The shah's immediate ambitions were limited, however; al- though Iran annexed small portions of foreign
territory
on several occa- sions, the shah did not seek to transform the existing state system or eliminate any of his immediate neighbors.
Revolution and War_nodrm
17 When a group of students seized the U.
S.
embassy on November 4 and Khomeini endorsed their action, Bazargan had no choice but to resign.
The second phase, from November 1979 to June 1981, was dominated by . a prolonged struggle for power between the new president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, and the clerical forces of the Islamic Republic Party led by the Ay- atollah Muhammed Beheshti. Unlike Bazargan, Bani-Sadr favored a radical
15 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 39; and see also Mary Heglund, "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in Keddie, Religion and Politics, esp. 228-30; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 99-100.
? 16 The text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is reprinted in Middle East Journal(hereafterME/)J4, no. 2 (198o), 181-204; and see also Bakhash, Reign oftheAyatollahs, 74-75 ?
17 See "Chronology," ME/ J4, no. 1 (198o), 50.
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transformation of Iran along Islamic lines. 18 He opposed direct clerical rule, however, and believed that government positions should be given to indi- viduals with technical expertise rather than religious qualifications. He also sought to improve Iran's international position by resolving the hostage cri- sis with the Uruted States. 19
These positions placed Bani-Sadr at odds with the radical clergy, which waged a relentless campaign to limit his power. The IRP dominated the par- liamentary elections in March 1980, and Bani-Sadr found himself in a pro- tracted struggle against the party's efforts to expand its control? 0 Although Khomeini impllored the two sides to resolve their differences and even formed a three-man commission to mediate between them in March 1981, disputes between the clergy and the president remained intense. 21 Bani-Sadr eventually sought support from liberals, moderate clerics, and the left-wing Islamic Mujahedin, and this step convinced Khomeini that Bani-Sadr had become a threat to the clerical regime. The ayatollah relieved him from his position as commander-in-chief in June and the Majlis (Parliament) soon or-
dered his arrest, forcing Bani-Sadr to flee into exile in July.
The third phase, from July 1981 to February 1983, featured a violent struggle between the IRP and the radical left. 22 The Mujahedin launched a bloody wave olf terrorism following Bani-Sadr's removal. Abomb blast at the headquarters of the IRP in June killed seventy-four IRP officials, in-
cluding the Ayatollah Beheshti. Bani-Sadr's successor,. Mohammed Rajai, was killed by another bomb on August 30 (along with Prime Minister Muhammed Bahonar). The clergy responded with a brutal campaign of re- pression. Official executions totaled over twenty-six hundred by Novem- ber 1981, and over twelve thousand dissidents were killed in clashes with the Revolutionary Guards or in official executions between 1981 and 1985. 23
18 The son. of an ayatollah, Bani-Sadr had studied sociology and law in Tehran and was jailed for opposition activities in the 196os. He became part of Khomeini's entourage during the latter's exile in France and returned with him to Tehran in February 1979.
19 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 114-17; Behrooz, "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Re- public," 18-19; and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution, and Secret Deals with the United States, trans. William Ford (Washington, D. C. : Brassey's, 1991), 22-25.
20 See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 6o-65; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, esp. 10o-110; and David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990}, 1JJ-J5, 168-74, 181-83.
21 Khomeini asked the contestants to settle their differences and serve "the interest of the nation" in September and implored them to stop "biting one another like scorpions" in Feb- ruary. See "Chronology," ME/ 35, no. 1 (198o), 46; no. 2 (1981), 215; no. 3 (1981), 367.
22 The principal left-wing groups in Iran were the Islamic Mujahedin, the Marxist Feda'i, and the Communist Tudeh Party. All three groups favored radical domestic change and an end to imperialist exploitation but opposed the establishment of a theocratic state.
23 The chief prosecutor, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, declared that "these deaths are not merely permissible, they are necessary. " See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 68-69, 219-22.
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The threat from the Mujahedin was largely eliminated by the end of 1982, and in February 1983, the government moved to suppress the (Communist) Tudeh Party, removing the last independent political organization of any consequence. The presidency, prime ministry, and speakership of the Majlis were all in derical hands, the IRP dominated the Majlis, and the clergy had established effective control over the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards. Although low-level opposition continued throughout the rest of the decade and splits among the religious leaders became more and more ap- parent, the leaders of the Islamic Republic no longer faced a serious threat to their rule.
Conflict and Compromise in the Islamic Republic
The basic institutions of the Islamic Republic were in place by the end of 1983. The IRP dominated the Majlis and the ministries, and the army and Revolutionary Guards were all controlied by clerics loyal to Khomeini. The new regime had begun to reorder Iranian society along Islamic lines, bring- ing dramatic changes in law, education, and popular mores. 24 Opposition from within the senior clergy had been stilled as well, leaving Khomeini as the ultimate arbiter of Iran's Islamic future. 25
Despite these achievements, deep political differences soon began to di- vide Iran's new rulers. 26 In broad terms, the contest pitted a comparatively moderate group led by Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Pres- ident Said Alii Khamenei, and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati against a more radical faction led by Prime Minister Mir-Husayn Musavi, Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, and Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. The pragma- tists downplayed the importance of exporting the revolution, supported the private sector, and advocated enhancing Iran's international position by in- creasing its ties with other countries. By contrast, the radicals sought to maintain the ideological purity of the revolution, and they emphasized the
24 See Menashri, Iran, 137-38, 192-97, 225-28, 271-76.
25 Khomeini was the only grand ayatollah to endorse direct clerical rule, and several equally eminent clerics (most notably Kazem Shariatmadari) criticized Khomeini's position as contrary to Islam. Shariatmadari's personal prestige was no match for Khomeini's control over the main state institutions, however, and he was placed under house arrest and subse- quently discredited by his later involvement in an unsuccessful coup. See Menashri, Iran, 7o--n 129-30, 239-40; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 67? 8, Scr9o, 223; Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 139-43, 21s-19; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Clerical Politics in Iran since 1979,'' in The Iranian Revolution and Islamic Republic, ed. Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 5? 2, 8s-89.
26 In September 1984, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani admitted that the Islamic Republican Party's Central Council "does not enjoy a unity which is a sine qua non for its ability to be ac- tive and advance the [party's) goals," and he described "this very fundamental problem" as "a significant challenge. " See Menashri, Iran, 307-308; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Elite Fac- tionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran," MET 41, no. 2 (1987), 184.
