AManthen does things that *re disagreeable knowing that they areso,hedoesthembecausehe isovercomeandfur* mounted by those that are agreeable, and that not* withstanding are uncapable to
overcome
andsurmount.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
Itisthusthat I have said that Boldness and Valour were not the iamtf thing, and that there were, some Occasions wherein the Valiant were Bold, but that it could not be infer'd from thence that all the Bold were Valiant.
* For Men become Bold by exerciseand art, and sometimes by Anger and Fury, just as they be come puiflant.
But Valour proceeds from Nature and the good Nourishment that is given to the
Soul.
tBut don'tyou say^ my dearProtagoras^ that certain People live well, that is to lay agreeably, and that others live ill, that is to lay disagreea bly >
Without doubt.
AnddoyoufaythatManlivesweU, whenhe spends his Life in Troubles and Grief.
No afluredly.
Butwhen aMan diesafterhavingspenthisLife
agreeably, don't you think he lived well> Yes Ido.
After your reckoning then is it not a good thing to live pleasantly, and is it not very bad thing to live disagreeably ?
*Hemeansthatthemore Menaredisciplin'd,trainedus toroar,ortransportedwithAnger,theyarethemorebold HecomparesBoldnesscoPuissanceandValourtoforce. But he does not fee that in Confessing that Valour proceeds from the good Nourishment given to the Soul, he acquiesceth with Socrate's Principle, thatValour isnothing but Science. So crates is going to lead him another way.
? t T o k n o w w e l l w h a t V a l o u r i s , o n e m u s t first fix w e l l w h a t
Griefand Pleasureis5andthisiswhatSocratesisgoingtodo aftej an admirable way worthy of so great a Philosopher.
N
Tis
'
? ? jo4
Protagoras: Or, 7he Sophists.
* 'TisaccordingasonedelightsinwhatisDecent and Honest, laid he.
What, Protagoras, laid I, will you he of the Opi3 nion of the Vulgar, t and will you, with them^ call certain things that are agreeable, bad, and feme others that are disagreeable, will you 'call them good?
Yes certainly.
How fayyou? Those agreeable thingsarethey bad in that which makes them agreeable, indepen- dantlyfromallthatmayhappen? Andthosedis agreeable things are they good after the fame man ner independantly on allConsequences?
| Yes, it isjust so.
. -. Then they are not bad in so far as they are disagreeable.
In Truth, Socrates, said he, I k n o w not if I ought tomakemy Answersassimpleandasgeneralas yourQuestions, andifIoughttoassertabsolutely, that all agreeable things are good and that all dila-
*"Protagorasisasham'dof whathejustnowconfess'd,for he fees the Consequence of itj therefore he contradicts him selfallofasudden,andheacknowledgesthataManwho spends his Life in honest Things, and w h o delights therein, livesagreeably,eventho'thelaidThingsbepainful. Socra- tts makes good use of this Confession, and is going to pursue thisPrinciplewhich willoverthrowtheSophistimmediatly.
t For the Vulgar are persuaded that there were some agreeablethingsthatarebad, andsome disagreeable things thataregood. Buttheyreckonthemgoodorbadonlyby their Consequences ; for to consider them in themselves they find the things that are agreeable to be good, and the disa greeable bad. . ,
|ThisSophistconfesseth onethingherewhereofheisnot in the least persuaded 5 he also retracts it in the following Answer, forheforeseesverywellthatthatConfessionwould ingage him too far. He knows not how to rid himself out ot the Trouble and Contusion he is in.
. *. 'Tis a necessary Consequence of what this Sophist con sess'd just now. For if disagreeable things are good inde- pendant from what may follow, they can't be bad because they arc disagreeable.
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. 30j
treeablethingsarebad. Methinksthatnotonly
in this Dispute, but also in all others that I may-
have, it is surest to answer that there are cer
tain agreeable things that are not good, and that
a m o n g the Disagreeable there are certain things that are not bad ? ,. and that there is a third kind which
keeps the middle and which are neither good nor bacL But don't you call those Things agreeable that are join'd with Pleasure, and which give Pleasure ?
Most assuredly.
I ask you then if they are not good in so far as they are agreeable, that is to fay, is not the Plea sure they cause something of good?
To' that, Socrates, said he, I answer you what you daily answer others, thatis, that we must ex amineit, andifitagreeswithreason,andwe-find that the agreeable and the good are but one and the same thing, we must acquiesce therewith, if not,
there's an open Field for Dispute. Whichdoyoulikebestthen, Protagoras, laidI,
will you be pleased to lead me in this Inquiry, or shall I lead you?
Itismost reasonable that you should lead me^ for you began.
I will do it, said I, and here's perhaps a means, thatwillmake thethingappearplain,asaMaster of Exercise, or a Physician seeing a Man whole Constitutionhewouldknow, inordertojudge of his Health or the Strength and good Disposition of his Body, does not content himself with looking on his Hands and Face, but fays to him, strip your self I pray you^ and let me fee your Breast and your Back, that I may judge of your State with the more certainty;Ihaveamind tousethefameConduct: with you for our Inquiry ; after having known your Sentiments of Good and of Agreeable, I must still fay to you as that Master of Exercises, my dear Protagoras, discoveryourselfalittlemore, andtell meyourThoughtsofScience. AreyourThoughts of that like those of the Vulgarj or are you of
U u other
? ? 306 Protagoras: Or, the Sophists'.
Forthe otherSentiments? ForthisistheOpinionofthe Knowledge Vulgar in reference to Science or Knowledge :They
ihaana think'lt1Sa^ingthatisneitherstrong,capable of sreeMel'r Conduct, nor worthy to command : They can't
Afagreea- fancy to themselves that it has any of thole Qua- bh defends lities-, and they perswade themselves that when Sci- ^lfen\7? n ence*sf? un^m aMan,U isnotthatwhichleadsand
Tbeopmionconducts him, but a quite different thing-,that
thatthe sometimes 'tis Anger, sometimes Pleasure, some- r>>ig*rhastjmesSadness,atothertimesLove, and most fre essconce. qUentiy pear. jn a Word, the Vulgar take Science
to be a vile Slave always insulted and domineer'd
afinetor-over'anc*drag'dalongbytheotherPassions. Are
traja^c ofyou of the fame Opinion with them? Or do you
Science,thethink onthe contrary thatScienceisafirm thing, chamchy that itis capable of commanding Man, and that
Zr'btl'ii'dZltcan Put him into a State never to be conquered the%? ? >>-"by any Passion, and that all the Potentates upon mint. * Earthshallneverbeabletoforcehimtodoany
thingbutwhatScienceshallcommandhim, forit Thertmity isalone sufficient to deliver him ?
oftheSo-? *Idonotonlythinkallthatyouhavesaid,So ft's, crates, answered Protagoras, of Science; but I add,
thatitwouldseemworseinmethaninanyother Man not to mentain that it is the strongest of all Humane Things.
You have reason, Protagoras, that is true. H o w ever you know very well that the Vulgar don't be lieve us upon this Subject, and that they maintain that most Men do to little purpose know what is most just, and what is best, for they do nothing of it, although it be in their Power, and that fre quentlytheyactquitecontrary. ThoseofwhomI have asked the cause of so strange a Conduct, have
* Yes, but Socrates speaks of another Science far different from that which the Soship means, and whereof he boasts, for he speaks of the Knowledge of God,and of the Knowledge of the Truth, winch alone can deliver Man 5 whereas the So
phistspeaks of Humane Science, which ismore capable of thltroymg a Man than saving him.
. . ? all
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. 307
all told m e that those People are overcome by Plea sure or by Sadness, or vanquished, and carried away by some other Passion. I am apt to believe that those whom I have consulted, are decei vedinthat,asinmanyotherthings. But,letus fee, endeavour with m e here to teach them, and to make them plainly know what this unhappy Incli nation is, and wherein it consists, which occasion- eth them to be overcome by Pleasures, and that they do not act that which is best, though they know it. For perhaps ifwe should fay to them, Friends you are deceived, and you have a false Prin ciple, they would askus intheirturn, Socrates,and you, Protagoras, What ! Isitnot a Passion to be
overcome by Pleasures? Tell us then what it is? from whence itcomes, and whereinitconsists?
