(It is
betrayed
by the fact that even the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
)
I99
? It is the
height psychological falsity
of (** on the
part of man to imagine a being according to his
own petty standard, who is a beginning, a "thing
in-itself," and who appears to him good, wise,
mighty, and precious; for thus he suppresses in
thought all the causality by means of which every
kind of goodness, wisdom, and power comes into
existence and has value. In short, elements of
the most recent and most conditional origin were regarded not as evolved, but as spontaneously
generated and "things-in-themselves," and perhaps
as the cause of all things. . . . Experience teaches us that, in every case in which a man has
? ? ? 2OO THE WILL TO POWER.
elevated himself to any great extent above the average of his fellows, every high degree of power always involves a corresponding degree of freedom from Good and Evil as also from "true" and
"false," and cannot take into account what good ness dictates: the same holds good of a high
degree of wisdom--in this case goodness is just as much suppressed as truthfulness, justice, virtue,
and other popular whims in valuations. In fact, is it not obvious that every high degree of goodness
itself presupposes a certain intellectual myopia
and obtuseness? as also an inability to dis
tinguish at a great distance between true and false, useful and harmful ? --not to mention the fact that
a high degree of power in the hands of the highest goodness might lead to the most baleful conse
quences ("the suppression of evil"). In sooth it is enough to perceive with what aspirations the
"God of Love" inspires His believers: they ruin mankind for the benefit of "good men. " In practice, this same God has shown Himself to be a God of the most acute myopia, devilry, and im potence, in the face of the actual arrangement of the universe, and from this the value of His con ception may be estimated.
Knowledge and wisdom can have no value in themselves, any more than goodness can: the goal
they are striving after must be known first, for
then only can their value or worthlessness be judged--a goal might be imagined which would
make excessive wisdom a great disadvantage (if, for instance, complete deception were a prerequisite to the enhancement of life; likewise, if goodness
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF RELIGION. * 2OI
were able to paralyse and depress the main springs of the great passions). . . .
Taking our human life as it cannot denied that all "truth," "goodness," "holiness,"
and "Godliness" the Christian sense, have
hitherto shown themselves be great dangers--
danger perishing owing to an ideal which hostile to life.
245
Let any one think which all human
institutions suffer, when divine and transcend
even now mankind
? ental, higher sphere postulated
which must first
sanction these institutions By recognising their
worth this sanction alone (as the case
marriage, for instance) their natural dignity
reduced,
Nature spitefully misjudged the same
and under certain circumstances denied.
ratio as the anti-natural notion of God held in honour. "Nature" then comes to mean no more than "contemptible," "bad. "
The fatal nature belief God the reality of the highest moral qualities: through all real
systematically regarded as valueless. Thus Anti-Nature ascended the
throne. With relentless logic the last step was
reached, and this was the absolute demand deny Mature
246.
values were denied and
By pressing
and love into the foreground, Christianity by no
the doctrine disinterestedness
? ? of
of
is,
to
is
as it,
a in in
it
. in .
to
. . .
in is
is is a ofin
in
of is:
is of
be
!
a the as
? 2O2 THE WILL TO POWER.
means elevated the interests of the species above those of the individual. Its real historical effect,
its fatal effect, remains precisely the increase of
egotism, of individual egotism, to excess (to the extreme which consists in the belief in individual
immortality).
The individual was made so
important and so absolute, by means of Christian values, that he could no longer be sacrificed, despite
the fact that the species can only be maintained by human sacrifices. All "souls" became equal before God: but this is the most pernicious of all
valuations !
If one
regards equals, individuals as
the demands of the species are ignored, and a
process is initiated which ultimately leads to its
ruin. Christianity is the reverse of the principle of
selection. If the degenerate and sick man ("the
Christian") is to be of the same value as the
healthy man ("the pagan"), or if he is even to be
valued higher than the latter, as Pascal's view of
health and sickness would have us value him, the
natural course of evolution is thwarted and the
unnatural becomes law. . . . In practice this general love of mankind is nothing more than deliberately favouring all the suffering, the botched,
and the degenerate: it is this love that has reduced and weakened the power, responsibility, and lofty duty of sacrificing men. According to the scheme
of Christian values, all that remained was the
alternative of self-sacrifice, but this vestige of human sacrifice, which Christianity conceded and even recommended, has no meaning when regarded in the light of rearing a whole species. The pro
sperity of the species is by no means affected by
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
2O3
the sacrifice of one individual (whether in the
monastic and ascetic manner, or by means of crosses, stakes, and scaffolds, as the "martyrs" of error).
What the species requires is the suppression of the physiologically botched, the weak and the degenerate: but it was precisely to these people that Christianity appealed as a preservative force, it simply strengthened that natural and very strong
instinct of all the weak which bids them protect, maintain, and mutually support each other. What
is Christian "virtue" and "love of men," if not
precisely
survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting
of selection ? What is Christian altruism, if it is
not the mob-egotism of the weak which divines
that, if everybody looks after everybody else,
every individual will be preserved for a longer period of time? . . . He who does not consider
this attitude of mind as immoral, as a crime against life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also
shares their instincts. . . . Genuine love of man
kind exacts sacrifice for the good of the species --it is hard, full of self-control, because it needs
pseudo-humanity which is called Christianity, would fain establish
this mutual assistance with a view to
? human sacrifices. And this
the rule that nobody should be sacrificed.
247.
Nothing
more promotion than systematic Nihilism in action. --As I understand the phenomena of Christianity
and pessimism, this is what they say: "We are
could be more useful and deserves
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
2O4
ripe for nonentity, for us it is reasonable not to be. " This hint from "reason" in this case, is simply the voice of selective Nature.
