemned in mild terms by the court of directors, and it was
the one occasion on which Hastings lost the support of the proprietors.
The fact that even they felt bound to record a reluctant disapproval,
testifies clearly that disapproval was very widespread :
"Notwithstanding”, they said, “this court hath the highest opinion of the
service and integrity of Hastings, and cannot admit a suspicion of corrupt
motives operating on his conduct without proof; yet they are of opinion with
their Court of Directors, that the agreement made with Shuja-ud-daula for the
hire of a part of the Company's troops for the reduction of the Rohilla country,
and the subsequent steps taken for carrying on that war, were founded on
wrong policy, were contrary to the general orders of the Company, frequently
repeated, for keeping their troops within the bounds of the provinces, and for
not extending their territories.
Even Sir John Strachey admits that his policy was somewhat
» 3
i Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 55.
2 Idem, p. 113.
8 Idem, p. 273.
## p. 224 (#252) ############################################
224
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
cynical, and there was a certain substratum of truth in Francis's
comment : "we do not enquire into, nor think ourselves concerned in,
the justice of the cause in which the troops are to act”. 1 Sir Alfred
Lyall notes that the war was the last occasion upon which British
troops have joined in a campaign with Indian allies without retaining
control of the operations, and his final verdict seems not unreasonable
that “the expedition against the Rohillas was wrong in principle, for
they had not provoked us, and the Vazier could only be relied upon
to abuse his advantages". But it was at its worst an error in judgment,
which could only be proved to be such after all the consequences
had developed.
State Papers in Foreign Department of
1 Forrest, Selections from the
the Government of India, I, 127.
2 Lyall, Warren Hastings, p. 49.
## p. 225 (#253) ############################################
CHAPTER XIII
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
THE Rohilla War was the last important event in Hastings's first
period of office prior to the Regulating Act. The judges of the Supreme
Court arrived on 17 October, 1774, the councillors two days later,
The new council began badly by quarrelling with the governor-
general on some petty detail of their reception, which merely
exemplified the spirit with which they approached their work. They
embarked from the very outset, in Barwell's words, upon "a pre-
determined, pre-concerted system of opposition". 1
The six years' struggle which now ensued between Hastings and
the majority of the council can hardly be paralleled in history. There
was room, no doubt, for reasonable criticism of the administration;
there should have been no room for the personal vindictiveness which
was designed to hound the governor-general from office. "Every
page of our public records”, wrote Barwell, “teems with matter of
private and personal discussion which neither directly nor remotely
bear relation to the interests of the country. " 2 Such was the
lamentable result of the policy embodied in the Regulating Act of
sending out as councillors men without Indian experience. It should
be remembered that Hastings was the only governor-general who
was subjected to this regulation. It need not, however, be supposed
that parliament could have expected that such dire results necessarily
followed from such a policy. Had the councillors been men of reason-
able goodwill and of reasonable modesty-had, we might almost say,
Philip Francis not been one of them—they would have found a way
either of agreeing with Hastings, or at least of disagreeing with him
with sanity and moderation. They came out imbued with a self-
righteous conceit and fixed determination to overthrow the govern-
ment, which they had condemned before examination. Something
must now be said about their individual characters. Philip Francis
has been described once and for all by Lord Macaulay as
a man clearly not destitute of real patriotism and magnanimity, a man whose
VIC' s were not of a sordid kind. But he must also have been a man in the
highest degree arrogant and insolent; a man prone to malevolence and prone to
the error of mistaking his malevolence for public virtue.
The first part of this verdict may appear to some to err on the side
of generosity. Sir James Stephen, while he quotes it with approval,
adds that Francis was capable "not only of the faults of undying
1
Bengal, Past and present, xai, 74.
2 Idem, xan, 78.
15
## p. 226 (#254) ############################################
226
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
>
» 2
5
malignity and ferocious cruelty, but also of falsehood, treachery, and
calumny". 1 Francis himself, it may be added, soon after his arrival
in Bengal, acknowledged to a friend that his aims were flagrantly
personal. “I am now”, he wrote, “I think, on the road to be Governc
of Bengal, which I believe is the first situation in the world attainable
by a subject. " 2
Sir John Clavering has been described as “an honest, straight-
forward man of passionate disposition and mediocre abilities".
Hastings's first impression of him was that he was honourable, but
brought strong prejudices with him. His opinion, however, gradually
changed for the worse, and after his death he could only write : "May
God forgive him all the injuries which he has heaped upon me, and
me, as I forgive him".
Monson had served in southern India from 1758 to 1763. Impey
described him as “a proud, rash, self-willed man, though easily
misled and very greedy for patronage and power”. . Again, in this
case also, Hastings had to modify unfavourably his first impression.
At first he wrote, “Colonel Monson is a sensible man”,5 but after-
wards he came to believe that Monson was almost his worst enemy.
In March, 1775, he says of him : "Colonel Monson, with a more
guarded temper, and a more regular conduct, now appears to be
the most determined of the three". 8
Richard Barwell, the only one of the new councillors already
resident in India, was the regular type of the Indian official of those
days. His family had been connected with the East for some genera-
tions. His father had been governor of Bengal and a director of the
Company. He himself had been in India since 1758. He was a man
of many merits and considerable, though not pre-eminent, ability.
He made a great fortune in India, and, as Sir James Stephen says,
this fact of itself raises a presumption against his official purity. His
letters show that in the year 1775 alone he remitted £40,000 to
England. Barwell probably acted up to his lights, but his standard
was low. We find him, for instance, writing to his sister in 1769 :
“I would spend £5,000 to secure to myself the chiefship of Dacca,
and to supervise the collection of the revenues of that province". ?
In another letter he states that he considers himself justified in
evading the law which prohibited the Company's servants from
trading, by engaging in salt contracts under the names of native
Indians. Barwell, as we know, became Hastings's staunch supporter,
but at first they were by no means in sympathy. Hastings found him
tedious and punctilious. He wrote in 1772 :
i Stephen, The Story of Nuncomar and the Impeachment of Sir Elijah
Impey, I, 30-31.
2 Dictionary of National Biography. 9 Gleig, op. cit. II, 179.
4 Parkes, and H. Merivale, Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis, 1, 376.
5 Gleig, op. cit. I, 477.
6 Idem, p 517.
? Bengal, Past and Present, x, 233.
