infra) are to be called
respectively
the highest and the great Brahm.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
g.
the Hindu incarnations of the divine in human beings with the Christian incarnation.
in the Christian religion, god also became man, but Jesus, so he argued, was never adored as a god when he was alive.
only after he had ascended into heaven and was seated at the right hand of the father, was he adored as divine.
it is only as spirit, not in his immediacy, that a human being can be considered as an incarnation of the divine.
this spiritual dimen- sion, however, appears to be absent in Hinduism and in nature religions in general (l2 m, 108/15).
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 35
still, Hegel was well aware of how seductive nature religions were for a certain kind of romanticism. thanks to their primitive and immedi- ate character, the spiritual and the natural not yet having fallen apart, nature religions had the aura of being the oldest and most original ones, not yet contaminated by the influences of culture and reflection. they were considered as reminiscences of a paradisiacal situation of harmony, beauty and innocence, in which the human being, possessing a kind of wisdom, which it is suggested, is subsequently lost, was still in a natural unity with nature and with god. thus nature religion was presented as "the true, mostly outstanding, actually divine religion" (l2 24, 238/144),8 whereas Hegel himself rather considered it as "the most contemptuous of all religions" (l2 m, 108/15). With all his sympathy for the wisdom present in these forms of religion, Hegel, sticking to the superiority of the Chris- tian religion, strongly condemned any exaltation of what was presented as being 'original' or 'primitive'. a zealous enthusiasm for eastern or even more 'primitive' religions is completely foreign to Hegel.
3. the Hindu Religion: a Religion of fantasy
in the manuscript, Hegel deals with immediate religion without making any further distinctions. it is clear, however, that, for the most part, he has the Hindu religion in mind.
When discussing the immediate or nature religions in the 1824 lec- tures Hegel distinguishes: 1) the religion of magic (encompassing african (negro), eskimo, and Chinese religions, but also Buddhism), 2) the reli- gion of fantasy, which is actually the Hindu religion, 3) the religion of the good (the Persian light religion) and 4) the religion of riddle (the egyptian religion).
in the 1827 lectures the Chinese religion of the state is explicitly men- tioned as a transitional form between the religion of magic and Bud- dhism, which receives a separate treatment (presented as the religion of
8 in his commentary Jaeschke refers to both schelling (Vorlesungen u? ber die Methode des academischen Studium) and friedrich schlegel (Sprache und Weisheit der Inder) as typical devotees of such an old religion and wisdom (see note to 146, 170-172 in 4b 688). Complaining about the low level of education in 19th century germany, people critical of their own culture had a tendency to contrast the former wisdom of the indians to it (l2 24, 249/154). in l2 31, 723/612 Hegel mentions explicitly friedrich schlegel's thesis that fragments of ? this primitive, true religion of the human spirit' can be found in all other religions.
? 36 paul cruysberghs
being-within-self ), preceding the religion of fantasy which is now charac- terised as the indian religion. 9
i have already mentioned the important modification carried out in the 1831 lectures and taken up by marheineke in the first and second editions of the Werke, in which Hegel moves the Buddhist religion from its inferior position before the indian religion to a hierarchically higher position after it. the part on determinate religion is divided now in three chapters, the first of them being natural religion, which now encompasses exclusively the eskimo, mongolian and african religions (the religions of magic in l2 27). the second chapter introduces a new principle of division: 'the splitting up (Entzweiung) of the Religious Consciousness in itself '. in this chapter, both the Chinese and the indian religions find a place of their own, followed by the lamaic-Buddhist religions. the third chapter, which is not our concern here, deals with the religion of freedom, which refers to the greek and the Roman religions, but they are preceded by so-called forms of transition, to which the religions of the good (the Persian and the Jewish religions), the religion of pain (the Phoenix and adonis cults), and the egyptian religion belong.
in order to understand what happened here, we must first turn to Hegel's analysis of the religions of magic in the 1824 lectures. there are two ele- ments that Hegel considers characteristic of the religions of magic. the first element is a practical one: that of power. a magic relation to the world presupposes a spiritual self-consciousness manifesting its overall power over nature in all its concrete forms. for example, the magic practices we find in african religions, hardly merit the name of religion, since there is no explicit reference to any divinity, but the exercise of magic power is manifestly present. the second element, which Hegel distinguishes in his 1824 lectures, is a theoretical one. it can be found in the Chinese fo tradition, the tibetan lama and other Buddhist traditions. Here the god is present in human shapes like the dalai lama or the Buddha. thanks to metempsychosis however, the god shows his being-within-self, his iden- tity with himself independently of the particular human or animal bodies it reincarnates in. this absolute reflection of the divine in itself, in which all distinctions are dissolved (l2 24, 316-317/219), is considered by Hegel
9 the english edition of the 27 lectures translates 'indian religion' as 'Hindu religion'. -- it is remarkable that in the first and second editions of the Werke, edited by Hegel's friends, the Buddhist religion (religion of being-within-itself) is dealt with after the Hindu religion (religion of fantasy). marheineke, the editor of the lectures on philosophy of religion, might have found evidence for this intervention in the 31 lectures.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 37
as the basic idea of divinity in general and thus of all religions worthy of that name. (l2 24, 316/218)
according to the 1824 lectures, the Hindu religion, qualified as the reli- gion of fantasy, brings the two moments present in the religion of magic, that of power and that of being-within-self, together. in both fo religion and Buddhism the being-within-self is indefinite and therefore qualified as nothingness (nirvana). in contrast with the essentially negative per- spective of nirvana fostered by Buddhism, Hinduism endows the divine with the determinateness that was part of the concrete exercise of magic power in merely magic religions. in the Hindu religion, Hegel contends, "divinity is objective with all its plenitude of content". (l2 24, 317/220) Whereas the Buddhist world is empty, a concrete divine world arises in Hinduism. Constituting a unity of the infinite essence and the finite shape, the divine develops into a concrete form;--and from a Hegelian point of view this is the considerable kind of progress we are supposed to encounter in all higher religions.
in comparison to the 1824 lectures, the 1827 lectures place a different accent to the treatment of Buddhism, giving it a separate treatment in the first place (cf. supra). this is quite understandable when we take into consideration that Buddhism, at least in its essence, can hardly be con- sidered as a form of magic. nonetheless, Hegel confirms that Hinduism is further developing the substantiality and the being-within-self that fo, lama and Buddhist religions stand for, "in the totality of its externality". (l2 27, 579/475) and, as in l2 24, he considers this particularisation of the universal substance, this adding of "the richness of the world" (l2 27, 581/476) as substantial progress when compared to the Buddhist position. 10 thanks to this concretisation of substantiality both natural and spiritual powers, as they manifest themselves in the concrete world, are recognized as belonging to the absolute; a belonging that has a double side: on the one hand, they appear in their particularity and independency; on the other hand, they appear as vanishing and being consumed by the univer- sal being-within-self of the first substantiality. (l2 27, 581/477)
as a matter of fact, Hegel argues, Hinduism expresses--in its own way, "according to the instinct of the concept" ("nach dem instinkt des Be- griffs") (l2 27, 586/482), the general structure of the (logical) idea: in the first place it is "one, immediate and identical with itself " (l2 27, 581/478);
10 "Here, therefore, the horizon is enlarged; we have here the totality. the viewpoint is concrete; that is the necessary progress. " (l2 27, 581/477)
? 38 paul cruysberghs
secondly, the idea differentiates itself internally, particularizes itself into different, particular shapes and powers; thirdly, the particular powers have to return to the one, to the one universal substance, insofar as they are contained by it. (l2 27, 581/478) Precisely because Hinduism makes room for the second moment of concreteness, it must be considered as a richer form of religion than Buddhism. the third moment however, is presented in a deficient way--and that is the conclusion of both the 1824 and 1827 lectures (l2 24, 326/229; l2 27, 581-584/478-479) (see infra)-- and therefore the Hindu religion itself is deficient. still, in both versions Hegel recognizes that the Hindu religion contains "the three basic deter- minations of the concept" (l2 24, 326/229), i. e. "the basics of the reason- able development, though only in its most general determinations". (l2 27, 582/478)
as for the 1831 lectures, here Hegel also recognizes the three moments of the concept, accusing especially the third moment of offering only a determination in which spirit is absent (geistlose Bestimmung). (l2 31, 734/622) more important, however, is that, as we mentioned earlier, Hegel modified quite drastically the general structure of his lectures. He reduced the natural religions to the eskimo, the mongolian and the afri- can ones, i. e. the former magic religions, which are now, more explicitly than before, denied the status of being religions in the strict sense. more important for us, however, is the introduction of a new perspective: that of the internal splitting up (Entzweiung) of the religious consciousness into a substance, on the one hand (god), and the transitory accidents (the subjects), on the other. in a way this perspective was already present in the former lectures, in which substantiality was considered as a general perspective of nature religion as such. now, the internal splitting up of the religious consciousness into a substantial and an accidental side becomes the common characteristic of the Chinese, indian, and Buddhist religions and separates them from the merely natural religions. in the Chinese reli- gion, the substance is recognized as the foundation (Grundlage) which is determined in itself. it is thought fundamentally as measure, to which human beings have to conform their actions (cf. Confucianism). the indian religion considers the substance as an abstract unity, akin to the human spirit, to which the human being has to elevate itself. the lamaic- Buddhist religion for its part is now--fundamentally different from the previous interpretations--a more concrete form of religion as compared to Hinduism, in so far as the substance becomes concrete in it: it takes the form of a particular individual (the dalai lama, Buddha gautama), to which other human beings have to raise themselves, which is supposed
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 39
to result ultimately in the complete annihilation of the self (nirvana). Concreteness remains the hierarchical criterion to evaluate the different religions of substantiality. yet instead of stressing the concreteness of the relationship to the world, as Hegel did in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, he now focuses on the concreteness of the particular individuals in which the substance finds (as in the dalai lama) or found (as in Buddha) its concrete incarnation. However, apart from the evidence that Buddhism is a histori- cally later development than Hinduism, Hegel's reasons for changing the hierarchical order of eastern religions are not very clear. His analysis of Hinduism remains substantially the same as in the former lectures and, as for the transition, Hegel just stresses the fact that "these [lamaism and Buddhism] religions are very akin to the indian one". (l2 31, 735/623) the sole argument remains the one he mentions when dealing with lamaism: "the general presence of the substance already stands down in favour of the concrete presence of the individual, which is worshipped as absolute power" (ibid. ). the incarnation of power in one (Buddha) or more (the three lamas) particular individuals, who are worshipped as such, seems to be a progress over against a worship of an endless plurality of more or less independent gods.
