No More Learning

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says:
"Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action. "

I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in
two ways, as stated above [3573](A[2]). First, on the part of the
appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is
a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to
charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a
venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection
is considered either in relation to the subject desirous of vengeance,
as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or
in relation to the desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in
a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even
if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance
by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some other like action.
Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being
angry, for instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one
exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal
sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin,
for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away
from the love of God and his neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that
all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually
by anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their
reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or
by doing injury to their neighbor.

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition
to the words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of
the judgment" (Mat. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of
the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave
injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to
this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity,
it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we
have said.
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Whether anger is the most grievous sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan. ] that "nothing is more repulsive
than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless*
face, and most of all than a cruel soul. " [*'Severo'. The correct text
is 'Si vero. ' The translation would then run thus . . . 'and nothing
uglier. ' And if his 'face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul! '].
Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.

Objection 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would
seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing
is said to be evil because it hurts. " Now anger is most hurtful,
because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself;
for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan. ) that "anger differs in no
way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome
than one harassed by a demon. " Therefore anger is the most grievous
sin.

Objection 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their
outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most
grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.

On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam;
for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow into hatred
and a mote become a beam. " Therefore anger is not the most grievous
sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([3574]AA[1],2), the inordinateness of
anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an
undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to
the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least
of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person,
under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the
evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those sins which
desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while
hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the envious man
desires another's evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man
desires another's evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it
is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy than anger:
since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to
desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory, than under the
aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the
aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with the
sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again,
absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than
that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the
angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which
is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "the incontinent in desire is more
disgraceful than the incontinent in anger. "

On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of
being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account
of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4,
"Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear
the violence of one provoked? " Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "The
heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles,
the tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged
and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes
sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance. "

Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of
the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement
of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than
from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the
aspect of justice, as stated above.
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Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably
assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some
angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered" or
"stern. " According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose anger
"is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time. " But this
apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems
that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the
other circumstances.

Objection 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or
"stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge,
or punishment. " Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of
anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He
says (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in
danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,
shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his
brother, "Thou fool. " But these degrees are not referable to the
aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger
is not fitting.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says
"there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger which is
called wrath [*'Fellea,' i. e. like gall. But in [3575]FS, Q[46], A[8],
St. Thomas quoting the same authority has {Cholos} which we render
'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and
"rancour. " Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.
For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons:
"ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and
this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes
"rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with the
Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered. " The same division is
given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid
division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.

I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the
passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when
treating of the passions ([3576]FS, Q[46], A[8]) how it is to be
applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly
what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have
to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin
of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.

For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two
things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards
"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause.
Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures
too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the
cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a
man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting
displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to himself. In
another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks
with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or "stern"
people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted
punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger,
or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration
in the aforesaid species.

Reply to Objection 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a
long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person
has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he
holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the
outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he
of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away
with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of
"ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense
desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be
quelled only by revenge.

Reply to Objection 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not
refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course
of the human act [*Cf. [3577]FS, Q[46], A[8], OBJ[3]]. For the first
degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says:
"Whosoever is angry with his brother. " The second degree is when the
anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into
effect; and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his
brother, Raca! " which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when
the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of
anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of
hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to
this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool! "
Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the
third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the
case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A[3], ad 2), much more
so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as
corresponding to each one of them. In the first case "judgment" is
assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be delivered, there is an
opportunity for defense": in the second case "council" is assigned,
"whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be
inflicted": to the third case is assigned "hell-fire," i. e. "decisive
condemnation. "
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Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the
capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known
by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital
vice.

Objection 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it
should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay:
'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to all
vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if
it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime. " Now no capital vice
is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore
anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the
capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above ([3578]FS, Q[84], A[3],4), a capital
vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two
reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the
part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so
far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is
attractive by its excellence, as stated above [3579](A[4]). [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q[145], A[1]]. The
second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the
mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that
anger is a capital vice.

Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the
most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results
from an injury inflicted.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[118], A[7]; Q[148], A[5];
Q[153], A[4]; [3580]FS, Q[84], A[4]), it belongs to the notion of a
capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are
committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil
under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has,
since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger
is more a capital vice than hatred is.

Reply to Objection 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices
accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the
judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however,
directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its
daughters.
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Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned
to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor,
indignation and blasphemy. " For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ.
in Deut. , qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not
be accounted a daughter of anger.

Objection 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his
rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of
anger.

Objection 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as
pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all
vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the
mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to
anger.

I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as
consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on
the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems
unworthy [indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called
"indignation. " The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so
far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like
thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise man . . .
fill his stomach with burning heat? " And thus we have "swelling of the
mind. "

Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a
twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his
anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A[5], ad 3) of the man
who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor," which
denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a
man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is
"blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely. "

Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger
gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all manner of
injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.

Reply to Objection 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out
deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up
against God: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God," i. e. to fall away from reverence
for Him is the first part of pride [*Cf. [3581] Q[162], A[7], ad 2]; and
this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks
out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.

Reply to Objection 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it
has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely
displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now
through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to
hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from
sloth rather than from anger.

Reply to Objection 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as
identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to
take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.
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Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger,
resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by
being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges
"with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice
to be altogether without anger.

Objection 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether
useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca
proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq. ). Therefore it
seems that lack of anger is not a vice.

Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's
evil is to be without reason. " Now the judgment of reason remains
unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of
anger amounts to a vice.

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is
not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience
is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not
only the wicked but even the good to do wrong. "

I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a
simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not
through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus
without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger
is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth. ,
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom):
"Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger,
properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is
angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is
said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a
movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting
from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in
man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily
follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an
obstacle.
Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot
be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether
lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a
vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment
by the judgment of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought
to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's
punishing by judgment.