## p. 227 (#255) ############################################
BARWELL
227
There is a gentleman of our Council who seems to think that every subject
that comes before the Board, or that he can obtrude upon, ought to go through
a long discussion. 1
And again :
Mr. Barwell has made it necessary to declare that although I have the
justest deference for his abilities, I have not yet had an opportunity of experien-
cing their effects but in points of controversy or opposition, nor derived any
benefit from his assistance. ”
The distrust was reciprocated. Barwell wrote in 1773 :
I think there is a probability of our continuing friends, or more properly
speaking upon good terms, for it ce ainly is prostituting a name for the most
sacred tie to say. Mr. Hastings is my friend, which he never was, and I verily
believe, never will be. A duplicity of character once detected and known, as
his is by me, proves an insuperable bar to any cordial intimacy ever taking
place. 3
Gradually, however, the two men drew together and Barwell was
entirely won over by the tact, and impressed by the capacity, of his
chief. We find Hastings writing in 1777 : “Francis . . .
. . . must be grossly
misinformed indeed if he entertains any hope of change in Barwell's
conduct, after the proofs which he has given of his steadiness and
fidelity”. 4 Again he writes in 1778 : "I owe much to Barwell, and
to his steady friendship”,5 and a little later he pays him a generous
tribute saying : “He possesses much experience, a solid judgment,
much greater fertility of official resources than I have, and his
manners are easy and pleasant”. !
Before dealing in detail with the disputes between Hastings and
the council after 1774, it may be useful to sketch in outline his rela-
tions with his councils generally till the end of his period. of office.
For two years, 1774-6, he was steadily outvoted and overruled, and
for all practicable purposes he had ceased to be governor-general.
His position is best described in his own vivid words:
My situation is truly painful and mortifying, deprived of the powers with
which I have been invested by a solemn Act of the Legislature, . . . denied the
respect which is due to my station and character, denied even the rights of per-
sonal civility by men with whom I am compelled to associate in the daily
course of official business, and condemned to bear my share in the responsi-
bility of measures which I do not approve, I should long since have yielded up
my place in this disgraceful scene, did not my ideas of my duty to you and
a confidence in your justice animate me to persevere; and if your records must
be dishonoured and your interests suspended by the continuance of such con-
tests as have hitherto composed the business of your present Council, it shall
be my care to bear as small a part in them as possible. ?
1 Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, p. 201.
2 Forrest, Selections. from State Papers in the Foreign Department of
the Government of India, I, 39.
3 Bengal, Past and Present, xi, 51.
• Gleig, op. cit. II, 185. 3 Idem, p. 224.
6 Idem, p. 243.
7 Forrest, Selections from State Papers in the Foreign Department of
the Government of India. u, 279.
## p. 228 (#256) ############################################
228
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Yet he held on his way with marvellous fortitude and tenacity, and
at last came relief. In September, 1776, Monson died, and Hastings
now held the mastery though only by his casting vote, he and Barwell
opposing Clavering and Francis. In 1777 came the curious and con-
fused incident of Hastings's conditional resignation. The facts were
as follows: Hastings had first given, on 27 March, 1775, and then on
18 May withdrawn, discretionary powers to his agent in England,
Colonel McLeane, to signify to the directors his intention to resign.
McLeane came to the conclusion that Hastings could not long hope
to withstand the opposition growing up against him at home, and,
having obtained the promise of certain conditions from Lord North,
signified to the court of directors the intention of his chief to resign.
The court accepted the resignation. By the terms of the Regulating
Act, Clavering, as senior councillor, would normally succeed till the
five years of the original appointment were over. Wheler was appoin-
ted to fill the place in council that would be vacated by Clavering's
succession, but before he sailed the news came of Monson's
death and he was now appointed to fill that vacancy. Soon after
these events, McLeane, owing to the granting of a knighthood of the
Bath to Clavering without any corresponding honour to the governor-
general, came to the conclusion that Lord North did not really intend
to fulfil the conditions of the agreement, and he therefore wrote to
Hastings advising him not to resign. The position apparently was
that Hastings, through the action of his agent, and though he himself
had recalled his original instructions two months after they were sent,
had signified his intention to resign, but had fixed no date. When
the news came to Bengal in June, 1777, Francis and Clavering at
once assumed that Hastings had resigned; Clavering claimed the
governor-generalship, took his seat in council at the head of the table,
demanded the keys of the fortress and the treasuries, and in general
acted with the greatest precipitation and violence. Hastings was stung
into a flat resistance, and declined to vacate the seat of authority,
though he declared that, but for Clavering's presumptuous and absurd
haste, he would have held himself bound by his agent's action. The
deadlock was so hopeless that both sides agreed to refer the question
to the Supreme Court, who, decided "that Mr. Hastings had not
resigned". Not content with this decision, which saved him from
ruin, Hastings next contended that Clavering by his action had for-
feited even his seat in council, but here the Supreme Court decided
against him. Thus ended what Hastings himself called the "convulsion
of four days, which might have shaken the very foundation of the
national power and interests in India”. ?
Clavering died on 30 August, 1777, and Hastings's control over the
council was greatly strengthened, though Wheler at first was inclined
to act with Francis, the usual division being Hastings, Barwell and
1 Gleig, op. cit. O, 159.
## p. 229 (#257) ############################################
COMPACT WITH FRANCIS
229
the casting vote against Francis and Wheler. Clavering was succeeded
in 1779 as commander-in-chief by Sir Eyre Coote, who, though often
intractable and difficult, acted quite independently of Francis.
Hastings, therefore, was still able by the exercise of his casting vote
to make his views prevail, and it is at this period that he writes of his
rival : "Francis is miserable, and is weak enough to declare it in a
manner much resembling the impatience of a passionate woman,
whose hands are held to prevent her from doing mischief”. In 1779
Barwell retired. Hastings had prevailed upon him to stay till he had
made, as he supposed, an accommodation with Francis that the latter
would not oppose measures for the prosecution of the Maratha War
or for the general support of the present political system of govern-
ment. In July, 1780, ne accused Francis of violating this compact,
and in a minute laid before the council, said: “I judge of his public
conduct by my experience of his private, which I have found to be
void of truth and honour”;a he accepted the inevitable challenge
from Francis to a duel, and wounded him rather severely. Though
Hastings spoke of this incident with a certain compunction, writing :
“I hope Mr. Francis does not think of assuming any merit from this
silly affair. I have been ashamed that I have been made an actor
in it”,9 yet he had forced on the meeting with great deliberation
and most clearly intended to disable his adversary. As regards
the accommodation a few words must be said. Francis, as we have
seen, was not over-scrupulous, but he always hotly declared that he
had ? ver been party to any such engagement as Hastings pretended.
The agreement I meant to enter into, with respect to the Maratha War,
was to prosecute the operations actually existing on the Malabar coast, which,
since the campaign was begun, and General Goddard had already taken the
field, I thought should be pushed as vigorously as possible. 4
He flatly denied that he had ever promised any general support. It
is probable that Francis's account of the matter is mainly correct.
