does not therefore regard the mutual depend ence the
opposites
good and evil proved.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
?
274
THE WILL TO POWER.
ceived in the history of mankind to-day. ) In
short: the coming of the "Kingdom of God" has
been placed in the future, and has been given an
earthly, a human meaning--but on the whole the faith in the old ideal is still maintained. . . .
34O.
The more concealed forms of the cult of Christian,
moral ideals. --The insipid and cowardly notion
"Mature," invented by Nature-enthusiasts (without any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the
implacable, and the cynical element in even "the
most beautiful" aspects), is only a sort of attempt
at reading the moral and Christian notion of "humanity" into Nature;--Rousseau's concept of
Nature, for instance, which took for granted that
? freedom, goodness, innocence, equity, justice, and Idylls, was nothing more at
bottom than the cult of Christian morality. We should collect passages from the poets in order to see what they admired, in lofty mountains, for instance. What Goethe had to do with them--
why he admired Spinoza. Absolute ignorance
"Nature" meant
concerning
The insipid and cowardly concept "Man," a la
the reasons of this cult. . . .
Comte and Stuart Mill, is at times the subject of
a cult. . . . This is only the Christian moral ideal
again under another name. . . . Refer also to the freethinkers--Guyau for example.
The insipid and cowardly concept "Art," which
is held to mean sympathy with all suffering and with everything botched and bungled (the same
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
275
And now, the whole socialistic ideal: nothing but blockheaded misunderstanding the Christian moral ideal.
34
The origin the ideal. The examination
states during which the world seems rounder, fuller, and more perfect: we have the pagan ideal
thing happens to history, Thierry): again the cult of the Christian moral ideal.
grows.
the soil out which
A. Starting out from those "aesthetic" mental
? with dominating spirit
(people give their abundance). type: the classical ideal--regarded
self-affirmation The highest an expres
sion of the successful nature of all the more
important
find the grand style
expression instinct which
this classical ideal we the highest style. An
power" itself. The
when "spiritualisation" and the absence sensu
ality assume the rank perfection, and when all that brutal, animal, direct, and proximate
avoided (people calculate and select): the "sage,"
angel"; priestliness virginity ignorance,
are the physiological ideals such idealists: the anaemic ideal. Under certain circumstances this
anaemic ideal may the ideal such natures
ledge
Starting
"the
itself.
instincts.
the "will
most feared dares acknow
out from the mental states which the world seemed emptier, paler, and thinner,
? ? be
it
I.
of = of
to
cf.
as
is in
B. is
its
of of of
=
of
of as
of
as In
is
of
to
it of ofisis
a
as to
it
? 276
THE WILL TO POWER.
represent paganism (thus Goethe sees his "saint" in Spinoza).
C. Starting out from those mental states in
which the world seemed more absurd, more evil,
poorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot even be imagined or desired in it (people deny and annihilate); the projection of the ideal into the sphere of the anti-natural, anti-actual, anti-logical;
the state of him who judges thus (the "impover
ishment" of the world as a result of suffering:
People take, they no longer bestow): the anti-natural ideal.
(The Christian ideal is a transitional form between the second and the third, now inclining more towards the former type, and anon inclining towards the latter. )
The three ideals: A. Either a strengthening of Life (paganism), or B. an impoverishment of Life
(anaemia), or C. a denial of Life (anti-naturalism). The state of beatitude in A. is the feeling of extreme abundance; in B. it is reached by the most fastidious selectiveness; in C, it is the contempt and the destruction of Life.
342.
A. The consistent type understands that even
evil must not be hated, must not be resisted, and
that it is not allowable to make war against
one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept
the pain which such behaviour brings in its train; that one lives entirely in positive feelings; that
one takes the side of one's opponents in word
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
277
and deed; that by means of a superfoetation of peaceful, kindly, conciliatory, helpful, and loving
states, one impoverishes the soil of the other states, . . . that one is in need of unremitting practice. What is achieved thereby ? --The
Buddhistic type, or the perfect cow.
This point of view is possible only where no
moral fanaticism prevails--that is to say, when
evil is not hated on its own account, but because
it opens the road to conditions which are painful (unrest, work, care, complications, dependence).
This is the Buddhistic point of view: there is no hatred of sin, the concept "sin," in fact, is
entirely lacking.
B. The inconsistent type. War is waged against evil--there is a belief that war waged
for Goodness' sake does not involve the same moral
results or affect character in the same way as
war generally does (and owing to which tend
encies it is detested as evil). As a matter of
fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is much more profoundly pernicious than any sort
of personal hostility; and generally, it is "the person" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the position of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc. ).
The attitude of hostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be bad in us, or
hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented and most anxious state of mind: thus
"miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and transcendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became desir
able. . . . The Christian type: or the perfect bigot, >k
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability, peace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active--profound quiet, the de fensive state, the fortress, t-he mistrust of war--
278
C. The stoical
firmness of principles; the unity of knowledge and will; great self-respect. The type of the
fanchorite. The perfect blockhead. --"
-Z
343.