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export of Islamic fundamentalism, the use of state power to aid the "op- pressed," the removal of Western influence, and steadfast opposition to the United States and its regional allies. 27
The pragmatists slowly gained the upper hand throughout the 198os, al- though the process was erratic and the basic divisions would remain intact after Khomeini's death in 1989. Khomeini called repeatedly for the "elimi- nation of differences," but he also shifted his own position in order to pre- vent either faction from gaining undisputed control. As a result, periods of deradicalization alternated with occasional outbursts of extremism. By 1985, Rafsanjani and his supporters had begun to curb the excesses of "Islamiza- tion" and Iranian officials were signaling their desire to restore Iran's con- tacts with the outside world. In addition to a detente with Saudi Arabia and several Western states, Iran began seeking advanced U. S. weaponry from a number of Israeli intermediaries. This policy was a direct response to the de- mands imposed by Iran's war with Iraq and marked a noteworthy depar- ture from its public antipathy toward! Israel and the "Great Satan. "28 The initiative came to an abrupt end when Rafsanjani's internal opponents leaked word of his negotiations with the United States. The news brought intense criticism from the radicals, but Khomeini condemned this new
threat to unity, and Rafsanjani and the moderates emerged in an even stronger position. Khomeini continued to back them, and the trial and sub- sequent execution of Mehdi Hashemi, former head of the bureau dealing with foreign revolutionaries, was a major setback for the radicals. 29
As Rafsanjani and the pragmatists continued to consolidate their posi- tion during 1988, evidence of a renewed drive toward moderation was ap- parent. The most obvious sign was the ceasefire with Iraq-which entailed abandoning the oft-repeated goal of toppling Saddam Hussein-but Khomeini also agreed to a series of administrative initiatives that curtailed the role of religious authorities. Both Khomeini and Rafsanjani made state- ments stressing that religious principles must "adapt to the requirements of time and place," and the speaker later declared that although "the law
27 The membership of each faction changed over time, and some individuals supported one side on certain issues but not on others. See Akhavi, "Elite Factionalism"; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy"; Middle East Contemporary Survey (hereafter MECS), vol. 8: 1983-84 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies/ Shiloah Center, 1986), 43(}-33; MECS 1988 (Boulde1; Colo. : Westview, 1990), 493-<)4; and Shireen T. Hunter, Iran after Kho- meini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 36-39.
28 See Menashri, Iran, 322-25, 374-75.
29 Hashemi was believed to be responsible for leaking word of the arms deals. Another sign of internal differences was the decision to disband the Islamic Revolution Party in 1987. Raf- sanjani admitted in 1986 that there were "two relatively powerful factions in our country. . . . They may in fact be regarded as two parties without names. " He termed the decision to dis- band the party "temporary" and said that it might be revived "if the consensus which Jed to its formation in 1979 is available again. " See Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 162.
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should follow Islamic doctrine . . . priority will be given to government de- cisions over doctrine. " Khomeini also issued a formal edict (orfatwa) de- claring that the authority of the Islamic state was the same as it had been in the time of Muhammed, implying that government decisions could super- sede Islamic law. "Our government," he declared, "has priority over all other Islamic tenets, even over prayer, fasting, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. " Thus, after having overthrown one regime in the name of Islamic law, Khomeini in effect declared that the Islamic Republic could disregard Islam if the interests of the state required it. Other signs of liberalization in- cluded the open endorsement of birth control by several prominent theolo- gians, the implementation of a law permitting the registration of new political parties, and public calls for greater freedom of expression in uni- versities and more flexibility in the veiling of women. These steps did not imply a new tolerance toward all domestic opponents, however, and sev- eral radical clerics and a large number of suspected leftists were reportedly executed later in the year. 30
As before, however, these acts of moderation were followed by a subse- quent tilt toward the revolutionary purists. The occasion for this shift was the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses, whose satirical por- trayal of Muhammed had already sparked protests in other Muslim coun- tries. In February 1989, Khomeini stunned the world by sentencing Rushdie (who lived in England) to death and publicly exhorting "zealous Muslims" to carry out his order. Iran offered a $2. 6 million reward to Rushdie's execu- tioner, and Khomeini declared that the entire episode was divinely intended to warn Iran against an overly "pragmatic" foreign policy. 31
Khomeini's sudden reversal was meant to ensure that Iran's revolution- ary ideals were not entirely abandoned. If compromise and moderation had been necessary to save the revolution in 1988, Khomeini now saw a need to rekindle ideological purity and revolutionary commitment. According to David Menashri, "Rushdie's book served the revolution just as the Ameri- can hostages had in 1979; it unified the revolutionary forces against the ex- ternal demonical enemy and stirred up passions around an issue which all believers could . . . identify with. "32
30 In January 1989, Khomeini also approved a series of legislative reforms that further di- luted the authority of religious experts and gave greater priority to state (as opposed to the- ological) interests. For these quotations and events, see MECS I988, 472-73- 486--88; andl Wright, In the Name ofGod, 172-73-
31 This sudden return to a bellicose ideological posture forced the moderates to adopt more extreme rheftoric themselves, and Rafsanjani at one point suggested that the Palestinians should kill fllve U. S. , French, or British citizens for every Arab killed in the Israeli-occupied West Bank or Gaza Strip. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 44-48; MECS 1988, 4% and Wright, In the Name of God, 201.
32 See MECS 1988, 495?
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The condemnation of Rushdie was Khorneini's last important political act. His health deteriorated in the spring and he died on June 3, 1989, at the age of eighty-six. His passing allowed Rafsanjani and the moderates to resume their efforts to adapt the principles of "Islamic government" to con- temporary political conditions. Not surprisingly, the transition to the post- Khorneini era began with new signs of moderation.
The first step was the selection of President Ali Kharnenei to succeed Khorneini as supreme jurisprudent. This decision was a further retreat from Khorneini's original blueprint for Islamic government, because Kharnenei was not an accomplished theologian. A sweeping series of constitutional amendments was approved by a national referendum in July. The new con- stitution dropped the requirement that the supreme jurisprudent be a senior religious leader (thereby legitimizing Kharnenei's selection as Khorneini's successor), abolished the position of prime minister, and strengthened the powers of the presidency. 33 Rafsanjani was elected president by an over- whelming margin in July, further cementing the moderates' hold on power. Rafsanjani emphasized that his main priority would be reconstruction and economic recovery, and his new cabinet was dominated by technocrats cho-
sen for their administrative competence rather than their ideological purity. Although the radicals were not silenced and the pragmatists had not wholly abandoned the principles of the Islamic revolution, the leaders of the regime seemed to be increasingly willing to sacrifice doctrinal purity for the sake of political stability, economic recovery, and international acceptance. 34
The radicals suffered yet another defeat in the 1991 elections, leading ? orne observers to conclude that Rafsanjani's position was more powerful than ever. 35 Yet tlhe scales quickly swung back when Kharnenei announced a crackdown on "Western culture" in the summer of 1992 and reaffirmed the death sentence on Salman Rushdie, Iran's hostility to the United States, and its commitment to spreading the revolution. 36 Kharnenei and the radicals began to strip Rafsanjani of many of the powers he had previously accumu- lated and forced him to abandon his efforts to establish better relations with the Wfst. The radical resurgence was partly a response to Rafsanjani's failed attempts to liberalize the economy, but it also reflected the incomplete insti-
33 See Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 25-26; MECS 1989 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1991), 344, 348-53; and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 34-35.
34 See MECS 1989, 341-62.
35 See R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: North and South," ME/ 46, no. 3 (1992), 394-<)5; and Said Amir Arjomand, "A Victory for the Pragmatists: The Islamic Fundamental- ist Reaction in Iran," in Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991 ).
36 On July 29, 1992, Ayatollah Khamenei warned, "One must never believe that the United States, the everlasting enemy of Islam, has put an end to its antagonism. . . . The United States is the main enemy of Islam and will remain so. " Middle East International, no. 431 (August 7, 1992), 13.
