No More Learning

What is this dharma that you term the result of supernormal knowledge?
49c-d. It is through a mind capable of creating fictive beings {nirmdnacitta) that one creates. They are fourteen in number.
A result of supernormal knowledge are minds capable of creating fictive, created objects. These minds are fourteen in number.
50a-b. They are the results of the Dhyanas, from the number of two up to five, in this order.
? These minds are fourteen in number, being differentiated by their Dhyana (fundamental Dhyana, muladhydna) which serves as their support.
Two minds are the results of the First Dhyana: the first of the sphere of Kamadhatu, and the second of the sphere of the First
298
Dhyana.
Three minds are the results of the Second Dhyana: two of the two lower spheres (Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana) and one of the same sphere as the Dhyana of which it is the result, so therefore of the Second Dhyana.
In the same way four and five minds are the results of the Third and Fourth Dhyanas. The mind capable of creating fictive objects, the result of a certain Dhyana, is of the sphere of this Dhyana or of a lower sphere.
299
The Dhyana mind of a lower sphere does not produce a mind capable of creating fictive beings (that is, a result of a Dhyana) of a higher sphere, because its power is too small.
A fictive being,--that is to say, a magical being--of a lower sphere, but which is the result of the Second Dhyana, prevails over, from the standpoint of its going and coming, a being of a higher
300
sphere, which is a result of the First Dhyana. The same for the
50b. They do not arise from a lower Dhyana.
following Dhyanas.
301
One obtains a mind capable of creating fictive beings, a result of a muladhydna, as one obtains the Dhyana, that is to say, through detachment, for the result is obtained at the same time as its support.
50c. One obtains them like a Dhyana
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50c-d. A mind capable of creating fictive beings proceeds from a pure Dhyana and from itself; [it produces the
302
two. ]
Its result, a mind capable of creating fictive beings, is produced from a Dhyana. This mind does not lead to a departure from contemplation.
50d. It produces the two.
A first mind capable of creating fictive beings arises from a pure (suddhaka, viii. 6) Dhyana. Then successive minds capable of creating fictive beings arise from a mind of their same type, that is to say, of the first, of the second. . . mind capable of creating fictive beings: the former mind of this series thus produces a subsequent mind capable of creating fictive beings. The last mind is followed by a pure Dhyana. Therefore the mind capable of creating fictive beings comes from two minds (a pure Dhyana and a mind capable of creating fictive beings) and produces these same two. This is to suppose that the person who has a mind which is capable of creating fictive beings--the result of an absorption, and morally neutral--does not again enter a Dhyana, that he would not depart from this Dhyana, in the same way that one enters through a door and leaves through this same door.
51a. One creation takes place through one mind of its sphere.
All the fictive, created (nirmita) things are created by a mind of their sphere, for a mind capable of creating fictive beings of a certain sphere does not produce a being belonging to another sphere.
? 51b. But speech also takes place through a mind of a lower
303 sphere.
Speech uttered by fictive (nirmita) being also depends, in certain cases, on a mind of a lower sphere.
Speech uttered by a fictive being in Kamadhatu or of the First Dhyuna takes place by virtue of a mind of the sphere of this created being. But a fictive being of a higher sphere, of the Second Dhyana, etc. , speaks by virtue of a mind of the First Dhyana: for in the higher spheres a mind endowed with vitarka and vicdra (ii. 33, English trans, p. 203) and capable of producing vijndpti (iv. 7d) does not exist.
51c. With the creator, except in the case of the Master.
When the nirmdtar, the person who produces fictive beings {nirmita), produces a number of fictive beings, all speak when their creator speaks, because their vdgvijndpti (iv. 3d) or vocal action, is common to all. This is why the stanza says, "When one speaks, namely the creator, all his creatures speak; when one
304
This rule does not refer to the Buddha, for he possesses a perfect mastery in absorption: at his will, fictive beings speak one after the other; they question the Buddha and the Buddha answers; the Buddha questions them and they respond.
***
But, one would say, when the mind which produces the voice arises, the mind capable of creating fictive beings no longer exists: therefore at this moment the fictive being does not exist; thus how does a fictive being speak?
remains silent, all remain silent/'
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5 Id. The fictive being speaks, because its creator sets speech into motion through another mind, after having empo- wered the fictive being.
Through the power of a mind previous to its entry into contemplation and creation, the creator empowers {adhitisphati) the fictive being, "May it last! " By means of another mind, he causes it to speak. Therefore, even though the fictive being speaks, the two minds,--that which creates it and that which causes it to speak,--are not simultaneous, and yet the vocal action takes place with the fictive being for its support.
305
It is not only for the duration of his own life that the creator is capable of empowering a thing in such a manner that it endures; his empowerment can also make the thing last after his own death.
