No More Learning

He sent timely warning to Raja
Ram, who escaped first to Vellore with his chief officers but left his
family behind. The three forts within Gingee were successfully
stormed in gallant style by the Rajputs and Afghans (18 January,
1698). A vast amount of booty was captured, and among the prisoners
were four wives and five children of Raja Ram. But the raja succeeded
in arriving at Vishalgarh; the work of the long siege of Gingee was
undone; the war was merely transferred to the western theatre.
We shall now turn to the affairs of western India after Raja Ram's
accession. The first flush of Mughul success was over in a year and
a half, the Marathas recovered from the crushing blows of Sham-
bhuji's capture and Raja Ram's flight to Madras, and they gained
their first signal victory over the Mughuls on 4 June, 1690, when they


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294
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
captured Sharza Khan near Satara with his family, 4000 horses and
the entire camp and baggage of his army, after slaying 1500 of his
men. Then they recovered several forts from the imperialists, Partab-
garh, Rohira, Rajgarh and Torna. In 1692 there was a renewal of
Maratha activity and their success was conspicuous in many quarters,
such as the recovery of Panhala. The siege of this fort, urged by
Aurangzib, failed after many years of desultory attack under Mu'izz-
ud-din Bidar Bakht and Firuz Jang. The disaster to Sharza Khan
in 1690 compelled the emperor to occupy the north Satara district
in force, which led to frequent but indecisive conflicts with Santa
Ghorpare, who had made the Mahadev hill his base, and used to
raid far to the south and the east. The Belgaum and Dharwar districts
were harried by Santa and Dhana, which necessitated the strengthen-
ing of the Mughul forces there; but when these generals went off
to the eastern Carnatic (end of 1692), the Mughuls on the western
front enjoyed a short respite. Late in 1693 they returned home and
renewed their attacks. Dhana destroyed the siege-works before
Panhala, while Santa sent off Amrit Rao Nimbalkar to raid Berar,
and he himself levied chauth in the Malkhed region. Throughout
1694 and 1695 the Maratha bands were active and the Berads trouble-
some all over the western Deccan, but nothing decisive or noteworthy
was done on either side but desultory fighting and futile marches,
which wore the Mughuls down,
Then came two terrible disasters. In November, 1695, the emperor,
learning that Santa was conveying his rich store of plunder to his
own home in north-western Mysore, ordered Qasim Khan to intercept
him, and sent a picked force of his personal retinue and the contin-
gents of the nobles, under some of his highest officers, to reinforce
Qasim Khan. The two divisions united near Chitaldroog, and Qasim
Khan entertained his noble guests with all the pomp and luxury
of a Mughul grandee, discarding military precaution. Santa came
up from a distance by swift and secret marches and formed his men
in three divisions which were very ably handled and co-ordinated.
The first surprised and plundered the advanced tents of Qasim Khan
and his heavy baggage, the second intercepted and enveloped the
Khan, who was advancing to the rescue, while the third Maratha
division looted the camp and baggage left behind by Qasim Khan
in his advance. The Carnatic musketeers and Maratha light horse
completely overpowered the Mughuls and drove them in headlong
rout to the small fort of Dodderi, which had neither space nor food
sufficient for them. Fully one-third of the Mughul army fell in the
battle and the retreat; the rest capitulated through hunger; Qasim
Khan committed suicide. The remnant of his army, after promising
a ransom of two million rupees and giving up all its cash, horses and
other property, was set free (December, 1695).
Another great Mughul general, Himmat Khan, was in Basayapatan


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RAJA RAM'S LAST EFFORTS
295
(forty miles west of Dodderi). Santa appeared before it on 30 January,
1696, and lured Himmat Khan out of his refuge, and shot him dead
as he was leading a charge. His baggage was plundered, and his men
fell back into the fort. Here they were relieved after more than a
month. The emperor took prompt measures to strengthen the defence
of this district. Prince Bidar Bakht chastised Barmappa Nayak of
Chitaldroog, who had disloyally sided with Santa. Prince A'zam was
posted at Pedgaon.
But now a civil war weakened the Maratha strength. Santaji
Ghorpare was mortally jealous of Dhana-Jadav, his favoured rival
for the post of commander-in-chief (Senapati). His vanity, imperious
temper and insubordinate spirit gave great offence at Raja Ram's
court; Santa was attacked by Raja Ram and Dhana near Conjeveram
(May, 1696), but he defeated them. When he returned to Maharashtra
in March, 1697, a civil war broke out between him and Dhana, all
the Maratha captains being ranged on the two sides. In another
battle most of Santa's followers, disgusted with his severity and
insolence, went over to Dhana. Santa, defeated and despoiled of all,
fled from the field, but near the Mahadev hill he was murdered by
order of Radhika Bai Mane, whose brother he had slain (June, 1697).
In force of genius he was the greatest Maratha soldier after Shivaji,
but his temper was unbearable.
Nothing remarkable happened in the second half of 1697, nor for
some time after Raja Ram's return from Gingee to Vishalgarh
(February, 1698). Next year, after forming plans for an extensive
raid through Khandesh and Berar, he issued from Satara (5 Novem-
ber, 1699) and took the road with a large force. But he was intercepted
near Parenda by Bidar Bakht, broken and driven towards Ahmad.
nagar; his raid into Berar was nipped in the bud; but one division
under Krishna Savant crossed the Narbada for the first time and
plundered some places near Dhamoni. Battles, however, were fought
with Dhana and other generals in the Satara district with various
results (January, 1700).
On 12 March, 1700, Raja Ram died at Sinhgarh. His senior widow
Tara Bai placed her son. Shivaji III on the throne, while another wife
Rajas Bai crowned her son as Shambhuji II, and the Maratha
ministers and generals were again divided into two rival factions.
But Tara Bai's ability and energy, seconded by the genius of Para-
shuram Trimbak (the new regent), gave her supreme power in the
state.
. During the past decade, the Mughul cause had achieved remarkable
and unbroken success in the northern Konkan through the ability
and enterprise of a local commandant named Muat'bar Khan, a
Sayyid of the Navait clan. He first distinguished himself by cap-
turing or buying many hill-forts in the Nasik district, and then
descended into the Konkan, where he took Kalyan (April, 1689)
.


