Bind its free
waving boughs to a wall, force foreign branches on it by
ingrafting, and it will feel itself compelled to one course of
action; its branches will grow, but not in the direction
they would have taken if left to themselves; it will produce
fruits, but not those which belong to its original nature.
waving boughs to a wall, force foreign branches on it by
ingrafting, and it will feel itself compelled to one course of
action; its branches will grow, but not in the direction
they would have taken if left to themselves; it will produce
fruits, but not those which belong to its original nature.
Fichte - Nature of the Scholar
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? 242
cisely which did precede them, and by no others; and be-
cause the present could arise out of those and out of no
other possible conditions. Had anything in the preceding
moment been in the smallest degree different from what it
was, then in the present moment something would have been
different from what it is. And from what cause were all
things in that preceding moment precisely such as they were?
For this reason, that in the moment preceding that, they
were such as they were then. And this moment again was
dependent on its predecessor, and that on another, and so on
without limit. In like manner will Nature, in the succeed-
ing moment, be necessarily determined to the particular
forms which it will then assume--for this reason, that in
the present moment it is determined exactly as it is; and
were anything in the present moment in the smallest
degree different from what it is, then in the succeeding mo-
ment something would necessarily be different from what
it will be. And in the moment following that, all things
will be precisely as they will be, because in the immediately
previous moment they will be as they will be; and so will
its successor proceed forth from it, and another from that,
and so on for ever.
Nature proceeds throughout the whole infinite series of
her possible determinations without outward incentive; and
the succession of these changes is not arbitrary, but follows
strict and unalterable laws. Whatever exists in Nature,
necessarily exists as it does exist, and it is absolutely impos-
sible that it should be otherwise. I enter within an un-
broken chain of phenomena, in which every link is deter-
mined by that which has preceded it, and in its turn deter-
mines the next; so that, were I able to trace backward the
causes through which alone any given moment could have come into actual existence, and to follow out the conse-
quences which must necessarily flow from it, I should then
be able, at that moment, and by means of thought alone, to
discover all possible conditions of the universe, both past
and future;--past, by interpreting the given moment;
future, by foreseeing its results. Every part contains the
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
243
whole, for only through the whole is each part what it is,
hut through the whole it is necessarily what it is.
What is it then which I have thus arrived at? If I
review my positions as a whole, I find their substance to be this:--that in every stage of progress an antecedent is
necessarily supposed, from which and through which alone
the present has arisen; in every condition a previous condi-
tion, in every existence another existence; and that from
nothing, nothing whatever can proceed.
Let me pause here a little, and develope whatever is con-
tained in this principle, until it become perfectly clear to
me! For it may be that on my clear insight into this point
may depend the success of my whole future inquiry.
Why, and from what cause, I had asked, are the deter-
minate forms of objects precisely such as they are at this
moment. I assumed without farther proof, and without the
slightest inquiry, as an absolute, immediate, certain and un-
alterable truth, that they had a cause;--that not through
themselves, but through something which lay beyond them,
they had attained existence and reality. I found their
existence insufficient to account for itself, and I was com-
pelled to assume another existence beyond them, as a neces-
sary condition of theirs. But why did I find the existence of
these qualities and determinate forms insufficient for itself 1
why did I find it to be an incomplete existence? What was
there in it which betrayed to me its insufficiency? This,
without doubt:--that, in the first place, these qualities do
not exist in and for themselves,--they are qualities of some-
thing else, attributes of a substance, forms of something
formed; and the supposition of such a substance, of a some-
thing to support these attributes,--of_a subslratum-for them,
to use the phraseology of the Schools,--is a necessary con-
dition of the conceivableness of such qualities. Further,
before I can attribute a definite quality to such a sub-
stratum, I must suppose for it a condition of repose, and of
cessation from change,--a pause in its existence. Were I
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? 244
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
to regard it as in a state of transition, then there could be
no definite determination, but merely an endless series of
changes from one state to another. The state of determi-
nation in a thing is thus a state and expression of mere
passivity; and a state of mere passivity is in itself an in-
complete existence. Such passivity itself demands an
activity to which it may be referred, by which it can be
explained, and through which it first becomes conceivable;
--or, as it is usually expressed,--which contains within it the
ground of this passivity.
What I found myself compelled to suppose was thus by
no means that the various and successive determinations of
Nature themselves produce each other,--that the present
determination annihilates itself, and, in the next moment,
when it no longer exists, produces another, which is dif-
ferent from itself and not contained in it, to fill its place:--
this is wholly inconceivable. The mere determination pro-
duces neither itself nor anything else.
What I found myself compelled to assume in order to
account for the gradual origin and the changes of those
determinations, was an active power, peculiar to the object,
and constituting its essential nature.
And how, then, do I conceive of this power ? --what is its
nature, and the modes of its manifestation 1 This only,--
that under these definite conditions it produces, by its own
energy and for its own sake, this definite effect and no
other;--and that it produces this certainly and infallibly.
This principle of activity, of independent and spontaneous
development, dwells in itself alone, and in nothing beyond
itself, as surely as it is power--power which is not im-
pelled or set in motion, but which sets itself in motion.
The cause of its having developed itself precisely in this
manner and no other, lies partly in itself--because it is this
particular power and no other; and partly in the circum-
stances under which it developes itself. Both these,--the
inward determination of a power by itself, and its outward
determination by circumstances,--must be united in order
to produce a change. The latter, the circumstances, the
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? BOOK L DOUBT.
245
passive condition of things,--can of itself produce no change,
for it has within it the opposite of all change,--inert exist-
ence. The former, the power,--is wholly determined, for
only on this condition is it conceivable; but its determina-
tion is completed only through the circumstances under
which it is developed. I can conceive of a power, it can
have an existence for me, only in so far as I can perceive an
effect proceeding from it; an inactive power,--which should
yet be a power and not an inert thing,--is wholly inconceiv-
able. Every effect, however, is determined; and--since the
effect is but the expression, but another mode of the activity
itself,--the active power is determined in its activity; and
the ground of this determination lies partly in itself, be-
cause it cannot otherwise be conceived of as a particular
and definite power;--partly out of itself, because its own
determination can be conceived of only as conditioned by
something else.
A flower has sprung out of the earth, and I infer from
thence a formative power in Nature. Such a formative
power exists for me only so far as this flower and others,
plants generally, and animals exist for me:--I can describe this power only through its effects, and it is to me
no more than the producing cause of such effects,--the
generative principle of flowers, plants, animals, and organic
forms in general (1 will go further, and maintain that a
flower, and this particular flower, could arise in this place
only in so far as all other circumstances united to make it
possible. But by the union of all these circumstances for
its possibility, the actual existence of the flower is by no
means explained; and for this I am still compelled to as-
sume a special, spontaneous, and original power in Nature, and indeed a jlpwer-producing power; for another power of
Nature might, under the same circumstances, have pro-
duced something entirely different. --I have thus attained
to the following view of the Universe.
When I contemplate all things as one whole, one Nature,
there is but one power,--when I regard them as separate
existences, there are many powers--which develope them-
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? 2-4-6 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
selves according to their inward laws, and pass through all
the possible forms of which they are capable; and all objects
in Nature are but those powers under certain determinate
forms. The manifestations of each individual power of
Nature are determined, become what they are, partly by
its own essential character, and partly through the mani-
festations of all the other powers of Nature with which it is
connected; but it is connected with them all--for Nature is one connected whole. They are, therefore, unalterably de-
termined ;--while its essential character remains what it is,
and while it continues to manifest itself under these parti-
cular circumstances, its manifestations must necessarily be
what they are;--and it is absolutely impossible that they
should be in the smallest degree different from what they
are.
In every moment of her duration Nature is one connected
whole; in every moment each individual part must be what
it is, because all the others are what they are; and you
could not remove a single grain of sand from its place,
without thereby, although perhaps imperceptibly to you,
changing something throughout all parts of the immeasur-
able whole. But every moment of this duration is deter-
mined by all past moments, and will determine all future
moments; and you cannot conceive even the position of a
grain of sand other than it is in the Present, without being
compelled to conceive the whole indefinite Past to have
been other than what it has been, and the whole indefinite
Future other than what it will be. Make the experiment,
for instance, with this grain of quick-sand. Suppose it to
lie some few paces further inland than it does :--then must
the storm-wind that drove it in from the sea have been
stronger than it actually was;--then must the preceding
state of the weather, by which this wind was occasioned and
its degree of strength determined, have been different from
what it actually was; and the previous state by which this
particular weather was determined,--and so on; and thus
you have, without stay or limit, a wholly different tempera-
ture of the air from that which really existed, and a dif-
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? BOOK I. DOUBT. 247
ferent constitution of the bodies which possess an influence
over this temperature, and over which, on the other hand,
it exercises such an influence. On the fruitfulness or un-
fruitfulness of countries, and through that, or even directly,
on the duration of human life,--this temperature exercises
a most decided influence. How can you know,--since it is
not permitted us to penetrate the arcana of Nature, and it
is therefore allowable to speak of possibilities,--how^can
you know, that in such a state of weather as may have been
necessary to carry this grain of sand a few paces further
inland, some one of your forefathers might not have
perished from hunger, or cold, or heat, before begetting
that son from whom you are descended; and that thus you
might never have been at all, and all that you have ever
done, and all that you ever hope to do in this world, must
have been obstructed, in order that a grain of sand might
lie in a different place?
