-- Finally the chapter
presents
a critique of liberation as asserted by the opponent.
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
All causes must change in time, they must be triggered to start the causing-effect, and stopped otherwise the effect will continue forever.
So time, as a supposed cause of the maturation or degradation of things must be itself modulated.
Otherwise it is not a cause and that is refuted in verse 208.
)
.
(-- How can functional things such as sprouts be impermanent? It follows that they are not, because of being produced by that which is permanent. This entailment follows because cause and effect are never seen to have incongruent characteristics in that one is permanent and the other impermanent. )
.
L4: [D. Refuting permanent particles (primary causes, without being effects, or composed of parts)] L5: [1. Refuting permanent particles]
L6: [a. Unsuitability of that which has parts as a permanent functional thing]
.
\ ###
\ 212.
\ That of which some sides are causes
\ While other sides are not is thereby
\ Multifarious. How can that
\ Which is multifarious be permanent?
.
(i. e. The case of elementary components: even elementary components are dependent on directional & functional parts, on their characteristics, and on the mind conceptualizing them, thus impermanent. )
.
(-- To demonstrate that particles are not truly existent partless phenomena as asserted, it is shown that they have sides and do not therefore interpenetrate completely when they come together to form a composite. Moreover, informing such a composite, particles could not move unless they had parts, such as fore and rear. Since they undergo change during the formation of the composite, how can they be permanent? The causal particles no longer exist once the effect has been produced.
-- Vaisesika assertion: Permanent particles of the four elements activated by the force of karma form the substantial entity of a composite, producing the environmental world and so forth.
-- Answer: That is incorrect, for it follows that when particles coalesce and form a composite, an increase in size is impossible if there is total interpenetration. If some parts coalesce, those that do are causes while those that do not are not causes.
-- It therefore follows that the smallest particle has parts, because some of its sides are causes while others are not. Being multifarious, it follows that it cannot be a permanent functional thing because of having diverse parts. )
.
L6: [b. Unfeasibility of an accretion which is a separate substantial entity forming through the coalescence of homogeneous particles]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 213.
\ The cause which is spherical
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\ Is not present in the effect.
\ Thus complete interpenetration
\ Of particles is not feasible.
.
(i. e. Refuting a conceptual proof that makes no sense. -- And it is not possible that there would be no directional & functional parts, that everything would mix without rearrangement depending on directional and functional parts of elementary components. The individuality of parts is not completely annihilated in forming a new result. The result is still dependent on its parts or causes, and those parts have directional and functional parts themselves. - It is in fact more reasonable to think that the whole is merely a name, and that the real dynamic is still operating at the basic level. But there is no such basic level. Everything is both whole and part, and the whole and its parts are not two, not one. Everything is merely imputed by the mind. )
.
(-- Assertion: Although particles interpenetrate completely because they are partless, a separate accretion of coalesced particles forms, which produces the composite.
-- Answer: It follows that it is not feasible for particles to interpenetrate completely when composites form. If they merge completely there will be no gradual increase in size from the first to the second composite and so forth.
-- Also the causative sphere with the characteristic of appearing to the mind as partless and spherical is not present in the resultant substantial entity, the composite. )
.
L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of asserting that particles do not interpenetrate completely]
.
\ ###
\ 214.
\ One particle's position is not
\ Asserted as also that of another.
\ Thus it is not asserted that
\ Cause and effect are the same size.
.
(i. e. So there is no complete assimilation of the individuality of parts into a new whole, and the elementary components still use their directional and functional parts, they are thus not elementary functional things. They are also whole, or effect. Everything is both whole and part, cause and effect. )
.
(-- Where complete interpenetration does not occur, one particle's position will not be asserted as also that of another. Thus since the causal particles and resultant composite are not asserted to be equal in size, the absurd consequence that the composite is not an object of the senses is avoided. Nevertheless since particles have parts, their consequent unfeasibility as permanent functional things remains. )
.
L6: [c. Refuting that particles are partless prior to the formation of a composite] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 215.
\ Whatever has eastern side
\ Also has an eastern part.
\ Those whose particles have sides admit
\ That they are not [partless] particles.
.
(i. e. Even before being involved into a function or composite, they have sides, and thus they have parts. Thus they are not without depending on parts, functional parts or directional parts. )
.
(-- Assertion: The problem of their having parts occurs when the resultant substantial entity is forming, but prior to that the smallest particles do not have parts.
-- Answer: That is incorrect. If a particle has no sides, it cannot be surrounded by particles on its four sides.
-- If it has sides, such as an eastern one, it definitely must have parts, since any particle with an eastern side must also have an eastern part. For that reason any opponent who holds that particles have sides prior to the formation of a composite admits those particles are not partless ones, because of accepting that they are located within the ten boundless directions. )
.
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L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of particles forming composites when movement from one position to another is unfeasible for partless particles]
.
\ ###
\ 216.
\ The front takes up, the back relinquishes --
\ Whatever does not have
\ Both of these [motions]
\ Is not something which moves.
.
(i. e. And if they had no sides (like front, back, . . . ) they would not be move, and would not be able to be part of a composite. There is always a possibility to define a direction relative to something else, even if there is no absolute referential or space. )
.
(-- It follows that such particles would not move from one place to another. When a thing moves from one place to another, its front takes up a position ahead while its rear relinquishes the rearward position, but partless particles neither take up nor relinquish a position. If it is asserted that they do not move, it is contradictory for partless particles to form the substantial entity of a composite. Thus truly existent particles should never be accepted. )
.
L5: [2. Unfeasibility of Yogic awareness perceiving partless particles] L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 217.
\ That which does not have a front,
\ Nor any middle,
\ And which does not have a rear,
\ Being invisible, who will see it?
.
(i. e. Refuting the claim that elementary components can be seen in deep meditation. -- Some say that Yogi can perceive elementary components of the external world; that they can see the real origination and cessation of impermanent things by the assembling and dissociation of those elementary components. But if they are elementary, and without sides or parts, how can they be seen. This is absurd. A permanent thing cannot be functional as demonstrated before. Anything perceptible is necessary functional, thus cause and effect, part and whole, and impermanent. )
.
