" By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by
the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves
that body.
the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves
that body.
Summa Theologica
1), "The evening and the morning
were the second day . . . the third day," and so on. But where there is
a second and third there are more than one. There was not, therefore,
only one day.
I answer that, On this question Augustine differs from other
expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are
one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ.
Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were seven
distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as
explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different.
For Augustine understands by the word "day," the knowledge in the mind
of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their
knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second day their
knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then,
each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days,
inasmuch as God wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God
wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge
thereof on the angelic mind; which can know many things at the same
time, especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is
perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days denotes the
natural order of the things known, and not a succession in the
knowledge acquired, or in the things produced. Moreover, angelic
knowledge is appropriately called "day," since light, the cause of day,
is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit.
iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a
succession both in time, and in the things produced.
If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the
mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the
diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown
([594]Q[67], A[1]; [595]Q[69], A[1]), between Augustine and other
writers is taken into account. First, because Augustine takes the earth
and the water as first created, to signify matter totally without form;
but the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the
appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal
matter. But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first
created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing
under the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort of
distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown
([596]Q[67], AA[1],4; [597]Q[69], A[1] ). Secondly, some writers hold
that plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six
days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion
of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is
consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other
writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter
existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with him
also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did
not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference as to four
points; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the
production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the firmament
had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the waters, nor
had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth difference;
which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. In order,
therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side.
Reply to Objection 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and
the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed,
actually, but "before it sprung up in the earth," that is, potentially.
And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to
the first instituting of the world.
Reply to Objection 2: God created all things together so far as regards
their substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all
things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies
in distinction and adornment. Hence the word "creation" is significant.
Reply to Objection 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new
things, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter
work it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.
Reply to Objection 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned
together, not from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in
which to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting
of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be
assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work
added to the world a fresh state of perfection.
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers
to the natural order of the works attributed to the days.
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Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?
Objection 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words to
express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament, and
other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the heaven
and the earth. For "all things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3). Therefore
in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, mention
should have been made of the Word of God.
Objection 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is
not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently
described.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all the things
that He had made, and they were very good. " It ought, then, to have
been said of each work, "God saw that it was good. " The omission,
therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the
second day, is not fitting.
Objection 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not
befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, "The Spirit
of God moved over the waters," are unbecoming.
Objection 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again.
Therefore to the words, "God said: Let the firmament be made . . . and
it was so," it is superfluous to add, "God made the firmament. " And the
like is to be said of other works.
Objection 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide
the day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, "The
evening and morning were the second day" or, "the third day," are not
suitable.
Objection 7: Further, "first," not "one," corresponds to "second" and
"third. " It should therefore have been said that, "The evening and the
morning were the first day," rather than "one day. "
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the
person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world,
and in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place.
For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world
receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means
of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called
his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is by the
word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and
adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned
as the beginning, by the words, "In the beginning God created," since
by creation is understood the production of formless matter. But
according to those who hold that the elements were created from the
first under their proper forms, another explanation must be given; and
therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem. ) that the words, "God
said," signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not
have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it.
Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by
the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the
earth, the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no
creature is omitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem. ), the
heaven and the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the
intervening things being left to be understood, since all these move
heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that
under the word, "earth," Scripture is accustomed to include all the
four elements as (Ps. 148:7,8) after the words, "Praise the Lord from
the earth," is added, "fire, hail, snow, and ice. "
Reply to Objection 3: In the account of the creation there is found
something to correspond to the words, "God saw that it was good," used
in the work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the
consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, "there are two
things," says Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God's love
of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. That they might
then exist, and exist permanently, "the Spirit of God," it is said,
"moved over the waters"---that is to say, over that formless matter,
signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over the
materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And the
words, "God saw that it was good," signify that the things that He had
made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction taken by
God in His works, as of an artist in his art: not as though He knew the
creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise,
than before He made it. Thus in either work, of creation and of
formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation the Person of
the Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by
the beginning, in which He created, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by
the Spirit that moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person
of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Person of the
Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit
by the satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good. And
if the words, "God saw that it was good," are not said of the work of
the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing the waters
was only begun on that day, but perfected on the third. Hence these
words, that are said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it
may be that Scripture does not use these words of approval of the
second days' work, because this is concerned with the distinction of
things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the
firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is
not one of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal
divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by Rabbi
Moses [*Perplex. ii. ], and to these may be added a mystical one derived
from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom the work
of the second day is not marked with approval because the second number
is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection of unity.