Hastings seems to have been far too easily content with a vague
acceptance of his proposal, and it was surely the height of folly, if he
really wished for a compact, after his experience of Francis's charac-
ter, not to get a definitely signed agreement from him. It almost
appears as though Hastings, despairing of any other method of freeing
himself from his opponent, was purposely content with a mere verbal
promise, intending afterwards to force a quarrel upon Francis for not
fulfilling it. Whether this were true or not, he had at last attained his
object. Francis left India in November, 1780, and Hastings wrote in
exultation :
i Idem, p. 263.
2 Forrest, Selections from . . . State Papers in the Foreign Department of
the Government of India, a, 712.
3 Gleig, op. cit. II, 310. .
4 Forrest, Selections from State Papers in the Foreign Department of
the Government of India, n, 715.
## p. 230 (#258) ############################################
230
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
In a word, I have power, and I will employ it, during the interval in which
the credit of it shall last, to retrieve past misfortunes, to remove present dan.
gers, and to re-establish the power of the Company, and the safety of its
possessions.
Hastings's position was now indeed much easier and his chief tribu-
lations were over; for some time the council was reduced to three,
and as Sir Eyre Coote was generally absent from Calcutta on military
expeditions, Wheler was practically the governor-general's only
colleague, and he found him very amenable to guidance. At first,
as we have seen, Hastings had formed a poor opinion of him. He
wrote in 1777 : “He is now, and must be, a mere cipher and the echo
of Francis, a vox et praeterea nihil, a mere vote".
said Hastings on one occasion, “than the compiler of other men's
opinions. ” But what is also clear beyond any doubt, is the immense
ability, the cact, the urbanity with which they were carried. In every
period of history any notable political or social improvements, if
carefully investigated, will be found to be largely derived from a
common stock of enlightened contemporary opinion. Many of them
are in the air of the time. But to argue from this that credit must be
withheld from the statesman who finally carries them into actuality
is extremely unfair. The general impression forced upon any enquirer
by a perusal of the innumerable minutes, letters, consultations and
dispatches of these two years is that Hastings carried along parallel
lines, and contemporaneously, a great series of reforms, economic,
fiscal, judicial and social. They form a fine record of devoted and
laborious work and reveal in their author administrative capacities
of a unique kind. He is master of every branch of the enquiry, end-
lessly fertile in resource, convincing in argument, reasonable in
discussion. He toiled ceaselessly and encountered all opposition
dauntlessly. Yet the bitter tragedy of the whole thing was that,
before the work could be completed, power and authority were
snatched away from him, and years that would naturally have been
devoted to the further development of his great task were spent in
a desperate and sometimes almost a despairing effort to protect his
position, career and honour against a vindictive and cruel assault. He
speaks of his work by the metaphor of an unfinished building, “a
great and weighty fabric, of which all the parts were yet loose and
destitute of the superior weight, which was to give them their mutual
support and their . . . collateral strength". 2
1 Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, p. 151.
2 Selections from the State Papers of the Governors-General
Hastings, ed. Forrest, II, 64.
Warren
## p. 215 (#243) ############################################
CHAPTER XII
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE
ROHILLA WAR
HAVING abolished the dual government set up by Clive,
Hastings had next to overhaul the system of relations established with
Indian princes. Clive's policy in this field had worked well for five
years, but changing circumstances had made revision necessary. At
the time of Clive's settlement northern India had been temporarily
free from the Maratha terror. It was the imminent renewal of that
menace which entirely altered the whole situation. The Marathas,
who in 1761 had been driven headlong into the Deccan after their
terrible rout at Panipat at the hands of Ahmad Shah, once more
recrossed the Narbada in 1769, and came surging northward again
to occupy Delhi in 1771. They offered to restore Shah 'Alam to his
throne and make his imperial title a reality. The emperor consulted
the English, who implored him to reject so dangerous and deceptive
a proposal. In spite of this, he agreed to the Maratha terms, and left
Allahabad in May, 1771. Though the English had protested, they
parted with him amicably. It was to prove a momentous and
calamitous decision, and the misguided emperor was never again to
return to British territory. For thirty-two years he was practically
a state prisoner in the hands of the Marathas or the Afghans. A year
after his restoration, the Marathas forced upon him a minister of
their own choice, and obliged him to make over to them the districts
of Kora and Allahabad. A new and delicate problem now con-
fronted the Company's servants. To continue to pay the tribute was
practically to subsidize its most formidable enemies. The Company
was bound to suffer for its own quixotic generosity. It had bound
itself to pay tribute, as Hastings said, to an idol of its own creation,
"not one of his natural subjects offered any kind of submission to his
authority, when we first fell down and worshipped it”. 1 With regard
to the districts there were four possible courses; to let the Marathas
occupy them, to take them ourselves, to keep them for Shah 'Alam,
or to give them back to Oudh. It was finally decided to discontinue
paying the tribute of twenty-six lakhs to Shah 'Alam on the ground
that "his desertion of us, and union with our enemies, leaves us
without a pretence to throw away more of the Company's property
upon him", and to restore Kora and Allahabad to the nawah of Oudh
(by the treaty of Benares) for fifty lakhs of rupees.
Hastings had no doubts and no reservations as to the desirability
2
1 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 59.
2 Gleig, op. cit. I, 360.
## p. 216 (#244) ############################################
216
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
of this course : “I am not apt to attribute a large share of merit to my
own actions, but I own that this is one of the few to which I can with
confidence affix my own approbation”. 1 He thus sums up the
advantages of his policy :
By ceding them to the (Nawab of Oudh), we strengthen our alliance with
him, we make him more dependent upon us, as he is more exposed to the
hostilities of the Marathas; we render a junction between him and them, which
has been sometimes apprehended, morally impossible, since their pretensions to
Korah will be a constant source of animosity between them; we free ourselves
from the expense and all the dangers attending either a remote property, or a
remote connection; we adhere literally to the limited system laid down by the
Honourable Court of Directors we provide effectually for the protection of
our frontier, and reduce the expenses of our army, even in employing it; and
lastly we acquire a nett sum of 50 lacs of rupees most seasonably obtained for
the relief of the Company's necessities. 2
This solution met with the support both of the council and the
directors, and it is difficult to see what other course was possible.
Yet it has been condemned, and was opposed by Sir Robert Barker.