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296
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
and several other places, occupying the country southwards to the
latitude of Bombay, and even forced the Portuguese of “the North"
(Bassein and Daman) to make peace by promising not to support
the Marathas. At Kalyan he lived for many years, adorning the
city with his many buildings and gardens, and restoring peace and
prosperity to the district.
By April, 1695, Aurangzib came to realise that his work in the
Deccan was not finished with the conquest of Bijapur, Golconda and
the Maratha capital; it was only beginning; for him there was no
going back to Delhi, as he could see no end to the people's war in
which he was entangled. Therefore, in May, 1695, he sent his eldest
surviving son Shah 'Alam to govern the Punjab, Sind and afterwards
Afghanistan and guard the north-western gateway of India, while
he himself took post at Brahmapuri for the next four and a half years
in the very heart of the enemy country. During this period (1695-99),
the Maratha danger came nearer home and drove the Mughuls into
the defensive in Maharashtra and Kanara. The movements of their
roving bands were bewilderingly rapid and unexpected, and the
Mughul pursung columns toiled in vain after them. Local represen-
tatives of the emperor were often driven to make unauthorised terms
with the Marathas by agreeing to pay chauth. Worse than that, some
imperialists made a concert with the enemy for sharing the plunder
of the emperor's own subjects. The Mughul administration had really
dissolved and only the presence of the emperor held it together, but
merely as a phantom rule.
The fall of Gingee enabled Aurangzib to concentrate all his re-
sources in the western theatre of war, and now began the last stage
of his career, the siege of successive Maratha forts by the emperor in
person. The rest of his life is a repetition of the same sickening tale:
a hill-fort captured by him in person after a vast expenditure of time,
men and money, the fort recovered by the Marathas from the weak
Mughul garrison after a few months, and its siege begun again a year
or two later. His soldiers and camp-followers suffered unspeakable
hardship in marching over flooded rivers, muddy roads and broken
hilly tracks; porters disappeared, transport beasts died of hunger and
overwork, scarcity of grain was ever present in the camp and the
Maratha and Berad “thieves" (as he officially called them) not far off.
The mutual jealousies of his generals ruined his cause or delayed
his success. The siege of eight forts, Satara, Parli, Panhala, Khelna
(=Vishalgarh), Kondhana (Sinhgarh), Rajgarh, Torna and Wagin-
gera, besides five places of lesser note, occupied him for five years
and a half (1699-1705), after which the broken down old man of
eighty-eight retired to die.
Leaving his family, surplus baggage and unnecessary officials in
the fortified camp of Brahmapuri in charge of the vazir, and giving
Zu-l-Fiqar, surnamed Nusrat Jang, a roving commission to fight the


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CAPTURE OF SATARA AND PARLI
297
Maratha field-armies that hovered round the emperor or threatened
this base camp, Aurangzib started from Brahmapuri on 29 October,
1699. Capturing Basantgarh on the way without a blow, he arrived
before Satara on 18 December and took up his quarters at Karanja,
a mile and a half to the north of the fort. The entire siege-camp, five
miles round, was enclosed with a wall to keep the Maratha raiders
out. The rocky soil made sapping a very slow and difficult work, and
the fort was never completely invested. The garrison made frequent
sorties, which were repulsed with more or less loss, while the Maratha
field-forces reduced the besiegers to the condition of a beleaguered
city, cutting off outposts and closing the road to grain dealers.
On 23 April the Mughuls fired two mines. The first killed many
of the garrison, but the commandant Pragji Prabhu was dug out -
alive from under the debris. The second exploded outwards, killing
two thousand of the Mughul soldiers, but making a 20 yards breach
in the wall. Baji Chavan Daphle, a Maratha vassal, mounted the
breach shouting to the Mughul soldiers to follow him and enter, but
they were too dazed by the catastrophe to advance, and he was
killed. But after the death of Raja Ram, the Maratha commandant
Subhanji lost heart and yielded the fort to the imperialists (1 May,
1700).
Aurangzib next laid siege to Parli, a fort six miles west of Satara
and the headquarters of the Maratha government. It resisted for
some time, and the invaders suffered terribly from excessive rain and
the scarcity of grain and fodder. But the emperor held grimly on
and at last the commandant evacuated the fort for a bribe (19 June).
These two sieges caused an enormous waste of men and animals;
the Mughul treasury was empty and the soldiers were starving as
their pay for three years was in arrears. Excessive rain aggravated
their sufferings. On the return march from Parli to Bhushangarh,
transport utterly broke down, much property had to be abandoned,
even nobles had to walk on foot through the mud, and only forty-five
miles were covered in thirty-five days. While the emperor was
encamped at Khavasspur (on the Man river), the river suddenly
rose in flood at midnight (11 October) and swept through the camp,
destroying many men and animals, and ruining the tents and baggage.
The emperor himself stumbled and dislocated his knee in trying to
escape. This left him a little lame for the rest of his life, which the
court flatterers used to say was the heritage of his ancestor, the
world-conqueror Timur-Lang! But reinforcements were summoned
from northern India and many thousands of fresh horses purchased
to mount the army again. The Marathas and Berads plundered
and levied chauth far and wide during this eclipse of the Mughul
power.
Panhala was the next fort attacked (19 March, 1701). The emperor
formed a complete circle of investment, fourteen miles in length,


