No More Learning

The first question concerning the order of rank:
how far is a man disposed to be solitary or gre-
garious? (in the latter case, his valueconsists in those
qualities which secure the survival of his tribe or
his type; in the former case, his qualities are those
which distinguish him from others, which isolate
and defend him, and make his solitude possible).
Consequence : the solitary type should not be
valued from the standpoint of the gregarious type,
or vice versa.
Viewed from above, both types are necessary ;
as is likewise their antagonism,—and nothing is
more thoroughly reprehensible than the “ desire
which would develop a third thing out of the two
(“ virtue" as hermaphroditism). This is as little
worthy of desire as the equalisation and reconcilia-
tion of the sexes. The distinguishing qualities must
be developed ever more and more, the gulf must be
made ever wider. . .
The concept of degeneration in both cases : the
approximation of the qualities of the herd to those
of solitary creatures: and vice versa—in short, when
they begin to resemble each other.
of degeneration is beyond the sphere of moral
judgments.
"
This concept


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
321
887.
Where the strongest natures are to be sought.
The ruin and degeneration of the solitary species is
much greater and more terrible: they have the in-
stincts of the herd, and the tradition of values,
against them; their weapons of defence, their in-
stincts of self-preservation, are from the beginning
insufficiently strong and reliable—fortune must be
peculiarly favourable to them if they are to prosper
(they prosper best in the lowest ranks and dregs
of society; if ye are seeking personalities it is there
that ye will find them with much greater certainty
than in the middle classes ! )
When the dispute between ranks and classes,
which aims at equality of rights, is almost settled,
the fight will begin against the solitary person. (In
a certain sense the latter can maintain and develop
himself most easily in a democratic society: there
where the coarser means of defence are no longer
necessary, and a certain habit of order, honesty,
justice, trust, is already a general condition. The
strongest must be most tightly bound, most strictly
watched, laid in chains and supervised: this is the
instinct of the herd. To them belongs a régime of
self-mastery, of ascetic detachment, of “duties”
consisting in exhausting work, in which one can no
longer call one's soul one's own.
888.
I am attempting an economic justification of
virtue. The object is to make man as useful as
х
VOL. II.


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322
THE WILL TO POWER.
possible, and to make him approximate as nearly
as one can to an infallible machine : to this end he
must be equipped with machine-like virtues (he
must learn to value those states in which he works
in a most mechanically useful way, as the highest
of all: to this end it is necessary to make him as
disgusted as possible with the other states, and to
represent them as very dangerous and despicable).
Here is the first stumbling-block: the tedious-
ness and monotony which all mechanical activity
brings with it. To learn to endure this and not
only to endure it, but to see tedium enveloped in
a ray of exceeding charm : this hitherto has been
the task of all higher schools. To learn something
which you don't care a fig about, and to find pre-
cisely your “duty” in this “objective” activity ;
to learn to value happiness and duty as things
apart; this is the invaluable task and performance
of higher schools. It is on this account that the
philologist has, hitherto, been the educator per se:
because his activity, in itself, affords the best
pattern of magnificent monotony in action; under
his banner youths learn to "swat”: first pre-
“
requisite for the thorough fulfilment of mechanical
duties in the future (as State officials, husbands,
slaves of the desk, newspaper readers, and soldiers).
Such an existence may perhaps require a philosoph-
ical glorification and justification more than any
other : pleasurable feelings must be valued by some
sort of infallible tribunal, as altogether of inferior
rank; “duty per se," perhaps even the pathos of re-
verence in regard to everything unpleasant-must
be demanded imperatively as that which is above all
:


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
323
useful, delightful, and practical things. . . A
mechanical form of existence regarded as the
highest and most respectable form of existence,
worshipping itself (type: Kant as the fanatic of the
formal concept “Thou shalt ”).
889.
The economic valuation of all the ideals that
have existed hitherto—that is to say, the selection
and rearing of definite passions and states at the
cost of other passions and states. The law-giver
(or the instinct of the community) selects a number
of states and passions the existence of which
guarantees the performance of regular actions
(mechanical actions would thus be the result of
the regular requirements of those passions and
states).
In the event of these states and passions con-
taining ingredients which were painful, a means
would have to be found for overcoming this pain-
fulness by means of a valuation ; pain would have
to be interpreted as something valuable, as some-
thing pleasurable in a higher sense. Conceived in
a formula: “How does something unpleasant become
pleasant ? " For instance, when our obedience and
our submission to the law become honoured, thanks
to the energy, power, and self-control they entail.
The same holds good of our public spirit, of our
neighbourliness, of our patriotism, our “ humanisa-
tion," our "altruism," and our "heroism. "
“ The
object of all idealism should be to induce people to
do unpleasant things cheerfully.
a
»
»


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324
THE WILL TO POWER.
890.
The belittlement of man must be held as the
chief aim for a long while: because what is needed
in the first place is a broad basis from which a
stronger species of man may arise (to what extent
hitherto has every stronger species of man arisen
from a substratum of inferior people? ).
891.
The absurd and contemptible form of idealism
which would not have mediocrity mediocre, and
which instead of feeling triumphant at being ex-
ceptional, becomes indignant at cowardice, false-
ness, pettiness, and wretchedness. We should not
wish things to be any different, we should make the
gulfs even wider ! —The higher types among men
should be compelled to distinguish themselves by
means of the sacrifices which they make to their
own existence.
Principal point of view : distances must be es-
tablished, but no contrasts must be created. The
middle classes must be dissolved, and their influence
decreased: this is the principal means of main-
taining distances.
892.
Who would dare to disgust the mediocre of their
mediocrity! As you observe, I do precisely the
reverse: every step away from mediocrity—thus
do I teach leads to immorality.


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
325
893
To hate mediocrity is unworthy of a philo-
sopher: it is almost a note of interrogation to his
right to philosophy. ” It is precisely because he is
the exception that he must protect the rule and
ingratiate all mediocre people.
894.
What I combat: that an exceptional form should
make war upon the rule—instead of understanding
that the continued existence of the rule is the first
condition of the value of the exception. For in-
stance, there are women who, instead of consider-
ing their abnormal thirst for knowledge as a dis-
tinction, would fain dislocate the whole status of
womanhood.
895.
The increase of strength despite the temporary
ruin of the individual :-
A new level must be established ;
We must have a method of storing up forces
for the maintenance of small performances,
in opposition to economic waste;
Destructive nature must for once be reduced
to an instrument of this economy of the
future;
The weak must be maintained, because there
is an enormous mass of finicking work to
be done;


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326
THE WILL TO POWER.
The weak and the suffering must be upheld
in their belief that existence is still possible;
Solidarity must be implanted as an instinct
opposed to the instinct of fear and servility;
War must be made upon accident, even upon
the accident of “the great man. ”
896.
War upon great men justified on economic
grounds. Great men are dangerous; they are
accidents, exceptions, tempests, which are strong
enough to question things which it has taken time
to build and establish. Explosive material must
not only be discharged harmlessly, but, if possible,
its discharge must be prevented altogether; this is
the fundamental instinct of all civilised society.
1
897.
He who thinks over the question of how the type
man may be elevated to its highest glory and
power, will realise from the start that he must
place himself beyond morality; for morality was
directed in its essentials at the opposite goal—that
is to say, its aim was to arrest and to annihilate
that glorious development wherever it was in pro-
cess of accomplishment. For, as a matter of fact,
development of that sort implies that such an
enormous number of men must be subservient to it,
that a counter-movement is only too natural: the
weaker, more delicate, more mediocre existences,
find it necessary to take up sides against that glory
1