/*-
An ideal which is striving to prevail or to
. ** /
purpose (a) by laying claim spurious origin; (b) by
assert itself endeavours to further
? assuming relationship
powerful ideals already existing; (c) by means
produced by mystery, though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself;
(d) by the slander its opponents' ideals; (e) by lying teaching the advantages which follow its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace,
general peace, even the assistance mighty
God, etc. --Contributions the psychology the idealists: Carlyle, Schiller, Michelet.
the thrill
Supposing protection, by means are discovered,
Morality emancipated.
between itself and the
all the means defence and which an ideal survives, thereby refuted? has
the means by which every
merely availed itself
thing lives and grows--they are all "immoral. "
My view: all the forces and instincts which
are the source life are lying beneath the ban of morality: morality the life-denying instinct.
must be annihilated life
? ? if
of
is to be
It
of is
is
or
a of
it
of of
of
to
to
of a
as
its
of in
a
of
a
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
344.
279
To avoid knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The idealist: a creature who has reasons
for remaining in the dark concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark
concerning
these reasons also.
345.
The tendency of moral evolution. --Every one's
desire is that there should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds. Thus the fundamental tendency of the weak and mediocre of all times, has been to enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of the weak : their chief weapon in this process was the moral principle. The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords.
The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against the extraordinary, of the
weak against the strong: meets with one of finest interruptions the fact that the rare, the refined, the more exacting, present themselves the weak, and repudiate the coarser weapons power.
346.
(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge philosophers dictated them by their moral "truths," and only seemingly inde
pendent.
(2) The "Moral Truths," "thus shall things
? ? ? be
of as
its
is is
in
of all
to
? 28O
THE WILL TO POWER.
p
done," are mere states of consciousness of an
instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus
are things done by us. " The "ideal" is supposed
to re-establish and strengthen an instinct; it
flatters man to feel he can obey when he is only an automaton.
347.
Morality as a means of seduction. --"Nature is
good; for a wise and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the 'corruption
of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are responsible--they must be wiped out": this is Rousseau's logic (compare with Pascal's logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin).
Refer also to Luther's logic, which is similar. In both cases a pretext is sought for the
Compare this with Paul's logic, which is similar. It is always under the cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In
the case of Christ the rejoicings of the people
? introduction of an insatiable lust of
as a moral and religious duty. The hatred directed against the ruling classes tries to sanctify itself . . . (the "sinfulness of Israel" is the basis of the priest's powerful position).
as the cause of His crucifixion. It was
appear
an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the anti-Semitic movement we find the
same trick: the opponent is overcome with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as retributive Justice.
revenge
? ? ? A. CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 28I
348.
The incidents of the fight: the fighter tries to transform his opponent into the exact opposite of
himself--imaginatively,
of course. He tries to
believe in himself to such an extent that he may have the courage necessary for the "good Cause"
(as if he were the good Cause); as if reason, taste,
and virtue were being assailed by his opponents.
. . . The belief of which he is most in need, as
the strongest means of defence and attack, is the belief in himself, which, however, knows how to
misinterpret itself as a belief in God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory,
but only understands victory for the sake of victory--for God's sake. Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle,
strives to convince itself of this: "Good taste, good judgment, and virtue are ours. " War urges people
to this exaggerated self-esteem. . . .
349.
Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have (whether as a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an
? "immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being the ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged
nature. One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate and thus
level one's self down to the rest of mankind.
How that spite this obvious fact, the majority idealists indulge propaganda for
? ? of is it,
of in
in
it,
? 282 THE WILL TO POWER.
their ideal, just as if they had no right to it unless the majority acquiesce therein P--For instance, all
those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim the right to study Latin and
mathematics. What is it urges them to do this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the herd: they fight for the "emancipation of
woman," because they are best able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it under the cover of a charitable movement, under the banner bearing the device "For others. " per
The cleverness of idealists consists in their sistently posing as the missionaries and "repre
sentatives" of an ideal: they thus "beautify"
themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real
heroism consists, not in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and disinterestedness,
but in not fighting at all. . . . "Iam thus; I will be thus--and you can go to the devil! "
35O.
Every ideal assumes love, hate, reverence, and con tempt. Either positive feeling is the primum mobile, or negative feeling Hatred and contempt are
the primum mobile all the ideals which proceed from resentment.
Criticism the "Good Man," the Saint, etc.
35
The "good man. " Or, hemiplegia virtue. -- the opinion every strong and natural man,
? ? ? In
B. A
of
I.
of
in is.
of of
? *
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
283
love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness
and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong
to each other. A man is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil, because otherwise he would not know how to be good.