How, Socrates, said my Antagonist, are we ob ligedtostandtotheOpinionsoftheVulgar, who speak at random all that comes into their Heads.
However, me thinks, answered I, that thisserves in some Measure to make us understand the Cohe rencethatValourmayhavewith theotherpartsof Virtue. If therefore you will stand to what you at first accepted of, which is that Ishould lead you through that way which I think the best and the shortest, follow me, if not, as you think fit, I give itover.
O n the contrary, said he, Socrates, I pray you to continue as you began.
Resuming irly Discourse then, if those same Peo ple, said I, m y dear Protagoras, should persist to . askus,howdoyoucallthatStatewhichwe*call to be overcome by Pleasures? What should we an swer! . Formy partthisisthewayIshouldtaketo answerthem. Ishouldimmediatelysaytothem. , m y Friends harken I pray you, for Protagoras and I?
are going to endeavour to give a satisfactory An swer toyour Question. Do you think that any other thing happens to you than what really hap pens, at all times when you are enticed by the
Ut u 2 Plea-
? ? 308 Prbtagbras. : Or, the Sophisti.
? . Pleasure of Feasting, or by that of Love, which seems very agreeable to you, you yield to the Temptation, though you know very well that those Pleasures are very bad and very dangerous > They wouldnotfailtoanswer,that'tisnothingelse. We shouldafterwardsaskthem, why fayyouthatthole Pleasures are Evil ? Is it because they give you a
sort of Pleasure in the very minute that you h> joy them, and that they are both agreeable ? Or is it because in the Sequel they ingender Diseases, that they throw you headlong into Poverty -, and that they draw afterthem a thousand and a thousand Mis fortunes that are as fatal ? O r suppose they should not be followed by any of those Mischiefs, would you alwayscallthem bad,*becausetheycauseMan tore j o i c e , a n d t o r e j o i c e i n V i c e is t h e m o s t d e p l o r a b l e o f allVices, and the Punishment of Sin ? Let us con sider, Protagoras, what other thing could they an swer to us, than that they are not bad, by reason of the Pleasure they occasion at the time of injoy- ment, but because of the Diseases and other Acci dents which they draw after them ?
+ Iam persuaded, said Protagoras, that that's what all of them almost would answer,
. Does not, fay I, all that which destroys our HealthorwhichcausethourRuin, vexus? Ifancy they would agree to it,
* For that's what would be needful to fay to confesses Vro- tagoras hasalreadydone,thatagreeablethingsarebadinde pendant of their Consequences. , This is a Principle altoge-
. ther Divine. Socrates does not insist upon this, because ne findsittoo sublime, forthe Vulgar ; and that he knew very well that it is not their Opinion. .
jAnd consequently"Protagorashasspokeagainsthisown proper Sentiments, when he answered />. f66. that certain agreeable things were bad by the very*fame thing that maefe them agreeable, and independant from all that might happen, and that certain disagreeable things were good after the famemanner,independantatallthatmayfollow. We must observe this wonderful art whereby Socrates makes Trotago- ras contradict himself so plainly, witheur ever offending
him.
With-
? ? Protagoras : Or, The Sophists. 309
Without doubt, said Protagoras.
Then should I continue, you think my Friends
as w e fay, Protagoras and I, that thole Pleasures are not bad but because they terminate in Sorrow, and deprive Men of other Pleasures which they de- fire to enjoy ? They would not fail to acquiesce therein.
Protagoras consents to it.
But, fay I, if we should take the contrary side, and should ask them, my Friends, you fay that dis agreeable things are good, how do you understand it? Will you speak by example of bodily Exercises of War, of Cures'that the Physicians perform by Incision, by Purgations or by the strictest of Diet ? Do you fay that those things are good, but that they are disagreeable ? They would be of that Opi nion.
Without any difficulty.
Why do you call them good ? Is it because at the very minute they causethe greatest of Aches and infinitepain? Or becausebytheirOperation,they occasion Health and a good habit of Body, that they are the preservation of Cities that they raise to Impire, and that they heap Glory and . Riches upon certain States? Without doubt they would makenoscrupletotakethelastPart: And Prota goras acquiesceth therein.
ButsupposeIshouldgoonandaskifallthose thingswhichIhavenamed aregoodforanyother reasonthanbecausetheyendinPleasure, andthat they remove and chase away Vexation and Sadness ? For could you have any other Motive which should oblige you to call those things good, than the re moving of Vexation, and the expectation of Plea sure? Ican'tbelieveit.
Nor Ineither,saidProtagoras.
Therefore don't you seek after Pleasure as a good thing, and don't you avoid Vexation as an Evil ?
Without contradiction.
Uu3 And
? ? ^lo
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
And consequently you take Vexation for an Evil, and Pleasure for a Good ? You call Pleasure it self an Evil when ii deprives you of certain Plea sures that are greater than those which it procures you, and when it causes you Troubles more sensible thanallitsPleasures. Forifyoushouldhaveany other reason to call Pleasure an Evil, and if you should find that ithad any other end,you would make
no difficultyto tellitus,butIam sureyou can'tfindit. Iam alsosurethatthey can'tfindany, said Pro
tagoras.
Is it not the same thing with Grief or Pain?
Don t you call it good when it deliversyou from
certain Anguishes that are greater than those which
it occasions you, or when the Pleasures it procures,
you are greater than itsVexations? For if you could
propose to your selfany other end than what I have
told you for calling pain Good, you would with outdoubttellitus;butyoucan't. ? ? '? ' '? '
That is very true Socrates, said Protagoras.
Suppose, continuedI;youshouldaskmeinyour Course, why I turn the thing so many ways? I should fay pardon me, my Friends, this ismy way of examining into Subjects on all sides. For first
it is not eafie to demonstrate to you what that is
which you call to be overcome by Pleasures. . And Th"TJLkeont^ieot^erkanc*tnere1Sn0 otnerMeanstomake
>wD<<>>M>>-ce. rtain an(i sensible Demonstrations. But you are strathnsh stillatyourLibertytodeclareunto me ifyou find toexamine good to be any other thing than Pleasure and Evil
tlllaionst0keanyothertningtnanp^n anc*Sadness. Tell enallside's. me> would not you be very well satisfied to spend "-'"' your time agreeably, and without Vexation ? Ifyou; are contented therewith, and if you can't find that Good and Evil are any other thing than what I say,
i
hearken to what follows. ? .
That being presupposed, I maintain that there is
nothing more ridiculous than to fay as you do, that a Man knowing Evil to be Evil, and being able to prevent his abandoning himself thereunto, to ceaseth not
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
j u
not to commit it, because he is hurried along by Pleasure, and that it is uo lels absur'd to advance asyoudo,ontheotherside, thataMan knowing good yet refuseth to do it, because of some pre
sentPleasurethatputshimofffromit. TheRidi culousnessthatIfindintholetwo Propositionswill visiblyappeartoyouifwe don'tmake useof ma ny Names, which only serve to imbroii us, as Agreeable,Disagreeable,Good,Evil. Seeingthere fore we speak but of two things, let us make use onlyoftwoNames: Letusatfirstcallthemby theNamesofGoodandEvils-,andafterwardswe lhall call them by those of Agreeable and Disagree able. Thatbeinggranted,letusfay,ThataMan knowingEvil, andbeingsensiblethatitissoceaseih nottocommitit. Weshallcertainlybeaskedwhy doeshecommitit? We shallanswerhimbecausehe isovercome. Andbywhatisheovercome,theywill fay ? W e can answer no more by the agreeableness of it, that is to fay, by Pleasure, for 'tis a word thatisbanished,andinlieuthereof, wehavea- greedtomake use. ofthatWord Good. Thereforewe must make use of that Term only, and we must answer, ThatthatMan commitsEvilonlybecausehe isovercomeandsurmounted. By what? We must cut short the Words, overcome and surmounted by Good. Ifhewhoquestionsushasneversolittle Inclinationtoraillery, and if hebe a Man that can push us home, you see what a fine Field we givehim. Hewilllaughimmediatelywithallhis might, and will fay to us, in truth that's a very pleasant thing, that a Man who knows Evil, and is sensible'that it is so, and being able to forbear doing of . it, ceaseth not to commit it, because he
isovercomebyGood. Hewilladd, doyou think t h a t g o o d is u n c a p a b l e o f s u r m o u n t i n g E v i l ? O r is it capableofit? Withoutdoubtwewillanswerthat itisnotcapableofit, forotherwisehewhomwe fay to be overcome by Pleasure would not have sinned. ButforwhatreasonisGoodincapableof
Uu4 fur-
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
for ifGood, surmounting Evil ? Or why has Evil the strengthto
"ad been capable of
surmount Good? Is it not because one is greater andtheotherless? Orbecauseoneismorenume rous and the other less? For we have no other
Then it is evident from this, would he add, that according to you, to be overcome by Good, isto choose the greatest Evils in room of the least Good.
surmount
ing Evil
hewould seasonstoalledgetothem.
have done
it, and con
sequently
the Evil
VPonld not There's an end on that fide. N o w let us change not haye
been com
mitted.
those Names by calling this Good and Evil -by the NamesofAgreeablearidDisagreeable, Andletus faythataMan does, we have hitherto said Evil, butletusnowsaydisagreeablethings.