On the other hand, what deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is the ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like Christianity,--or rather like the Church,--which, instead of recommending death and self-destruction, actually protects all the botched and bungled, and encourages them to propagate their kind.
Problem: with what kind of means could one
lead up to a severe form of really contagious
Nihilism--a Nihilism which would teach and prac
tise voluntary death with scientific conscientious
ness (and not the feeble continuation of a vegetative
sort of life with false hopes of a life after death)? Christianity cannot be sufficiently condemned
for having depreciated the value of a great cleansing
Nihilistic movement (like the one which was pro bably in the process of formation), by its teaching
of the immortality of the private individual, as
also by the hopes of resurrection which it held out: that is to say, by dissuading people from perform
ing the deed of Nihilism which is suicide. . . . In the latter's place it puts lingering suicide, and
gradually a puny, meagre, but durable life; gradu ally a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre life, etC.
248.
Christian moral quackery. --Pity and contempt
succeed each other at short intervals, and at the sight of them I feel as indignant as if I were in
? ? ? ? Proposition
IV. : Man converted into a weak
CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
2O5
the presence of the most despicable crime. Here error is made a duty--a virtue, misapprehension
has become a knack, the destructive instinct is
systematised under the name of "redemption";
here every operation becomes a wound, an amputa
tion of those very organs whose energy would be
the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the
best of cases no cure is effected; all that is done
is to exchange one set of evil symptoms for another set. . . . And this pernicious nonsense, this system
atised profanation and castration of life, passes for holy and sacred; to be in its service, to be an
instrument of this art of healing--that is to say, to be a priest, is to be rendered distinguished,
reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have
been the Author of this supreme art of healing; redemption is only possible as a revelation, as an
act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the Creator Himself.
Proposition I. : Spiritual healthiness is regarded as morbid, and creates suspicion. . . .
Proposition II. : The prerequisites of a strong, exuberant life--strong desires and passions--are reckoned as objections against strong and ex uberant life.
Proposition III. : Everything which threatens
danger to man, and which can overcome and ruin him, is evil, must be rejected--and should be torn root and branch from his soul.
? creature, inoffensive to himself and others, crushed
by humilit-y and modesty, and conscious of his
weakness, fact, "sinner,"
in the --this is the
? ? ? 2O6 THE WILL TO POWER.
desirable type, and one which one can Produce by means of a little spiritual surgery. . . .
249.
What is it I protest against? That people should regard this paltry and peaceful mediocrity, this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing of
the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength, as something high, or possibly as the standard of all things.
Bacon of Verulam says: Infimarum virtutum apud vulgus laus est, mediarum admiratio, supre
marum sensus nullus. Christianity as a religion, however, belongs to the vulgus: it has no feeling for the highest kind of virtus.
25O.
Let us see what the "genuine Christian " does with all the things which his instincts forbid:--he covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion and mud-
in short, all culture: his object is to deprive the latter of its clean conscience.
25 I.
The attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto,
have been not only timid but false. So long as
Christian morality was not felt to be a capital crime against Life, apologists had good time.
The question concerning the mere "truth"
? ? ? of
its
a
? CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
207
Christianity--whether in regard to the existence of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin,
not to speak of its astronomy and natural science --is quite beside the point so long as no inquiry
is made into the value ofChristian morality. Are
Christian morals worth anything, or are they a profanation and an outrage, despite all the arts of
holiness and seduction with which they are en
forced? The question concerning the truth of the religion may be met by all sorts of subterfuges;
and the most fervent believers can, in the end, avail themselves of the logic used by their opponents, in order to create a right for their side to assert that certain things are irrefutable--that is to say, they transcend the means employed to refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is
? called "Kantian Criticism").
252.
-
Christianity should never be forgiven for having
precisely what should be combated in Christianity, namely,
ruined such men as Pascal. This is
that it has the will to break the spirit of the
strongest and noblest natures. One should take no rest until this thing is utterly destroyed:--the
ideal of mankind which Christianity advances, the demands it makes upon men, and its "Nay" and
"Yea" relative to humanity. The whole of the remaining absurdities, that is to say, Christian
fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and
principles, and Christian theology, do not concern us; they might be a thousand times more absurd
? ? ? 2O8 THE WILL TO POWER.
and we should not raise a finger to destroy them. But what we do stand up against, is that ideal which, thanks to its morbid beauty and feminine seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and slanderous eloquence, appeals
to all the cowardices and
vanities of wearied souls,--and the strongest have
their moments of fatigue,--as though all that which seems most useful and desirable at such
moments--that is to say, confidence, artlessness, modesty, patience, love of one's like, resignation, submission to God, and a sort of self-surrender-- were useful and desirable per se; as though the puny, modest abortion which in these creatures takes the place of a soul, this virtuous, mediocre
animal and sheep of the flock--which deigns to
call itself man, were not only to take precedence of the stronger, more evil, more passionate, more
defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who by virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a
hundred times more dangers than the former, but were actually to stand as an ideal for man in general, as a goal, a measure--the highest de sideratum. The creation of this ideal was the
most appalling temptation that had ever been put in the way of mankind; for, with the stronger
and more successful exceptions, the lucky cases among men, which the will power and growth leads the whole species "man" one step farther forward, this type was threatened with disaster. By means the values this ideal, the growth such higher men would be checked
the root. For these men, owing their superior demands and duties, readily accept
? ? ? at
of
in
of to
to
it,
of
a to
? CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
2O9
more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is a case of an increase in the costs of the under
taking coinciding with a greater chance of failure).
