iv, 1) that
"illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality.
"illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality.
Summa Theologica
viii, 8).
But some
pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some
pleasures are contrary to one another.
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
repose in natural bodies, as stated above ([1271]Q[23], A[4]). Now one
repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary
termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low
place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul
that one pleasure is contrary to another.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because
one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be
contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one
good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the
former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water.
And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is
impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that
virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one
thing---i. e. the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened
to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable
and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose;
because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the
place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now
natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body, and
to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore
pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they
are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a
formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different.
Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in
acts and passions, as stated above ([1272]Q[23], AA[1],4;[1273] Q[30],
A[2]).
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OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?
(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?
(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
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Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first
cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),
"pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is
requisite for pleasure, as stated above ([1274]Q[31], A[1]). But the
objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves.
Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained:
since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an
operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore
operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work:
and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is
not the proper cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that
"pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1275]Q[31], A[1]), two things are
requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good,
and knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a kind
of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the
attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover,
the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every
pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.
Reply to Objection 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable
save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as
when we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or
in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes
pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the
like; which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as
possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take
great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the
natural love we have for ourselves. " Now to have such like things is
nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is
through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is
traced to some operation as its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect
of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as
possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.
Reply to Objection 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are
proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is
finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain
measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.
And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to
repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
from labor.
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Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Because, as stated above ([1276]Q[31], A[1]), the good which is
obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared
with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in
existence. Now that which is being moved towards something has it not
as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch
as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in
Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue
in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are
not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is
the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are
pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is
not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O
Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some
things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this
portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and
reconciled? " From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes
pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to
cause pleasure.
I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i. e. the
one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a
third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these
three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14
and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned,
change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: for which
reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at
another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter
but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is
united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an
agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the
fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being
consists in a certain measure; and therefore when the continued
presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode
of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of
the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because man desires to
know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be
apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is pleasant,
so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be
perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not
have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou
hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all
of which do not exist together, all would please collectively more than
they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively. "
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the
natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of
any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its
delight at once---to such a one change will afford no delight. And the
more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being
continual.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet
perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to
have something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has
something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of
pleasure; because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are
unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so
far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes
suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds
our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by
removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
Reply to Objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as
it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the
movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom,
but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of
being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the
same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become pleasant.
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Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure.
Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory
is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory and hope do
not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries.
But hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul. " Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding
good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned
as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope"; and
(Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted. "
I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in
so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present
to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i. e. according as the thing
known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality---i. e.
according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another,
either actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is greater
than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of knowledge;
and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction:
therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation
which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place
belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is pleasurable
conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect
of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object. The third
place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction
of apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which,
absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion,
present, i. e. either according to apprehension only; or according to
apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different
ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it
implies a present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure;
whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes
affliction.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For
everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a
kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner
every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since
desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a
certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that is not
implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference
to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is
of that which has already passed away.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sadness causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For
nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.
Therefore it does not cause it.
Objection 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures,
when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when
remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love.
But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as
stated above ([1277]Q[29], A[2]). Therefore sadness does not cause
pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my bread
day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure.
Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give pleasure.
I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing
actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can
cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure,
inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence of which
causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The
recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on account of the
deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as
something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been
delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason
has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31
[*Gregory, Moral. iv. ] that "oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad
things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without
feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more filled with joy and
gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril
there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the
triumph. "
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of
its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as
stated in Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause
of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of
something pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not
in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so
far as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of
pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love:
i. e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating
one and the same thing.
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Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause
of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when
conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us.
Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.
Objection 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If,
therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the
same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which
is evidently untrue.
Objection 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an
innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon
the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit
existing in us. " But the actions of others do not proceed from habits
existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents.
Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the
agents themselves.