What might necessitate an upgrade of Buddhism is in fact that, after all, in the Hindu religion the concreteness of its form remains essentially natural: the moments of the divine fall asunder (falling asunder is typical of nature) as if they were independent entities. true religion, Hegel sug- gests, i. e. a religion of spirit in contrast to nature religion, asks for the con- crete resuming of itself into itself. it requires that the concrete not just be posited as such, but that it be posited as ideal as well--and that it be rec- ognized as such. this is not the case in Hinduism yet, whereas Buddhism, in spite of or thanks to its nirvana perspective, might be interpreted as a concrete unification of these moments. the Hindu world consists of a variegated multiplicity of gods, of powers, spiritual distinctions and sensa- tions, all of which appear as isolated and as independent, taking the form of separate human beings or even animals (l2 24, 318-319/221). 11 this mul- tiplicity of human beings and animals constitutes the "realm of fantasy" (l2 24, 319/222), in which arbitrariness appears to be the general rule: "an unrestrained flush (Taumel) of all this content" (l2 24, 323/226), a "jumble (Wirrwarr)"! (l2 24, 323/226-7) fantasy indeed can master any content
11 it might be considered as significant that the Buddha himself is worshipped as a god, as an incarnation of Vishnu in particular. (l2 31, 736/623)
? 40 paul cruysberghs
whatsoever and link freely and arbitrarily representations together. thus, the richness of fantasy has its reverse side as well: the forms appear to lose their initial independency and end up by being totally at the mercy of the arbitrariness of imagination (see also H, 74). 12
insofar as imagination is done justice to in the religion of fantasy Hegel appreciates it undeniably. still, because of the appearance of arbi- trariness and of the keeping apart of the different representations of the divine, without any definite structure, he considers it as a degradation of the basic (read: logical or conceptual) determinations instinctually and unconsciously present in Hinduism. as a consequence of these determi- nations having a "wild, disgusting shape" (l2 24, 324/228), they appear to be "baroque" (l2 24, 324/228) and even "horrifying" (greuelhaft). still, it is precisely in the conceptual determinations, and not so much in the fanci- ful shapes or representations, that Hegel as a philosopher is interested in.
4. the Conceptual determinations
in line with what we have hitherto developed, Hegel distinguishes two moments in the conceptual framework of the Hindu religion: 1) that of the substantiality of the reflection-within-self and 2) that of the form the substantiality is manifesting itself in: the determinations of the absolute. (l2 24, 325/228) We will deal with these moments first, before considering the concrete shape they take in the deities of Brahma (1) and shiva (2).
1) the moment of universal substantiality is the eternal rest of being- within-self. it is defined as a power that is not directed towards anything else, in the way that desire is, but as a power that, still and quiet, being simply reflected in itself, is enclosed in itself. (l2 24, 325/228) it thus remains isolated from the multiplicity of things, from its own concrete particularisations: "this being-within-self [. . . ] remains abstractly inward, purely by itself, as abstract power" (l2 27, 583/478). nonetheless, it needs an existence anyway, although it is supposed to have it outside the par- ticularity of the second moment. it rather takes existence in the "con-
12 Hegel thus contrasts the 'fanciful' (phantastisch) powers of the Hindu religion with the 'images of a beautiful fantasy' (einer scho? nen Phantasie) that he finds in the greek religion: "they are particular powers, although it is a wild particularity in which there is no system but only intimations of what is understandable and necessary, echoed of understood moments but still no understandable totality or systematization, much less a rational one; instead only a multiplicity in a colorful throng" (cf. infra) (l2 27, 584/479).
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 41
crete existing (daseienden),13 immediate human mind"14 (l2 27, 583/478). How this is to be understood more concretely, we will make clear below, when dealing with the concrete shape the logical determinations take in Hinduism.
2) the substantial power, even when having its existence in the con- sciousness of concrete human beings, is to be distinguished from its mani- festation, from the moments as they have been posited by the substantial power itself. these moments have a double status. they are independent beings and, at the same time, they are perishing and vanishing in the power of the one substance. on the one hand, they in fact appear as inde- pendent persons, as divine persons who are the whole itself, so that the first moment, the moment of substantiality, as a matter of fact, disappears in the particular figures (gestalten)15 in which it manifests itself. Hegel has in mind the multiplicity of natural objects and processes that are deified and personified such as "sun, moon, mountains, or rivers; or [. . . ] greater abstractions such as generation, perishing, change of shape" . . . (l2 27, 583/479). one the one hand, these gods are totalities by themselves which do not need anything beyond themselves. on the other hand, they disap- pear again, being absorbed in the one power. "the power [indeed] is the ideal, the negative, for which everything else is only as sublated, negated" (l2 24, 325/228). thus both moments are alternating perpetually: once the one is presented, then the distinction, and then the one again, etc. as a matter of fact, the one presents itself as a continuous alternating of the one and its manifestations. (l2 24, 325/228; l2 27, 585/481)
therefore, in a way, there are three, not just two moments that inter- play. (l2 24, 326/229) there is 1) the one, the universal. it must be con- ceived as manifesting itself into objectivity (Gegensta? ndlichkeit). 16 2) Being itself divine, however, the manifestation itself becomes the whole god. over against this [determinate] god, who is the manifestation of the first one, the latter, the first power that is in itself, the one as such, necessarily
13 'daseienden' has been translated in the english translation as 'concrete existing'.
14 the english translator says: 'spirit'; however, i would rather translate 'geist' here by 'mind', since it refers to the consciousness of a particular individual.
15 this multiplicity of powers is described by Hegel in his 27 lecture as 'an unbridled polytheism' (l2 27, 583/479). He thus contrasts it with the greek religion in which the gods have reached 'the beauty of figure'.
16 as in Christian theology, it can also be termed 'eternal goodness': the one grants the determinate, which is intrinsically only apparent, momentary being, though it still remains absorbed in the absolute power of the one. the one allows the finite to have a shape of its own, without having any right of its own.
? 42 paul cruysberghs
opposes itself. as such, however, it is reduced into a particular moment, so that beyond that an absolute one, a higher one, is to be posited, which can or must be called god as well. 3) thirdly, there is the alternation of both moments. this is to be termed Change as such (Vishnu). 17 it is the process of genesis and corruption, of being brought forth and being anni- hilated: to be being as not-Being. at the same time, these three moments must be considered as being one totality, a whole or a unity of its own.
these are the basic conceptual determinations Hegel distinguished both in the 1824 and in the 1827 lectures. 18 in spite of the triadic struc- ture of the one, which is referring to what we might consider as a truly dialectical structure, Hegel stresses the fundamental deficiency of the way it takes shape in the Hindu religion. (l2 24, 326/229) it is lacking a basic element that every truly spiritual religion, i. e. the Christian religion, is supposed to have. the third moment indeed is determined in Hinduism as mere becoming or change. However, that is not good enough. in the absolute idea, Hegel says, this third moment is determined as spirit. and spirit cannot be thought of in terms of mere transition. it must be con- ceived as a true return into itself, which is quite different from a continu- ous transition of being into non-being and vice versa. the third moment of Hinduism actually does not merit the status of being a third moment. that explains why the 1824 lectures initially started the development of the metaphysical structure of Hinduism with only two moments, the third one being introduced (and criticised at once) only in the end.
17 Hegel compares this third moment with what the milesian philosophers used to call ? ? ? ? ? or Justice.
18 in l27 however the content is introduced in a slightly different way. Hegel suggests that in spite of Brahm representing the simple (einfache) substance, some (three) distinc- tions are introduced according to "the instinct of the concept" (l2 27, 586/482). 1) there is the totality as such: the abstract oneness. it is considered here as one of three--thus it is distinguished from and subordinated to the oneness that encompasses the three of them. 2) the second moment is the determinateness, the distinction as such; and 3) the third moment is the concrete unity of the distinctions. Brahm is the formless unity; according to its determinateness it is tri(u)nity. thus we have two distinct powers: the triunity on the one hand (eternal goodness); then justice: that the being is not, but that it reaches its right to change, to become a particular determinateness. these three as a totality, being a whole and a unity, is called trimurti: the three essences.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 43 5. the Concrete Representations
as for the way the three basic determinations of the concept find expres- sion more concretely in the Hindu mythology (l2 24, 327/230), we can be relatively brief. the triadic structure as such is represented as trimurti. murti means soul in general: all emanations of the absolute, all particular manifestations must be interpreted as souls. the three essences or shapes we distinguished up to now, and which we must identify as respectively Brahm, Vishnu or Krishna, and shiva or mahadeva, are trimurti. from this perspective, the first moment, the one (Brahm), as an abstract unity, presents itself not as the unity of the other moments, but rather as just one of three: thus it is inferior to trimurti (ist heruntergesetzt), in so far as the unity of the three (trimurti itself as oneness) is represented as different from the first oneness. still, we must firstly take into account that in the ancient texts, in the Vedas, neither Vishnu nor shiva has yet appeared. they are both later developments, Hegel suggests. (l2 24, 334/236) secondly, there are many other gods besides the three that con- stitute trimurti; and there are many sects, each being a particular cult of a particular god or gods: mahadeva (male) and yoni (female), and further indra, the god of heaven, fire, cattle such as cows, elephants, horses, etc. ). Hegel characterises this multitude of gods and goddesses as the sphere of mere imagination (Einbildungskraft), and, as connected with this, of confusion (Verwirrung) (l2 24, 335/237; cf. l2 27, 595/490). nevertheless, in spite of the inevitable confusion, Hegel tries to make sense of at least the three highest gods.