AManthen does things that *re disagreeable knowing that they areso,hedoesthembecausehe isovercomeandfur* mounted by those that are agreeable, and that not* withstanding are uncapable to overcome andsurmount. And what is it that makes Pleasure incapable of
surmounting Grief > Is it not the excess or the de- sect: of the one in reference to the other? that is to fay when the one isgreater or less than the other? When oneismoreorlessflatanddullthantheother*
But if any body should object to us * that there is a great difference between a present t Pleasuie,and a
*That'sthelastrefugeof thosewho maintain thatMen . commit Evil voluntarily, because they are carried away by Pleasures, for the Man prefers a present Pleasure to a future
one, and this Pleasure is stillmore preferable than P. ain that heonlyforesees. ThisiswhatSocratesisgoingtorefuteaf ter a very plain manner and with much Strength.
t This is Socrates's Answer to the foregoing Objection. Pleasure and Pain differ only in the number or degree of the PainsandPleasures. Thereforeitisridiculoustothinkthat aManshouldbesomuchanEnemytohimselfasvoluntarily
to prefer a small present Pleasure to a great Pleasure that he issureof, andtorunafteraPleasurewhichheseesisfol lowedbyacertainPain. ForitisagreedthateveryMan seeks. theGoodandshunstheEvil. Allthatisinquestionis to take a ballance and to weigh the Good and the Evil, seeing theyareknown. Thisisnotdone, anditisasuretoken that they are not known, and consequently 'tis the want off
Knowledge, that is to fay, Ignorance that precipitates us intoEvil. Thisiswithoutalldoubt. '? ? ? ? ?
Pleasure
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. 31*
Pleasure oraPainthatistocomeandexpected. Iask uponthatHeadjbutdotheydifferbyanyotherthing . than by Pleasure or Pain ? They can differ in nothing else. NowIsaythataManwhoknowshowtoba lancethings well, and who puts agreeable things on one fide, and disagreeable things on another, as well these that are present as those that he may foresee are to come, knows very well which are the most numerous. ForifyouweightheAgreeablewith the Agreeable, you must always chuse the most nu merous,andthegreatest;ifyouweightheDisa greeable with the Disagreeable, you must chuse the least innumber, and the smallest; and if you weigh the Agreeable with the Disagreeable, and that the last are surmounted by the first, * whether it be that the present are surmounted by the absent, or the absent by the present, we must always chuse the greatest number, that is, the first, the Agreeable : And if the latter, I mean the Disagreeable weigh
downtheScales,wemustbewareofmakingsobad aChoice:IsnotthatalltheArttobeused? Yes, withoutdoubttheywouldfay. Protagorasalsoa- grees to it.
Sincethatisib,Iwouldfay,answermeIpray.
Does not an Object appear greater near at hand than
atadistance? Don'tyouunderstand a VoicebettertrmrH
whenitisnearyou,thanwhenitisfaroff? p-^je. <? Without contradiction. fendedupon.
If therefore our Happiness consisted always intheg"f^fi
chusinganddoingthatwhichisgreatest,andinre-^ &1
jestingthatwhichisleastswhatshouldwedo,andto2i mL-
what shouldwehaverecoursetoassureusofHappi-><<with
nessallourLifetime? Shouldwe haverecourseto^foffMe theartof Measuring,- or should we content ourexailneJ}'
* ? That is to fay, whether the present Pains be less nume rous than the Pleasures that are expected, or the Pains that are expected fewer than the present Pleasures, the greatest number ought always to be chosen j In a word, we must run after good when it isgreater than Evil; whether that Evil be present or absent. 'A great Principle.
selves
? ? 314
Protagoras: Or, The Sophistsi
selves with Appearances, and with a simple Glance of the Eye? But we know that the Sight has often deceived us, and that when we have judged by the Eye, we have been often obliged to change out Opinion when the Question to be decided has been whichisthegreatest? Whereastheartofmeasur ing has always removed those false Appearances,and by making the TruthappearhassettheMind atease, which relied upon this Truth,and has assertain'd the HappinessofourLife. WhatwouldourDisputants lay to that ? W o u l d they fay that our Safety depends upontheartofMeasuring, oruponanyotherArt?
Upon theArtofMeasuringwithoutdoubt. ifourSafe- AndifourSafetyshoulddependupontheChoice tyshould 0fevenanciodd,everytimethatonemustchusethe
ZSerT"kast'andcomparethemost withthemost, themost tiereism ortheleastwiththeleast,andtheonewithother,
ladybut whethertheybenearoratadistance,uponwhatArt win would Would our Safety depend ? Is it not upon the Art of ^*oC'-Arithmetick? For the Art of Measuring, which
teacheth us nothing but the greatness of things is no longer the Business in Question ? , it would be
requisite to know the Even and the Odd, and no thing but the Knowledge of Arithmetick can teach usthat. WouldnotourPeopleagreetothat?
Assuredly, said Protagoras.
* That's well then, my Friends. But since it has appeared to us that our Safety depends upon the good Choice which we should make between Plea sure and Pain, that is to say,between that which in those two Kinds is the greatest, or the least, the most numerous or the least, the nearest or the fur thestoff-, IsitnottruethattheArtof Measur ing is the Art ofexamining the largeness of Things, and of comparing their different Resemblances ?
* Our Safety depends upon the good Choice between. PleasureandPain. Weareonlyunhappybecausewe de ceive our selves in our Choice. Our Misfortunes proceed onlyfrom our Ignorance, forno body desires to be un
happy.
? It
? ? Protagoras: Or, Ihe Sophists. jiy
It can't be otherwise.
Then the Art of Measuring must be * an Art and aScience,theycouldnotdisagreetoit We(hall examine another time what that Art is,which at the fame time is an Art and a Science,now that the Art of measuring isa Science, we agree to it, and that suf ficesfor a Demonstration that we ought to give, you Protagoras and I, upon the Question that you have proposed to us j for at the fame time that you and I have agreed that there is nothing so strong as Sci ence, and that wherever it is found it is victorious over Pleasure and all other Passions, you have con tradicted us, in assuring us that Pleasure is often victorious, and that it triumphs over Man, even when he knows the Poison of it, and as we have
not agreed to your Principle, then if you remember it, you have demanded, Protagoras and you Socra tes, if that be not to be overcome by Pleasure, tell us then what itis, andhow do you call that Incli nationthatcarriesusaway. Ifweshouldhavean
swered you upon the Spot, that we call'd it Igno
rance, you would have laughed at us. Laugh on
now,andyouwilllaughatyourselves. Foryou
have confessed that those who deceive themselves
in the Choice of Pleasure and ofPain,that istofay
of Good and of Evil, are notdeceived,butforwant of Knowledge ? , and afterwards you further agreed
not only for want of Knowledge, but for want of
that Science which teacheth to measure. N o w every Action wherein one isvdeceived for Want of Know
ledgeyouknowverywellyourselfthatitisan Ignorance, and by consequence it is a very great Ig norance to be overcome by Pleasure. Protagoras, Prodkus and Hippias, boast that they can cure this Ignorance, and you because you are persuaded that
*ItisanArt,becausethereareRulesandaMethod;and 'tisaScience, because itsObjectarethings necessaryandim material, and because it makes its Demonstrations by In fallible Arguments built upon necessary Principles that are
incontestable and certain.