On the contrary, It is written in the second canonical epistle of John
(verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking in
truth. "
I answer that, As stated above [1278](A[1]; Q[31], A[1]), two things
are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper
good, and the knowledge of having obtained it. Wherefore the action of
another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact
that we obtain some good through the action of another. And in this
way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us:
since it is pleasant to be benefited by another. Secondly, from the
fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good:
and for this reason men take pleasure in being praised or honored by
others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing
in themselves. And since this appreciation receives greater weight from
the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure in
being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to
praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. And as love is for
something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is
pleasant to be loved and admired by others, inasmuch as a man thus
becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving
pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the fact that another's actions, if
they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of
love, which makes a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And
on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's good as being
in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object
of pleasure: whence it is written (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth
not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth. "
Reply to Objection 1: Another's action may be conjoined to me, either
by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second
way; or by affection, as in the third way.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not
for the first two.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the actions of another do not proceed
from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something
that gives pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of
mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by
love.
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Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of
pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's proper
good, as stated above ([1279]AA[1],5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good
pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good.
Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 1) that
"illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality. " Now it is a
mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of
illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone takes
pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x,
4, it seems that doing good to others is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes.
But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such as
overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in
punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore doing
good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most
pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers. "
I answer that, Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways.
First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred on
another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by
love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take pleasure in the
good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good.
Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when a man, from doing good
to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either from God or from
man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the
principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure in
respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and
in this regard, doing good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it
arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof
he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their
children, and in their own works, as being things on which they bestow
a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual
inclination to do good, by reason of which doing good becomes
connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in
giving to others. The third principle is the motive: for instance when
a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for
whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the
principal cause of pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's
good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause
of sadness; for instance when it is excessive.
Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is
unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.
Reply to Objection 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give
pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's
own good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is
naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to
appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which
there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility of winning it,
afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, in
so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can
give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be
wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove
and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding and reproving, one
does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It
is pleasant to an angry man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself
to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous
hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted
thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying
back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be
of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is not pleasant,
except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good.
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Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure.
Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. But
"it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in
Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause
of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But
those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather
than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, those who are satiated with certain delights,
derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated with
food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated
([1280]Q[27], A[3]): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore
likeness is a cause of pleasure.
I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like
us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love, as
stated above ([1281]Q[27], A[3]). And if that which is like us does not
hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for
instance one man in respect of another, one youth in relation to
another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it
causes disgust or sadness, not as being like and one with us, but as
hurtful to that which is yet more one with us.
Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own
good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, by a kind of
excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned
by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous good or any bodily
pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's
own good: thus a potter dislikes other potters, not because they are
potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or profits,
which he seeks as his own good.
Reply to Objection 1: Since ruler and subject are in communion with one
another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is
conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding
pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they belong to
men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they
give man an idea of his own excellence. Another reason is that by
ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man,
though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is
sorrowful: because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the
sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so far as
it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures,
which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought than
intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall
state later on ([1282]Q[35], A[5]). And this explains why all animals
naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense and
movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined to seek
pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are subject,
while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong
desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: because his "body
is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed
measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and
consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary
to the proper good of man.
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Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of
something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is
a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it
were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of
Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than
to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7): since
in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the
former not; while pleasure arises from an operation which is
unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders
rather than causes pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed
to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant.
But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in
Joan. ). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the
cause of pleasure.
I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above
([1283]Q[23], A[4]): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing
loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very
increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as
it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it
was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a
cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a
desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause
either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of
understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as
it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have.
For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance things
that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which
are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul
rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one
thing with another is the proper and connatural act of the reason, as
the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more
delightful to be delivered from great danger, because it is something
wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11.
Reply to Objection 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies
ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the
cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i. e. that
the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to another
reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be. ]
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good,
and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is
more perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the
unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing
than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the
second, it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing
accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for
greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This
is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things
for the first time.
Reply to Objection 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do,
inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that
are of rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge,
from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as
they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind
is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are new," as
stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation causes more perfect
pleasure.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?
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Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the Apostle
(2 Cor. 6:11): "Our heart is enlarged. " Wherefore it is written (Ps.
118:96) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is
exceeding broad. " But pleasure is a distinct passion from love.
Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive
more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet
possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But
contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that
which we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in
regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain
to pleasure.
On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written (Is. 60:5):
"Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged. "
Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" as being derived
from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above ([1284]Q[31], A[3], ad
3).