Burke described it as a “shocking, horrible, and outrageous breach
of faith". 3 Mill says:
Generosity, had it any place in such arrangements, pleaded with almost
unexampled strength in behalf of the forlorn Emperor, the representative
of so illustrious a race, who now possessed hardly a roof to cover him. Justice
too, or something not easily distinguished from justice, spoke on the same side. 4
But Hastings and his council clearly require no defence. The districts
and the tribute, which was purely eleemosynary, had only been
granted to Shah 'Alam to support his imperial dignity while under
the protection of the British. When he handed them over to the
Marathas, morally—if not legally–ha forfeited his right to retain
them. The Company's course would no doubt have been clearer, and
its case stronger, if it had definitely warned the emperor, as it might
well have done, when he marched away to Delhi, that it would not
continue to pay tribute or allow him to retain the districts, should
he become dependent upon its enemies. It should also be remem-
bered that, before the decision to withhold the revenues was taken,
Shah 'Alam was asked to send representatives to Benares to state his
case, but that he omitted to do so.
The only other question worth consideration is whether there
was any possible alternative. Might not the Company have retained
Kora and Allahabad for itself? To this Hastings had two objections;
in the first place, it would be unwise to retain in our own hands the
administration of provinces entirely separated from the rest of our
territories. Secondly, as he afterwards said before the House of
i Gleig, op. cit. I, 355.
2 Forrest, Selections from State Papers in the Foreign Department of the
Government of India, I, 50.
3 Bond, Speeches in the Trial of Warren Hastings, IV, 759.
4 Mill, History of India, m, 397.
>
## p. 217 (#245) ############################################
THE ROHILLAS AND OUDH
217
Commons, we should then have excited the jealousy of the nawab
of Oudh, to whom the districts had formerly belonged, and so have
endangered our alliance with him. It is always worth while to
remember that the central pillar of Hastings's foreign policy was the
alliance with Oudh.
The other important problem of foreign affairs before the arrival
of the new council was the Rohilla War. Rohilkhand, a fertile country
lying along the base of the Himalayas, marched with the north-west
frontier of Oudh. Its area was about 12,000 square miles and its
population about 6,000,000. The bulk of the people were Hindus,
but the ruling race were Rohillas, that is mountaineers, or Pathans;
or Afghans, the words signifying much the same thing. The country
was governed by a loose confederacy of chiefs under the headship of
Rahmat Khan, generally known as Hafiz Rahmat Khan because he
had been guardian (hafiz) of the sons of the late ruler 'Ali Muham-
mad and had ultimately usurped their rights. The Rohillas had
established their power early in the eighteenth century.
The events leading up to the war must be briefly summarised. In
1772 the Marathas invaded and ravaged Rohilkhand. The Rohillas
thereupon appealed to the nawab of Oudh. They did so reluctantly,
for there was no cordiality between him and them. The nawab had
long notoriously coveted their territory. They knew that if it paid
him to do so, he would not hesitate to combine with the Marathas
against them, just as they in their turn had considered the possibility
of making peace with the invaders, by giving them a free passage
through their territory into Oudh. But both parties for the moment
dreaded a Maratha invasion more than anything in the world, and
this drove them into an uneasy alliance. In reality, as Sir John
Strachey observes, "The Vazier, the Rohillas and the Marathas were
all utterly unscrupulous and each knew that no trust could be placed
in either of the others". 1 We find, for instance, that the nawab asked
Hastings "whether he should persuade the Rohillas to attack the
Marathas . . . and take his advantage of both when they should have
weakened each other by mutual hostilities". British officers of a later
date would probably have improved the occasion by a homily on
political rectitude, and it is rather typical of Hastings—both of his
cynicism and his frankness—that, in his own words, "I commended
the project, but expressed my apprehension of the consequences”. 2
Finally, after the usual interval of intrigue and finesse, during
which the advice of Sir Robert Barker just availed to prevent the
nawab from joining the Marathas, a treaty of alliance was made, 17
June, 1772, between the Rohillas and Shuja-ud-daula. The Rohillas
agreed to pay him forty lakhs on his obliging the Marathas to retire
from their country “either by peace or war". The treaty was really
due to the initiative and intervention of Sir Robert Barker, the British
1 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 49.
2 Idem, p. 113.
## p. 218 (#246) ############################################
218
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
.
commander-in-chief, an intervention not at first welcomed by
nọt
Hastings and the Select Committee, and was signed in his presence.
Almost before the signatures. were appended, the Marathas evacuated
Rohilkhand, and the Rohillas reoccupied the country.
The casus foederis arose in 1773. In the spring the Marathas
re-entered Rohilkhand at Ramghat. The nawab of Oudh, with a
British brigade in support under Sir Robert Barker, advanced to
repel the invasion. After some, manoeuvring and counter-marching
the detachments of the Marathas which had crossed the Ganges (the
Inain body seem to have remained on the other bank) recrossed the
river on 28 March. In May the revolution at Poona, which broke
out on the death of the Peshwa, Madhu Rao, caused the Marathas
to return to the Deccan, leaving only a few small garrisons in Northern
India. The nawab of Oudh now demanded from the Rohillas the sum
due to him, but they refused to pay. They claimed that the Marathas
had really retired of their own accord, and that there had been no
collision with the allies.
It seems clear that the nawab and the British protected Rohil-
khand mainly by their presence on the spot, for Hastings on one
occasion acknowledged that “the Marathas (i. e. the main body) lay
during the whole campaign of 1773 in the neighbourhood of our army,
but without daring either to cross the river or to approach the borders
of Kora". 1 It was claimed-and technically no doubt the claim was
indisputable—that the Rohillas still owed the forty lakhs, for the
treaty stipulated that they were liable if the Marathas retreated
"efther by peace or war". The Rohillas, however, fell back upon a
second line of defence by questioning whether the Marathas had
really been driven out at all : "they might return the next year,
when our joint forces were not in the Rohilla country, to defend
them; that we had done little, meaning that we had not destroyed
the Maratha armies". Legally no doubt the Rohillas were in the
wrong, but it must be admitted that European nations have often
evaded treaty obligations on no better grounds.
Nothing further was done till Hastings held his conference with
the nawab of Oudh at Benares in August and September, 1773. There
he' concluded a public treaty which made no direct mention of the
Rohillas. By it Kora and Allahabad, as already mentioned, were
ceded to the nawab in return for fifty lakhs of rupees, and it was
stipulated that, whenever he employed a British brigade, he should
pay a subsidy of 210,000 rupees a month. At the same time a secret
agreement was made by which the British were to furnish a brigade,
to help the "nawab punish the Rohillas for their evasion, and conquer
the country for him. In return the nawab was to bear all the expenses
of the campaign andato pay a sum of forty lakhs. Almost as soon,
Warren
1 Selections from the State Papers of the Governors General
Hastings, ed. Forrest, I, 311.
