, says: "By this commandment
our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly
motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his
own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on
mere suspicion.
our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly
motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his
own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on
mere suspicion.
Summa Theologica
Now the proper object of justice is the
just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man
should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through
doing an unjust thing.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they
hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do
suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of
doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be
false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust.
Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an
unjust thing.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its
proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever
does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever
does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do
an unjust thing without being unjust. "
I answer that, Even as the object of justice is something equal in
external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,
through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him.
To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its
proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in
two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on
account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its
proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its
direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an
end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is
beside the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without
intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through
ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does
an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were,
doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not
called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of
proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may
sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and
sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the
direct object of one's complacency. In the latter case properly
speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit,
whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly,
to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the
unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of
injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through
passion, without having the habit of injustice.
Reply to Objection 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct
and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing
from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for
the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: The object of temperance is not something
established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of
temperance, i. e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to
the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional
cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like
manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there
is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as
regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity
in all respects.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For
injustice is inequality, as stated above [2867](A[2]). Now a man by
injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.
Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But
whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a
man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by
himself.
Objection 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for
having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished
according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable
burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can
do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man
suffers injustice voluntarily.
Objection 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers
that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one
who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is
worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.
On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are
contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on
the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.
I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,
whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in
the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys.
iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will,
wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily,
and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against
his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in
himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive.
Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man
can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save
involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so to speak, it is
possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done
involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), or to be
suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more
than he owes him).
Reply to Objection 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that
which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality.
For a man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion
if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by
another's action.
Reply to Objection 2: An individual person may be considered in two
ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury
on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin,
intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because
injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.
Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State
as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and image; and
thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but
to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with
both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of
the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man violate the temple of God,
him shall God destroy. "
Reply to Objection 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now
in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is
that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above
[2868](A[2]), and the formal and essential element is on the part of
the will of agent and patient, as stated above [2869](A[2]).
Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and
injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the
material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an
injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other
man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and
on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an
injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury
unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?
Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins
mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes
a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in
reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they do not merely in
ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter. " Therefore not
everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
Objection 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter,
departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant
and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice
sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues"
[*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary
thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to
the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal
sin to do an injustice.
On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal
sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the
law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to
murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on
(Q[64], seqq. ). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.
I answer that, As stated above ([2870]FS, Q[12], A[5]), when we were
treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is
contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury
inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which
moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always
consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that
to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls "ignorance
of particular circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves
pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he
who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except
accidentally, as stated above [2871](A[2])
Reply to Objection 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls
short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does
may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who
suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such
thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is
not hurt or displeased.
Reply to Objection 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues
are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder
affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?
(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?
(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?
(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?
(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written
law?
(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether judgment is an act of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what he
knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty.
Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. Therefore judgment
belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as
stated above ([2872]Q[58], A[4]).
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual
man judgeth all things. " Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the
virtue of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to
charity rather than to justice.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its
proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in
everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore
judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral
virtues.
Objection 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But
the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges
are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act
of justice.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be turned
into judgment. "
I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such.
Now a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus
dicens] and right is the object of justice, as stated above
([2873]Q[57], A[1]). Consequently the original meaning of the word
"judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to
decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from
the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about matters
relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a right
decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For this
reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have recourse to a
judge as to one who is the personification of justice. "
Reply to Objection 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of
a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a
right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a
right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the
virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an
act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define.
The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends
his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice,
judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fortitude, it
proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in
so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so
far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) which belongs to prudence is said to "judge
rightly," as stated above ([2874]Q[51], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of
charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to
the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces
judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces
judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of
the law.
Reply to Objection 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself,
whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown
above ([2875]Q[58], A[2]). Now man is master in things concerning
himself, but not in matters relating to others. Consequently where the
other virtues are in question, there is no need for judgment other than
that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as
explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further
need for the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and
to put his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more
specifically to justice than to any other virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue
[*Cf. [2876] Q[58], A[6]], commanding and prescribing what is just;
while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue.
Hence judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to
justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to judge?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished
except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with
punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Mat.
7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged. " Therefore it is unlawful
to judge.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that
judgest another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth. "
Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
Objection 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 Jn. 1:8, "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. " Now it is unlawful for
a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, O man,
whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another,
thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou
judgest. " Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint judges
and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people
with just judgment. "
I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice.
Now it follows from what has been stated above (A[1], ad 1,3) that
three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice:
first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that
it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced
according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be
lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is
contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted"
or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has
no authority, and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly,
when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid
motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it
is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment.
Reply to Objection 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment
which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as
Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids
judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply
believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary
on Mat. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in
the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], He
forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from
bitterness of heart.