I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude:
hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save
metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards
breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things
requisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive
power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good.
As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a
certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in
this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or expanded by
pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the
appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests
therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus
man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered
itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one
and the same thing from being attributed to different things according
to different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by
reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the
lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own
interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand
expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample
in itself so as to become more capacious.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from
the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at
the presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders
itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it,
than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end
of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast,
by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that
he may enjoy it perfectly.
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Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for
itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But
pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as
stated above ([1285]Q[23], A[4];[1286] Q[25], A[2]). Therefore the
movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure
does not cause desire.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure
is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since
desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure
regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause
desire for itself.
Objection 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But
pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this
water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in
Joan. ), water denotes pleasures of the body.
I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as
existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst,
or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a
craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding
distaste.
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause
thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take
thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed:
because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something
actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is
not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of the thing
possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing
possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a
simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it
successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to
possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part of
a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says
(Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst
for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of
this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of the
table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses
a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly,
but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this life, a
faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight
sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; in which sense we may
understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet
thirst. "
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere
intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all
others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves.
Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing
an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even
when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the
table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in
bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another
kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural
mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection
is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except,
perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is
accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from
protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those
words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for,
even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is
written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they "desire to look at Him. "
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as
existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to
cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that
disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is
past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that
pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the
memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.
Reply to Objection 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes
complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not
possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending
to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed
in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently
it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in
another, as stated above.
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Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of
reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and
rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is
written (Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself
with her," i. e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it
helps rather than hinders the use of reason.
Objection 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though
they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the
appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive
power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
Objection 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be
moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power moves
pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of
pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure
destroys the estimate of prudence. "
I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures
increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources
are impediments to activity. " Accordingly there is a certain pleasure
that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in
contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the
act of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in doing
that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.
On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three
ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just
observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the
attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in
respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and
thus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the
use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else
it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason.
Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are
contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says
that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the
speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance
that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right
angles. " In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates.
Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so far as bodily pleasure is
followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the
other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently
affected towards a present than towards an absent thing.
pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some
pleasures are contrary to one another.
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
repose in natural bodies, as stated above ([1271]Q[23], A[4]). Now one
repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary
termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low
place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul
that one pleasure is contrary to another.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because
one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be
contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one
good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the
former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water.
And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is
impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that
virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one
thing---i. e. the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened
to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable
and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose;
because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the
place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now
natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body, and
to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore
pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they
are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a
formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different.
Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in
acts and passions, as stated above ([1272]Q[23], AA[1],4;[1273] Q[30],
A[2]).
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OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?
(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?
(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
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Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first
cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),
"pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is
requisite for pleasure, as stated above ([1274]Q[31], A[1]). But the
objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves.
Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained:
since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an
operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore
operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work:
and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is
not the proper cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that
"pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1275]Q[31], A[1]), two things are
requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good,
and knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a kind
of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the
attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover,
the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every
pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.
Reply to Objection 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable
save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as
when we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or
in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes
pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the
like; which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as
possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take
great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the
natural love we have for ourselves. " Now to have such like things is
nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is
through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is
traced to some operation as its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect
of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as
possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.
Reply to Objection 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are
proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is
finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain
measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.
And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to
repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
from labor.
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Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Because, as stated above ([1276]Q[31], A[1]), the good which is
obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared
with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in
existence. Now that which is being moved towards something has it not
as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch
as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in
Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue
in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are
not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is
the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are
pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is
not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O
Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some
things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this
portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and
reconciled? " From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes
pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to
cause pleasure.
I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i. e. the
one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a
third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these
three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14
and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned,
change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: for which
reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at
another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter
but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is
united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an
agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the
fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being
consists in a certain measure; and therefore when the continued
presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode
of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of
the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because man desires to
know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be
apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is pleasant,
so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be
perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not
have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou
hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all
of which do not exist together, all would please collectively more than
they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively. "
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the
natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of
any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its
delight at once---to such a one change will afford no delight. And the
more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being
continual.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet
perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to
have something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has
something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of
pleasure; because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are
unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so
far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes
suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds
our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by
removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
Reply to Objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as
it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the
movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom,
but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of
being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the
same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become pleasant.