--which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest of all things? Whence this hemiplegia
of virtue, the invention of the good man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those
instincts which enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to insist upon revenge. . . . This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to
that dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God, Spirit, Man); in the first
are found all the positive, in the second all the
"idealistic"; it never doubts that in concept the "good man," has found the highest de
sideratum. When aspiring its zenith fancies state which all evil wiped out, and which only good creatures have actually remained over.
does not therefore regard the mutual depend ence the opposites good and evil proved. On the contrary, the latter ought vanish, and
right
all. What, matter fact, the reason this desire? all ages, and particularly the
Christian age, much labour has been spent trying reduce men this one-sided activity:
Whence comes the morbidness and unnaturalness which repudiates these compounds
ideological
? negative forces, intentions,
and states. This method of valuing thus believes itself to be
the former should remain. The first has exist, the second ought not with
? ? to
. . .
of
to
in
at
of to
It a of in
In as a
it is
in
a us
of to
to to
is be
as
in it
its
? 284
THE WILL TO POWER.
and even to-day, among those who have been deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who desire precisely the same thing with their "humanisation" generally, or with their "Will of God," or with their "Salvation of the Soul. " The principal injunction behind all these things that man should no longer do anything evil, that
stances be harmful arrive this state hostile tendencies, resentment, and
chronic disease.
should under no circum desire harm. The way
affairs amputate all
suppress the instincts establish "spiritual peace"
mind, which certain type
? This attitude
man bred, starts out with this absurd
hypothesis: good and evil are postulated realities which are in state of mutual contradic
tion (not complementary values, which they
are), people are advised take the side the good, and insisted upon that good man resists and forswears evil until every trace uprooted--but with this valuation Life actually denied, for all its instincts Life has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts, this valuation dreams rather returning the wholeness, oneness, and strengthfulness Life:
actually believes that state blessedness will reached when the inner anarchy and state
opposed impulses brought end. --It possible that more
unrest which result from these
dangerous ideology, greater
science psychology, has ever yet existed, than
mischief the this will good: the most repugnant type man
? ? 2.
is
of
to to
of inno
to
of it is
of
is
be
of is
a
at
to of
to init
an
as is
is,
no a
a
or
of he
of
it
as
as of to
of of of
allis
a is
to
in
a to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
285
has been reared, the man who is not free, the
bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a
bigot could one tread the path which leads to
God, and that only a bigot's life could be a godly life.
And even here, Life is still in the right--Life
that knows not how to separate Yea from Nay:
what is the good of declaring with all one's might
that war is an evil, that one must harm no one,
that one must not act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is impossible to do
otherwise ! The good man who has renounced all evil, and who is afflicted according to his desire
with the hemiplegia of virtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making enemies,
or from saying "nay" and doing "nay. " The
Christian, for instance, hates "sin" --and what on earth is there which he does not call "sin"!
It is precisely because of his belief in a moral antagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown so full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally. The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the continual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in the end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical, that Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an act of grace
(that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands alone). In short: he denies Life, he sees
how "good," as the highest value, condemns Life. . . . And thus his ideology concerning good and
? ? ? ? 286 THE WILL TO POWER.
evil ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease. Therefore he is obliged to conceive another life . . .
352.
Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood to consist in the ability to harm as well as to help. This is the case with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and well-constituted races.
The dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal. . . . In this way morality becomes the
poisoner
A criticism of the good man,--Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice, humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience--is it really supposed that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to lead)?
I naturally do not wish to imply that there is
any opposition between the ego and the alter in the judgment: the question whether the
results these qualities, either regard him who possesses them regard environment,
? of life.
353.
? ? or in
of
is, to in
it to is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
287
society, "humanity," which lend them their value;
or whether they have a value in themselves. . . . In other words: is it utility which bids men condemn, combat, and deny the opposite qualities
(duplicity, falseness, perversity,
lack of self
confidence, inhumanity)?
qualities condemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it desirable that there should
exist no men at all possessed of such qualities? In any case, this is believed. . . . But here lies the error, the shortsightedness, the monocularity
of narrow egoism.
Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in which the whole advan
tage would be on the side of the just--so that all those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and would slowly become extinct?
At bottom, this is a question of taste and of asthetics: should we desire the most honourable
types of men--that is to say, the greatest bores-- alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright, the good-natured, the straightforward, and the "blockheads"?
If one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number constituting the "others," even the
just man himself ceases from having a right to exist,--he fact, no longer necessary,--and
this way seen that coarse utility alone could
have elevated such an insufferable virtue
honour.
Is the essence of such
? place
Desirability may lie precisely the other side.
might be better create conditions which the "just man" would reduced the humble
? ? to be
It
on to
in
of
it
is is, in
to
a in
? 288 THE WILL TO POWER.
position
short, conditions in which he would no longer
stand in the highest sphere, which requires other qualities.
354.