It is thus, through his own empowerment that Kasyapa the
306 Great made his bones last until the advent of Maitreya.
52a. But not with respect to that which is not hard.
It is only a hard thing which is susceptible of being empowered for a long period of time. This is why Kasyapa the Great did not empower his flesh.
52b. Some other masters say no.
The body protected by the power of empowerment is not
capable of lasting beyond death. If the bones of Kasyapa last, it is
307 through the protection of the gods.
52c-d. From the beginning, the ascetic creates a single creation through numerous minds capable of creating
52a. Empowerment continues after death.
? The Knowledges 1175 fictive beings; the contrary, when his practice is purified. 308
A beginner, by means of numerous minds capable of creating fictive beings, produces a single fictive being; later, when his practice is complete, the ascetic produces at his own will, by means of a single such mind, many or few creatures.
53a. Produced through meditation, it is neutral.
The mind capable of creating fictive beings, when it is acquired through meditation (that is, when it is the result of a Dhyana, or of a supernormal knowledge), is morally neutral: the result of a supernormal knowledge is in fact one of the classes of neutral items (ii. 71b).
53b. Innate, it is threefold.
But when it is innate, it can be good, bad, or neutral: for example gods, ndgas, etc. , who have been created with a view to aiding or harming.
Also capable of being created, among the ten material (rUpiri) dyatanas, are nine dyatanas, with the exclusion of sound, namely, the eye, visible things, the ear, the organ of smell, etc. 309
[But if nine dyatanas are capable of being created, there can therefore be creation of organs (indriya): there can therefore be an apparition of a new being (sattva), for the organs are of ? ? ? ? (color and shape) which belong to living beings. ]310
The organ is not capable of being created. Yet one can say without being incorrect that "creation consists of nine dyatanas" for creation--whether it refers to the transformation of the body of the creator or to the creation of a distinct body--consists of four dyatanas, physical matter {? ? ? ? ) odors, tastes, and tangible things, and does not exist independently of the five organs.
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311
meditation (or Dhyana), and innate.
It is also of three other types:
53c-d. Rddhi is also produced through mantras, plants, and actions; in all five types.
It is produced through meditation (bhavandja), or innate (upapattildbhika), or created through mantras (mantrakrta),
nb created through the use of drugs or medicines (osadhikrta) or
514 produced through karma (karmaja).
Examples of the fifth type (produced through karma) are the rddhi of Mandhatar, etc, and the rddhi of beings in intermediate existence (iii. 14d).
***
Are divine sight and the divine hearing called "divine" in the proper sense of the word, because they are of the nature of the organs of the gods, or rather figuratively so, because they are as if they were divine?
They are "as divine" in the case of the Bodhisattvas, Cakravar-
315 tins, and Grhapatiratnas.
316 When they are divine in the proper sense of the word
Rddhi is, we have said, of two types: produced through 312
54a-b. Divme sight and divine hearing are of pure tupa of 317
the sphere of the Dhyanas.
By reason of a preparatory exercise consisting of meditation on
? light and sound--the ascetic is in the Dhyanas, and in the eyes and ears of the ascetic--eyes and ears which are in Kamadhatu--there is found to be attracted (ii. 10a, English trans, p. 166) a pure rupa, & matter derived from the primary elements of the sphere of the Dhyana in which it exists, subtle and excellent. This rupa constitutes his eyes and ears; it sees and understands; it constitutes what is called divine sight and divine hearing. Arising by reason of physical matter (rupa) of the sphere of the Dhyanas, the organs are therefore divine in the proper sense of the word.
54c-d. They are always active, non-deficient; they bear on the distant, the subtle, etc.
Divine sight and divine hearing of this category, obtained 318
through meditation, are never tatsabhdga (i. 42), but are always accompanied by visual or auditory consciousness.
They are never deficient; for they come in pairs, and are in a good state (lit. "not seized by squinting"), as are the organs of beings born in Rupadhatu.
They grasp what is obscured, subtle, distant, etc. On this point, there is a stanza, "The eye of flesh does not see rupa which is distant, obscured, or subtle; it does not see in all directions. Divine
319 sight, the contrary. "
320
When one sees the rupas by means of divine sight, are the
objects of sight near or far away?
The objects are near or far away according to the person and according to the eye. If they desire to see, but make no effort to do so, Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas see, respectively, a Sahasra, a Dvisahasra, or a Trisahasra universe (iii. 73). If they make an effort,
55a-b. The Arhat, the Rhinoceros and the Master see a
321 Dvisahasra, a Trisahasra, infinite universes.
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If a Sravaka, desiring to see by divine sight, makes a great
322
effort, he will see a Dvisahasra Madhyama Lokadhatu. Pratyekabuddha will see a Trisahasra Mahasahasra Lokadhatu. And the Buddha the Blessed One, will see the Asamkhya Loka- dhatu: he sees according as he desires.