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tutionalization of the revolutionary regime and the radicals' fear that fur- ther moves toward moderation would jeopardize their own claim to rule. 37
The Islamic revolution in Iran is still a work in progress. Although the revolution created a strong state apparatus, authority remains divided, and neither the moderates nor the radicals have been able to eliminate the other faction or reduce its base of support. It has thus been difficult for the Islamic Republic to sustain a coherent set of policies, and as we shall see, this en- demic inconsistency has had especially pernicious effects on Iran's foreign relations.
THE FoREIGN RELATIONS OF REvoLUTIONARY IRAN
Foreign Policy under the Shah
Under the shah, Iranian foreign policy was directed toward the long-term goal of becoming a major world power. The foundation of this policy was the shah's alliance with the United States, which had grown in importance after the Nixon administration decided to use Iran as one of its "twin pil- lars" in the Persian Gulf region. This policy fed the shah's own ambitions;
? Iran's oil wealth fueled a massive arms buildup; and the United States be- came inextricably identified with the shah's regime. 38
Predictably, prerevolutionary Iran's relations with the Soviet Union were less favorable. The shah was understandably wary of his large northern neighbor and! perennially worried about leftist subversion within Iran itself. Iran's role as the West's "regional policeman" irritated the Soviets, as did the shah's opposition to revolutionary movements and radical states else- where in the Middle East. 39 Yet despite these disagreements and Iran's close ties with the United States, the Soviet Union and Iran maintained cordial diplomatic and economic relations, and their 1921 treaty of friendship and ? cooperation Jremained in force. 40
37 On these events, see "Iran, the Sequel: New Actors, but the Same lines," New York Times, January 23, 1994, 4:4; and also Middle East International, no. 430 Ouly 24, 1992), 13; no. 432 (Au- gust 21, 1992), 1 1; no. 438 (November 6, 1992), 12; no. 439 (November 20, 1992), 3-5.
38 Useful surveys of the U. S. -Iranian relationship include Mark J. Gasiorowski, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Bill, Eagle and Lion, chaps. 1? ; and R. K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran: The Patterns of In-
fluence (New York: Praeger, 1982).
39 Iran helped! the sultan of Oman suppress the Soviet-backed Dhofar rebellion in the early
1970s, and the shah was especially hostile to Soviet clients such as Carnal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the Baath parties in Syria and Iraq.
40 See Sepehr Zabih, "Iran's International Posture: De Facto Non-Alignment within a Pro- Western Alliance," MEJ 24, no. 3 ( 1970), 313; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics ofInfluence (New York: Praeger, 1982); and Aryeh Yodfat, The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 25-43.
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Within the Middle East, Iran's foreign policy grew more assertive as its mil- itary and economic power increased. Iran seized several islands in the Persian Gulf in 1971, and its support for the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq forced Bagh- dad to accept its terms in a long-standing dispute over the Shatt al-Arab wa- terway. Relations with Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states were friendly but guarded; although the gulf monarchies shared the shah's opposition to radicalism of any sort, they were also worried by Iran's military power and the shah's regional ambitions. Relations with Egypt improved dramatically after its realignment with the United States, but relations with Syria, Libya, and South Yemen remained hostile. These tensions help explain Iran's tacit
alignment with Israel, based on a combination of factors including shared op- position to the main Arab powers, Israel's interest in the Iranian Jewish com- munity, covert cooperation between the Israeli and Iranian intelligence services, and their shared ties to the United States. 41
Overall, Iran's foreign policy under the shah combined a pro-Western ori- entation with an ambitious effort to build Iran's military power and expand its regional role.
The shah's immediate ambitions were limited, however; al- though Iran annexed small portions of foreign territory on several occa- sions, the shah did not seek to transform the existing state system or eliminate any of his immediate neighbors. And though he occasionally in- voked Islamic symbols to attack his Arab opponents, Islam played little or no role in Iran's foreign policy prior to the revolution.
Aims and Ambitions of the Islamic Republic
Although the revolutionary coalition was divided on many issues, there was widespread agreement on the broad outlines of Iran's postrevolu- tionary foreign policy. The new regime was strongly opposed to foreign (especially U. S. ) interference and committed to an explicit policy of non- alignment. Prime Minister Bazargan announced this new policy in February 1979, and the principle of nonalignment was formally enshrined in the Con- stitution of the Islamic Republic later in the year. 42 The constitution commit- ted Iran to work for the unity of all Islamic peoples and openly endorsed efforts to export the revolution to other countries. 43 Although Khomeini at
41 OntheoriginsoftheIranian-Israelirelationship,seeUriBialer,"TheIranianConnection in Israel's Foreign Policy, 1948-1951," ME] 39, no. 2 (1985).
42 The constitution calls for "the complete expulsion of colonialism and the prevention of foreign influence" and explicitly forbids foreign military bases or any agreements "allowing a foreign power to dominate . . . the affairs of the country. " "Constitution of the Islamic Re- public," 189, 201-202.
43 The constitution states that it "provides the basis for trying to perpetuate this revolution both at home and abroad," and it emphasizes the importance of "expanding international re- lations with other Islamic movements . . . to pave the way to form the world unity of follow- ers. " Ibid. , 185.
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times stated that Iran would not use force to spread its revolution, some of his remarks (and those of several of his followers) were less restrained. 44 The new regime also undertook to aid other victims of imperialism, and the new constitution proclaimed that Iran would "protect the struggles of the weak against the arrogant, in any part of the world. "45
These principles constituted a near-total reversal of the shah's foreign pol- icy. In addition to moving to a nonaligned position, the commitment to spreading Khomeini's ideas of Islamic government challenged the legiti- macy of the existing state system and threatened the stability of Iran's im- mediate neighbors. Not surprisingly, the establishment of the Islamic Republic had dramatic effects on Iran's international position.
The United States and Revolutionary Iran
The effects of the revolution were most apparent in Iran's relations with the United States. The revolutionaries blamed the United States for the in- justices of the shah's rule, and they were especially worried that the United States would try to repeat the 1953 coup that had restored the shah to his throne. For their part, the Americans were concerned by the loss of an im- portant ally, the impact of the revolution on world oil supplies, and the pos- sibility that the shah's ouster would permit the Soviet Union to expand its own influence in an important strategic area. 46
Yet U. S. -Iranian relations seemed fairly encouraging at first. Prime Minis- ter Bazargan announced that Iran would continue exporting oil to the United States, and when a group of radical students invaded the U. S. em- bassy compound in Tehran in February 1979, the Bazargan government quickly removed them and tightened security around the embassy. Presi- dent Carter declared that the United States "would attempt to work closely with the existing government of Iran," and U. S. diplomats and intelligence officials maintained extensive contacts with the Bazargan government and tried to cultivate more radical figures such as Bani-Sadr as well. Carter also
44 According to Khomeini, Iran would "export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no God but God' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle. " Quoted in Wright, In the Name ofGod, 108. In 1981, Foreign Minister Musavi declared that one of the objectives of Iran's foreign policy was to "carry the message of Iran's Islamic revolu- tion to the [entire] world," and Ayatollah Ali Meshkini stated that the goal of the revolution was "to impose the Qur'an over the entire world. " In 1982. , then-president Ali Khamenei called on prayer leaders from forty countries to use their mosques as "prayer, political, cul- tural and military bases," in order to "prepare the ground for the creation of Islamic govern? ments in all countries. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 4S-49; and Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 2. 34-35.
