No More Learning

e. the goddess of malaria, who reigned in terror by
the swampy banks of the Po.

[92] Cremona was founded in 218 B. C. as a Latin colony,
together with Placentia, to keep the Gallic tribes of North
Italy in check.

[93] The Po, Adda, and Oglio.


VITELLIUS

When Caecina had left Rome,[94] Vitellius, after an interval of a 36
few days, sent Fabius Valens hurrying to the front, and then proceeded
to drown his cares in self-indulgence. He neither made any provision
for the war, nor tried to increase the efficiency of his troops either
by haranguing or by drilling them. He did not keep himself in the
public eye, but retired into the pleasant shade of his gardens,
regarding past, present, and future with equal indifference, like one
of those listless animals which lie sluggish, and torpid so long as
you supply them with food. While he thus loitered languid and indolent
in the woods of Aricia,[95] he received the startling news of Lucilius
Bassus' treachery and the disaffection of the fleet at Ravenna. [96]
Soon afterwards he heard with mixed feelings of distress and
satisfaction that Caecina had deserted him and had been imprisoned by
the army. On his insensate nature joy had more effect than trouble.
He returned in triumph to Rome and at a crowded meeting praised the
devotion of the troops in extravagant terms. He gave orders for the
imprisonment of Publilius Sabinus, the prefect of the Guards, on the
ground of his intimacy with Caecina, and appointed Alfenus Varus[97]
in his place.

He next delivered a pompous and elaborate speech in the senate, 37
where he was loaded with far-fetched compliments by the members.
Lucius Vitellius rose to propose a harsh sentence against Caecina. The
rest of the house inveighed with assumed indignation against the
consul who had betrayed his country, the general who had betrayed his
commander-in-chief, the friend who had betrayed his benefactor to whom
he owed all his riches and distinction. But their protestations of
sympathy with Vitellius really voiced their personal vexation. [98]
None of the speeches contained any criticism of the Flavian generals.
They threw the blame on the misguided and impolitic action of the
armies, and with cautious circumlocution avoided all direct mention of
Vespasian. Caecina's consulship[99] had still one day to run, and
Rosius Regulus actually made humble petition for this one day's
office, Vitellius' offer and his acceptance exciting universal
derision. Thus he entered and abdicated his office on the same day,
the last of October. Men who were learned in constitutional history
pointed out that no one before had ever been elected to fill a
vacancy without the passing of a bill or some act of deprivation,
although there was precedent for the one day consulship in the case of
Caninius Rebilus when Caius Caesar was dictator and the civil war
necessitated prompt rewards. [100]

It was at this time that the news of the death of Junius 38
Blaesus[101] gave rise to much talk. I give the story as I find it.
When Vitellius was lying seriously ill at his house in the Servilian
Park, he noticed that a neighbouring mansion was brilliantly
illuminated at night. On asking the reason, he was told that Caecina
Tuscus[102] was giving a large dinner-party, at which Junius Blaesus
was the chief guest. He further received an exaggerated account of
their extravagance and dissipation. Some of his informants even made
specific charges against Tuscus and others, but especially accused
Blaesus for spending his days in revelry while his emperor lay ill.
There are people who keep a sharp eye on every sign of an emperor's
displeasure. They soon made sure that Vitellius was furious and that
Blaesus' ruin would be an easy task, so they cast Lucius Vitellius for
the part of common informer. He had a mean and jealous dislike for
Blaesus, whose spotless reputation far outshone his own, which was
tainted with every kind of infamy. Bursting into the emperor's
apartment, he caught up Vitellius' young son in his arms and fell at
his feet. When asked the reason of this excitement, he said it was due
to no anxiety for himself; all his suit and all his prayers were for
his brother and his brother's children. Their fears of Vespasian were
idle: between him and Vitellius lay all the legions of Germany, all
those brave and loyal provinces, and an immeasurable space of land and
sea. 'It is here in Rome,' he cried, 'in the bosom of our household
that we have an enemy to fear, one who boasts the Junii and Antonii as
his ancestors, one who shows himself affable and munificent to the
troops, posing as a descendant of imperial stock. [103] It is to him
that Rome's attention turns, while you, Sire, careless who is friend
or foe, cherish in your bosom a rival, who sits feasting at his table
and watches his emperor in pain. You must requite his unseasonable
gaiety with a night of deadly sorrow, in which he may both know and
feel that Vitellius lives and is his emperor, and, if anything should
happen, has a son to be his heir. '

