For mortal sins are not all
directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which
contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain
specially to justice and its parts, as stated above ([3496]Q[122],
A[1]).
directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which
contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain
specially to justice and its parts, as stated above ([3496]Q[122],
A[1]).
Summa Theologica
in Luc.
] commenting on these words
says: "What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some
pious work, since Christ prayed before sending His apostles? "
With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi in
Evang. ) there are three reasons for the number. First, "because the
power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy
Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four. " Or
"because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body through
whose lusts we transgress the Lord's commandments which are delivered
to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that
same body forty times. or, because, just as under the Law it was
commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive to pay God
a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three hundred and
sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six days" (namely,
the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) "we pay God a tithe of
our year. " According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth
reason may be added. For the Creator is the "Trinity," Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost: while the number "three" refers to the invisible creature,
since we are commanded to love God, with our whole heart, with our
whole soul, and with our whole mind: and the number "four" refers to
the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the
number "ten" [*Ten is the sum of three, three, and four] signifies all
things, and if this be multiplied by four which refers to the body
whereby we make use of things, we have the number forty.
Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of
the number of months in each season: or on account of the number of
Holy orders which are conferred at these times.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but
in order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him
to fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to
fast before our baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the
very same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted
in July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the
first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai
broke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, according to Jer. 39:2,
"the walls of the city were first broken through. " In the fifth month,
which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded not to go
up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the
spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt
down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) and afterwards by Titus. In the
seventh month which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the
remnants of the people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In the tenth month,
which we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in captivity
heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech. 4).
Reply to Objection 3: The "fasting of joy" proceeds from the
instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore
this fasting should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts
appointed by the commandment of the Church are rather "fasts of sorrow"
which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not
ordered by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on
Sundays: and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to
the custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi)
"is to be considered as law," or even through some erroneous opinion
(thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of
obligation)---he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting
considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad
Lucin. , Ep. lxxi): "Would that we might fast always. "
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Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that
one eat but once. For, as stated above [3487](A[2]), fasting is an act
of the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not
less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited
for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals be
limited.
Objection 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by
drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot
receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink
at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be
forbidden to eat several times.
Objection 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take
them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to
fasting to take only one meal.
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Christian people.
I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle
concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is
seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is able to
satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by
minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the
Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should take one meal in
the day.
Reply to Objection 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of
food for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result
being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for
the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.
Reply to Objection 2: Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A[1], ad 3]. One is
the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This
is broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not
lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another kind
and is called the "fasting of the faster," and this is not broken save
by such things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the
fast. Now the Church does not intend to command abstinence from drink,
for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the
food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible
to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink:
as also by eating immoderately at one meal.
Reply to Objection 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not
taken chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not
break one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were
to take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and
by way of food.
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Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster's meal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed
for the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect
than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted
until evening, for it is written (Lev. 23:32): "It is a sabbath . . .
you shall afflict your souls," and then the text continues: "From
evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths. " Much more
therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until the
evening.
Objection 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all.
But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it seems
that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the
commandment to fast.
Objection 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as
stated above [3488](A[2]). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply
in the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for
another, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not
be fixed for those who fast.
On the contrary, The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the
Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and is
said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De
Consecratione] says: "During Lent those are by no means to be credited
with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers,"
which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour. Therefore we
ought to fast until the ninth hour.
I answer that, As stated above ([3489]AA[1],3,5), fasting is directed
to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something
to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now
the right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour:
both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being
withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold of
the night), and the humor spread about through the limbs (to which
result the heat of the day conduces until the sun has reached its
zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that the nature of the
human body needs assistance against the external heat that is in the
air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in order that those who
fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for their sins, the ninth hour
is suitably fixed for their meal.
Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion, which
was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing His head, He
gave up the ghost" (Jn. 19:30): because those who fast by punishing
their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Gal.
5:24, "They that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh with the
vices and concupiscences. "
Reply to Objection 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the
night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day,
according to Rom. 13:12, "The night is passed and the day is at hand. "
Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the
New Testament.
Reply to Objection 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a
strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be
about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.
Reply to Objection 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much
harm. Now it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which
men for the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is
fixed for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do
much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however this
were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness, age, or
some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or be allowed
to forestall the hour by a little.
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Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from
flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be
bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has
been stated above [3490](A[6]) that fasting was instituted as a curb on
the concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by
drinking wine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, "Wine
is a luxurious thing," and Eph. 5:18, "Be not drunk with wine, wherein
is luxury. " Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine,
it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat.