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298
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
around it and its sister-height Pavangarh. A mobile force under
Nusrat Jang was sent out to chastise the Marathas wherever heard of.
But in that stony region the progress of mining was very slow, while
the mutual jealousies of his generals led them to thwart each other
and thus prolonged the siege. The siege dragged on for two months,
without success seeming any nearer. Then a heavy bribe was paid
to the commandant Trimbak and he delivered the fort on 7 June.
Wardhangarh, Chandan, Nandgir and Wandan were next captured
with little or no opposition.
Aurangzib marched against Khelna next winter. This fort stands
on the crest of the western Ghats, 3350 feet above the sea and over-
looking the Konkan plain, with dense forests and thick underwood
below it. With great labour a road was made through the Ambaghat
pass by Fath-ullah Khan, but even then the emperor's followers
suffered terrible hardship and loss in crossing it and bringing his
camp and equipage to the foot of the fort. The siege dragged on for
five months; the Mughul artillery beat in vain against the solid rock
of the walls, while the missiles of the garrison did terrible havoc
among the imperialists crowded below. Some success was gained
at the western gate by Bidar Bakht's follower Raja Jay Singh (Sawai,
of Amber) and his Rajputs, who stormed the fausse braye of the gate
(7 May, 1702). But the terrible monsoon of the Bombay coast now
burst on the heads of the Mughul army. They then bribed the
commandant Parashuram to evacuate it (17 June). The imperialists
underwent unspeakable hardship in their return from Khelna, in
crossing the Ambaghat and the swollen streams on the way which
raged like torrents. Grain sold at a rupee a seer, "fodder and fire-
wood appeared in the isolated camp only by mistake”; no tent was
available. In this condition, traversing 30 miles in thirty-eight days,
the miserable army reached Panhala on 27 July.
On 12 December, the indomitable old man set out to conquer
Kondhana (Sinhgarh). But there was no life in the work of the
besiegers, and after wasting three months they secured the fort by
profuse bribery (18 April, 1703). After spending seven months near
Poona, the emperor besieged Rajgarh, and captured its first gate
by assault after two months of bombardment. Then the garrison
made terms but fled away from the fort at night (26 February, 1704).
Torna was next taken (20 March), the only fort that Aurangzib
captured by force without resort to bribery.
Next, after a six months' halt at Khed (7 miles north of Chakan),
the emperor marched to attack Wagingera, the capital of the Berads, a
an aboriginal people expert in musketry, night attack and robbery,
who lived in the fork between the Krishna and the Bhima, east of
Bijapur. The siege began on 19 February, 1705, but for many weeks
afterwards the Mughuls could make no progress; every day the
1 Fifteen pence a pound. 2 Beydurs in Meadows Taylor's 'Story of my life. '


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>
AURANGZIB'S LAST CAMPAIGN
299
enemy sallied out and attacked them, the bombardment from the
numerous well-supplied guns in the fort made the advance of the
siege-trenches or even their maintenance within range impossible.
One morning the imperialists captured by surprise the hillock of
Lal Tikri, which commands a portion of Wagingera, but the Berads
soon drove them out with heavy loss, as mutual jealousy among the
Mughul generals prevented the timely reinforcement of the captors
of this position.
On 6 April, a Maratha force under Dhana Jadav and Hindu Rao
(brother of Santa Ghorpare) arrived to support the Berads, because
the families of many Maratha generals were sheltered in Wagingera.
These were cleverly removed by the newcomers through the back-
door, while they kept the Mughuls in play by a noisy feint in front.
The Marathas halted in the neighbourhood in consideration of a
daily subsidy from Pidia the Berad chief, and made frequent attacks
on the Mughuls, who were now thrown into a state of siege and all
their activity ceased, while famine raged in their camp. Then Pidia
gained some time by delusive peace negotiations.
Nusrat Jang, who had arrived to aid the emperor, made steady
progress by capturing some of the outlying hillocks and the village
of Talwargera, in the plain south of the fort gate, after days of gallant
fight and heavy loss among his Bundela soldiers, till Pidia found
further struggle hopeless and evacuated the fort secretly at night
(8 May, 1705) with his Maratha allies. The Mughul camp-followers
who first entered it in search of plunder set fire to the grass huts
which caused terrible gunpowder explosions. The bare fort was
captured, but its chieftain and his clansmen remained free to give.
more trouble to the emperor.
After the fall of the fort, Aurangzib encamped at Devapur, a quiet
village on the bank of the Krishna, eight miles south of it. Here he
fell very ill on account of his extreme old age (ninety lunar years)
and incessant toil. His entire army was seized with consternation;
if he died who would lead them safely out of that enemy country?
His courageous struggling with disease and insistence on transacting
business in spite of fever made him very weak and at times uncon-
scious. But after ten or twelve days he began to rally, though slowly.
On his complete recovery, he broke up his camp on 2 November
and marched slowly to Ahmadnagar, which was reached on 31
January, 1706. This was destined to be his "journey's end”, for here
he died a year later.
When Aurangzib set out on his retreat to Ahmadnagar, he left
desolation and anarchy behind him. His march was molested by the
exultant Marathas under all their great generals, who followed his
army a few miles in the rear, cutting off its grain supplies and
stragglers and threatening to break into its camp. When attacked by
the Mughuls in force, they would fall back a little, but like water