-- Assertion: permanent particles do exist because adepts perceive them by virtue of the divine eye.
-- Answer: What adept sees such a permanent particle?
-- Seeing is not feasible because such a form -- a particle which firstly has no front, nor any middle, and finally does not
have a .
.
\
\
\
\
\
\
.
(i. e. And it is not because we can see coarse things - wholes (or effects) that there are necessarily elementary permanent parts composing them (or elementary permanent causes) - In the case of elementary components that would be the causes of the whole new effect, the cause cannot continue while the effect is present otherwise there would be endless production of effect, nor can the cause stop before the effect is produce, otherwise the effect would be causeless? So the cause and the effect cannot be simultaneous, nor sequential. So these elementary causing particles cannot really exist as we think they do. There is no real (inherently existing) cause, no real effect. It is more subtle than this. )
.
-- Assertion: Since coarse things would have no cause if particles did not exist, particles do exist and, moreover, are
rear portion -- is not evident to any kind of perception. )
L6: [b. Refuting belief in the existence of permanent particles because there are coarse things]
###
218.
The effect destroys the cause; Therefore the cause is not permanent. Alternatively, where the cause
Exists the effect does not.
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permanent because of being causeless functional things.
-- Answer ab: It follows that causal particles are not permanent, for just as the seed changes and disintegrates when the sprout is produced, the causal particles are destroyed by the production of the resultant composite.
-- Objection: This is not established, for they produce a separate effect without giving up their causal identity.
-- Answer cd: Alternatively, since the presence of the causal particles in a place precludes that of the resultant composite, it follows that they are not cause and effect because of being simultaneous and occupying individual positions, like a pot and a woolen cloth in their respective places. )
.
L5: [3. Why Buddhas do not mention the existence of permanent particles]
.
\ ###
\ 219.
\ A permanent thing that is obstructive
\ Is not seen anywhere.
\ Therefore Buddhas never say
\ That particles are permanent.
.
(i. e. Anything obstructive is necessary functional, thus cause and effect, part and whole, and impermanent. Generalization: Anything that can bee seen, that can interact with anything (ex. any wavelength or field), is necessarily obstructive, thus cause and effect, part and whole, impermanent. Meaning there is no elementary basic components as seeked out by some physicists. )
.
-- For the following reason, too, particles are not permanent: particles are obstructive in that they cannot be penetrated completely by other particles. That which is obstructive cannot be permanent.
-- The reason why Buddhas never say that permanent particles exist is because they do not perceive obstructive permanent things
Cittamatrins, who refute the existence of particles by applying the reasoning of ultimate analysis but assert that consciousness is truly existent, should accept objects and consciousnesses as they are conventionally accepted, since exactly the same reasoning applies. )
.
L4: [E. Refuting substantially established liberation]
L5: [1. Refuting the substantially established liberation of our own sectarians] L6: [a. Unfeasibility of substantially established cessation]
.
\ ###
\ 220.
\ If liberation, which is other than
\ What binds, is bound (i. e. caused) and the means (i. e. causal path) existed,
\ It should not be called liberation(i. e. independent)
\ Since nothing is produced from it.
.
(i. e. The case of the path and Liberation: First, Liberation is not a functional thing because all functional things are both cause and effect, but there should be no observable effect from Liberation; liberation cannot be a cause. - Also, true cessation, like space is not a permanent functional thing; it is not a real thing, it is a negation, the stopping of illusions based on ignorance. The path is not the real cause of Liberation. Liberation is not an effect caused, or produced by the path as if they were absolute cause, and absolute effect. If Liberation was a final effect produced by an absolutely perfect causing path, then it would be dependent and impermanent. It would also be a cause and have further samsaric effect. Thus it would not be called Liberation. -- As demonstrated above, there are no real causes and effects as we usually think they exist. Liberation, like space, is the negation of something else. But this something else, as we will see, is not really inherently existing either - and that is the whole point. Liberation and samsara are co- dependently arisen concepts. Transcendence is going beyond this duality - not taking one side like accepting one and rejecting the other, nor both, nor neither. Transcendence is seeing through illusions created by our own mind, seeing through all opposites / dualities. )
.
(About real cessations: liberation is just another concept. There is no causal path, and no final result. (i. e. Liberation is taught as the final effect, caused but not causing anything else. A permanent functional phenomena. ) If it is a produced functional thing, it would necessarily have an effect, a function. If liberation is caused, and the path exist, then it would be an effect. By there is no effect which are not cause of something else. So it would not be called liberation, because it
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would produce something else -- more karma. So "liberation" is not a functional thing, but a mere concept.
-- Finally the chapter presents a critique of liberation as asserted by the opponent. It cannot be a functional phenomenon as claimed, for then it should produce an effect, but none can be identified.
-- Assertion of our own sectarians who do not understand uncompounded phenomena as merely nominal: Although it is true that Buddhas do not mention permanent particles, they say uncompounded phenomena are permanent. Thus there is substantially existent cessation, which is like a dam. If this were not so it would be inappropriate to speak of the third noble truth.
-- Answer: True source bind to cyclic existence, true sufferings are that which is bound and true paths are the means which liberate one from sufferings and their sources. If liberation which is other than these were a functional phenomena, it should facilitate an effect, but it does not produce any effect and not the slightest facilitation occurs. Thus it is inappropriate to call such a substantially existent cessation "liberation. " It contradicts what the Teacher said: "Monks, these five are only names - past time, future time, space, nirvana, and the person. " One should therefore accept liberation as a mere term, a mere imputation and not as substantially existent. )
.
L6: [b. It contradicts the explanation that all suffering is abandoned in the sphere of nirvana]
.
\ ###
\ 221.
\ In nirvana there are no aggregates
\ And there cannot be a person.
\ What nirvana is there for one
\ Who is not seen in nirvana?
.