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
327
of life and power; and for that purpose they must
get a new valuation of themselves by means of
which they are able to condemn, and if possible to
destroy, life in this high degree of plenitude.
Morality is therefore essentially the expression of
hostility to life, in so far as it would overcome
vital types.
898.
The strong of the future. --To what extent neces-
sity on the one hand and accident on the other
have attained to conditions from which a stronger
species may be reared: this we are now able to
understand and to bring about consciously; we
can now create those conditions under which such
an elevation is possible.
Hitherto education has always aimed at the
utility of society: not the greatest possible utility
for the future, but the utility of the society actually
extant. What people required were “instruments"
for this purpose. Provided the wealth of forces
were greater, it would be possible to think of a
draft being made upon them, the aim of which
would not be the utility of society, but some future
utility.
The more people grasped to what extent the
present form of society was in such a state of tran-
sition as sooner or later to be no longer able to exist
for its own sake, but only as a means in the hands
of a stronger race, the more this task would have to
be brought forward.
The increasing belittlement of man is precisely
the impelling power which leads one to think of
»


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328
THE WILL TO POWER.
the cultivation of a stronger race: a race which
would have a surplus precisely there where the
dwarfed species was weak and growing weaker
(will, responsibility, self-reliance, the ability to
postulate aims for one's self).
The means would be those which history teaches:
isolation by means of preservative interests which
would be the reverse of those generally accepted;
exercise in transvalued valuations; distance as
pathos; a clean conscience in what to-day is most
despised and most prohibited.
The levelling of the mankind of Europe is the
great process which should not be arrested ; it
should even be accelerated. The necessity of
cleaving gulfs, of distance, of the order of rank, is
therefore imperative; but not the necessity of re-
tarding the process above mentioned.
This levelled-down species requires justification
as soon as it is attained : its justification is that
it exists for the service of a higher and sovereign
race which stands upon it and can only be elevated
upon its shoulders to the task which it is destined
to perform. Not only a ruling race whose task
would be consummated in ruling alone: but a race
with vital spheres of its own, with an overflow of
energy for beauty, bravery, culture, and manners,
even for the most abstract thought; a yea-saying
race which would be able to allow itself every kind
of great luxury-strong enough to be able to dis-
pense with the tyranny of the imperatives of virtue,
rich enough to be in no need of economy or
pedantry; beyond good and evil; a forcing-house
for rare and exceptional plants.
:


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
329
899.
Our psychologists, whose glance dwells in-
voluntarily upon the symptoms of decadence, lead
us to mistrust intellect ever more and more.
People persist in seeing only the weakening, pam-
pering, and sickening effects of intellect, but there
are now going to appear :-
The union of
Cynics
intellectual
New
Experiment. superiority
barbarians alists
with well-be-
Conquerors ing and an
overflow of
strength.
900.
I point to something new : certainly for such a
democratic community there is a danger of bar-
barians; but these are sought only down below.
There is also another kind of barbarians who come
from the heights: a kind of conquering and ruling
natures, which are in search of material that they
can mould. Prometheus was a barbarian of this
stamp.
901.
Principal standpoint : one should not suppose
the mission of a higher species to be the leading
of inferior men (as Comte does, for instance); but
the inferior should be regarded as the foundation
upon which a higher species may live their higher
life-upon which alone they can stand.


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330
THE WILL TO POWER.
The conditions under which a strong, noble
species maintains itself (in the matter of intellectual
discipline) are precisely the reverse of those under
which the industrial masses—the tea-grocers à la
Spencer — subsist. Those qualities which are
within the grasp only of the strongest and most
terrible natures, and which make their existence
possible--leisure, adventure, disbelief, and even dis-
sipation-would necessarily ruin mediocre natures
--and does do so when they possess them. In
the case of the latter industry, regularity, modera-
tion, and strong “conviction" are in their proper
place-in short, all “gregarious virtues”: under
their influence these mediocre men become perfect.
902.
Concerning the ruling types. —The shepherd as
opposed to the “lord" (the former is only a means
to the maintenance of the herd; the latter, the
purpose for which the herd exists).
903.
The temporary preponderance of social valua-
tions is both comprehensible and useful; it is a
matter of building a foundation upon which a
stronger species will ultimately be made possible.
The standard of strength: to be able to live under
the transvalued valuations, and to desire them for
all eternity. State and society regarded as a sub-
structure: economic point of view, education con-
ceived as breeding.