Reply to Objection 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore
it is written (Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on
(Dt. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should
not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as
Chrysostom [*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not. "
Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would
be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however
they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for
the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove
or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as
another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to
strive against it together with us. " And yet it is not through acting
thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once
again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally
deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment
from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about
an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion
is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any
but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human
judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent
matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not
lawful to judge from suspicions.
Objection 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him
unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man's
opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of
another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to
an injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above
[2877](A[1]). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its
genus, as stated above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based on
suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this
is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss of
Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan. ) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the
time. " Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be
unlawful.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on
the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not," etc.
, says: "By this commandment
our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly
motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his
own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on
mere suspicion. "
I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes
evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three
causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very
fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think
evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he walketh in
the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools. "
Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for
when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of
him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because
everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long
experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "old
people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults
of others. " The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote
perversity of the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of
suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which is
contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently suspicion denotes a
certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it
is.
Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a
man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications. This
is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation
without which no man can go through this life," according to a gloss on
1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time. " The second degree is when a
man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as
certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it
cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes
on to say: "If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human,
we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a
definite and fixed opinion. " The third degree is when a judge goes so
far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to
injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts,
not indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting
the matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable
witnesses.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of
another without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore
does him an injury.
Reply to Objection 3: Since justice and injustice are about external
operations, as stated above ([2878]Q[58], AA[8],10,11;[2879] Q[59],
A[1], ad 3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice
when it is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as
stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as
it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the
external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or
anger to murder.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?
Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for
the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part.
But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number
of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and thought
of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gn. 8:21). Therefore
doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he
leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and
turns neither to this side nor to that. " Now he who interprets a
doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should
not be done.
Objection 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with
regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the
worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works. " Therefore it
seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be
interpreted for the worst.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not
judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best
sense. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), things from the very fact
that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures
and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure
another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have
evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him
good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.
Reply to Objection 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best,
may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err
frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less
frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the
latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.
Reply to Objection 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to
judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the
good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will
take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but
there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge
truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the
good of the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in Ethic.
vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord
with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the
good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the
person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of
honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of
contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this
kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident
proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in
thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the
evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the
intellect's perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in
themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for
the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when
we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's,
in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure,
it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be
efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a
lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for
the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of
things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and
when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated
above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we should always judge according to the written law?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge according
to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But
written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, "Woe
to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice. "
Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.
Objection 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual
happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual
happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it
seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written
law.
Objection 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's
intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if the
lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore we
ought not always to judge according to the written law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these
earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them,
when once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no
longer of them, but according to them. "
I answer that, As stated above [2880](A[1]), judgment is nothing else
but a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes
just in two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is
called "natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and
this is called "positive right," as stated above (Q[57], A[2]). Now
laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but
in different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural
right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force,
not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both contains
positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of authority.
Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else
judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive
right.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the written law does not give force to
the natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force,
because neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law
contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has
no binding force. For positive right has no place except where "it
matters not," according to the natural right, "whether a thing be done
in one way or in another"; as stated above (Q[57], A[2], ad 2).
Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather
corruptions of law, as stated above ([2881]FS, Q[95], A[2]): and
consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are,
either always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so
too laws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they
were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in
such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the letter of
the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in view. Hence
the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25]: "By no
reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret
harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been
enacted for the welfare of man. " In such cases even the lawgiver
himself would decide otherwise; and if he had foreseen the case, he
might have provided for it by law.
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by
being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now truth
is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from the
person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing,
no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is meant by
judgment.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is
related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having
authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the
Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri
the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto
justice" (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to
injustice.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now
prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters
concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not
unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to
judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown
above (A[1], ad 1,3; A[2]). But a judgment is not described as unjust,
if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the
law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, i. e.
without authority.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest
another man's servant? "
I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced according to the
written law, as stated above [2882](A[5]), he that pronounces judgment,
interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some
particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to
interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by
public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by
public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the
community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force
another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority, so
too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that
is pronounced by other than the public authority.
Reply to Objection 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation
to accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes.
On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is
unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.
Reply to Objection 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by
authority received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to
follow from Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian
. . . he thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand
would save Israel [Vulg. : 'them']. " Or it may be replied that Moses
slew the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked,
without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. Wherefore
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward off a blow
from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker"; and
he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with Augustine (QQ.
Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just as "the soil gives
proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs before the useful
seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a
sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, as it was a sign of the
power whereby he was to deliver his people.
With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for
God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest, he
was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his
concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex. 22:20;
Lev. 20; Dt. 13, 17].