1. the god Brahm, Brahma, or Brahman represents the first oneness we referred to (l2 24, 327/230; 27, 585/481): it is the absolute one and is to be conceived as a neutrum. the Hindu god, differently from the Jewish one, who is conceived as a subject, is 'das eine', not 'der eine' (l2 24, 339/242). it is "the eternal in itself with itself " (l2 24, 328/231), "pure being, pure uni- versality, supreme being [in english], the highest being" (H, 62). in so far as Brahm is a particular god, being one of the three persons of trimurti, (it is mostly called Brahma then), Brahm is conceived as 'der eine', as a per- son, as a (masculine) subject. as soon as the one is one of the three, it is made into something particular, and, as a consequence, a higher instance is needed: that is Brahm (in contrast to Brahma). 19 at the same time we
19 in so far as Brahma is considered as one of the three gods that constitute trimurti, he is subordinated to the universal soul, which, in that context, is sometimes called Parabrahma,
? 44 paul cruysberghs
must take into consideration that all the particular gods, in so far as they are further determinations of Brahm, are Brahm themselves. so, in a way, Brahm is reduced to the epitheton of oneness. But if this is the case, then Brahm runs the risk of becoming an empty epitheton, just an epitheton of praise, as the englishman James mill in his History of British India had suggested. (l2 24, 328-329/231-232; H, 66) thus both Vishnu and Krishna (cf.
infra) are to be called respectively the highest and the great Brahm. and shiva (or mahadeva or Rudra) is called Brahm as well. But so too the natural elements such as the water, the sun, the air, respiration, and human faculties such as love and consciousness, understanding, or happi- ness: they are all Brahm. thus Brahm, the one, is all oneness: everything that has any form of independency, of identity with itself, is Brahm. 20
But Brahm is not just conceived as the oneness in all that is one, it is also the substance from which everything proceeds or is begotten. thus, it is presented as a creator. 21 at the same time, however, it appears as inert, formless matter. from this perspective Brahm, the one substance, is both the masculine, formative activity, and the feminine, passive attitude. therefore Vishnu, appearing as a creator in his turn, can say that Brahma is his uterus, in which he sowed his seed so that everything is procreated. (l2 27, 588/84)
the last remark i want to make about Hegel's examination of Brahm concerns his position in the pantheism polemics, which already comes to the surface in the 1824 lectures (l2 24, 259-262/165-167), but more domi- nantly in the Humboldt review. Hegel agrees with Colebrooke's assertion that the old Hindu religion recognizes only one god, but that it does not sufficiently distinguish between the creator and his creation. (H, 64) in so far as Brahm is presented as oneness, the Hindu religion can be consid- ered as a form of monotheism. at the same time it is essentially panthe- istic: being the essence of all things, Brahm is immanent in and identical with all things, though it should not be identified with the concrete and
that which is above Brahma (l2 24, 328/231). in l2 27, consoling his students and apologiz- ing for his own lack of understanding i guess, Hegel remarks that "one cannot say in what determinate relation such forms stand to one another" (l2 27, 588/483).
20 Brahm, conceived under the category of pure being in which all particularity is dis- solved, constitutes, according to Hegel, the sublime dimension of the Hindu religion, which does not mean that it is beautiful or true (H, 64). Because of its abstract character, pure being instead of being truly infinite is, as a matter of fact, in line with the beginning of Hegel's logic, a finite category.
21 Hegel spends some time reporting the story, or rather one of the many stories, about the creation of the world. (l2 24, 330-334/233-236; l2 27, 588-589/484-485)
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 45
empirical things as such. it is "the being of their being-there (dasein)", not their being there as such that is considered as divine. (H, 65) Just as in the first edition of his Encyclopaedia (gW, 19, 9 ff; 405 f ), to which he himself refers explicitly, Hegel reproaches modern authors for identify- ing pantheism with the assertion that everything is god (Allesgo? tterei), a conception that, according to Hegel, exists only in the heads of these authors themselves. that Hinduism is pantheistic, but precisely not in a trivial sense, is illustrated clearly by the levels of knowledge Hegel quotes from the Humboldt book. there are three kinds of knowledge to be dis- tinguished. true knowledge consists in "seeing in all that exists, only the One unchangeable principle, the undivided in the divided. " (H, 65) the second level consists in recognizing the different or particular principles in the singular things, and the third, "the most disgusting one, the one of darkness", consists in only knowing the singular, without any reference to a general or universal principle. thus, as a matter of fact, Hegel does not so much fault the pantheism of the Hindu religion; on the contrary, he appears to sympathise with it just as he does with spinozism. He is rather blaming the "disgusting" interpretation of it by its critics. 22
2. the second principle is the concrete existence (Dasein), the preserva- tion (Erhaltung), the manifestation, of Brahm on earth. (l2 24, 327/230) that is Vishnu or Krishna. Being the incarnation of Brahm in general (das Inkarnieren des Brahms u? berhaupt) (l2 27, 589/486), Vishnu is incarnated in particular human beings like princes and kings, or in specific personifi- cations of human ideals, etc. as a matter of fact, any human passion, like e. g. a love affair, can be conceived as an incarnation. Being the taste in the waters, the shine in the sun and the moon, the mystic word in the holy books, the tone in the air, the knowledge of the knowers, etc. Krishna is what is essential in everything that is. still, the incarnations being particu- lar essences, Krishna himself remains particular and limited. therefore, all these particular generalities are to be conceived as absorbed in the one, in Krishna in so far as he is Brahm. (H, 66)
3. the third principle is that of change, of procreation and destruction (l2 24, 328/230; l2 27, 591/487). this is shiva, or mahadeva, "he who decays and procreates" (der Verderber und Erzeuger) (l2 24, 328/230-1). shiva is the return of the multiple incarnations into unity. since he is being and non-being at once, shiva can declare: "What is am i, and what is not, am i"
22 still, we should not forget that Hinduism combines this basic mono- and pantheism with an 'unbridled polytheism'. (l2 27, 583/479)
? 46 paul cruysberghs
(H, 66). He is both the present, the past and the future. "on the one hand" he is "the vast energy of life and on the other the destroyer, the devastator, the wild energy of natural life" (l2 27, 591/487). therefore he is symbol- ized by the bull and the lingam (Phallus). as has been said before, this third moment, personified by shiva, can be conceived as a prefiguration of spirit, but in a very deficient way. Hegel's criticism relates to the fact that the change occurs only in a being or a natural way: as becoming, or com- ing into being and perishing, not as a return of the one to itself: it is not a coming-to-self. the spiritual is not just change, Hegel argues, but change through which the distinction is brought to reconciliation with the first moment and through which the duality is sublated. (l2 27, 592/487)
6. Cultic aspects
How does a Hindu relate to his gods? that is the topic of cult, which Hegel pays attention to both in his lectures and in the Humboldt review. Cult is an essential part of religion that completes the concrete representations of the god or gods.
the "absolute or highest cult", Hegel affirms in the 1827 lectures, con- sists in a "complete emptying out of the human, the renunciation in which the Hindus relinquish all consciousness and willing, all passions and needs (nirvana), [or] this union with god in the mode of integral self- concentration (yoga)". (l2 27, 595/490) it presupposes a "growing lonely of the soul in emptiness" (Vereinsamen der Seele in die Leerheit) which might be compared to Christian or other forms of mysticism, but that Hegel, as far as Hinduism is concerned, radically rejects as being mere "numb- ing" (Verstumpfung) (H, 42; see also H, 34). the absence of any content, the emptiness of consciousness which the yogi is striving for, is not what Hegel recognizes in true mysticism, which has been "rich of spiritual, often highly pure, sublime and beautiful productions, because in the externally silent soul it is at once a going of it into itself and a development of the rich subject (Gegenstand) to which it relates and of its relationships to the latter" (ibid. ). this typical contrast between the Hindu cult, which is not just to be reduced to ritual sacrifices but encompasses a whole ethos, on the one hand, and a dimension of the Christian religion that is more or less akin to it, on the other, is symptomatic of Hegel's rejection of the excesses of the yogi ethos.
in the 1824 lectures, Hegel distinguishes three different forms depend- ing on the duration of the cult, being either momentaneous or more enduring.
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 47
1) in the first place, each Hindu is supposed to be Brahma himself, at least momentaneously, during the moments of prayer and meditation. the individual has to elevate itself to the level of abstract thought, to the level of the universal. insofar as it is capable of doing so, it is Brahma indeed. 23 (l2 24, 336/238) this "deification, or rather Brahmification" (H, 68) makes it understandable that there is, strictly speaking, no veneration of Brahma itself: Brahma has no temples dedicated to him or it, people do not pray to him. in fact, everyone capable of the higher forms of medita- tion can declare: "i am Brahm or the highest being" (l2 24, 337/239). 24
2) Whereas this first form of relationship of self-consciousness to the one is only momentaneous, the other ones are more enduring. one's whole existence should correspond to the universal represented by the god Brahm. therefore, a transition must be made from the moment of silent solitude and prayer into life. as a matter of fact this implies that the human individual should renounce all forms of vitality: "total indifference toward everything, and complete austerity" (l2 27, 595/491) appears to be the motto. the one shall penetrate the entire concrete life. therefore, the Hindus who are not Brahmans (see infra), have to make themselves into abstract egos: they must give up any movement, any interest, any incli- nation, any connection with their families. thus these saints, the yogis, venerated and fed by the other citizens, are making their lives into an enduring existence of Brahm.