Reply to Objection 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the
"Spirit of the Lord," the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says
that it is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which
these things are throughout attributed to God. But according to the
holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is
said to "move over the water"---that is to say, over what Augustine
holds to mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that God
loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in
need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the
object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved
over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is
not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. i, 7). It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem. )
that the Spirit moved over the element of water, "fostering and
quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen broods
over her chickens. " For water has especially a life-giving power, since
many animals are generated in water, and the seed of all animals is
liquid. Also the life of the soul is given by the water of baptism,
according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. "
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these
three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their
being in the Word, denoted by the command "Let . . . be made";
secondly, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, "It
was . . . done"; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the
words, "He made. " And because the formation of the angels is recorded
on the first day, it was not necessary there to add, "He made. " It may
also be said, following other writers, that the words, "He said," and
"Let . . . be made," denote God's command, and the words, "It was
done," the fulfilment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the
sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were
made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in
order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in each
work, after the words, "It was done," some act of God is expressed by
some such words as, "He made," or, "He divided," or, "He called. "
Reply to Objection 6: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,30),
by the "evening" and the "morning" are understood the evening and the
morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained ([598]Q[58],
A[6],7). But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem. ), the entire
period takes its name, as is customary, from its more important part,
the day. And instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, "The days
of my pilgrimage," where night is not mentioned at all. But the evening
and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day
begins with morning and ends with evening, or because evening denotes
the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of day. It seems
fitting, also, that where the first distinction of creatures is
described, divisions of time should be denoted only by what marks their
beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening first is that as
the evening ends the day, which begins with the light, the termination
of the light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness, which
ends with the morning. But Chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it
is intended to show that the natural day does not end with the evening,
but with the morning (Hom. v in Gen. ).
Reply to Objection 7: The words "one day" are used when day is first
instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours.
Hence, by mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed.
Another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the return
of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course. And yet
another, because at the completion of a week of seven days, the first
day returns which is one with the eighth day. The three reasons
assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem. ).
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TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)
__________________________________________________________________
OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE
FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL (SEVEN
ARTICLES)
Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now
proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal
substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of
his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation
to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the
body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our
consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi)
says that three things are to be found in spiritual
substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of
what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to
its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.
Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is
the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of
the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of
inquiry.
(1) Whether the soul is a body?
(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?
(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?
(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?
(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
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Whether the soul is a body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the
moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First,
because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since
nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not
give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not
moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find
proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the
movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul
is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul
is a body.
Objection 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness.
But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If,
therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of
corporeal things.
Objection 3: Further, between the mover and the moved there must be
contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul
moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is
simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy
space by its bulk. "
I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the
soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which
live: for we call living things "animate," [*i. e. having a soul], and
those things which have no life, "inanimate. " Now life is shown
principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of
old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the
principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted
that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is
nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal.
This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make
use of only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which
shows clearly that the soul is not a body.
It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for
then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the
same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is
the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a
body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart
is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the
first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of
life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such;
since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a
principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing
or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually
such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act.
Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a
body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of
calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.
Reply to Objection 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by
something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we
must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to
pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the
thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in
Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not
moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause
an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover,
which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for
this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is
the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved
essentially---namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old
believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every
mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity
actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows
potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing
known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only
potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but
only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of
corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that
there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the
ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and
potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to
have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the
principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity,"
and of "power.
" By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by
the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves
that body.
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Whether the human soul is something subsistent?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something
subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular
thing. " Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of
that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not
something subsistent.
Objection 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does
not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to say that
the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or
builds. " Therefore the soul is not subsistent.
Objection 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some
operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the
body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does
not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the
body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that
the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body,
will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are
led astray through associating with the soul those things without which
they are unable to think of any nature---i. e. imaginary pictures of
corporeal things. " Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not
only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something
subsistent.
I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of
intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both
incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the
intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever
knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because
that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything
else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a
feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and
everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle
contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies.
Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is
impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise
impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the
determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies;
as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the
eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of
that same color.
Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the
intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that
which subsists can have an operation "per se. " For nothing can operate
but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts
heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore,
that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is
something incorporeal and subsistent.