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their
spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance
into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows
how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect
them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves--
until the strong perish through their excessive
self-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome
way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most famous example,
? VOL. O
? ? I. e.
? II.
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
I. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.
2. 53.
THIS is an attempt at investigating morality
without being affected by charm, and not without some mistrust regard the beguiling
? beauty
which we can admire, which keeping with
its attitudes and looks. world
our capacity for worship--which demonstrating itself--in small things
this the Christian standpoint which to us all.
continually large:
common
But owing an increase our astuteness,
our mistrust, and our scientific spirit (also through more developed instinct for truth, which again due Christian influence), this interpre
tation has grown ever less and less tenable for us. The craftiest subterfuges: Kantian criticism.
The intellect not only denies itself every right interpret things that way, but also reject the interpretation once has been made. People
are satisfied with greater demand upon their credulity and faith, with renunciation all
? ? a
of
a
it
in
its
in
of
to
is or in
to
in
is
is a
to
in
to
in
is
in is
to A
of
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 2II
right to reason concerning the proof of their creed, with an intangible and superior "Ideal" (God) as a stop-gap.
The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece of romanticism and reaction, and
at the same time a symptom of the historical
sense of a new power: "Spirit" itself is the "self revealing and self-realising ideal": we believe
that in the "process of development" an ever
greater proportion of this ideal is being mani
fested--thus the ideal is being realised, faith is
vested in the future, into which all its noble
needs are projected, and in which they are being worshipped.
? In short:--
*
(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be
demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning
behind the whole of the epistemological move ment);
(2) God may be demonstrated, but as some thing evolving, and we are part of our
pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed
meaning behind the historical movement).
should be observed that criticism never
levelled the ideal itself, but only the
problem which gives rise
cerning the ideal--that yet been realised, why
small things great.
controversy con say, why has not
not demonstrable
makes all the difference: whether man recognises this state distress such owing
? ? It
It
in or of
as
a to
it
at is
it, as
>k
is
in
as
it to to is a
at
? 212 THE WILL TO POWER.
a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether
it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by straining his thinking powers
and his historical imagination to the utmost. Away from the religious and philosophical
points of view we find the same phenomena.
Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises the origin of moral valuations, though it believes
in them just as much as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could remain
when the sanctioning deity is no longer present :
The belief in a "Beyond" is absolutely necessary,
if the faith in morality is to be maintained. )
Fundamental problem : whence comes this
almighty power of Faith? Whence this faith in morality ?
(It is betrayed by the fact that even the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. "Self-preser
vation": the Darwinian prospect of a reconcilia tion of the altruistic and egotistic principles. )
254.
An inquiry into the origin of our moral
valuation does diminish its prestige, and pre
pares the way critical attitude and spirit towards
? valuations and tables of law has
nothing to do with the criticism of them, though people persist in believing it has; the two matters quite apart, notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge the pudenda origo of
absolutely
? ? it.
lie
to a
of
a
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
213
What is the actual worth of our valuations and
tables of moral laws? What is the outcome of their dominion ? For whom ? In relation to what? --
answer: for Life. But what is Life A new and
more definite concept of what "Life" becomes
necessary here. My formula this concept is: Life Will to Power.
the meaning the very act of valuing
What
Does world,
historical movement. ) short: what
origin Or had no human "origin"? --
Answer: moral valuations are sort
ation, they constitute method
Interpretation itself symptom definite
does who lived
point
back another, metaphysical point down? (As Kant believed, period which preceded the great
? physiological conditions,
spiritual level ruling judgments. What that interprets 3-Our passions.
255.
upon physio logical conditions: the principal organic functions, more particularly, should considered necessary
and good. All virtues are really refined passions and elevated physiological conditions.
Pity and philanthropy may regarded the
All virtues should looked
developments
development
sexual relations,--justice the the passion for revenge,--virtue resistance, the will power
the love
honour an acknowledgment an equal,
an equally powerful, force.
explana interpreting.
also definite
? ? of
be to
or of
as as
is it
is its
as
as
of of of
in
in
a it
be
is a as a
In a
to of
of
be
of
it
as
of of
a of of
is,
or it
is
is
f
? 2I4
THE WILL TO POWER.
256.
Under "Morality" I understand a system of valuations which is in relation with the conditions
of a creature's life.
257.
Formerly it was said of every form of morality,
"Ye shall know them by their fruits. " I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and from
it I learn the Soil out of which it grew. "
258.
I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of preservation and growth, are betrayed--a mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for instance, youth or decay, etc. ).
Applying this principle to the morality of
Christian Europe more particularly, we find that
our moral values are signs of decline, of a dis belief in Life, and of a preparation for pes simism.
My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of
Phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality.
What is the meaning of the fact that we have
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
2I5
imagined
of paramount importance: behind all other valuations those moral valuations stand com mandingly. Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then measure ? And
then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc. ? ? ?
259.
A point of view: in all valuations there is a
definite purpose: the preservation of an individ ual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a
belief, or a culture. --Thanks to the fact that people forget that all valuing has a purpose, one
and the same man may swarm with a host of contradictory valuations, and therefore with a host
of contradictory impulses. This is the expression
of disease in man as opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer certain definite purposes.
This creature full of contradictions, however,
has in his being a grand method of acquiring
knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates
himself to Justice--that is to say, to the ascertain
ing of principles beyond the valuations good and evil. The wisest man would thus be the richest in
contradictions, he would also be gifted with mental antennae wherewith he could understand
all kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all the chords in his being would ring in splendid unison--the rarest
of accidents even in us! A sort of movement.
a contradiction in existence? This is
? planetary
? ? ? 216 THE WILL TO POWER.