I myself, with all that I call mine, am a link in this chain <
of the rigid necessity of Nature. There was a time--so
others tell me who were then alive, and I am compelled by
reasoning to admit such a time of which I have no imme-
diate consciousness,--there was a time in which I was not,
and a moment in which I began to be. I then only existed
for others,--not yet for myself. Since then, my self, my
self-consciousness, has gradually unfolded itself, and I have
discovered in myself certain capacities and faculties, wants
and natural desires. I am a definite creature, which came
into being at a certain time.
I have not come into being by my own power. It would
be the highest absurdity to suppose that I was before I
came into existence, in order to bring myself into existence.
I have, then, been called into being by another power be-
yond myself. And by what power but the universal power
of Nature, since I too am a part of Nature? The time at
which my existence began, and the attributes with which J
came into being, were determined by this universal power
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? 248
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
of Nature; and all the forms under which these inborn at-
tributes have since manifested themselves, and will manifest
themselves as long as I have a being, are determined by the
same power. It was impossible that, instead of me, another
should have come into existence;--it is impossible that this
being, once here, should at any moment of its existence be
other than what it is and will be.
That my successive states of being have been accompa-
nied by consciousness, and that some of them, such as
thoughts, resolutions, and the like, appear to be nothingirat
varied modes of consciousness, need not perplex my reason-
ings. It is the natural constitution of the plant to develope it-1self, of the animal to move, of man to think,--all after fixed
laws. Why should I hesitate to acknowledge the last as the
manifestation of an original power of Nature, as well as the
first and second? Nothing could hinder me from doing so but
mere wonder; thought being assuredly a far higher and more
subtle operation of Nature than the formation of a plant or
the proper motion of an animal But how can I accord to
such a feeling any influence whatever upon the calm conclu-
sions of reason? I cannot indeed explain how the power of
Nature can produce thought; but can I better explain its
operation in the formation of a plant or in the motion of an
animal ? I To attempt to deduce thought from any mere
combination of matter is a perversity into which I shall
not fall | but can I then explain from it even the formation
of the simplest moss? Those original powers of Nature
cannot be explained, for it is only by them that we can
explain everything which is susceptible of explanation.
Thought exists,--its existence_is_absolute and independent j
just as the formative power of Nature exists absolutely and
independently. It is in Nature; for the thinking being
arises and developes himself according to the laws of
Nature; therefore thought exists through Nature. There
js_in Nature an original thinking-power, as. there_is_an,_
original formative-power.
This original thinking-power of the Universe goes forth
and developes itself in all possible modes of which it is
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
249
capable, as the other original forces of Nature go forth and
assume all forms possible to them. I, like the plant, am a
particular mode or manifestation of the formative-power I
like the animal, a particular mode or manifestation of the
power of motion; and besides these I am also a particular
mode or manifestation of the thinking-power; and the uni-
_jm_ofthese three original powers into one,--into one har-
^monious_<<igyelopment,--is the distinguishing characteristic
of my species, as it is the distinguishing characteristic of
the plant species to be merely a mode or manifestation of
-the forpia&y&flojKer,--
Figure, motion, thought, in me, are not dependent on
each other and consequent on each other;--so that I think
and thereby conceive of the forms and motions that sur-
round me in such or such a manner because they are so, or
on the other hand, that they are so because I so conceive of
them,--but they are all simultaneous and harmonious de- Ivelopments of one and the same power, the manifestation of which necessarily assumes the form of a complete creature of my species, and which may thus be called the man-farm-
ing power. A thought arises within me absolutely, without
dependence otLanything else; the corresponding form like-
wiBe~~arises absolutely, and also the motion which corre-
sponds to both. I am not what I am, because I think so, or
will so; nor do I think and will it, because I am so; but I
am, and I think, both absolutely;--both harmonize with
each other by virtue of a higher power.
As surely as those original powers of Nature exist for
themselves, and have their own internal laws and purposes,
so surely must their outward manifestations, if they are left
to themselves and not suppressed by any foreign force, en-
dure for a certain period of time, and describe a certain cir-
cle of change. That which disappears even at the moment
of its production is assuredly not the manifestation of one
primordial power, but only a consequence of the combined
operation of various powers. The plant, a particular mode
or manifestation of the formative-power of Nature, when left
to itself, proceeds from the first germination to the ripen-
Ka
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? 250
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
ing of the seed. Man, a particular mode or manifestation
of all the powers of Nature in their union, when left to
himself, proceeds from birth to death in old age. Hence,
the duration of the life of plants and of men, and the varied
modes of this life.
This form, this proper motion, this thought, in harmony
with each other,--this duration of all these essential qua-
lities, amidst many non-essential changes, belong to me in
so far as I am a being of my species. But the man-form-
ing power of Nature had already displayed itself before I
existed, under a multitude of outward conditions and cir-
cumstances. Such outward circumstances have determined
the particular manner of its present activity, which has re-
sulted in the production of precisely such an individual of
my species as I am. The same circumstances can never re-
turn, unless the whole course of Nature should repeat itself,
and two Natures arise instead of one; hence the same indi-
viduals, who have once existed, can never again come into
actual being. Further, the man-forming power of Nature
manifests itself, during the same time in which I exist, un-
der all conditions and circumstances possible in that time.
But no combination of such circumstances can perfectly re-
semble those through which I came into existence, unless
the universe could divide itself into two perfectly similar
but independent worlds. It is impossible that two perfectly
similar individuals can come into actual existence at the
same time. It is thus determined what I, this definite per-
son, must be; and the general law by which I am what I
am is discovered. I am that which the man-forming power
of Nature--having been what it was, being what it is, and
standing in this particular relation to the other opposing
powers of Nature--could become; and,--there being no
ground of limitation within itself,--since it could become,
necessarily must become. I am that which I am, because in
this particular position of the great system of Nature, only
such a person, and absolutely no other, was possible;--and a
spirit who could look through the innermost secrets of Na-
ture, would, from knowing one single man, be able distinctly
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
251
to declare what men had formerly existed, and what men
would exist at any future moment;--in one individual he
would discern all actual and possible individuals. It is this
my inter-connexion with the whole system of Nature which'
determines what I have been, what I am, and what I shall
be; and the same spirit would be able, from any possible
moment of my existence, to discover infallibly what I had
previously been, and what I was afterwards to become. All
that, at any time, I am and shall be, I am and shall be of
absolute necessity; and it is impossible that I should be
anything else.
I am, indeed, conscious of myself as an independent, and,
in many occurrences of my life, a free being; but this con-
sciousness may easily be explained on the principles already
laid down, and may be thoroughly reconciled with the con-
clusions which have been drawn. My immediate conscious-
ness, my proper perception, cannot go beyond myself and
the modes of my own being;--I have immediate knowledge
of myself alone: whatever I may know more than this, I
know only by inference, in the same way in which I have
inferred the existence of original powers of Nature, which
yet do not lie within the circle of my perceptions. I myself
however,--that which I call me--my personality,--am not the man-forming power of Nature, but only one of its mani-.
testations; and it is only of this manifestation that I am
conscious, as myself, not of that power whose existence I
only infer from the necessity of explaining my own. This
manifestation, however, in its true nature, is really the pro-
duct of an original and independent power, and must appear
as such in consciousness. On this account I recognise my-
self generally as an independent being. For this reason I
appear to myself as free in certain occurrences of my life,
when these occurrences are the manifestations of the inde-
pendent power which falls to my share as an individual; as restrained and limited, when, by any combination of out-
ward circumstances, which may arise in time, but do not lie
within the original limitations of my personality, I cannot 1
\
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? 252
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
do what my individual power would naturally, if unob-
structed, be capable of doing; as compelled, when this indi-
vidual power, by the superiority of antagonistic powers, is
constrained to manifest itself even in opposition to the laws
of its own nature.