Vitellius hesitated anxiously between his criminal desires and his 39
fear that, if he deferred Blaesus' death, he might hasten his own
ruin, or by giving official orders for it might raise a storm of
indignation. He decided to proceed by poison. The suspicion against
him he confirmed by going to see Blaesus and showing obvious
satisfaction. Moreover, he was heard to make the savage boast that he
had, to quote his own words, 'feasted his eyes on his enemy's
deathbed. '

Blaesus, besides his distinguished origin and refined character, was
steadfastly loyal. Even before the decline of Vitellius' cause he had
been canvassed by Caecina and other party leaders, who were turning
against the emperor, and had met them with a persistent refusal. He
was a man of quiet and blameless life, with no ambition for the
principate or, indeed, for any sudden distinction, but he could not
escape the danger of being considered worthy of it.

Meanwhile Fabius Valens, encumbered by a long train of harlots and 40
eunuchs, was conducting a leisurely advance, most unlike a march to
the front, when couriers arrived post-haste with the news that
Lucilius Bassus had surrendered the Ravenna fleet. [104] If he had
hurried forward on his march he might have been in time to save
Caecina's faltering loyalty, or to have joined the legions before the
critical engagement was fought. Many, indeed, advised him to avoid
Ravenna and to make his way by obscure by-roads to Hostilia or
Cremona. Others wanted him to send to Rome for the Guards and to break
through the enemy's lines with a strong force. Valens himself, with
helpless indecision, let the time for action go by while he took
advice; and then rejecting the advice he was offered, chose the middle
course, which is always the worst in a crisis, and thus failed both in
courage and in caution.

He wrote to Vitellius demanding reinforcements, and there arrived 41
three cohorts of Guards and a regiment of cavalry from Britain, too
many to slip through unobserved and too few to force a passage. But
even in such a crisis as this Valens' reputation was as unsavoury as
ever. He was still believed to use violence in the pursuit of illicit
pleasures, and to betray the confidence of his hosts by seducing their
wives and families. He had money and authority to help him, and the
feverish impatience of one whose star is on the wane. At last the
arrival of the reinforcements revealed the perversity of his strategy.
He had too few men to assume the offensive, even if they had been
unquestionably loyal, and their loyalty was under grave suspicion.
However, their sense of decency and respect for the general restrained
them for a while, though such ties are soon broken when troops are
disinclined for danger and indifferent to disgrace. [105] Fearing
trouble, he sent the Guards forward to Ariminum[106] with the cavalry
to secure the rear. Valens himself, with a few companions, whose
loyalty had survived misfortune, turned off into Umbria and thence to
Etruria, where he learnt the result of the battle of Cremona.
Thereupon he formed a plan, which was far from cowardly and might have
had alarming consequences, if it had succeeded. He was to seize ships
and cross to some point on the coast of Narbonnese Gaul, whence he
could rouse the provinces of Gaul and the native German tribes, and
thus raise forces for a fresh outbreak of war.

Valens' departure having dispirited the troops at Ariminum, 42
Cornelius Fuscus[107] advanced his force and, stationing
Liburnian[108] cruisers along the adjoining coast, invested the town
by land and sea. The Flavians thus occupied the Umbrian plain and the
sea-board of Picenum; and the Apennines now divided Italy between
Vitellius and Vespasian.