Reply to Objection 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual,
even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is
not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal
matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have been
committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.
Reply to Objection 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are
perfections of the individual, and consequently their absence does not
make a judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority
which gives a judgment its coercive force.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts,
which are the species of justice, i. e. distributive and commutative
justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts,
i. e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will
be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And
since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we
must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive
justice; (2) restitution.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and
commutative?
(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?
(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?
(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as
counter-passion?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and
distributive?
Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are
unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is
hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is
directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of
the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many,
both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and because
the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii,
15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that
he will receive again. " Therefore distribution does not belong to any
species of justice.
Objection 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what
is his own, as stated above ([2883]Q[58], A[2]). But when things are
distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed
of something which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not
pertain to justice.
Objection 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in
the subject, as stated above ([2884]Q[58], A[6]). But it belongs
exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does
not always belong to justice.
Objection 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods"
(Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal
justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular,
but of legal justice.
Objection 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a
virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one
person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to
many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says
(Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other,
commutations. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2885]Q[58], AA[7],8), particular
justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the
community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered
in relation to a part. In the first place there is the order of one
part to another, to which corresponds the order of one private
individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice,
which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons. In
the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to
which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community in
relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive
justice, which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there
are two species of justice, distributive and commutative.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as a private individual is praised for
moderation in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought
moderation to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein
distributive justice directs.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so
too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part
also: so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a
number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his
own.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of distributing the goods of the
community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those
goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom
those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just
distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made
not to the state but to the members of a family, and such distribution
can be made by authority of a private individual.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement takes its species from the term
"whereunto. " Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common
good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the
contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to
particular individuals by way of distribution.
Reply to Objection 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not
only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of
different kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual
in one way, and his personal property in another way.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in
commutative justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to
be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of
these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above [2886](A[1]).
Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or
fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way
in both distributive and commutative justice.
Objection 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing
the mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then,
one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the
same.
Objection 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive
justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a
person's deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for
instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished
more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is
observed in the same way in both kinds of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in
distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical proportion,"
whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical proportion. "
I answer that, As stated above [2887](A[1]), in distributive justice
something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs
to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is
proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect
of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person receives
all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more
prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic
community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to
wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways
according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice
the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and
thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such
a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given
to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case
follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality depends not on
quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is
to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1-1/2; since the
greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: whereas the
equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 exceeds 4 by 2,
while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.
On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on
account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen
chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found
primarily.
just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man
should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through
doing an unjust thing.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they
hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do
suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of
doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be
false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust.
Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an
unjust thing.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its
proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever
does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever
does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do
an unjust thing without being unjust. "
I answer that, Even as the object of justice is something equal in
external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,
through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him.
To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its
proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in
two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on
account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its
proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its
direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an
end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is
beside the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without
intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through
ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does
an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were,
doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not
called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of
proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may
sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and
sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the
direct object of one's complacency. In the latter case properly
speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit,
whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly,
to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the
unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of
injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through
passion, without having the habit of injustice.
Reply to Objection 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct
and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing
from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for
the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: The object of temperance is not something
established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of
temperance, i. e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to
the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional
cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like
manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there
is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as
regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity
in all respects.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For
injustice is inequality, as stated above [2867](A[2]). Now a man by
injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.
Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But
whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a
man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by
himself.
Objection 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for
having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished
according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable
burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can
do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man
suffers injustice voluntarily.
Objection 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers
that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one
who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is
worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.
On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are
contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on
the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.
I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,
whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in
the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys.
iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will,
wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily,
and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against
his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in
himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive.
Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man
can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save
involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so to speak, it is
possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done
involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), or to be
suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more
than he owes him).
Reply to Objection 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that
which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality.
For a man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion
if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by
another's action.
Reply to Objection 2: An individual person may be considered in two
ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury
on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin,
intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because
injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.
Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State
as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and image; and
thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but
to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with
both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of
the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man violate the temple of God,
him shall God destroy. "
Reply to Objection 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now
in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is
that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above
[2868](A[2]), and the formal and essential element is on the part of
the will of agent and patient, as stated above [2869](A[2]).
Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and
injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the
material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an
injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other
man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and
on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an
injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury
unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?
Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins
mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes
a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in
reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they do not merely in
ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter. " Therefore not
everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
Objection 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter,
departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant
and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice
sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues"
[*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary
thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to
the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal
sin to do an injustice.
On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal
sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the
law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to
murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on
(Q[64], seqq. ). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.
I answer that, As stated above ([2870]FS, Q[12], A[5]), when we were
treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is
contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury
inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which
moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always
consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that
to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls "ignorance
of particular circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves
pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he
who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except
accidentally, as stated above [2871](A[2])
Reply to Objection 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls
short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does
may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who
suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such
thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is
not hurt or displeased.