Reply to Objection 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of
the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more
prompt execution [*Cf. [3582]FS, Q[24], A[3]] of reason's dictate:
else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas
"nature does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].

Reply to Objection 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his
reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of
the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just
as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so
the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.
__________________________________________________________________

OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For
Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel who
exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is
reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and
will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now
mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above ([3583]Q[157], A[4],
ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Objection 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of
punishment, as stated above ([3584]Q[157], A[1]): whereas cruelty
applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17,
"But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred. " Therefore
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of
clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in
exacting punishment. "

I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas"
[rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have
an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and
bitter taste. Now it has been stated above ([3585]Q[157], A[3], ad 1;
A[4], ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of
soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is
directly opposed to clemency.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate
punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which
inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing,
as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards
the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment,
belongs to cruelty.

Reply to Objection 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun
and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it
belongs to mercy [*Cf. [3586] Q[30], A[1]] to relieve another's
unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to
mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And
since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more
directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the
mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for
mercilessness.

Reply to Objection 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which
is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of
beneficence is in itself a punishment.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or
brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue.
Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess.
Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it
were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without
attending to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that
mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by
piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1).
Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.

Objection 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by
way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to
the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency
is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity.
For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but not that which
enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal
without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency. "
Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is
angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not
said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage. "

I answer that, "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a
likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals
of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for
some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason
alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to
those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the
person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's
torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under
bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and
resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature,
as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only
regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of
punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as
human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.

Reply to Objection 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly
opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But
savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is
directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which
according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift
of piety.

Reply to Objection 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage,
because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards
the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not
inclined to mitigate punishment.

Reply to Objection 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it
disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on
account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand,
cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of
punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
__________________________________________________________________

OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of
its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?

(2) What is the matter of modesty?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether modesty is a part of temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance.
For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every
virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to
Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order. "
Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be
reckoned a part of temperance.

Objection 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise
chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name.
Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.

Objection 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of
our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24,25, "The servant of the Lord
must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty
admonishing them that resist the truth. " Now admonishing wrong-doers is
an act of justice or of charity, as stated above ([3587]Q[33], A[1]).
Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of
temperance.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a
part of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above ([3588]Q[141], A[4];[3589] Q[157],
A[3]), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is
most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures
of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of
very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of
lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the
virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above
([3590]Q[134], A[3], ad 1), that while magnificence is about great
expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is
concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue
to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult.
This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its
principal.

Reply to Objection 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes
appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel
is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode
which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated
to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.

Reply to Objection 2: Some things need tempering on account of their
strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in
all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong
passions, and modesty about weaker passions.

Reply to Objection 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general
moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
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Whether modesty is only about outward actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions.
For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other
persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be
known to all men. " Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.

Objection 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are
distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will
not be concerned with inward passions.

Objection 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things
pertaining to the appetite---which is proper to the moral virtues---and
about things pertaining to knowledge---which is proper to the
intellectual virtues---and again about things pertaining to the
irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one
virtue, it cannot be about all these things.

On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the
"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of
them.

I answer that, As stated above [3591](A[1]), modesty differs from
temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint
is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less
difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about
modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special
difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of
modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all
that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty:
wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.

In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of
punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held
modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require
moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of
the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by "humility. "
The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is
moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third
regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done
becomingly and honestly [*Cf. [3592] Q[145], A[1]], whether we act
seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in
dress and the like.

To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain
special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions "meekness,
simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have
spoken above (Q[143]); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned
{eutrapelia} to pleasures in games, as stated above ([3593]FS, Q[60],
A[5]). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully;
and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward
actions.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding
externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by
certain outward signs.

Reply to Objection 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities
are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from
regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so
great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is
between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is
about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great
difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of
moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of
moderation.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.
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OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride
which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity;
(3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting
outward attire.

Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether humility is a virtue?

(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?

(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?

(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?

(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;

(6) Of the degrees of humility.
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Whether humility is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue
conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They
humbled his feet in fetters. " Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now
humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23):
"There is one that humbleth himself wickedly. " Therefore humility is
not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims
at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem
that humility is not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is
perfect" (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the
imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be
subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.

Objection 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions,
according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the
Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it
comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem
not to be a virtue.

On the contrary, Origen commenting on Lk. 1:48, "He hath regarded the
humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc. ): "One of the
virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our
Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart. '"

I answer that, As stated above ([3594]FS, Q[23], A[2]) when we were
treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive
to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something
repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In
respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect
of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above
([3595]FS, Q[61], A[2]) that for those appetitive movements which are a
kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and
restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil,
there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to
strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary
with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and restrain the
mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the
virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the mind against despair,
and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right
reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility
is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is
so called because he is, as it were, 'humo acclinis'" [*Literally,
'bent to the ground'], i. e. inclined to the lowest place. This may
happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance
when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.
Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done
sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings,
assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to
the Lord (Gn. 18:27), "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and
ashes. " In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may
be ill-done, for instance when man, "not understanding his honor,
compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to them" (Ps.
48:13).

Reply to Objection 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a
virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the
lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and
pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine says
in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to wit, it
would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is
done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly
speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not
consist externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).

Reply to Objection 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at
great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to
great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that
magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
that each is according to right reason.

Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First
absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor
in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him
humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as
regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect
in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state
or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with
God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Is.
40:17, "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all. " In
this way humility may be competent to every man.

Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as
directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is
defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a
matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue,
regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles
himself by subjecting himself to others.
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Whether humility has to do with the appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but
the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride
concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral.
xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first
of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written (Ps. 130:1), "Lord,
my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty. " Now eyes are the chief
aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly
concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost
the whole of Christian teaching is humility.