45 "Constitution of the Islamic Republic," 2. 02. ; and see also Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 2. 3-2. 4, and "Khumayni's Islam," 2. 1-2. 2. ; and Rajaee, Islamic Values, 79-th.
46 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 2. 77--'fS; and Warren Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct ofa Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 2. .
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
authorized shipments of gasoline and heating oil to alleviate temporary shortages in Iran and agreed to ship spare parts to the Iranian armed forces in October. 47
There were several obvious points of tension, however. Secretary of De- fense Harold Brown's statement that the United States would use military force "if appropriate" to protect its access to Persian Gulf oil alarmed Iran's new leaders, and the violent reprisals that followed the shah's departure disturbed many American observers. The U. S. Senate condemned the sum- mary executions conducted by the Revolutionary Courts in May-an action Iran denounced as "clear interference. " The new regime refused to accept the credentials of the U. S. ambassador-designate in June, expelled several
U. S. journalists in July, and canceled a $9 billion arms deal in August. 48 Un- able to establish direct contact with Khomeini or his supporters during this period, the Carter administration was forced to pin its hopes on such mod- erates as Bazargan. Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi were in- terested in developing a cordial relationship with the United States, but their authority was evaporating rapidly at this point. The radical clergy op- posed any attempt at a rapprochement, and relations between the two states worsened as the mullahs tightened their hold on power. The final break came when Carter agreed to permit the shah to fly to New York for medical treatment in October. This decision triggered a new wave of anti-U. S. demonstrations and raised new fears that the United States was preparing a counterrevolutionary coup. Bazargan met with U. S. national security advi- sor Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dispute, but his efforts ended with the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the onset of a major hostage crisis.
The United States responded to the seizure of its embassy by freezing Iranian assets, organizing an international embargo, and deploying addi- tional military forces in the region. It began transmitting propaganda broad- casts into Iran in order to undermine the Ayatollah and eventually attempted an unsuccessful rescue mission in April 1980. The continuing power struggle in Iran impeded efforts to resolve the crisis through negoti- ation, largely because Bani-Sadr lacked the authority to make a deal and because supporters of a settlement were vulnerable to accusations of insuf- ficient revolutionary zeal. 49 The breakthrough finally came in the fall of 1980, when Iran agreed to release the hostages in exchange for roughly $11 billion in frozen Iranian assets and other financial commitments. 5?
47 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 286-3-9 .
48 Ibid. , 28o-82.
49 "Chronology," ME] 34, no. 4 (198o), 475? The sheer difficulty of communicating with the
Iranian regime was a serious obstacle as well, and virtually all accounts of the hostage crisis em- phasize the confusion that U. S. negotiators faced in trying to deal with the Islamic Republic.
50 The most complete account of the hostage negotiators (though written entirely from the U. S. perspective), is Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran. See also Sick, All Fall Down,
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By confirming each side's impression that the other was unremittingly hostile, the hostage crisis cast an enduring shadow over U. S. -Iranian re- lations. U. S. pressure on Iran strengthened the revolutionaries' image of American hostility, and the radical clergy used the threat of the "Great Satan" to undermine Bazargan and Bani-Sadr and to consolidate their own positions. 51 The abortive rescue mission also revealed that the United States still controlled significant intelligence assets within the country and reinforced Iranian fears of U. S. military action, while Iran's bellicose rhetoric and disregard for traditional diplomatic norms solidi-
fied its reputation as an aggressive revolutionary state. Iran's subsequen? actions (such as its support for the Lebanese Shiites who kidnapped sev- eral U. S. citizens and conducted the suicide bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983) merely sealed Iran's aggressive reputation in Washington.
These developments convinced the United States to increase its sup- port for conservative Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and to tilt to- wards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Initially concerned that an Iraqi victory would upset the regional balance of power, the U. S. government had quietly allowed Israel to ship several billion dollars' worth of U. S. arms and spare parts to Iran in 1981 and 1982. When the tide of battle turned in llran's favor, however, the U. S. State Department began a diplo- matic campaign to persuade other states to deny military equipment to Iran. The United States began providing intelligence information to Iraq in 1982 and replenished the stockpiles of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait when they transferred U. S. -made weaponry to Baghdad. The United States reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984 and began covertly supporting Iranian exile groups during this period as well. 52
chaps. 9-15; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 293-304; Pierre Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1981); Brzezinski, Power and Principle, chap. 13; and Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year ofthe Carter Presidency (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1982).
51 As Rafsanjani remarked after the hostage settlement, "America continues to remain our enemy, and, accordingly, we are America's enemy. . . . This will continue for a long time. " Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 205; and see also Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolution," 49?
52 See Anthony Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1 984-1987: Strategic Im- plications and Policy Options (London: Jane's, 1987), esp. 79; "U. S. Said to Aid Iranian Exiles in Combat and Political Units," and "U. S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War against Iran," New York Times, March 7, 1982, A1, A12; January 26, 1992, At, A4; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Routledge, 1991), 96; Ralph King, The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications, Adelphi Paper no. 219 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 53?
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The main departure from this policy was the notorious Iran-contra arms deal. 53 This initiative rested on the hope that supplying arms would strengthen "moderate forces" within the Islamic Republic, who would help obtain the release of the U. S. hostages in Lebanon and work to improve U. S. -Iranian relations. This goal also reflected U. S. concerns that Iran was in- creasingly vulnerable to Soviet pressure or subversion, as well as the expec- tation that the threat from Moscow would make Iran more receptive to U. S. overtures. 54
In the summer of 1985, U. S. and Israeli officials began negotiating to sell advanced weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of U. S. citizens held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. Lacking both direct access to the revolu- tionary government and accurate information about internal developments within Iran, the U. S. government-or more precisely, the cabal within the National Security Council that conducted the negotiations-decided to use a shady Iranian arms merchant, Manucher Ghorbanifar, as their principal intermediary. The initiative was soon taken over by Oliver North, a marine officer assigned to the U. S. National Security Council, and he and former U. S. national security advisor Robert C. McFarlane eventually made a secret visit to Tehran in May 1986 in an unsuccessful venture to get the hostages released. The continuing power struggle between moderates and extremists in Iran brought the negotiations to an end in November 1986, but not before the U. S. had sent Iran nearly sixteen hundred antitank missiles, assorted spare parts, and valuable intelligence information on Iraqi military deploy- ments.
The attempt to trade arms for hostages improved neither the situation in Lebanon, the position of the Iranian "moderates," nor the state of U. S. -Iranian relations. Although the Shiites released one U. S. hostage in September 1985
53 The best account of the Iran-contra affair is Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran- Contra Affairs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). See also James A. Bill, "The U. S. Over- ture to Iran, 1985-86: An Analysis," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 166-7- 9;PeterKornbluhandMalcolmByrne,eds. ,TheIran-ContraScandal:TheDeclassifiedHis- tory (New York: New Press, 1993); and Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in tlze Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Free Press, 1988).
54 At the request of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency pre- pared a new intelligence estimate on Iran in May 1985. It predicted that "the Khomeini regime will face serious instability," warned that Tehran's leadership "seems to have con- cluded that improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is essential to Iranian interest," and recommended that the United States begin active efforts compete for influence in Iran. In response, a National Security Council memorandum suggested that U. S. allies be encouraged to provide Iran with "selected military equipment .