? ;. . . '. ? ? ? this
? ? 31(5
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
this unhappy Inclination is some other thing than Ignorance j you will not apply your self, and will not fend your Children to those Sophists who are such excellent Masters, as holding it for a certain TruththatVirtuecan'tbetaught, andyousavethe Money which you would be obliged to give them. And itisthatfineOpinionthatcausesalltheMis fortunes, not only of the Republick, but also of particularPersons.
That's what we would answer to those honest People. ButIapplymyselfnowtoyou,Prodi- cus and Hippias, and I ask you as well as Protago ras, if you think what I just now laid to be true
orfalse? '
They all agreed that they were very sensible
Truths.
You agree then said I, that Agreeable is that
whichiscalledGood, and Disagreeablethatwhich is. calledEvil. ForasforthatDistinctionofNames which Prodicus wouldhaveintroduced, Ikisshis Hands. Ineffect,Prodicus,callGoodness,Agreea ble, Delectable, Delicious, Charming, and invent stillmoreNamesifthatpleasesyou,itisalike to me. AnsvyeronlytowhatIaskyou.
Prodicus agrees to it, smiling, as do also the others.
ZvtryAEi- Thenwhatdoyouthinkofthis,myFriends, mwhich ^^ i? arenotallActionsfine,whichtendtolive
matuslire a8rfeaWy, and without pain ? And is it not a fine
with^t "* Action at the fame time good . and useful ?
fainisfine, Theyagreetoit?
andconse- ifitbetruethatAgreeablebegood,andthatit
IZTild DetheGood,thenitisnotpossiblethataMan tfifj" knowingthattherearebetterthingsthanthose which he does, and knowing that he can do them, should notwithstanding do the Evil and leave the
Good. Therefore to be overcome by Pleasure, is nothing else than to be in Ignorance $ and to over come Pleasuresisnothingelsethantohave Know ledge.
They
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Soph0s. 317
They acquiefced therein.
' But, said I, to them, what do you call it to be Wha isit in Ignorance ? Is it not to have a false Opinion, and t0 ** *>> Is- to deceive one's self in Things that are very eflen-mrance-
tial and very important ?
Without Contradiction.
It follows then from this Principle, that no
Person runs voluntarily into Evil, nor info that whichhetakestobeEvil. *Anditisnotatall intheNatureofMantorunafterEvil,asEvil,in steadofrunningafterGood. Andwhenoneisforced to chuse one of two Evils, you Will find no Body who would chuse the greatest, if it were in his power to take the least.
That seern'd to us all to be a manifest Truth.
Then, said I, what you call Tenor and Fear, speak Prodicus. Is it not the expectation of an Evil, whether you call it Terror or Fear?
Protagoras and Hippias acquiesced, that Terror
and Fear were nothing precisely but that, and Pro dicusconfesseditofFear,but denieditofTerror.
But that is no matter, m y dear Prodicus, answer'd I.
The only important Point is to know if the Princi plewhichIjust'nowassertedbetrue. Ifitbeso,
all your Distinctions are useless. . In effect, who is . theManwhowouldrunafterthatwhichhefears, whenhemightgobeforethatwhichhefearsnot? That isimpossible by your own Confession; for
from the time that a Man fears a thing, he confef1 feth that he believes it to be bad ^ and there is no Body that voluntarily seeks after and receives that which isbad.
They agreed to it.
ThoseFoundationsbeinglaiddown, Prodicusand Hippias, said I, Protagoras must now justifie and prove the Truth of what he at first asserted j or ra
* For it is a certain Truth, our Will never inclines to any thing but that which pleaseth it most. And there is no thing but Goodj or what it takes for such;, that pleases it.
s ther
? ? ji8
Protagoras: Orythe Sophists.
ther I must grant him Quarter for what he ad vanced at first, for he said that of the five Parts of Virtue there is not one that resembles another, and that they had each of them their own Qualities and a differentCharacter. Iwillnotinsistupon that, but let him prove what he said afterwards, that of those five Parts there were four which had some resemblance to each other, and one which was altogether different from the other four, that is to fay valour.
He added, that I should know thisTruth by this evident Mark, that is, said he, Socrates, that you shall see Men who are very Imperious, unjust, De-
bauch'd and Ignorant, and yet have a heroick Va lour5 and you will understand by that, that Valour is extreamly different from the other parts of Vir tue.
IconfessthatatfirstIwasverymuch supriz'dat this Answer, and my Surprize hath been greater sinceIexamin'dtheThingwithyou. Iask'dhim if he did not call bold and resolute Men, Valiant ? HetoldmethathegavethatNametothosebold Spirits who run headlong into danger j for you re memberitverywell, Protagoras,thatwastheAn swer you made me.
I do remember it, said he.
Tell us then wherein are the Valiant bold, is it in Things that the Timorous undertake ?
No, withoutdoubt.
Isitinothers? InthosethattheBraveunder take?
Assuredly.
Don't Cowards run on upon those Things that seem to be safe, and the Valiant upon those that seem to be terrible?
So People say, Socrates, answered Protagoras. You saytrue,Protagoras? ,butthat'snotwhatI
askyou,IwouldknowyourSentiment. Wherein do you fay are the Valiant bold ? Is it in Things that are terrible, and that they themselves find so ?
? Don't
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists: jip
Don't you remember, Socrates, that you haveFor*>>k* p l a i n l y m a d e it a p p e a r a l r e a d y t h a t t h a t w a s i m p o f m f e * " ^
sible- rZort You are in the right, Protagoras, I had forgot it. theexpetta-
Then it isa Thing demonstrated, that no Body runs"'<>'*>>/'<>>* upon Things that he finds to be terrible, because itE? j> ani
is most certainly an Ignorance to suffer one's self to *? ? "ZmS be overcome by Passions. voluntarily 'Tisagreed to. *<<&*&
But on the other fide, both the one and the other, * the Brave and the Coward run upon Things that seem to be safe and without danger, and by that means the Cowards undertake the fame Things as
the Brave.
There is a great Difference, Socrates h the C o w
ards do the quite contrary to what the Brave do 5 without going further, the one seeks War and the other flies from it- *,
ButdotheyfindittobeafinethingtogotoWar ? Yes, certainly, most fine.
If it be fine it is also good, for w e have agreed
that all Actions that are fine are good.
That is most true, said he to me, and I have al
ways been of that Sentiment.
Iam very glad of it. But who are those then
who will not go to the War which they find to be so fine and so good ?
They areCowards, saidhe.
*'TisaneceflaryConsequenceofwhat Tntagoras justnow consess'd. That the Brave don't run upon terrible Things be cause it is an Evil. Then they run upoa Things that are safe,andthatappeartobewithoutdanger. ;andbyconse quence they do the same thing as the Cowards, and they tend to the fame Mark : That is certain; but here's the difference between the Cowards and the brave Men, that the brave MenactingalwaysbyKnowledge,areneverdeceiv'dinthe- Side they chuse ; for they certainly know what is terrible andwhatisnot. WhereastheCowardsactingbyIgnorance, and fixing safety where danger' is, and danger where safety is,arealwaysdeceiv'd. How manygreatTruthsareclear edby thisPrinciple!
. ? In
? ? 3io Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
Inthemeantime,saidI,togotoWarisafine and a good thing : Is it not also agreeable ?
It is a sequel of the Principles which we have agreed to?
fheydon't Do theCowardsrefusetogotothatwhichis know it, fjnerj better and more agreeable although they
tTinZ kn0Wkt0feWhatkiS?
stance?
But Socrates, if we should confess that, then we overthrow all our first Principles.
How, fayI,doesnotthebraverunuponallthat he thinks to be the finest, the best, and the most agreeable ?
It can't be denied.
TheSraye - Then it is evident that the Brave have not a star when shameful Fear when they fear, nor a shameful As-
cmflmU surancewhentheyarefirrnanaassure(i> fearbut ,_. '
not other- wist.
MdFoois
fearunfia-Quitecontrary? HavetheynotunworthyFearsand fondly, shamefulAssurances?
^ *r>>st I confess it.
fameman- ^nc*^xomwnencecomethoseunworthyFearsand ? fr. aa~shamefulAssurances? IsitnotfromIgnorance1?
That isqertain.
But, what do you call that which makes Cow ards,Cowards? Do youcallitValourorCowardise?