(i. e. The case of what is liberated: the self and the five aggregates are not two, not one: We cannot find a self among the five aggregates individually or together, nor can we find a self separate from them. There cannot be a self liberated. So what is individual Liberation? This is an imperfect concept. )
.
-- This is followed by a discussion of what attains liberation and what exists as a basis when liberation occurs, in the course of which it is demonstrated that the basis cannot be a permanent truly existent self.
-- ab: The Subduer said, "That which is the complete abandonment, removal, and extinction of this suffering . . . the abandonment of all the aggregates, the end of worldly existence and separation from attachment, is cessation and nirvana. " According to proponents of functional things as truly existent, this citation means the aggregates are entirely non-existent in the sphere of nirvana. Nor can there be a person imputed in dependence upon them, for neither the reliance nor reliant exist
-- cd: Neither the aggregates nor the person are seen as a truly existent reliance which reaches nirvana through the ending of disturbing attitudes and rebirth. What truly existent nirvana reliant upon that is there? Not the slightest, thus one should accept liberation, too, as a mere imputation. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting other sectarians' liberation identified with the self]
L6: [a. Refuting the permanent liberation consisting of consciousness imputed by Samkhyas]
.
\ ###
\ 222.
\ When free from attachment at [the time of] liberation
\ What good is the existence of consciousness?
\ Also to exist without consciousness
\ Is clearly the same as not existing.
.
(i. e. The real nature of the self is not existence, not non-existence: It is wrong to think that a primordial individual consciousness can be Liberated. There would be no need for consciousness at liberation; and there is no person without consciousness. )
.
(With or without consciousness, there could be no self at liberation: If there is no self in nirvana, then there is no self- consciousness. So it is not existing, not not-existing, not both, not neither. It is beyond conceptualization.
-- Samkhyas assertion: According to us there is no flaw that nirvana is not liberation because of lacking a reliance. When an adept understands that the principal and person are different the process of involvement in cyclic existence such as the great one and so forth stops. When everything subsides into the latent state of the principal, the conscious person remains alone. Thus there is a liberated self.
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-- Answer ab: It follows that it is illogical to accept the existence of a conscious person at the time of liberation when there is freedom from attachment to objects, because you assert that the intellect makes known to the person objects to which there is attraction. You also assert that it is the person's nature to be conscious and that this is permanent and immutable. What is the value of accepting the existence of consciousness during liberation? There is not the slightest value, because while accepting the conscious person as an experiencer of objects, the transformations which are experienced no longer exist, having subsided into a latent state.
-- Question: What if the person remains without consciousness at liberation?
-- Answer cd: It follows that to accept the existence of a liberated person without consciousness clearly amounts to accepting the person's non-existence, because of accepting that the person and consciousness are of one nature, being either equally existent or non-existent. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting permanent liberation consisting of the potential for the existence of consciousness]
.
\ ###
\ 223.
\ If at liberation a self existed
\ There could be a seed of consciousness.
\ Without it there is no speculation
\ With regard to worldly existence.
.
(i. e. The true nature of the self and liberation is beyond conceptualization - speculating is useless: There no need to speculate about anything after liberation, after the cessation of those illusions. The real meaning of Liberation is beyond all conceptualization. )
.
(Without a self, there is no world, no need to speculate.
-- Assertion: There is a self during liberation, for though there is no actual consciousness, the potential to be conscious of objects exists.
-- Answer ab: That too is illogical.
-- If at liberation a self existed, there could be such a potential or seed of consciousness, but at that time there is no consciousness.
-- Objection: If there is no liberated self, there is no liberation and thus cyclic existence is indestructible. Many unwanted entailments arise.
-- Answer cd: It is irrelevant to speculate whether, because there is consciousnesses, [people would or would not enter liberation] or whether, because its seed is truly existent, people would or would not enter worldly existence. It would be relevant if a self as reliance existed but there is no liberated self. )
.
L6: [c. Suitability of the complete abandonment of conceptions of a self as liberation]
.
\ ###
\ 224.
\ It is certain that those liberated
\ From suffering have no other [self].
\ Therefore the end of the self
\ Should always be affirmed as good.
.
(i. e. Let's concentrate on no-self for now: The real nature of the self is beyond conceptualization; what happen after Liberation is imponderable. There no need to speculate about anything after liberation, after the cessation of all illusions. Instead of speculating about what is beyond all conceptualization, we should concentrate on the actual problem: the belief in a permanent self, and the realization that it is the root cause of all suffering. That is a sure thing in the actual context. )
.
(So don't think about liberating a permanent self -- that would be a mistake: So without the perception of a self based on the five aggregates, there is no more suffering. And there is no other causeless permanent self which does not depend on the aggregates. There is no liberated self.
-- It is certain that in the state of nirvana, people who have gained liberation from suffering by completely abandoning the contaminated aggregates through the total elimination of disturbing attitudes and emotions have no other causeless permanent self which does not depend on the aggregates. Therefore people who aspire to become free should always affirm that the complete ending forever of conceptions of a self is good and should never assert the existence of such a
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L3: [III. Arguing the unsuitability of refuting true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 225.
\ The conventional is preferable
\ But the ultimate never is.
\ Ordinary people have some [belief in this]
\ But none in the ultimate.
.
(i. e. Without falling into the other extreme, using a gradual path: On the other hand, we should not fall into the other extreme - nihilism, thinking there is no self at all, no path at all. Between the two truths, or between two extremes, it is preferable for beginners to think that there is a self that has to be Liberated by following a path consisting of virtuous methods - to think in real cause and effect like taught in the teaching of dependent origination, the Wheel of Life. It is preferable to start with the Hinayana teachings, because of the danger of total rejection of the dharma or failing into nihilism are great. Then it is preferable to teach love, compassion, patience, bodhicitta. Receptivity to a more subtle wisdom will come later. But, of course, a right path has to combine method and wisdom (the two accumulations) all the time, because only the wisdom directly realizing the true nature of reality is the final antidote, and only accumulating enough merit can make this possible. )
.