26O.
"To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm, "pleasant or painful," their basis?
But in an incalculable number of cases we
first of make with valuation.
thing painful, by investing
The compass moral valuations: they play part almost every mental impression. To
the world coloured by them.
We have imagined the purpose and value
? all things: owing this we possess an enormous fund latent power: but the study compara tive values teaches us that values which were actually opposed
each other have been held high esteem, and that there have been many
tables laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth anything per se).
The analysis individual tables laws re vealed the fact that they were framed (often very
badly)
groups people,
the conditions of existence for limited ensure their maintenance.
Upon examining modern men, we found that
there are large number very different values hand, and that they no longer contain any
creative power--the fundamental principle: "the
condition existence" from the moral values. fluous and not nearly arbitrary matter. Chaos.
now quite divorced much more super painful. becomes an
Who creates the goal which stands above man
? ? so
It is is
of It
to
of as
of
of
in is
a
all
of
to
of to to ofa
a
of
of
in ofusait
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
Formerly morality was a preservative measure: but nobody wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to
preserve. Thus we are reduced to an experi mental morality, each must postulate a goal for
kind and above the individual *
himself.
- 26 I.
What is the criterion of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation,
etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must
be studied and observed, and, in each case, the
criterion must be discovered, as also the thing
it expresses: a belief such as: "This particular
attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of our existence. " Immoral means "that
which brings about ruin. " Now all societies in
which these principles were discovered have met
with their ruin: a few of these principles have
been used and used again, because every newly established community required them; this was
the case, for instance, with "Thou shalt not steal. "
In ages when people could not be expected to
show any marked social instinct (as, for instance,
in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was,
religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of "spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance,
towards "the greatest happiness. " For even the
philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for their Tro? Ats.
262.
The necessity of false values. --A judgment may be refuted when it is shown that it was
217
? ? ? ? 218 THE WILL TO POWER.
conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than they can alter astig matism in a man's eyes.
The need of their existence must be understood :
they are the result of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.
263.
To see and reveal the problem of morality seems to me to be the new task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by moral philosophies heretofore.
264.
How false and deceptive men have always
been concerning the fundamental facts of their
inner world ! Here to have no eye; here to
hold one's tongue, and here to open one's mouth.
265.
There seems to be no knowledge or conscious
ness of the many revolutions that have taken
place in moral judgments, and of the number
of times that "evil" has really and seriously
been christened "good" and vice versa? , I myself
pointed to one of these transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte. " * Even conscience
* The morality of custom.
? ? ? ? \
A. Morality as the work of Immorality.
I. In order that moral values may attain to supremacy, a host of immoral forces and
passions must assist them.
2. The establishment of moral values is the
work of immoral passions and considera tions.
B. Morality as the work of error.
C. Morality gradually contradicts itself.
Requital--Truthfulness, Doubt, e? roxi, Judging. --The "Immorality" of belief in morality.
The steps:-- -
1. Absolute dominion of morality: bio logical phenomena measured and judged
. . . --> A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. A 219
-" a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.
has changed its sphere: formerly there was
266.
? according
The attempt identify Life with morality
(symptom awakened scepticism: mor |ality must no longer be regarded
the opposite Life); many means are
its values.
sought--even
The opposition of Life and Morality.
Morality condemned and sentenced by Life.
D. To what extent was morality dangerous Life?
(a) depreciated the joy living and the gratitude felt towards Life, etc.
transcendental one.
? ? It
of
to
as
i 3.
i
of to to a of
2.
all
? 22O
THE WILL TO POWER.
(b) It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.
(c) It checked the knowledge of Life.
(d) It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.
E. Contra-account: the usefulness of morality to Life.
(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it may be a pro
cess of uniting dispersed members: it
is useful as an agent in the production of the man who is a "tool. "
(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger threatening
man from the direction of his passions:
it is useful to "mediocre people. "
(3) Morality may be a preservative measure
resisting the life-poisoning influences of
profound sorrow and bitterness: it is
useful to the "sufferers. "
(4) Morality may be a preservative measure
opposed to the terrible outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "lowly. "
267.
It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and "wrong" in a definite,
narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one''; *
* "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand. "
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 22I
--that is to say, to do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit of which a community exists. --Let us not think meanly of what a few thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds,
268.
Two types of morality must not be confounded:
the morality with which the instinct that has
remained healthy defends itself from incipient decadence, and the other morality by means of
which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.
The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyran
nical (Stoicism itself was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the
other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it
has the women and "beautiful feelings" on its
side (Primitive Christianity was an example of this morality).
269.
I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a phenomenon--also as a riddle. Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like
riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question: why should my neighbour's
welfare be of greater value to me than my own P and why is it that my neighbour himself should value his welfare differently from the way in which
? ? ? ? 222 THE WILL TO POWER.
I value it--that is to say, why should precisely
my welfare be paramount in his mind? What
is the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by philosophers them selves?
The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature,
higher than the one he performs for himself, and that the same fellow-creature should do so too
(that only those acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to the neighbour
reasons--namely, as the result of the social instinct which rests
and for his welfare) has its
? upon the valuation, that single individuals are of little importance although collectively their
importance is very great. This, of course, pre supposes that they constitute a community with
one feeling and one conscience pervading the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for
keeping one's eyes in a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a view of one's self impossible.
My idea: goals are wanting, and these must be individuals. We see the general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool. Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets-- is not every one he sees a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?
27O.
How is it possible that a man can respect himself only in regard to moral values, that he
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
subordinates and despises everything in favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation,
etc. ? as, for instance, Henri Fre?