Objection 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh
of certain animals. Now "concupiscence is desire of the delectable," as
stated above ([3491]FS, Q[30], A[1]). Therefore since fasting which was
instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating
of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.
Objection 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs
and cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the
Lenten fast.
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the faithful.
I answer that, As stated above [3492](A[6]), fasting was instituted by
the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which
regard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore
the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both
afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great
incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest
on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products,
such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds.
For, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford
greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, so
that from their consumption there results a greater surplus available
for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to
lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially
from these foods.
Reply to Objection 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation,
namely, heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I. , Q. 118, A[1], ad 3], and humor. Wine
and other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat:
flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital
spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most
productive of nourishment, that conduces to the production of humor.
Now the alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital
spirits are of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor
remains a long time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of
flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.
Reply to Objection 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes
account of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating
flesh meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not
always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh
meat, rather than to eat fish.
Reply to Objection 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who
fast, for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with
flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the
prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the most
solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and
because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our
redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in
every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on
eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other fasts
the custom varies among different people, and each person is bound to
conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among whom he is
dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De
Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and
look upon the commands of the elders as though they were the laws of
the apostles. "
__________________________________________________________________
OF GLUTTONY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether gluttony is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Its species;
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) Its daughters.
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Whether gluttony is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord
said (Mat. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a
man. " Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since
every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [*Ep. lxxi,
ad Lucin. ]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid
this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure and
necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of necessity
and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31):
"Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than necessary? "
Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin.
But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and
thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we first
tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we
have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat. " But man's
inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.
I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking,
but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through
leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists:
and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue.
Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by
reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually.
But the Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees
deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their
signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. [3493]FS, Q[102],
A[6], ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man
spiritually.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not
regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being
regulated by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not
from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this
pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a
case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in
eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.
Reply to Objection 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural
appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these
powers virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to
reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the
powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and
thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the sensitive
appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that the vice
of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes
inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this is not without sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether gluttony is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this,
apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as
stated above ([3494]Q[132], A[3]). But gluttony is not opposed to
charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of
one's neighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf.
Append. to St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]:
"Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should
know that this is one of the lesser sins. " But this pertains to
gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to
say venial, sins.
Objection 4: On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "As long
as the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done
valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is
unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught. " But virtue is not done away
save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above [3495](A[1]), the vice of gluttony
properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of reason
in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two points of
view. First, with regard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as
they may be incommensurate and consequently improportionate to the end;
secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence
turns man away from his due end. Accordingly, if the inordinate
concupiscence in gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end,
gluttony will be a mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the
pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God,
being ready to disobey God's commandments, in order to obtain those
pleasures. On the other hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the
vice of gluttony be found to affect only such things as are directed to
the end, for instance when a man has too great a desire for the
pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything
contrary to God's law, it is a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by
turning man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of
reduction, it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which
commands us to rest in our last end.
For mortal sins are not all
directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which
contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain
specially to justice and its parts, as stated above ([3496]Q[122],
A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: In so far as it turns man away from his last end,
gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last
end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal
sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as
denoting inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed
to the end.
Reply to Objection 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not
so much on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from
it. For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by
gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust. "
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Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For
the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the
punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth. ]: "Gluttony turned Adam out of
Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of
Noah. " According to Ezech. 16:49, "This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy
sister . . . fulness of bread," etc. Therefore the sin of gluttony is
the greatest of all.
Objection 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful.
Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps.
135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust,
concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony. " Therefore
gluttony is the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after
God, as stated above ([3497]Q[25], A[4]). Now man, by the vice of
gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus.
37:34): "By surfeiting many have perished. " Therefore gluttony is the
greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against God.
On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is
reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways.
First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is
committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine
things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the
greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of
the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who
sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished
rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking
food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and
moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the
result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity,
inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.
Reply to Objection 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices
that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang,
rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from
Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of
gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom
were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the
sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more
powerful, unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct
cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other
vices.
Reply to Objection 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body,
but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is
accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of
gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur
some bodily injury through taking too much food.
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Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?
Objection 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly
distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of
gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of
need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food
to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment
by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of an immoderate
appetite"---which are contained in the following verse: "Hastily,
sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily. "
For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance.
Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do not differentiate
its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished
according to the aforesaid.
Objection 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then
gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that there
should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so
do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the
other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various
circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony
distinguished thus.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.