## p. 219 (#247) ############################################
THE WAZIR DEMANDS HELP
219
.
however, as the treaty had been concluded, the nawab began to doubt
whether he could bear the pecuniary burden involved, and since
Hastings had some heart-searchings as to its expediency, they
mutually agreed to postpone the expedition. The thought came to
the governor-general, as he said years afterwards in his defence
before the House of Commons in 1786, that:
all my actions were to be viewed through a very remote medium, with a thou-
sand refractions of private interest, secret misrepresentation, general prejudice,
and the precipitation of unformed judgement. 1
In November, 1773, the nawab having, with his usual fickleness,
changed his mind, asked for the aid stipulated in the treaty. Hastings
laid a minute before the council in which he pointed out the ad-
vantages of intervention and among them that “our ally would
obtain by this acquisition a complete state shut in effectually from
foreign invasions by the Ganges, all the way from the frontiers of
Behar to the mountains of Tibet". On the other hand he expressed
doubts as to its expediency:
arising from the circumstances of the Company at home, exposed to popular
clamour, all its measures liable to be canvassed in Parliament, their charter
drawing to a close and . . . ministers unquestionably ready to take advantage of
every unfavourable circumstance in the negotiation for its renewal. 2
Accordingly he proposed to agree to the expedition but on terms
which were likely to make the nawab relinquish the design. The
council, which, through Hastings and his Select Committee, had been
committed to the whole business without much choice on their part,
declared : "We concur heartily in wishing to avoid the expedition
proposed, without entering into the discussion on the propriety of
such an enterprise on general principles”. 3 They added rather mean-
ingly that they were sensible of the embarrassment that Hastings was
under "from what passed on the subject between him and the Vizier
at Benares”. 3 The upshot was that the nawab on 10 January, 1774,
declined the conditions laid down. But on 3 February, 1774, a letter
arrived from the vacillating nawab agreeing to everything and asking
that the brigade should be sent. So after all the policy of bluff had
broken down, and the Bengal government found themselves com-
mitted to the expedition.
The British army under Colonel Champion marched into Rohil-
khand supported by the forces of Oudh on 17 April. Six days later
a battle took place at Miranpur Katra, called by the victors the battle
of St George because of the date on which it was fought. Hafiz
Rahmat Khan was killed fighting bravely at the head of his troops.
The valour of the Rohillas extorted the admiration of the British
commander. They showed, he said :
1 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 112.
2 Idem, p. 121.
3 Idem, p. 123.
## p. 220 (#248) ############################################
220
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
great bravery and resolution . . . they gave proofs of a good share of military
knowledge by showing inclinations to force both our flanks at the same time and
endeavouring to call off our attention by a brisk fire on our centre . it is im-
possible to describe a more obstinate firmness of resolution than the enemy
displayed. 1
The action was entirely decisive. About 20,000 Rohillas were
driven out of the country, which was incorporated in the dominions
of the nawab of Oudh, a small portion only, together with Rampur,
was left in the possession of Faizulla Khan, son of 'Ali Muhammad,
the founder of the Rohilla power, whose sons had been dispossessed
by their guardian, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, and a treaty was made with
him, 7 October, 1774, before the campaign was over. Champion
brought serious charges against the nawab of Oudh and his troops
for cruelties inflicted on the peasantry and the family of Hafiz
Rahmat Khan.
The Rohilla War was the subject of the first attack on Hastings in
Parliament in April, 1786, but as the Commons refused to accept the
charge, it was not made one of the articles in the impeachment. The
war has earned the strong condemnation of all the older school of
Indian historians. Their view, in its extreme presentment, was that
Hastings deliberately sold the lives and liberties of a free people and
condoned horrible atrocities on the part of the armies of the nawab
of Oudh. Sir John Strachey in his Hastings und the Rohilla War has
put forward a complete and elaborate defence. He contends that the
Rohillas were a p! undering Afghan tribe who had only established
their power over the Hindu population of Rohilkhand for about a
quarter of a century. The Rohillas, he says, were as much foreigners
in Rohilkhand as Frenchmen in Spain or Russians in Poland in the
time of Napoleon; that the aim of the nawab of Oudh and the English
was to "exterminate" the Rohillas only in the literal sense of the
term, that is, to drive them over the frontier, not to massacre them;
that Champion failed to substantiate his serious charges against the
conduct of the allies by definite details; that he began the campaign
in a thoroughly discontented frame of mind, and that he was extremely
jealous of the plunder acquired by the soldiers of his ally; that, since
the Rohillas declined to pay the forty lakhs they had promised in the
treaty of 1772, the nawab of Oudh had a good legal and moral case
against them; that Hastings can be entirely defended from the charge
of callousness and brutality, for he took prompt measures to make a
serious protest to the nawab; that as a matter of fact, the campaign
in Rohilkhand "had been carried on with an absence of violence and
bloodshed and generally with a degree of humanity altogether un-
usual in Indian warfare”;2 finally, that Hastings's motives in the war
were statesmanlike and defensible. They were first, to punish the
a
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department
of the Government of India, I, 97.
2 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 233.
## p. 221 (#249) ############################################
HASTINGS'S DEFENCE
221
.
Rohillas for a serious breach of a treaty, secondly to protect Bengal
by giving the nawab, the Company's ally, a scientific and natural
frontier; thirdly, to acquire for the Company the valuable pecuniary
benefit of a subsidy for the maintenance of one-third of our army.
Summing up generally, Strachey asks the question :
Is a British Governor justified in making war upon a confederacy of bar-
barous chiefs, who, not long before, had imposed their rule on a population
foreign to themselves in race and religion; through whose country the only
road lies open for attacks by savage invaders upon a British ally, whose secu-
rity is essential to the security of British possessions; who are too weak and too
treacherous to be relied on to close this road; and who have injured that ally
by breaking a treaty with him, negotiated and attested by the British general,
and approved by the British Government? 1
Clearly he assumes an answer in the affirmative, and we may
certainly admit that we have fought many wars on grounds far less
adequate.
But though Sir John Strachey makes good most of his points, it
is absurd to say that either the policy leading up to the war or the
actual conduct of operations was beyond temperate criticism. Hastings
was obviously himself doubtful about the expediency of the whole
transaction, and his council still more so. He seems to have allowed
himself to be drawn into the matter without having carefully thought
it out. The whole question in its initial stages was weakly handled.