I99
? It is the
height psychological falsity
of (** on the
part of man to imagine a being according to his
own petty standard, who is a beginning, a "thing
in-itself," and who appears to him good, wise,
mighty, and precious; for thus he suppresses in
thought all the causality by means of which every
kind of goodness, wisdom, and power comes into
existence and has value. In short, elements of
the most recent and most conditional origin were regarded not as evolved, but as spontaneously
generated and "things-in-themselves," and perhaps
as the cause of all things. . . . Experience teaches us that, in every case in which a man has
? ? ? 2OO THE WILL TO POWER.
elevated himself to any great extent above the average of his fellows, every high degree of power always involves a corresponding degree of freedom from Good and Evil as also from "true" and
"false," and cannot take into account what good ness dictates: the same holds good of a high
degree of wisdom--in this case goodness is just as much suppressed as truthfulness, justice, virtue,
and other popular whims in valuations. In fact, is it not obvious that every high degree of goodness
itself presupposes a certain intellectual myopia
and obtuseness? as also an inability to dis
tinguish at a great distance between true and false, useful and harmful ? --not to mention the fact that
a high degree of power in the hands of the highest goodness might lead to the most baleful conse
quences ("the suppression of evil"). In sooth it is enough to perceive with what aspirations the
"God of Love" inspires His believers: they ruin mankind for the benefit of "good men. " In practice, this same God has shown Himself to be a God of the most acute myopia, devilry, and im potence, in the face of the actual arrangement of the universe, and from this the value of His con ception may be estimated.
Knowledge and wisdom can have no value in themselves, any more than goodness can: the goal
they are striving after must be known first, for
then only can their value or worthlessness be judged--a goal might be imagined which would
make excessive wisdom a great disadvantage (if, for instance, complete deception were a prerequisite to the enhancement of life; likewise, if goodness
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF RELIGION. * 2OI
were able to paralyse and depress the main springs of the great passions). . . .
Taking our human life as it cannot denied that all "truth," "goodness," "holiness,"
and "Godliness" the Christian sense, have
hitherto shown themselves be great dangers--
danger perishing owing to an ideal which hostile to life.
245
Let any one think which all human
institutions suffer, when divine and transcend
even now mankind
? ental, higher sphere postulated
which must first
sanction these institutions By recognising their
worth this sanction alone (as the case
marriage, for instance) their natural dignity
reduced,
Nature spitefully misjudged the same
and under certain circumstances denied.
ratio as the anti-natural notion of God held in honour. "Nature" then comes to mean no more than "contemptible," "bad. "
The fatal nature belief God the reality of the highest moral qualities: through all real
systematically regarded as valueless. Thus Anti-Nature ascended the
throne. With relentless logic the last step was
reached, and this was the absolute demand deny Mature
246.
values were denied and
By pressing
and love into the foreground, Christianity by no
the doctrine disinterestedness
? ? of
of
is,
to
is
as it,
a in in
it
. in .
to
. . .
in is
is is a ofin
in
of is:
is of
be
!
a the as
? 2O2 THE WILL TO POWER.
means elevated the interests of the species above those of the individual. Its real historical effect,
its fatal effect, remains precisely the increase of
egotism, of individual egotism, to excess (to the extreme which consists in the belief in individual
immortality).
The individual was made so
important and so absolute, by means of Christian values, that he could no longer be sacrificed, despite
the fact that the species can only be maintained by human sacrifices. All "souls" became equal before God: but this is the most pernicious of all
valuations !
If one
regards equals, individuals as
the demands of the species are ignored, and a
process is initiated which ultimately leads to its
ruin. Christianity is the reverse of the principle of
selection. If the degenerate and sick man ("the
Christian") is to be of the same value as the
healthy man ("the pagan"), or if he is even to be
valued higher than the latter, as Pascal's view of
health and sickness would have us value him, the
natural course of evolution is thwarted and the
unnatural becomes law. . . . In practice this general love of mankind is nothing more than deliberately favouring all the suffering, the botched,
and the degenerate: it is this love that has reduced and weakened the power, responsibility, and lofty duty of sacrificing men. According to the scheme
of Christian values, all that remained was the
alternative of self-sacrifice, but this vestige of human sacrifice, which Christianity conceded and even recommended, has no meaning when regarded in the light of rearing a whole species. The pro
sperity of the species is by no means affected by
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
2O3
the sacrifice of one individual (whether in the
monastic and ascetic manner, or by means of crosses, stakes, and scaffolds, as the "martyrs" of error).
What the species requires is the suppression of the physiologically botched, the weak and the degenerate: but it was precisely to these people that Christianity appealed as a preservative force, it simply strengthened that natural and very strong
instinct of all the weak which bids them protect, maintain, and mutually support each other. What
is Christian "virtue" and "love of men," if not
precisely
survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting
of selection ? What is Christian altruism, if it is
not the mob-egotism of the weak which divines
that, if everybody looks after everybody else,
every individual will be preserved for a longer period of time? . . . He who does not consider
this attitude of mind as immoral, as a crime against life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also
shares their instincts. . . . Genuine love of man
kind exacts sacrifice for the good of the species --it is hard, full of self-control, because it needs
pseudo-humanity which is called Christianity, would fain establish
this mutual assistance with a view to
? human sacrifices. And this
the rule that nobody should be sacrificed.
247.
Nothing
more promotion than systematic Nihilism in action. --As I understand the phenomena of Christianity
and pessimism, this is what they say: "We are
could be more useful and deserves
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
2O4
ripe for nonentity, for us it is reasonable not to be. " This hint from "reason" in this case, is simply the voice of selective Nature.
