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Therefore happiness consists in wealth.

Objection 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never
fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more
than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with
riches" (Eccles. 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.

On the contrary, Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than
in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines
in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas
the generous man is applauded. " Therefore man's happiness does not
consist in wealth.

I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in
wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3),
viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as
a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars,
dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not
a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man,
for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.

Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural
wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something
else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be
man's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore
in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for
him, according to Ps. 8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his
feet. "

And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of
natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its
means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently
much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore
it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to
consist in wealth.

Reply to Objection 1: All material things obey money, so far as the
multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods,
which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of
human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a
person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing
is palatable.

Reply to Objection 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so
spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov.
17:16): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy
wisdom. "

Reply to Objection 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite:
because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire
for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered
concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear
(Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than
the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign
good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised:
because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 24:29): "They that eat me shall yet hunger. " Whereas
in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the
contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise
them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (Jn.
4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are
signified, "shall thirst again. " The reason of this is that we realize
more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows
that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not consist
therein.
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Whether man's happiness consists in honors?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For
happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by
which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.

Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great
excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good.
But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover,
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only God be honor and
glory. " Therefore happiness consists in honor.

Objection 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness.
But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers
loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor.
Therefore happiness consists in honor.

On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the
honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the
person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore
happiness does not consist in honor.

I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For
honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and
consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in
the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, especially
to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i. e.
those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore
honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally
consist therein.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is
not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they
receive honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have
nothing greater to offer. " But virtue's true reward is happiness
itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor,
it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.

Reply to Objection 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great
excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not
that honor makes them excellent.

Reply to Objection 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises
from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as
stated above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise,
on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.
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Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For
happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the
trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the
Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy
to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us. "
Therefore happiness consists in glory.

Objection 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the
knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else: since,
according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory
consists "in being well known and praised. " Therefore man's happiness
consists in glory.

Objection 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this
seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after
a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto
yourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time. "
Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory.

On the contrary, Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame
or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe
their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything
be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at
their own praise. " Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame
or glory.

I answer that, Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory.
For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose
[*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is
related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for human
knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the
cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good,
which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but
rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a
fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect.
Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the
other hand, man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause. And
therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which
man has with God; according to Ps. 90:15,16: "I will deliver him, and I
will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show
him my salvation. "

Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails,
especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this
reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be
deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. 10:18):
"He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth. "

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which
is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence
it is written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the
glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38
with Lk. 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact
that he was quoting from memory].

Reply to Objection 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in
the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived
from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect
or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not
harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is
looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man
happy.

Reply to Objection 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily
ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by
accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
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Whether man's happiness consists in power?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all
things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first
beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity
of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are
called "gods" (Ex. 22:28), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods. "
Therefore happiness consists in power.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest
perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those
who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.

Objection 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is
contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than
aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore
happiness consists in power.

On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most
imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man
cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path
of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who is
surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom
he fears still more? "

I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and
this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle,
as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last
end. Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas
happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness
might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than
in power itself.

Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists
in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since
happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now
all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly,
because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as
stated in Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any
needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may
still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom,
bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is the
perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be
said of the foregoing: for it is written (Eccles. 5:12) that "riches"
are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said
of the other three. Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness
through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto
naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to
external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they
are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness
nowise consists in the foregoing.

Reply to Objection 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use
His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently
it is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power,
unless he become like Him in goodness also.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make
good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes
a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.

Reply to Objection 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of
power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's
supreme good consists in power.
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Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily
goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above the
riches of the health of the body. " But happiness consists in that which
is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is
better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows.
But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary.
Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that health
of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.

Objection 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the
principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the
greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the
efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the
causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore,
just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the
last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is
that which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists
most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the health of
the body.

On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to
happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for
instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the
stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist in goods
of the body.

I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the
goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing
be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in
the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a
last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship
is ordained to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. Now just
as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course,
so man is given over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus.
15:14: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his
own counsel. " Now it is evident that man is ordained to something as
his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of
man's reason and will cannot be the preservation of man's being.

Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the
preservation of man's being, it could not be said that the end of man
is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body;
and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of
the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above ([997]FP, Q[75],
A[2]); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and
the instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their
means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained
to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness,
which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its
end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself.
And therefore
it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external
goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good of the soul is
preferred to all bodily goods.

Reply to Objection 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection
of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself
includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we
consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which does
not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being,
such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself
together with an additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the
same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than
things that exist, and intelligent better than living things.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this
argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in
Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their
proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some
as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to
few.
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Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure.
For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something
else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than
to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in
wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists
principally in pleasure and delight.