Valens, embarking from the Bay of Pisa, was either becalmed on a slow
sea or caught by an unfavourable wind and had to put in at the harbour
of Hercules Monoecus. [109] Stationed in the neighbourhood was Marius
Maturus, the Governor of the Maritime Alps,[110] who had remained
loyal to Vitellius, and, though surrounded by enemies, had so far been
faithful to his oath of allegiance. He gave Valens a friendly welcome
and strongly advised him not to venture rashly into Narbonnese Gaul.
This alarmed Valens, who found also that his companions' loyalty was
yielding to their fears. For Valerius Paulinus, the imperial agent 43
in the province, was an energetic soldier who had been friendly with
Vespasian in old days, and had lately sworn all the surrounding
communities to his cause. Having summoned to his flag all the Guards
discharged by Vitellius,[111] who needed no persuasion to resume the
war, he was now holding the colony of Forum Julii,[112] the key to the
command of the sea. His influence carried the more weight since Forum
Julii was his native town and, having once been an officer in the
Guards, he was respected by the men. Besides this, the inhabitants
supported their fellow citizen, and in the hope of future
aggrandizement rendered enthusiastic service to the party. When the
news of these efficient preparations, somewhat exaggerated by rumour,
came to the ears of the Vitellians, who were already in some doubt,
Fabius Valens returned to the ships with four men of the Body Guard,
three of his friends and three centurions, while Maturus and the rest
preferred to remain and swear allegiance to Vespasian. As for Valens,
though he felt safer at sea than among the cities on the coast, he was
still full of doubts for the future, since he was certain what he had
to avoid but quite uncertain whom he could trust. Eventually a gale
drove him upon the Stoechades,[113] some islands belonging to
Marseilles, and there he was overtaken by the cruisers which Paulinus
had sent in pursuit.

FOOTNOTES:

[94] The story returns again to ii. 101.

[95] La Riccia.

[96] See chap. 12.

[97] Hitherto camp-prefect (cp. ii. 29).

[98] Against Caecina for his inefficiency.

[99] Cp. i. 77.

[100] This was in 45 B. C. , when Caesar was carrying on the
government with a high hand and small regard for precedent.
Holding an election on the last day of the year, he was told
that the consul was dead: there was no one to preside. So he
promptly announced that Caninius was consul till the next
morning. 'So no one,' says Cicero, 'breakfasted during his
consulship. However, there was no crime either, and his
vigilance was such that he never closed an eye during his
whole term of office. '

[101] Cp. ii. 59.

[102] This man had been prefect of Egypt, and had built
special baths for Nero, who was expected to visit Alexandria.
But he committed the indiscretion of washing in them first,
for which Nero had banished him.

[103] Both the Junii and Antonii could claim as an ancestor
Augustus' sister Octavia; and the Junii were also connected
with M. Junius Silanus, Augustus' great-great-grandson, whom
Nero had put out of the way.

[104] See chap. 12.

[105] They had already incurred the disgrace of betraying
first Galba, then Otho.

[106] Rimini.

[107] Now admiral of the Ravenna fleet (see chap. 12).

[108] See ii. 16, note 247.

[109] Monaco.

[110] See ii. 12.

[111] Cp. ii. 67.

[112] Fréjus.

[113] Îles d'Hyères.


THE STATE OF THE PROVINCES

With the capture of Valens the tide had now fully turned in favour 44
of Vespasian. The movement had been begun in Spain by the First legion
_Adjutrix_,[114] whose reverence for Otho's memory made them hate
Vitellius. They carried the Tenth and the Sixth[115] with them. The
provinces of Gaul soon followed suit. Britain was bound to his cause
by the favour felt for one who had been sent there by Claudius in
command of the Second legion, and had fought with great distinction in
the war. But the adherence of the province was to some extent opposed
by the other legions, in which many of the centurions and soldiers had
been promoted by Vitellius. They were used to their emperor and felt
some doubt about the change. This quarrel between the legions and 45
the constant rumours of civil war, encouraged the Britons to take
heart. Their chief instigator was one Venutius. He was of a ferocious
disposition and hated the name of Rome, but his strongest motive was a
private quarrel with Queen Cartimandua, a member of a powerful family,
who ruled the Brigantes. [116] Her authority had lately increased,
since she had betrayed King Caratacus into the hands of the Romans,
and was thus considered to have provided Claudius Caesar with material
for his triumph. [117] Thus she had grown rich, and with prosperity
came demoralization. She threw over Venutius, who was her husband, and
gave her hand and kingdom to his squire, Vellocatus. This crime soon
proved the ruin of her house. The people supported her husband: she
defended her lover with passionate ferocity. Venutius therefore
summoned assistance and, aided by the simultaneous revolt of the
Brigantes, brought Cartimandua into dire straits. She petitioned for
troops from Rome. Our auxiliaries, both horse and foot, then fought
several engagements with varying success, but eventually rescued the
queen. Thus the kingdom was left in the hands of Venutius and the war
in ours.