(-- Assertion: "the four lines of the stanza. "
-- If during liberation there is no liberated self, and nirvana which is termed the ultimate is said to be mere ending of conceptions of a self through the non-recurrence of that which is composite, what is the purpose of striving for such an ultimate? It is preferable for those interested in their own good to accept conventionalities like eyes, sprouts and so forth but not to assert any ultimate, for ordinary people have some belief in virtuous and non-virtuous actions, their homes, forests and so forth but none whatsoever in the ultimate.
-- This stanza was written in connection with the extensive refutation of the self in the following chapter. Since it is interpreted as a controversial contention in Candrakirti's commentary, it should not be accepted as our own contention. ) .
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ Discovering that external (i. e. world) and internal (i. e. mind) dependently arising Phenomena (i. e. the five aggregates) exist in reliance (i. e. dependently arisen - conventional truths / existence),
\ and understanding Their emptiness of existence (i. e. ultimate truth / non-existence) by way of their own entities,
\ Grow wise in the meaning of THE MIDDLE WAY FREE FROM EXTREMES. (i. e. Tetralemma - Aiming at the Union of The Two Truths)
.
(i. e. Trying to stay with the Middle Way using both method and wisdom together: The Union of method and wisdom. The Middle Way: at the same time as we use virtuous methods based on the law of dependent origination (causality) to accumulate merit, we need to gradually develop the wisdom realizing the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharma (including causes, conditions and causality, including dependent origination and all virtuous methods and paths). But that doesn't mean that there is no cause, condition or causality at all, or that we should drop all virtuous paths right now. We need both method and wisdom together all the time, because this is more in accord with the real non-dual nature of everything which is beyond all conceptualization. )
.
\ ###
\ This is the ninth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of permanent functional phenomena.
.
This concludes the commentary on the ninth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of permanent functional phenomena, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
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L2: [Chapter 10 - Refuting Misconceptions of the Self -
There is nothing permanent that is having rebirths, or is being Liberated - P. 215]
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON REFUTING THE SELF.
-- Individual refutation of truly existent functional phenomena: Refuting the self.
.
-- Refuting various views of a permanent self:
-- Because the self is not real, it is not viewed as the same way by all opponents
.
-- As a permanent cause:
-- A cause cannot be permanent, thus the self cannot be permanent
-- An intangible self could not be the cause of the movement of tangible things
-- A permanent self/cause and its effects would not depend on other conditions; but that is not what is seen
-- Everything is not entirely existent only in the mind; there is a flow out there
-- Real existent cause and effect, because they cannot exist simultaneously nor be separate, could not explain continuity .
-- The permanent self vs. the aggregates: no one, not separate
-- A permanent self cannot be found in the aggregates, or outside of them
-- (The individual self is not identical to the aggregates, it is not different / separate. )
-- A permanent self would not change from one rebirth to another
-- A permanent self could not be matter only
-- A permanent self is not mental either, because mental states changes
-- A permanent consciousness, a knower, would not need the sense organs
-- A permanent self without a consciousness is unimaginable
-- Changing from potential to consciousness would mean not permanent
-- Again a person without consciousness is not imaginable
-- A liberated person without a self ?
-- (There is no self-nature that transmigrate (in the dispositions or aggregates, or out of it) )
-- (There is no subtle-self separate from an ego to Liberate. Some very subtle self-nature to purify. )
-- (There is no self bound in samsara, there is no bounding, there is no i, ii, iii; there is no self liberated, no liberation) .
-- Something omnipresent does not need to act, thus the self cannot be omnipresent
-- An actionless self, non-functional, is as non-existent
-- The "I" is relative to the subject, it is not an absolute independent functional thing
-- A permanent self would not change, nor be harmed, nor need protection, morality, or seek liberation
.
-- Concluding that there is no real self
-- It is more useful : (If there is no self, then there is no possessions, and no need to protect or satisfy an "ego". Thus all the defilements have no foundation, we can let go. There is not even a self with no ego (like implicit in self-Liberation). There is no "I" in opposition to "the World". And all the mental constructions based on this assumption are stopped. There is no more acquisition of karma resulting in the five aggregates (from rebirth, or as adaptation within a suppose "life"). There is no more accumulation of knowledge, expectations, views. And there is no more deceptions. It is this release, this stopping of mental constructions (based on self-existence), seeing everything as empty (even a very subtle self), that is Liberation. )
-- The wise does concludes that
-- Liberation would not be attained through lies
.
-- Impermanence does not necessitate discontinuation :
-- Products which undergo change moment by moment are neither permanent nor do they discontinue.
-- No need of a permanent self, as a support for karma, to explain memory, bondage, continuity, and liberation
-- The flow is from impermanent causes to impermanent effects, without limits on both sides
-- Everything is both cause and effect, both part and composite, everything continually change nothing last even a moment
-- Nothing is permanent in the flow / continuum
-- The illusion of real things, the names, are given by the mind trying to build conceptual models of the flow regularity
.
-- Avoiding the two extremes:
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-- (But this does not mean that there is no self at all: It is not individual self, it is not non-individual self at all. Don't go to the other extreme: nihilism. )
-- origination fights annihilation/nihilism and impermanence/emptiness fight eternity/inherent existence
-- (THE UNION OF THE TWO TRUTHS (Dependent Origination, Emptiness))
.
L3: [I. Individual refutations of the self] L4: [A. Refuting the Vaisesika self] L5: [1. Refuting the nature of the self] L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 226.
\ When the inner self is not
\ Female, male or neuter,
\ It is only out of ignorance
\ That you think your own self male.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing self with its own permanent attributes defining it. Gender cannot be an essential attribute of the permanent inner self since it can change with rebirths. The basis for the attributes cannot be found in the whole. All attributes that would define a permanent self are like that, they change, they are impermanent. So they cannot be used to prove the existence of an inherently existing self. )
.
-- i. e. To maintain the need for morality with ordinary people who do not understand the true meaning of emptiness, some feel that there is a need to teach about a self, although very subtle, that could be liberated, and about a self that goes through rebirths. Otherwise they would think there is nothing after death, that they could escape the consequences of their actions through death, or that liberation is like annihilation of their own self. So, lets try to find this self.