The "good man" as a tyrant--Mankind has always repeated the same error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the measure and standard of life;--instead of seeking the
standard in the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, it takes the
Preservative measures of a very definite kind of
life, and uses them to exclude all other kinds of
life, and even to criticise Life itself and to select
from among its forms. That is to say, man
ultimately forgets that measures are a means to
an end, and gets to like them for themselves:
they take the place of a goal in his mind, and
even become the standard of goals to him-- that is to say, a given species of man regards his
means of existence as the only legitimate means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as "truth," "goodness," "perfection": the given species, in fact, begins to tyrannise. . . . It is a
form of faith, of instinct, when a certain species
of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned, when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate, any species
of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights,
and no longer desires to be master.
of a "useful instrument"--an "ideal or at best a herdsman: in
gregarious animal,"
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
355.
289
"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.
>k
"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb.
356.
Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate:
thus you would that men were ? --that good men were ? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future.
357.
The metamorphoses of slavery, its disguise in the cloak of religion; its transfiguration through morality.
358.
The ideal slave (the "good man"). --He who
cannot regard himself as a "purpose," and who
cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, in
stinctively honours the morality of unselfishness. Everything urges him to this morality: his
prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And even faith is a form of self-denial.
:k
Atavism: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for once.
sk VOL. I. T
? ? ? ? 29O
THE WILL TO POWER.
Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance,
are just so many obstacles in the way of sovereign sentiments, of great ingenuity, of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.
sk
\: /
It is not a question of going ahead (to that end all that is required is to be at best a herdsman,
\ that is to say, the prime need of the herd), it is
a matter of getting along alone, of being able to be another.
? 359.
We must realise all that has been accumulated as the result of the highest moral idealism: how almost all other values have crystallised round
very long time and with the strongest passions--and
This shows that has been desired for
that has not yet been attained: otherwise would have disappointed everybody (that say,
would have been followed by more moderate
valuation). The saint
natural seemed the
the most powerful type man: which has elevated the value
high. One would think that the whole science had been engaged proving that the moral man the most powerful and most
this ideal
moral perfection
godly. --The conquest
passions--everything inspired terror;--the
natural and
transcendental,
the senses and the un spectators super
? ? to
is
so
it
of ,
, ,
a
to be
in
of
is to
of
is as
it
of
it
it.
it)
it
a
? hierarchy--"all
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
36O.
29I
Francis of Assisi : amorous and popular, a poet
who combats the order of rank among souls, in
favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual
man, the saint, the sage, the just man. O Marcus
? Aurelius !
361.
I have declared war against the anaemic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate but only put an end its tyranny and clear the way for other ideals, for more robust ideals.
The continuance the Christian ideal belongs
the most desirable desiderata: only for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their
stand beside and perhaps above it--they must have opponents, and strong ones too, order
grow strong themselves. That why we im
alike before God. "
Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish
morality: our
insists upon our strength -- all
them.
the so-called
Egoism and problem
gloominess La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism
moralists require the power instinct self-preservation opponents maintaining their requires
become master
Concerning the Slander Evil Qualities.
362.
The Christian
*~.
? ? ? of
its
is to
of
it
to
!
of
of
is
C.
it
to
of
in
if
it,
to . .
of of
to
? |
|
Egoism But no one has yet asked: what is the ego like? Everybody is rather inclined to see all egos alike. This is the result of the slave theory, of universal suffrage, and of "equality. "
292
THE WILL TO POWER.
in everything, and imagined that he had therefore
reduced the worth of things and virtues ! In
opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that
nothing else could exist save egoism,--that in
those men whose ego is weak and thin, the power > to love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers
* are such owing to the strength of their ego,--that
love is an expression egoism,
of etc. As a matter
of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the cause of uni versal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of men.
363.
Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest
regards his habits as more important than his advantage.
364.
? 365.
The behaviour of a higher man is the result of
a very complex set of motives: any word such as "pity" betrays nothing of this complexity. The
? ? ? possible
France standing below where
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
293
most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other relative to me? "--Thus the
valuing spirit is continually active.
366.
To think that the history of all moral pheno mena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought,
--that is to say, that pity is to be found at the
root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,-is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense
and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which the Germans, from
Herder to Hegel, have undergone.
367.
My "pity. "--This is a feeling for which I can
find no adequate term : I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what
power and what tasteless problems for back woodsmen (At time when the brave and light
? hearted scepticism
the development
Montaigne was already
Or when see some one might have stood, thanks
set perfectly senseless
accidents. Or even when, with the thought man's destiny my mind, contemplate with
horror and contempt the whole system modern European politics, which creating the circum
? ? in
)a of
is
I of
of
of
to
in
l
of
a he
a
I
fit
? THE WILL TO POWER.
stances and weaving the fabric of the whole future
294
of mankind. attain, if
Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to the health, "it cannot possibly
be our duty to increase the evil in the world. " If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self
and not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon
emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an infection.
369.
There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and does not exceed them--
consequently, the "allowable," the "morally in
different" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.
"One is continually promoting the interests of one's "ego" at the cost of other people"; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself.
37O.
The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the ego of
which every one speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.
This is sympathise in this way.
my "pity"; despite
the
Yes, to what could not "mankind"
!
fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I
368.