On the other hand, what deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is the ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like Christianity,--or rather like the Church,--which, instead of recommending death and self-destruction, actually protects all the botched and bungled, and encourages them to propagate their kind.
Problem: with what kind of means could one
lead up to a severe form of really contagious
Nihilism--a Nihilism which would teach and prac
tise voluntary death with scientific conscientious
ness (and not the feeble continuation of a vegetative
sort of life with false hopes of a life after death)? Christianity cannot be sufficiently condemned
for having depreciated the value of a great cleansing
Nihilistic movement (like the one which was pro bably in the process of formation), by its teaching
of the immortality of the private individual, as
also by the hopes of resurrection which it held out: that is to say, by dissuading people from perform
ing the deed of Nihilism which is suicide. . . . In the latter's place it puts lingering suicide, and
gradually a puny, meagre, but durable life; gradu ally a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre life, etC.
248.
Christian moral quackery. --Pity and contempt
succeed each other at short intervals, and at the sight of them I feel as indignant as if I were in
? ? ? ? Proposition
IV. : Man converted into a weak
CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
2O5
the presence of the most despicable crime. Here error is made a duty--a virtue, misapprehension
has become a knack, the destructive instinct is
systematised under the name of "redemption";
here every operation becomes a wound, an amputa
tion of those very organs whose energy would be
the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the
best of cases no cure is effected; all that is done
is to exchange one set of evil symptoms for another set. . . . And this pernicious nonsense, this system
atised profanation and castration of life, passes for holy and sacred; to be in its service, to be an
instrument of this art of healing--that is to say, to be a priest, is to be rendered distinguished,
reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have
been the Author of this supreme art of healing; redemption is only possible as a revelation, as an
act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the Creator Himself.
Proposition I. : Spiritual healthiness is regarded as morbid, and creates suspicion. . . .
Proposition II. : The prerequisites of a strong, exuberant life--strong desires and passions--are reckoned as objections against strong and ex uberant life.
Proposition III. : Everything which threatens
danger to man, and which can overcome and ruin him, is evil, must be rejected--and should be torn root and branch from his soul.
? creature, inoffensive to himself and others, crushed
by humilit-y and modesty, and conscious of his
weakness, fact, "sinner,"
in the --this is the
? ? ? 2O6 THE WILL TO POWER.
desirable type, and one which one can Produce by means of a little spiritual surgery. . . .
249.
What is it I protest against? That people should regard this paltry and peaceful mediocrity, this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing of
the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength, as something high, or possibly as the standard of all things.
Bacon of Verulam says: Infimarum virtutum apud vulgus laus est, mediarum admiratio, supre
marum sensus nullus. Christianity as a religion, however, belongs to the vulgus: it has no feeling for the highest kind of virtus.
25O.
Let us see what the "genuine Christian " does with all the things which his instincts forbid:--he covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion and mud-
in short, all culture: his object is to deprive the latter of its clean conscience.
25 I.
The attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto,
have been not only timid but false. So long as
Christian morality was not felt to be a capital crime against Life, apologists had good time.
The question concerning the mere "truth"
? ? ? of
its
a
? CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
207
Christianity--whether in regard to the existence of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin,
not to speak of its astronomy and natural science --is quite beside the point so long as no inquiry
is made into the value ofChristian morality. Are
Christian morals worth anything, or are they a profanation and an outrage, despite all the arts of
holiness and seduction with which they are en
forced? The question concerning the truth of the religion may be met by all sorts of subterfuges;
and the most fervent believers can, in the end, avail themselves of the logic used by their opponents, in order to create a right for their side to assert that certain things are irrefutable--that is to say, they transcend the means employed to refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is
? called "Kantian Criticism").
252.
-
Christianity should never be forgiven for having
precisely what should be combated in Christianity, namely,
ruined such men as Pascal. This is
that it has the will to break the spirit of the
strongest and noblest natures. One should take no rest until this thing is utterly destroyed:--the
ideal of mankind which Christianity advances, the demands it makes upon men, and its "Nay" and
"Yea" relative to humanity. The whole of the remaining absurdities, that is to say, Christian
fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and
principles, and Christian theology, do not concern us; they might be a thousand times more absurd
? ? ? 2O8 THE WILL TO POWER.
and we should not raise a finger to destroy them. But what we do stand up against, is that ideal which, thanks to its morbid beauty and feminine seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and slanderous eloquence, appeals
to all the cowardices and
vanities of wearied souls,--and the strongest have
their moments of fatigue,--as though all that which seems most useful and desirable at such
moments--that is to say, confidence, artlessness, modesty, patience, love of one's like, resignation, submission to God, and a sort of self-surrender-- were useful and desirable per se; as though the puny, modest abortion which in these creatures takes the place of a soul, this virtuous, mediocre
animal and sheep of the flock--which deigns to
call itself man, were not only to take precedence of the stronger, more evil, more passionate, more
defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who by virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a
hundred times more dangers than the former, but were actually to stand as an ideal for man in general, as a goal, a measure--the highest de sideratum. The creation of this ideal was the
most appalling temptation that had ever been put in the way of mankind; for, with the stronger
and more successful exceptions, the lucky cases among men, which the will power and growth leads the whole species "man" one step farther forward, this type was threatened with disaster. By means the values this ideal, the growth such higher men would be checked
the root. For these men, owing their superior demands and duties, readily accept
? ? ? at
of
in
of to
to
it,
of
a to
? CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
2O9
more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is a case of an increase in the costs of the under
taking coinciding with a greater chance of failure).