Bestow consciousness on a tree, and let it grow, spread
out its branches, and bring forth leaves and buds, blossoms
and fruits, after its kind, without hindrance or obstruc-
tion :--it will perceive no limitation to its existence in being
only a tree, a tree of this particular species, and this par-
ticular individual of the species; it will feel itself perfectly
free, because, in all those manifestations, it will do nothing
but what its nature requires; and it will desire to do no-
thing else, because it can only desire what that nature re-
quires. But let its growth be hindered by unfavourable
weather, want of nourishment, or other causes, and it will
feel itself limited and restrained, because an impulse which
actually belongs to its nature is not satisfied.
Bind its free
waving boughs to a wall, force foreign branches on it by
ingrafting, and it will feel itself compelled to one course of
action; its branches will grow, but not in the direction
they would have taken if left to themselves; it will produce
fruits, but not those which belong to its original nature.
In immediate consciousness, I appear to myself as free; by
reflection on the whole of Nature, I discover that freedom
is absolutely impossible; the former must be subordinate to
the latter, for it can be explained only by means of it.
What high satisfaction is attained through the system which my understanding has thus built up! What order,
what firm connexion, what comprehensive supervision does
it introduce into the whole fabric of my knowledge! Con-
sciousness is here no longer that stranger in Nature, whose
connexion with existence is so incomprehensible; it is native
to it, and indeed one of its necessary manifestations. Na-
ture rises gradually in the fixed series of her productions.
In rude matter she is a simple existence; in organized mat-
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
253
ter she returns within herself to internal activity; in the
plant, to produce form; in the animal, motion;--in man, as
her highest masterpiece, she turns inward that she may
perceive and contemplate herself,--in him she, as it were,
doubles herself, and, from being mere existence, becomes
existence and consciousness in one.
How I am and must be conscious of my own being and of
its determinations, is, in this connexion, easily understood.
My being and my knowledge have one common foundation,
--my own nature. The being within me, even because it
is my being, is conscious of itself. Quite as conceivable
is my consciousness of corporeal objects existing beyond
myself. The powers in whose manifestation my personali-
ty consists,--the formative--the self-moving--the thinking
powers--are not these same powers as they exist in Nature
at large, but only a certain definite portion of them; and
that they are but such a portion, is because there are so
many other existences beyond me. From the former, I can
infer the latter; from the limitation, that which limits. Be-
cause I myself am not this or that, which yet belongs to the
connected system of existence, it must exist beyond me;--
thus reasons the thinking principle within me. Of my own
limitation, I am immediately conscious, because it is a part
of myself, and only by reason of it do I possess an actual
existence; my consciousness of the source of this limitation,
--of that which I myself am not,--is produced by the for-
mer, and arises out of it.
Away, then, with those pretended influences and opera-
tions of outward things upon me, by means of which they
are supposed to pour in upon me a knowledge which is
not in themselves and cannot flow forth from them. flThe
ground upon which I assume the existence of something
beyond myself, does not lie out of myself, but within me, in
the limitation of my own personality. By means of this
limitation, the thinking principle of Nature within me pro-
ceeds out of itself, and is able to survey itself as a whole,
although, in each individual, from a different point of view. In the same way there arises within me the idea of
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? 254
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
other thinking beings like myself. I, or the thinking power
of Nature within me, possess some thoughts which seem to
have developed themselves within myself as a particular
form of Nature; and others, which seem not to have so de-
veloped themselves. And so it is in reality. The former are
my own, peculiar, individual contributions to the general cir-
cle of thought in Nature; the latter are deduced from them,
as what must surely have a place in that circle; but being
only inferences so far as I am concerned, must find that
place, not in me, but in other thinking beings:--hence I
conclude that there are other thinking beings besides myself,
(in short, Nature, becomes in me conscious of herself as a
whole, but only by beginning with my own individual con-
sciousness, and proceeding from thence to the consciousness
of universal being by inference founded on the principle of
causality ;^-that is, she is conscious of the conditions under
which alone such a form, such a motion, such a thought as
that in which my personality consists, is possible. The prin-
ciple of causality is the point of transition, from the particu-
lar within myself, to the universal which lies beyond my-
self; and the distinguishing characteristic of those two kinds
of knowledge is this, that the one is immediate percep-
tion, while the other is inference. In each individual, Nature beholds herself from a particu-
ftax point of view. I call myself--I, and thee--thou; thou
callest thyself--/, and me--thou; I lie beyond thee, as thou
beyond me. Of what is without me, I comprehend first
those things which touch me most nearly; thou, those which
touch thee most nearly;--from these points we each proceed
onwards to the next proximate; but we describe very dif-
ferent paths, which may here and there intersect each other,
but never run parallel. There is an infinite variety of pos-
sible individuals, and hence also an infinite variety of pos-
sible starting points of consciousness. This consciousness of
all individuals taken together, constitutes the complete con-
sciousness of the universe; and there is no other, for only in
the individual is there definite completeness and reality.
The testimony of consciousness in each individual is alto-
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? >
BOOK I. DOUBT. 255gether sure and trustworthy, if it be indeed the conscious-
ness here described; for this consciousness developes itself /
out of the whole prescribed course of Nature, and Nature I
cannot contradict herself. Wherever there is a conception,
there must be a corresponding existence, for conceptions are
only produced simultaneously with the production of the
corresponding realities. To each individual his own particu-
lar consciousness is wholly determined, for it proceeds from
his own nature:--no one can have other conceptions, or a
greater or less degree of vitality in these conceptions, than
he actually has. The substance of his conceptions is de-
termined by the position which he assumes in the universe;
their clearness and vitality, by the higher or lower degree of
efficiency manifested by the power of humanity in his per-
son. Give to Nature the determination of one single ele-
ment of a person, let it seem to be ever so trivial,--the
course of a muscle, the turn of a hair,--and, had she a uni-
versal consciousness and were able to reply to thee, she
could tell thee all the thoughts which could belong to this
person during the whole period of his conscious existence.
In this system also, the phenomenon of our consciousness which we call Will, becomes thoroughly intelligible. A vo-
lition is the immediate consciousness of the activity of any
of the powers oF Nature-within us. The immediate con-
sciousness of an effort of these powers which has not yet be-
come a reality because it is hemmed in by opposing powers,
is, in consciousness, inclination or desire;--the struggle of
contending powers is irresolution;--the victory of one is the
determination of the Will. If the power which strives after
activity be only that which we have in common with the
plant or the animal, there arises a division and degradation
of our inward being; the desire is unworthy of our rank in
the order of things, and, according to a common use of lan-
guage, may be called a low one. If this striving power be
the whole undivided force of humanity, then is the desire
worthy of our nature, and it may be called a high one. The
latter effort, considered absolutely, may be called a moral
law. The activity of this latter is a virtuous Will, and the
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? 25G
THE VOCATION OP MAN.
course of action resulting from it is virtue. The triumph of
the former not in harmony with the latter is vice; such a
triumph over the latter, and despite its opposition, is crime,
i The power which, on each individual occasion, proves
triumphant, triumphs of necessity; its superiority is deter-
mined by the whole connexion of the universe; and hence
by the same connexion is the vice or crime of each indivi-
dual irrevocably determined. Give to Nature, once more,
the course of a muscle, the turn of a hair, in any particular
individual, and, had she the power of universal thought and
could answer thee, she would be able to declare all the good
and evil deeds of his life from the beginning to the end of
it . But still virtue does not cease to be virtue, nor vice to
be vice. The virtuous man is a noble product of nature;
the vicious, an ignoble and contemptible one:--although
both are necessary results of the connected system of the
universe
.
Repentance is the consciousness of the continued effort of
humanity within me, even after it has been overcome, asso-
ciated with the disagreeable sense of having been subdued;
a disquieting but still precious pledge of our nobler nature.
From this consciousness of the fundamental impulse of our
nature, arises the sense which has been called 'conscience,'
and its greater or less degree of strictness and susceptibility,
down to the absolute want of it in many individuals. The
ignoble man is incapable of repentance, for in him humanity
has at no time sufficient strength to contend with the lower
impulses. Reward and punishment are the natural conse-
)quences of virtue and vice for the production of new virtue
and new vice. By frequent and important victories, our
peculiar power is extended and strengthened; by inaction
or frequent defeat, it becomes ever weaker and weaker. The
ideas of guilt and accountability have no meaning but in
external legislation. He only has incurred guilt, and must
render an account of his crime, who compels society to em-
ploy artificial external force in order to restrain in him the
activity of those impulses which are injurious to the general
welfare.