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
THE WILL TO POWER.
ceived in the history of mankind to-day. ) In
short: the coming of the "Kingdom of God" has
been placed in the future, and has been given an
earthly, a human meaning--but on the whole the faith in the old ideal is still maintained. . . .
34O.
The more concealed forms of the cult of Christian,
moral ideals. --The insipid and cowardly notion
"Mature," invented by Nature-enthusiasts (without any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the
implacable, and the cynical element in even "the
most beautiful" aspects), is only a sort of attempt
at reading the moral and Christian notion of "humanity" into Nature;--Rousseau's concept of
Nature, for instance, which took for granted that
? freedom, goodness, innocence, equity, justice, and Idylls, was nothing more at
bottom than the cult of Christian morality. We should collect passages from the poets in order to see what they admired, in lofty mountains, for instance. What Goethe had to do with them--
why he admired Spinoza. Absolute ignorance
"Nature" meant
concerning
The insipid and cowardly concept "Man," a la
the reasons of this cult. . . .
Comte and Stuart Mill, is at times the subject of
a cult. . . . This is only the Christian moral ideal
again under another name. . . . Refer also to the freethinkers--Guyau for example.
The insipid and cowardly concept "Art," which
is held to mean sympathy with all suffering and with everything botched and bungled (the same
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
275
And now, the whole socialistic ideal: nothing but blockheaded misunderstanding the Christian moral ideal.
34
The origin the ideal. The examination
states during which the world seems rounder, fuller, and more perfect: we have the pagan ideal
thing happens to history, Thierry): again the cult of the Christian moral ideal.
grows.
the soil out which
A. Starting out from those "aesthetic" mental
? with dominating spirit
(people give their abundance). type: the classical ideal--regarded
self-affirmation The highest an expres
sion of the successful nature of all the more
important
find the grand style
expression instinct which
this classical ideal we the highest style. An
power" itself. The
when "spiritualisation" and the absence sensu
ality assume the rank perfection, and when all that brutal, animal, direct, and proximate
avoided (people calculate and select): the "sage,"
angel"; priestliness virginity ignorance,
are the physiological ideals such idealists: the anaemic ideal. Under certain circumstances this
anaemic ideal may the ideal such natures
ledge
Starting
"the
itself.
instincts.
the "will
most feared dares acknow
out from the mental states which the world seemed emptier, paler, and thinner,
? ? be
it
I.
of = of
to
cf.
as
is in
B. is
its
of of of
=
of
of as
of
as In
is
of
to
it of ofisis
a
as to
it
? 276
THE WILL TO POWER.
represent paganism (thus Goethe sees his "saint" in Spinoza).
C. Starting out from those mental states in
which the world seemed more absurd, more evil,
poorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot even be imagined or desired in it (people deny and annihilate); the projection of the ideal into the sphere of the anti-natural, anti-actual, anti-logical;
the state of him who judges thus (the "impover
ishment" of the world as a result of suffering:
People take, they no longer bestow): the anti-natural ideal.
(The Christian ideal is a transitional form between the second and the third, now inclining more towards the former type, and anon inclining towards the latter. )
The three ideals: A. Either a strengthening of Life (paganism), or B. an impoverishment of Life
(anaemia), or C. a denial of Life (anti-naturalism). The state of beatitude in A. is the feeling of extreme abundance; in B. it is reached by the most fastidious selectiveness; in C, it is the contempt and the destruction of Life.
342.
A. The consistent type understands that even
evil must not be hated, must not be resisted, and
that it is not allowable to make war against
one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept
the pain which such behaviour brings in its train; that one lives entirely in positive feelings; that
one takes the side of one's opponents in word
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
277
and deed; that by means of a superfoetation of peaceful, kindly, conciliatory, helpful, and loving
states, one impoverishes the soil of the other states, . . . that one is in need of unremitting practice. What is achieved thereby ? --The
Buddhistic type, or the perfect cow.
This point of view is possible only where no
moral fanaticism prevails--that is to say, when
evil is not hated on its own account, but because
it opens the road to conditions which are painful (unrest, work, care, complications, dependence).
This is the Buddhistic point of view: there is no hatred of sin, the concept "sin," in fact, is
entirely lacking.
B. The inconsistent type. War is waged against evil--there is a belief that war waged
for Goodness' sake does not involve the same moral
results or affect character in the same way as
war generally does (and owing to which tend
encies it is detested as evil). As a matter of
fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is much more profoundly pernicious than any sort
of personal hostility; and generally, it is "the person" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the position of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc. ).
The attitude of hostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be bad in us, or
hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented and most anxious state of mind: thus
"miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and transcendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became desir
able. . . . The Christian type: or the perfect bigot, >k
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability, peace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active--profound quiet, the de fensive state, the fortress, t-he mistrust of war--
278
C. The stoical
firmness of principles; the unity of knowledge and will; great self-respect. The type of the
fanchorite. The perfect blockhead. --"
-Z
343.