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
331
904.
A consideration which " free spirits' lack: that
the same discipline which makes a strong nature
still stronger, and enables it to go in for big under-
takings, breaks up and withers the mediocre: doubt
-la largeur de ceur-experiment—independence.
905.
The hammer. How should men who must value
in the opposite way be constituted ? — Men who
possess all the qualities of the modern soul, but are
strong enough to convert them into real health ?
The means to their task.
906.
The strong man, who is mighty in the instincts
of a strong and healthy organisation, digests his
deeds just as well as he digests his meals; he even
gets over the effects of heavy fare: in the main,
however, he is led by an inviolable and severe
instinct which prevents his doing anything which
goes against his grain, just as he never does any-
thing against his taste.
907.
Can we foresee the favourable circumstances
under which creatures of the highest value might
arise? It is a thousand times too complicated, and
the probabilities of failure are very great: on that
account we cannot be inspired by the thought of


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THE WILL TO POWER.
striving after them! Scepticism. To oppose this
we can enhance courage, insight, hardness, inde-
pendence, and the feeling of responsibility; we can
also subtilise and learn to forestall the delicacy of
the scales, so that favourable accidents may be
enlisted on our side.
908.
Before we can even think of acting, an enormous
amount of work requires to be done. In the main,
however, a cautious exploitation of the present con-
ditions would be our best and most advisable
course of action. The actual creation of conditions
such as those which occur by accident, presupposes
the existence of iron men such as have not yet
lived. Our first task must be to make the personal
ideal prevail and become realised! He who has
understood the nature of man and the origin of
mankind's greatest specimens, shudders before man
and takes flight from all action: this is the result
of inherited valuations ! !
My consolation is, that the nature of man is evil,
and this guarantees his strength!
909.
The typical forms of self-development, or the
eight principal questions :
I. Do we want to be more multifarious or more
simple than we are?
2. Do we want to be happier than we are, or
more indifferent to both happiness and un-
happiness?


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
333
3. Do we want to be more satisfied with our-
selves,or moreexactingand moreinexorable?
4. Do we want to be softer, more yielding, and
more human than we are, or more in-
human ?
5. Do we want to be more prudent than we are,
or more daring?
6. Do we want to attain a goal, or do we want
to avoid all goals (like the philosopher, for
instance, who scents a boundary, a cul-de-
sac, a prison, a piece of foolishness in every
goal)?
7. Do we want to become more respected, or
more feared, or more despised?
8. Do we want to become tyrants, and seducers,
or do we want to become shepherds and
gregarious animals ?
910.
The type of my disciples. —To such men as con-
cern me in any way I wish suffering, desolation,
sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of all kinds. I
wish them to be acquainted with profound self-
contempt, with the martyrdom of self-distrust, with
the misery of the defeated : I have no pity for
them; because I wish them to have the only thing
which to-day proves whether a man has any value
or not, namely, the capacity of sticking to his guns.
9II.
The happiness and self-contentedness of the
lazzaroni, or the blessedness of “beautiful souls,"