Reply to Objection 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues
are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder
affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?
(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?
(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?
(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?
(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written
law?
(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether judgment is an act of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what he
knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty.
Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. Therefore judgment
belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as
stated above ([2872]Q[58], A[4]).
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual
man judgeth all things. " Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the
virtue of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to
charity rather than to justice.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its
proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in
everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore
judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral
virtues.
Objection 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But
the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges
are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act
of justice.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be turned
into judgment. "
I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such.
Now a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus
dicens] and right is the object of justice, as stated above
([2873]Q[57], A[1]). Consequently the original meaning of the word
"judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to
decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from
the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about matters
relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a right
decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For this
reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have recourse to a
judge as to one who is the personification of justice. "
Reply to Objection 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of
a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a
right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a
right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the
virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an
act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define.
The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends
his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice,
judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fortitude, it
proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in
so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so
far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) which belongs to prudence is said to "judge
rightly," as stated above ([2874]Q[51], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of
charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to
the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces
judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces
judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of
the law.
Reply to Objection 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself,
whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown
above ([2875]Q[58], A[2]). Now man is master in things concerning
himself, but not in matters relating to others. Consequently where the
other virtues are in question, there is no need for judgment other than
that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as
explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further
need for the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and
to put his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more
specifically to justice than to any other virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue
[*Cf. [2876] Q[58], A[6]], commanding and prescribing what is just;
while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue.
Hence judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to
justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to judge?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished
except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with
punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Mat.
7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged. " Therefore it is unlawful
to judge.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that
judgest another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth. "
Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
Objection 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 Jn. 1:8, "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. " Now it is unlawful for
a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, O man,
whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another,
thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou
judgest. " Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint judges
and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people
with just judgment. "
I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice.
Now it follows from what has been stated above (A[1], ad 1,3) that
three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice:
first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that
it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced
according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be
lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is
contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted"
or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has
no authority, and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly,
when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid
motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it
is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment.
Reply to Objection 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment
which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as
Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids
judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply
believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary
on Mat. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in
the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], He
forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from
bitterness of heart.
Reply to Objection 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore
it is written (Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on
(Dt. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should
not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as
Chrysostom [*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not. "
Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would
be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however
they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for
the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove
or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as
another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to
strive against it together with us. " And yet it is not through acting
thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once
again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally
deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.
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Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment
from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about
an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion
is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any
but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human
judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent
matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not
lawful to judge from suspicions.
Objection 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him
unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man's
opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of
another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to
an injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above
[2877](A[1]). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its
genus, as stated above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based on
suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this
is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss of
Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan. ) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the
time. " Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be
unlawful.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on
the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not," etc.
, says: "By this commandment
our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly
motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his
own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on
mere suspicion. "
I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes
evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three
causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very
fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think
evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he walketh in
the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools. "
Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for
when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of
him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because
everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long
experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "old
people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults
of others. " The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote
perversity of the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of
suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which is
contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently suspicion denotes a
certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it
is.
Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a
man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications. This
is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation
without which no man can go through this life," according to a gloss on
1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time. " The second degree is when a
man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as
certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it
cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes
on to say: "If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human,
we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a
definite and fixed opinion. " The third degree is when a judge goes so
far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to
injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts,
not indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting
the matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable
witnesses.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of
another without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore
does him an injury.
Reply to Objection 3: Since justice and injustice are about external
operations, as stated above ([2878]Q[58], AA[8],10,11;[2879] Q[59],
A[1], ad 3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice
when it is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as
stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as
it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the
external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or
anger to murder.
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Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?
Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for
the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part.
But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number
of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and thought
of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gn. 8:21). Therefore
doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he
leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and
turns neither to this side nor to that. " Now he who interprets a
doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should
not be done.
Objection 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with
regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the
worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works. " Therefore it
seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be
interpreted for the worst.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not
judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best
sense. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), things from the very fact
that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures
and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure
another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have
evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him
good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.
Reply to Objection 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best,
may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err
frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less
frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the
latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.
Reply to Objection 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to
judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the
good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will
take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but
there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge
truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the
good of the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in Ethic.
vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord
with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the
good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the
person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of
honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of
contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this
kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident
proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in
thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the
evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the
intellect's perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in
themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for
the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when
we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's,
in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure,
it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be
efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a
lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for
the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of
things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and
when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated
above.
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Whether we should always judge according to the written law?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge according
to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But
written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, "Woe
to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice. "
Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.