/*-
An ideal which is striving to prevail or to
. ** /
purpose (a) by laying claim spurious origin; (b) by
assert itself endeavours to further
? assuming relationship
powerful ideals already existing; (c) by means
produced by mystery, though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself;
(d) by the slander its opponents' ideals; (e) by lying teaching the advantages which follow its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace,
general peace, even the assistance mighty
God, etc. --Contributions the psychology the idealists: Carlyle, Schiller, Michelet.
the thrill
Supposing protection, by means are discovered,
Morality emancipated.
between itself and the
all the means defence and which an ideal survives, thereby refuted? has
the means by which every
merely availed itself
thing lives and grows--they are all "immoral. "
My view: all the forces and instincts which
are the source life are lying beneath the ban of morality: morality the life-denying instinct.
must be annihilated life
? ? if
of
is to be
It
of is
is
or
a of
it
of of
of
to
to
of a
as
its
of in
a
of
a
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
344.
279
To avoid knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The idealist: a creature who has reasons
for remaining in the dark concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark
concerning
these reasons also.
345.
The tendency of moral evolution. --Every one's
desire is that there should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds. Thus the fundamental tendency of the weak and mediocre of all times, has been to enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of the weak : their chief weapon in this process was the moral principle. The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords.
The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against the extraordinary, of the
weak against the strong: meets with one of finest interruptions the fact that the rare, the refined, the more exacting, present themselves the weak, and repudiate the coarser weapons power.
346.
(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge philosophers dictated them by their moral "truths," and only seemingly inde
pendent.
(2) The "Moral Truths," "thus shall things
? ? ? be
of as
its
is is
in
of all
to
? 28O
THE WILL TO POWER.
p
done," are mere states of consciousness of an
instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus
are things done by us. " The "ideal" is supposed
to re-establish and strengthen an instinct; it
flatters man to feel he can obey when he is only an automaton.
347.
Morality as a means of seduction. --"Nature is
good; for a wise and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the 'corruption
of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are responsible--they must be wiped out": this is Rousseau's logic (compare with Pascal's logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin).
Refer also to Luther's logic, which is similar. In both cases a pretext is sought for the
Compare this with Paul's logic, which is similar. It is always under the cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In
the case of Christ the rejoicings of the people
? introduction of an insatiable lust of
as a moral and religious duty. The hatred directed against the ruling classes tries to sanctify itself . . . (the "sinfulness of Israel" is the basis of the priest's powerful position).
as the cause of His crucifixion. It was
appear
an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the anti-Semitic movement we find the
same trick: the opponent is overcome with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as retributive Justice.
revenge
? ? ? A. CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 28I
348.
The incidents of the fight: the fighter tries to transform his opponent into the exact opposite of
himself--imaginatively,
of course. He tries to
believe in himself to such an extent that he may have the courage necessary for the "good Cause"
(as if he were the good Cause); as if reason, taste,
and virtue were being assailed by his opponents.
. . . The belief of which he is most in need, as
the strongest means of defence and attack, is the belief in himself, which, however, knows how to
misinterpret itself as a belief in God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory,
but only understands victory for the sake of victory--for God's sake. Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle,
strives to convince itself of this: "Good taste, good judgment, and virtue are ours. " War urges people
to this exaggerated self-esteem. . . .
349.
Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have (whether as a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an
? "immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being the ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged
nature. One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate and thus
level one's self down to the rest of mankind.
How that spite this obvious fact, the majority idealists indulge propaganda for
? ? of is it,
of in
in
it,
? 282 THE WILL TO POWER.
their ideal, just as if they had no right to it unless the majority acquiesce therein P--For instance, all
those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim the right to study Latin and
mathematics. What is it urges them to do this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the herd: they fight for the "emancipation of
woman," because they are best able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it under the cover of a charitable movement, under the banner bearing the device "For others. " per
The cleverness of idealists consists in their sistently posing as the missionaries and "repre
sentatives" of an ideal: they thus "beautify"
themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real
heroism consists, not in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and disinterestedness,
but in not fighting at all. . . . "Iam thus; I will be thus--and you can go to the devil! "
35O.
Every ideal assumes love, hate, reverence, and con tempt. Either positive feeling is the primum mobile, or negative feeling Hatred and contempt are
the primum mobile all the ideals which proceed from resentment.
Criticism the "Good Man," the Saint, etc.
35
The "good man. " Or, hemiplegia virtue. -- the opinion every strong and natural man,
? ? ? In
B. A
of
I.
of
in is.
of of
? *
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
283
love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness
and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong
to each other. A man is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil, because otherwise he would not know how to be good.