Almost simultaneously a disturbance broke out in Germany, where 46
the inefficiency of the generals, the disaffection of the troops, the
strength of the enemy, and the treachery of our allies all combined to
bring the Roman government into serious danger. The causes and history
of this protracted struggle--for such it proved--we must leave to a
later chapter. [118] Amongst the Dacians[119] also there was trouble.
They could never be trusted, and now that the army was moved from
Moesia they were no longer under the restraint of fear. At first they
remained quiet and awaited developments. But when they saw Italy in
the flames of war, and found the whole empire divided into hostile
camps, they fell upon the winter-quarters of the auxiliary infantry
and cavalry and began to occupy both banks of the Danube. They were on
the point of storming the Roman camp as well, when Mucianus, who knew
of the victory at Cremona, sent the Sixth legion[120] against them.
For the empire was in danger of a double foreign invasion, if the
Dacians and the Germans had broken in from opposite directions. But
here, as so often, Rome's good fortune saved her by bringing Mucianus
on the scene with the forces of the East just at the moment when we
had settled matters at Cremona. Fonteius Agrippa, who had for the last
year been pro-consul in Asia, was transferred to the government of
Moesia. His forces were strengthened by a draft from the defeated
Vitellian army, for in the interest of peace it seemed prudent to
distribute these troops over the provinces and to keep their hands
tied by a foreign war.

The other peoples soon made their voices heard. Pontus[121] had 47
suddenly risen in a general rebellion at the instigation of a foreign
menial, who was in command of what had once been the royal fleet. He
was one of Polemo's freedmen, by name Anicetus, who had formerly been
influential and resented the change which had converted the kingdom
into a province of the Roman empire. He accordingly enlisted the
maritime tribes of Pontus in Vitellius' service, attracting all the
neediest ruffians with promises of plunder. At the head of no mean
force he suddenly fell upon Trapezus,[122] an ancient and famous city,
founded by Greek settlers on the frontier of the Pontic kingdom. There
he cut to pieces the auxiliaries, who had once formed the king's Body
Guard, and, after receiving the Roman franchise, had adopted our
ensigns and equipment, while still retaining all the inefficiency and
insubordination of Greek troops. Anicetus also set fire to the
fleet[123] and thus enjoyed complete mastery of the sea, since
Mucianus had moved the pick of his cruisers and all his troops to
Byzantium. The sea was overrun by natives too, who had hurriedly built
themselves boats. These, which they call 'arks',[124] are
broad-bottomed boats with low sides, built without any brass or iron
rivets. In a rough sea, as the waves rise higher and higher, the
height of the sides is raised by the addition of planks which, in the
end, enclose the whole boat under a sort of roof. They are thus left
to toss up and down on the waves. They have bows at both ends and the
paddles can be used on either side, since it is as easy and as safe to
row in one direction as in the other.

This state of things attracting Vespasian's attention, he was 48
obliged to send out a picked force of detachments from the legions
under Virdius Geminus, a soldier of tried experience. He attacked the
enemy while they were dispersed in all directions in quest of plunder,
and drove them back to their ships. He then had some Liburnian
cruisers hurriedly constructed and ran Anicetus to ground in the mouth
of the river Chobus,[125] where he had taken refuge with the King of
the Sedochezi tribe, whose alliance he had purchased by bribes. At
first, indeed, the king endeavoured to protect his petitioner by using
threats of violence, but he soon saw that it was a choice between
making war or being paid for his treachery. The barbarian's sense of
honour was unequal to this strain. He came to terms, surrendered
Anicetus and the other fugitives, and thus put an end to 'the slaves'
war'.