23 this is the place where Hegel makes a reference to the modern religious belief that speaks in terms of immediate knowledge (Jacobi) (l2 24, 340/243-244): "Comparison with modern belief of reflection. immediate knowledge; god unknown. Jenseits. god is outside me: but as a negative for me. abstract being is the negative itself. Cf. the abstractum that Brahm is. existence only in my selfconsciousness. illusion to say something objective: god is only through my positing. the affirmative: only the i. modernity: i am the universal, master of all determinations; i am the one that posited them. But modern reflection is more developed, more free than Hinduism saying silently: i am Brahm. Hinduism: candid (unbefangene) stage of abstraction, beside of which the rest of the divine world remains objective. in modernity: everything is posited by me. Positing has volatilized all content of sensuous and supersensuous world. "
24 Cf. Hegel's quote from francis Wilford's Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West: "Wenn ich das gebet verrichte zu irgendeinem der go? tter, wenn ich mich auf den Boden setze, die Beine u? bereinander verschra? nke, die Ha? nde falte und gen Himmel blicke und meinen geist und meine gedanken sammle, ohne die Zunge zu bewegen, so sage ich mir selbst, ich bin Brahm oder das ho? chste Wesen" (l2 24, 337/239). ["When i perform the pu? ja? in honor of some of the gods, i seat myself on the ground, with my legs crossed in such a manner, that each foot rests upon the opposite thigh, (not under it, like a taylor, but) like those who perform tapasya. then with my eyes closed, and looking up to heaven, my hands moderately open, and close to each other, an a little elevated, i compose my mind and thoughts, and without moving the tongue, or using any of the organs of speech, i say inwardly i am Brahme, or the supreme Being. " (4b 720)]
? 48 paul cruysberghs
the yoga-doctrine, which Hegel also deals with extensively in the Humboldt review, is not considered by him as a real doctrine or science, as some philosophers had the tendency to do, but as a collection of asser- tions, which are primarily constructive and edifying (H, 30). their main aim is "a deepening without any content, a giving up of any attention of external objects, of the activity of the senses as well as the silencing of any inner sensation of a wish or a hope or a fear surging up, the silence of all inclinations and passions, as well as the absence of all images, represen- tations and of all determinate thoughts" (H, 34). Being oriented towards a complete absence of content (Inhaltslosigkeit) both of the subject and of the object, the yogi is trying to reach a state of complete unconscious- ness (H, 35). this state of abstraction is not to be understood as a transi- tional tension, but has to become a "habitual state of mind" (H, 35). 25 the highest form of perfection is a permanent state of abstraction--"a peren- nial solitude of the self-consciousness that has given up all sensations, all needs and representations of external things, thus no longer being consciousness,--even not a filled self-consciousness, which would have spirit as its content and would be insofar as it is still a consciousness;--an intuition, that does not intuit anything, that is not aware of anything--the pure emptiness of itself in itself " (H, 58). 26 ultimately, the transformation into Brahma will liberate the yogi even from metempsychosis (ibid. ).
3. the third moment is particular to the members of one particular caste, that of the Brahmans. each Brahman, each member of the caste is considered as Brahm. thus the Brahman is the god for every other Hindu who does not belong to the caste. typical of the Brahman is that his relationship to god no longer takes the negative form of renounce- ment. this is not so by accident: according to the logic of negation itself, we might say, the necessity of an affirmative relationship is confirmed. However, since the unity of Brahm remains "solitary, by itself " (einsam, fu? r sich), the concrete fulfilment of this affirmative relationship is "a wild and unruly one" (eine wilde, ausgelassene) (l2 27, 600/495).
this is the source of the fanciful polytheism (phantastische Vielgo? tterei) (l2 27, 601/496) of Hinduism, to which we have already referred. ignoring the independency of natural things, they endow them with the shape of
25 Comparing the yogi's practice to the Christian meditation (Andacht), Hegel, after hav- ing stressed the fact that both are essentially different because the Christian Andacht is not empty (cf. mysticism supra), sees an analogy between both, insofar as the Christian Andacht has to turn into a habitual state of mind as well in the form of piety (Fro? mmigkeit).
26 Hegel compares his interpretation with the modern (i. e. Jacobi's) conception of 'immedi- ate knowing'.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 49
the only independent being they know, the human being. thus the imagi- nation (Phantasie) deifies everything in an anthropomorphic way. at the same time, however, the human being itself, not yet being able to distin- guish its freedom from its natural side, is thought of in natural terms. as a consequence its life has no higher value than that of the natural objects upon which it depends. "for the Hindus" indeed, Hegel suggests, "human life is something contemptible and despicable--it has no more value than a sip of water" (l2 27, 602/497). life gains worth only through its negation. this explains, according to Hegel, the cult of human beings sacrificing themselves, their wives, or their children. 27 the dependency on natural objects on the other hand, explains the many forms of superstition, which Hegel interprets as an indication of the fact that a true concept of freedom and of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is absent. "and just as the superstition aris- ing from this lack of freedom is unbounded, so it also follows that there is no ethics to be found, no determinate form of rational freedom, no right, no duty. the Hindu people are utterly sunk in the depths of an unethical life (in die tiefste Unsittlichkeit)" (l2 27, 603/498). 28 not just in the lectures, but in the Humboldt review as well, Hegel argues that ethical life and true education (Bildung) are "eternally" impossible amongst Hindus. He con- nects this with the fact that Hindu religiosity and the doctrine of duties connected with it, are determined exclusively by the law of the castes (H, 37). Hence Hegel's conclusion: "instead of the work of wisdom, of good- ness and justice, which is known as the work of the divine world govern- ment in a higher religion, the work that is fulfilled perpetually by Krishna, is just the maintaining of the caste difference" (H, 38). 29 in the caste of the Brahmans the inner relationship to the one has taken the form of something external and natural: that of being born as a Brahman (l2 24, 345/248). those who belong to the caste of Brahmans are conscious of
27 Hegel praises Humboldt paying attention to the fact that Krishna suggests the prin- ciple that when acting, we should renounce the fruits of our acts, somehow in the line of the modern Kantian principle that the good be done for its own case, duty for the case of duty. But just as for the Kantian morality, Hegel complains that there is no transition in the mahabharata episode to the question of the goals of our actions and the content of our duty (H, 23; 35).
28 in the Humboldt review Hegel quotes the general governor of india, Warren Hast- ings, who in his foreword to the english translation of the Bhagavad-gita, warns the readers that he has to admit "zum voraus die eigenschaften von Dunkelheit, Absurdita? t, barbarischen Gebra? uchen und einer verdorbenen Moralita? t" (H, 22).
29 Here again Hegel compares the Hindu religion to the Christian religion, in which, he assumes, all distinctions of social position disappear and the human beings relate equally to god as human beings (gW 16, 38).
? 50 paul cruysberghs
their essence as thinking beings. as such they are the reincarnated ones, those who are born twice: once in a natural way, and a second time via the abstraction of spirit.
as a matter of fact the caste system reveals the fundamental contra- diction which is present at the very heart of Hinduism: that between the (ethical) order of acting, on the one hand, and the order of merely inactive (handlungslosen) submerging in Krishna, on the other (H, 40). this con- tradiction cannot be resolved because the highest moment of Hindu con- sciousness, Brahm, is in itself without any determination. determinations all fall outside the unity and can only have the character of mere external or natural determination. "this very same opposition and contradiction appears everywhere, where external cult and ceremonies are connected at the same time with the consciousness of higher interiority" (H, 57).
Conclusion
the basic problem is that the Hindu religion, according to Hegel, is not capable of reconciling the abstraction of thinking in general with the par- ticularity of the concrete. for that very reason its spirit is only that unre- strained whirl (einen haltungslosen Taumel), Hegel talked about in l2 24, 323/226, from one to the other, ending up with the unhappy situation of having to experience happiness only as annihilation of the personality (H, 59). from this perspective, Hinduism is far from being a religion of freedom, in which the concreteness of one's personality and one's con- crete situation in the world is integrated, and not annihilated in the god relationship. these types of considerations, which show up time and again, make it clear that Hegel's conception of Hinduism is far from the romantic devotee's who expected a religious renewal to come from the east, despising the achievements of both Protestantism and the enlight- enment in the Christian tradition and expecting salvation to come from elsewhere. it goes without saying that Hegel's presentation and interpre- tation of the Hindu religion is not a neutral one, but the least one can say is that his treatment of it is a thoughtful one.
Avoiding nihilism by Affirming nothing: hegel on buddhism
henk oosterling
the image of buddha is in the thinking posture with feet and arms inter- twined so that a toe extends into the mouth--this [is] the withdrawal into self, this absorption in oneself. hence the character of the people who adhere to this religion is one of tranquility, gentleness, and obedience, a character that stands above the wildness of desire and is the cessation of desire. great religious orders have been founded among these peoples; they share a common life of tranquility of spirit, in quiet, 'tranquil occupation of the spirit,' as do the bonze in China and 'the shamans of mongolia'. Attain- ment of this pure, inward stillness is expressly declared to be the goal for human beings, to be the highest state. (l2 27, 564/461)
1. introduction
the hegelian discourse on buddhism culminates in this image: the medi- tating buddha swallowing himself. this image expresses for hegel abso- lute immediacy, unarticulated in-itself. the toe-sucking posture resembles the snake swallowing its own tail as a symbol for eternity, for the infi- nite. the finite being of the human body of the buddha is united with the infinite substance of divine power. it is devoid of negativity, at least in a dialectical sense, because its substance has not been objectified. the divine substance is not negated, made abstractly conscious in a for-itself. the divine rests fully in-itself. As one critic of hegel phrased it in a quasi- mystical wordplay: "Are swallower and swallowee the same. Are they different? this indeterminacy is structural, not epiphenomenal. subject, object and abject are smeared across one another unrecognizably. "1 for hegel awareness of human limitedness is a necessary step to an identi- fication, a union and uniting, with divine power and a precondition for
1 timothy morton, 'romanticism and buddhism. hegel on buddhism', Praxis series 20, par. 14. see: http://www. rc. umd. edu/praxis/buddhism/morton/morton.
? 52 henk oosterling
subjectivity. in buddhism this essential rupture with immediacy has not taken place.
this 'thinking posture' bears witness to an incomprehensible intimacy that not so much represents meditation--it is not a symbol--as it con- cretely embodies immediacy. the image triggers all sorts of associations that, psycho-analytically, can divert, pervert and subvert the hegelian texture in different directions. hegel positions all world religions within a hierarchy of collective consciousness that realize their essence in Chris- tianity as the consummate religion with the father, the son and the holy ghost as the exemplary triad. retrospectively this power play is criticized as an ideological construct that favors Western metaphysics and politi- cally legitimizes Western expansionism. hegel's negative evaluation of buddhism's nirvana can even be understood as an articulation of the Western 'horor vacui', the fear for emptiness. i will however concentrate on other aspects in hegel's texture. i draw only one thread out of the hegelian tapestry: the evaluation of buddhist emptiness as the void and nothingness. in spite of the fact that hegel's positioning of buddhism is in itself not nihilistic, his identification of buddhism as a religion that is focused on nothingness has determined the modern debate on nihilism that even persists in the 21st century.
the dialectician slavoj Z? iz? ek still qualifies nirvana as a 'primordial void'. he frequently cites from brian victoria's Zen at War to illustrate the fascist, nihilistic mentality of Zen followers and criticizes the nai? ve hippy mentality of Western buddhism as a perfect legitimization for late capitalism. its adherers are accused of refusing to take a stand against capitalist consumerism. their refusal of revolutionary commitment to truthful political action, due to their quietism, is contrasted by Z? iz?