For a statesman to commit himself to a course of action while hoping
that the need for it may not arise, is not the happiest or the most
efficient kind of political expedient. The truth is Hastings w. . . always
tempted by, novel and daring schemes. We shall frequently encounter
the same characteristic in his later history. Sir Alfred Lyall speaks
truly of “the hardy and self-reliant spirit of political enterprise that
is so strongly diffused through his whole career and character". 2
It is no less true that Mill and Macaulay wasted a good deal of
sentiment, and falsified a good deal of history, in painting a picture
of the Rohillas as an ancient people long inhabiting a peaceful and
happy valley, but the fact that the Rohillas had only established
themselves for about twenty-five years has really nothing to do with
the justice or injustice of the war. Their rights were quite as good as
that of most of the ruling powers of India at this time, and quite as
good as those of the East India Company itself. The more important
question is whether the rule of the nawab of Oudh, which we were
now imposing over the peasantry of Rohilkhand, was better or worse
than that of the chieftains we were dispossessing. The evidence as to
the condition of the country under Rohilla sway is conflicting, but
the weight of it is undoubtedly in their favour.
The only writer hostile to them is Charles Hamilton, who depends
mainly on sources inimical to Hafiz Rahmat Khan, and even he only
1 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 260.
2 Sir Alfred Lyall, Warren Hastings, p. 174.
## p. 222 (#250) ############################################
222
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
.
condemns their régime when their control was relaxing. As Hafiz
Rahmat Khan's power weakened, he says, "the Hindu farmers, and
other inhabitants of the country, groaned under the worst species of
military vassalage”. 1 There seems to be no other corroboration of
this view. Hafiz Rahmat Khan was a ruler of ability, courage and
considerable culture. Sir John Strachey himself concludes that under
his strong personal rule and that of his brother chiefs, "the mass of
the Hindu population were treated with greater consideration and
received better protection than was the case in any of the neighbour-
ing provinces, excepting those in the possession of Najib-ud-daula"-
himself, be it noted, a Rohilla. Elphinstone declares that their kind-
ness to their Hindu subjects cannot be denied, and that the state of
improvement to which they had brought their country excited the
admiration of our troops. In 1781 the British Resident at Rampur
described that district as "what the whole of Rohilkhand was under
the government of the Rohillas, a garden without an uncultivated
spot”. Major Hannay in evidence given before the council in 1774
said that “the country appeared to be in good cultivation. . . . It is
in general one of the best cultivated countries I have seen in Hindo-
stan”.
In any case, whatever the rule of the Rohillas had been, it
was better than that of the nawabs of Oudh, which, especially in
the time of Shuja-ud-daula's successor, was unspeakably bad and vile.
As regards the alleged atrocities perpetrated by the nawab and
his army, there is little doubt that Champion greatly exaggerated
them, partly out of pique that he was not allowed to control the poli-
tical relations, which were left in the hands of Middleton, partly from
envy of the booty that fell into the hands of his allies. At the same
time there was probably a modicum of truth in the strong statements
to which he committed himself, that the nawab did not "cease to
overspread the country with flames till three days after the fate of
Hafiz Rahmat Khan was decided";4 that "the whole army were wit-
nesses of scenes that cannot be described";5 and that "I have been
obliged to give a deaf ear to the lamentable cries of the widow and
fatherless, and to shut my eyes against a wanton display of violence
and oppression, of inhumanity and cruelty”. 8 Middleton too, who
was friendly to the nawab, admitted that he could not acquit him of
severe treatment of Hafiz Rahmat Khan's family or of wanton ravages
of the country. But Champion was curiously loth to give details when
Hastings demanded them, and when twelve years later he was inter-
rogated on the matter before the House of Commons, though he
repeated his allegations, he declared that his memory was too much
». 5
1 C. Hamilton, An historical relation of the origin, progress and final disso-
lution of the Government. of the Rohilla Afghans, p. 209.
2 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 30.
Reports from Committees of the House of Commons, VI, 30.
4 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 196.
5 Idem, p. 203.
8 Idem, p. 191.
3
## p. 223 (#251) ############################################
POLICY OF THE WAR
223
"1
» 2
weakened by long illness to recall any definite instances of cruelty.
In any case there can be no doubt that as soon as the reports and
complaints of the commander-in-chief reached him, Hastings took
all possible measures by strong representations to the nawab to ensure
that this conduct should cease. Hastings afterwards was inclined to
speak of the Company's honour as "pledged implicitly by General
Barker's attestation”, but this is not accurate. Barker had merely
witnessed the signatures, though it is probably true enough, as Sir
John Strachey says, that without his "active interference and per-
suasion” i no treaty would have been made. But even supposing that
it was the duty of the British to coerce the Rohillas into payment,
was so drastic a method as the conquest of the whole country neces-
sary? Surely, as Fox suggested, a lesser penalty might have sufficed.
It must be admitted that there is something rather repellent about
the finance of the whole operation. Hastings himself was frank
enough to avow that the question of money was one of his main
motives.
“The absence of the Marathas”, he wrote, "and the weak state of the
Rohillas, promised an easy conquest of them, and I own that such was my idea
of the Company's distress at home, added to my knowledge of their wants
abroad, that I should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces,
that saves so much of their pay and expenses. ”
There is a certain truth in the acrid comment of the majority of the
council : "The expectation in sharing in the spoils of a people who
have given us no cause of quarrel whatsoever, is plainly avowed to
be a motive for invading them".
It seems unlikely that it was really within the power of the
Rohillas to produce the original sum of forty lakhs for the nawab,
and the weight of evidence goes to show that in the end Shuja-ud-
daula was demanding two crores, or five times that sum. Their
country had recently been ravaged by the Marathas. The Rohilla War
was condemned in mild terms by the court of directors, and it was
the one occasion on which Hastings lost the support of the proprietors.
The fact that even they felt bound to record a reluctant disapproval,
testifies clearly that disapproval was very widespread :
"Notwithstanding”, they said, “this court hath the highest opinion of the
service and integrity of Hastings, and cannot admit a suspicion of corrupt
motives operating on his conduct without proof; yet they are of opinion with
their Court of Directors, that the agreement made with Shuja-ud-daula for the
hire of a part of the Company's troops for the reduction of the Rohilla country,
and the subsequent steps taken for carrying on that war, were founded on
wrong policy, were contrary to the general orders of the Company, frequently
repeated, for keeping their troops within the bounds of the provinces, and for
not extending their territories.
Even Sir John Strachey admits that his policy was somewhat
» 3
i Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 55.
2 Idem, p. 113.
8 Idem, p. 273.
## p. 224 (#252) ############################################
224
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR
cynical, and there was a certain substratum of truth in Francis's
comment : "we do not enquire into, nor think ourselves concerned in,
the justice of the cause in which the troops are to act”. 1 Sir Alfred
Lyall notes that the war was the last occasion upon which British
troops have joined in a campaign with Indian allies without retaining
control of the operations, and his final verdict seems not unreasonable
that “the expedition against the Rohillas was wrong in principle, for
they had not provoked us, and the Vazier could only be relied upon
to abuse his advantages". But it was at its worst an error in judgment,
which could only be proved to be such after all the consequences
had developed.