This victory delighted Vespasian: everything was succeeding beyond his
hopes: and to crown all the news of the battle of Cremona now reached
him in Egypt. He hurried forward all the faster towards Alexandria
with the object of bringing starvation[126] upon Vitellius' defeated
troops and the inhabitants of Rome, who were already feeling the pinch
of diminished imports. For he was at the same time making preparations
for an invasion of the adjacent province of Africa[127] by land and
sea. By cutting off their corn supply he hoped to reduce the enemy to
famine and disunion.

FOOTNOTES:

[114] The marines (see ii. 67, i. 6).

[115] X Gemina, VI Victrix.

[116] They occupied a large district of the north of England,
from the Trent to the Tyne.

[117] As a matter of fact his triumph took place in 44.
Caratacus was brought to Rome in 51. Perhaps Tacitus regards
this in itself as a 'triumph', or else he makes a venial
mistake.

[118] The rebellion on the Rhine is described in Books IV and V.

[119] In Roumania.

[120] Ferrata. Cp. ii. 83.

[121] This little kingdom west of Trebizond was left to Rome
by Polemo II, A. D. 63. Nero made it a Roman province under the
name of Pontus Polemoniacus.

[122] Trebizond.

[123] Mucianus had 'ordered the fleet to move from Pontus to
Byzantium' (ii. 83). This leads some editors to change the
text, and others to suppose that a few ships were left behind.

[124] Literally, arched boats. Tacitus describes somewhat
similar craft in _Germania_, 44.

[125] The Khopi, which flows from the Caucasus into the Euxine.

[126] Cp. chap. 8.

[127] Africa came next to Egypt in importance as a Roman
granary (cp. i. 73).


ANTONIUS' ADVANCE FROM CREMONA

Thus[128] a world-wide convulsion marked the passing of the 49
imperial power into new hands.
Meanwhile, after Cremona, the behaviour
of Antonius Primus was not so blameless as before. He had settled the
war, he felt; the rest would be plain sailing. Or, perhaps, in such a
nature as his success only brought to light his greed and arrogance
and all his other dormant vices. While harrying Italy like a conquered
country, he courted the goodwill of his troops and used every word and
every action to pave his way to power. He allowed his men to appoint
centurions themselves in place of those who had fallen, and thus gave
them a taste for insubordination; for their choice fell on the most
turbulent spirits. The generals no longer commanded the men, but were
dragged at the heels of their caprices. This revolutionary system,
utterly fatal to good discipline, was exploited by Antonius for his
own profit. [129] Of Mucianus' approach he had no fears, and thus made
a mistake even more fatal than despising Vespasian. [130]

His advance, however, continued. As winter was at hand[131] and 50
the Po had inundated the meadows, his column marched unencumbered by
heavy baggage. The main body of the victorious legions was left
behind at Verona, together with such of the soldiers as were
incapacitated by wounds or old age, and many besides who were still in
good condition. Having already broken the back of the campaign,
Antonius felt strong enough with his auxiliary horse and foot and some
picked detachments from the legions. The Eleventh[132] had voluntarily
joined the advance. They had held back at first, but, seeing Antonius'
success, were distressed to think they had had no share in it. The
column was also accompanied by a force of six thousand Dalmatian
troops, which had been recently raised. The ex-consul, Pompeius
Silvanus,[133] commanded the column, but the actual control was in the
hands of a general named Annius Bassus. Silvanus was quite ineffective
as a general, and wasted every chance of action in talking about it.
Bassus, while showing all due respect, managed him completely, and was
always ready with quiet efficiency to do anything that had to be done.
Their force was further increased by enlisting the best of the marines
from the Ravenna fleet, who were clamouring for service in the
legions. The vacancies in the fleet were filled by Dalmatians. The
army and its generals halted at Fanum Fortunae,[134] still hesitating
what policy to adopt, for they had heard that the Guards were on the
move from Rome, and supposed that the Apennines were held by troops.
And they had fears of their own. Supplies were scarce in a district
devastated by war. The men were mutinous and demanded 'shoe-money',[135]
as they called the donative, with alarming insistence. No provision
had been made either for money or for stores. The precipitate greed of
the soldiers made further difficulties, for they each looted what
might have served for them all.