The second phase, from November 1979 to June 1981, was dominated by . a prolonged struggle for power between the new president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, and the clerical forces of the Islamic Republic Party led by the Ay- atollah Muhammed Beheshti. Unlike Bazargan, Bani-Sadr favored a radical
15 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 39; and see also Mary Heglund, "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in Keddie, Religion and Politics, esp. 228-30; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 99-100.
? 16 The text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is reprinted in Middle East Journal(hereafterME/)J4, no. 2 (198o), 181-204; and see also Bakhash, Reign oftheAyatollahs, 74-75 ?
17 See "Chronology," ME/ J4, no. 1 (198o), 50.
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transformation of Iran along Islamic lines. 18 He opposed direct clerical rule, however, and believed that government positions should be given to indi- viduals with technical expertise rather than religious qualifications. He also sought to improve Iran's international position by resolving the hostage cri- sis with the Uruted States. 19
These positions placed Bani-Sadr at odds with the radical clergy, which waged a relentless campaign to limit his power. The IRP dominated the par- liamentary elections in March 1980, and Bani-Sadr found himself in a pro- tracted struggle against the party's efforts to expand its control? 0 Although Khomeini impllored the two sides to resolve their differences and even formed a three-man commission to mediate between them in March 1981, disputes between the clergy and the president remained intense. 21 Bani-Sadr eventually sought support from liberals, moderate clerics, and the left-wing Islamic Mujahedin, and this step convinced Khomeini that Bani-Sadr had become a threat to the clerical regime. The ayatollah relieved him from his position as commander-in-chief in June and the Majlis (Parliament) soon or-
dered his arrest, forcing Bani-Sadr to flee into exile in July.
The third phase, from July 1981 to February 1983, featured a violent struggle between the IRP and the radical left. 22 The Mujahedin launched a bloody wave olf terrorism following Bani-Sadr's removal. Abomb blast at the headquarters of the IRP in June killed seventy-four IRP officials, in-
cluding the Ayatollah Beheshti. Bani-Sadr's successor,. Mohammed Rajai, was killed by another bomb on August 30 (along with Prime Minister Muhammed Bahonar). The clergy responded with a brutal campaign of re- pression. Official executions totaled over twenty-six hundred by Novem- ber 1981, and over twelve thousand dissidents were killed in clashes with the Revolutionary Guards or in official executions between 1981 and 1985. 23
18 The son. of an ayatollah, Bani-Sadr had studied sociology and law in Tehran and was jailed for opposition activities in the 196os. He became part of Khomeini's entourage during the latter's exile in France and returned with him to Tehran in February 1979.
19 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 114-17; Behrooz, "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Re- public," 18-19; and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution, and Secret Deals with the United States, trans. William Ford (Washington, D. C. : Brassey's, 1991), 22-25.
20 See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 6o-65; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, esp. 10o-110; and David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990}, 1JJ-J5, 168-74, 181-83.
21 Khomeini asked the contestants to settle their differences and serve "the interest of the nation" in September and implored them to stop "biting one another like scorpions" in Feb- ruary. See "Chronology," ME/ 35, no. 1 (198o), 46; no. 2 (1981), 215; no. 3 (1981), 367.
22 The principal left-wing groups in Iran were the Islamic Mujahedin, the Marxist Feda'i, and the Communist Tudeh Party. All three groups favored radical domestic change and an end to imperialist exploitation but opposed the establishment of a theocratic state.
23 The chief prosecutor, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, declared that "these deaths are not merely permissible, they are necessary. " See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 68-69, 219-22.
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The threat from the Mujahedin was largely eliminated by the end of 1982, and in February 1983, the government moved to suppress the (Communist) Tudeh Party, removing the last independent political organization of any consequence. The presidency, prime ministry, and speakership of the Majlis were all in derical hands, the IRP dominated the Majlis, and the clergy had established effective control over the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards. Although low-level opposition continued throughout the rest of the decade and splits among the religious leaders became more and more ap- parent, the leaders of the Islamic Republic no longer faced a serious threat to their rule.
Conflict and Compromise in the Islamic Republic
The basic institutions of the Islamic Republic were in place by the end of 1983. The IRP dominated the Majlis and the ministries, and the army and Revolutionary Guards were all controlied by clerics loyal to Khomeini. The new regime had begun to reorder Iranian society along Islamic lines, bring- ing dramatic changes in law, education, and popular mores. 24 Opposition from within the senior clergy had been stilled as well, leaving Khomeini as the ultimate arbiter of Iran's Islamic future. 25
Despite these achievements, deep political differences soon began to di- vide Iran's new rulers. 26 In broad terms, the contest pitted a comparatively moderate group led by Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Pres- ident Said Alii Khamenei, and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati against a more radical faction led by Prime Minister Mir-Husayn Musavi, Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, and Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. The pragma- tists downplayed the importance of exporting the revolution, supported the private sector, and advocated enhancing Iran's international position by in- creasing its ties with other countries. By contrast, the radicals sought to maintain the ideological purity of the revolution, and they emphasized the
24 See Menashri, Iran, 137-38, 192-97, 225-28, 271-76.
25 Khomeini was the only grand ayatollah to endorse direct clerical rule, and several equally eminent clerics (most notably Kazem Shariatmadari) criticized Khomeini's position as contrary to Islam. Shariatmadari's personal prestige was no match for Khomeini's control over the main state institutions, however, and he was placed under house arrest and subse- quently discredited by his later involvement in an unsuccessful coup. See Menashri, Iran, 7o--n 129-30, 239-40; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 67? 8, Scr9o, 223; Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 139-43, 21s-19; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Clerical Politics in Iran since 1979,'' in The Iranian Revolution and Islamic Republic, ed. Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 5? 2, 8s-89.
26 In September 1984, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani admitted that the Islamic Republican Party's Central Council "does not enjoy a unity which is a sine qua non for its ability to be ac- tive and advance the [party's) goals," and he described "this very fundamental problem" as "a significant challenge. " See Menashri, Iran, 307-308; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Elite Fac- tionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran," MET 41, no. 2 (1987), 184.