State Papers in Foreign Department of
1 Forrest, Selections from the
the Government of India, I, 127.
2 Lyall, Warren Hastings, p. 49.
## p. 225 (#253) ############################################
CHAPTER XIII
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
THE Rohilla War was the last important event in Hastings's first
period of office prior to the Regulating Act. The judges of the Supreme
Court arrived on 17 October, 1774, the councillors two days later,
The new council began badly by quarrelling with the governor-
general on some petty detail of their reception, which merely
exemplified the spirit with which they approached their work. They
embarked from the very outset, in Barwell's words, upon "a pre-
determined, pre-concerted system of opposition". 1
The six years' struggle which now ensued between Hastings and
the majority of the council can hardly be paralleled in history. There
was room, no doubt, for reasonable criticism of the administration;
there should have been no room for the personal vindictiveness which
was designed to hound the governor-general from office. "Every
page of our public records”, wrote Barwell, “teems with matter of
private and personal discussion which neither directly nor remotely
bear relation to the interests of the country. " 2 Such was the
lamentable result of the policy embodied in the Regulating Act of
sending out as councillors men without Indian experience. It should
be remembered that Hastings was the only governor-general who
was subjected to this regulation. It need not, however, be supposed
that parliament could have expected that such dire results necessarily
followed from such a policy. Had the councillors been men of reason-
able goodwill and of reasonable modesty-had, we might almost say,
Philip Francis not been one of them—they would have found a way
either of agreeing with Hastings, or at least of disagreeing with him
with sanity and moderation. They came out imbued with a self-
righteous conceit and fixed determination to overthrow the govern-
ment, which they had condemned before examination. Something
must now be said about their individual characters. Philip Francis
has been described once and for all by Lord Macaulay as
a man clearly not destitute of real patriotism and magnanimity, a man whose
VIC' s were not of a sordid kind. But he must also have been a man in the
highest degree arrogant and insolent; a man prone to malevolence and prone to
the error of mistaking his malevolence for public virtue.
The first part of this verdict may appear to some to err on the side
of generosity. Sir James Stephen, while he quotes it with approval,
adds that Francis was capable "not only of the faults of undying
1
Bengal, Past and present, xai, 74.
2 Idem, xan, 78.
15
## p. 226 (#254) ############################################
226
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
>
» 2
5
malignity and ferocious cruelty, but also of falsehood, treachery, and
calumny". 1 Francis himself, it may be added, soon after his arrival
in Bengal, acknowledged to a friend that his aims were flagrantly
personal. “I am now”, he wrote, “I think, on the road to be Governc
of Bengal, which I believe is the first situation in the world attainable
by a subject. " 2
Sir John Clavering has been described as “an honest, straight-
forward man of passionate disposition and mediocre abilities".
Hastings's first impression of him was that he was honourable, but
brought strong prejudices with him. His opinion, however, gradually
changed for the worse, and after his death he could only write : "May
God forgive him all the injuries which he has heaped upon me, and
me, as I forgive him".
Monson had served in southern India from 1758 to 1763. Impey
described him as “a proud, rash, self-willed man, though easily
misled and very greedy for patronage and power”. . Again, in this
case also, Hastings had to modify unfavourably his first impression.
At first he wrote, “Colonel Monson is a sensible man”,5 but after-
wards he came to believe that Monson was almost his worst enemy.
In March, 1775, he says of him : "Colonel Monson, with a more
guarded temper, and a more regular conduct, now appears to be
the most determined of the three". 8
Richard Barwell, the only one of the new councillors already
resident in India, was the regular type of the Indian official of those
days. His family had been connected with the East for some genera-
tions. His father had been governor of Bengal and a director of the
Company. He himself had been in India since 1758. He was a man
of many merits and considerable, though not pre-eminent, ability.
He made a great fortune in India, and, as Sir James Stephen says,
this fact of itself raises a presumption against his official purity. His
letters show that in the year 1775 alone he remitted £40,000 to
England. Barwell probably acted up to his lights, but his standard
was low. We find him, for instance, writing to his sister in 1769 :
“I would spend £5,000 to secure to myself the chiefship of Dacca,
and to supervise the collection of the revenues of that province". ?
In another letter he states that he considers himself justified in
evading the law which prohibited the Company's servants from
trading, by engaging in salt contracts under the names of native
Indians. Barwell, as we know, became Hastings's staunch supporter,
but at first they were by no means in sympathy. Hastings found him
tedious and punctilious. He wrote in 1772 :
i Stephen, The Story of Nuncomar and the Impeachment of Sir Elijah
Impey, I, 30-31.
2 Dictionary of National Biography. 9 Gleig, op. cit. II, 179.
4 Parkes, and H. Merivale, Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis, 1, 376.
5 Gleig, op. cit. I, 477.
6 Idem, p 517.
? Bengal, Past and Present, x, 233.
## p. 227 (#255) ############################################
BARWELL
227
There is a gentleman of our Council who seems to think that every subject
that comes before the Board, or that he can obtrude upon, ought to go through
a long discussion. 1
And again :
Mr. Barwell has made it necessary to declare that although I have the
justest deference for his abilities, I have not yet had an opportunity of experien-
cing their effects but in points of controversy or opposition, nor derived any
benefit from his assistance. ”
The distrust was reciprocated. Barwell wrote in 1773 :
I think there is a probability of our continuing friends, or more properly
speaking upon good terms, for it ce ainly is prostituting a name for the most
sacred tie to say. Mr. Hastings is my friend, which he never was, and I verily
believe, never will be. A duplicity of character once detected and known, as
his is by me, proves an insuperable bar to any cordial intimacy ever taking
place. 3
Gradually, however, the two men drew together and Barwell was
entirely won over by the tact, and impressed by the capacity, of his
chief. We find Hastings writing in 1777 : “Francis . . .
. . . must be grossly
misinformed indeed if he entertains any hope of change in Barwell's
conduct, after the proofs which he has given of his steadiness and
fidelity”. 4 Again he writes in 1778 : "I owe much to Barwell, and
to his steady friendship”,5 and a little later he pays him a generous
tribute saying : “He possesses much experience, a solid judgment,
much greater fertility of official resources than I have, and his
manners are easy and pleasant”. !
Before dealing in detail with the disputes between Hastings and
the council after 1774, it may be useful to sketch in outline his rela-
tions with his councils generally till the end of his period. of office.
For two years, 1774-6, he was steadily outvoted and overruled, and
for all practicable purposes he had ceased to be governor-general.