Why is this?
As his knowledge extends to all the dharmas, so too his divine
sight extends to all the rupas.
***
Is only rddhi innate, or can other supernatural powers be innate?
323
Four powers,--divine hearing, divine sight, memory of past existences, and knowledge of the mind of another,--are also innate. But the innate powers are not called supernormal knowledges.
55c-d. Divine sight, when it is innate, does not see
324
It is not capable of seeing the color and shape of intermediate beings which are seen only by the divine sight of supernormal knowledge. For the rest, innate divine sight is similar to the divine sight of supernormal knowledge.
56a. This knowledge of the mind of another is of three types.
55c. The others are also innate.
intermediary beings.
A
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This knowledge signifies the knowledge of the mind of another when it is innate. It can be three types: good, bad, or neutral.
56b. Also when it is produced through reflection (tarka) or through formulas (vidyd).
When it is produced through reflection or through formulas, the knowledge of the mind of another can be morally good, bad, or
b2b neutral. A person, through the study of the Iksanikasastra, is
capable of interpreting signs: his knowledge of the mind of
another is produced through reflection; so too one can know the
mind of another through mantras. But, produced by meditation or 326
Dhyana, this knowledge is only good.
A knowledge of the mind of another, and memory of past existences are innate in the beings in hell. Through these two knowledges,
327
From their birth and as long as they are not crushed by their sufferings, they know the minds of others and remember their past existences (see iv. 80d).
Beings in the other realms of rebirth where a knowledge of the mind of another and a memory of past existences are innate always know because their sufferings do not overwhelm them.
328
Among humans, the five powers, rddhi, etc. , described above, are not innate.
56c. The beings in hell know from the very beginning.
56d. Among humans, not innate.
If this is so, how do certain persons, the Bodhisattvas, naturally
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possess a remembranace of past existences?
The remembrance of past existences that they possess by nature is not innate among them, that is, acquired by the mere fact of their human birth; it results from certain actions.
How is this?
A knowledge of the memory of past existences is of three types: a result of meditation (the supernormal knowledge described above), innate (as among the gods), or realized through action (as is the case with the Bodhisattvas).
***
? 1. This Chapter is divided into two parts. The first deals with 1. the distinction between patience (ksdnti), knowledge (jfidna), and seeing (drf) (Kurika 1); 2. the characteristics of the ten knowledges (2-9); 3. the aspects of the ten knowledges (10-13b); 4. different questions, prainanirdeia (13c-27); and the second deals with the qualities (guna) which consist of knowledge (jtidnamaya (28-55). (This is according to the gloss of the Japanese editor, Kyokuga Saeki. )
Among Vasubandhu's sources, the Prakaranapdda, xiii. 10, fol. 14: definition of the ten jUdnas; dariana which is notjfidna; object of thejndnas (I4bll); reciprocal inclusion (15a3); why? (15a8); which jndna is sdsrava, andsrava, sdsravapratyaya, samskrta, etc. Pali sources, Samyutta, ii. 57, Digha iii. 226-227. Papisambhiddmagga, Vibhanga, 306-344, especially 328.
2. On jndnadarsana, see vii. 27c. Prajnd (that is to say the caitta described in ii. 24 which accompanies all minds) is either pure (andsrava) or impure (sdsrava).
i. Pure, prajfid is "knowledge" (jndna) or "patience" (ksdnti).
a. "Knowledge" signifies a consciousness of certitude, free from doubt (niicita; jnanam niicitarupena utpadyate).
Knowledge can be "pure contemplation" (paratyaveksanamdtra; below note 6); such as kssyajndna and anutpadajndna (vi. 67a-b).
It can be accompanied by samttrana, by parimdrgandiaya; in other words, it can be an upanidbydnapurvaka manasikdra (i. 4lc- d): in this case it is dariana a "view" or seeing.
This knowledge includes the desire to instruct itself; it is preceded by reflection; let us say then that it is "consideration" or examination. Nevertherless the Western equivalents are insufficient, for they do not refer to a "discursive" consciousness, but to a consciousness which can last only one moment, which is produced in the states of absorption free from vitarka and vicdra.
b. Patience is not free from doubt, since it has for its end the production of knowledge through the expulsion of doubt. It does not arise as certitude (niicaya), but as "consent" (ksamanarUpena). Perhaps we can render this nuance by saying that the ascetic, in the state of patience, thinks, "The dharmas are doubtless transitory . . . ," and, in the state of knowledge,"Thedharmasaretransitory. . . "Thepurepatiencesarethus iaiksisamyagdfsti (i. 4a). They are produced in fact in the course of the Path of Seeing and as a consequence they belong to the Saiksa. And they are dariana.
ii. Impure, prajnd is associated either with the five sense consciousnesses (eye consciousness, etc. ), or with the mental consciousness (manovijnana).