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export of Islamic fundamentalism, the use of state power to aid the "op- pressed," the removal of Western influence, and steadfast opposition to the United States and its regional allies. 27
The pragmatists slowly gained the upper hand throughout the 198os, al- though the process was erratic and the basic divisions would remain intact after Khomeini's death in 1989. Khomeini called repeatedly for the "elimi- nation of differences," but he also shifted his own position in order to pre- vent either faction from gaining undisputed control. As a result, periods of deradicalization alternated with occasional outbursts of extremism. By 1985, Rafsanjani and his supporters had begun to curb the excesses of "Islamiza- tion" and Iranian officials were signaling their desire to restore Iran's con- tacts with the outside world. In addition to a detente with Saudi Arabia and several Western states, Iran began seeking advanced U. S. weaponry from a number of Israeli intermediaries. This policy was a direct response to the de- mands imposed by Iran's war with Iraq and marked a noteworthy depar- ture from its public antipathy toward! Israel and the "Great Satan. "28 The initiative came to an abrupt end when Rafsanjani's internal opponents leaked word of his negotiations with the United States. The news brought intense criticism from the radicals, but Khomeini condemned this new
threat to unity, and Rafsanjani and the moderates emerged in an even stronger position. Khomeini continued to back them, and the trial and sub- sequent execution of Mehdi Hashemi, former head of the bureau dealing with foreign revolutionaries, was a major setback for the radicals. 29
As Rafsanjani and the pragmatists continued to consolidate their posi- tion during 1988, evidence of a renewed drive toward moderation was ap- parent. The most obvious sign was the ceasefire with Iraq-which entailed abandoning the oft-repeated goal of toppling Saddam Hussein-but Khomeini also agreed to a series of administrative initiatives that curtailed the role of religious authorities. Both Khomeini and Rafsanjani made state- ments stressing that religious principles must "adapt to the requirements of time and place," and the speaker later declared that although "the law
27 The membership of each faction changed over time, and some individuals supported one side on certain issues but not on others. See Akhavi, "Elite Factionalism"; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy"; Middle East Contemporary Survey (hereafter MECS), vol. 8: 1983-84 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies/ Shiloah Center, 1986), 43(}-33; MECS 1988 (Boulde1; Colo. : Westview, 1990), 493-<)4; and Shireen T. Hunter, Iran after Kho- meini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 36-39.
28 See Menashri, Iran, 322-25, 374-75.
29 Hashemi was believed to be responsible for leaking word of the arms deals. Another sign of internal differences was the decision to disband the Islamic Revolution Party in 1987. Raf- sanjani admitted in 1986 that there were "two relatively powerful factions in our country. . . . They may in fact be regarded as two parties without names. " He termed the decision to dis- band the party "temporary" and said that it might be revived "if the consensus which Jed to its formation in 1979 is available again. " See Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 162.
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should follow Islamic doctrine . . . priority will be given to government de- cisions over doctrine. " Khomeini also issued a formal edict (orfatwa) de- claring that the authority of the Islamic state was the same as it had been in the time of Muhammed, implying that government decisions could super- sede Islamic law. "Our government," he declared, "has priority over all other Islamic tenets, even over prayer, fasting, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. " Thus, after having overthrown one regime in the name of Islamic law, Khomeini in effect declared that the Islamic Republic could disregard Islam if the interests of the state required it. Other signs of liberalization in- cluded the open endorsement of birth control by several prominent theolo- gians, the implementation of a law permitting the registration of new political parties, and public calls for greater freedom of expression in uni- versities and more flexibility in the veiling of women. These steps did not imply a new tolerance toward all domestic opponents, however, and sev- eral radical clerics and a large number of suspected leftists were reportedly executed later in the year. 30
As before, however, these acts of moderation were followed by a subse- quent tilt toward the revolutionary purists. The occasion for this shift was the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses, whose satirical por- trayal of Muhammed had already sparked protests in other Muslim coun- tries. In February 1989, Khomeini stunned the world by sentencing Rushdie (who lived in England) to death and publicly exhorting "zealous Muslims" to carry out his order. Iran offered a $2. 6 million reward to Rushdie's execu- tioner, and Khomeini declared that the entire episode was divinely intended to warn Iran against an overly "pragmatic" foreign policy. 31
Khomeini's sudden reversal was meant to ensure that Iran's revolution- ary ideals were not entirely abandoned. If compromise and moderation had been necessary to save the revolution in 1988, Khomeini now saw a need to rekindle ideological purity and revolutionary commitment. According to David Menashri, "Rushdie's book served the revolution just as the Ameri- can hostages had in 1979; it unified the revolutionary forces against the ex- ternal demonical enemy and stirred up passions around an issue which all believers could . . . identify with. "32
30 In January 1989, Khomeini also approved a series of legislative reforms that further di- luted the authority of religious experts and gave greater priority to state (as opposed to the- ological) interests. For these quotations and events, see MECS I988, 472-73- 486--88; andl Wright, In the Name ofGod, 172-73-
31 This sudden return to a bellicose ideological posture forced the moderates to adopt more extreme rheftoric themselves, and Rafsanjani at one point suggested that the Palestinians should kill fllve U. S. , French, or British citizens for every Arab killed in the Israeli-occupied West Bank or Gaza Strip. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 44-48; MECS 1988, 4% and Wright, In the Name of God, 201.
32 See MECS 1988, 495?
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The condemnation of Rushdie was Khorneini's last important political act. His health deteriorated in the spring and he died on June 3, 1989, at the age of eighty-six. His passing allowed Rafsanjani and the moderates to resume their efforts to adapt the principles of "Islamic government" to con- temporary political conditions. Not surprisingly, the transition to the post- Khorneini era began with new signs of moderation.
The first step was the selection of President Ali Kharnenei to succeed Khorneini as supreme jurisprudent. This decision was a further retreat from Khorneini's original blueprint for Islamic government, because Kharnenei was not an accomplished theologian. A sweeping series of constitutional amendments was approved by a national referendum in July. The new con- stitution dropped the requirement that the supreme jurisprudent be a senior religious leader (thereby legitimizing Kharnenei's selection as Khorneini's successor), abolished the position of prime minister, and strengthened the powers of the presidency. 33 Rafsanjani was elected president by an over- whelming margin in July, further cementing the moderates' hold on power. Rafsanjani emphasized that his main priority would be reconstruction and economic recovery, and his new cabinet was dominated by technocrats cho-
sen for their administrative competence rather than their ideological purity. Although the radicals were not silenced and the pragmatists had not wholly abandoned the principles of the Islamic revolution, the leaders of the regime seemed to be increasingly willing to sacrifice doctrinal purity for the sake of political stability, economic recovery, and international acceptance. 34
The radicals suffered yet another defeat in the 1991 elections, leading ? orne observers to conclude that Rafsanjani's position was more powerful than ever. 35 Yet tlhe scales quickly swung back when Kharnenei announced a crackdown on "Western culture" in the summer of 1992 and reaffirmed the death sentence on Salman Rushdie, Iran's hostility to the United States, and its commitment to spreading the revolution. 36 Kharnenei and the radicals began to strip Rafsanjani of many of the powers he had previously accumu- lated and forced him to abandon his efforts to establish better relations with the Wfst. The radical resurgence was partly a response to Rafsanjani's failed attempts to liberalize the economy, but it also reflected the incomplete insti-
33 See Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 25-26; MECS 1989 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1991), 344, 348-53; and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 34-35.
34 See MECS 1989, 341-62.
35 See R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: North and South," ME/ 46, no. 3 (1992), 394-<)5; and Said Amir Arjomand, "A Victory for the Pragmatists: The Islamic Fundamental- ist Reaction in Iran," in Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991 ).
36 On July 29, 1992, Ayatollah Khamenei warned, "One must never believe that the United States, the everlasting enemy of Islam, has put an end to its antagonism. . . . The United States is the main enemy of Islam and will remain so. " Middle East International, no. 431 (August 7, 1992), 13.
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tutionalization of the revolutionary regime and the radicals' fear that fur- ther moves toward moderation would jeopardize their own claim to rule. 37
The Islamic revolution in Iran is still a work in progress. Although the revolution created a strong state apparatus, authority remains divided, and neither the moderates nor the radicals have been able to eliminate the other faction or reduce its base of support. It has thus been difficult for the Islamic Republic to sustain a coherent set of policies, and as we shall see, this en- demic inconsistency has had especially pernicious effects on Iran's foreign relations.