I find among the best authorities evidence which shows how 51
wickedly careless were the victorious army of all considerations of
right and wrong. They tell how a trooper professed that he had killed
his brother in the last battle, and demanded a reward from his
generals. The dictates of humanity forbade them to remunerate such a
murder, but in the interests of civil war they dared not punish it.
They had put him off with the plea that they could not at the moment
reward his service adequately. And there the story stops. However, a
similar crime had occurred in earlier civil wars. In the battle which
Pompeius Strabo fought against Cinna at the Janiculum,[136] one of his
soldiers killed his own brother and then, realizing what he had done,
committed suicide. This is recorded by Sisenna. [137] Our ancestors, it
seems, had a livelier sense than we have both of the glory of good
deeds and the shame of bad. [138] These and other such instances from
past history may be appropriately cited, whenever the subject seems to
demand either an example of good conduct or some consolation for a
crime.

Antonius and his fellow generals decided to send the cavalry ahead 52
to explore the whole of Umbria, and to see whether any of the
Apennines were accessible by a gentler route; to summon the eagles and
standards[139] and all the troops at Verona,[140] and to fill the Po
and the sea with provision ships. Some of the generals continually
suggested obstacles. Antonius had grown too big for his place, and
they had surer hopes of reward from Mucianus. He was distressed that
victory had come so soon, and felt that, if he was not present when
Rome was taken, he would lose his share in the war and its glory. So
he kept on writing to Antonius and Varus in ambiguous terms, sometimes
urging them to 'press forward on their path', sometimes expatiating on
'the manifold value of delay'. He thus managed to arrange that he
could disclaim responsibility in case of a reverse, or acknowledge
their policy as his own if it succeeded. To Plotius Grypus, whom
Vespasian had lately raised to senatorial rank and put in command of a
legion, and to his other trusty friends he sent less ambiguous
instructions, and they all wrote back criticizing the haste with which
Antonius and Varus acted. This was just what Mucianus wanted. He
forwarded the letters to Vespasian with the result that Antonius'
plans and exploits were not appreciated as highly as Antonius had
hoped. This he took very ill and threw the blame on Mucianus, 53
whose charges he conceived had cheapened his exploits. Being little
accustomed to control his tongue or to obey orders, he was most
unguarded in his conversation and composed a letter to Vespasian in
presumptuous language which ill befitted a subject, making various
covert charges against Mucianus. 'It was I,' he wrote, 'who brought
the legions of Pannonia into the field:[141] it was my stimulus which
stirred up the officers in Moesia:[142] it was by my persistence that
we broke through the Alps, seized hold of Italy and cut off the German
and Raetian auxiliaries. [143] When Vitellius' legions were all
scattered and disunited, it was I who flung the cavalry on them like a
whirlwind, and then pressed home the attack with the infantry all day
and all night. That victory is my greatest achievement and it is
entirely my own. As for the mishap at Cremona, that was the fault of
the war. In old days the civil wars cost the country far more damage
and involved the destruction of more than one town. It is not with
couriers and dispatches that I serve my master, but with my sword in
my hand. Nor can it be said that I have interfered with the glory of
the men who have meanwhile settled matters in Dacia. [144] What peace
in Moesia is to them, the safety and welfare of Italy are to me. It
was my encouragement which brought the provinces of Gaul and of Spain,
the strongest parts of the whole world, over to Vespasian's side. But
my labours will prove useless, if the reward for the dangers I have
run is to fall to the man who was not there to share them. ' All this
reached the ears of Mucianus and a serious quarrel resulted. Antonius
kept it up in a frank spirit of dislike, while Mucianus showed a
cunning which was far more implacable.

FOOTNOTES:

[128] The narrative is here resumed from the end of chap. 35.

[129] Would-be centurions doubtless bribed him to influence
the soldiers in their favour.

[130] Vespasian was too big to mind being despised; Mucianus
was not, and eventually retaliated (cp. iv. 11).

[131] November.

[132] From Dalmatia (see ii. 11, 67).

[133] Governor of Dalmatia (cp. ii. 86).

[134] Fano.

[135] Apparently soldiers' slang. Probably at some period an
officer had bribed his men under the pretence of making
special grants for the purchase of nails for their shoes.

[136] 87 B. C.