I answer that, As stated above [3498](A[1]), gluttony denotes
inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered
in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly,
the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with
regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or
species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"---i. e. costly food; as regards
its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely---i. e. "daintily"; and
as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much. "
Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the
consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for
eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the due
manner of eating, by eating "greedily. "
Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under
one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in "what" he eats,
or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats. "
Reply to Objection 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes
the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by
reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in
him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very
species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is
disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 2: Place and other circumstances include no special
motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of
gluttony.
Reply to Objection 3: In all other vices, whenever different
circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of
circumstances argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not
apply to all circumstances, as stated above ([3499]FS, Q[72], A[9]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether gluttony is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For
capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause,
other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has
not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but
for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain
pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which,
in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that
it is most akin to what is in respect of its genus, is apparently the
least gluttony is not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the food of
virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing
to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there
is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly,
there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this
is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater
pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3500]FS, Q[84], A[3]), a capital vice
denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i. e. as having a
most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring
that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered
most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which
is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to
happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8. Therefore the vice of
gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among
other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that food itself is directed to
something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of
life, is most desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without
food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all
the toil of man's life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7,
"All the labor of man is for his mouth. " Yet gluttony seems to be about
pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), "with such food as is good for
the worthless body, men desire to be fed," wherein namely the pleasure
consists, "rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire
is this---not to thirst and not to hunger. "
Reply to Objection 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the
conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the
aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has
the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.
Reply to Objection 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself:
and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital
vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is
useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else:
wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of
desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such
things.
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Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?
Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned
to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness,
loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding. " For
unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, "Who are
glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. "
Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, according to
Prov. 14:22, "They err that work evil. " Therefore they are unfittingly
reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.
Objection 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result
of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Is.
28:8, "All tables were full of vomit and filth. " But this seems to be
not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of
counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, "If thou hast been forced to eat
much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee. " Therefore
it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as
a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the
daughters of gluttony.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to
gluttony.
I answer that, As stated above ([3501]AA[1],2,3), gluttony consists
properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore
those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the
results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for
either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on the part
of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the
reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in
this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, "dullness of sense in
the understanding," on account of the fumes of food disturbing the
brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the
penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. 2:3, "I thought in my
heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in
wisdom. " Secondly, as regards the. appetite, which is disordered in
many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were
fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect "unseemly joy" is
reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy
or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying
of 3 Esdra 3:20, that "wine . . . gives every one a confident and
joyful mind. " Thirdly, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have
"loquaciousness," because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless
gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is
stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so
tortured in his tongue. " Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in
this way we have "scurrility," i. e. a kind of levity resulting from
lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also
to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, "Or foolish
talking or scurrility," says that "fools call this geniality---i. e.
jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh. " Both of these,
however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful,
either by reason of excess which belongs to "loquaciousness," or by
reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility. "
On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may
refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities,
or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3,
"But fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind of
incontinence that has reference to lust. "
Reply to Objection 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every
sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random
riotous joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from
immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that
dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin,
whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from
gluttony, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating
too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by
immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as
a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.
Reply to Objection 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and
not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may
be referred to either vice.
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OF SOBRIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely
drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of sobriety?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?
(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?
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Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?
Objection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to
sobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): "Not to be more wise than it
behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety. " Therefore sobriety
is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.
Objection 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis.
8:7) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence,
and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for temperance. Now
temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual
matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.
Objection 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from
"measure" [*'Bria,' a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's
Lexicon]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things
appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): "We should live
soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in
ourselves"; and (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning
themselves with modesty and sobriety. " Consequently it would seem that
sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things
appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter
proper to sobriety.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): "Wine taken with
sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt
be sober. "
I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from some condition common
to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which
it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of
virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about
pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from "measure," for a
man is said to be sober because he observes the "bria," i. e. the
measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein
/the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter
is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured use thereof is
most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since
it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it
is written (Ecclus. 31:37,38): "Sober drinking is health to soul and
body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many
ruins. " For this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink,
not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is
liable to disturb the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants.
Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to
apply to any matter, as stated above ([3502]Q[123], A[2];[3503] Q[141],
A[2]) with regard to fortitude and temperance.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to
his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is
said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its
delight, according to Ps. 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how
goodly is it! " Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in
speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance
are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful.
Wherefore it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This
is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to
designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than
in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink.
Reply to Objection 3: Although a measure is needful in all things,
sobriety is not properly employed in connection with all things, but
only in those wherein there is most need for a measure.