THE FoREIGN RELATIONS OF REvoLUTIONARY IRAN
Foreign Policy under the Shah
Under the shah, Iranian foreign policy was directed toward the long-term goal of becoming a major world power. The foundation of this policy was the shah's alliance with the United States, which had grown in importance after the Nixon administration decided to use Iran as one of its "twin pil- lars" in the Persian Gulf region. This policy fed the shah's own ambitions;
? Iran's oil wealth fueled a massive arms buildup; and the United States be- came inextricably identified with the shah's regime. 38
Predictably, prerevolutionary Iran's relations with the Soviet Union were less favorable. The shah was understandably wary of his large northern neighbor and! perennially worried about leftist subversion within Iran itself. Iran's role as the West's "regional policeman" irritated the Soviets, as did the shah's opposition to revolutionary movements and radical states else- where in the Middle East. 39 Yet despite these disagreements and Iran's close ties with the United States, the Soviet Union and Iran maintained cordial diplomatic and economic relations, and their 1921 treaty of friendship and ? cooperation Jremained in force. 40
37 On these events, see "Iran, the Sequel: New Actors, but the Same lines," New York Times, January 23, 1994, 4:4; and also Middle East International, no. 430 Ouly 24, 1992), 13; no. 432 (Au- gust 21, 1992), 1 1; no. 438 (November 6, 1992), 12; no. 439 (November 20, 1992), 3-5.
38 Useful surveys of the U. S. -Iranian relationship include Mark J. Gasiorowski, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Bill, Eagle and Lion, chaps. 1? ; and R. K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran: The Patterns of In-
fluence (New York: Praeger, 1982).
39 Iran helped! the sultan of Oman suppress the Soviet-backed Dhofar rebellion in the early
1970s, and the shah was especially hostile to Soviet clients such as Carnal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the Baath parties in Syria and Iraq.
40 See Sepehr Zabih, "Iran's International Posture: De Facto Non-Alignment within a Pro- Western Alliance," MEJ 24, no. 3 ( 1970), 313; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics ofInfluence (New York: Praeger, 1982); and Aryeh Yodfat, The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 25-43.
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Within the Middle East, Iran's foreign policy grew more assertive as its mil- itary and economic power increased. Iran seized several islands in the Persian Gulf in 1971, and its support for the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq forced Bagh- dad to accept its terms in a long-standing dispute over the Shatt al-Arab wa- terway. Relations with Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states were friendly but guarded; although the gulf monarchies shared the shah's opposition to radicalism of any sort, they were also worried by Iran's military power and the shah's regional ambitions. Relations with Egypt improved dramatically after its realignment with the United States, but relations with Syria, Libya, and South Yemen remained hostile. These tensions help explain Iran's tacit
alignment with Israel, based on a combination of factors including shared op- position to the main Arab powers, Israel's interest in the Iranian Jewish com- munity, covert cooperation between the Israeli and Iranian intelligence services, and their shared ties to the United States. 41
Overall, Iran's foreign policy under the shah combined a pro-Western ori- entation with an ambitious effort to build Iran's military power and expand its regional role.
The shah's immediate ambitions were limited, however; al- though Iran annexed small portions of foreign territory on several occa- sions, the shah did not seek to transform the existing state system or eliminate any of his immediate neighbors. And though he occasionally in- voked Islamic symbols to attack his Arab opponents, Islam played little or no role in Iran's foreign policy prior to the revolution.
Aims and Ambitions of the Islamic Republic
Although the revolutionary coalition was divided on many issues, there was widespread agreement on the broad outlines of Iran's postrevolu- tionary foreign policy. The new regime was strongly opposed to foreign (especially U. S. ) interference and committed to an explicit policy of non- alignment. Prime Minister Bazargan announced this new policy in February 1979, and the principle of nonalignment was formally enshrined in the Con- stitution of the Islamic Republic later in the year. 42 The constitution commit- ted Iran to work for the unity of all Islamic peoples and openly endorsed efforts to export the revolution to other countries. 43 Although Khomeini at
41 OntheoriginsoftheIranian-Israelirelationship,seeUriBialer,"TheIranianConnection in Israel's Foreign Policy, 1948-1951," ME] 39, no. 2 (1985).
42 The constitution calls for "the complete expulsion of colonialism and the prevention of foreign influence" and explicitly forbids foreign military bases or any agreements "allowing a foreign power to dominate . . . the affairs of the country. " "Constitution of the Islamic Re- public," 189, 201-202.
43 The constitution states that it "provides the basis for trying to perpetuate this revolution both at home and abroad," and it emphasizes the importance of "expanding international re- lations with other Islamic movements . . . to pave the way to form the world unity of follow- ers. " Ibid. , 185.
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times stated that Iran would not use force to spread its revolution, some of his remarks (and those of several of his followers) were less restrained. 44 The new regime also undertook to aid other victims of imperialism, and the new constitution proclaimed that Iran would "protect the struggles of the weak against the arrogant, in any part of the world. "45
These principles constituted a near-total reversal of the shah's foreign pol- icy. In addition to moving to a nonaligned position, the commitment to spreading Khomeini's ideas of Islamic government challenged the legiti- macy of the existing state system and threatened the stability of Iran's im- mediate neighbors. Not surprisingly, the establishment of the Islamic Republic had dramatic effects on Iran's international position.
The United States and Revolutionary Iran
The effects of the revolution were most apparent in Iran's relations with the United States. The revolutionaries blamed the United States for the in- justices of the shah's rule, and they were especially worried that the United States would try to repeat the 1953 coup that had restored the shah to his throne. For their part, the Americans were concerned by the loss of an im- portant ally, the impact of the revolution on world oil supplies, and the pos- sibility that the shah's ouster would permit the Soviet Union to expand its own influence in an important strategic area. 46
Yet U. S. -Iranian relations seemed fairly encouraging at first. Prime Minis- ter Bazargan announced that Iran would continue exporting oil to the United States, and when a group of radical students invaded the U. S. em- bassy compound in Tehran in February 1979, the Bazargan government quickly removed them and tightened security around the embassy. Presi- dent Carter declared that the United States "would attempt to work closely with the existing government of Iran," and U. S. diplomats and intelligence officials maintained extensive contacts with the Bazargan government and tried to cultivate more radical figures such as Bani-Sadr as well. Carter also
44 According to Khomeini, Iran would "export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no God but God' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle. " Quoted in Wright, In the Name ofGod, 108. In 1981, Foreign Minister Musavi declared that one of the objectives of Iran's foreign policy was to "carry the message of Iran's Islamic revolu- tion to the [entire] world," and Ayatollah Ali Meshkini stated that the goal of the revolution was "to impose the Qur'an over the entire world. " In 1982. , then-president Ali Khamenei called on prayer leaders from forty countries to use their mosques as "prayer, political, cul- tural and military bases," in order to "prepare the ground for the creation of Islamic govern? ments in all countries. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 4S-49; and Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 2. 34-35.
