No More Learning

Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.

Objection 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps.
36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord. " Now "the
invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according
to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the
understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not
necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God. "

I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find
that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one
of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, while the
other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water by
its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while
according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb
and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from
west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first
heaven, they have a movement from east to west. Now the created
rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God, since other
creatures do not attain to the universal, but only to something
particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in "being"
only, as inanimate things, or also in "living," and in "knowing
singulars," as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, in as
much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is
immediately related to the universal principle of being.

Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only
in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which
it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness.
Hence it was said above ([2282]FS, Q[3], A[8]) that man's ultimate
happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man
cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every
one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me. " Now
man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by
little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one
who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire
science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De
Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a learner to believe. "

Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the
master who is teaching him.

Reply to Objection 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher
nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some
supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the
natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of
virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way,
by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to
matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently
"there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are in Christ
Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.

Reply to Objection 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible
things of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to
God from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many
things are shown to thee above the understandings of man. "
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Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by
natural reason?

Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which
can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's
works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is
superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can
be known by natural reason.

Objection 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the
object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object,
as stated above ([2283]Q[1], AA[4],5). Since therefore all things that
can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that
there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.

Objection 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is
certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of
them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others
should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not
necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural
reason.

On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is one and
incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.

I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only
things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by
reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive
more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to
whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of
all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other
sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would
arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the
knowledge of God may be more general. For many are unable to make
progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or
through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even
through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived
of

the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought to their
knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of
certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God.
A sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural
investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and
have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men
might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was
necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith,
being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.

Reply to Objection 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice
mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be
proved by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be
believed.

Reply to Objection 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject
and about the same object: but what is an object of science for one,
can be an object of faith for another, as stated above ([2284]Q[1],
A[5]).

Reply to Objection 3: Although all things that can be known by science
are of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to
beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything
explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it
is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written
(Rom. 10:14,15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not
heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they
preach unless they be sent? " Therefore man is not bound to believe
anything explicitly.

Objection 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are
we by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity,
and it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the
precept of Our Lord (Mat. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg. :
'thy right'] cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the
same kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything explicitly,
and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be
believed.

Objection 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience,
according to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations. " Now
the virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed
precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according to
Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy
commandments. " Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man
should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his
believing anything explicitly.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. "

I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to fulfil,
concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining salvation. Now
an act of virtue, as stated above ([2285]FS, Q[60], A[5]) depends on
the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things may be
considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is the
proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is accidental
and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it belongs
properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the dangers
of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself, for the sake
of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike
another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of
fortitude, but indirectly.

Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a
precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in
its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of
the precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate in
those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the
proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and
at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of
faith is that whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above
([2286]Q[1], A[8]): while the indirect and secondary object comprises
all things delivered by God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that
Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.

Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is
bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to
other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but
only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he is
prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures.
Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is
clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.

Reply to Objection 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a
man's power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are
bound to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing
grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe
the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for
this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully given;
and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a punishment of
a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine states (De
Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. viii. ]).

Reply to Objection 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable
things which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely,
God and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity
which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly
speaking, in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to
authority, suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper
and direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental
or consequent to that proper and direct object.
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Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have explicit
faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary for
salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is
necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed
explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.

Objection 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he
is not bound to believe. But simple reasons are sometimes tested in
reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are bound
to believe everything explicitly.

Objection 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but
only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith of
the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the
learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have
explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have
explicit faith.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 1:14): "The oxen were ploughing,
and the asses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory expounds this
passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified by the asses,
ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by
the oxen.

I answer that, The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of
Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now
Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are
over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the
angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius
explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding
of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher
degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those
who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the
lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of
higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under
obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to believe
them more explicitly.

Reply to Objection 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not
equally necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher
degree, whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe
explicitly more things than others are.

Reply to Objection 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test
about subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having
been corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple
people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free
from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to
their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.

Reply to Objection 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the
learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine teaching.
Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me, as I also
am of Christ. " Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine truth
that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this
rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the
learned believe aright; unless the simple hold obstinately to their
individual errors, against the faith of the universal Church, which
cannot err, since Our Lord said (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for thee,"
Peter, "that thy faith fail not. "
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Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should believe
explicitly in the mystery of Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation
of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.
For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are ignorant
about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine revelation,
which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above [2287](A[6];
[2288]FP, Q[111], A[1]). Now even the angels were in ignorance of the
mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask (Ps. 23:8): "Who is
this king of glory? " and (Is. 63:1): "Who is this that cometh from
Edom? " Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the
mystery of Christ's Incarnation.