IcallitCowardise, withoutdoubt.
Then the Cowards appear to you to be so,- be cause of their Ignorance of sensible Things ?
Most assuredly.
Then 'tisthatIgnorancewhich makes them Cow ards?
I agree to it.
You have agreed that 'tisCowardise that makes Cowards.
Soul.
tBut don'tyou say^ my dearProtagoras^ that certain People live well, that is to lay agreeably, and that others live ill, that is to lay disagreea bly >
Without doubt.
AnddoyoufaythatManlivesweU, whenhe spends his Life in Troubles and Grief.
No afluredly.
Butwhen aMan diesafterhavingspenthisLife
agreeably, don't you think he lived well> Yes Ido.
After your reckoning then is it not a good thing to live pleasantly, and is it not very bad thing to live disagreeably ?
*Hemeansthatthemore Menaredisciplin'd,trainedus toroar,ortransportedwithAnger,theyarethemorebold HecomparesBoldnesscoPuissanceandValourtoforce. But he does not fee that in Confessing that Valour proceeds from the good Nourishment given to the Soul, he acquiesceth with Socrate's Principle, thatValour isnothing but Science. So crates is going to lead him another way.
? t T o k n o w w e l l w h a t V a l o u r i s , o n e m u s t first fix w e l l w h a t
Griefand Pleasureis5andthisiswhatSocratesisgoingtodo aftej an admirable way worthy of so great a Philosopher.
N
Tis
'
? ? jo4
Protagoras: Or, 7he Sophists.
* 'TisaccordingasonedelightsinwhatisDecent and Honest, laid he.
What, Protagoras, laid I, will you he of the Opi3 nion of the Vulgar, t and will you, with them^ call certain things that are agreeable, bad, and feme others that are disagreeable, will you 'call them good?
Yes certainly.
How fayyou? Those agreeable thingsarethey bad in that which makes them agreeable, indepen- dantlyfromallthatmayhappen? Andthosedis agreeable things are they good after the fame man ner independantly on allConsequences?
| Yes, it isjust so.
. -. Then they are not bad in so far as they are disagreeable.
In Truth, Socrates, said he, I k n o w not if I ought tomakemy Answersassimpleandasgeneralas yourQuestions, andifIoughttoassertabsolutely, that all agreeable things are good and that all dila-
*"Protagorasisasham'dof whathejustnowconfess'd,for he fees the Consequence of itj therefore he contradicts him selfallofasudden,andheacknowledgesthataManwho spends his Life in honest Things, and w h o delights therein, livesagreeably,eventho'thelaidThingsbepainful. Socra- tts makes good use of this Confession, and is going to pursue thisPrinciplewhich willoverthrowtheSophistimmediatly.
t For the Vulgar are persuaded that there were some agreeablethingsthatarebad, andsome disagreeable things thataregood. Buttheyreckonthemgoodorbadonlyby their Consequences ; for to consider them in themselves they find the things that are agreeable to be good, and the disa greeable bad. . ,
|ThisSophistconfesseth onethingherewhereofheisnot in the least persuaded 5 he also retracts it in the following Answer, forheforeseesverywellthatthatConfessionwould ingage him too far. He knows not how to rid himself out ot the Trouble and Contusion he is in.
. *. 'Tis a necessary Consequence of what this Sophist con sess'd just now. For if disagreeable things are good inde- pendant from what may follow, they can't be bad because they arc disagreeable.
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. 30j
treeablethingsarebad. Methinksthatnotonly
in this Dispute, but also in all others that I may-
have, it is surest to answer that there are cer
tain agreeable things that are not good, and that
a m o n g the Disagreeable there are certain things that are not bad ? ,. and that there is a third kind which
keeps the middle and which are neither good nor bacL But don't you call those Things agreeable that are join'd with Pleasure, and which give Pleasure ?
Most assuredly.
I ask you then if they are not good in so far as they are agreeable, that is to fay, is not the Plea sure they cause something of good?
To' that, Socrates, said he, I answer you what you daily answer others, thatis, that we must ex amineit, andifitagreeswithreason,andwe-find that the agreeable and the good are but one and the same thing, we must acquiesce therewith, if not,
there's an open Field for Dispute. Whichdoyoulikebestthen, Protagoras, laidI,
will you be pleased to lead me in this Inquiry, or shall I lead you?
Itismost reasonable that you should lead me^ for you began.
I will do it, said I, and here's perhaps a means, thatwillmake thethingappearplain,asaMaster of Exercise, or a Physician seeing a Man whole Constitutionhewouldknow, inordertojudge of his Health or the Strength and good Disposition of his Body, does not content himself with looking on his Hands and Face, but fays to him, strip your self I pray you^ and let me fee your Breast and your Back, that I may judge of your State with the more certainty;Ihaveamind tousethefameConduct: with you for our Inquiry ; after having known your Sentiments of Good and of Agreeable, I must still fay to you as that Master of Exercises, my dear Protagoras, discoveryourselfalittlemore, andtell meyourThoughtsofScience. AreyourThoughts of that like those of the Vulgarj or are you of
U u other
? ? 306 Protagoras: Or, the Sophists'.
Forthe otherSentiments? ForthisistheOpinionofthe Knowledge Vulgar in reference to Science or Knowledge :They
ihaana think'lt1Sa^ingthatisneitherstrong,capable of sreeMel'r Conduct, nor worthy to command : They can't
Afagreea- fancy to themselves that it has any of thole Qua- bh defends lities-, and they perswade themselves that when Sci- ^lfen\7? n ence*sf? un^m aMan,U isnotthatwhichleadsand
Tbeopmionconducts him, but a quite different thing-,that
thatthe sometimes 'tis Anger, sometimes Pleasure, some- r>>ig*rhastjmesSadness,atothertimesLove, and most fre essconce. qUentiy pear. jn a Word, the Vulgar take Science
to be a vile Slave always insulted and domineer'd
afinetor-over'anc*drag'dalongbytheotherPassions. Are
traja^c ofyou of the fame Opinion with them? Or do you
Science,thethink onthe contrary thatScienceisafirm thing, chamchy that itis capable of commanding Man, and that
Zr'btl'ii'dZltcan Put him into a State never to be conquered the%? ? >>-"by any Passion, and that all the Potentates upon mint. * Earthshallneverbeabletoforcehimtodoany
thingbutwhatScienceshallcommandhim, forit Thertmity isalone sufficient to deliver him ?
oftheSo-? *Idonotonlythinkallthatyouhavesaid,So ft's, crates, answered Protagoras, of Science; but I add,
thatitwouldseemworseinmethaninanyother Man not to mentain that it is the strongest of all Humane Things.
You have reason, Protagoras, that is true. H o w ever you know very well that the Vulgar don't be lieve us upon this Subject, and that they maintain that most Men do to little purpose know what is most just, and what is best, for they do nothing of it, although it be in their Power, and that fre quentlytheyactquitecontrary. ThoseofwhomI have asked the cause of so strange a Conduct, have
* Yes, but Socrates speaks of another Science far different from that which the Soship means, and whereof he boasts, for he speaks of the Knowledge of God,and of the Knowledge of the Truth, winch alone can deliver Man 5 whereas the So
phistspeaks of Humane Science, which ismore capable of thltroymg a Man than saving him.
. . ? all
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. 307
all told m e that those People are overcome by Plea sure or by Sadness, or vanquished, and carried away by some other Passion. I am apt to believe that those whom I have consulted, are decei vedinthat,asinmanyotherthings. But,letus fee, endeavour with m e here to teach them, and to make them plainly know what this unhappy Incli nation is, and wherein it consists, which occasion- eth them to be overcome by Pleasures, and that they do not act that which is best, though they know it. For perhaps ifwe should fay to them, Friends you are deceived, and you have a false Prin ciple, they would askus intheirturn, Socrates,and you, Protagoras, What ! Isitnot a Passion to be
overcome by Pleasures? Tell us then what it is? from whence itcomes, and whereinitconsists?
How, Socrates, said my Antagonist, are we ob ligedtostandtotheOpinionsoftheVulgar, who speak at random all that comes into their Heads.
However, me thinks, answered I, that thisserves in some Measure to make us understand the Cohe rencethatValourmayhavewith theotherpartsof Virtue. If therefore you will stand to what you at first accepted of, which is that Ishould lead you through that way which I think the best and the shortest, follow me, if not, as you think fit, I give itover.