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334
THE WILL TO POWER.
or the consumptive love of Puritan pietists,
proves nothing in regard to the order of rank
among men. As a great educator one ought in-
exorably to thrash a race of such blissful creatures
into unhappiness. The danger of belittlement and
of a slackening of powers follows immediately-
I am opposed to happiness à la Spinoza or à la
Epicurus, and to all the relaxation of contemplative
states. But when virtue is the means to such
happiness, well then, one must master even virtue.
912.
I cannot see how any one can make up for
having missed going to a good school at the proper
time. Such a person does not know himself; he
walks through life without ever having learned to
walk. His soft muscles betray themselves at every
step. Occasionally life itself is merciful enough to
make a man recover this lost and severe schooling:
by means of periods of sickness, perhaps, which
exact the utmost will-power and self-controi; or
by means of a sudden state of poverty, which
threatens his wife and child, and which may force
a man to such activity as will restore energy to his
slackened tendons, and a tough spirit to his will to
life. The most desirable thing of all, however, is,
under all circumstances to have severe discipline at
the right time, i. e. at that age when it makes us
proud that people should expect great things from
us. For this is what distinguishes hard schooling,
as good schooling, from every other schooling,
namely, that a good deal is demanded, that a good


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
335
deal is severely exacted; that goodness, nay even
excellence itself, is required as if it were normal;
that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent;
that blame is sharp, practical, and without reprieve,
and has no regard to talent and antecedents. We
are in every way in need of such a school : and
ị this holds good of corporeal as well as of spiritual
things; it would be fatal to draw distinctions here!
The same discipline makes the soldier and the
scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there
is no true scholar who has not the instincts of a
true soldier in his veins. To be able to command
and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to keep
one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready
at any moment to lead; to prefer danger to
comfort; not to weigh what is permitted and
what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be
more hostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism
than to wickedness. What is it that one learns in
a hard school to obey and to command.
913.
We should repudiate merit—and do only that
which stands above all praise and above all under-
standing.
914.
one
The new forms of morality :
Faithful vows concerning that which
wishes to do or to leave undone; complete and
definite abstention from many things. . Test
Tests as
to whether one is ripe for such discipline.


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336
THE WILL TO POWER.
915.
It is my desire to naturalise asceticism: I would
substitute the old intention of asceticism, “self-
denial,” by my own intention,“ self-strengthening":
a gymnastic of the will; a period of abstinence
and occasional fasting of every kind, even in things
intellectual; a casuistry in deeds, in regard to the
opinions which we derive from our powers; we
should try our hand at adventure and at deliberate
dangers. (Dîners chez Magny: all intellectual
gourmets with spoilt stomachs.
) Tests ought also
to be devised for discovering a man's power in
keeping his word.
916.
The things which have become spoilt through
having been abused by the Church :
(1) Asceticism. —People have scarcely got the
courage yet to bring to light the natural utility
and necessity of asceticism for the purpose of the
education of the will. Our ridiculous world of
education, before whose eyes the useful State
official hovers as an ideal to be striven for, believes
that it has completed its duty when it has in-
structed or trained the brain; it never
suspects that something else is first of all necessary
--the education of will-power; tests are devised for
everything except for the most important thing
of all: whether a man can will, whether he can
promise; the young man completes his education
without a question or an inquiry having been
even


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
337
made concerning the problem of the highest value
of his nature.
(2) Fasting:-In every sense- even as a means
of maintaining the capacity for taking pleasure in
all good things (for instance, to give up reading
for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease
from being amiable for a while: one ought also
to have fast days for one's virtues).
(3) The monastery. —Temporary isolation with
severe seclusion from all letters, for instance; a
kind of profound introspection and self-recovery,
which does not go out of the way of “temptations,"
but out of the way of “duties”; a stepping out
of the daily round of one's environment; a detach-
ment from the tyranny of stimuli and external
influences, which condemns us to expend our
power only in reactions, and does not allow it to
gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous
activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely :
they only think reflexively, i. e. they must first
read before they can think).
(4) Feasts. —A man must be very coarse in order
not to feel the presence of Christians and Christian
values as oppressive, so oppressive as to send all
festive moods to the devil. By feasts we under-
stand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of
all kinds of seriousness and Philistinism ; a divine
saying of Yea to one's self, as the result of physical
plenitude and perfection--all states to which the
Christian cannot honestly say Yea. A feast is a
pagan thing par excellence,
(5) The courage of one's own nature : dressing-
up in morality. -To be able to call one's passions
Y
-
VOL. II.