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Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special
virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there
is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which
is about drink, a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of
touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make
food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment.
Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment,
drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats
and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue,
seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each
different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it
would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somno Scip.
says: "What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some
pious work, since Christ prayed before sending His apostles? "
With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi in
Evang. ) there are three reasons for the number. First, "because the
power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy
Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four. " Or
"because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body through
whose lusts we transgress the Lord's commandments which are delivered
to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that
same body forty times. or, because, just as under the Law it was
commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive to pay God
a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three hundred and
sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six days" (namely,
the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) "we pay God a tithe of
our year. " According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth
reason may be added. For the Creator is the "Trinity," Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost: while the number "three" refers to the invisible creature,
since we are commanded to love God, with our whole heart, with our
whole soul, and with our whole mind: and the number "four" refers to
the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the
number "ten" [*Ten is the sum of three, three, and four] signifies all
things, and if this be multiplied by four which refers to the body
whereby we make use of things, we have the number forty.
Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of
the number of months in each season: or on account of the number of
Holy orders which are conferred at these times.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but
in order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him
to fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to
fast before our baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the
very same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted
in July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the
first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai
broke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, according to Jer. 39:2,
"the walls of the city were first broken through. " In the fifth month,
which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded not to go
up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the
spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt
down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) and afterwards by Titus. In the
seventh month which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the
remnants of the people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In the tenth month,
which we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in captivity
heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech. 4).
Reply to Objection 3: The "fasting of joy" proceeds from the
instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore
this fasting should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts
appointed by the commandment of the Church are rather "fasts of sorrow"
which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not
ordered by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on
Sundays: and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to
the custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi)
"is to be considered as law," or even through some erroneous opinion
(thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of
obligation)---he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting
considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad
Lucin. , Ep. lxxi): "Would that we might fast always. "
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Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that
one eat but once. For, as stated above [3487](A[2]), fasting is an act
of the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not
less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited
for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals be
limited.
Objection 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by
drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot
receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink
at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be
forbidden to eat several times.
Objection 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take
them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to
fasting to take only one meal.
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Christian people.
I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle
concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is
seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is able to
satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by
minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the
Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should take one meal in
the day.
Reply to Objection 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of
food for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result
being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for
the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.
Reply to Objection 2: Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A[1], ad 3]. One is
the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This
is broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not
lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another kind
and is called the "fasting of the faster," and this is not broken save
by such things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the
fast. Now the Church does not intend to command abstinence from drink,
for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the
food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible
to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink:
as also by eating immoderately at one meal.
Reply to Objection 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not
taken chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not
break one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were
to take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and
by way of food.
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Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster's meal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed
for the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect
than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted
until evening, for it is written (Lev. 23:32): "It is a sabbath . . .
you shall afflict your souls," and then the text continues: "From
evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths. " Much more
therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until the
evening.
Objection 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all.
But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it seems
that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the
commandment to fast.
Objection 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as
stated above [3488](A[2]). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply
in the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for
another, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not
be fixed for those who fast.
On the contrary, The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the
Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and is
said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De
Consecratione] says: "During Lent those are by no means to be credited
with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers,"
which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour. Therefore we
ought to fast until the ninth hour.
I answer that, As stated above ([3489]AA[1],3,5), fasting is directed
to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something
to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now
the right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour:
both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being
withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold of
the night), and the humor spread about through the limbs (to which
result the heat of the day conduces until the sun has reached its
zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that the nature of the
human body needs assistance against the external heat that is in the
air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in order that those who
fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for their sins, the ninth hour
is suitably fixed for their meal.
Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion, which
was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing His head, He
gave up the ghost" (Jn. 19:30): because those who fast by punishing
their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Gal.
5:24, "They that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh with the
vices and concupiscences. "
Reply to Objection 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the
night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day,
according to Rom. 13:12, "The night is passed and the day is at hand. "
Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the
New Testament.
Reply to Objection 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a
strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be
about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.
Reply to Objection 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much
harm. Now it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which
men for the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is
fixed for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do
much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however this
were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness, age, or
some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or be allowed
to forestall the hour by a little.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from
flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be
bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has
been stated above [3490](A[6]) that fasting was instituted as a curb on
the concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by
drinking wine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, "Wine
is a luxurious thing," and Eph. 5:18, "Be not drunk with wine, wherein
is luxury. " Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine,
it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat.
Objection 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh
of certain animals. Now "concupiscence is desire of the delectable," as
stated above ([3491]FS, Q[30], A[1]). Therefore since fasting which was
instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating
of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.