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 35
still, Hegel was well aware of how seductive nature religions were for a certain kind of romanticism. thanks to their primitive and immedi- ate character, the spiritual and the natural not yet having fallen apart, nature religions had the aura of being the oldest and most original ones, not yet contaminated by the influences of culture and reflection. they were considered as reminiscences of a paradisiacal situation of harmony, beauty and innocence, in which the human being, possessing a kind of wisdom, which it is suggested, is subsequently lost, was still in a natural unity with nature and with god. thus nature religion was presented as "the true, mostly outstanding, actually divine religion" (l2 24, 238/144),8 whereas Hegel himself rather considered it as "the most contemptuous of all religions" (l2 m, 108/15). With all his sympathy for the wisdom present in these forms of religion, Hegel, sticking to the superiority of the Chris- tian religion, strongly condemned any exaltation of what was presented as being 'original' or 'primitive'. a zealous enthusiasm for eastern or even more 'primitive' religions is completely foreign to Hegel.
3. the Hindu Religion: a Religion of fantasy
in the manuscript, Hegel deals with immediate religion without making any further distinctions. it is clear, however, that, for the most part, he has the Hindu religion in mind.
When discussing the immediate or nature religions in the 1824 lec- tures Hegel distinguishes: 1) the religion of magic (encompassing african (negro), eskimo, and Chinese religions, but also Buddhism), 2) the reli- gion of fantasy, which is actually the Hindu religion, 3) the religion of the good (the Persian light religion) and 4) the religion of riddle (the egyptian religion).
in the 1827 lectures the Chinese religion of the state is explicitly men- tioned as a transitional form between the religion of magic and Bud- dhism, which receives a separate treatment (presented as the religion of
8 in his commentary Jaeschke refers to both schelling (Vorlesungen u? ber die Methode des academischen Studium) and friedrich schlegel (Sprache und Weisheit der Inder) as typical devotees of such an old religion and wisdom (see note to 146, 170-172 in 4b 688). Complaining about the low level of education in 19th century germany, people critical of their own culture had a tendency to contrast the former wisdom of the indians to it (l2 24, 249/154). in l2 31, 723/612 Hegel mentions explicitly friedrich schlegel's thesis that fragments of ? this primitive, true religion of the human spirit' can be found in all other religions.
? 36 paul cruysberghs
being-within-self ), preceding the religion of fantasy which is now charac- terised as the indian religion. 9
i have already mentioned the important modification carried out in the 1831 lectures and taken up by marheineke in the first and second editions of the Werke, in which Hegel moves the Buddhist religion from its inferior position before the indian religion to a hierarchically higher position after it. the part on determinate religion is divided now in three chapters, the first of them being natural religion, which now encompasses exclusively the eskimo, mongolian and african religions (the religions of magic in l2 27). the second chapter introduces a new principle of division: 'the splitting up (Entzweiung) of the Religious Consciousness in itself '. in this chapter, both the Chinese and the indian religions find a place of their own, followed by the lamaic-Buddhist religions. the third chapter, which is not our concern here, deals with the religion of freedom, which refers to the greek and the Roman religions, but they are preceded by so-called forms of transition, to which the religions of the good (the Persian and the Jewish religions), the religion of pain (the Phoenix and adonis cults), and the egyptian religion belong.
in order to understand what happened here, we must first turn to Hegel's analysis of the religions of magic in the 1824 lectures. there are two ele- ments that Hegel considers characteristic of the religions of magic. the first element is a practical one: that of power. a magic relation to the world presupposes a spiritual self-consciousness manifesting its overall power over nature in all its concrete forms. for example, the magic practices we find in african religions, hardly merit the name of religion, since there is no explicit reference to any divinity, but the exercise of magic power is manifestly present. the second element, which Hegel distinguishes in his 1824 lectures, is a theoretical one. it can be found in the Chinese fo tradition, the tibetan lama and other Buddhist traditions. Here the god is present in human shapes like the dalai lama or the Buddha. thanks to metempsychosis however, the god shows his being-within-self, his iden- tity with himself independently of the particular human or animal bodies it reincarnates in. this absolute reflection of the divine in itself, in which all distinctions are dissolved (l2 24, 316-317/219), is considered by Hegel
9 the english edition of the 27 lectures translates 'indian religion' as 'Hindu religion'. -- it is remarkable that in the first and second editions of the Werke, edited by Hegel's friends, the Buddhist religion (religion of being-within-itself) is dealt with after the Hindu religion (religion of fantasy). marheineke, the editor of the lectures on philosophy of religion, might have found evidence for this intervention in the 31 lectures.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 37
as the basic idea of divinity in general and thus of all religions worthy of that name. (l2 24, 316/218)
according to the 1824 lectures, the Hindu religion, qualified as the reli- gion of fantasy, brings the two moments present in the religion of magic, that of power and that of being-within-self, together. in both fo religion and Buddhism the being-within-self is indefinite and therefore qualified as nothingness (nirvana). in contrast with the essentially negative per- spective of nirvana fostered by Buddhism, Hinduism endows the divine with the determinateness that was part of the concrete exercise of magic power in merely magic religions. in the Hindu religion, Hegel contends, "divinity is objective with all its plenitude of content". (l2 24, 317/220) Whereas the Buddhist world is empty, a concrete divine world arises in Hinduism. Constituting a unity of the infinite essence and the finite shape, the divine develops into a concrete form;--and from a Hegelian point of view this is the considerable kind of progress we are supposed to encounter in all higher religions.
in comparison to the 1824 lectures, the 1827 lectures place a different accent to the treatment of Buddhism, giving it a separate treatment in the first place (cf. supra). this is quite understandable when we take into consideration that Buddhism, at least in its essence, can hardly be con- sidered as a form of magic. nonetheless, Hegel confirms that Hinduism is further developing the substantiality and the being-within-self that fo, lama and Buddhist religions stand for, "in the totality of its externality". (l2 27, 579/475) and, as in l2 24, he considers this particularisation of the universal substance, this adding of "the richness of the world" (l2 27, 581/476) as substantial progress when compared to the Buddhist position. 10 thanks to this concretisation of substantiality both natural and spiritual powers, as they manifest themselves in the concrete world, are recognized as belonging to the absolute; a belonging that has a double side: on the one hand, they appear in their particularity and independency; on the other hand, they appear as vanishing and being consumed by the univer- sal being-within-self of the first substantiality. (l2 27, 581/477)
as a matter of fact, Hegel argues, Hinduism expresses--in its own way, "according to the instinct of the concept" ("nach dem instinkt des Be- griffs") (l2 27, 586/482), the general structure of the (logical) idea: in the first place it is "one, immediate and identical with itself " (l2 27, 581/478);
10 "Here, therefore, the horizon is enlarged; we have here the totality. the viewpoint is concrete; that is the necessary progress. " (l2 27, 581/477)
? 38 paul cruysberghs
secondly, the idea differentiates itself internally, particularizes itself into different, particular shapes and powers; thirdly, the particular powers have to return to the one, to the one universal substance, insofar as they are contained by it. (l2 27, 581/478) Precisely because Hinduism makes room for the second moment of concreteness, it must be considered as a richer form of religion than Buddhism. the third moment however, is presented in a deficient way--and that is the conclusion of both the 1824 and 1827 lectures (l2 24, 326/229; l2 27, 581-584/478-479) (see infra)-- and therefore the Hindu religion itself is deficient. still, in both versions Hegel recognizes that the Hindu religion contains "the three basic deter- minations of the concept" (l2 24, 326/229), i. e. "the basics of the reason- able development, though only in its most general determinations". (l2 27, 582/478)
as for the 1831 lectures, here Hegel also recognizes the three moments of the concept, accusing especially the third moment of offering only a determination in which spirit is absent (geistlose Bestimmung). (l2 31, 734/622) more important, however, is that, as we mentioned earlier, Hegel modified quite drastically the general structure of his lectures. He reduced the natural religions to the eskimo, the mongolian and the afri- can ones, i. e. the former magic religions, which are now, more explicitly than before, denied the status of being religions in the strict sense. more important for us, however, is the introduction of a new perspective: that of the internal splitting up (Entzweiung) of the religious consciousness into a substance, on the one hand (god), and the transitory accidents (the subjects), on the other. in a way this perspective was already present in the former lectures, in which substantiality was considered as a general perspective of nature religion as such. now, the internal splitting up of the religious consciousness into a substantial and an accidental side becomes the common characteristic of the Chinese, indian, and Buddhist religions and separates them from the merely natural religions. in the Chinese reli- gion, the substance is recognized as the foundation (Grundlage) which is determined in itself. it is thought fundamentally as measure, to which human beings have to conform their actions (cf. Confucianism). the indian religion considers the substance as an abstract unity, akin to the human spirit, to which the human being has to elevate itself. the lamaic- Buddhist religion for its part is now--fundamentally different from the previous interpretations--a more concrete form of religion as compared to Hinduism, in so far as the substance becomes concrete in it: it takes the form of a particular individual (the dalai lama, Buddha gautama), to which other human beings have to raise themselves, which is supposed
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 39
to result ultimately in the complete annihilation of the self (nirvana). Concreteness remains the hierarchical criterion to evaluate the different religions of substantiality. yet instead of stressing the concreteness of the relationship to the world, as Hegel did in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, he now focuses on the concreteness of the particular individuals in which the substance finds (as in the dalai lama) or found (as in Buddha) its concrete incarnation. However, apart from the evidence that Buddhism is a histori- cally later development than Hinduism, Hegel's reasons for changing the hierarchical order of eastern religions are not very clear. His analysis of Hinduism remains substantially the same as in the former lectures and, as for the transition, Hegel just stresses the fact that "these [lamaism and Buddhism] religions are very akin to the indian one". (l2 31, 735/623) the sole argument remains the one he mentions when dealing with lamaism: "the general presence of the substance already stands down in favour of the concrete presence of the individual, which is worshipped as absolute power" (ibid. ). the incarnation of power in one (Buddha) or more (the three lamas) particular individuals, who are worshipped as such, seems to be a progress over against a worship of an endless plurality of more or less independent gods.