[137] L. Cornelius Sisenna, who died 67 B. C. in Pompey's war
against the pirates, wrote a history of his own time, dealing
in particular with Sulla's wars.

[138] This or some similar incident seems to have become a
respected commonplace of history and poetry (cp. chap. 25).

[139] i. e. the main body of the legions.

[140] See chap. 50.

[141] See ii. 86.

[142] i. e. Aponius, Vipstanus Messala, Dillius, and Numisius
(see ii. 85, iii. 9, 10).

[143] Cp. chap. 8.

[144] i. e. Mucianus and his officers (see chap. 46).


VITELLIUS' MEASURES OF DEFENCE

After the crushing defeat at Cremona Vitellius stupidly suppressed 54
the news of the disaster, thus postponing not the danger itself but
only his precautions against it. Had he admitted the facts and sought
advice, hope and strength were still left to him: his pretension that
all went well only made matters worse. He was himself extraordinarily
silent about the war, and in Rome all discussion of the subject was
forbidden. This only increased the number of people who, if permitted,
would have told the truth, but in the face of this prohibition spread
grossly exaggerated rumours. Nor were the Flavian leaders slow to
foster these rumours. Whenever they captured Vitellian spies they
escorted them round the camp to show them the strength of the winning
army, and sent them back again. Vitellius cross-examined each of them
in private and then had them murdered. A centurion named Julius
Agrestis, after many interviews, in which he endeavoured in vain to
fire Vitellius' courage, at last with heroic persistence induced the
emperor to send him to inspect the enemy's forces and discover what
had really happened at Cremona. He made no attempt to deceive Antonius
by concealing the object of his mission, but openly avowed the
emperor's instructions, stated his intentions and demanded to be shown
everything. He was given guides, who showed him the field of battle,
the ruins of Cremona and the captured legions. Back went Agrestis to
Vitellius. Finding that the emperor disbelieved his report and even
suggested that he had been bribed, he said, 'You want some certain
evidence and, since you have no further use for me either alive or
dead, I will give you evidence that you can believe. ' And he was as
good as his word. He went straight from the emperor's presence and
committed suicide. Some say he was killed by order of Vitellius, but
they give the same account of his heroic devotion. [145]

Vitellius was like a man roused from sleep. He dispatched Julius 55
Priscus and Alfenus Varus[146] with fourteen cohorts of Guards and all
his available cavalry to hold the Apennines. A legion levied from the
marines[147] was sent after them. This large army of picked men and
horses, if there had been any general to lead it, was strong enough to
have even taken the offensive. His other cohorts[148] were given to
his brother, Lucius Vitellius, for the protection of the city. The
emperor himself gave up none of his habitual luxuries, but, feeling
nervous and depressed, he hurried on the elections and nominated
consuls for several years in advance. He lavished special
charters[149] on allied communities and extended Latin rights[150] to
foreign towns: he remitted taxation here, granted immunities there. In
fact, he took no thought for the future, and did his best to cripple
the empire. However, the mob accepted these munificent grants with
open mouths. Fools paid money for them, but wise men held them
invalid, since they could be neither given nor received without a
revolution. At last he yielded to the demands of the army and joined
the camp at Mevania,[151] where they had taken up their position. A
long train of senators followed him, many moved by their ambition, but
most by their fears. Here he was still undecided and at the mercy of
treacherous advice.

During one of his speeches a portent occurred. A cloud of 56
ill-omened birds[152] flew over his head and its density obscured the
daylight. To this was added another omen of disaster. A bull broke
from the altar, scattered the utensils for the ceremony, and escaped
so far away that it had to be killed instead of being sacrificed
according to the proper ritual. But the chief portent was Vitellius
himself. He was ignorant of soldiering, incapable of forethought: knew
nothing of drill or scouting, or how far operations should be pressed
forward or protracted. He always had to ask some one else. At every
fresh piece of news his expression and gait betrayed his alarm. And
then he would get drunk. At last he found camp life too tedious, and
on learning of a mutiny in the fleet at Misenum[153] he returned to
Rome. Every fresh blow terrified him, but of the real crisis he seemed
insensible. For it was open to him to cross the Apennines and with his
full strength unimpaired to attack the enemy while they were worn out
with cold and hunger. But by breaking up his forces he sent his
keenest soldiers, stubbornly loyal to the last, to be killed or taken
prisoner. The more experienced of his centurions disapproved of this
policy and would have told him the truth, if they had been consulted.
But the emperor's intimates refused them admittance. He had, indeed,
formed a habit of regarding wholesome advice as unpleasant, and
refusing to listen to any that was not agreeable, and in the long run
fatal.