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? BOOK L DOUBT.
257
My inquiry is closed, and my desire of knowledge satis-
fied. I know what I am, and wherein the nature of my
species consists. I am a manifestation, determined by the whole system of the universe, of a power of Nature which is determined by itself. To understand thoroughly my parti-
cular personal being in its deepest sources is impossible, for
I cannot penetrate into the innermost recesses of Nature.
But I am immediately conscious of this my personal existence. I know right well what I am at the present moment;
I can for the most part remember what I have been formerly;
and I shall learn what I shall be, when what is now future
shall become present experience.
I cannot indeed make use of this discovery in the regula-
tion of my actions, for I do not truly act at all, but Nature
acts in me; and to make myself anything else than that for
which Nature has intended me, is what I cannot even pro-
pose to myself, for I am not the author of my own being,
but Nature has made me myself, and all that I am. I may
repent, and rejoice, and form good resolutions;--although,
strictly speaking, I cannot even do this, for all these things
come to me of themselves, when it is appointed for them to
come;--but most certainly I cannot, by all my repentance,
and by all my resolutions, produce the smallest change in
that which I must once for all inevitably become. I stand
under the inexorable power of rigid Necessity:--should she
have destined me to become a fool and a profligate, a fool
and a profligate without doubt I shall become; should she
have destined me to be wise and good, wise and good I shall
doubtless be. There is neither blame nor merit to her nor
to me. She stands under her own laws, I under hers. I see
this, and feel that my tranquillity would be best ensured by
subjecting my wishes also to that Necessity to which my
being is wholly subject.
But, oh these opposing wishes! For why should J any long-
er hide from myself the sadness, the horror, the amazement
with which I was penetrated when I saw how my inquiry
La
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? 258
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
must end? I had solemnly promised myself that my in-
clinations should have no influence in the direction of my
thoughts; and I have not knowingly allowed them any such
influence. But may I not at last confess that this result con-
tradicts the profoundest aspirations, wishes, and wants of my
being. And, despite of the accuracy and the decisive strict-
ness of the proofs by which it seems to be supported, how
can I truly believe in a theory of my being which strikes at
the very root of that being, which so distinctly contradicts
all the purposes for which alone I live, and without which I
should loathe my existence 1
Why must my heart mourn at, and be lacerated by, that
which so perfectly satisfies my understanding? While
nothing in Nature contradicts itself, is man alone a contra-
diction? Or perhaps not man in general, but only me and
those who resemble me? Had I but been contented to re-
main amid the pleasant delusions that surrounded me, satis-
fied with the immediate consciousness of my existence, and
never raised those questions concerning its foundation, the
answer to which has caused me this misery! But if this
answer be true, then / must of necessity have raised these
questions: I indeed raised them not,--the thinking nature
within me raised them. I was destined to this misery, and
I weep in vain the lost innocence of soul which can never
return to me again.
But courage! Let all else be lost, so that this at least
remains! Merely for the sake of my wishes, did they lie
ever so deep or seem ever so sacred, I cannot renounce what
rests on incontrovertible evidence. But perhaps I may have
erred in my investigation;--perhaps I may have only par-
tially comprehended and imperfectly considered the grounds
upon which I had to proceed. I ought to retrace the in-
quiry again from the opposite end, in order that I may at
least possess a correct starting point. What is it, then, that I
find so repugnant, so painful, in the decision to which I have
come? What is it, which I desired to find in its place?
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
259
* Let me before 'all things make clear to myself what are
these inclinations to which I appeal.
That I should be destined to be wise and good, or foolish
and profligate, without power to change this destiny in
aught,--in the former case having no merit, and in the lat-
ter incurring no guilt,--this it was that filled me with
amazement and horror. The reference of my being, and of
all the determinations of my being, to a cause lying out of
myself,--the manifestations of which were again determined
by other causes out of itself,--this it was from which I so
violently recoiled. That freedom which was not my own,
but that of a foreign power without me, and even in that,
only a limited half-freedom,--this it was which did not
satisfy me. I myself,--that of which I am conscious as my own being and person, but which in this system appears
as only the manifestation of a higher existence,--this /' I"
would be independent,--would be something, not by an-
other or through another, but of myself,--and, as such,
would be the final root of all my own determinations. ! The
rank which in this system is assumed by an original power
of Nature I would myself assume; with this difference, that
the modes of my manifestations shall not be determined by
any foreign power. I desire to possess an inward and pecu-
liar power of manifestation, infinitely manifold like those
powers of Nature; and this power shall manifest itself in
the particular way in which it does manifest itself, for no
other reason than because it does so manifest itself; not, like
these powers of Nature, because it is placed under such or
such outward conditions.
What then, according to my wish, shall be the especial
seat and centre_of this peculiar inward power 1 Evidently
not my body, for that I willingly allow to pass for a mani-
festation of the powers of Nature,--at least so far as its con-
stitution is concerned, if not with regard to its farther de-
terminations; not my sensuous inclinations, for these I re-
gard as a relation of those powers to my consciousness.
Hence it jnnsthgj-iy thought, and wilL I would exercise
my voluntary power freely, for the accomplishment of aims
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? 200
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
which I shall have freely adopted; and this will, as its ulti- *mate ground which can be determined by no higher, shall
move and mould, first my own body, and through it the
surrounding world. My active powers shall be under the
control of my will alone, and shall be set in motion by
nothing else than by it. Thus it shall be. There shall be
a Supreme Good in the spiritual world; I shall have the
power to seek this with freedom until I find it, to acknow-
ledge it as such when found, and it shall be my fault if I do
not find it. This Supreme Good I shall will to know, mere-
ly because I will it; and if I will anything else instead of
it, the fault shall be mine. My actions shall be the result of
this will, and without it there shall absolutely no action of
mine ensue, since there shall be no other power over my
actions but this wilL Then shall my powers, determined by,
and subject to the dominion of, my will, invade the external
world. I will be the lord of Nature, and she shall be my ser-
vant. I will influence her according to the measure of my
capacity, but she shall have no influence on ma
This, then, is the substance of my wishes and aspirations.
But the system, which has satisfied my understanding, has
wholly repudiated these. According to the one, I am wholly
independent of Nature and of any law which I do not impose
upon myself; according to the other, I am but a strictly de-
termined link in the chain of Nature. Whether such a free-
dom as I have desired be at all conceivable, and, if so, whe-
ther there be not grounds which, on complete and thorough
investigation, may compel me to accept it as a reality and
to ascribe it to myself, and whereby the result of my former
conclusions might thus be refuted;--this is now the question.
To be free, in the sense stated, means that I myself will
make myself whatever I am to be. I must then,--and this
is what is most surprising, and, at first sight, absurd in the
idea,--I must already be, in a certain sense, that which I
shall become, in order to be able to become so; I must pos-
sess a two-fold being, of which the first shall contain the
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
2G1
fundamental determining principle of the second. If I inter-
rogate my immediate self-consciousness on this matter, I
find the following. I have the knowledge of various possible
courses of action, from amongst which, as it appears to me,
I may choose which I please. I run through the whole cir-
cle, enlarge it, examine the various courses, compare one
with another, and consider. I at length decide upon one, de-
termine my will in accordance with it, and this resolution of
my will is followed by a corresponding action. Here then,
certainly, I am beforehand, in the mere conception of a pur-
pose, what subsequently, by means of this conception I am
in will and in action, jl&m beforehand as a thinking, what
I am afterwards as an active, beingX I create myself:--my
being by my thought, my thougbfby thought itself. One
can conceive the determinate state of a manifestation of a
mere power of Nature, of a plant for instance, as preceded
by an indeterminate state, in which, if left to itself, it might
have assumed any one of an infinite variety of possible de-
terminations. These manifold possibilities are certainly pos-
sibilities within it, contained in its original constitution, but
they are not possibilities for it, because it is incapable of such
an idea, and cannot choose or of itself put an end to this
state of indecision: there must be external grounds by which
it may be determined to some one of those various possibili-
ties to which it is unable to determine itself. This determina-
tion can have no previous existence within it, for it is capable
of but one mode of determination, that which it has actually
assumed. Hence it was, thatft formerly felt myself com- \pelled to maintain that the manifestation of every power must
receive its final determination from without. Doubtless I
then thought only of such powers as are incapable of con-
sciousness, and manifest themselves merely in the outward
world. To them that assertion may be applied without the
slightest limitation;--but to intelligences the grounds of it
are not applicable, and it was, therefore, rash to extend it to
them.