--which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest of all things? Whence this hemiplegia
of virtue, the invention of the good man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those
instincts which enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to insist upon revenge. . . . This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to
that dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God, Spirit, Man); in the first
are found all the positive, in the second all the
"idealistic"; it never doubts that in concept the "good man," has found the highest de
sideratum. When aspiring its zenith fancies state which all evil wiped out, and which only good creatures have actually remained over.
does not therefore regard the mutual depend ence the opposites good and evil proved. On the contrary, the latter ought vanish, and
right
all. What, matter fact, the reason this desire? all ages, and particularly the
Christian age, much labour has been spent trying reduce men this one-sided activity:
Whence comes the morbidness and unnaturalness which repudiates these compounds
ideological
? negative forces, intentions,
and states. This method of valuing thus believes itself to be
the former should remain. The first has exist, the second ought not with
? ? to
. . .
of
to
in
at
of to
It a of in
In as a
it is
in
a us
of to
to to
is be
as
in it
its
? 284
THE WILL TO POWER.
and even to-day, among those who have been deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who desire precisely the same thing with their "humanisation" generally, or with their "Will of God," or with their "Salvation of the Soul. " The principal injunction behind all these things that man should no longer do anything evil, that
stances be harmful arrive this state hostile tendencies, resentment, and
chronic disease.
should under no circum desire harm. The way
affairs amputate all
suppress the instincts establish "spiritual peace"
mind, which certain type
? This attitude
man bred, starts out with this absurd
hypothesis: good and evil are postulated realities which are in state of mutual contradic
tion (not complementary values, which they
are), people are advised take the side the good, and insisted upon that good man resists and forswears evil until every trace uprooted--but with this valuation Life actually denied, for all its instincts Life has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts, this valuation dreams rather returning the wholeness, oneness, and strengthfulness Life:
actually believes that state blessedness will reached when the inner anarchy and state
opposed impulses brought end. --It possible that more
unrest which result from these
dangerous ideology, greater
science psychology, has ever yet existed, than
mischief the this will good: the most repugnant type man
? ? 2.
is
of
to to
of inno
to
of it is
of
is
be
of is
a
at
to of
to init
an
as is
is,
no a
a
or
of he
of
it
as
as of to
of of of
allis
a is
to
in
a to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
285
has been reared, the man who is not free, the
bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a
bigot could one tread the path which leads to
God, and that only a bigot's life could be a godly life.
And even here, Life is still in the right--Life
that knows not how to separate Yea from Nay:
what is the good of declaring with all one's might
that war is an evil, that one must harm no one,
that one must not act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is impossible to do
otherwise ! The good man who has renounced all evil, and who is afflicted according to his desire
with the hemiplegia of virtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making enemies,
or from saying "nay" and doing "nay. " The
Christian, for instance, hates "sin" --and what on earth is there which he does not call "sin"!
It is precisely because of his belief in a moral antagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown so full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally. The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the continual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in the end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical, that Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an act of grace
(that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands alone). In short: he denies Life, he sees
how "good," as the highest value, condemns Life. . . . And thus his ideology concerning good and
? ? ? ? 286 THE WILL TO POWER.
evil ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease. Therefore he is obliged to conceive another life . . .
352.
Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood to consist in the ability to harm as well as to help. This is the case with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and well-constituted races.
The dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal. . . . In this way morality becomes the
poisoner
A criticism of the good man,--Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice, humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience--is it really supposed that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to lead)?
I naturally do not wish to imply that there is
any opposition between the ego and the alter in the judgment: the question whether the
results these qualities, either regard him who possesses them regard environment,
? of life.
353.
? ? or in
of
is, to in
it to is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
287
society, "humanity," which lend them their value;
or whether they have a value in themselves. . . . In other words: is it utility which bids men condemn, combat, and deny the opposite qualities
(duplicity, falseness, perversity,
lack of self
confidence, inhumanity)?
qualities condemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it desirable that there should
exist no men at all possessed of such qualities? In any case, this is believed. . . . But here lies the error, the shortsightedness, the monocularity
of narrow egoism.
Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in which the whole advan
tage would be on the side of the just--so that all those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and would slowly become extinct?
At bottom, this is a question of taste and of asthetics: should we desire the most honourable
types of men--that is to say, the greatest bores-- alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright, the good-natured, the straightforward, and the "blockheads"?
If one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number constituting the "others," even the
just man himself ceases from having a right to exist,--he fact, no longer necessary,--and
this way seen that coarse utility alone could
have elevated such an insufferable virtue
honour.
Is the essence of such
? place
Desirability may lie precisely the other side.
might be better create conditions which the "just man" would reduced the humble
? ? to be
It
on to
in
of
it
is is, in
to
a in
? 288 THE WILL TO POWER.
position
short, conditions in which he would no longer
stand in the highest sphere, which requires other qualities.
354.