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338
THE WILL TO POWER.
1
good without the help of a moral formula: this is
the standard which measures the extent to which
a man is able to say Yea to his own nature,
namely, how much or how little he has to have
recourse to morality.
(6) Death. —The foolish physiological fact must
be converted into a moral necessity. One should
live in such a way that one may have the will to
die at the right time !
917.
To feel one's self stronger-or, expressed other-
wise: happiness always presupposes a comparison
(not necessarily with others, but with one's self, in
the midst of a state of growth, and without being
conscious that one is comparing).
Artificial accentuation : whether by means of
exciting chemicals or exciting errors (“halluci-
nations. ")
Take, for instance, the Christian's feeling of
security; he feels himself strong in his confidence,
in his patience, and his resignation : this artificial
accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is pro-
tected by a God. Take the feeling of superiority,
for instance : as when the Caliph of Morocco sees
only globes on which his three united kingdoms
cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling
of uniqueness, for instance: as when the European
imagines that culture belongs to Europe alone,
and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged
cosmic process; or, as when the Christian makes
all existence revolve round the “ Salvation of man. "
The question is, where does one begin to feel the


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
339
pressure of constraint: it is thus that different
degrees are ascertained. A philosopher, for instance,
in the midst of the coolest and most transmontane
feats of abstraction feels like a fish that enters its
element: while colours and tones oppress him;
not to speak of those dumb desires-of that which
others call “ the ideal. ”
918.
>
A healthy and vigorous little boy will look up
sarcastically if he be asked: “Wilt thou become
virtuous ? ”—but he immediately becomes eager if
he be asked: “Wilt thou become stronger than
thy comrades ? "
*
How does one become stronger ? —By deciding
slowly; and by holding firmly to the decision
once it is made. Everything else follows of itself.
Spontaneous and changeable natures: both species
of the weak. We must not confound ourselves
with them; we must feel distance betimes !
Beware of good-natured people! Dealings with
them make one torpid. All environment is good
which makes one exercise those defensive and
aggressive powers which are instinctive in man.
All one's inventiveness should apply itself to
putting one's power of will to the test. . . . Here
the determining factor must be recognised as
something which is not knowledge, astuteness, or
wit.
One must learn to command betimes,-likewise
to obey. A man must learn modesty and tact in


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340
THE WILL TO POWER.
modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to
honour where modesty is displayed; he must like-
wise distinguish and honour wherever he bestows
bis confidence.
What does one repent most? One's modesty;
the fact that one has not lent an ear to one's most
individual needs; the fact that one has mistaken
one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self
low; the fact that one has lost all delicacy of
hearing in regard to one's instincts. —This want of
reverence in regard to one's self is avenged by all
sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being,
pride, cheerfulness, freedom, determination, cour-
age. A man never forgives himself, later on, for
this want of genuine egoism : he regards it as an
objection and as a cause of doubt concerning his
real ego. .
919.
I should like man to begin by respecting himself:
everything else follows of itself. Naturally a man
ceases from being anything to others in this way:
for this is precisely what they are least likely to
forgive. “What? a man who respects himself ? " *
This is something quite different from the blind
instinct to love one's self. Nothing is more common
in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is
* Cf. Disraeli in Tancred: “Self-respect, too, is a super.
stition of past ages. •
It is not suited to these times ; it is
much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No
one is important enough to have self-respect nowadays”
(book iii. chap. v. ). -TR.
"


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
341
called ego, than a certain contempt for that which
is loved : the fatalism of love,
920.
(
"I will have this or that"; " I would that this
or that were so ”; “I know that this or that is
so "—the degrees of power: the man of will, the
man of desire, the man of fate.
921.
The means by which a strong species maintains
itself :
It grants itself the right of exceptional actions,
as a test of the power of self-control and
of freedom.
It abandons itself to states in which a man is
not allowed to be anything else than a
barbarian.
It tries to acquire strength of will by every
kind of asceticism.
It is not expansive; it practises silence; it
is cautious in regard to all charms.
It learns to obey in such a way that obedi-
ence provides a test of self-maintenance.
Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in
regard to points of honour.
It never argues,
“What is sauce for the goose
is sauce for the gander,”—but conversely !
it regards reward, and the ability to repay,
as a privilege, as a distinction.
It does not covet other people's virtues.