Freedom, such as I have laid claim to, is conceivable only of intelligences; but to them, undoubtedly, it belongs. Un-
? ?
? 242
cisely which did precede them, and by no others; and be-
cause the present could arise out of those and out of no
other possible conditions. Had anything in the preceding
moment been in the smallest degree different from what it
was, then in the present moment something would have been
different from what it is. And from what cause were all
things in that preceding moment precisely such as they were?
For this reason, that in the moment preceding that, they
were such as they were then. And this moment again was
dependent on its predecessor, and that on another, and so on
without limit. In like manner will Nature, in the succeed-
ing moment, be necessarily determined to the particular
forms which it will then assume--for this reason, that in
the present moment it is determined exactly as it is; and
were anything in the present moment in the smallest
degree different from what it is, then in the succeeding mo-
ment something would necessarily be different from what
it will be. And in the moment following that, all things
will be precisely as they will be, because in the immediately
previous moment they will be as they will be; and so will
its successor proceed forth from it, and another from that,
and so on for ever.
Nature proceeds throughout the whole infinite series of
her possible determinations without outward incentive; and
the succession of these changes is not arbitrary, but follows
strict and unalterable laws. Whatever exists in Nature,
necessarily exists as it does exist, and it is absolutely impos-
sible that it should be otherwise. I enter within an un-
broken chain of phenomena, in which every link is deter-
mined by that which has preceded it, and in its turn deter-
mines the next; so that, were I able to trace backward the
causes through which alone any given moment could have come into actual existence, and to follow out the conse-
quences which must necessarily flow from it, I should then
be able, at that moment, and by means of thought alone, to
discover all possible conditions of the universe, both past
and future;--past, by interpreting the given moment;
future, by foreseeing its results. Every part contains the
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
243
whole, for only through the whole is each part what it is,
hut through the whole it is necessarily what it is.
What is it then which I have thus arrived at? If I
review my positions as a whole, I find their substance to be this:--that in every stage of progress an antecedent is
necessarily supposed, from which and through which alone
the present has arisen; in every condition a previous condi-
tion, in every existence another existence; and that from
nothing, nothing whatever can proceed.
Let me pause here a little, and develope whatever is con-
tained in this principle, until it become perfectly clear to
me! For it may be that on my clear insight into this point
may depend the success of my whole future inquiry.
Why, and from what cause, I had asked, are the deter-
minate forms of objects precisely such as they are at this
moment. I assumed without farther proof, and without the
slightest inquiry, as an absolute, immediate, certain and un-
alterable truth, that they had a cause;--that not through
themselves, but through something which lay beyond them,
they had attained existence and reality. I found their
existence insufficient to account for itself, and I was com-
pelled to assume another existence beyond them, as a neces-
sary condition of theirs. But why did I find the existence of
these qualities and determinate forms insufficient for itself 1
why did I find it to be an incomplete existence? What was
there in it which betrayed to me its insufficiency? This,
without doubt:--that, in the first place, these qualities do
not exist in and for themselves,--they are qualities of some-
thing else, attributes of a substance, forms of something
formed; and the supposition of such a substance, of a some-
thing to support these attributes,--of_a subslratum-for them,
to use the phraseology of the Schools,--is a necessary con-
dition of the conceivableness of such qualities. Further,
before I can attribute a definite quality to such a sub-
stratum, I must suppose for it a condition of repose, and of
cessation from change,--a pause in its existence. Were I
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? 244
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
to regard it as in a state of transition, then there could be
no definite determination, but merely an endless series of
changes from one state to another. The state of determi-
nation in a thing is thus a state and expression of mere
passivity; and a state of mere passivity is in itself an in-
complete existence. Such passivity itself demands an
activity to which it may be referred, by which it can be
explained, and through which it first becomes conceivable;
--or, as it is usually expressed,--which contains within it the
ground of this passivity.
What I found myself compelled to suppose was thus by
no means that the various and successive determinations of
Nature themselves produce each other,--that the present
determination annihilates itself, and, in the next moment,
when it no longer exists, produces another, which is dif-
ferent from itself and not contained in it, to fill its place:--
this is wholly inconceivable. The mere determination pro-
duces neither itself nor anything else.
What I found myself compelled to assume in order to
account for the gradual origin and the changes of those
determinations, was an active power, peculiar to the object,
and constituting its essential nature.
And how, then, do I conceive of this power ? --what is its
nature, and the modes of its manifestation 1 This only,--
that under these definite conditions it produces, by its own
energy and for its own sake, this definite effect and no
other;--and that it produces this certainly and infallibly.
This principle of activity, of independent and spontaneous
development, dwells in itself alone, and in nothing beyond
itself, as surely as it is power--power which is not im-
pelled or set in motion, but which sets itself in motion.
The cause of its having developed itself precisely in this
manner and no other, lies partly in itself--because it is this
particular power and no other; and partly in the circum-
stances under which it developes itself. Both these,--the
inward determination of a power by itself, and its outward
determination by circumstances,--must be united in order
to produce a change. The latter, the circumstances, the
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? BOOK L DOUBT.
245
passive condition of things,--can of itself produce no change,
for it has within it the opposite of all change,--inert exist-
ence. The former, the power,--is wholly determined, for
only on this condition is it conceivable; but its determina-
tion is completed only through the circumstances under
which it is developed. I can conceive of a power, it can
have an existence for me, only in so far as I can perceive an
effect proceeding from it; an inactive power,--which should
yet be a power and not an inert thing,--is wholly inconceiv-
able. Every effect, however, is determined; and--since the
effect is but the expression, but another mode of the activity
itself,--the active power is determined in its activity; and
the ground of this determination lies partly in itself, be-
cause it cannot otherwise be conceived of as a particular
and definite power;--partly out of itself, because its own
determination can be conceived of only as conditioned by
something else.
A flower has sprung out of the earth, and I infer from
thence a formative power in Nature. Such a formative
power exists for me only so far as this flower and others,
plants generally, and animals exist for me:--I can describe this power only through its effects, and it is to me
no more than the producing cause of such effects,--the
generative principle of flowers, plants, animals, and organic
forms in general (1 will go further, and maintain that a
flower, and this particular flower, could arise in this place
only in so far as all other circumstances united to make it
possible. But by the union of all these circumstances for
its possibility, the actual existence of the flower is by no
means explained; and for this I am still compelled to as-
sume a special, spontaneous, and original power in Nature, and indeed a jlpwer-producing power; for another power of
Nature might, under the same circumstances, have pro-
duced something entirely different. --I have thus attained
to the following view of the Universe.
When I contemplate all things as one whole, one Nature,
there is but one power,--when I regard them as separate
existences, there are many powers--which develope them-
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? 2-4-6 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
selves according to their inward laws, and pass through all
the possible forms of which they are capable; and all objects
in Nature are but those powers under certain determinate
forms. The manifestations of each individual power of
Nature are determined, become what they are, partly by
its own essential character, and partly through the mani-
festations of all the other powers of Nature with which it is
connected; but it is connected with them all--for Nature is one connected whole. They are, therefore, unalterably de-
termined ;--while its essential character remains what it is,
and while it continues to manifest itself under these parti-
cular circumstances, its manifestations must necessarily be
what they are;--and it is absolutely impossible that they
should be in the smallest degree different from what they
are.
In every moment of her duration Nature is one connected
whole; in every moment each individual part must be what
it is, because all the others are what they are; and you
could not remove a single grain of sand from its place,
without thereby, although perhaps imperceptibly to you,
changing something throughout all parts of the immeasur-
able whole. But every moment of this duration is deter-
mined by all past moments, and will determine all future
moments; and you cannot conceive even the position of a
grain of sand other than it is in the Present, without being
compelled to conceive the whole indefinite Past to have
been other than what it has been, and the whole indefinite
Future other than what it will be. Make the experiment,
for instance, with this grain of quick-sand. Suppose it to
lie some few paces further inland than it does :--then must
the storm-wind that drove it in from the sea have been
stronger than it actually was;--then must the preceding
state of the weather, by which this wind was occasioned and
its degree of strength determined, have been different from
what it actually was; and the previous state by which this
particular weather was determined,--and so on; and thus
you have, without stay or limit, a wholly different tempera-
ture of the air from that which really existed, and a dif-
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? BOOK I. DOUBT. 247
ferent constitution of the bodies which possess an influence
over this temperature, and over which, on the other hand,
it exercises such an influence. On the fruitfulness or un-
fruitfulness of countries, and through that, or even directly,
on the duration of human life,--this temperature exercises
a most decided influence. How can you know,--since it is
not permitted us to penetrate the arcana of Nature, and it
is therefore allowable to speak of possibilities,--how^can
you know, that in such a state of weather as may have been
necessary to carry this grain of sand a few paces further
inland, some one of your forefathers might not have
perished from hunger, or cold, or heat, before begetting
that son from whom you are descended; and that thus you
might never have been at all, and all that you have ever
done, and all that you ever hope to do in this world, must
have been obstructed, in order that a grain of sand might
lie in a different place?