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300
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
parted by the oar would close again as soon as the attackers retired
on their main body. As the eyewitness Bhimsen wrote:
The Marathas became completely dominant over the whole kingdom and
closed the roads. By means of robbery they escaped from poverty and rose to
great wealth. I have heard that every week they distributed alms and sweet-
meats in charity, praying for the long life of the emperor, who had proved (for
them) the Feeder of the Universe! The price of grain grew higher and higher;
in the imperial camp in particular vast numbers perished of hunger and many
kinds of illegal exactions and practices appeared.
The Marathas reduced spoliation to a system :
Wherever these raiders arrived they engaged in collecting the revenue of the
place and passed months and years there with their wives and children in
composure of mind. They divided the parganas among themselves, and in
imitation of the imperial government they appointed their own subahdars (gov-
ernors), kamavish-dars (chauth-collectors) and rahdars (road-patrol). When
a kamavishdar was opposed by a strong zamindar or imperial faujdar, the
Maratha subahdat came to his aid (with his troops). . . . In each subah the
Marathas built one or two small forts, from which they issued to raid the
country around (Khafi Khan).
When the Marathas invade a province, they take from every pargana as much
money as they desire and make their horses eat the standing crops or tread them
down. The imperial army that comes in pursuit can subsist there only after
the fields have been cultivated (anew). All administration has disappeared. . . .
The peasants have given up cultivation; the jagirdars do not get a penny from
their fiefs. . . . The servants of the Maratha state support themselves by plund-
ering on all sides, and pay a small part of their booty to their king, getting no
salary from him. The coming of rent from the Mughul officers' jagirs ceased
. . . . The condition of the imperial army grew worse from the high price of
grain and the devastation of the jagirs, while the resources of the Marathas
increased through robbery. Thus, vicious circle was formed which aggra-
vated the evil. The mansabdars, on account of the scanty forces under them,
. cannot gain control over their jagirs. The local zamindars, growing stronger,
have joined the Marathas, raised troops and stretched the hand of oppression
over the realm. As the imperial dominions have been given out in fief to the
jagirdars, so too the Marathas have made a distribution of the whole empire
among their generals, and thus une kingdom has to support two sets of agir-
dars. . . . . The peasants, subjected to this double exaction, have collected arms
and horses and joined the Marathas (Bhimsen).
The economic ruin and destruction of order caused to the empire
by the Maratha ascendancy will be clear from these two contem-
porary accounts. Another eyewitness, Manucci, thus describes the
frightful material waste caused by this quarter-century of futile
warfare, and the complete desolation of the Deccan :
Aurangzib withdrew to Ahmadnagar, leaving behind him the fields of these
provinces devoid of trees and bare of crops, their places being taken by the
bones of men and beasts. Instead of verdure all is black and barren. There have
died in his armies over a hundred thousand souls yearly, and of animals, pack-
oxen, camels, elephants, etc. , over three hundred thousand. In the Deccan pro-
vinces from 1702 to 1704 plague (and famine) prevailed. In these two years
there expired over two millions of souls.
After 1705 the Marathas became masters of the situation all over
the Deccan and even in parts of central India. The Mughul officers
were helplessly reduced to the defensive. A change came over the


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AURANGZIB'S LAST YEAR AND DEATH
301
Maratha tactics with this growth of power; they were no longer, as
in Shivaji's and Shambhuji's times, light horsemen who plundered
and fled or merely looted defenceless traders and villagers, dispersing
at the first report of the Mughul army's approach. On the contrary,
as Manucci noticed in 1704,
These Maratha leaders and their troops move in these days with much con-
fidence, because they have cowed the Mughul commanders and inspired them
with fear. At the present time they possess artillery, musketry,. . . with ele-
phants and camels for all their baggage and tents. In short, they are equipped
and move about just like the armies of the Mughul.
Even at Ahmadnagar, Aurangzib's camp was threatened by a vast
horde of Marathas in May, 1706, and it was only after a long and
severe contest that they could be repulsed. In Gujarat a terrible
disaster befell the imperialists. Inu Mand, a former brewer of
Khandesh, who had taken to highway robbery, invited Dhana Jadav
and his army and sacked the large and rich trading centre of Baroda
(March, 1706), the imperial commandant of the place being captured
with his men. Similarly, the province of Aurangabad was frequently
ravaged by raiding bands under different leaders. In July Maratha
activity near Wagingera forced the emperor to detach a strong force
there. Pidia Berad, in alliance with Hindu Raó, gained Penukonda
by bribing its starving Mughul commandant. Then they turned to
Sera, the capital of the Bijapur Carnatic uplands, the district around
which had been plundered once before. (in 1704). Daud Khan
recovered Penukonda; but Şiadat Khan, a high officer of the court,
was wounded and held to ransom by the enemy. They also recovered
Basantgarh. When the rainy season of 1706 ended in September,
Maratha activity was renewed with tenfold intensity. Dhana Jadav
made a dash for Berar and Khandesh, but was headed off by Nusrat
Jang into Bijapur and beyond the Krishna.
A long train of caravans
coming from Aurangabad to the imperial camp in Ahmadnagar was
plundered of everything on the way.
In the midst of this chaos and darkness Aurangzib closed his eyes.
The internal troubles of his camp were even more alarming. Prince
A'zam Shah's inordinate vanity and ambition urged him to secure
the succession for himself by removing all rivals from his path. So
he poisoned the ears of the emperor against 'Azim-ush-Shan, the able
third son of Shah 'Alam, and had him recalled from the government
of Patna. Then he looked out for an opportunity to make a sudden
attack on Kam Bakhsh and kill him. Every day A'zam's hostile
designs against Kam Bakhsh became more evident, and therefore the
emperor charged the brave and faithful Sultan Husain (Mir Malang)
with that prince's defence, which threw A'zam ' into uncontrollable
anger. Early in February, 1707, Aurangzib had one more of the
attacks of languor and illness which had become rather frequent of
late. He recovered for a time, but feeling that the end could not be