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their
spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance
into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows
how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect
them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves--
until the strong perish through their excessive
self-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome
way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most famous example,
? VOL. O
? ? I. e.
? II.
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
I. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.
2. 53.
THIS is an attempt at investigating morality
without being affected by charm, and not without some mistrust regard the beguiling
? beauty
which we can admire, which keeping with
its attitudes and looks. world
our capacity for worship--which demonstrating itself--in small things
this the Christian standpoint which to us all.
continually large:
common
But owing an increase our astuteness,
our mistrust, and our scientific spirit (also through more developed instinct for truth, which again due Christian influence), this interpre
tation has grown ever less and less tenable for us. The craftiest subterfuges: Kantian criticism.
The intellect not only denies itself every right interpret things that way, but also reject the interpretation once has been made. People
are satisfied with greater demand upon their credulity and faith, with renunciation all
? ? a
of
a
it
in
its
in
of
to
is or in
to
in
is
is a
to
in
to
in
is
in is
to A
of
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 2II
right to reason concerning the proof of their creed, with an intangible and superior "Ideal" (God) as a stop-gap.
The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece of romanticism and reaction, and
at the same time a symptom of the historical
sense of a new power: "Spirit" itself is the "self revealing and self-realising ideal": we believe
that in the "process of development" an ever
greater proportion of this ideal is being mani
fested--thus the ideal is being realised, faith is
vested in the future, into which all its noble
needs are projected, and in which they are being worshipped.
? In short:--
*
(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be
demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning
behind the whole of the epistemological move ment);
(2) God may be demonstrated, but as some thing evolving, and we are part of our
pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed
meaning behind the historical movement).
should be observed that criticism never
levelled the ideal itself, but only the
problem which gives rise
cerning the ideal--that yet been realised, why
small things great.
controversy con say, why has not
not demonstrable
makes all the difference: whether man recognises this state distress such owing
? ? It
It
in or of
as
a to
it
at is
it, as
>k
is
in
as
it to to is a
at
? 212 THE WILL TO POWER.
a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether
it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by straining his thinking powers
and his historical imagination to the utmost. Away from the religious and philosophical
points of view we find the same phenomena.
Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises the origin of moral valuations, though it believes
in them just as much as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could remain
when the sanctioning deity is no longer present :
The belief in a "Beyond" is absolutely necessary,
if the faith in morality is to be maintained. )
Fundamental problem : whence comes this
almighty power of Faith? Whence this faith in morality ?
(It is betrayed by the fact that even the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. "Self-preser
vation": the Darwinian prospect of a reconcilia tion of the altruistic and egotistic principles. )
254.
An inquiry into the origin of our moral
valuation does diminish its prestige, and pre
pares the way critical attitude and spirit towards
? valuations and tables of law has
nothing to do with the criticism of them, though people persist in believing it has; the two matters quite apart, notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge the pudenda origo of
absolutely
? ? it.
lie
to a
of
a
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
213
What is the actual worth of our valuations and
tables of moral laws? What is the outcome of their dominion ? For whom ? In relation to what? --
answer: for Life. But what is Life A new and
more definite concept of what "Life" becomes
necessary here. My formula this concept is: Life Will to Power.
the meaning the very act of valuing
What
Does world,
historical movement. ) short: what
origin Or had no human "origin"? --
Answer: moral valuations are sort
ation, they constitute method
Interpretation itself symptom definite
does who lived
point
back another, metaphysical point down? (As Kant believed, period which preceded the great
? physiological conditions,
spiritual level ruling judgments. What that interprets 3-Our passions.
255.
upon physio logical conditions: the principal organic functions, more particularly, should considered necessary
and good. All virtues are really refined passions and elevated physiological conditions.
Pity and philanthropy may regarded the
All virtues should looked
developments
development
sexual relations,--justice the the passion for revenge,--virtue resistance, the will power
the love
honour an acknowledgment an equal,
an equally powerful, force.
explana interpreting.
also definite
? ? of
be to
or of
as as
is it
is its
as
as
of of of
in
in
a it
be
is a as a
In a
to of
of
be
of
it
as
of of
a of of
is,
or it
is
is
f
? 2I4
THE WILL TO POWER.
256.
Under "Morality" I understand a system of valuations which is in relation with the conditions
of a creature's life.
257.
Formerly it was said of every form of morality,
"Ye shall know them by their fruits. " I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and from
it I learn the Soil out of which it grew. "
258.
I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of preservation and growth, are betrayed--a mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for instance, youth or decay, etc. ).
Applying this principle to the morality of
Christian Europe more particularly, we find that
our moral values are signs of decline, of a dis belief in Life, and of a preparation for pes simism.
My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of
Phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality.
What is the meaning of the fact that we have
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
2I5
imagined
of paramount importance: behind all other valuations those moral valuations stand com mandingly. Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then measure ? And
then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc. ? ? ?
259.
A point of view: in all valuations there is a
definite purpose: the preservation of an individ ual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a
belief, or a culture. --Thanks to the fact that people forget that all valuing has a purpose, one
and the same man may swarm with a host of contradictory valuations, and therefore with a host
of contradictory impulses. This is the expression
of disease in man as opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer certain definite purposes.
This creature full of contradictions, however,
has in his being a grand method of acquiring
knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates
himself to Justice--that is to say, to the ascertain
ing of principles beyond the valuations good and evil. The wisest man would thus be the richest in
contradictions, he would also be gifted with mental antennae wherewith he could understand
all kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all the chords in his being would ring in splendid unison--the rarest
of accidents even in us! A sort of movement.
a contradiction in existence? This is
? planetary
? ? ? 216 THE WILL TO POWER.