I myself, with all that I call mine, am a link in this chain <
of the rigid necessity of Nature. There was a time--so
others tell me who were then alive, and I am compelled by
reasoning to admit such a time of which I have no imme-
diate consciousness,--there was a time in which I was not,
and a moment in which I began to be. I then only existed
for others,--not yet for myself. Since then, my self, my
self-consciousness, has gradually unfolded itself, and I have
discovered in myself certain capacities and faculties, wants
and natural desires. I am a definite creature, which came
into being at a certain time.
I have not come into being by my own power. It would
be the highest absurdity to suppose that I was before I
came into existence, in order to bring myself into existence.
I have, then, been called into being by another power be-
yond myself. And by what power but the universal power
of Nature, since I too am a part of Nature? The time at
which my existence began, and the attributes with which J
came into being, were determined by this universal power
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? 248
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
of Nature; and all the forms under which these inborn at-
tributes have since manifested themselves, and will manifest
themselves as long as I have a being, are determined by the
same power. It was impossible that, instead of me, another
should have come into existence;--it is impossible that this
being, once here, should at any moment of its existence be
other than what it is and will be.
That my successive states of being have been accompa-
nied by consciousness, and that some of them, such as
thoughts, resolutions, and the like, appear to be nothingirat
varied modes of consciousness, need not perplex my reason-
ings. It is the natural constitution of the plant to develope it-1self, of the animal to move, of man to think,--all after fixed
laws. Why should I hesitate to acknowledge the last as the
manifestation of an original power of Nature, as well as the
first and second? Nothing could hinder me from doing so but
mere wonder; thought being assuredly a far higher and more
subtle operation of Nature than the formation of a plant or
the proper motion of an animal But how can I accord to
such a feeling any influence whatever upon the calm conclu-
sions of reason? I cannot indeed explain how the power of
Nature can produce thought; but can I better explain its
operation in the formation of a plant or in the motion of an
animal ? I To attempt to deduce thought from any mere
combination of matter is a perversity into which I shall
not fall | but can I then explain from it even the formation
of the simplest moss? Those original powers of Nature
cannot be explained, for it is only by them that we can
explain everything which is susceptible of explanation.
Thought exists,--its existence_is_absolute and independent j
just as the formative power of Nature exists absolutely and
independently. It is in Nature; for the thinking being
arises and developes himself according to the laws of
Nature; therefore thought exists through Nature. There
js_in Nature an original thinking-power, as. there_is_an,_
original formative-power.
This original thinking-power of the Universe goes forth
and developes itself in all possible modes of which it is
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
249
capable, as the other original forces of Nature go forth and
assume all forms possible to them. I, like the plant, am a
particular mode or manifestation of the formative-power I
like the animal, a particular mode or manifestation of the
power of motion; and besides these I am also a particular
mode or manifestation of the thinking-power; and the uni-
_jm_ofthese three original powers into one,--into one har-
^monious_<<igyelopment,--is the distinguishing characteristic
of my species, as it is the distinguishing characteristic of
the plant species to be merely a mode or manifestation of
-the forpia&y&flojKer,--
Figure, motion, thought, in me, are not dependent on
each other and consequent on each other;--so that I think
and thereby conceive of the forms and motions that sur-
round me in such or such a manner because they are so, or
on the other hand, that they are so because I so conceive of
them,--but they are all simultaneous and harmonious de- Ivelopments of one and the same power, the manifestation of which necessarily assumes the form of a complete creature of my species, and which may thus be called the man-farm-
ing power. A thought arises within me absolutely, without
dependence otLanything else; the corresponding form like-
wiBe~~arises absolutely, and also the motion which corre-
sponds to both. I am not what I am, because I think so, or
will so; nor do I think and will it, because I am so; but I
am, and I think, both absolutely;--both harmonize with
each other by virtue of a higher power.
As surely as those original powers of Nature exist for
themselves, and have their own internal laws and purposes,
so surely must their outward manifestations, if they are left
to themselves and not suppressed by any foreign force, en-
dure for a certain period of time, and describe a certain cir-
cle of change. That which disappears even at the moment
of its production is assuredly not the manifestation of one
primordial power, but only a consequence of the combined
operation of various powers. The plant, a particular mode
or manifestation of the formative-power of Nature, when left
to itself, proceeds from the first germination to the ripen-
Ka
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? 250
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
ing of the seed. Man, a particular mode or manifestation
of all the powers of Nature in their union, when left to
himself, proceeds from birth to death in old age. Hence,
the duration of the life of plants and of men, and the varied
modes of this life.
This form, this proper motion, this thought, in harmony
with each other,--this duration of all these essential qua-
lities, amidst many non-essential changes, belong to me in
so far as I am a being of my species. But the man-form-
ing power of Nature had already displayed itself before I
existed, under a multitude of outward conditions and cir-
cumstances. Such outward circumstances have determined
the particular manner of its present activity, which has re-
sulted in the production of precisely such an individual of
my species as I am. The same circumstances can never re-
turn, unless the whole course of Nature should repeat itself,
and two Natures arise instead of one; hence the same indi-
viduals, who have once existed, can never again come into
actual being. Further, the man-forming power of Nature
manifests itself, during the same time in which I exist, un-
der all conditions and circumstances possible in that time.
But no combination of such circumstances can perfectly re-
semble those through which I came into existence, unless
the universe could divide itself into two perfectly similar
but independent worlds. It is impossible that two perfectly
similar individuals can come into actual existence at the
same time. It is thus determined what I, this definite per-
son, must be; and the general law by which I am what I
am is discovered. I am that which the man-forming power
of Nature--having been what it was, being what it is, and
standing in this particular relation to the other opposing
powers of Nature--could become; and,--there being no
ground of limitation within itself,--since it could become,
necessarily must become. I am that which I am, because in
this particular position of the great system of Nature, only
such a person, and absolutely no other, was possible;--and a
spirit who could look through the innermost secrets of Na-
ture, would, from knowing one single man, be able distinctly
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
251
to declare what men had formerly existed, and what men
would exist at any future moment;--in one individual he
would discern all actual and possible individuals. It is this
my inter-connexion with the whole system of Nature which'
determines what I have been, what I am, and what I shall
be; and the same spirit would be able, from any possible
moment of my existence, to discover infallibly what I had
previously been, and what I was afterwards to become. All
that, at any time, I am and shall be, I am and shall be of
absolute necessity; and it is impossible that I should be
anything else.
I am, indeed, conscious of myself as an independent, and,
in many occurrences of my life, a free being; but this con-
sciousness may easily be explained on the principles already
laid down, and may be thoroughly reconciled with the con-
clusions which have been drawn. My immediate conscious-
ness, my proper perception, cannot go beyond myself and
the modes of my own being;--I have immediate knowledge
of myself alone: whatever I may know more than this, I
know only by inference, in the same way in which I have
inferred the existence of original powers of Nature, which
yet do not lie within the circle of my perceptions. I myself
however,--that which I call me--my personality,--am not the man-forming power of Nature, but only one of its mani-.
testations; and it is only of this manifestation that I am
conscious, as myself, not of that power whose existence I
only infer from the necessity of explaining my own. This
manifestation, however, in its true nature, is really the pro-
duct of an original and independent power, and must appear
as such in consciousness. On this account I recognise my-
self generally as an independent being. For this reason I
appear to myself as free in certain occurrences of my life,
when these occurrences are the manifestations of the inde-
pendent power which falls to my share as an individual; as restrained and limited, when, by any combination of out-
ward circumstances, which may arise in time, but do not lie
within the original limitations of my personality, I cannot 1
\
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? 252
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
do what my individual power would naturally, if unob-
structed, be capable of doing; as compelled, when this indi-
vidual power, by the superiority of antagonistic powers, is
constrained to manifest itself even in opposition to the laws
of its own nature.