Objection 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of
the teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Mat. 11:11)
that "there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater
than" he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the
mystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Mat. 11:3): "Art
Thou He that art to come, or look we for another? " Therefore even the
teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the
ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it
would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith in
Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that it
was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in the
mystery of Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc): "Our
faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is delivered
from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except by the one
Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ. "

I answer that, As stated above [2289](A[5]; Q[1], A[8]), the object of
faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man
obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion
is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written (Acts
4:12): "There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we
must be saved. " Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation was necessary at all times and for all persons,
but this belief differed according to differences of times and persons.
The reason of this is that before the state of sin, man believed,
explicitly in Christ's Incarnation, in so far as it was intended for
the consummation of glory, but not as it was intended to deliver man
from sin by the Passion and Resurrection, since man had no
foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however, seem to have had
foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the fact that he said
(Gn. 2:24): "Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall
cleave to his wife," of which the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32) that "this
is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the Church," and it is
incredible that the first man was ignorant about this sacrament.

But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the
Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the
human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else,
have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before
and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the
learned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those
sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to
Christ's coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so
to speak. And, as stated above ([2290]Q[1], A[7]), the nearer they were
to Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ's mysteries.

After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound
to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards those
which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such
as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we have spoken
above ([2291]Q[1], A[8]). As to other minute points in reference to the
articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to believe them more
or less explicitly according to each one's state and office.

Reply to Objection 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not
entirely hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v,
19), yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ
revealed them to them.

Reply to Objection 2: It was not through ignorance that John the
Baptist inquired of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly
professed his belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony,
that this is the Son of God" (Jn. 1:34). Hence he did not say: "Art
Thou He that hast come? " but "Art Thou He that art to come? " thus
saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be
believed that he was ignorant of Christ's future Passion, for he had
already said (Jn. 1:39): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh
away the sins [Vulg. : 'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling His future
immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as may be seen
especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with Gregory (Hom. xxvi
in Evang. ) that he asked this question, being in ignorance as to
whether Christ would descend into hell in His own Person. But he did
not ignore the fact that the power of Christ's Passion would be
extended to those who were detained in Limbo, according to Zech. 9:11:
"Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners
out of the pit, wherein there is no water"; nor was he bound to believe
explicitly, before its fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither
Himself.

It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on
Lk. 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from
devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth. ), that he
inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his
disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the
latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing
to the signs of His works.

Reply to Objection 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of
Christ, as is clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25):
"I know that my Redeemer liveth. " The Sibyl too foretold certain things
about Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover,
we read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine
Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a man
on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: "Christ shall
be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime
of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again" [*Cf. Baron, Annal. ,
A. D. 780]. If, however, some were saved without receiving any
revelation, they were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for,
though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless,
have implicit faith through believing in Divine providence, since they
believed that God would deliver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to
Him, and according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew
the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: "Who teacheth us more than the
beasts of the earth. "
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Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to
believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6):
"He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to
them that seek Him. " Now one can believe this without believing in the
Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the
Trinity.

Objection 2: Further our Lord said (Jn. 17:5,6): "Father, I have
manifested Thy name to men," which words Augustine expounds (Tract.
cvi) as follows: "Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the
name whereby Thou art called My Father," and further on he adds: "In
that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is not
to be worshipped together with false gods, 'God is known in Judea';
but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He takes
away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name of His,
which hitherto they knew not. " Therefore before the coming of Christ it
was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the Godhead: and so
the Trinity was not believed explicitly.

Objection 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of
God is the object of heavenly happiness.
Now the object of heavenly
happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in God,
without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not necessary to
believe explicitly in the Trinity.

On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is
expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is
written in manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our image
and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was
necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity.

I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of
Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of Christ
includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the world
through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was conceived
by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of
Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but implicitly and under
a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was it with the mystery of
the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace had been revealed, all
were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who
are born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation
of the Trinity, according to Mat. 28:19: "Going therefore teach ye all
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and
of the Holy Ghost. "

Reply to Objection 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary
at all times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times
and for all people.

Reply to Objection 2: Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay
hidden in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles
it was shown to the world.

Reply to Objection 3: God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now
through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of Persons:
but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be
understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the mission of the
Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether to believe is meritorious?

Objection 1: It would seem that to believe in not meritorious. For the
principle of all merit is charity, as stated above ([2292]FS, Q[114],
A[4]). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore,
just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by
our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith.

Objection 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific
knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known [*Science
is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration. ]. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious,
nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious.

Objection 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a
sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a sufficient
motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit on his
part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas
if he has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of
levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is hasty to give credit, is
light of heart," so that, seemingly, he gains no merit thereby.
Therefore to believe is by no means meritorious.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints "by faith .
. . obtained promises," which would not be the case if they did not
merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.

I answer that, As stated above ([2293]FS, Q[114], AA[3],4), our actions
are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will moved with
grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from the free-will,
if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing
is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command
of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the
free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be
meritorious.

Reply to Objection 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the
principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to
charity as the disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is
evident that the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the
form, nor can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form:
but after the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding
disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle of
action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form
of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without charity,
produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of
faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and a
natural act of the free-will.

Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely
the scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of
that fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will,
because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the
demonstration, wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the
actual consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to
his free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider.
Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred to
the end of charity, i. e. to the honor of God or the good of our
neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things
are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of faith
can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no firm
assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes
(Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect act
of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does not
appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the actual
consideration.

Reply to Objection 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing,
for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by
miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine
invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however,
sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the
merit.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe
lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang. ) that
"there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason. " If,
therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith
is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human
reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of
believing.