Reply to Objection 1: "This particular thing" can be taken in two
senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which
subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense
excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter
excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be
called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not in the
second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can
indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being
something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is
composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing. "
Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his
own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to
be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate
"per se" belongs to what exists "per se. " But for a thing to exist "per
se," it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a
material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that
is rightly said to subsist "per se," which is neither inherent in the
above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the
hand cannot be said to subsist "per se"; nor can it for that reason be
said to operate "per se. " Hence the operation of the parts is through
each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the
eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say
that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking,
does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as
the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands
through the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is necessary for the action of the
intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object;
for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight.
Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be
non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is
non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in
order to perform its act of perception.
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Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are
subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as we
have just shown [599](A[2]), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore
the souls of other animals are subsistent.
Objection 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible
objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to
intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body,
apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart
from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls
of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent;
just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.
Objection 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the
body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute animals
has an operation apart from the body.
On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi,
xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the
souls of animals are not subsistent. "
I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between
sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has
been said [600](A[1]). Plato, however, drew a distinction between
intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle,
maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as
such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are
subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul,
understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the
other hand, sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive
soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act
of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of color:
and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul
has no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the
sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as
the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not
subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its
being.
Reply to Objection 1: Although man is of the same "genus" as other
animals, he is of a different "species. " Specific difference is derived
from the difference of form; nor does every difference of form
necessarily imply a diversity of "genus. "
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the
sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual
faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in
potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ,
inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied
with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible
corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect.
For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects
is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If,
however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary,
this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the
operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.
Reply to Objection 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive
power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive
soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like
nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power
is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the
appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in
being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the
sensitive soul without the body.
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Whether the soul is man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2
Cor. 4:16): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is
renewed day by day. " But that which is within man is the soul.
Therefore the soul is the inward man.
Objection 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a
universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore
it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person.
Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as
holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul
and body. "
I answer that, The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two
senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man,
Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I
say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the
species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species.
This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the
definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not
signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural
things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter,
which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as
it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this
soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of
man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in
common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given
species, must belong to the substance of the species.
It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man;
and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the
sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that
case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the
soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is
that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is
man. But it has been shown above [601](A[3]) that sensation is not the
operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of
man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only,
but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that
sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul
making use of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a
thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the
governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way
sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes,
indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is
called the "inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body
is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go
beyond the senses. And this is called the "outward" man.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or
a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence
a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor,
likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human
species.
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Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and
form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things
are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by
participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living
things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v).
Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the
first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter.
Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality;
which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially
understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary
matter, as part of itself.
Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found,
there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the
soul---namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject
to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and
from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of
their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6).
But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God.
Therefore the soul has matter.
Objection 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure
act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul
has matter.
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the
soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.
I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in
two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs
to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a
form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of
itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible
that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand
something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that
which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since
potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If,
however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that
part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the
"primary animate. "
Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul
inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is
received into something is received according to the condition of the
recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower.
But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for
instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the
form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the
intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an
absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if
the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of
things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only
know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which
receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by
which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the
intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge
of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all
acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as
a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as
potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But
the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are
participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one
potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which
all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality
would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive
potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive
potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the
things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms;
whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence
of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the
soul is composed of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to
matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the
potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of
primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of
subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge,
and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in
potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the
agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes
it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however,
does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause
transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted
above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and
form "there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to
act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once. "
[*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid. "
The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim
per se unum quiddam est . . . et ens quiddam. "]
Reply to Objection 4: Everything participated is compared to the
participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to
subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even
life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by
the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own
existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances
there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of
matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some
say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which
they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
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Whether the human soul is incorruptible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For
those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a
like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of
animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is
alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing
more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as
the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the
condition of both is equal. " But the souls of brute animals are
corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to
nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as
it is written (Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which is true, not
only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in
the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had not been," even
as to our soul.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But
the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a
phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing
without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the
Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the
dissolution of the body.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to
Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an
incorruptible substantial life. "
I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we
call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in
two ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any
substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the
generation or corruption of something else. For generation and
corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is
acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has
existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se';
while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material
forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or
corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above ([602]AA[2],3)
that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human
soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies
are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it
were corrupted "per se. " This, indeed, is impossible, not only as
regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is
a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of
itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which
is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual
existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the
form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be
separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent
form to cease to exist.
Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some
pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is
incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety;
since generation and corruption are from contraries and into
contraries.
were the second day . . . the third day," and so on. But where there is
a second and third there are more than one. There was not, therefore,
only one day.
I answer that, On this question Augustine differs from other
expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are
one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ.
Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were seven
distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as
explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different.
For Augustine understands by the word "day," the knowledge in the mind
of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their
knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second day their
knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then,
each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days,
inasmuch as God wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God
wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge
thereof on the angelic mind; which can know many things at the same
time, especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is
perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days denotes the
natural order of the things known, and not a succession in the
knowledge acquired, or in the things produced. Moreover, angelic
knowledge is appropriately called "day," since light, the cause of day,
is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit.
iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a
succession both in time, and in the things produced.
If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the
mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the
diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown
([594]Q[67], A[1]; [595]Q[69], A[1]), between Augustine and other
writers is taken into account. First, because Augustine takes the earth
and the water as first created, to signify matter totally without form;
but the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the
appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal
matter. But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first
created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing
under the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort of
distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown
([596]Q[67], AA[1],4; [597]Q[69], A[1] ). Secondly, some writers hold
that plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six
days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion
of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is
consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other
writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter
existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with him
also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did
not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference as to four
points; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the
production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the firmament
had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the waters, nor
had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth difference;
which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. In order,
therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side.
Reply to Objection 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and
the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed,
actually, but "before it sprung up in the earth," that is, potentially.
And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to
the first instituting of the world.
Reply to Objection 2: God created all things together so far as regards
their substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all
things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies
in distinction and adornment. Hence the word "creation" is significant.
Reply to Objection 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new
things, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter
work it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.
Reply to Objection 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned
together, not from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in
which to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting
of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be
assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work
added to the world a fresh state of perfection.
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers
to the natural order of the works attributed to the days.
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Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?
Objection 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words to
express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament, and
other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the heaven
and the earth. For "all things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3). Therefore
in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, mention
should have been made of the Word of God.
Objection 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is
not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently
described.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all the things
that He had made, and they were very good. " It ought, then, to have
been said of each work, "God saw that it was good. " The omission,
therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the
second day, is not fitting.
Objection 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not
befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, "The Spirit
of God moved over the waters," are unbecoming.
Objection 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again.
Therefore to the words, "God said: Let the firmament be made . . . and
it was so," it is superfluous to add, "God made the firmament. " And the
like is to be said of other works.
Objection 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide
the day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, "The
evening and morning were the second day" or, "the third day," are not
suitable.
Objection 7: Further, "first," not "one," corresponds to "second" and
"third. " It should therefore have been said that, "The evening and the
morning were the first day," rather than "one day. "
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the
person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world,
and in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place.
For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world
receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means
of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called
his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is by the
word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and
adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned
as the beginning, by the words, "In the beginning God created," since
by creation is understood the production of formless matter. But
according to those who hold that the elements were created from the
first under their proper forms, another explanation must be given; and
therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem. ) that the words, "God
said," signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not
have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it.
Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by
the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the
earth, the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no
creature is omitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem. ), the
heaven and the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the
intervening things being left to be understood, since all these move
heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that
under the word, "earth," Scripture is accustomed to include all the
four elements as (Ps. 148:7,8) after the words, "Praise the Lord from
the earth," is added, "fire, hail, snow, and ice. "
Reply to Objection 3: In the account of the creation there is found
something to correspond to the words, "God saw that it was good," used
in the work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the
consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, "there are two
things," says Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God's love
of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. That they might
then exist, and exist permanently, "the Spirit of God," it is said,
"moved over the waters"---that is to say, over that formless matter,
signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over the
materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And the
words, "God saw that it was good," signify that the things that He had
made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction taken by
God in His works, as of an artist in his art: not as though He knew the
creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise,
than before He made it. Thus in either work, of creation and of
formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation the Person of
the Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by
the beginning, in which He created, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by
the Spirit that moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person
of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Person of the
Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit
by the satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good. And
if the words, "God saw that it was good," are not said of the work of
the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing the waters
was only begun on that day, but perfected on the third. Hence these
words, that are said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it
may be that Scripture does not use these words of approval of the
second days' work, because this is concerned with the distinction of
things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the
firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is
not one of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal
divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by Rabbi
Moses [*Perplex. ii. ], and to these may be added a mystical one derived
from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom the work
of the second day is not marked with approval because the second number
is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection of unity.