.
(-- How can functional things such as sprouts be impermanent? It follows that they are not, because of being produced by that which is permanent. This entailment follows because cause and effect are never seen to have incongruent characteristics in that one is permanent and the other impermanent. )
.
L4: [D. Refuting permanent particles (primary causes, without being effects, or composed of parts)] L5: [1. Refuting permanent particles]
L6: [a. Unsuitability of that which has parts as a permanent functional thing]
.
\ ###
\ 212.
\ That of which some sides are causes
\ While other sides are not is thereby
\ Multifarious. How can that
\ Which is multifarious be permanent?
.
(i. e. The case of elementary components: even elementary components are dependent on directional & functional parts, on their characteristics, and on the mind conceptualizing them, thus impermanent. )
.
(-- To demonstrate that particles are not truly existent partless phenomena as asserted, it is shown that they have sides and do not therefore interpenetrate completely when they come together to form a composite. Moreover, informing such a composite, particles could not move unless they had parts, such as fore and rear. Since they undergo change during the formation of the composite, how can they be permanent? The causal particles no longer exist once the effect has been produced.
-- Vaisesika assertion: Permanent particles of the four elements activated by the force of karma form the substantial entity of a composite, producing the environmental world and so forth.
-- Answer: That is incorrect, for it follows that when particles coalesce and form a composite, an increase in size is impossible if there is total interpenetration. If some parts coalesce, those that do are causes while those that do not are not causes.
-- It therefore follows that the smallest particle has parts, because some of its sides are causes while others are not. Being multifarious, it follows that it cannot be a permanent functional thing because of having diverse parts. )
.
L6: [b. Unfeasibility of an accretion which is a separate substantial entity forming through the coalescence of homogeneous particles]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 213.
\ The cause which is spherical
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\ Is not present in the effect.
\ Thus complete interpenetration
\ Of particles is not feasible.
.
(i. e. Refuting a conceptual proof that makes no sense. -- And it is not possible that there would be no directional & functional parts, that everything would mix without rearrangement depending on directional and functional parts of elementary components. The individuality of parts is not completely annihilated in forming a new result. The result is still dependent on its parts or causes, and those parts have directional and functional parts themselves. - It is in fact more reasonable to think that the whole is merely a name, and that the real dynamic is still operating at the basic level. But there is no such basic level. Everything is both whole and part, and the whole and its parts are not two, not one. Everything is merely imputed by the mind. )
.
(-- Assertion: Although particles interpenetrate completely because they are partless, a separate accretion of coalesced particles forms, which produces the composite.
-- Answer: It follows that it is not feasible for particles to interpenetrate completely when composites form. If they merge completely there will be no gradual increase in size from the first to the second composite and so forth.
-- Also the causative sphere with the characteristic of appearing to the mind as partless and spherical is not present in the resultant substantial entity, the composite. )
.
L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of asserting that particles do not interpenetrate completely]
.
\ ###
\ 214.
\ One particle's position is not
\ Asserted as also that of another.
\ Thus it is not asserted that
\ Cause and effect are the same size.
.
(i. e. So there is no complete assimilation of the individuality of parts into a new whole, and the elementary components still use their directional and functional parts, they are thus not elementary functional things. They are also whole, or effect. Everything is both whole and part, cause and effect. )
.
(-- Where complete interpenetration does not occur, one particle's position will not be asserted as also that of another. Thus since the causal particles and resultant composite are not asserted to be equal in size, the absurd consequence that the composite is not an object of the senses is avoided. Nevertheless since particles have parts, their consequent unfeasibility as permanent functional things remains. )
.
L6: [c. Refuting that particles are partless prior to the formation of a composite] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 215.
\ Whatever has eastern side
\ Also has an eastern part.
\ Those whose particles have sides admit
\ That they are not [partless] particles.
.
(i. e. Even before being involved into a function or composite, they have sides, and thus they have parts. Thus they are not without depending on parts, functional parts or directional parts. )
.
(-- Assertion: The problem of their having parts occurs when the resultant substantial entity is forming, but prior to that the smallest particles do not have parts.
-- Answer: That is incorrect. If a particle has no sides, it cannot be surrounded by particles on its four sides.
-- If it has sides, such as an eastern one, it definitely must have parts, since any particle with an eastern side must also have an eastern part. For that reason any opponent who holds that particles have sides prior to the formation of a composite admits those particles are not partless ones, because of accepting that they are located within the ten boundless directions. )
.
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L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of particles forming composites when movement from one position to another is unfeasible for partless particles]
.
\ ###
\ 216.
\ The front takes up, the back relinquishes --
\ Whatever does not have
\ Both of these [motions]
\ Is not something which moves.
.
(i. e. And if they had no sides (like front, back, . . . ) they would not be move, and would not be able to be part of a composite. There is always a possibility to define a direction relative to something else, even if there is no absolute referential or space. )
.
(-- It follows that such particles would not move from one place to another. When a thing moves from one place to another, its front takes up a position ahead while its rear relinquishes the rearward position, but partless particles neither take up nor relinquish a position. If it is asserted that they do not move, it is contradictory for partless particles to form the substantial entity of a composite. Thus truly existent particles should never be accepted. )
.
L5: [2. Unfeasibility of Yogic awareness perceiving partless particles] L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 217.
\ That which does not have a front,
\ Nor any middle,
\ And which does not have a rear,
\ Being invisible, who will see it?
.
(i. e. Refuting the claim that elementary components can be seen in deep meditation. -- Some say that Yogi can perceive elementary components of the external world; that they can see the real origination and cessation of impermanent things by the assembling and dissociation of those elementary components. But if they are elementary, and without sides or parts, how can they be seen. This is absurd. A permanent thing cannot be functional as demonstrated before. Anything perceptible is necessary functional, thus cause and effect, part and whole, and impermanent. )
.