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Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure.
Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory
is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory and hope do
not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries.
But hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul. " Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding
good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned
as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope"; and
(Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted. "
I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in
so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present
to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i. e. according as the thing
known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality---i. e.
according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another,
either actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is greater
than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of knowledge;
and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction:
therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation
which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place
belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is pleasurable
conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect
of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object. The third
place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction
of apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which,
absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion,
present, i. e. either according to apprehension only; or according to
apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different
ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it
implies a present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure;
whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes
affliction.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For
everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a
kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner
every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since
desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a
certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that is not
implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference
to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is
of that which has already passed away.
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Whether sadness causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For
nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.
Therefore it does not cause it.
Objection 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures,
when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when
remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love.
But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as
stated above ([1277]Q[29], A[2]). Therefore sadness does not cause
pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my bread
day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure.
Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give pleasure.
I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing
actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can
cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure,
inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence of which
causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The
recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on account of the
deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as
something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been
delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason
has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31
[*Gregory, Moral. iv. ] that "oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad
things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without
feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more filled with joy and
gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril
there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the
triumph. "
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of
its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as
stated in Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause
of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of
something pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not
in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so
far as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of
pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love:
i. e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating
one and the same thing.
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Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause
of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when
conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us.
Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.
Objection 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If,
therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the
same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which
is evidently untrue.
Objection 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an
innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon
the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit
existing in us. " But the actions of others do not proceed from habits
existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents.
Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the
agents themselves.
On the contrary, It is written in the second canonical epistle of John
(verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking in
truth. "
I answer that, As stated above [1278](A[1]; Q[31], A[1]), two things
are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper
good, and the knowledge of having obtained it. Wherefore the action of
another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact
that we obtain some good through the action of another. And in this
way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us:
since it is pleasant to be benefited by another. Secondly, from the
fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good:
and for this reason men take pleasure in being praised or honored by
others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing
in themselves. And since this appreciation receives greater weight from
the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure in
being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to
praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. And as love is for
something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is
pleasant to be loved and admired by others, inasmuch as a man thus
becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving
pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the fact that another's actions, if
they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of
love, which makes a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And
on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's good as being
in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object
of pleasure: whence it is written (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth
not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth. "
Reply to Objection 1: Another's action may be conjoined to me, either
by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second
way; or by affection, as in the third way.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not
for the first two.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the actions of another do not proceed
from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something
that gives pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of
mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by
love.
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Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of
pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's proper
good, as stated above ([1279]AA[1],5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good
pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good.
Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 1) that
"illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality. " Now it is a
mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of
illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone takes
pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x,
4, it seems that doing good to others is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes.
But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such as
overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in
punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore doing
good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most
pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers. "
I answer that, Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways.
First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred on
another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by
love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take pleasure in the
good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good.
Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when a man, from doing good
to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either from God or from
man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the
principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure in
respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and
in this regard, doing good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it
arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof
he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their
children, and in their own works, as being things on which they bestow
a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual
inclination to do good, by reason of which doing good becomes
connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in
giving to others. The third principle is the motive: for instance when
a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for
whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the
principal cause of pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's
good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause
of sadness; for instance when it is excessive.
Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is
unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.
Reply to Objection 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give
pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's
own good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is
naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to
appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which
there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility of winning it,
afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, in
so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can
give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be
wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove
and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding and reproving, one
does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It
is pleasant to an angry man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself
to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous
hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted
thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying
back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be
of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is not pleasant,
except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good.
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Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure.
Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. But
"it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in
Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause
of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But
those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather
than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, those who are satiated with certain delights,
derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated with
food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated
([1280]Q[27], A[3]): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore
likeness is a cause of pleasure.
I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like
us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love, as
stated above ([1281]Q[27], A[3]). And if that which is like us does not
hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for
instance one man in respect of another, one youth in relation to
another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it
causes disgust or sadness, not as being like and one with us, but as
hurtful to that which is yet more one with us.
Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own
good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, by a kind of
excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned
by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous good or any bodily
pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's
own good: thus a potter dislikes other potters, not because they are
potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or profits,
which he seeks as his own good.
Reply to Objection 1: Since ruler and subject are in communion with one
another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is
conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding
pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they belong to
men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they
give man an idea of his own excellence. Another reason is that by
ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man,
though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is
sorrowful: because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the
sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so far as
it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures,
which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought than
intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall
state later on ([1282]Q[35], A[5]). And this explains why all animals
naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense and
movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined to seek
pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are subject,
while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong
desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: because his "body
is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed
measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and
consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary
to the proper good of man.
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Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of
something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is
a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it
were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of
Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than
to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7): since
in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the
former not; while pleasure arises from an operation which is
unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders
rather than causes pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed
to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant.
But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in
Joan. ). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the
cause of pleasure.
I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above
([1283]Q[23], A[4]): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing
loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very
increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as
it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it
was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a
cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a
desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause
either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of
understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as
it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have.
For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance things
that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which
are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul
rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one
thing with another is the proper and connatural act of the reason, as
the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more
delightful to be delivered from great danger, because it is something
wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11.
Reply to Objection 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies
ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the
cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i. e. that
the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to another
reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be. ]
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good,
and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is
more perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the
unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing
than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the
second, it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing
accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for
greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This
is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things
for the first time.
Reply to Objection 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do,
inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that
are of rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge,
from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as
they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind
is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are new," as
stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation causes more perfect
pleasure.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?
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Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the Apostle
(2 Cor. 6:11): "Our heart is enlarged. " Wherefore it is written (Ps.
118:96) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is
exceeding broad. " But pleasure is a distinct passion from love.
Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive
more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet
possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But
contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that
which we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in
regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain
to pleasure.
On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written (Is. 60:5):
"Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged. "
Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" as being derived
from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above ([1284]Q[31], A[3], ad
3).
I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude:
hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save
metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards
breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things
requisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive
power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good.
As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a
certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in
this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or expanded by
pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the
appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests
therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus
man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered
itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one
and the same thing from being attributed to different things according
to different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by
reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the
lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own
interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand
expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample
in itself so as to become more capacious.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from
the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at
the presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders
itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it,
than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end
of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast,
by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that
he may enjoy it perfectly.
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Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for
itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But
pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as
stated above ([1285]Q[23], A[4];[1286] Q[25], A[2]). Therefore the
movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure
does not cause desire.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure
is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since
desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure
regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause
desire for itself.
Objection 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But
pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this
water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in
Joan. ), water denotes pleasures of the body.
I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as
existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst,
or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a
craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding
distaste.
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause
thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take
thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed:
because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something
actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is
not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of the thing
possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing
possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a
simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it
successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to
possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part of
a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says
(Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst
for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of
this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of the
table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses
a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly,
but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this life, a
faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight
sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; in which sense we may
understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet
thirst. "
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere
intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all
others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves.
Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing
an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even
when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the
table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in
bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another
kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural
mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection
is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except,
perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is
accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from
protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those
words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for,
even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is
written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they "desire to look at Him. "
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as
existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to
cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that
disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is
past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that
pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the
memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.
Reply to Objection 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes
complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not
possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending
to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed
in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently
it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in
another, as stated above.
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Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of
reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and
rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is
written (Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself
with her," i. e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it
helps rather than hinders the use of reason.
Objection 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though
they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the
appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive
power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
Objection 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be
moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power moves
pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of
pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure
destroys the estimate of prudence. "
I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures
increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources
are impediments to activity. " Accordingly there is a certain pleasure
that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in
contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the
act of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in doing
that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.
On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three
ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just
observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the
attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in
respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and
thus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the
use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else
it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason.
Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are
contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says
that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the
speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance
that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right
angles. " In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates.
Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so far as bodily pleasure is
followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the
other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently
affected towards a present than towards an absent thing.