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THE WILL TO POWER
922.
The way in which one has to treat raw savages
and the impossibility of dispensing with barbarous
methods, becomes obvious, in practice, when one
is transplanted, with all one's European pampering,
to a spot such as the Congo, or anywhere else
where it is necessary to maintain one's mastery
over barbarians.
923.
Warlike and peaceful people. —Art thou a man
who has the instincts of a warrior in thy blood ?
If this be so, another question must be put. Do
thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend ?
The rest of mankind, all those whose instincts are
not warlike, desire peace, concord, "freedom,"
“equal rights”: these things are but names and
steps for one and the same thing. Such men only
wish to go where it is not necessary for them to
defend themselves, such men become discon-
tented with themselves when they are obliged to
offer resistance: they would fain create circum-
stances in which war is no longer necessary.
If
the worst came to the worst, they would resign
themselves, obey, and submit: all these things are
better than waging war-thus does the Christian's
instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born
warrior's character there is something of armour,
likewise in the choice of his circumstances and in
the development of every one of his qualities :
weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields
are best devised by the former.


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
343
What expedients and what virtues do the un-
armed and the undefended require in order to
survive and even to conquer ?
924.
What will become of a man who no longer has
any reasons for either defence or attack ? What
will remain of his passions when he has lost those
which form his defence and his weapons ?
925.
A marginal note to a niaiserie anglaise: “Do
not to others that which you would not that they
should do unto you. ” This stands for wisdom;
this stands for prudence; this stands as the very
basis of morality-as “a golden maxim. " John
Stuart Mill believes in it and what Englishman
does not ? ). . . . But the maxim does not bear
investigation. The argument, “Do not as you
would not be done by," forbids action which pro-
duce harmful results; the thought behind always
is that an action is invariably requited. What if
some one came forward with the “ Principe" in his
hands, and said: “We must do those actions alone
which enable us to steal a march on others,
and which deprive others of the power of doing
the same to us”? -On the other hand, let us re-
member the Corsican who pledges his honour to
vendetta. He too does not desire to have a bullet
through him; but the prospect of one, the proba-
bility of getting one, does not deter him from
i


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344
THE WILL TO POWER,
vindicating his honour. . . . And in all really de-
cent actions are we not intentionally indifferent as
to what result they will bring ? To avoid an action
which might have harmful results,—that would be
tantamount to forbidding all decent actions in
general.
Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable
because it betrays a certain type of man: it is the
instinct of the herd which formulates itself through
him, -we are equal, we regard each other as equal :
as I am to thee so art thou to me. - In this com-
munity equivalence of actions is really believed in
an equivalence which never under any circum-
stances manifests itself in real conditions. It is
impossible to requite every action : among real
individuals equal actions do not exist, consequently
there can be no such thing as "requital. "
When I do anything, I am very far from thinking
that any man is able to do anything at all like
it: the action belongs to me. . . . Nobody can
pay me back for anything I do; the most that can
be done is to make me the victim of another
action.
.
926.
Against John Stuart Mill. -I abhor the man's
vulgarity when he says: "What is right for one
man is right for another"; "Do not to others that
which you would not that they should do unto
you. ” Such principles would fain establish the
whole of human traffic upon mutual services, so
that every action would appear to be a cash pay-
ment for something done to us. The hypothesis