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302
AURANGZIB (1681-1707) -
far off, he tried to secure peace in his camp by making civil war there
immediately after his death impossible. So he appointed Kam Bakhsh
as viceroy of Bijapur and sent him away with his army on 20 Febru-
ary. Four days later A'zam was despatched to Malwa as its governor;
but that cunning prince marched slowly, halting every other day.
On the 28th the aged and worn-out monarch was seized with a severe
fever, but for three days he obstinately insisted on coming to the
court-room and saying the five daily prayers there. During this period
he dictated two pathetic letters to A'zam and Kam Bakhsh entreating
them to avoid the slaughter of Muslims and the desolation of the
realm by civil war, but to cultivate brotherly love, peace and modera-
tion, and illustrating the vanity of all earthly things. In the morning
of 3 March, 1707, he came out of his bedroom, offered the morning
prayer, and repeating the Islamic credo, gradually sank into uncon-
sciousness, which ended in his death about 8 o'clock.
Muhammad A'zam Shah, who had marched only forty miles in
ten days, returned to Ahmadnagar in the night of the 4th, and after
mourning for his father and consoling his sister Zinat-un-Nisa, who
had superintended the emperor's household throughout the Deccan
period of his reign, took part in carrying his coffin for a short distance,
and then sent it away to the rauza or sepulchre of the saint Shaikh
Zain-ul-Haqq, four miles west of Daulatabad, for burial. This place
was named Khuldabad and Aurangzib was described in official
writings by the posthumous title of Khuld-makan ("He whose abode
is in eternity').
Aurangzib's last years were unspeakably sad. In the political
sphere his lifelong endeavour to govern India justly and strongly
ended in anarchy and disruption. A sense of unutterable loneliness
haunted his heart in his old age: one by one all the older nobles,
his personal friends and the survivors of his own generation, died,
with the sole exception of Asad Khan, his minister and personal
companion. In his court circle he now found only younger men,
timid sycophants, afraid of responsibility and eternally intriguing
in a mean spirit of greed and jealousy. His puritan austerity had, at
all times, chilled the advances of other men towards him, as one who
seemed to be above the joys and sorrows, weakness and pity of
mortals. His domestic life was darkened as bereavements thickened
round his closing eyes. His gifted daughter Zib-un-Nisa died in
1702, his rebel son Akbar in exile on a foreign soil in 1704, his best
beloved daughter-in-law Jahanzib in 1705, and Gauharara, his sole
surviving sister, in 1706, besides one of his daughters and two nephews
in this last year of his life.
After Aurangzib had left Rajputana for the Deccan (1681) his
troops continued to hold the cities and strategic points of Marwar;
but the Rathor patriots remained in a state of war for twenty-seven
years more. They occupied the hills and deserts and every now and
>
. ܝ ܕܳ


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RATHOR WAR OF LIBERATION
303
then swooped down upon the plains, cutting off convoys, capturing
weakly held Mughul outposts, and rendering the cultivation of the
fields and traffic on the roads wellnigh impossible, so that famine was
constantly present in Marwar, and in some years “the sword and
pestilence united to clear the land”. The Rathor national opposition
would have gradually died out through attrition, if the emperor had
not been plunged into a more serious conflict in the Deccan, which
drained all his resources and ensured the ultimate success of the
Rathor patriots. The history of these twenty-seven years (1681-1707)
in Marwar falls into three well-defined stages : from 1681 to 1687
there was a people's war, because the chief was a child and the
national leader Durga Das was absent in the Deccan. The Rathor
people fought under different captains individually, with no central
authority and no common plan of action. By adopting guerrilla tactics
they wore the Mughuls out and minimised the disadvantages of their
own inferior arms and numbers. The second stage of the war began
in 1687, when Durga Das returned from the Deccan and Ajit Singh
came out of concealment and the two took the command of the
national forces. The success of the Rathors was at first brilliant;
joined by the Hara clan of Bundi they cleared the plains of Marwar
and advancing beyond their own land raided Malpura and Pur-Mandal
and carried their ravages into Mewat and the west of Delhi. But they
could not recover their own country, because in this very year 1687
an exceptionally capable and energetic officer named Shuja'at Khan
became the imperial governor of Jodhpur and held that office for
fourteen years, during which he successfully maintained the Mughul
hold on Marwar. He always kept his retainers up to their full
strength and was very quick in his movements. Thus, he succeeded in
checking the Rathors when it came to fighting, while he also made
an understanding with them by paying them one-fourth (chauth) of
the imperial custom-duties on all merchandise if they · spared the
traders on the roads. On Shuja'at Khan's death (in July, 1701),
A'zam Shah, who succeeded him as governor, renewed hostilities with
Ajit Singh and the third stage of the Rajput war began which ended
in the complete recovery of Marwar by Ajit Singh in 1707.
In 1687, Durjan Sal Hara, the leading vassal of Bundi, being
insulted by his chieftain Anurudh Singh, rose and seized the capital,
and coming over to Marwar joined the Rathors with a thousand
horsemen of his own. The two united clans drove away most of the
Mughul outposts in Marwar, and raided the imperial dominions in
the north, causing alarm even in Delhi. In 1690 Durga Das routed
the new governor of Ajmer and continued to plunder and disturb
the parts of Marwar in Mughul occupation. But Shuja'at Khan
restored the situation by tactfully winning many of the Rajput
headmen over. ' Aurangzib was naturally anxious to get back his
rebel son Akbar's daughter Safiyat-un-Nisa and son Buland Akhtar,