Objection 2: Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect
than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end
consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that
which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end.
Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs
man's will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods.
Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness, consists
principally in pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all
desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even
irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore
happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses
to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a
sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why
we should not say that the very beasts are happy too. "

I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the
name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13),
although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist
in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is
distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he
is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal.
We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident
resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the
reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either
in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if
indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness: and if it
is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote,
or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight,
which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but
something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.

But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that
way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power
of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to
the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For
since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that
part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a
certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul
which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way
infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a
fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is
independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is
a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through
matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter,
knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an
infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good
which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through
being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a
trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wis.
7:9) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand. " And
therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper
accident of happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or
desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good:
thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne
downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired
for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else,
if the preposition "for" denote the final cause. But if it denote the
formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for
something else, i. e. for the good, which is the object of that delight,
and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the
reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.

Reply to Objection 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight
arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the
principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that
sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.

Reply to Objection 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire
good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not
conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow
that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight
results from some good, and that some delight results from that which
is the essential and supreme good.
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Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's
happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: external
goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not
consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above
([998]AA[4],5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than
the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we
desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires,
he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all
other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident
from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired.
Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however,
in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which
is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness
is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the
body, as shown above [999](A[5]). Therefore it is something belonging
to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.

On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that
which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own
sake. " But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in
man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in no
good of the soul.

I answer that, As stated above ([1000]Q[1], A[8]), the end is twofold:
namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use,
namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak
of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul
itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in
itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes
knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually
virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is
for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in
potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot
be its own last end.

In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power,
habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good
fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for
the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated
good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be
man's last end.

But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession
thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an
end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his
last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the
thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes
happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is
called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something
belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is
something outside the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that
man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or
act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in
this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness
is a good of the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned,
happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is
loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves
himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As
to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of
friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.

Reply to Objection 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of
the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes
happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul,
as stated above.
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Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's
happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom
"unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,"
from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the
base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since
then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in
[1001]FP, Q[111], A[1], it seems that man's happiness consists in man
somehow reaching the angel.

Objection 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in
relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its
end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is
compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect
to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe
of creatures.

Objection 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural
desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good
surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include
that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man
can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good
constitutes man's happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is
the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it is
written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Ps. 143:15). "

I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute
man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the
appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something
yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i. e. of man's
appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is
the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's
will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any
creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by
participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man,
according to the words of Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with
good things. " Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of
the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there
as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of
good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as
being the infinite and perfect good.

Reply to Objection 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a
further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole
itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man
is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to
God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good
of the universe, but God himself.

Reply to Objection 3: Created good is not less than that good of which
man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it
is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and
which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and
in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
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WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are
required for it.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?

(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?

(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the
intellectual part?

(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an
operation of the intellect, or of the will?

(5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation
of the speculative or of the practical intellect?

(6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it
consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?

(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances
viz. angels?

(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His
Essence?
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Whether happiness is something uncreated?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God is
happiness itself. "

Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to
God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme
goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.

Objection 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will
tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an end,
but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.

On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is
something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i,
3): "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy. " Therefore
happiness is not something uncreated.

I answer that, As stated above ([1002]Q[1], A[8];[1003] Q[2], A[7]),
our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to
attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the
attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired;
thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money;
and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable.
In the first sense, then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely,
God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's
will. But in the second way, man's last end is something created,
existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or
enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If,
therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or object, then it
is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of
happiness, then it is something created.

Reply to Objection 1: God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy
not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His
Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol.
iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by
participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which
man is said to be happy, is something created.

Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because
it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.

Reply to Objection 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same
way as the attainment of the end is called the end.
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Whether happiness is an operation?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the
Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and
the end, life everlasting. " But life is not an operation, but the very
being of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is
not an operation.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is
"a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. " But state
does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Objection 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the
happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of
operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather
something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an
operation.

Objection 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation
does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Objection 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations
are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Objection 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly.
But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or
some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an
operation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is
an operation according to perfect virtue. "

I answer that, In so far as man's happiness is something created,
existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For
happiness is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so
far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.
Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is
evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the
Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which
has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is
potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too,
each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore
man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.

Reply to Objection 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very
being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been
shown ([1004]Q[2] , A[5]) that the being of a man, no matter in what it
may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true
that His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of
the living, by which operation the principle of life is made actual:
thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life of
pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as
is clear from Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee,
the only true God. "

Reply to Objection 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered
happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common
good; and he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made
perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the
state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good.