O n the contrary, said he, Socrates, I pray you to continue as you began.
Resuming irly Discourse then, if those same Peo ple, said I, m y dear Protagoras, should persist to . askus,howdoyoucallthatStatewhichwe*call to be overcome by Pleasures? What should we an swer! . Formy partthisisthewayIshouldtaketo answerthem. Ishouldimmediatelysaytothem. , m y Friends harken I pray you, for Protagoras and I?
are going to endeavour to give a satisfactory An swer toyour Question. Do you think that any other thing happens to you than what really hap pens, at all times when you are enticed by the
Ut u 2 Plea-
? ? 308 Prbtagbras. : Or, the Sophisti.
? . Pleasure of Feasting, or by that of Love, which seems very agreeable to you, you yield to the Temptation, though you know very well that those Pleasures are very bad and very dangerous > They wouldnotfailtoanswer,that'tisnothingelse. We shouldafterwardsaskthem, why fayyouthatthole Pleasures are Evil ? Is it because they give you a
sort of Pleasure in the very minute that you h> joy them, and that they are both agreeable ? Or is it because in the Sequel they ingender Diseases, that they throw you headlong into Poverty -, and that they draw afterthem a thousand and a thousand Mis fortunes that are as fatal ? O r suppose they should not be followed by any of those Mischiefs, would you alwayscallthem bad,*becausetheycauseMan tore j o i c e , a n d t o r e j o i c e i n V i c e is t h e m o s t d e p l o r a b l e o f allVices, and the Punishment of Sin ? Let us con sider, Protagoras, what other thing could they an swer to us, than that they are not bad, by reason of the Pleasure they occasion at the time of injoy- ment, but because of the Diseases and other Acci dents which they draw after them ?
+ Iam persuaded, said Protagoras, that that's what all of them almost would answer,
. Does not, fay I, all that which destroys our HealthorwhichcausethourRuin, vexus? Ifancy they would agree to it,
* For that's what would be needful to fay to confesses Vro- tagoras hasalreadydone,thatagreeablethingsarebadinde pendant of their Consequences. , This is a Principle altoge-
. ther Divine. Socrates does not insist upon this, because ne findsittoo sublime, forthe Vulgar ; and that he knew very well that it is not their Opinion. .
jAnd consequently"Protagorashasspokeagainsthisown proper Sentiments, when he answered />. f66. that certain agreeable things were bad by the very*fame thing that maefe them agreeable, and independant from all that might happen, and that certain disagreeable things were good after the famemanner,independantatallthatmayfollow. We must observe this wonderful art whereby Socrates makes Trotago- ras contradict himself so plainly, witheur ever offending
him.
With-
? ? Protagoras : Or, The Sophists. 309
Without doubt, said Protagoras.
Then should I continue, you think my Friends
as w e fay, Protagoras and I, that thole Pleasures are not bad but because they terminate in Sorrow, and deprive Men of other Pleasures which they de- fire to enjoy ? They would not fail to acquiesce therein.
Protagoras consents to it.
But, fay I, if we should take the contrary side, and should ask them, my Friends, you fay that dis agreeable things are good, how do you understand it? Will you speak by example of bodily Exercises of War, of Cures'that the Physicians perform by Incision, by Purgations or by the strictest of Diet ? Do you fay that those things are good, but that they are disagreeable ? They would be of that Opi nion.
Without any difficulty.
Why do you call them good ? Is it because at the very minute they causethe greatest of Aches and infinitepain? Or becausebytheirOperation,they occasion Health and a good habit of Body, that they are the preservation of Cities that they raise to Impire, and that they heap Glory and . Riches upon certain States? Without doubt they would makenoscrupletotakethelastPart: And Prota goras acquiesceth therein.
ButsupposeIshouldgoonandaskifallthose thingswhichIhavenamed aregoodforanyother reasonthanbecausetheyendinPleasure, andthat they remove and chase away Vexation and Sadness ? For could you have any other Motive which should oblige you to call those things good, than the re moving of Vexation, and the expectation of Plea sure? Ican'tbelieveit.
Nor Ineither,saidProtagoras.
Therefore don't you seek after Pleasure as a good thing, and don't you avoid Vexation as an Evil ?
Without contradiction.
Uu3 And
? ? ^lo
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
And consequently you take Vexation for an Evil, and Pleasure for a Good ? You call Pleasure it self an Evil when ii deprives you of certain Plea sures that are greater than those which it procures you, and when it causes you Troubles more sensible thanallitsPleasures. Forifyoushouldhaveany other reason to call Pleasure an Evil, and if you should find that ithad any other end,you would make
no difficultyto tellitus,butIam sureyou can'tfindit. Iam alsosurethatthey can'tfindany, said Pro
tagoras.
Is it not the same thing with Grief or Pain?
Don t you call it good when it deliversyou from
certain Anguishes that are greater than those which
it occasions you, or when the Pleasures it procures,
you are greater than itsVexations? For if you could
propose to your selfany other end than what I have
told you for calling pain Good, you would with outdoubttellitus;butyoucan't. ? ? '? ' '? '
That is very true Socrates, said Protagoras.
Suppose, continuedI;youshouldaskmeinyour Course, why I turn the thing so many ways? I should fay pardon me, my Friends, this ismy way of examining into Subjects on all sides. For first
it is not eafie to demonstrate to you what that is
which you call to be overcome by Pleasures. . And Th"TJLkeont^ieot^erkanc*tnere1Sn0 otnerMeanstomake
>wD<<>>M>>-ce. rtain an(i sensible Demonstrations. But you are strathnsh stillatyourLibertytodeclareunto me ifyou find toexamine good to be any other thing than Pleasure and Evil
tlllaionst0keanyothertningtnanp^n anc*Sadness. Tell enallside's. me> would not you be very well satisfied to spend "-'"' your time agreeably, and without Vexation ? Ifyou; are contented therewith, and if you can't find that Good and Evil are any other thing than what I say,
i
hearken to what follows. ? .
That being presupposed, I maintain that there is
nothing more ridiculous than to fay as you do, that a Man knowing Evil to be Evil, and being able to prevent his abandoning himself thereunto, to ceaseth not
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
j u
not to commit it, because he is hurried along by Pleasure, and that it is uo lels absur'd to advance asyoudo,ontheotherside, thataMan knowing good yet refuseth to do it, because of some pre
sentPleasurethatputshimofffromit. TheRidi culousnessthatIfindintholetwo Propositionswill visiblyappeartoyouifwe don'tmake useof ma ny Names, which only serve to imbroii us, as Agreeable,Disagreeable,Good,Evil. Seeingthere fore we speak but of two things, let us make use onlyoftwoNames: Letusatfirstcallthemby theNamesofGoodandEvils-,andafterwardswe lhall call them by those of Agreeable and Disagree able. Thatbeinggranted,letusfay,ThataMan knowingEvil, andbeingsensiblethatitissoceaseih nottocommitit. Weshallcertainlybeaskedwhy doeshecommitit? We shallanswerhimbecausehe isovercome. Andbywhatisheovercome,theywill fay ? W e can answer no more by the agreeableness of it, that is to fay, by Pleasure, for 'tis a word thatisbanished,andinlieuthereof, wehavea- greedtomake use. ofthatWord Good. Thereforewe must make use of that Term only, and we must answer, ThatthatMan commitsEvilonlybecausehe isovercomeandsurmounted. By what? We must cut short the Words, overcome and surmounted by Good. Ifhewhoquestionsushasneversolittle Inclinationtoraillery, and if hebe a Man that can push us home, you see what a fine Field we givehim. Hewilllaughimmediatelywithallhis might, and will fay to us, in truth that's a very pleasant thing, that a Man who knows Evil, and is sensible'that it is so, and being able to forbear doing of . it, ceaseth not to commit it, because he
isovercomebyGood. Hewilladd, doyou think t h a t g o o d is u n c a p a b l e o f s u r m o u n t i n g E v i l ? O r is it capableofit? Withoutdoubtwewillanswerthat itisnotcapableofit, forotherwisehewhomwe fay to be overcome by Pleasure would not have sinned. ButforwhatreasonisGoodincapableof
Uu4 fur-
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
for ifGood, surmounting Evil ? Or why has Evil the strengthto
"ad been capable of
surmount Good? Is it not because one is greater andtheotherless? Orbecauseoneismorenume rous and the other less? For we have no other
Then it is evident from this, would he add, that according to you, to be overcome by Good, isto choose the greatest Evils in room of the least Good.
surmount
ing Evil
hewould seasonstoalledgetothem.
have done
it, and con
sequently
the Evil
VPonld not There's an end on that fide. N o w let us change not haye
been com
mitted.
those Names by calling this Good and Evil -by the NamesofAgreeablearidDisagreeable, Andletus faythataMan does, we have hitherto said Evil, butletusnowsaydisagreeablethings.