## p. 304 (#338) ############################################

304
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
who had been left in the hands of the Rathors on the failure of his
rebellion in 1681. The negotiations for this purpose were happily
concluded by Shuja'at Khan in 1694, when Durga Das was induced
by the historian Ishwar Das Nagar to make terms for his raja and
himself by giving up Akbar's daughter to the emperor. Aurangzib was
highly pleased with Durga Das on learning from his grand-daughter
that the Rathor leader had carefully educated her in Islamic theology
by engaging a Muhammadan tutoress for her in the wilds of Marwar.
In 1698 Buland Akhtar, the last pawn in the hands of the Rathors,
was delivered to Aurangzib. In return, the emperor pardoned Ajit
Singh and gave him rank and the parganas of Jhalor, Sanchod and
Siwana as his jagir but did not restore the kingdom of Marwar. Durga
Das was rewarded by being taken into imperial service with the
command of 3000 and appointment as commandant of Patan in
Gujarat.
In 1702 Durga Das was driven into rebellion a second time. Both
he and Ajit Singh had continued to distrust the Mughul government
and kept themselves at a safe distance from the court, while the
emperor regarded both with suspicious watchfulness. În 1702 he
· tried to get Durga Das arrested or killed by the governor of Gujarat.
The Rathor hero immediately fled to Marwar and there raised the
standard of rebellion, in which he was joined by Ajit Singh. But they
could effect nothing, as the economic exhaustion of Marwar was
complete and war-weariness had seized the Rathor clansmen. Dis-
agreement also broke out between Ajit Singh and Durga Das; the
youthful raja was impatient of advice, imperious in temper and
jealous of Durga Das's deserved influence in the royal council and the
country. In 1704, Aurangzib, at last admitting his growing helpless-
ness against a sea of enemies, made peace with Ajit Singh by giving
him Merta as jagir, and next year Durga Das also made his submission
to the emperor and was restored to his old rank and post in Gujarat.
In 1706 a Maratha incursion into Gujarat was followed by a crushing
disaster to the Mughul army at Ratanpur. Ajit Singh and Durga
Das again rebelled. Prince Bidar Bakht, then deputy-governor of
Gujarat, defeated Durga Das and drove him into the Koli country.
But Ajit Singh defeated Mukham Singh of Nagaur, a loyal vassal of
the emperor, at Drunera, and thus gained an increase of prestige and
strength. When the news of Aurangzib's death arrived, Ajit Singh
expelled the Mughul commandant and took possession of his father's
capital. Sojat, Pali and Merta were recovered from the imperial
agents, and the Rathor war of liberation ended in complete success
(1707).
The endless wars in which Aurangzib became involved in the
Deccan reacted on the political condition of northern India, which
continued during the second half of his reign to be annually drained
of its public money and youthful recruits. The rich old provinces of
1


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JAT REBELLIONS CRUSHED
305
the empire 'north of the Narbada were left in charge of second-rate
nobles with insufficient troops and the trade routes unguarded. The
great royal road leading from Delhi to Agra and Dholpur, and thence
through Malwa to the Deccan, passed directly through the country
of the Jats, a brave, strong and hardy people, but habitually addicted
to plundering. In 1685, these people raised their heads under two
new leaders, Raja Ram and Ram Chehra, the petty chiefs of Sinsani
and Soghor, who were the first to train their clansmen in group organi-
sation and open warfare. Every Jat peasant was practised in wielding
the staff and the sword; they had only to be embodied in regiments,
taught to obey their captains and supplied with fire-arms to make
them into an army. As bases for their operations, refuges for their
chiefs in defeat, and storing places for their booty, they built several
small forts amidst their almost trackless jungles and strengthened
them with mud walls that could defy artillery. Then they began to
raid the king's highway and carry their depredations even to the
gates of Agra
Raja Ram gained some striking victories; he killed near Dholpur
the renowned Turani warrior Uighur Khan when on his way from
Kabul to the Deccan (1687), and next year plundered Mir Ibrahim
(a former Qutb Shahi general, now created Mahabat Khan), who
was marching to join his viceroyalty in the Punjab. Shortly after-
wards, he looted Akbar's tomb at Sikandra, doing great damage to
the building and, according to one account, digging out and burning
that great emperor's bones. This sudden development of the Jat
power alarmed Aurangzib, and he sent his favourite grandson Bidar
Bakht to assume the supreme command in the Jat war (1688). Bishan
Singh Kachhwaha, the new Raja of Amber (Jaipur), was appointed
as commandant of Muttra with a special charge to root out the Jats.
Bidar Bakht infused greater vigour into the Mughul operations. In
an internecine war raging between two Rajput clans, Raja Ram who
was fighting for one party was shot dead (14. July, 1688). Bidar
Bakht laid siege to Sinsani; his troops underwent great hardship
from the scarcity of provisions and water; at last they fired a mine,
stormed the breach and captured the fort after three hours of obsti-
nate fighting, the Mughuls losing 900 men and the Jats 1500. Next
year Bishan Singh surprised Soghor.
As the result of these operations, the Jat leaders went into hiding
and the district enjoyed peace for some years. The next rising of the
clan was under Churaman, a nephew of Raja Ram. He had a genius
for organisation and using opportunities and succeeded in founding
a dynasty which still rules over Bharatpur. "He not only increased
the number of his soldiers, but also strengthened them by the addition
of fusiliers (musketeers) and a troop of cavalry,. . . and having robbed
many of the ministers of the (Mughul) court on the road, he attacked
the royal wardrobe and the revenue sent, from the provinces"
20