What might necessitate an upgrade of Buddhism is in fact that, after all, in the Hindu religion the concreteness of its form remains essentially natural: the moments of the divine fall asunder (falling asunder is typical of nature) as if they were independent entities. true religion, Hegel sug- gests, i. e. a religion of spirit in contrast to nature religion, asks for the con- crete resuming of itself into itself. it requires that the concrete not just be posited as such, but that it be posited as ideal as well--and that it be rec- ognized as such. this is not the case in Hinduism yet, whereas Buddhism, in spite of or thanks to its nirvana perspective, might be interpreted as a concrete unification of these moments. the Hindu world consists of a variegated multiplicity of gods, of powers, spiritual distinctions and sensa- tions, all of which appear as isolated and as independent, taking the form of separate human beings or even animals (l2 24, 318-319/221). 11 this mul- tiplicity of human beings and animals constitutes the "realm of fantasy" (l2 24, 319/222), in which arbitrariness appears to be the general rule: "an unrestrained flush (Taumel) of all this content" (l2 24, 323/226), a "jumble (Wirrwarr)"! (l2 24, 323/226-7) fantasy indeed can master any content
11 it might be considered as significant that the Buddha himself is worshipped as a god, as an incarnation of Vishnu in particular. (l2 31, 736/623)
? 40 paul cruysberghs
whatsoever and link freely and arbitrarily representations together. thus, the richness of fantasy has its reverse side as well: the forms appear to lose their initial independency and end up by being totally at the mercy of the arbitrariness of imagination (see also H, 74). 12
insofar as imagination is done justice to in the religion of fantasy Hegel appreciates it undeniably. still, because of the appearance of arbi- trariness and of the keeping apart of the different representations of the divine, without any definite structure, he considers it as a degradation of the basic (read: logical or conceptual) determinations instinctually and unconsciously present in Hinduism. as a consequence of these determi- nations having a "wild, disgusting shape" (l2 24, 324/228), they appear to be "baroque" (l2 24, 324/228) and even "horrifying" (greuelhaft). still, it is precisely in the conceptual determinations, and not so much in the fanci- ful shapes or representations, that Hegel as a philosopher is interested in.
4. the Conceptual determinations
in line with what we have hitherto developed, Hegel distinguishes two moments in the conceptual framework of the Hindu religion: 1) that of the substantiality of the reflection-within-self and 2) that of the form the substantiality is manifesting itself in: the determinations of the absolute. (l2 24, 325/228) We will deal with these moments first, before considering the concrete shape they take in the deities of Brahma (1) and shiva (2).
1) the moment of universal substantiality is the eternal rest of being- within-self. it is defined as a power that is not directed towards anything else, in the way that desire is, but as a power that, still and quiet, being simply reflected in itself, is enclosed in itself. (l2 24, 325/228) it thus remains isolated from the multiplicity of things, from its own concrete particularisations: "this being-within-self [. . . ] remains abstractly inward, purely by itself, as abstract power" (l2 27, 583/478). nonetheless, it needs an existence anyway, although it is supposed to have it outside the par- ticularity of the second moment. it rather takes existence in the "con-
12 Hegel thus contrasts the 'fanciful' (phantastisch) powers of the Hindu religion with the 'images of a beautiful fantasy' (einer scho? nen Phantasie) that he finds in the greek religion: "they are particular powers, although it is a wild particularity in which there is no system but only intimations of what is understandable and necessary, echoed of understood moments but still no understandable totality or systematization, much less a rational one; instead only a multiplicity in a colorful throng" (cf. infra) (l2 27, 584/479).
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 41
crete existing (daseienden),13 immediate human mind"14 (l2 27, 583/478). How this is to be understood more concretely, we will make clear below, when dealing with the concrete shape the logical determinations take in Hinduism.
2) the substantial power, even when having its existence in the con- sciousness of concrete human beings, is to be distinguished from its mani- festation, from the moments as they have been posited by the substantial power itself. these moments have a double status. they are independent beings and, at the same time, they are perishing and vanishing in the power of the one substance. on the one hand, they in fact appear as inde- pendent persons, as divine persons who are the whole itself, so that the first moment, the moment of substantiality, as a matter of fact, disappears in the particular figures (gestalten)15 in which it manifests itself. Hegel has in mind the multiplicity of natural objects and processes that are deified and personified such as "sun, moon, mountains, or rivers; or [. . . ] greater abstractions such as generation, perishing, change of shape" . . . (l2 27, 583/479). one the one hand, these gods are totalities by themselves which do not need anything beyond themselves. on the other hand, they disap- pear again, being absorbed in the one power. "the power [indeed] is the ideal, the negative, for which everything else is only as sublated, negated" (l2 24, 325/228). thus both moments are alternating perpetually: once the one is presented, then the distinction, and then the one again, etc. as a matter of fact, the one presents itself as a continuous alternating of the one and its manifestations. (l2 24, 325/228; l2 27, 585/481)
therefore, in a way, there are three, not just two moments that inter- play. (l2 24, 326/229) there is 1) the one, the universal. it must be con- ceived as manifesting itself into objectivity (Gegensta? ndlichkeit). 16 2) Being itself divine, however, the manifestation itself becomes the whole god. over against this [determinate] god, who is the manifestation of the first one, the latter, the first power that is in itself, the one as such, necessarily
13 'daseienden' has been translated in the english translation as 'concrete existing'.
14 the english translator says: 'spirit'; however, i would rather translate 'geist' here by 'mind', since it refers to the consciousness of a particular individual.
15 this multiplicity of powers is described by Hegel in his 27 lecture as 'an unbridled polytheism' (l2 27, 583/479). He thus contrasts it with the greek religion in which the gods have reached 'the beauty of figure'.
16 as in Christian theology, it can also be termed 'eternal goodness': the one grants the determinate, which is intrinsically only apparent, momentary being, though it still remains absorbed in the absolute power of the one. the one allows the finite to have a shape of its own, without having any right of its own.
? 42 paul cruysberghs
opposes itself. as such, however, it is reduced into a particular moment, so that beyond that an absolute one, a higher one, is to be posited, which can or must be called god as well. 3) thirdly, there is the alternation of both moments. this is to be termed Change as such (Vishnu). 17 it is the process of genesis and corruption, of being brought forth and being anni- hilated: to be being as not-Being. at the same time, these three moments must be considered as being one totality, a whole or a unity of its own.
these are the basic conceptual determinations Hegel distinguished both in the 1824 and in the 1827 lectures. 18 in spite of the triadic struc- ture of the one, which is referring to what we might consider as a truly dialectical structure, Hegel stresses the fundamental deficiency of the way it takes shape in the Hindu religion. (l2 24, 326/229) it is lacking a basic element that every truly spiritual religion, i. e. the Christian religion, is supposed to have. the third moment indeed is determined in Hinduism as mere becoming or change. However, that is not good enough. in the absolute idea, Hegel says, this third moment is determined as spirit. and spirit cannot be thought of in terms of mere transition. it must be con- ceived as a true return into itself, which is quite different from a continu- ous transition of being into non-being and vice versa. the third moment of Hinduism actually does not merit the status of being a third moment. that explains why the 1824 lectures initially started the development of the metaphysical structure of Hinduism with only two moments, the third one being introduced (and criticised at once) only in the end.
17 Hegel compares this third moment with what the milesian philosophers used to call ? ? ? ? ? or Justice.
18 in l27 however the content is introduced in a slightly different way. Hegel suggests that in spite of Brahm representing the simple (einfache) substance, some (three) distinc- tions are introduced according to "the instinct of the concept" (l2 27, 586/482). 1) there is the totality as such: the abstract oneness. it is considered here as one of three--thus it is distinguished from and subordinated to the oneness that encompasses the three of them. 2) the second moment is the determinateness, the distinction as such; and 3) the third moment is the concrete unity of the distinctions. Brahm is the formless unity; according to its determinateness it is tri(u)nity. thus we have two distinct powers: the triunity on the one hand (eternal goodness); then justice: that the being is not, but that it reaches its right to change, to become a particular determinateness. these three as a totality, being a whole and a unity, is called trimurti: the three essences.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 43 5. the Concrete Representations
as for the way the three basic determinations of the concept find expres- sion more concretely in the Hindu mythology (l2 24, 327/230), we can be relatively brief. the triadic structure as such is represented as trimurti. murti means soul in general: all emanations of the absolute, all particular manifestations must be interpreted as souls. the three essences or shapes we distinguished up to now, and which we must identify as respectively Brahm, Vishnu or Krishna, and shiva or mahadeva, are trimurti. from this perspective, the first moment, the one (Brahm), as an abstract unity, presents itself not as the unity of the other moments, but rather as just one of three: thus it is inferior to trimurti (ist heruntergesetzt), in so far as the unity of the three (trimurti itself as oneness) is represented as different from the first oneness. still, we must firstly take into account that in the ancient texts, in the Vedas, neither Vishnu nor shiva has yet appeared. they are both later developments, Hegel suggests. (l2 24, 334/236) secondly, there are many other gods besides the three that con- stitute trimurti; and there are many sects, each being a particular cult of a particular god or gods: mahadeva (male) and yoni (female), and further indra, the god of heaven, fire, cattle such as cows, elephants, horses, etc. ). Hegel characterises this multitude of gods and goddesses as the sphere of mere imagination (Einbildungskraft), and, as connected with this, of confusion (Verwirrung) (l2 24, 335/237; cf. l2 27, 595/490). nevertheless, in spite of the inevitable confusion, Hegel tries to make sense of at least the three highest gods.