Reply to Objection 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the
"Spirit of the Lord," the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says
that it is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which
these things are throughout attributed to God. But according to the
holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is
said to "move over the water"---that is to say, over what Augustine
holds to mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that God
loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in
need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the
object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved
over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is
not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. i, 7). It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem. )
that the Spirit moved over the element of water, "fostering and
quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen broods
over her chickens. " For water has especially a life-giving power, since
many animals are generated in water, and the seed of all animals is
liquid. Also the life of the soul is given by the water of baptism,
according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. "
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these
three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their
being in the Word, denoted by the command "Let . . . be made";
secondly, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, "It
was . . . done"; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the
words, "He made. " And because the formation of the angels is recorded
on the first day, it was not necessary there to add, "He made. " It may
also be said, following other writers, that the words, "He said," and
"Let . . . be made," denote God's command, and the words, "It was
done," the fulfilment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the
sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were
made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in
order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in each
work, after the words, "It was done," some act of God is expressed by
some such words as, "He made," or, "He divided," or, "He called. "
Reply to Objection 6: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,30),
by the "evening" and the "morning" are understood the evening and the
morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained ([598]Q[58],
A[6],7). But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem. ), the entire
period takes its name, as is customary, from its more important part,
the day. And instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, "The days
of my pilgrimage," where night is not mentioned at all. But the evening
and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day
begins with morning and ends with evening, or because evening denotes
the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of day. It seems
fitting, also, that where the first distinction of creatures is
described, divisions of time should be denoted only by what marks their
beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening first is that as
the evening ends the day, which begins with the light, the termination
of the light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness, which
ends with the morning. But Chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it
is intended to show that the natural day does not end with the evening,
but with the morning (Hom. v in Gen. ).
Reply to Objection 7: The words "one day" are used when day is first
instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours.
Hence, by mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed.
Another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the return
of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course. And yet
another, because at the completion of a week of seven days, the first
day returns which is one with the eighth day. The three reasons
assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem. ).
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TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)
__________________________________________________________________
OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE
FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL (SEVEN
ARTICLES)
Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now
proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal
substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of
his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation
to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the
body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our
consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi)
says that three things are to be found in spiritual
substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of
what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to
its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.
Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is
the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of
the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of
inquiry.
(1) Whether the soul is a body?
(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?
(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?
(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?
(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the soul is a body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the
moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First,
because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since
nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not
give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not
moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find
proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the
movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul
is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul
is a body.
Objection 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness.
But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If,
therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of
corporeal things.
Objection 3: Further, between the mover and the moved there must be
contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul
moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is
simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy
space by its bulk. "
I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the
soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which
live: for we call living things "animate," [*i. e. having a soul], and
those things which have no life, "inanimate. " Now life is shown
principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of
old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the
principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted
that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is
nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal.
This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make
use of only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which
shows clearly that the soul is not a body.
It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for
then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the
same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is
the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a
body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart
is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the
first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of
life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such;
since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a
principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing
or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually
such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act.
Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a
body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of
calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.
Reply to Objection 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by
something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we
must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to
pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the
thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in
Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not
moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause
an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover,
which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for
this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is
the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved
essentially---namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old
believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every
mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity
actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows
potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing
known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only
potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but
only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of
corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that
there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the
ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and
potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to
have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the
principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity,"
and of "power.
" By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by
the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves
that body.
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Whether the human soul is something subsistent?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something
subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular
thing. " Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of
that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not
something subsistent.
Objection 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does
not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to say that
the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or
builds. " Therefore the soul is not subsistent.
Objection 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some
operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the
body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does
not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the
body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that
the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body,
will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are
led astray through associating with the soul those things without which
they are unable to think of any nature---i. e. imaginary pictures of
corporeal things. " Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not
only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something
subsistent.
I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of
intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both
incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the
intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever
knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because
that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything
else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a
feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and
everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle
contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies.
Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is
impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise
impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the
determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies;
as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the
eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of
that same color.
Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the
intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that
which subsists can have an operation "per se. " For nothing can operate
but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts
heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore,
that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is
something incorporeal and subsistent.