The "good man" as a tyrant--Mankind has always repeated the same error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the measure and standard of life;--instead of seeking the
standard in the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, it takes the
Preservative measures of a very definite kind of
life, and uses them to exclude all other kinds of
life, and even to criticise Life itself and to select
from among its forms. That is to say, man
ultimately forgets that measures are a means to
an end, and gets to like them for themselves:
they take the place of a goal in his mind, and
even become the standard of goals to him-- that is to say, a given species of man regards his
means of existence as the only legitimate means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as "truth," "goodness," "perfection": the given species, in fact, begins to tyrannise. . . . It is a
form of faith, of instinct, when a certain species
of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned, when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate, any species
of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights,
and no longer desires to be master.
of a "useful instrument"--an "ideal or at best a herdsman: in
gregarious animal,"
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
355.
289
"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.
>k
"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb.
356.
Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate:
thus you would that men were ? --that good men were ? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future.
357.
The metamorphoses of slavery, its disguise in the cloak of religion; its transfiguration through morality.
358.
The ideal slave (the "good man"). --He who
cannot regard himself as a "purpose," and who
cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, in
stinctively honours the morality of unselfishness. Everything urges him to this morality: his
prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And even faith is a form of self-denial.
:k
Atavism: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for once.
sk VOL. I. T
? ? ? ? 29O
THE WILL TO POWER.
Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance,
are just so many obstacles in the way of sovereign sentiments, of great ingenuity, of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.
sk
\: /
It is not a question of going ahead (to that end all that is required is to be at best a herdsman,
\ that is to say, the prime need of the herd), it is
a matter of getting along alone, of being able to be another.
? 359.
We must realise all that has been accumulated as the result of the highest moral idealism: how almost all other values have crystallised round
very long time and with the strongest passions--and
This shows that has been desired for
that has not yet been attained: otherwise would have disappointed everybody (that say,
would have been followed by more moderate
valuation). The saint
natural seemed the
the most powerful type man: which has elevated the value
high. One would think that the whole science had been engaged proving that the moral man the most powerful and most
this ideal
moral perfection
godly. --The conquest
passions--everything inspired terror;--the
natural and
transcendental,
the senses and the un spectators super
? ? to
is
so
it
of ,
, ,
a
to be
in
of
is to
of
is as
it
of
it
it.
it)
it
a
? hierarchy--"all
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
36O.
29I
Francis of Assisi : amorous and popular, a poet
who combats the order of rank among souls, in
favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual
man, the saint, the sage, the just man. O Marcus
? Aurelius !
361.
I have declared war against the anaemic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate but only put an end its tyranny and clear the way for other ideals, for more robust ideals.
The continuance the Christian ideal belongs
the most desirable desiderata: only for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their
stand beside and perhaps above it--they must have opponents, and strong ones too, order
grow strong themselves. That why we im
alike before God. "
Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish
morality: our
insists upon our strength -- all
them.
the so-called
Egoism and problem
gloominess La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism
moralists require the power instinct self-preservation opponents maintaining their requires
become master
Concerning the Slander Evil Qualities.
362.
The Christian
*~.
? ? ? of
its
is to
of
it
to
!
of
of
is
C.
it
to
of
in
if
it,
to . .
of of
to
? |
|
Egoism But no one has yet asked: what is the ego like? Everybody is rather inclined to see all egos alike. This is the result of the slave theory, of universal suffrage, and of "equality. "
292
THE WILL TO POWER.
in everything, and imagined that he had therefore
reduced the worth of things and virtues ! In
opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that
nothing else could exist save egoism,--that in
those men whose ego is weak and thin, the power > to love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers
* are such owing to the strength of their ego,--that
love is an expression egoism,
of etc. As a matter
of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the cause of uni versal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of men.
363.
Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest
regards his habits as more important than his advantage.
364.
? 365.
The behaviour of a higher man is the result of
a very complex set of motives: any word such as "pity" betrays nothing of this complexity. The
? ? ? possible
France standing below where
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
293
most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other relative to me? "--Thus the
valuing spirit is continually active.
366.
To think that the history of all moral pheno mena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought,
--that is to say, that pity is to be found at the
root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,-is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense
and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which the Germans, from
Herder to Hegel, have undergone.
367.
My "pity. "--This is a feeling for which I can
find no adequate term : I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what
power and what tasteless problems for back woodsmen (At time when the brave and light
? hearted scepticism
the development
Montaigne was already
Or when see some one might have stood, thanks
set perfectly senseless
accidents. Or even when, with the thought man's destiny my mind, contemplate with
horror and contempt the whole system modern European politics, which creating the circum
? ? in
)a of
is
I of
of
of
to
in
l
of
a he
a
I
fit
? THE WILL TO POWER.
stances and weaving the fabric of the whole future
294
of mankind. attain, if
Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to the health, "it cannot possibly
be our duty to increase the evil in the world. " If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self
and not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon
emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an infection.
369.
There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and does not exceed them--
consequently, the "allowable," the "morally in
different" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.
"One is continually promoting the interests of one's "ego" at the cost of other people"; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself.
37O.
The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the ego of
which every one speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.
This is sympathise in this way.
my "pity"; despite
the
Yes, to what could not "mankind"
!
fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I
368.
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