## p. 306 (#340) ############################################

306
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
(Xavier Wendel). But this full development of Churaman's power
took place after the death of Aurangzib. About 1704 he recovered
Sinsani from the Mughuls, but lost it to Mukhtar Khan, the governor
of Agra, a year later.
There were some serious Hindu risings in Malwa and Bihar late
in this reign, but owing to different causes. Pahar Singh, a Gaur
Rajput petty chief of Indrakhi in western Bundelkhand and an
imperial commandant, took the side of Lal Singh Khichi against the
latter's oppressive overlord Anurudh Singh Hara of Bundi, a loyal
general of the emperor, and defeated Anurudh and plundered his
camp and baggage (1685). He then broke with the imperial govern-
ment and took to plundering the villages of Malwa. Rai Muluk
Chand, the assistant of the governor of Malwa, attacked and slew
the rebel at the end of the year, but the rising continued under Pahar
Singh's son, Bhagwant, who totally defeated Muluk Chand near
Antri but was himself killed (March, 1686). Devi Singh, another son
of Pahar Singh, joined Chhatra Sal in plundering imperial territory
in Bundelkhand. We find more rebels of this Gaur family active
and troublesome up to 1692, when they were pacified by receiving
employment in the imperial army. Ganga Ram Nagar, the revenue
officer of Khan Jahan, managed his master's assignments in Allahabad
and Bihar while the Khan was campaigning in the Deccan. The other
servants of the Khan jealously poisoned his ears against his absent
officer, and Ganga Ram, after clearing his reputation once or twice,
flew to arms in disgust and in despair of his life and honour. Collecting
some 4000 soldiers he plundered the city of Bihar, laid siege to Patna,
and set up a bogus prince Akbar, calling upon the people to rally
round his standard (April, 1681). The siege of Patna was raised by
imperial reinforcements, but Ganga Ram, after looting some other
places, went over to the Rajput rebels in Malwa and plundered
Sironj (October, 1684). Shortly afterwards he died. Rao Gopal
Singh Chandrawat, the chief of Rampura in Malwa and an imperial
captain, rebelled when the emperor gave that estate to his son Ratan
Singh as the price of his conversion to Islam (1700). But he was
.
defeated and forced to submit. In 1706 he joined the Marathas for
a living
and accompanied them in the sack of Baroda.
The English East India Company had established its first trade
factory in India at Surat in 1612 and exchanged goods with Agra
and Delhi by the long and costly land route; it also had an agency
at Masulipatam, a port then belonging to Qutb Shah. In 1633 an
English factory was opened at Balasore and another at Hariharpur
(twenty-five miles south-east of Cuttack). In 1640, the foundations
of Fort St George at Madras were laid, this being the first independent
station of the English in India, though outside the Mughul empire. In
1651 they opened their first commercial house in Bengal, at Hooghly
(twenty-four miles north of Calcutta). Their chief exports were
.


## p. 307 (#341) ############################################

ENGLISH TRADERS IN INDIA
307
saltpetre (from Bihar), silk and sugar. Prince Shuja', then governor
of Bengal, granted a nishan (or prince's order) by which the English
were allowed to trade in Bengal on payment of 3000 rupees a year
in lieu of all kinds of customs and dues (1652).
In 1661 the English establishments in India were reorganised with
the result of two independent governments ("President and Council")
being set up at Surat and Madras, all the Bengal establishments being
made subordinate to the Presidency of Madras. The trade with Bengal
was very prosperous about 1658; raw silk was abundant, the taffetas
were various and fine, the saltpetre was cheap and of the best quality;
all these exchanged for the gold and silver sent out from England.
The Bengal trade continued to grow rapidly: the value of the Com-
pany's exports from this province rose from £34,000 in 1668 to £85,000
in 1675 and £150,000 in 1680. In addition to buying local manufac-
tures the English sent out European dyers to Bengal to improve the
colour of the silk cloth made locally and also inaugurated a pilot
service for navigating the Ganges from Hoogly to the sea (1668). The
first British ship sailed up the Ganges from the Bay of Bengal in 1679.
The complaints of the English traders against the local agents of
the Mughul government were three : (i) The demand of an ad valorem
duty on the actual merchandise imported, instead of the lump sum
of 3000 rupees per annum into which it had been commuted during,
the viceroyalty of Shuja' in Bengal. The English also claimed that
Aurangzib's farman of 25 March, 1680, entitled them, on the payment
of a consolidated duty of 32 per cent. at Surat, to trade absolutely
free of customs at all other places in the Mughul empire. (ii) Exac-
tions by local officers under the name of rahdari internal transit
duty), peshkash (presents), clerks' fee, and farmaish (supplying
manufactures to order of the emperor free). (iii) The practice of high
officials opening the packages of goods in transit and taking away
articles at prices below the fair market value and then selling them
in the open market. The two claims of the English under the first
head cannot be defended on any reasoning. The custom duty was
fixed throughout the empire at 242 per cent. ad valorem for all except
the Muslims, while in the case of the Europeans 1 per cent. was added
to it (1679) in commutation of the jizya. As for the second and third
grievances, such exactions had been declared illegal by Aurangzib
and were practised only in disregard of his orders. Rahdari had been
abolished in the second year of his reign, while "benevolences"
were condemned in the general order abolishing cesses (9 May, 1673).
The "forcing of goods" by his grandson 'Azim-ush-shan for his private
trade called forth the emperor's sternest censures in 1703. But the
traders thus wronged by the local officers had no real means of redress;
purity of administration was impossible in a society devoid of public
spirit and accustomed to submit helplessly to every man in power;
the emperor could not look to everything nor be present everywhere.