AManthen does things that *re disagreeable knowing that they areso,hedoesthembecausehe isovercomeandfur* mounted by those that are agreeable, and that not* withstanding are uncapable to overcome andsurmount. And what is it that makes Pleasure incapable of
surmounting Grief > Is it not the excess or the de- sect: of the one in reference to the other? that is to fay when the one isgreater or less than the other? When oneismoreorlessflatanddullthantheother*
But if any body should object to us * that there is a great difference between a present t Pleasuie,and a
*That'sthelastrefugeof thosewho maintain thatMen . commit Evil voluntarily, because they are carried away by Pleasures, for the Man prefers a present Pleasure to a future
one, and this Pleasure is stillmore preferable than P. ain that heonlyforesees. ThisiswhatSocratesisgoingtorefuteaf ter a very plain manner and with much Strength.
t This is Socrates's Answer to the foregoing Objection. Pleasure and Pain differ only in the number or degree of the PainsandPleasures. Thereforeitisridiculoustothinkthat aManshouldbesomuchanEnemytohimselfasvoluntarily
to prefer a small present Pleasure to a great Pleasure that he issureof, andtorunafteraPleasurewhichheseesisfol lowedbyacertainPain. ForitisagreedthateveryMan seeks. theGoodandshunstheEvil. Allthatisinquestionis to take a ballance and to weigh the Good and the Evil, seeing theyareknown. Thisisnotdone, anditisasuretoken that they are not known, and consequently 'tis the want off
Knowledge, that is to fay, Ignorance that precipitates us intoEvil. Thisiswithoutalldoubt. '? ? ? ? ?
Pleasure
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. 31*
Pleasure oraPainthatistocomeandexpected. Iask uponthatHeadjbutdotheydifferbyanyotherthing . than by Pleasure or Pain ? They can differ in nothing else. NowIsaythataManwhoknowshowtoba lancethings well, and who puts agreeable things on one fide, and disagreeable things on another, as well these that are present as those that he may foresee are to come, knows very well which are the most numerous. ForifyouweightheAgreeablewith the Agreeable, you must always chuse the most nu merous,andthegreatest;ifyouweightheDisa greeable with the Disagreeable, you must chuse the least innumber, and the smallest; and if you weigh the Agreeable with the Disagreeable, and that the last are surmounted by the first, * whether it be that the present are surmounted by the absent, or the absent by the present, we must always chuse the greatest number, that is, the first, the Agreeable : And if the latter, I mean the Disagreeable weigh
downtheScales,wemustbewareofmakingsobad aChoice:IsnotthatalltheArttobeused? Yes, withoutdoubttheywouldfay. Protagorasalsoa- grees to it.
Sincethatisib,Iwouldfay,answermeIpray.
Does not an Object appear greater near at hand than
atadistance? Don'tyouunderstand a VoicebettertrmrH
whenitisnearyou,thanwhenitisfaroff? p-^je. <? Without contradiction. fendedupon.
If therefore our Happiness consisted always intheg"f^fi
chusinganddoingthatwhichisgreatest,andinre-^ &1
jestingthatwhichisleastswhatshouldwedo,andto2i mL-
what shouldwehaverecoursetoassureusofHappi-><<with
nessallourLifetime? Shouldwe haverecourseto^foffMe theartof Measuring,- or should we content ourexailneJ}'
* ? That is to fay, whether the present Pains be less nume rous than the Pleasures that are expected, or the Pains that are expected fewer than the present Pleasures, the greatest number ought always to be chosen j In a word, we must run after good when it isgreater than Evil; whether that Evil be present or absent. 'A great Principle.
selves
? ? 314
Protagoras: Or, The Sophistsi
selves with Appearances, and with a simple Glance of the Eye? But we know that the Sight has often deceived us, and that when we have judged by the Eye, we have been often obliged to change out Opinion when the Question to be decided has been whichisthegreatest? Whereastheartofmeasur ing has always removed those false Appearances,and by making the TruthappearhassettheMind atease, which relied upon this Truth,and has assertain'd the HappinessofourLife. WhatwouldourDisputants lay to that ? W o u l d they fay that our Safety depends upontheartofMeasuring, oruponanyotherArt?
Upon theArtofMeasuringwithoutdoubt. ifourSafe- AndifourSafetyshoulddependupontheChoice tyshould 0fevenanciodd,everytimethatonemustchusethe
ZSerT"kast'andcomparethemost withthemost, themost tiereism ortheleastwiththeleast,andtheonewithother,
ladybut whethertheybenearoratadistance,uponwhatArt win would Would our Safety depend ? Is it not upon the Art of ^*oC'-Arithmetick? For the Art of Measuring, which
teacheth us nothing but the greatness of things is no longer the Business in Question ? , it would be
requisite to know the Even and the Odd, and no thing but the Knowledge of Arithmetick can teach usthat. WouldnotourPeopleagreetothat?
Assuredly, said Protagoras.
* That's well then, my Friends. But since it has appeared to us that our Safety depends upon the good Choice which we should make between Plea sure and Pain, that is to say,between that which in those two Kinds is the greatest, or the least, the most numerous or the least, the nearest or the fur thestoff-, IsitnottruethattheArtof Measur ing is the Art ofexamining the largeness of Things, and of comparing their different Resemblances ?
* Our Safety depends upon the good Choice between. PleasureandPain. Weareonlyunhappybecausewe de ceive our selves in our Choice. Our Misfortunes proceed onlyfrom our Ignorance, forno body desires to be un
happy.
? It
? ? Protagoras: Or, Ihe Sophists. jiy
It can't be otherwise.
Then the Art of Measuring must be * an Art and aScience,theycouldnotdisagreetoit We(hall examine another time what that Art is,which at the fame time is an Art and a Science,now that the Art of measuring isa Science, we agree to it, and that suf ficesfor a Demonstration that we ought to give, you Protagoras and I, upon the Question that you have proposed to us j for at the fame time that you and I have agreed that there is nothing so strong as Sci ence, and that wherever it is found it is victorious over Pleasure and all other Passions, you have con tradicted us, in assuring us that Pleasure is often victorious, and that it triumphs over Man, even when he knows the Poison of it, and as we have
not agreed to your Principle, then if you remember it, you have demanded, Protagoras and you Socra tes, if that be not to be overcome by Pleasure, tell us then what itis, andhow do you call that Incli nationthatcarriesusaway. Ifweshouldhavean
swered you upon the Spot, that we call'd it Igno
rance, you would have laughed at us. Laugh on
now,andyouwilllaughatyourselves. Foryou
have confessed that those who deceive themselves
in the Choice of Pleasure and ofPain,that istofay
of Good and of Evil, are notdeceived,butforwant of Knowledge ? , and afterwards you further agreed
not only for want of Knowledge, but for want of
that Science which teacheth to measure. N o w every Action wherein one isvdeceived for Want of Know
ledgeyouknowverywellyourselfthatitisan Ignorance, and by consequence it is a very great Ig norance to be overcome by Pleasure. Protagoras, Prodkus and Hippias, boast that they can cure this Ignorance, and you because you are persuaded that
*ItisanArt,becausethereareRulesandaMethod;and 'tisaScience, because itsObjectarethings necessaryandim material, and because it makes its Demonstrations by In fallible Arguments built upon necessary Principles that are
incontestable and certain.
? ;. . . '. ? ? ? this
? ? 31(5
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
this unhappy Inclination is some other thing than Ignorance j you will not apply your self, and will not fend your Children to those Sophists who are such excellent Masters, as holding it for a certain TruththatVirtuecan'tbetaught, andyousavethe Money which you would be obliged to give them. And itisthatfineOpinionthatcausesalltheMis fortunes, not only of the Republick, but also of particularPersons.