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
345
66
>
here is ignoble to the last degree: it is taken for
granted that there is some sort of equivalence in
value between my actions and thine ; the most per-
sonal value of an action is simply cancelled in this
manner (that part of an action which has no
equivalent and which cannot be remunerated).
Reciprocity” is a piece of egregious vulgarity;
the mere fact that what I do cannot and may not
be done by another, that there is no such thing as
equivalence (except in those very select circles
where one actually has one's equal, inter pares),
that in a really profound sense a man never re-
quites because he is something unique in himself
and can only do unique things,—this fundamental
conviction contains the cause of aristocratic aloof-
·ness from the mob, because the latter believes in
equality, and consequently in the feasibility of equiva-
lence and “reciprocity. ”
>
927.
9
The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations
and of its concepts “ useful” and “harmful” is well
founded; it is the necessary point of view of a
community which is only able to see and survey
immediate and proximate consequences.
The State and the political man are already in
need of a more super-moral attitude of mind :
because they have to calculate concerning a much
more complicated tissue of consequences. An eco-
nomic policy for the whole world should be possible
which could look at things in such broad perspec-
tive that all its isolated demands would seem for
the moment not only unjust, but arbitrary.


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346
THE WILL TO POWER.
928.
Should one follow one's feelings ? ”—To set
one's life at stake on the impulse of the moment,
and actuated by a generous feeling, has little worth,
and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is
alike in being capable of this—and in behaving in
this way with determination, the criminal, the
bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the
honest man.
A higher degree of excellence would be to over-
come this impulse, and to refrain from performing
an heroic deed at its bidding, and to remain cold,
raisonnable, free from the tempestuous surging of
concomitant sensations of delight. . . . The same
holds good of pity: it must first be sifted through
reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous
as any other passion.
The blind yielding to a passion, whether it be
generosity, pity, or hostility, is the cause of the
greatest evil. Greatness of character does not
consist in not possessing these passions-on the
contrary, a man should possess them to a terrible
degree: but he should lead them by the bridle . . .
and even this he should not do out of love of con-
trol, but merely because.
.
.
929.
“ To give up one's life for a cause "-very effec-
tive. But there are many things for which one
gives up one's life: the passions, one and all, will
be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to
pity, to anger, or to revenge-it matters not from


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THE ORDER OF RANK.
347
the point of view of value. How many have not
sacrificed their lives for pretty girls—and even
what is worse, their health! When one has
temperament, one instinctively chooses the most
dangerous things : if one is a philosopher, for in-
stance, one chooses the adventures of speculation;
if one is virtuous, one chooses immorality. One
kind of man will risk nothing, another kind will
risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On
the contrary, what we seek is life raised to a
higher power, life in danger. . . . But, let me re-
peat, we do not, on that account, wish to be more
virtuous than others. Pascal, for instance, wished
to risk nothing, and remained a Christian. That
perhaps was virtuous. --A man always sacrifices
something.
930.
How many advantages does not a man sacrifice!
To how small an extent does he seek his own
profit! All his emotions and passions wish to
assert their rights, and how remote a passion is
from that cautious utility which consists in
personal profit !
A man does not strive after “happiness"; one
must be an Englishman to be able to believe that
a man is always seeking his own advantage.
Our desires long to violate things with passion-
their overflowing strength seeks obstacles.
931.
All passions are generally useful, some directly,
others indirectly; in regard to utility it is abso-
1


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THE WILL TO POWER.
lutely impossible to fix upon any gradation of
values,-however certainly the forces of nature in
general may be regarded as good (i. e. useful),
from an economic point of view, they are still
the sources of much that is terrible and much
that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might
say would be, that the mightiest passions are the
most valuable: seeing that no stronger sources
of power exist.
932.
!
All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes
of mind have not come to be honoured on account
of their usefulness: but because they are the
conditions peculiar to rich souls who are able to
bestow and whose value consists in their vital
exuberance. Look into the eyes of the benevolent
man! In them you will see the exact reverse
of self-denial, of hatred of self, of “ Pascalism. "
933
In short, what we require is to dominate the
passions and not to weaken or to extirpate
them !