45 "Constitution of the Islamic Republic," 2. 02. ; and see also Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 2. 3-2. 4, and "Khumayni's Islam," 2. 1-2. 2. ; and Rajaee, Islamic Values, 79-th.
46 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 2. 77--'fS; and Warren Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct ofa Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 2. .
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authorized shipments of gasoline and heating oil to alleviate temporary shortages in Iran and agreed to ship spare parts to the Iranian armed forces in October. 47
There were several obvious points of tension, however. Secretary of De- fense Harold Brown's statement that the United States would use military force "if appropriate" to protect its access to Persian Gulf oil alarmed Iran's new leaders, and the violent reprisals that followed the shah's departure disturbed many American observers. The U. S. Senate condemned the sum- mary executions conducted by the Revolutionary Courts in May-an action Iran denounced as "clear interference. " The new regime refused to accept the credentials of the U. S. ambassador-designate in June, expelled several
U. S. journalists in July, and canceled a $9 billion arms deal in August. 48 Un- able to establish direct contact with Khomeini or his supporters during this period, the Carter administration was forced to pin its hopes on such mod- erates as Bazargan. Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi were in- terested in developing a cordial relationship with the United States, but their authority was evaporating rapidly at this point. The radical clergy op- posed any attempt at a rapprochement, and relations between the two states worsened as the mullahs tightened their hold on power. The final break came when Carter agreed to permit the shah to fly to New York for medical treatment in October. This decision triggered a new wave of anti-U. S. demonstrations and raised new fears that the United States was preparing a counterrevolutionary coup. Bazargan met with U. S. national security advi- sor Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dispute, but his efforts ended with the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the onset of a major hostage crisis.
The United States responded to the seizure of its embassy by freezing Iranian assets, organizing an international embargo, and deploying addi- tional military forces in the region. It began transmitting propaganda broad- casts into Iran in order to undermine the Ayatollah and eventually attempted an unsuccessful rescue mission in April 1980. The continuing power struggle in Iran impeded efforts to resolve the crisis through negoti- ation, largely because Bani-Sadr lacked the authority to make a deal and because supporters of a settlement were vulnerable to accusations of insuf- ficient revolutionary zeal. 49 The breakthrough finally came in the fall of 1980, when Iran agreed to release the hostages in exchange for roughly $11 billion in frozen Iranian assets and other financial commitments. 5?
47 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 286-3-9 .
48 Ibid. , 28o-82.
49 "Chronology," ME] 34, no. 4 (198o), 475? The sheer difficulty of communicating with the
Iranian regime was a serious obstacle as well, and virtually all accounts of the hostage crisis em- phasize the confusion that U. S. negotiators faced in trying to deal with the Islamic Republic.
50 The most complete account of the hostage negotiators (though written entirely from the U. S. perspective), is Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran. See also Sick, All Fall Down,
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By confirming each side's impression that the other was unremittingly hostile, the hostage crisis cast an enduring shadow over U. S. -Iranian re- lations. U. S. pressure on Iran strengthened the revolutionaries' image of American hostility, and the radical clergy used the threat of the "Great Satan" to undermine Bazargan and Bani-Sadr and to consolidate their own positions. 51 The abortive rescue mission also revealed that the United States still controlled significant intelligence assets within the country and reinforced Iranian fears of U. S. military action, while Iran's bellicose rhetoric and disregard for traditional diplomatic norms solidi-
fied its reputation as an aggressive revolutionary state. Iran's subsequen? actions (such as its support for the Lebanese Shiites who kidnapped sev- eral U. S. citizens and conducted the suicide bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983) merely sealed Iran's aggressive reputation in Washington.
These developments convinced the United States to increase its sup- port for conservative Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and to tilt to- wards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Initially concerned that an Iraqi victory would upset the regional balance of power, the U. S. government had quietly allowed Israel to ship several billion dollars' worth of U. S. arms and spare parts to Iran in 1981 and 1982. When the tide of battle turned in llran's favor, however, the U. S. State Department began a diplo- matic campaign to persuade other states to deny military equipment to Iran. The United States began providing intelligence information to Iraq in 1982 and replenished the stockpiles of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait when they transferred U. S. -made weaponry to Baghdad. The United States reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984 and began covertly supporting Iranian exile groups during this period as well. 52
chaps. 9-15; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 293-304; Pierre Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1981); Brzezinski, Power and Principle, chap. 13; and Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year ofthe Carter Presidency (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1982).
51 As Rafsanjani remarked after the hostage settlement, "America continues to remain our enemy, and, accordingly, we are America's enemy. . . . This will continue for a long time. " Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 205; and see also Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolution," 49?
52 See Anthony Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1 984-1987: Strategic Im- plications and Policy Options (London: Jane's, 1987), esp. 79; "U. S. Said to Aid Iranian Exiles in Combat and Political Units," and "U. S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War against Iran," New York Times, March 7, 1982, A1, A12; January 26, 1992, At, A4; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Routledge, 1991), 96; Ralph King, The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications, Adelphi Paper no. 219 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 53?
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? The Iranian Revolution
The main departure from this policy was the notorious Iran-contra arms deal. 53 This initiative rested on the hope that supplying arms would strengthen "moderate forces" within the Islamic Republic, who would help obtain the release of the U. S. hostages in Lebanon and work to improve U. S. -Iranian relations. This goal also reflected U. S. concerns that Iran was in- creasingly vulnerable to Soviet pressure or subversion, as well as the expec- tation that the threat from Moscow would make Iran more receptive to U. S. overtures. 54
In the summer of 1985, U. S. and Israeli officials began negotiating to sell advanced weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of U. S. citizens held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. Lacking both direct access to the revolu- tionary government and accurate information about internal developments within Iran, the U. S. government-or more precisely, the cabal within the National Security Council that conducted the negotiations-decided to use a shady Iranian arms merchant, Manucher Ghorbanifar, as their principal intermediary. The initiative was soon taken over by Oliver North, a marine officer assigned to the U. S. National Security Council, and he and former U. S. national security advisor Robert C. McFarlane eventually made a secret visit to Tehran in May 1986 in an unsuccessful venture to get the hostages released. The continuing power struggle between moderates and extremists in Iran brought the negotiations to an end in November 1986, but not before the U. S. had sent Iran nearly sixteen hundred antitank missiles, assorted spare parts, and valuable intelligence information on Iraqi military deploy- ments.
The attempt to trade arms for hostages improved neither the situation in Lebanon, the position of the Iranian "moderates," nor the state of U. S. -Iranian relations. Although the Shiites released one U. S. hostage in September 1985
53 The best account of the Iran-contra affair is Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran- Contra Affairs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). See also James A. Bill, "The U. S. Over- ture to Iran, 1985-86: An Analysis," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 166-7- 9;PeterKornbluhandMalcolmByrne,eds. ,TheIran-ContraScandal:TheDeclassifiedHis- tory (New York: New Press, 1993); and Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in tlze Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Free Press, 1988).
54 At the request of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency pre- pared a new intelligence estimate on Iran in May 1985. It predicted that "the Khomeini regime will face serious instability," warned that Tehran's leadership "seems to have con- cluded that improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is essential to Iranian interest," and recommended that the United States begin active efforts compete for influence in Iran. In response, a National Security Council memorandum suggested that U. S. allies be encouraged to provide Iran with "selected military equipment .