Reply to Objection 1: "This particular thing" can be taken in two
senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which
subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense
excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter
excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be
called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not in the
second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can
indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being
something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is
composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing. "
Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his
own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to
be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate
"per se" belongs to what exists "per se. " But for a thing to exist "per
se," it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a
material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that
is rightly said to subsist "per se," which is neither inherent in the
above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the
hand cannot be said to subsist "per se"; nor can it for that reason be
said to operate "per se. " Hence the operation of the parts is through
each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the
eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say
that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking,
does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as
the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands
through the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is necessary for the action of the
intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object;
for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight.
Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be
non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is
non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in
order to perform its act of perception.
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Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are
subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as we
have just shown [599](A[2]), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore
the souls of other animals are subsistent.
Objection 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible
objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to
intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body,
apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart
from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls
of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent;
just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.
Objection 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the
body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute animals
has an operation apart from the body.
On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi,
xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the
souls of animals are not subsistent. "
I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between
sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has
been said [600](A[1]). Plato, however, drew a distinction between
intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle,
maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as
such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are
subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul,
understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the
other hand, sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive
soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act
of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of color:
and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul
has no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the
sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as
the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not
subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its
being.
Reply to Objection 1: Although man is of the same "genus" as other
animals, he is of a different "species. " Specific difference is derived
from the difference of form; nor does every difference of form
necessarily imply a diversity of "genus. "
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the
sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual
faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in
potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ,
inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied
with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible
corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect.
For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects
is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If,
however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary,
this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the
operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.
Reply to Objection 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive
power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive
soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like
nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power
is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the
appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in
being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the
sensitive soul without the body.
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Whether the soul is man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2
Cor. 4:16): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is
renewed day by day. " But that which is within man is the soul.
Therefore the soul is the inward man.
Objection 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a
universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore
it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person.
Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as
holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul
and body. "
I answer that, The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two
senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man,
Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I
say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the
species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species.
This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the
definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not
signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural
things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter,
which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as
it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this
soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of
man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in
common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given
species, must belong to the substance of the species.
It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man;
and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the
sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that
case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the
soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is
that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is
man. But it has been shown above [601](A[3]) that sensation is not the
operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of
man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only,
but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that
sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul
making use of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a
thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the
governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way
sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes,
indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is
called the "inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body
is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go
beyond the senses. And this is called the "outward" man.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or
a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence
a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor,
likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human
species.
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Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and
form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things
are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by
participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living
things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v).
Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the
first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter.
Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality;
which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially
understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary
matter, as part of itself.
Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found,
there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the
soul---namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject
to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and
from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of
their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6).
But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God.
Therefore the soul has matter.
Objection 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure
act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul
has matter.
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the
soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.
I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in
two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs
to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a
form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of
itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible
that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand
something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that
which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since
potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If,
however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that
part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the
"primary animate. "
Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul
inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is
received into something is received according to the condition of the
recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower.
But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for
instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the
form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the
intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an
absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if
the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of
things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only
know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which
receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by
which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the
intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge
of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all
acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as
a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as
potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But
the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are
participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one
potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which
all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality
would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive
potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive
potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the
things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms;
whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence
of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the
soul is composed of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to
matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the
potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of
primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of
subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge,
and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in
potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the
agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes
it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however,
does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause
transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted
above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and
form "there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to
act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once. "
[*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid. "
The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim
per se unum quiddam est . . . et ens quiddam. "]
Reply to Objection 4: Everything participated is compared to the
participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to
subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even
life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by
the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own
existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances
there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of
matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some
say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which
they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
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Whether the human soul is incorruptible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For
those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a
like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of
animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is
alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing
more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as
the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the
condition of both is equal. " But the souls of brute animals are
corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to
nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as
it is written (Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which is true, not
only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in
the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had not been," even
as to our soul.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But
the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a
phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing
without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the
Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the
dissolution of the body.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to
Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an
incorruptible substantial life. "
I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we
call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in
two ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any
substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the
generation or corruption of something else. For generation and
corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is
acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has
existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se';
while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material
forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or
corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above ([602]AA[2],3)
that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human
soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies
are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it
were corrupted "per se. " This, indeed, is impossible, not only as
regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is
a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of
itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which
is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual
existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the
form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be
separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent
form to cease to exist.
Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some
pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is
incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety;
since generation and corruption are from contraries and into
contraries.