Objection 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs
and cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the
Lenten fast.
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the faithful.
I answer that, As stated above [3492](A[6]), fasting was instituted by
the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which
regard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore
the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both
afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great
incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest
on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products,
such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds.
For, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford
greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, so
that from their consumption there results a greater surplus available
for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to
lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially
from these foods.
Reply to Objection 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation,
namely, heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I. , Q. 118, A[1], ad 3], and humor. Wine
and other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat:
flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital
spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most
productive of nourishment, that conduces to the production of humor.
Now the alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital
spirits are of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor
remains a long time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of
flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.
Reply to Objection 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes
account of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating
flesh meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not
always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh
meat, rather than to eat fish.
Reply to Objection 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who
fast, for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with
flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the
prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the most
solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and
because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our
redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in
every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on
eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other fasts
the custom varies among different people, and each person is bound to
conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among whom he is
dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De
Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and
look upon the commands of the elders as though they were the laws of
the apostles. "
__________________________________________________________________
OF GLUTTONY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether gluttony is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Its species;
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) Its daughters.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether gluttony is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord
said (Mat. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a
man. " Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since
every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [*Ep. lxxi,
ad Lucin. ]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid
this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure and
necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of necessity
and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31):
"Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than necessary? "
Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin.
But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and
thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we first
tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we
have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat. " But man's
inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.
I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking,
but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through
leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists:
and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue.
Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by
reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually.
But the Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees
deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their
signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. [3493]FS, Q[102],
A[6], ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man
spiritually.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not
regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being
regulated by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not
from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this
pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a
case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in
eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.
Reply to Objection 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural
appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these
powers virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to
reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the
powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and
thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the sensitive
appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that the vice
of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes
inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this is not without sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether gluttony is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this,
apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as
stated above ([3494]Q[132], A[3]). But gluttony is not opposed to
charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of
one's neighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf.
Append. to St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]:
"Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should
know that this is one of the lesser sins. " But this pertains to
gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to
say venial, sins.
Objection 4: On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "As long
as the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done
valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is
unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught. " But virtue is not done away
save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above [3495](A[1]), the vice of gluttony
properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of reason
in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two points of
view. First, with regard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as
they may be incommensurate and consequently improportionate to the end;
secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence
turns man away from his due end. Accordingly, if the inordinate
concupiscence in gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end,
gluttony will be a mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the
pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God,
being ready to disobey God's commandments, in order to obtain those
pleasures. On the other hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the
vice of gluttony be found to affect only such things as are directed to
the end, for instance when a man has too great a desire for the
pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything
contrary to God's law, it is a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by
turning man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of
reduction, it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which
commands us to rest in our last end.
For mortal sins are not all
directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which
contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain
specially to justice and its parts, as stated above ([3496]Q[122],
A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: In so far as it turns man away from his last end,
gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last
end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal
sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as
denoting inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed
to the end.
Reply to Objection 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not
so much on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from
it. For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by
gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust. "
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Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For
the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the
punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth. ]: "Gluttony turned Adam out of
Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of
Noah. " According to Ezech. 16:49, "This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy
sister . . . fulness of bread," etc. Therefore the sin of gluttony is
the greatest of all.
Objection 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful.
Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps.
135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust,
concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony. " Therefore
gluttony is the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after
God, as stated above ([3497]Q[25], A[4]). Now man, by the vice of
gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus.
37:34): "By surfeiting many have perished. " Therefore gluttony is the
greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against God.
On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is
reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways.
First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is
committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine
things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the
greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of
the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who
sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished
rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking
food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and
moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the
result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity,
inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.
Reply to Objection 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices
that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang,
rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from
Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of
gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom
were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the
sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more
powerful, unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct
cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other
vices.
Reply to Objection 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body,
but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is
accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of
gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur
some bodily injury through taking too much food.
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Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?
Objection 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly
distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of
gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of
need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food
to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment
by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of an immoderate
appetite"---which are contained in the following verse: "Hastily,
sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily. "
For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance.
Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do not differentiate
its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished
according to the aforesaid.
Objection 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then
gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that there
should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so
do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the
other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various
circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony
distinguished thus.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.