-- Assertion: permanent particles do exist because adepts perceive them by virtue of the divine eye.
-- Answer: What adept sees such a permanent particle?
-- Seeing is not feasible because such a form -- a particle which firstly has no front, nor any middle, and finally does not
have a .
.
\
\
\
\
\
\
.
(i. e. And it is not because we can see coarse things - wholes (or effects) that there are necessarily elementary permanent parts composing them (or elementary permanent causes) - In the case of elementary components that would be the causes of the whole new effect, the cause cannot continue while the effect is present otherwise there would be endless production of effect, nor can the cause stop before the effect is produce, otherwise the effect would be causeless? So the cause and the effect cannot be simultaneous, nor sequential. So these elementary causing particles cannot really exist as we think they do. There is no real (inherently existing) cause, no real effect. It is more subtle than this. )
.
-- Assertion: Since coarse things would have no cause if particles did not exist, particles do exist and, moreover, are
rear portion -- is not evident to any kind of perception. )
L6: [b. Refuting belief in the existence of permanent particles because there are coarse things]
###
218.
The effect destroys the cause; Therefore the cause is not permanent. Alternatively, where the cause
Exists the effect does not.
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permanent because of being causeless functional things.
-- Answer ab: It follows that causal particles are not permanent, for just as the seed changes and disintegrates when the sprout is produced, the causal particles are destroyed by the production of the resultant composite.
-- Objection: This is not established, for they produce a separate effect without giving up their causal identity.
-- Answer cd: Alternatively, since the presence of the causal particles in a place precludes that of the resultant composite, it follows that they are not cause and effect because of being simultaneous and occupying individual positions, like a pot and a woolen cloth in their respective places. )
.
L5: [3. Why Buddhas do not mention the existence of permanent particles]
.
\ ###
\ 219.
\ A permanent thing that is obstructive
\ Is not seen anywhere.
\ Therefore Buddhas never say
\ That particles are permanent.
.
(i. e. Anything obstructive is necessary functional, thus cause and effect, part and whole, and impermanent. Generalization: Anything that can bee seen, that can interact with anything (ex. any wavelength or field), is necessarily obstructive, thus cause and effect, part and whole, impermanent. Meaning there is no elementary basic components as seeked out by some physicists. )
.
-- For the following reason, too, particles are not permanent: particles are obstructive in that they cannot be penetrated completely by other particles. That which is obstructive cannot be permanent.
-- The reason why Buddhas never say that permanent particles exist is because they do not perceive obstructive permanent things
Cittamatrins, who refute the existence of particles by applying the reasoning of ultimate analysis but assert that consciousness is truly existent, should accept objects and consciousnesses as they are conventionally accepted, since exactly the same reasoning applies. )
.
L4: [E. Refuting substantially established liberation]
L5: [1. Refuting the substantially established liberation of our own sectarians] L6: [a. Unfeasibility of substantially established cessation]
.
\ ###
\ 220.
\ If liberation, which is other than
\ What binds, is bound (i. e. caused) and the means (i. e. causal path) existed,
\ It should not be called liberation(i. e. independent)
\ Since nothing is produced from it.
.
(i. e. The case of the path and Liberation: First, Liberation is not a functional thing because all functional things are both cause and effect, but there should be no observable effect from Liberation; liberation cannot be a cause. - Also, true cessation, like space is not a permanent functional thing; it is not a real thing, it is a negation, the stopping of illusions based on ignorance. The path is not the real cause of Liberation. Liberation is not an effect caused, or produced by the path as if they were absolute cause, and absolute effect. If Liberation was a final effect produced by an absolutely perfect causing path, then it would be dependent and impermanent. It would also be a cause and have further samsaric effect. Thus it would not be called Liberation. -- As demonstrated above, there are no real causes and effects as we usually think they exist. Liberation, like space, is the negation of something else. But this something else, as we will see, is not really inherently existing either - and that is the whole point. Liberation and samsara are co- dependently arisen concepts. Transcendence is going beyond this duality - not taking one side like accepting one and rejecting the other, nor both, nor neither. Transcendence is seeing through illusions created by our own mind, seeing through all opposites / dualities. )
.
(About real cessations: liberation is just another concept. There is no causal path, and no final result. (i. e. Liberation is taught as the final effect, caused but not causing anything else. A permanent functional phenomena. ) If it is a produced functional thing, it would necessarily have an effect, a function. If liberation is caused, and the path exist, then it would be an effect. By there is no effect which are not cause of something else. So it would not be called liberation, because it
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would produce something else -- more karma. So "liberation" is not a functional thing, but a mere concept.
-- Finally the chapter presents a critique of liberation as asserted by the opponent. It cannot be a functional phenomenon as claimed, for then it should produce an effect, but none can be identified.
-- Assertion of our own sectarians who do not understand uncompounded phenomena as merely nominal: Although it is true that Buddhas do not mention permanent particles, they say uncompounded phenomena are permanent. Thus there is substantially existent cessation, which is like a dam. If this were not so it would be inappropriate to speak of the third noble truth.
-- Answer: True source bind to cyclic existence, true sufferings are that which is bound and true paths are the means which liberate one from sufferings and their sources. If liberation which is other than these were a functional phenomena, it should facilitate an effect, but it does not produce any effect and not the slightest facilitation occurs. Thus it is inappropriate to call such a substantially existent cessation "liberation. " It contradicts what the Teacher said: "Monks, these five are only names - past time, future time, space, nirvana, and the person. " One should therefore accept liberation as a mere term, a mere imputation and not as substantially existent. )
.
L6: [b. It contradicts the explanation that all suffering is abandoned in the sphere of nirvana]
.
\ ###
\ 221.
\ In nirvana there are no aggregates
\ And there cannot be a person.
\ What nirvana is there for one
\ Who is not seen in nirvana?
.
(i. e. The case of what is liberated: the self and the five aggregates are not two, not one: We cannot find a self among the five aggregates individually or together, nor can we find a self separate from them. There cannot be a self liberated. So what is individual Liberation? This is an imperfect concept. )
.