1. the god Brahm, Brahma, or Brahman represents the first oneness we referred to (l2 24, 327/230; 27, 585/481): it is the absolute one and is to be conceived as a neutrum. the Hindu god, differently from the Jewish one, who is conceived as a subject, is 'das eine', not 'der eine' (l2 24, 339/242). it is "the eternal in itself with itself " (l2 24, 328/231), "pure being, pure uni- versality, supreme being [in english], the highest being" (H, 62). in so far as Brahm is a particular god, being one of the three persons of trimurti, (it is mostly called Brahma then), Brahm is conceived as 'der eine', as a per- son, as a (masculine) subject. as soon as the one is one of the three, it is made into something particular, and, as a consequence, a higher instance is needed: that is Brahm (in contrast to Brahma). 19 at the same time we
19 in so far as Brahma is considered as one of the three gods that constitute trimurti, he is subordinated to the universal soul, which, in that context, is sometimes called Parabrahma,
? 44 paul cruysberghs
must take into consideration that all the particular gods, in so far as they are further determinations of Brahm, are Brahm themselves. so, in a way, Brahm is reduced to the epitheton of oneness. But if this is the case, then Brahm runs the risk of becoming an empty epitheton, just an epitheton of praise, as the englishman James mill in his History of British India had suggested. (l2 24, 328-329/231-232; H, 66) thus both Vishnu and Krishna (cf.
infra) are to be called respectively the highest and the great Brahm. and shiva (or mahadeva or Rudra) is called Brahm as well. But so too the natural elements such as the water, the sun, the air, respiration, and human faculties such as love and consciousness, understanding, or happi- ness: they are all Brahm. thus Brahm, the one, is all oneness: everything that has any form of independency, of identity with itself, is Brahm. 20
But Brahm is not just conceived as the oneness in all that is one, it is also the substance from which everything proceeds or is begotten. thus, it is presented as a creator. 21 at the same time, however, it appears as inert, formless matter. from this perspective Brahm, the one substance, is both the masculine, formative activity, and the feminine, passive attitude. therefore Vishnu, appearing as a creator in his turn, can say that Brahma is his uterus, in which he sowed his seed so that everything is procreated. (l2 27, 588/84)
the last remark i want to make about Hegel's examination of Brahm concerns his position in the pantheism polemics, which already comes to the surface in the 1824 lectures (l2 24, 259-262/165-167), but more domi- nantly in the Humboldt review. Hegel agrees with Colebrooke's assertion that the old Hindu religion recognizes only one god, but that it does not sufficiently distinguish between the creator and his creation. (H, 64) in so far as Brahm is presented as oneness, the Hindu religion can be consid- ered as a form of monotheism. at the same time it is essentially panthe- istic: being the essence of all things, Brahm is immanent in and identical with all things, though it should not be identified with the concrete and
that which is above Brahma (l2 24, 328/231). in l2 27, consoling his students and apologiz- ing for his own lack of understanding i guess, Hegel remarks that "one cannot say in what determinate relation such forms stand to one another" (l2 27, 588/483).
20 Brahm, conceived under the category of pure being in which all particularity is dis- solved, constitutes, according to Hegel, the sublime dimension of the Hindu religion, which does not mean that it is beautiful or true (H, 64). Because of its abstract character, pure being instead of being truly infinite is, as a matter of fact, in line with the beginning of Hegel's logic, a finite category.
21 Hegel spends some time reporting the story, or rather one of the many stories, about the creation of the world. (l2 24, 330-334/233-236; l2 27, 588-589/484-485)
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 45
empirical things as such. it is "the being of their being-there (dasein)", not their being there as such that is considered as divine. (H, 65) Just as in the first edition of his Encyclopaedia (gW, 19, 9 ff; 405 f ), to which he himself refers explicitly, Hegel reproaches modern authors for identify- ing pantheism with the assertion that everything is god (Allesgo? tterei), a conception that, according to Hegel, exists only in the heads of these authors themselves. that Hinduism is pantheistic, but precisely not in a trivial sense, is illustrated clearly by the levels of knowledge Hegel quotes from the Humboldt book. there are three kinds of knowledge to be dis- tinguished. true knowledge consists in "seeing in all that exists, only the One unchangeable principle, the undivided in the divided. " (H, 65) the second level consists in recognizing the different or particular principles in the singular things, and the third, "the most disgusting one, the one of darkness", consists in only knowing the singular, without any reference to a general or universal principle. thus, as a matter of fact, Hegel does not so much fault the pantheism of the Hindu religion; on the contrary, he appears to sympathise with it just as he does with spinozism. He is rather blaming the "disgusting" interpretation of it by its critics. 22
2. the second principle is the concrete existence (Dasein), the preserva- tion (Erhaltung), the manifestation, of Brahm on earth. (l2 24, 327/230) that is Vishnu or Krishna. Being the incarnation of Brahm in general (das Inkarnieren des Brahms u? berhaupt) (l2 27, 589/486), Vishnu is incarnated in particular human beings like princes and kings, or in specific personifi- cations of human ideals, etc. as a matter of fact, any human passion, like e. g. a love affair, can be conceived as an incarnation. Being the taste in the waters, the shine in the sun and the moon, the mystic word in the holy books, the tone in the air, the knowledge of the knowers, etc. Krishna is what is essential in everything that is. still, the incarnations being particu- lar essences, Krishna himself remains particular and limited. therefore, all these particular generalities are to be conceived as absorbed in the one, in Krishna in so far as he is Brahm. (H, 66)
3. the third principle is that of change, of procreation and destruction (l2 24, 328/230; l2 27, 591/487). this is shiva, or mahadeva, "he who decays and procreates" (der Verderber und Erzeuger) (l2 24, 328/230-1). shiva is the return of the multiple incarnations into unity. since he is being and non-being at once, shiva can declare: "What is am i, and what is not, am i"
22 still, we should not forget that Hinduism combines this basic mono- and pantheism with an 'unbridled polytheism'. (l2 27, 583/479)
? 46 paul cruysberghs
(H, 66). He is both the present, the past and the future. "on the one hand" he is "the vast energy of life and on the other the destroyer, the devastator, the wild energy of natural life" (l2 27, 591/487). therefore he is symbol- ized by the bull and the lingam (Phallus). as has been said before, this third moment, personified by shiva, can be conceived as a prefiguration of spirit, but in a very deficient way. Hegel's criticism relates to the fact that the change occurs only in a being or a natural way: as becoming, or com- ing into being and perishing, not as a return of the one to itself: it is not a coming-to-self. the spiritual is not just change, Hegel argues, but change through which the distinction is brought to reconciliation with the first moment and through which the duality is sublated. (l2 27, 592/487)
6. Cultic aspects
How does a Hindu relate to his gods? that is the topic of cult, which Hegel pays attention to both in his lectures and in the Humboldt review. Cult is an essential part of religion that completes the concrete representations of the god or gods.
the "absolute or highest cult", Hegel affirms in the 1827 lectures, con- sists in a "complete emptying out of the human, the renunciation in which the Hindus relinquish all consciousness and willing, all passions and needs (nirvana), [or] this union with god in the mode of integral self- concentration (yoga)". (l2 27, 595/490) it presupposes a "growing lonely of the soul in emptiness" (Vereinsamen der Seele in die Leerheit) which might be compared to Christian or other forms of mysticism, but that Hegel, as far as Hinduism is concerned, radically rejects as being mere "numb- ing" (Verstumpfung) (H, 42; see also H, 34). the absence of any content, the emptiness of consciousness which the yogi is striving for, is not what Hegel recognizes in true mysticism, which has been "rich of spiritual, often highly pure, sublime and beautiful productions, because in the externally silent soul it is at once a going of it into itself and a development of the rich subject (Gegenstand) to which it relates and of its relationships to the latter" (ibid. ). this typical contrast between the Hindu cult, which is not just to be reduced to ritual sacrifices but encompasses a whole ethos, on the one hand, and a dimension of the Christian religion that is more or less akin to it, on the other, is symptomatic of Hegel's rejection of the excesses of the yogi ethos.
in the 1824 lectures, Hegel distinguishes three different forms depend- ing on the duration of the cult, being either momentaneous or more enduring.
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 47
1) in the first place, each Hindu is supposed to be Brahma himself, at least momentaneously, during the moments of prayer and meditation. the individual has to elevate itself to the level of abstract thought, to the level of the universal. insofar as it is capable of doing so, it is Brahma indeed. 23 (l2 24, 336/238) this "deification, or rather Brahmification" (H, 68) makes it understandable that there is, strictly speaking, no veneration of Brahma itself: Brahma has no temples dedicated to him or it, people do not pray to him. in fact, everyone capable of the higher forms of medita- tion can declare: "i am Brahm or the highest being" (l2 24, 337/239). 24
2) Whereas this first form of relationship of self-consciousness to the one is only momentaneous, the other ones are more enduring. one's whole existence should correspond to the universal represented by the god Brahm. therefore, a transition must be made from the moment of silent solitude and prayer into life. as a matter of fact this implies that the human individual should renounce all forms of vitality: "total indifference toward everything, and complete austerity" (l2 27, 595/491) appears to be the motto. the one shall penetrate the entire concrete life. therefore, the Hindus who are not Brahmans (see infra), have to make themselves into abstract egos: they must give up any movement, any interest, any incli- nation, any connection with their families. thus these saints, the yogis, venerated and fed by the other citizens, are making their lives into an enduring existence of Brahm.