I answer that, As stated above [3498](A[1]), gluttony denotes
inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered
in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly,
the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with
regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or
species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"---i. e. costly food; as regards
its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely---i. e. "daintily"; and
as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much. "
Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the
consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for
eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the due
manner of eating, by eating "greedily. "
Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under
one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in "what" he eats,
or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats. "
Reply to Objection 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes
the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by
reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in
him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very
species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is
disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 2: Place and other circumstances include no special
motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of
gluttony.
Reply to Objection 3: In all other vices, whenever different
circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of
circumstances argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not
apply to all circumstances, as stated above ([3499]FS, Q[72], A[9]).
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Whether gluttony is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For
capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause,
other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has
not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but
for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain
pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which,
in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that
it is most akin to what is in respect of its genus, is apparently the
least gluttony is not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the food of
virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing
to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there
is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly,
there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this
is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater
pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3500]FS, Q[84], A[3]), a capital vice
denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i. e. as having a
most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring
that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered
most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which
is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to
happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8. Therefore the vice of
gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among
other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that food itself is directed to
something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of
life, is most desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without
food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all
the toil of man's life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7,
"All the labor of man is for his mouth. " Yet gluttony seems to be about
pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), "with such food as is good for
the worthless body, men desire to be fed," wherein namely the pleasure
consists, "rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire
is this---not to thirst and not to hunger. "
Reply to Objection 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the
conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the
aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has
the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.
Reply to Objection 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself:
and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital
vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is
useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else:
wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of
desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such
things.
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Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?
Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned
to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness,
loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding. " For
unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, "Who are
glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. "
Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, according to
Prov. 14:22, "They err that work evil. " Therefore they are unfittingly
reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.
Objection 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result
of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Is.
28:8, "All tables were full of vomit and filth. " But this seems to be
not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of
counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, "If thou hast been forced to eat
much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee. " Therefore
it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as
a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the
daughters of gluttony.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to
gluttony.
I answer that, As stated above ([3501]AA[1],2,3), gluttony consists
properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore
those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the
results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for
either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on the part
of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the
reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in
this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, "dullness of sense in
the understanding," on account of the fumes of food disturbing the
brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the
penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. 2:3, "I thought in my
heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in
wisdom. " Secondly, as regards the. appetite, which is disordered in
many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were
fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect "unseemly joy" is
reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy
or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying
of 3 Esdra 3:20, that "wine . . . gives every one a confident and
joyful mind. " Thirdly, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have
"loquaciousness," because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless
gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is
stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so
tortured in his tongue. " Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in
this way we have "scurrility," i. e. a kind of levity resulting from
lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also
to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, "Or foolish
talking or scurrility," says that "fools call this geniality---i. e.
jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh. " Both of these,
however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful,
either by reason of excess which belongs to "loquaciousness," or by
reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility. "
On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may
refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities,
or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3,
"But fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind of
incontinence that has reference to lust. "
Reply to Objection 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every
sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random
riotous joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from
immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that
dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin,
whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from
gluttony, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating
too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by
immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as
a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.
Reply to Objection 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and
not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may
be referred to either vice.
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OF SOBRIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely
drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of sobriety?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?
(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?
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Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?
Objection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to
sobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): "Not to be more wise than it
behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety. " Therefore sobriety
is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.
Objection 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis.
8:7) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence,
and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for temperance. Now
temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual
matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.
Objection 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from
"measure" [*'Bria,' a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's
Lexicon]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things
appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): "We should live
soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in
ourselves"; and (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning
themselves with modesty and sobriety. " Consequently it would seem that
sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things
appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter
proper to sobriety.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): "Wine taken with
sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt
be sober. "
I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from some condition common
to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which
it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of
virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about
pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from "measure," for a
man is said to be sober because he observes the "bria," i. e. the
measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein
/the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter
is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured use thereof is
most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since
it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it
is written (Ecclus. 31:37,38): "Sober drinking is health to soul and
body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many
ruins. " For this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink,
not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is
liable to disturb the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants.
Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to
apply to any matter, as stated above ([3502]Q[123], A[2];[3503] Q[141],
A[2]) with regard to fortitude and temperance.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to
his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is
said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its
delight, according to Ps. 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how
goodly is it! " Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in
speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance
are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful.
Wherefore it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This
is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to
designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than
in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink.
Reply to Objection 3: Although a measure is needful in all things,
sobriety is not properly employed in connection with all things, but
only in those wherein there is most need for a measure.
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Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special
virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there
is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which
is about drink, a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of
touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make
food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment.
Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment,
drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats
and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue,
seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each
different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it
would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somno Scip.