26O.
"To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm, "pleasant or painful," their basis?
But in an incalculable number of cases we
first of make with valuation.
thing painful, by investing
The compass moral valuations: they play part almost every mental impression. To
the world coloured by them.
We have imagined the purpose and value
? all things: owing this we possess an enormous fund latent power: but the study compara tive values teaches us that values which were actually opposed
each other have been held high esteem, and that there have been many
tables laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth anything per se).
The analysis individual tables laws re vealed the fact that they were framed (often very
badly)
groups people,
the conditions of existence for limited ensure their maintenance.
Upon examining modern men, we found that
there are large number very different values hand, and that they no longer contain any
creative power--the fundamental principle: "the
condition existence" from the moral values. fluous and not nearly arbitrary matter. Chaos.
now quite divorced much more super painful. becomes an
Who creates the goal which stands above man
? ? so
It is is
of It
to
of as
of
of
in is
a
all
of
to
of to to ofa
a
of
of
in ofusait
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
Formerly morality was a preservative measure: but nobody wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to
preserve. Thus we are reduced to an experi mental morality, each must postulate a goal for
kind and above the individual *
himself.
- 26 I.
What is the criterion of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation,
etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must
be studied and observed, and, in each case, the
criterion must be discovered, as also the thing
it expresses: a belief such as: "This particular
attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of our existence. " Immoral means "that
which brings about ruin. " Now all societies in
which these principles were discovered have met
with their ruin: a few of these principles have
been used and used again, because every newly established community required them; this was
the case, for instance, with "Thou shalt not steal. "
In ages when people could not be expected to
show any marked social instinct (as, for instance,
in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was,
religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of "spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance,
towards "the greatest happiness. " For even the
philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for their Tro? Ats.
262.
The necessity of false values. --A judgment may be refuted when it is shown that it was
217
? ? ? ? 218 THE WILL TO POWER.
conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than they can alter astig matism in a man's eyes.
The need of their existence must be understood :
they are the result of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.
263.
To see and reveal the problem of morality seems to me to be the new task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by moral philosophies heretofore.
264.
How false and deceptive men have always
been concerning the fundamental facts of their
inner world ! Here to have no eye; here to
hold one's tongue, and here to open one's mouth.
265.
There seems to be no knowledge or conscious
ness of the many revolutions that have taken
place in moral judgments, and of the number
of times that "evil" has really and seriously
been christened "good" and vice versa? , I myself
pointed to one of these transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte. " * Even conscience
* The morality of custom.
? ? ? ? \
A. Morality as the work of Immorality.
I. In order that moral values may attain to supremacy, a host of immoral forces and
passions must assist them.
2. The establishment of moral values is the
work of immoral passions and considera tions.
B. Morality as the work of error.
C. Morality gradually contradicts itself.
Requital--Truthfulness, Doubt, e? roxi, Judging. --The "Immorality" of belief in morality.
The steps:-- -
1. Absolute dominion of morality: bio logical phenomena measured and judged
. . . --> A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. A 219
-" a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.
has changed its sphere: formerly there was
266.
? according
The attempt identify Life with morality
(symptom awakened scepticism: mor |ality must no longer be regarded
the opposite Life); many means are
its values.
sought--even
The opposition of Life and Morality.
Morality condemned and sentenced by Life.
D. To what extent was morality dangerous Life?
(a) depreciated the joy living and the gratitude felt towards Life, etc.
transcendental one.
? ? It
of
to
as
i 3.
i
of to to a of
2.
all
? 22O
THE WILL TO POWER.
(b) It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.
(c) It checked the knowledge of Life.
(d) It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.
E. Contra-account: the usefulness of morality to Life.
(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it may be a pro
cess of uniting dispersed members: it
is useful as an agent in the production of the man who is a "tool. "
(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger threatening
man from the direction of his passions:
it is useful to "mediocre people. "
(3) Morality may be a preservative measure
resisting the life-poisoning influences of
profound sorrow and bitterness: it is
useful to the "sufferers. "
(4) Morality may be a preservative measure
opposed to the terrible outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "lowly. "
267.
It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and "wrong" in a definite,
narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one''; *
* "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand. "
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 22I
--that is to say, to do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit of which a community exists. --Let us not think meanly of what a few thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds,
268.
Two types of morality must not be confounded:
the morality with which the instinct that has
remained healthy defends itself from incipient decadence, and the other morality by means of
which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.
The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyran
nical (Stoicism itself was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the
other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it
has the women and "beautiful feelings" on its
side (Primitive Christianity was an example of this morality).
269.
I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a phenomenon--also as a riddle. Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like
riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question: why should my neighbour's
welfare be of greater value to me than my own P and why is it that my neighbour himself should value his welfare differently from the way in which
? ? ? ? 222 THE WILL TO POWER.
I value it--that is to say, why should precisely
my welfare be paramount in his mind? What
is the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by philosophers them selves?
The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature,
higher than the one he performs for himself, and that the same fellow-creature should do so too
(that only those acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to the neighbour
reasons--namely, as the result of the social instinct which rests
and for his welfare) has its
? upon the valuation, that single individuals are of little importance although collectively their
importance is very great. This, of course, pre supposes that they constitute a community with
one feeling and one conscience pervading the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for
keeping one's eyes in a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a view of one's self impossible.
My idea: goals are wanting, and these must be individuals. We see the general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool. Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets-- is not every one he sees a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?
27O.
How is it possible that a man can respect himself only in regard to moral values, that he
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
subordinates and despises everything in favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation,
etc. ? as, for instance, Henri Fre?