In civil war individual enterprise counts for much. The mutiny of 57
the fleet at Misenum had been engineered by Claudius Faventinus, a
centurion whom Galba had dismissed in disgrace. To obtain his object
he had forged a letter from Vespasian promising rewards for treachery.
The admiral, Claudius Apollinaris,[154] was neither a staunch loyalist
nor an enthusiastic traitor. Accordingly Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor,
who happened to be at Minturnae,[155] offered to take the lead of the
rebels. They proceeded to win over the colonies and country towns.
Puteoli in particular was strong for Vespasian, while Capua remained
loyal to Vitellius, for they dragged their local jealousies into the
civil war. To pacify the excited troops Vitellius chose Claudius
Julianus, who had lately been in command of the fleet at Misenum and
had allowed lax discipline. To support him he was given one cohort of
the city garrison and the force of gladiators already serving under
him. The two parties encamped close to one another, and it was not
long before Julianus came over to Vespasian's side. They then joined
forces and occupied Tarracina,[156] which owed its strength more to
its walls and situation than to the character of its new garrison.

When news of this reached Vitellius, he left part of his force at 58
Narnia[157] with the prefects of the Guard,[158] and sent his brother
Lucius with six regiments of Guards and five hundred horse to cope
with the threatened outbreak in Campania. His own nervous depression
was somewhat relieved by the enthusiasm of the troops and of the
populace, who clamoured loudly for arms. For he dignified this
poor-spirited mob, which would never dare to do anything but shout, by
the specious titles of 'the army' or 'his legions'. His friends were
all untrustworthy in proportion to their eminence; but on the advice
of his freedmen he held a levy for conscription and swore in all who
gave their names. As their numbers were too great, he gave the task of
selection to the two consuls. From each of the senators he levied a
fixed number of slaves and a weight of silver. The knights offered
money and personal service, while even freedmen volunteered similar
assistance. Indeed, protestations of loyalty prompted by fear, had
gradually changed into real sympathy. People began to feel pity, not
perhaps so much for Vitellius as for the throne and its misfortunes.
He himself by his looks, his voice, his tears made ceaseless demands
upon their compassion, promising rewards lavishly and, as men do when
they are frightened, beyond all limits. He had hitherto refused the
title of Caesar,[159] but he now expressed a wish for it. He had a
superstitious respect for the name, and in moments of terror one
listens as much to gossip as to sound advice. However, while a rash
and ill-conceived undertaking may prosper at the outset, in time it
always begins to flag. Gradually the senators and knights deserted
him. At first they hesitated and waited till his back was turned, but
soon they ceased to care and openly showed their disrespect. At last
Vitellius grew ashamed of the failure of his efforts and excused them
from the services which they refused to render.

FOOTNOTES:

[145] This incident was probably another historical
commonplace. See the story from Plutarch (ii. 46, note 316),
which is also told by Suetonius and Dio.

[146] The prefects of the Guards (cp. ii. 92).

[147] At Misenum. (Leg. II Adjutrix. ) The Ravenna marines were
on the Flavian side (see chap. 50).

[148] i. e. the rest of the Guards (2), with the city garrison (4),
and police (7) (cp. ii. 93).

[149] i. e. granting them special privileges denied to other
communities in the same province.

[150] A sort of 'half-way house to Roman citizenship'. Full
commercial rights were included but not those of
intermarriage. It was possible for individual citizens in a
Latin town to obtain the full rights of a Roman.

[151] Bevagna.

[152] Dio makes them vultures and the scene a sacrifice: they
scattered the victims and nearly knocked Vitellius off his
pulpit.

[153] Described in the following chapter.

[154] He had succeeded Bassus (iii. 12).

[155] Near the mouth of the Liris.