Objection 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual
happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual
happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it
seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written
law.
Objection 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's
intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if the
lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore we
ought not always to judge according to the written law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these
earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them,
when once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no
longer of them, but according to them. "
I answer that, As stated above [2880](A[1]), judgment is nothing else
but a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes
just in two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is
called "natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and
this is called "positive right," as stated above (Q[57], A[2]). Now
laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but
in different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural
right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force,
not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both contains
positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of authority.
Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else
judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive
right.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the written law does not give force to
the natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force,
because neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law
contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has
no binding force. For positive right has no place except where "it
matters not," according to the natural right, "whether a thing be done
in one way or in another"; as stated above (Q[57], A[2], ad 2).
Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather
corruptions of law, as stated above ([2881]FS, Q[95], A[2]): and
consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are,
either always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so
too laws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they
were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in
such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the letter of
the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in view. Hence
the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25]: "By no
reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret
harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been
enacted for the welfare of man. " In such cases even the lawgiver
himself would decide otherwise; and if he had foreseen the case, he
might have provided for it by law.
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
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Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by
being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now truth
is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from the
person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing,
no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is meant by
judgment.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is
related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having
authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the
Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri
the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto
justice" (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to
injustice.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now
prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters
concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not
unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to
judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown
above (A[1], ad 1,3; A[2]). But a judgment is not described as unjust,
if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the
law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, i. e.
without authority.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest
another man's servant? "
I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced according to the
written law, as stated above [2882](A[5]), he that pronounces judgment,
interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some
particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to
interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by
public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by
public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the
community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force
another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority, so
too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that
is pronounced by other than the public authority.
Reply to Objection 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation
to accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes.
On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is
unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.
Reply to Objection 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by
authority received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to
follow from Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian
. . . he thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand
would save Israel [Vulg. : 'them']. " Or it may be replied that Moses
slew the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked,
without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. Wherefore
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward off a blow
from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker"; and
he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with Augustine (QQ.
Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just as "the soil gives
proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs before the useful
seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a
sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, as it was a sign of the
power whereby he was to deliver his people.
With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for
God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest, he
was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his
concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex. 22:20;
Lev. 20; Dt. 13, 17].
Reply to Objection 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual,
even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is
not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal
matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have been
committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.
Reply to Objection 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are
perfections of the individual, and consequently their absence does not
make a judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority
which gives a judgment its coercive force.
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OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts,
which are the species of justice, i. e. distributive and commutative
justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts,
i. e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will
be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And
since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we
must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive
justice; (2) restitution.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and
commutative?
(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?
(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?
(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as
counter-passion?
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Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and
distributive?
Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are
unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is
hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is
directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of
the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many,
both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and because
the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii,
15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that
he will receive again. " Therefore distribution does not belong to any
species of justice.
Objection 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what
is his own, as stated above ([2883]Q[58], A[2]). But when things are
distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed
of something which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not
pertain to justice.
Objection 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in
the subject, as stated above ([2884]Q[58], A[6]). But it belongs
exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does
not always belong to justice.
Objection 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods"
(Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal
justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular,
but of legal justice.
Objection 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a
virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one
person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to
many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says
(Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other,
commutations. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2885]Q[58], AA[7],8), particular
justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the
community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered
in relation to a part. In the first place there is the order of one
part to another, to which corresponds the order of one private
individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice,
which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons. In
the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to
which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community in
relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive
justice, which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there
are two species of justice, distributive and commutative.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as a private individual is praised for
moderation in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought
moderation to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein
distributive justice directs.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so
too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part
also: so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a
number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his
own.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of distributing the goods of the
community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those
goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom
those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just
distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made
not to the state but to the members of a family, and such distribution
can be made by authority of a private individual.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement takes its species from the term
"whereunto. " Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common
good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the
contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to
particular individuals by way of distribution.
Reply to Objection 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not
only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of
different kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual
in one way, and his personal property in another way.
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Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in
commutative justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to
be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of
these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above [2886](A[1]).
Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or
fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way
in both distributive and commutative justice.
Objection 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing
the mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then,
one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the
same.
Objection 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive
justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a
person's deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for
instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished
more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is
observed in the same way in both kinds of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in
distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical proportion,"
whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical proportion. "
I answer that, As stated above [2887](A[1]), in distributive justice
something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs
to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is
proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect
of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person receives
all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more
prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic
community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to
wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways
according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice
the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and
thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such
a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given
to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case
follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality depends not on
quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is
to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1-1/2; since the
greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: whereas the
equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 exceeds 4 by 2,
while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.
On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on
account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen
chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found
primarily.