Objection 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens
the amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish
the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to
be about the unseen, as stated above ([2294]Q[1], AA[4],5). Now the
more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore
human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the merit of
faith.

Objection 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an
inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether
it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man
to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so.
Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): "Being ready always to
satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg. : 'Of
that hope which is in you. ' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken
from Bede. ] and hope which is in you. " Now the Apostle would not give
this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith.
Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.

I answer that, As stated above [2295](A[9]), the act of faith can be
meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the
use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of what we
believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer.
First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man
either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be
moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason diminishes the
merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above ([2296]FS, Q[24],
A[3], ad 1; Q[77], A[6], ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which
precedes choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a
man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment
of his reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe
matters of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the
Divine authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will
of the believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves
the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever
reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason
does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit.
Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more
prompt will, as stated above ([2297]FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1). We have an
indication of this in the words of the Samaritans to the woman, who is
a type of human reason: "We now believe, not for thy saying" (Jn.
4:42).

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has
no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons.
But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the
authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration
of some of them, e. g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith
is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.

Reply to Objection 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support
of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring
intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease
to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what
faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not
diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand, though
demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith [*The
Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which are
however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,' etc. ], but not
of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since they
make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the
measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even if
they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is not diminished.

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it
consist in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the
merit of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and
firm in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through
not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have
greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account
of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in
opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to
faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe,
and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:
under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?

(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether confession is an act of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For
the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession
belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of
faith.

Objection 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of
confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19)
asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence, to make
known the mystery of the gospel. " Now it belongs to fortitude, which
moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from doing good on
account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that confession is not
an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or constancy.

Objection 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess
one's faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good
works, for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by
charity. " But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith.
Therefore neither is confession an act of faith.

On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and the
work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a work
proper to faith. "

I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to whose
end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred
specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, and
consequently it is an act of abstinence.

Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred
specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according to
2 Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe, and
therefore we speak also. " For the outward utterance is intended to
signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of
matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward
confession of them.

Reply to Objection 1: A threefold confession is commended by the
Scriptures. One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a
proper act of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated
above. Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is
an act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God,
which is the end of "latria. " The third is the confession of sins,
which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of
penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.

Reply to Objection 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct,
but an indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4).
Hence fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith,
viz. fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession,
but an indirect cause so to speak.

Reply to Objection 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all
outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, but
not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession as its
proper act, without the help of any other virtue.
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Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary
for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if
it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of
faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can be
realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of faith
is not necessary for salvation.

Objection 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his
faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have
to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple
folk are not bound to confess the faith.

Objection 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb
others, is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
10:32): "Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the
Church of God. " Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance
among unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): "With the heart we
believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto
salvation. "

I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation come under the
precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is something
affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its
necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative
precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated above
([2298]FS, Q[71], A[5], ad 3; [2299]FS, Q[88], A[1], ad 2) do not bind
for always, although they are always binding; but they bind as to place
and time according to other due circumstances, in respect of which
human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of virtue.

Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at
all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain
times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due
honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: for
instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain
silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without faith,
or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from the
faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is necessary for
salvation.

Reply to Objection 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues,
must be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and
our neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good
demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to God's
truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.

Reply to Objection 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger,
every one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good
example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check the
attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty of all
the faithful to instruct others in the faith.

Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public
confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among
unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the faithful.
Hence Our Lord said (Mat. 7:6): "Give not that which is holy to dogs,
neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest turning upon you,
they tear you. " Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if
there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance of
unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is written (Mat.
15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord that "the Pharisee,
when they heard this word, were scandalized," He answered: "Let them
alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind. "
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OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first
place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause
of faith; fourthly, its effects.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) What is faith?

(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?

(3) Whether its form is charity?

(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are
one identically?

(5) Whether faith is a virtue?

(6) Whether it is one virtue?

(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;

(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual
virtues.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not? "

Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance
of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. " For
no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a
theological virtue, as stated above ([2300]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore
it is not a substance.

Objection 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now
things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should
not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were its
object.

Objection 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by
hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on
[2301](A[3]). Therefore the definition of faith should have included
the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.

Objection 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different
genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and
neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to
state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence. "

Objection 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for
which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth
is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to
speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is
unfittingly defined.

On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.

I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can
be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of
a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the
syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are
known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit,
should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object.
Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q[2], AA[2],3),
which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the
will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of
the will, i. e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
intellect, i. e. to the true. And since faith, through being a
theological virtues, as stated above ([2302]FS, Q[62], A[2]), has one
same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity,
be in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q[1],
AA[1],4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and
whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the
aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act
of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the
Apostle (Rom. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because to
see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has
already, but for what one has not, as stated above ([2303]FS, Q[67],
A[4]). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is
the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for. " For we are wont to call by the
name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the
whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning;
for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are
the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us
the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained
in them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the "substance
of things to be hoped for," for the reason that in us the first
beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of
faith, which contains virtually all things to be hoped for.