His position is best described in his own vivid words:
My situation is truly painful and mortifying, deprived of the powers with
which I have been invested by a solemn Act of the Legislature, . . . denied the
respect which is due to my station and character, denied even the rights of per-
sonal civility by men with whom I am compelled to associate in the daily
course of official business, and condemned to bear my share in the responsi-
bility of measures which I do not approve, I should long since have yielded up
my place in this disgraceful scene, did not my ideas of my duty to you and
a confidence in your justice animate me to persevere; and if your records must
be dishonoured and your interests suspended by the continuance of such con-
tests as have hitherto composed the business of your present Council, it shall
be my care to bear as small a part in them as possible. ?
1 Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, p. 201.
2 Forrest, Selections. from State Papers in the Foreign Department of
the Government of India, I, 39.
3 Bengal, Past and Present, xi, 51.
• Gleig, op. cit. II, 185. 3 Idem, p. 224.
6 Idem, p. 243.
7 Forrest, Selections from State Papers in the Foreign Department of
the Government of India. u, 279.
## p. 228 (#256) ############################################
228
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Yet he held on his way with marvellous fortitude and tenacity, and
at last came relief. In September, 1776, Monson died, and Hastings
now held the mastery though only by his casting vote, he and Barwell
opposing Clavering and Francis. In 1777 came the curious and con-
fused incident of Hastings's conditional resignation. The facts were
as follows: Hastings had first given, on 27 March, 1775, and then on
18 May withdrawn, discretionary powers to his agent in England,
Colonel McLeane, to signify to the directors his intention to resign.
McLeane came to the conclusion that Hastings could not long hope
to withstand the opposition growing up against him at home, and,
having obtained the promise of certain conditions from Lord North,
signified to the court of directors the intention of his chief to resign.
The court accepted the resignation. By the terms of the Regulating
Act, Clavering, as senior councillor, would normally succeed till the
five years of the original appointment were over. Wheler was appoin-
ted to fill the place in council that would be vacated by Clavering's
succession, but before he sailed the news came of Monson's
death and he was now appointed to fill that vacancy. Soon after
these events, McLeane, owing to the granting of a knighthood of the
Bath to Clavering without any corresponding honour to the governor-
general, came to the conclusion that Lord North did not really intend
to fulfil the conditions of the agreement, and he therefore wrote to
Hastings advising him not to resign. The position apparently was
that Hastings, through the action of his agent, and though he himself
had recalled his original instructions two months after they were sent,
had signified his intention to resign, but had fixed no date. When
the news came to Bengal in June, 1777, Francis and Clavering at
once assumed that Hastings had resigned; Clavering claimed the
governor-generalship, took his seat in council at the head of the table,
demanded the keys of the fortress and the treasuries, and in general
acted with the greatest precipitation and violence. Hastings was stung
into a flat resistance, and declined to vacate the seat of authority,
though he declared that, but for Clavering's presumptuous and absurd
haste, he would have held himself bound by his agent's action. The
deadlock was so hopeless that both sides agreed to refer the question
to the Supreme Court, who, decided "that Mr. Hastings had not
resigned". Not content with this decision, which saved him from
ruin, Hastings next contended that Clavering by his action had for-
feited even his seat in council, but here the Supreme Court decided
against him. Thus ended what Hastings himself called the "convulsion
of four days, which might have shaken the very foundation of the
national power and interests in India”. ?
Clavering died on 30 August, 1777, and Hastings's control over the
council was greatly strengthened, though Wheler at first was inclined
to act with Francis, the usual division being Hastings, Barwell and
1 Gleig, op. cit. O, 159.
## p. 229 (#257) ############################################
COMPACT WITH FRANCIS
229
the casting vote against Francis and Wheler. Clavering was succeeded
in 1779 as commander-in-chief by Sir Eyre Coote, who, though often
intractable and difficult, acted quite independently of Francis.
Hastings, therefore, was still able by the exercise of his casting vote
to make his views prevail, and it is at this period that he writes of his
rival : "Francis is miserable, and is weak enough to declare it in a
manner much resembling the impatience of a passionate woman,
whose hands are held to prevent her from doing mischief”. In 1779
Barwell retired. Hastings had prevailed upon him to stay till he had
made, as he supposed, an accommodation with Francis that the latter
would not oppose measures for the prosecution of the Maratha War
or for the general support of the present political system of govern-
ment. In July, 1780, ne accused Francis of violating this compact,
and in a minute laid before the council, said: “I judge of his public
conduct by my experience of his private, which I have found to be
void of truth and honour”;a he accepted the inevitable challenge
from Francis to a duel, and wounded him rather severely. Though
Hastings spoke of this incident with a certain compunction, writing :
“I hope Mr. Francis does not think of assuming any merit from this
silly affair. I have been ashamed that I have been made an actor
in it”,9 yet he had forced on the meeting with great deliberation
and most clearly intended to disable his adversary. As regards
the accommodation a few words must be said. Francis, as we have
seen, was not over-scrupulous, but he always hotly declared that he
had ? ver been party to any such engagement as Hastings pretended.
The agreement I meant to enter into, with respect to the Maratha War,
was to prosecute the operations actually existing on the Malabar coast, which,
since the campaign was begun, and General Goddard had already taken the
field, I thought should be pushed as vigorously as possible. 4
He flatly denied that he had ever promised any general support. It
is probable that Francis's account of the matter is mainly correct.
Hastings seems to have been far too easily content with a vague
acceptance of his proposal, and it was surely the height of folly, if he
really wished for a compact, after his experience of Francis's charac-
ter, not to get a definitely signed agreement from him. It almost
appears as though Hastings, despairing of any other method of freeing
himself from his opponent, was purposely content with a mere verbal
promise, intending afterwards to force a quarrel upon Francis for not
fulfilling it. Whether this were true or not, he had at last attained his
object. Francis left India in November, 1780, and Hastings wrote in
exultation :
i Idem, p. 263.
2 Forrest, Selections from . . . State Papers in the Foreign Department of
the Government of India, a, 712.
3 Gleig, op. cit. II, 310. .
4 Forrest, Selections from State Papers in the Foreign Department of
the Government of India, n, 715.
## p. 230 (#258) ############################################
230
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
In a word, I have power, and I will employ it, during the interval in which
the credit of it shall last, to retrieve past misfortunes, to remove present dan.
gers, and to re-establish the power of the Company, and the safety of its
possessions.
Hastings's position was now indeed much easier and his chief tribu-
lations were over; for some time the council was reduced to three,
and as Sir Eyre Coote was generally absent from Calcutta on military
expeditions, Wheler was practically the governor-general's only
colleague, and he found him very amenable to guidance. At first,
as we have seen, Hastings had formed a poor opinion of him. He
wrote in 1777 : “He is now, and must be, a mere cipher and the echo
of Francis, a vox et praeterea nihil, a mere vote".