23 this is the place where Hegel makes a reference to the modern religious belief that speaks in terms of immediate knowledge (Jacobi) (l2 24, 340/243-244): "Comparison with modern belief of reflection. immediate knowledge; god unknown. Jenseits. god is outside me: but as a negative for me. abstract being is the negative itself. Cf. the abstractum that Brahm is. existence only in my selfconsciousness. illusion to say something objective: god is only through my positing. the affirmative: only the i. modernity: i am the universal, master of all determinations; i am the one that posited them. But modern reflection is more developed, more free than Hinduism saying silently: i am Brahm. Hinduism: candid (unbefangene) stage of abstraction, beside of which the rest of the divine world remains objective. in modernity: everything is posited by me. Positing has volatilized all content of sensuous and supersensuous world. "
24 Cf. Hegel's quote from francis Wilford's Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West: "Wenn ich das gebet verrichte zu irgendeinem der go? tter, wenn ich mich auf den Boden setze, die Beine u? bereinander verschra? nke, die Ha? nde falte und gen Himmel blicke und meinen geist und meine gedanken sammle, ohne die Zunge zu bewegen, so sage ich mir selbst, ich bin Brahm oder das ho? chste Wesen" (l2 24, 337/239). ["When i perform the pu? ja? in honor of some of the gods, i seat myself on the ground, with my legs crossed in such a manner, that each foot rests upon the opposite thigh, (not under it, like a taylor, but) like those who perform tapasya. then with my eyes closed, and looking up to heaven, my hands moderately open, and close to each other, an a little elevated, i compose my mind and thoughts, and without moving the tongue, or using any of the organs of speech, i say inwardly i am Brahme, or the supreme Being. " (4b 720)]
? 48 paul cruysberghs
the yoga-doctrine, which Hegel also deals with extensively in the Humboldt review, is not considered by him as a real doctrine or science, as some philosophers had the tendency to do, but as a collection of asser- tions, which are primarily constructive and edifying (H, 30). their main aim is "a deepening without any content, a giving up of any attention of external objects, of the activity of the senses as well as the silencing of any inner sensation of a wish or a hope or a fear surging up, the silence of all inclinations and passions, as well as the absence of all images, represen- tations and of all determinate thoughts" (H, 34). Being oriented towards a complete absence of content (Inhaltslosigkeit) both of the subject and of the object, the yogi is trying to reach a state of complete unconscious- ness (H, 35). this state of abstraction is not to be understood as a transi- tional tension, but has to become a "habitual state of mind" (H, 35). 25 the highest form of perfection is a permanent state of abstraction--"a peren- nial solitude of the self-consciousness that has given up all sensations, all needs and representations of external things, thus no longer being consciousness,--even not a filled self-consciousness, which would have spirit as its content and would be insofar as it is still a consciousness;--an intuition, that does not intuit anything, that is not aware of anything--the pure emptiness of itself in itself " (H, 58). 26 ultimately, the transformation into Brahma will liberate the yogi even from metempsychosis (ibid. ).
3. the third moment is particular to the members of one particular caste, that of the Brahmans. each Brahman, each member of the caste is considered as Brahm. thus the Brahman is the god for every other Hindu who does not belong to the caste. typical of the Brahman is that his relationship to god no longer takes the negative form of renounce- ment. this is not so by accident: according to the logic of negation itself, we might say, the necessity of an affirmative relationship is confirmed. However, since the unity of Brahm remains "solitary, by itself " (einsam, fu? r sich), the concrete fulfilment of this affirmative relationship is "a wild and unruly one" (eine wilde, ausgelassene) (l2 27, 600/495).
this is the source of the fanciful polytheism (phantastische Vielgo? tterei) (l2 27, 601/496) of Hinduism, to which we have already referred. ignoring the independency of natural things, they endow them with the shape of
25 Comparing the yogi's practice to the Christian meditation (Andacht), Hegel, after hav- ing stressed the fact that both are essentially different because the Christian Andacht is not empty (cf. mysticism supra), sees an analogy between both, insofar as the Christian Andacht has to turn into a habitual state of mind as well in the form of piety (Fro? mmigkeit).
26 Hegel compares his interpretation with the modern (i. e. Jacobi's) conception of 'immedi- ate knowing'.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 49
the only independent being they know, the human being. thus the imagi- nation (Phantasie) deifies everything in an anthropomorphic way. at the same time, however, the human being itself, not yet being able to distin- guish its freedom from its natural side, is thought of in natural terms. as a consequence its life has no higher value than that of the natural objects upon which it depends. "for the Hindus" indeed, Hegel suggests, "human life is something contemptible and despicable--it has no more value than a sip of water" (l2 27, 602/497). life gains worth only through its negation. this explains, according to Hegel, the cult of human beings sacrificing themselves, their wives, or their children. 27 the dependency on natural objects on the other hand, explains the many forms of superstition, which Hegel interprets as an indication of the fact that a true concept of freedom and of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is absent. "and just as the superstition aris- ing from this lack of freedom is unbounded, so it also follows that there is no ethics to be found, no determinate form of rational freedom, no right, no duty. the Hindu people are utterly sunk in the depths of an unethical life (in die tiefste Unsittlichkeit)" (l2 27, 603/498). 28 not just in the lectures, but in the Humboldt review as well, Hegel argues that ethical life and true education (Bildung) are "eternally" impossible amongst Hindus. He con- nects this with the fact that Hindu religiosity and the doctrine of duties connected with it, are determined exclusively by the law of the castes (H, 37). Hence Hegel's conclusion: "instead of the work of wisdom, of good- ness and justice, which is known as the work of the divine world govern- ment in a higher religion, the work that is fulfilled perpetually by Krishna, is just the maintaining of the caste difference" (H, 38). 29 in the caste of the Brahmans the inner relationship to the one has taken the form of something external and natural: that of being born as a Brahman (l2 24, 345/248). those who belong to the caste of Brahmans are conscious of
27 Hegel praises Humboldt paying attention to the fact that Krishna suggests the prin- ciple that when acting, we should renounce the fruits of our acts, somehow in the line of the modern Kantian principle that the good be done for its own case, duty for the case of duty. But just as for the Kantian morality, Hegel complains that there is no transition in the mahabharata episode to the question of the goals of our actions and the content of our duty (H, 23; 35).
28 in the Humboldt review Hegel quotes the general governor of india, Warren Hast- ings, who in his foreword to the english translation of the Bhagavad-gita, warns the readers that he has to admit "zum voraus die eigenschaften von Dunkelheit, Absurdita? t, barbarischen Gebra? uchen und einer verdorbenen Moralita? t" (H, 22).
29 Here again Hegel compares the Hindu religion to the Christian religion, in which, he assumes, all distinctions of social position disappear and the human beings relate equally to god as human beings (gW 16, 38).
? 50 paul cruysberghs
their essence as thinking beings. as such they are the reincarnated ones, those who are born twice: once in a natural way, and a second time via the abstraction of spirit.
as a matter of fact the caste system reveals the fundamental contra- diction which is present at the very heart of Hinduism: that between the (ethical) order of acting, on the one hand, and the order of merely inactive (handlungslosen) submerging in Krishna, on the other (H, 40). this con- tradiction cannot be resolved because the highest moment of Hindu con- sciousness, Brahm, is in itself without any determination. determinations all fall outside the unity and can only have the character of mere external or natural determination. "this very same opposition and contradiction appears everywhere, where external cult and ceremonies are connected at the same time with the consciousness of higher interiority" (H, 57).
Conclusion
the basic problem is that the Hindu religion, according to Hegel, is not capable of reconciling the abstraction of thinking in general with the par- ticularity of the concrete. for that very reason its spirit is only that unre- strained whirl (einen haltungslosen Taumel), Hegel talked about in l2 24, 323/226, from one to the other, ending up with the unhappy situation of having to experience happiness only as annihilation of the personality (H, 59). from this perspective, Hinduism is far from being a religion of freedom, in which the concreteness of one's personality and one's con- crete situation in the world is integrated, and not annihilated in the god relationship. these types of considerations, which show up time and again, make it clear that Hegel's conception of Hinduism is far from the romantic devotee's who expected a religious renewal to come from the east, despising the achievements of both Protestantism and the enlight- enment in the Christian tradition and expecting salvation to come from elsewhere. it goes without saying that Hegel's presentation and interpre- tation of the Hindu religion is not a neutral one, but the least one can say is that his treatment of it is a thoughtful one.
Avoiding nihilism by Affirming nothing: hegel on buddhism
henk oosterling
the image of buddha is in the thinking posture with feet and arms inter- twined so that a toe extends into the mouth--this [is] the withdrawal into self, this absorption in oneself. hence the character of the people who adhere to this religion is one of tranquility, gentleness, and obedience, a character that stands above the wildness of desire and is the cessation of desire. great religious orders have been founded among these peoples; they share a common life of tranquility of spirit, in quiet, 'tranquil occupation of the spirit,' as do the bonze in China and 'the shamans of mongolia'. Attain- ment of this pure, inward stillness is expressly declared to be the goal for human beings, to be the highest state. (l2 27, 564/461)
1. introduction
the hegelian discourse on buddhism culminates in this image: the medi- tating buddha swallowing himself. this image expresses for hegel abso- lute immediacy, unarticulated in-itself. the toe-sucking posture resembles the snake swallowing its own tail as a symbol for eternity, for the infi- nite. the finite being of the human body of the buddha is united with the infinite substance of divine power. it is devoid of negativity, at least in a dialectical sense, because its substance has not been objectified. the divine substance is not negated, made abstractly conscious in a for-itself. the divine rests fully in-itself. As one critic of hegel phrased it in a quasi- mystical wordplay: "Are swallower and swallowee the same. Are they different? this indeterminacy is structural, not epiphenomenal. subject, object and abject are smeared across one another unrecognizably. "1 for hegel awareness of human limitedness is a necessary step to an identi- fication, a union and uniting, with divine power and a precondition for
1 timothy morton, 'romanticism and buddhism. hegel on buddhism', Praxis series 20, par. 14. see: http://www. rc. umd. edu/praxis/buddhism/morton/morton.
? 52 henk oosterling
subjectivity. in buddhism this essential rupture with immediacy has not taken place.
this 'thinking posture' bears witness to an incomprehensible intimacy that not so much represents meditation--it is not a symbol--as it con- cretely embodies immediacy. the image triggers all sorts of associations that, psycho-analytically, can divert, pervert and subvert the hegelian texture in different directions. hegel positions all world religions within a hierarchy of collective consciousness that realize their essence in Chris- tianity as the consummate religion with the father, the son and the holy ghost as the exemplary triad. retrospectively this power play is criticized as an ideological construct that favors Western metaphysics and politi- cally legitimizes Western expansionism. hegel's negative evaluation of buddhism's nirvana can even be understood as an articulation of the Western 'horor vacui', the fear for emptiness. i will however concentrate on other aspects in hegel's texture. i draw only one thread out of the hegelian tapestry: the evaluation of buddhist emptiness as the void and nothingness. in spite of the fact that hegel's positioning of buddhism is in itself not nihilistic, his identification of buddhism as a religion that is focused on nothingness has determined the modern debate on nihilism that even persists in the 21st century.
the dialectician slavoj Z? iz? ek still qualifies nirvana as a 'primordial void'. he frequently cites from brian victoria's Zen at War to illustrate the fascist, nihilistic mentality of Zen followers and criticizes the nai? ve hippy mentality of Western buddhism as a perfect legitimization for late capitalism. its adherers are accused of refusing to take a stand against capitalist consumerism. their refusal of revolutionary commitment to truthful political action, due to their quietism, is contrasted by Z? iz?