-- This is followed by a discussion of what attains liberation and what exists as a basis when liberation occurs, in the course of which it is demonstrated that the basis cannot be a permanent truly existent self.
-- ab: The Subduer said, "That which is the complete abandonment, removal, and extinction of this suffering . . . the abandonment of all the aggregates, the end of worldly existence and separation from attachment, is cessation and nirvana. " According to proponents of functional things as truly existent, this citation means the aggregates are entirely non-existent in the sphere of nirvana. Nor can there be a person imputed in dependence upon them, for neither the reliance nor reliant exist
-- cd: Neither the aggregates nor the person are seen as a truly existent reliance which reaches nirvana through the ending of disturbing attitudes and rebirth. What truly existent nirvana reliant upon that is there? Not the slightest, thus one should accept liberation, too, as a mere imputation. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting other sectarians' liberation identified with the self]
L6: [a. Refuting the permanent liberation consisting of consciousness imputed by Samkhyas]
.
\ ###
\ 222.
\ When free from attachment at [the time of] liberation
\ What good is the existence of consciousness?
\ Also to exist without consciousness
\ Is clearly the same as not existing.
.
(i. e. The real nature of the self is not existence, not non-existence: It is wrong to think that a primordial individual consciousness can be Liberated. There would be no need for consciousness at liberation; and there is no person without consciousness. )
.
(With or without consciousness, there could be no self at liberation: If there is no self in nirvana, then there is no self- consciousness. So it is not existing, not not-existing, not both, not neither. It is beyond conceptualization.
-- Samkhyas assertion: According to us there is no flaw that nirvana is not liberation because of lacking a reliance. When an adept understands that the principal and person are different the process of involvement in cyclic existence such as the great one and so forth stops. When everything subsides into the latent state of the principal, the conscious person remains alone. Thus there is a liberated self.
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-- Answer ab: It follows that it is illogical to accept the existence of a conscious person at the time of liberation when there is freedom from attachment to objects, because you assert that the intellect makes known to the person objects to which there is attraction. You also assert that it is the person's nature to be conscious and that this is permanent and immutable. What is the value of accepting the existence of consciousness during liberation? There is not the slightest value, because while accepting the conscious person as an experiencer of objects, the transformations which are experienced no longer exist, having subsided into a latent state.
-- Question: What if the person remains without consciousness at liberation?
-- Answer cd: It follows that to accept the existence of a liberated person without consciousness clearly amounts to accepting the person's non-existence, because of accepting that the person and consciousness are of one nature, being either equally existent or non-existent. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting permanent liberation consisting of the potential for the existence of consciousness]
.
\ ###
\ 223.
\ If at liberation a self existed
\ There could be a seed of consciousness.
\ Without it there is no speculation
\ With regard to worldly existence.
.
(i. e. The true nature of the self and liberation is beyond conceptualization - speculating is useless: There no need to speculate about anything after liberation, after the cessation of those illusions. The real meaning of Liberation is beyond all conceptualization. )
.
(Without a self, there is no world, no need to speculate.
-- Assertion: There is a self during liberation, for though there is no actual consciousness, the potential to be conscious of objects exists.
-- Answer ab: That too is illogical.
-- If at liberation a self existed, there could be such a potential or seed of consciousness, but at that time there is no consciousness.
-- Objection: If there is no liberated self, there is no liberation and thus cyclic existence is indestructible. Many unwanted entailments arise.
-- Answer cd: It is irrelevant to speculate whether, because there is consciousnesses, [people would or would not enter liberation] or whether, because its seed is truly existent, people would or would not enter worldly existence. It would be relevant if a self as reliance existed but there is no liberated self. )
.
L6: [c. Suitability of the complete abandonment of conceptions of a self as liberation]
.
\ ###
\ 224.
\ It is certain that those liberated
\ From suffering have no other [self].
\ Therefore the end of the self
\ Should always be affirmed as good.
.
(i. e. Let's concentrate on no-self for now: The real nature of the self is beyond conceptualization; what happen after Liberation is imponderable. There no need to speculate about anything after liberation, after the cessation of all illusions. Instead of speculating about what is beyond all conceptualization, we should concentrate on the actual problem: the belief in a permanent self, and the realization that it is the root cause of all suffering. That is a sure thing in the actual context. )
.
(So don't think about liberating a permanent self -- that would be a mistake: So without the perception of a self based on the five aggregates, there is no more suffering. And there is no other causeless permanent self which does not depend on the aggregates. There is no liberated self.
-- It is certain that in the state of nirvana, people who have gained liberation from suffering by completely abandoning the contaminated aggregates through the total elimination of disturbing attitudes and emotions have no other causeless permanent self which does not depend on the aggregates. Therefore people who aspire to become free should always affirm that the complete ending forever of conceptions of a self is good and should never assert the existence of such a
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L3: [III. Arguing the unsuitability of refuting true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 225.
\ The conventional is preferable
\ But the ultimate never is.
\ Ordinary people have some [belief in this]
\ But none in the ultimate.
.
(i. e. Without falling into the other extreme, using a gradual path: On the other hand, we should not fall into the other extreme - nihilism, thinking there is no self at all, no path at all. Between the two truths, or between two extremes, it is preferable for beginners to think that there is a self that has to be Liberated by following a path consisting of virtuous methods - to think in real cause and effect like taught in the teaching of dependent origination, the Wheel of Life. It is preferable to start with the Hinayana teachings, because of the danger of total rejection of the dharma or failing into nihilism are great. Then it is preferable to teach love, compassion, patience, bodhicitta. Receptivity to a more subtle wisdom will come later. But, of course, a right path has to combine method and wisdom (the two accumulations) all the time, because only the wisdom directly realizing the true nature of reality is the final antidote, and only accumulating enough merit can make this possible. )
.