Bestow consciousness on a tree, and let it grow, spread
out its branches, and bring forth leaves and buds, blossoms
and fruits, after its kind, without hindrance or obstruc-
tion :--it will perceive no limitation to its existence in being
only a tree, a tree of this particular species, and this par-
ticular individual of the species; it will feel itself perfectly
free, because, in all those manifestations, it will do nothing
but what its nature requires; and it will desire to do no-
thing else, because it can only desire what that nature re-
quires. But let its growth be hindered by unfavourable
weather, want of nourishment, or other causes, and it will
feel itself limited and restrained, because an impulse which
actually belongs to its nature is not satisfied.
Bind its free
waving boughs to a wall, force foreign branches on it by
ingrafting, and it will feel itself compelled to one course of
action; its branches will grow, but not in the direction
they would have taken if left to themselves; it will produce
fruits, but not those which belong to its original nature.
In immediate consciousness, I appear to myself as free; by
reflection on the whole of Nature, I discover that freedom
is absolutely impossible; the former must be subordinate to
the latter, for it can be explained only by means of it.
What high satisfaction is attained through the system which my understanding has thus built up! What order,
what firm connexion, what comprehensive supervision does
it introduce into the whole fabric of my knowledge! Con-
sciousness is here no longer that stranger in Nature, whose
connexion with existence is so incomprehensible; it is native
to it, and indeed one of its necessary manifestations. Na-
ture rises gradually in the fixed series of her productions.
In rude matter she is a simple existence; in organized mat-
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
253
ter she returns within herself to internal activity; in the
plant, to produce form; in the animal, motion;--in man, as
her highest masterpiece, she turns inward that she may
perceive and contemplate herself,--in him she, as it were,
doubles herself, and, from being mere existence, becomes
existence and consciousness in one.
How I am and must be conscious of my own being and of
its determinations, is, in this connexion, easily understood.
My being and my knowledge have one common foundation,
--my own nature. The being within me, even because it
is my being, is conscious of itself. Quite as conceivable
is my consciousness of corporeal objects existing beyond
myself. The powers in whose manifestation my personali-
ty consists,--the formative--the self-moving--the thinking
powers--are not these same powers as they exist in Nature
at large, but only a certain definite portion of them; and
that they are but such a portion, is because there are so
many other existences beyond me. From the former, I can
infer the latter; from the limitation, that which limits. Be-
cause I myself am not this or that, which yet belongs to the
connected system of existence, it must exist beyond me;--
thus reasons the thinking principle within me. Of my own
limitation, I am immediately conscious, because it is a part
of myself, and only by reason of it do I possess an actual
existence; my consciousness of the source of this limitation,
--of that which I myself am not,--is produced by the for-
mer, and arises out of it.
Away, then, with those pretended influences and opera-
tions of outward things upon me, by means of which they
are supposed to pour in upon me a knowledge which is
not in themselves and cannot flow forth from them. flThe
ground upon which I assume the existence of something
beyond myself, does not lie out of myself, but within me, in
the limitation of my own personality. By means of this
limitation, the thinking principle of Nature within me pro-
ceeds out of itself, and is able to survey itself as a whole,
although, in each individual, from a different point of view. In the same way there arises within me the idea of
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? 254
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
other thinking beings like myself. I, or the thinking power
of Nature within me, possess some thoughts which seem to
have developed themselves within myself as a particular
form of Nature; and others, which seem not to have so de-
veloped themselves. And so it is in reality. The former are
my own, peculiar, individual contributions to the general cir-
cle of thought in Nature; the latter are deduced from them,
as what must surely have a place in that circle; but being
only inferences so far as I am concerned, must find that
place, not in me, but in other thinking beings:--hence I
conclude that there are other thinking beings besides myself,
(in short, Nature, becomes in me conscious of herself as a
whole, but only by beginning with my own individual con-
sciousness, and proceeding from thence to the consciousness
of universal being by inference founded on the principle of
causality ;^-that is, she is conscious of the conditions under
which alone such a form, such a motion, such a thought as
that in which my personality consists, is possible. The prin-
ciple of causality is the point of transition, from the particu-
lar within myself, to the universal which lies beyond my-
self; and the distinguishing characteristic of those two kinds
of knowledge is this, that the one is immediate percep-
tion, while the other is inference. In each individual, Nature beholds herself from a particu-
ftax point of view. I call myself--I, and thee--thou; thou
callest thyself--/, and me--thou; I lie beyond thee, as thou
beyond me. Of what is without me, I comprehend first
those things which touch me most nearly; thou, those which
touch thee most nearly;--from these points we each proceed
onwards to the next proximate; but we describe very dif-
ferent paths, which may here and there intersect each other,
but never run parallel. There is an infinite variety of pos-
sible individuals, and hence also an infinite variety of pos-
sible starting points of consciousness. This consciousness of
all individuals taken together, constitutes the complete con-
sciousness of the universe; and there is no other, for only in
the individual is there definite completeness and reality.
The testimony of consciousness in each individual is alto-
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? >
BOOK I. DOUBT. 255gether sure and trustworthy, if it be indeed the conscious-
ness here described; for this consciousness developes itself /
out of the whole prescribed course of Nature, and Nature I
cannot contradict herself. Wherever there is a conception,
there must be a corresponding existence, for conceptions are
only produced simultaneously with the production of the
corresponding realities. To each individual his own particu-
lar consciousness is wholly determined, for it proceeds from
his own nature:--no one can have other conceptions, or a
greater or less degree of vitality in these conceptions, than
he actually has. The substance of his conceptions is de-
termined by the position which he assumes in the universe;
their clearness and vitality, by the higher or lower degree of
efficiency manifested by the power of humanity in his per-
son. Give to Nature the determination of one single ele-
ment of a person, let it seem to be ever so trivial,--the
course of a muscle, the turn of a hair,--and, had she a uni-
versal consciousness and were able to reply to thee, she
could tell thee all the thoughts which could belong to this
person during the whole period of his conscious existence.
In this system also, the phenomenon of our consciousness which we call Will, becomes thoroughly intelligible. A vo-
lition is the immediate consciousness of the activity of any
of the powers oF Nature-within us. The immediate con-
sciousness of an effort of these powers which has not yet be-
come a reality because it is hemmed in by opposing powers,
is, in consciousness, inclination or desire;--the struggle of
contending powers is irresolution;--the victory of one is the
determination of the Will. If the power which strives after
activity be only that which we have in common with the
plant or the animal, there arises a division and degradation
of our inward being; the desire is unworthy of our rank in
the order of things, and, according to a common use of lan-
guage, may be called a low one. If this striving power be
the whole undivided force of humanity, then is the desire
worthy of our nature, and it may be called a high one. The
latter effort, considered absolutely, may be called a moral
law. The activity of this latter is a virtuous Will, and the
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? 25G
THE VOCATION OP MAN.
course of action resulting from it is virtue. The triumph of
the former not in harmony with the latter is vice; such a
triumph over the latter, and despite its opposition, is crime,
i The power which, on each individual occasion, proves
triumphant, triumphs of necessity; its superiority is deter-
mined by the whole connexion of the universe; and hence
by the same connexion is the vice or crime of each indivi-
dual irrevocably determined. Give to Nature, once more,
the course of a muscle, the turn of a hair, in any particular
individual, and, had she the power of universal thought and
could answer thee, she would be able to declare all the good
and evil deeds of his life from the beginning to the end of
it . But still virtue does not cease to be virtue, nor vice to
be vice. The virtuous man is a noble product of nature;
the vicious, an ignoble and contemptible one:--although
both are necessary results of the connected system of the
universe
.
Repentance is the consciousness of the continued effort of
humanity within me, even after it has been overcome, asso-
ciated with the disagreeable sense of having been subdued;
a disquieting but still precious pledge of our nobler nature.
From this consciousness of the fundamental impulse of our
nature, arises the sense which has been called 'conscience,'
and its greater or less degree of strictness and susceptibility,
down to the absolute want of it in many individuals. The
ignoble man is incapable of repentance, for in him humanity
has at no time sufficient strength to contend with the lower
impulses. Reward and punishment are the natural conse-
)quences of virtue and vice for the production of new virtue
and new vice. By frequent and important victories, our
peculiar power is extended and strengthened; by inaction
or frequent defeat, it becomes ever weaker and weaker. The
ideas of guilt and accountability have no meaning but in
external legislation. He only has incurred guilt, and must
render an account of his crime, who compels society to em-
ploy artificial external force in order to restrain in him the
activity of those impulses which are injurious to the general
welfare.
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? BOOK L DOUBT.