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308
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
At last the English traders, getting no redress from the emperor
or the local viceroy, resolved to protect themselves by force. The war
broke out in Bengal in November, 1686. The English under Job
Charnock, ir, reprisal for the arrest of three discrderly English soldiers
by the commandant of Hooghly, sacked and burnt that town, cap-
tured a Mughul ship and burnt a large number of barges and boats.
The viceroy Shayista Khan seized all the English factories within his
reach. The English then sailed away down the river from Hooghly
(30 December, 1686). In February next they burnt the imperial
salt-warehouses near Matiaburuj and stormed the fort of Thana
(south of Calcutta), and sailing to the sea seized the island of Hijili
(on the coast of the Midnapore district) where all their land and sea
forces in the Bay of Bengal were assembled. Then one of their detach-
ments plundered and burnt the town of Balasore and seized or de-
stroyed the Indian shipping there. In May, 1687, a Mughul force
a
sent by Shayista Khan arrived before Hijili to expel the English, who
had been reduced by disease from 300 to 100 men and from forty to
five officers, and even these few survivors were weakened by fever.
So, they evacuated Hijili with all their artillery and munitions
(21 June). At the end of August Shayista Khan offered terms to the
English, permitting them to renew their trade at Hooghly. Next
year Captain Heath arrived from England as Agent in Bengal. He
decided to withdraw from Bengal altogether, wrest Chittagong from
the Mughul officers and make it a safe and independent base for the
English trade in Bengal. On the way he stormed Balasore fort and
committed frightful excesses on the people. But the council of war
turned down the Chittagong project as mad, and in disgust Heath
withdrew the English to Madras, abandoning Bengal altogether
(February, 1689).
Aurangzib, on hearing of the commencement of these hostilities,
had ordered the arrest of all Englishmen and the total stoppage of
trade with them throughout his empire. But he was compelled to
make terms with them, as they were supreme at sea and he was
anxious to ensure the safe voyage of Indian pilgrims to Mecca; the
loss of his custom revenue was also serious. At last, in 1690, peace
was finally concluded between the Mughul government and the
English. Ibrahim Khan, the new viceroy of Bengal, was a mild and
just man, very friendly to the English, and at his invitation Job
Charnock, the new Agent, arrived from Madras and settled at what
is now called Calcutta (3 September, 1690). This was the foundation
of the British power in northern India. The arrangement made by
prince Shuja' was restored.
Such was the war in the eastern side of India. On the western
coast the rupture began in 1687. Sir Josia Child, the masterful
Chairman of the East India Company in London, decided on a policy
of firmness and independence in respect of the Mughul empire. He


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EUROPEAN PIRACY IN INDIAN WATERS
309
ordered the English factory to be withdrawn from Surat, which "was
really a fool's paradise”, the Company's trade and officers to be
concentrated at Bombay beyond the reach of the Mughul, and Indian
shipping at sea to be seized in retaliation for the injury done to
English trade in the Mughul dominions. But Sir John Child, the
chiel director 1 of all the Company's factories in India, was weak and
incompetent. When he himself left Surat on 5 May, 1687, the Mughul
governor immediately put a guard round the factory there, detaining
the factors left behind.
In October, 1688, Child appeared with a fleet before Swally (the
landing place for Surat) demanding compensation, but the governor
suddenly put the English factors and their Indian brokers in prison,
and invested their factory. Child went back after capturing the
Indian shipping on the coast. The Mughul government in reply kept
the captive Englishmen at Surat in chains for sixteen months
(December 1688-April, 1690). At the same time, the Sidi of Janjira,
as Mughul admiral, landed on Bombay island, occupied its outlying
parts, and hemmed the English garrison within the fort. Child,
therefore, made an abject submission. The emperor by an order
dated 4 January, 1690, restored the English to their old position in
the Indian trade on condition of paying a fine of 150,000 rupees and
restoring the prizes taken by them at sea.
In the second half of the seventeenth century the Indian seas were
infested by a most formidable breed of European pirates, chiefly
English. One of them, Roberts, is said to have destroyed 400 trading
vessels in three years.
The chief cause of their immunity lay in the fact that it was the business of
nobody in particular to act against them. . . . Their friends on shore gave them
timely information. . . . Officials high in authority winked at their doings, from
which they drew a profit. . . . The native officials, unable to distinguish the
rogues from the honest traders, held the E. I. Co. 's servants responsible for their
fisdeeds. (Biddulph. )
They ranged over the sea from Mozambique to Sumatra. The most
famous of these pirates was Henry Bridgman alias Evory, of the
Fancy, forty guns. After many notable captures in the Gulf of Aden,
he took the Fath-Muhammadi, a richly laden ship of 'Abdul Ghafur,
the prince of Surat merchants, and then the Ganj-i-savai, eighty guns,
a ship belonging to Aurangzib and the largest vessel of the port of
Surat, being employed in conveying Indian pilgrims to and from
Месса. On its return voyage in September, 1695, between Bombay
and Daman it was attacked by the Fancy and another pirate. The
artillery of the Europeans was most effective; in a short time the
Mughul vessel had lost forty-five in killed and wounded and was set
on fire. Then the pirates boarded the ship; the crew made no resist.
ance, the captain having hidden himself in a lower cabin. For three
days the pirates looted the ship at leisure; the women on board (many
1 See vol. V, p. 102.


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310
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
of them belonging to the Sayyid and other respectable families) were
outraged and several of them flung themselves into the sea. When the
ship, left by the pirates, reached Surat, the people were furious,
ascribing the attack to Englishmen closely connected with Bombay.
But I'timad Khan, the governor of Surat, an upright man friendly to
the English, saved them from being lynched, by occupying their
factory in force. Their trade was totally stopped.
During this captivity, Annesley, the president of the Surat Council,
and Sir John Gayer, the governor of Bombay, were tireless in
petitioning the Mughul government and their friends at court, deman-
ding their release and the restoration of their trade, and asserting
"we are merchants, not pirates”. Aurangzib was too wise a man to
be swayed by his passions. His chief concern was to secure a regular
escort of European war-vessels for his pilgrim-ships to Mecca, and
this embargo on European trade was only an instrument for putting
pressure on the foreigners to gain that end cheaply. After much
higgling by the emperor as to the cost of the escort, Annesley signed
a bond for the purpose and the English prisoners were set free
(7 July, 1696).