That's what we would answer to those honest People. ButIapplymyselfnowtoyou,Prodi- cus and Hippias, and I ask you as well as Protago ras, if you think what I just now laid to be true
orfalse? '
They all agreed that they were very sensible
Truths.
You agree then said I, that Agreeable is that
whichiscalledGood, and Disagreeablethatwhich is. calledEvil. ForasforthatDistinctionofNames which Prodicus wouldhaveintroduced, Ikisshis Hands. Ineffect,Prodicus,callGoodness,Agreea ble, Delectable, Delicious, Charming, and invent stillmoreNamesifthatpleasesyou,itisalike to me. AnsvyeronlytowhatIaskyou.
Prodicus agrees to it, smiling, as do also the others.
ZvtryAEi- Thenwhatdoyouthinkofthis,myFriends, mwhich ^^ i? arenotallActionsfine,whichtendtolive
matuslire a8rfeaWy, and without pain ? And is it not a fine
with^t "* Action at the fame time good . and useful ?
fainisfine, Theyagreetoit?
andconse- ifitbetruethatAgreeablebegood,andthatit
IZTild DetheGood,thenitisnotpossiblethataMan tfifj" knowingthattherearebetterthingsthanthose which he does, and knowing that he can do them, should notwithstanding do the Evil and leave the
Good. Therefore to be overcome by Pleasure, is nothing else than to be in Ignorance $ and to over come Pleasuresisnothingelsethantohave Know ledge.
They
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Soph0s. 317
They acquiefced therein.
' But, said I, to them, what do you call it to be Wha isit in Ignorance ? Is it not to have a false Opinion, and t0 ** *>> Is- to deceive one's self in Things that are very eflen-mrance-
tial and very important ?
Without Contradiction.
It follows then from this Principle, that no
Person runs voluntarily into Evil, nor info that whichhetakestobeEvil. *Anditisnotatall intheNatureofMantorunafterEvil,asEvil,in steadofrunningafterGood. Andwhenoneisforced to chuse one of two Evils, you Will find no Body who would chuse the greatest, if it were in his power to take the least.
That seern'd to us all to be a manifest Truth.
Then, said I, what you call Tenor and Fear, speak Prodicus. Is it not the expectation of an Evil, whether you call it Terror or Fear?
Protagoras and Hippias acquiesced, that Terror
and Fear were nothing precisely but that, and Pro dicusconfesseditofFear,but denieditofTerror.
But that is no matter, m y dear Prodicus, answer'd I.
The only important Point is to know if the Princi plewhichIjust'nowassertedbetrue. Ifitbeso,
all your Distinctions are useless. . In effect, who is . theManwhowouldrunafterthatwhichhefears, whenhemightgobeforethatwhichhefearsnot? That isimpossible by your own Confession; for
from the time that a Man fears a thing, he confef1 feth that he believes it to be bad ^ and there is no Body that voluntarily seeks after and receives that which isbad.
They agreed to it.
ThoseFoundationsbeinglaiddown, Prodicusand Hippias, said I, Protagoras must now justifie and prove the Truth of what he at first asserted j or ra
* For it is a certain Truth, our Will never inclines to any thing but that which pleaseth it most. And there is no thing but Goodj or what it takes for such;, that pleases it.
s ther
? ? ji8
Protagoras: Orythe Sophists.
ther I must grant him Quarter for what he ad vanced at first, for he said that of the five Parts of Virtue there is not one that resembles another, and that they had each of them their own Qualities and a differentCharacter. Iwillnotinsistupon that, but let him prove what he said afterwards, that of those five Parts there were four which had some resemblance to each other, and one which was altogether different from the other four, that is to fay valour.
He added, that I should know thisTruth by this evident Mark, that is, said he, Socrates, that you shall see Men who are very Imperious, unjust, De-
bauch'd and Ignorant, and yet have a heroick Va lour5 and you will understand by that, that Valour is extreamly different from the other parts of Vir tue.
IconfessthatatfirstIwasverymuch supriz'dat this Answer, and my Surprize hath been greater sinceIexamin'dtheThingwithyou. Iask'dhim if he did not call bold and resolute Men, Valiant ? HetoldmethathegavethatNametothosebold Spirits who run headlong into danger j for you re memberitverywell, Protagoras,thatwastheAn swer you made me.
I do remember it, said he.
Tell us then wherein are the Valiant bold, is it in Things that the Timorous undertake ?
No, withoutdoubt.
Isitinothers? InthosethattheBraveunder take?
Assuredly.
Don't Cowards run on upon those Things that seem to be safe, and the Valiant upon those that seem to be terrible?
So People say, Socrates, answered Protagoras. You saytrue,Protagoras? ,butthat'snotwhatI
askyou,IwouldknowyourSentiment. Wherein do you fay are the Valiant bold ? Is it in Things that are terrible, and that they themselves find so ?
? Don't
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists: jip
Don't you remember, Socrates, that you haveFor*>>k* p l a i n l y m a d e it a p p e a r a l r e a d y t h a t t h a t w a s i m p o f m f e * " ^
sible- rZort You are in the right, Protagoras, I had forgot it. theexpetta-
Then it isa Thing demonstrated, that no Body runs"'<>'*>>/'<>>* upon Things that he finds to be terrible, because itE? j> ani
is most certainly an Ignorance to suffer one's self to *? ? "ZmS be overcome by Passions. voluntarily 'Tisagreed to. *<<&*&
But on the other fide, both the one and the other, * the Brave and the Coward run upon Things that seem to be safe and without danger, and by that means the Cowards undertake the fame Things as
the Brave.
There is a great Difference, Socrates h the C o w
ards do the quite contrary to what the Brave do 5 without going further, the one seeks War and the other flies from it- *,
ButdotheyfindittobeafinethingtogotoWar ? Yes, certainly, most fine.
If it be fine it is also good, for w e have agreed
that all Actions that are fine are good.
That is most true, said he to me, and I have al
ways been of that Sentiment.
Iam very glad of it. But who are those then
who will not go to the War which they find to be so fine and so good ?
They areCowards, saidhe.
*'TisaneceflaryConsequenceofwhat Tntagoras justnow consess'd. That the Brave don't run upon terrible Things be cause it is an Evil. Then they run upoa Things that are safe,andthatappeartobewithoutdanger. ;andbyconse quence they do the same thing as the Cowards, and they tend to the fame Mark : That is certain; but here's the difference between the Cowards and the brave Men, that the brave MenactingalwaysbyKnowledge,areneverdeceiv'dinthe- Side they chuse ; for they certainly know what is terrible andwhatisnot. WhereastheCowardsactingbyIgnorance, and fixing safety where danger' is, and danger where safety is,arealwaysdeceiv'd. How manygreatTruthsareclear edby thisPrinciple!
. ? In
? ? 3io Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
Inthemeantime,saidI,togotoWarisafine and a good thing : Is it not also agreeable ?
It is a sequel of the Principles which we have agreed to?
fheydon't Do theCowardsrefusetogotothatwhichis know it, fjnerj better and more agreeable although they
tTinZ kn0Wkt0feWhatkiS?
stance?
But Socrates, if we should confess that, then we overthrow all our first Principles.
How, fayI,doesnotthebraverunuponallthat he thinks to be the finest, the best, and the most agreeable ?
It can't be denied.
TheSraye - Then it is evident that the Brave have not a star when shameful Fear when they fear, nor a shameful As-
cmflmU surancewhentheyarefirrnanaassure(i> fearbut ,_. '
not other- wist.
MdFoois
fearunfia-Quitecontrary? HavetheynotunworthyFearsand fondly, shamefulAssurances?
^ *r>>st I confess it.
fameman- ^nc*^xomwnencecomethoseunworthyFearsand ? fr. aa~shamefulAssurances? IsitnotfromIgnorance1?
That isqertain.
But, what do you call that which makes Cow ards,Cowards? Do youcallitValourorCowardise?
IcallitCowardise, withoutdoubt.
Then the Cowards appear to you to be so,- be cause of their Ignorance of sensible Things ?
Most assuredly.
Then 'tisthatIgnorancewhich makes them Cow ards?
I agree to it.
You have agreed that 'tisCowardise that makes Cowards.