(-- Assertion: "the four lines of the stanza. "
-- If during liberation there is no liberated self, and nirvana which is termed the ultimate is said to be mere ending of conceptions of a self through the non-recurrence of that which is composite, what is the purpose of striving for such an ultimate? It is preferable for those interested in their own good to accept conventionalities like eyes, sprouts and so forth but not to assert any ultimate, for ordinary people have some belief in virtuous and non-virtuous actions, their homes, forests and so forth but none whatsoever in the ultimate.
-- This stanza was written in connection with the extensive refutation of the self in the following chapter. Since it is interpreted as a controversial contention in Candrakirti's commentary, it should not be accepted as our own contention. ) .
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ Discovering that external (i. e. world) and internal (i. e. mind) dependently arising Phenomena (i. e. the five aggregates) exist in reliance (i. e. dependently arisen - conventional truths / existence),
\ and understanding Their emptiness of existence (i. e. ultimate truth / non-existence) by way of their own entities,
\ Grow wise in the meaning of THE MIDDLE WAY FREE FROM EXTREMES. (i. e. Tetralemma - Aiming at the Union of The Two Truths)
.
(i. e. Trying to stay with the Middle Way using both method and wisdom together: The Union of method and wisdom. The Middle Way: at the same time as we use virtuous methods based on the law of dependent origination (causality) to accumulate merit, we need to gradually develop the wisdom realizing the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharma (including causes, conditions and causality, including dependent origination and all virtuous methods and paths). But that doesn't mean that there is no cause, condition or causality at all, or that we should drop all virtuous paths right now. We need both method and wisdom together all the time, because this is more in accord with the real non-dual nature of everything which is beyond all conceptualization. )
.
\ ###
\ This is the ninth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of permanent functional phenomena.
.
This concludes the commentary on the ninth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of permanent functional phenomena, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
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L2: [Chapter 10 - Refuting Misconceptions of the Self -
There is nothing permanent that is having rebirths, or is being Liberated - P. 215]
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON REFUTING THE SELF.
-- Individual refutation of truly existent functional phenomena: Refuting the self.
.
-- Refuting various views of a permanent self:
-- Because the self is not real, it is not viewed as the same way by all opponents
.
-- As a permanent cause:
-- A cause cannot be permanent, thus the self cannot be permanent
-- An intangible self could not be the cause of the movement of tangible things
-- A permanent self/cause and its effects would not depend on other conditions; but that is not what is seen
-- Everything is not entirely existent only in the mind; there is a flow out there
-- Real existent cause and effect, because they cannot exist simultaneously nor be separate, could not explain continuity .
-- The permanent self vs. the aggregates: no one, not separate
-- A permanent self cannot be found in the aggregates, or outside of them
-- (The individual self is not identical to the aggregates, it is not different / separate. )
-- A permanent self would not change from one rebirth to another
-- A permanent self could not be matter only
-- A permanent self is not mental either, because mental states changes
-- A permanent consciousness, a knower, would not need the sense organs
-- A permanent self without a consciousness is unimaginable
-- Changing from potential to consciousness would mean not permanent
-- Again a person without consciousness is not imaginable
-- A liberated person without a self ?
-- (There is no self-nature that transmigrate (in the dispositions or aggregates, or out of it) )
-- (There is no subtle-self separate from an ego to Liberate. Some very subtle self-nature to purify. )
-- (There is no self bound in samsara, there is no bounding, there is no i, ii, iii; there is no self liberated, no liberation) .
-- Something omnipresent does not need to act, thus the self cannot be omnipresent
-- An actionless self, non-functional, is as non-existent
-- The "I" is relative to the subject, it is not an absolute independent functional thing
-- A permanent self would not change, nor be harmed, nor need protection, morality, or seek liberation
.
-- Concluding that there is no real self
-- It is more useful : (If there is no self, then there is no possessions, and no need to protect or satisfy an "ego". Thus all the defilements have no foundation, we can let go. There is not even a self with no ego (like implicit in self-Liberation). There is no "I" in opposition to "the World". And all the mental constructions based on this assumption are stopped. There is no more acquisition of karma resulting in the five aggregates (from rebirth, or as adaptation within a suppose "life"). There is no more accumulation of knowledge, expectations, views. And there is no more deceptions. It is this release, this stopping of mental constructions (based on self-existence), seeing everything as empty (even a very subtle self), that is Liberation. )
-- The wise does concludes that
-- Liberation would not be attained through lies
.
-- Impermanence does not necessitate discontinuation :
-- Products which undergo change moment by moment are neither permanent nor do they discontinue.
-- No need of a permanent self, as a support for karma, to explain memory, bondage, continuity, and liberation
-- The flow is from impermanent causes to impermanent effects, without limits on both sides
-- Everything is both cause and effect, both part and composite, everything continually change nothing last even a moment
-- Nothing is permanent in the flow / continuum
-- The illusion of real things, the names, are given by the mind trying to build conceptual models of the flow regularity
.
-- Avoiding the two extremes:
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-- (But this does not mean that there is no self at all: It is not individual self, it is not non-individual self at all. Don't go to the other extreme: nihilism. )
-- origination fights annihilation/nihilism and impermanence/emptiness fight eternity/inherent existence
-- (THE UNION OF THE TWO TRUTHS (Dependent Origination, Emptiness))
.
L3: [I. Individual refutations of the self] L4: [A. Refuting the Vaisesika self] L5: [1. Refuting the nature of the self] L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 226.
\ When the inner self is not
\ Female, male or neuter,
\ It is only out of ignorance
\ That you think your own self male.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing self with its own permanent attributes defining it. Gender cannot be an essential attribute of the permanent inner self since it can change with rebirths. The basis for the attributes cannot be found in the whole. All attributes that would define a permanent self are like that, they change, they are impermanent. So they cannot be used to prove the existence of an inherently existing self. )
.
-- i. e. To maintain the need for morality with ordinary people who do not understand the true meaning of emptiness, some feel that there is a need to teach about a self, although very subtle, that could be liberated, and about a self that goes through rebirths. Otherwise they would think there is nothing after death, that they could escape the consequences of their actions through death, or that liberation is like annihilation of their own self. So, lets try to find this self.