257
My inquiry is closed, and my desire of knowledge satis-
fied. I know what I am, and wherein the nature of my
species consists. I am a manifestation, determined by the whole system of the universe, of a power of Nature which is determined by itself. To understand thoroughly my parti-
cular personal being in its deepest sources is impossible, for
I cannot penetrate into the innermost recesses of Nature.
But I am immediately conscious of this my personal existence. I know right well what I am at the present moment;
I can for the most part remember what I have been formerly;
and I shall learn what I shall be, when what is now future
shall become present experience.
I cannot indeed make use of this discovery in the regula-
tion of my actions, for I do not truly act at all, but Nature
acts in me; and to make myself anything else than that for
which Nature has intended me, is what I cannot even pro-
pose to myself, for I am not the author of my own being,
but Nature has made me myself, and all that I am. I may
repent, and rejoice, and form good resolutions;--although,
strictly speaking, I cannot even do this, for all these things
come to me of themselves, when it is appointed for them to
come;--but most certainly I cannot, by all my repentance,
and by all my resolutions, produce the smallest change in
that which I must once for all inevitably become. I stand
under the inexorable power of rigid Necessity:--should she
have destined me to become a fool and a profligate, a fool
and a profligate without doubt I shall become; should she
have destined me to be wise and good, wise and good I shall
doubtless be. There is neither blame nor merit to her nor
to me. She stands under her own laws, I under hers. I see
this, and feel that my tranquillity would be best ensured by
subjecting my wishes also to that Necessity to which my
being is wholly subject.
But, oh these opposing wishes! For why should J any long-
er hide from myself the sadness, the horror, the amazement
with which I was penetrated when I saw how my inquiry
La
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? 258
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
must end? I had solemnly promised myself that my in-
clinations should have no influence in the direction of my
thoughts; and I have not knowingly allowed them any such
influence. But may I not at last confess that this result con-
tradicts the profoundest aspirations, wishes, and wants of my
being. And, despite of the accuracy and the decisive strict-
ness of the proofs by which it seems to be supported, how
can I truly believe in a theory of my being which strikes at
the very root of that being, which so distinctly contradicts
all the purposes for which alone I live, and without which I
should loathe my existence 1
Why must my heart mourn at, and be lacerated by, that
which so perfectly satisfies my understanding? While
nothing in Nature contradicts itself, is man alone a contra-
diction? Or perhaps not man in general, but only me and
those who resemble me? Had I but been contented to re-
main amid the pleasant delusions that surrounded me, satis-
fied with the immediate consciousness of my existence, and
never raised those questions concerning its foundation, the
answer to which has caused me this misery! But if this
answer be true, then / must of necessity have raised these
questions: I indeed raised them not,--the thinking nature
within me raised them. I was destined to this misery, and
I weep in vain the lost innocence of soul which can never
return to me again.
But courage! Let all else be lost, so that this at least
remains! Merely for the sake of my wishes, did they lie
ever so deep or seem ever so sacred, I cannot renounce what
rests on incontrovertible evidence. But perhaps I may have
erred in my investigation;--perhaps I may have only par-
tially comprehended and imperfectly considered the grounds
upon which I had to proceed. I ought to retrace the in-
quiry again from the opposite end, in order that I may at
least possess a correct starting point. What is it, then, that I
find so repugnant, so painful, in the decision to which I have
come? What is it, which I desired to find in its place?
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
259
* Let me before 'all things make clear to myself what are
these inclinations to which I appeal.
That I should be destined to be wise and good, or foolish
and profligate, without power to change this destiny in
aught,--in the former case having no merit, and in the lat-
ter incurring no guilt,--this it was that filled me with
amazement and horror. The reference of my being, and of
all the determinations of my being, to a cause lying out of
myself,--the manifestations of which were again determined
by other causes out of itself,--this it was from which I so
violently recoiled. That freedom which was not my own,
but that of a foreign power without me, and even in that,
only a limited half-freedom,--this it was which did not
satisfy me. I myself,--that of which I am conscious as my own being and person, but which in this system appears
as only the manifestation of a higher existence,--this /' I"
would be independent,--would be something, not by an-
other or through another, but of myself,--and, as such,
would be the final root of all my own determinations. ! The
rank which in this system is assumed by an original power
of Nature I would myself assume; with this difference, that
the modes of my manifestations shall not be determined by
any foreign power. I desire to possess an inward and pecu-
liar power of manifestation, infinitely manifold like those
powers of Nature; and this power shall manifest itself in
the particular way in which it does manifest itself, for no
other reason than because it does so manifest itself; not, like
these powers of Nature, because it is placed under such or
such outward conditions.
What then, according to my wish, shall be the especial
seat and centre_of this peculiar inward power 1 Evidently
not my body, for that I willingly allow to pass for a mani-
festation of the powers of Nature,--at least so far as its con-
stitution is concerned, if not with regard to its farther de-
terminations; not my sensuous inclinations, for these I re-
gard as a relation of those powers to my consciousness.
Hence it jnnsthgj-iy thought, and wilL I would exercise
my voluntary power freely, for the accomplishment of aims
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? 200
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
which I shall have freely adopted; and this will, as its ulti- *mate ground which can be determined by no higher, shall
move and mould, first my own body, and through it the
surrounding world. My active powers shall be under the
control of my will alone, and shall be set in motion by
nothing else than by it. Thus it shall be. There shall be
a Supreme Good in the spiritual world; I shall have the
power to seek this with freedom until I find it, to acknow-
ledge it as such when found, and it shall be my fault if I do
not find it. This Supreme Good I shall will to know, mere-
ly because I will it; and if I will anything else instead of
it, the fault shall be mine. My actions shall be the result of
this will, and without it there shall absolutely no action of
mine ensue, since there shall be no other power over my
actions but this wilL Then shall my powers, determined by,
and subject to the dominion of, my will, invade the external
world. I will be the lord of Nature, and she shall be my ser-
vant. I will influence her according to the measure of my
capacity, but she shall have no influence on ma
This, then, is the substance of my wishes and aspirations.
But the system, which has satisfied my understanding, has
wholly repudiated these. According to the one, I am wholly
independent of Nature and of any law which I do not impose
upon myself; according to the other, I am but a strictly de-
termined link in the chain of Nature. Whether such a free-
dom as I have desired be at all conceivable, and, if so, whe-
ther there be not grounds which, on complete and thorough
investigation, may compel me to accept it as a reality and
to ascribe it to myself, and whereby the result of my former
conclusions might thus be refuted;--this is now the question.
To be free, in the sense stated, means that I myself will
make myself whatever I am to be. I must then,--and this
is what is most surprising, and, at first sight, absurd in the
idea,--I must already be, in a certain sense, that which I
shall become, in order to be able to become so; I must pos-
sess a two-fold being, of which the first shall contain the
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? BOOK I. DOUBT.
2G1
fundamental determining principle of the second. If I inter-
rogate my immediate self-consciousness on this matter, I
find the following. I have the knowledge of various possible
courses of action, from amongst which, as it appears to me,
I may choose which I please. I run through the whole cir-
cle, enlarge it, examine the various courses, compare one
with another, and consider. I at length decide upon one, de-
termine my will in accordance with it, and this resolution of
my will is followed by a corresponding action. Here then,
certainly, I am beforehand, in the mere conception of a pur-
pose, what subsequently, by means of this conception I am
in will and in action, jl&m beforehand as a thinking, what
I am afterwards as an active, beingX I create myself:--my
being by my thought, my thougbfby thought itself. One
can conceive the determinate state of a manifestation of a
mere power of Nature, of a plant for instance, as preceded
by an indeterminate state, in which, if left to itself, it might
have assumed any one of an infinite variety of possible de-
terminations. These manifold possibilities are certainly pos-
sibilities within it, contained in its original constitution, but
they are not possibilities for it, because it is incapable of such
an idea, and cannot choose or of itself put an end to this
state of indecision: there must be external grounds by which
it may be determined to some one of those various possibili-
ties to which it is unable to determine itself. This determina-
tion can have no previous existence within it, for it is capable
of but one mode of determination, that which it has actually
assumed. Hence it was, thatft formerly felt myself com- \pelled to maintain that the manifestation of every power must
receive its final determination from without. Doubtless I
then thought only of such powers as are incapable of con-
sciousness, and manifest themselves merely in the outward
world. To them that assertion may be applied without the
slightest limitation;--but to intelligences the grounds of it
are not applicable, and it was, therefore, rash to extend it to
them.
Freedom, such as I have laid claim to, is conceivable only of intelligences; but to them, undoubtedly, it belongs. Un-
? ?