In the first case, it is knowledge (jn~ana)\ it is never "seeing. "
In the second case, it is knowledge (samvrtijn~dna, vii. 2b); and it is "seeing": a. when it is bound to bad opinions (satkdyadrspi, etc. , i. 41a), b. when it is good (kuiala), that is to say associated with right views (samyagdrspi). However it happens that it is, improperly, termed "patience": the third nirvedhabhdgiya (vi. l8c) is in fact a "knowledge", even though it is termed "patience. "
3. Prakarana (xxiii. 10,10b3) quoted in the Vydkhyd ad vii. 7'.
4. samtirandtmakatvdt - upanidhydnasvabhdvatvdt (Koia i. 4l; below note 6 and viii. l). The impure ksdntis (for example vi. l8c) ? ? ? /? ? ? *, or more precisely samvrtijndna (vii.
note 40). Vydkhyd: amaldeva ksantay? ? ? jnanam ity avadbaranat sdsravdh ksdntayo jfianam ity uktarh bhavati.
5. See vii. 4b. Dhi = prajnd, dri - drspi = dariana. The prajnd or consciousness which consists of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements (ksayajn"dna)f of the knowledge of no new arising of the defilements (anutpddajn~dna), is not drsti, or dariana.
6. As long as the ascetic has not done what he should do (krtakrtya), he reflects
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(dhydyati), he inquires {parimdrgayati) into the subject of the Truths. When he has done that which he should have done, he only contemplates (pratyaveksanamdtra) the Suffering which is known, etc. , and he no longer inquires. [Compare Samantapdsddikd, 168, Milinda 338 (note trans, ii. p. 240)y paccavekkhanandna].
I. Hsuan-tsang here enumerates the ten jndnas: samvrti, dharma, anvaya, duhkha, samudaya, nirodha, mdrga, paracitta, ksaya, and anutpddajndna; an enumeration which, in the original, is given later on page 12. This is not the order of the Sdstra, below note 32.
8. See vii. 3a, 7a, 8, 10b, 12a-b, 18c, 20c-21. Vydkhyd: samvrtau bhavarh sdmvrtam, and below: svabhdvatah samvrtk jndnam samvrtau va jndnam samvrtijndnam.
See below vii. 21.
The Madhyamikas distinguish between lokasamvrtijndna and? ogisamvrtijndna (see for example Bodhicarydvatdra ix. 2). The latter corresponds to the laukika jndna prsthalabdh, Kosa, vi. trans, p. 141-2; and vii. l2a-b (prsthaja), 20c.
9. Samvrtisadvastu, vi. 4; Sutrdlamkdra, i. 12, Kathdvatthu, v. 6.
10. Pure jndna is the consciousness of the general characteristics of the dharmas; it is called dharmajndna when it bears on the dharmas of Kamadhatu, anvayajndna when it bears on the dharmas of the two higher Dhatus, vi. 26.
II. The Andhakas {Kathdvatthu, v. 6) say: sammutindnam pi saccdrammanam eva: Conventional knowledge has for its object only the Truths (according to Aung and Rhys-Davids).
12. See vi. 44d, 50a, vii. l, 7, 12a-b.
13. Paramartha: "when they are not by nature asaiksi samyagdrsti. " We have seen (vi. 50d) that all the Arhats possess "correct view proper to the Asaiksas"; this samyagdrsti is by its nature darfana; it consists of dharmajndna and anvayajndna.
14. Ksayajndna and anutpddajndna necessarily have Bhavagra from whence the Arhat is about to deliver himself for their object. When a person dies from a poisoned wound, the poison, after having spread over all the body, concentrates itself, at the moment of death, in the wound; in this same way the ascetic's jndna concentrates itself on the object to be abandoned, namely the skandhas of Bhavagra; it bears on Suffering (yena pidyate) and its Arising.
15. Vydkhyd: duhkhdkdrair anityddibhih/ samudaydkdrair vd hetvddibhih . . . Paramartha: "under six aspects of duhkha and samudaya (Gloss of the Japanese editor: anitya, duhkha, hetu samudaya, prabhava, pratyaya: two aspects of suffering, four aspects of its arising. See below vii. l2a-b, which justifies the correction of Hsuan-tsang).
16. The consciousness of another's mind, in principle, is conventional knowledge, samvrtijndna. But when another's mind is a pure mind, that is to say a mind forming part of the pure path (darfanamdrga or bhdvandmdrga), the consciousness which I have of this mind should be pure; it embraces mdrgajndna, pure knowledge relative to the Path; the following mdrgajndna which is relative to Kamadhatu or to the higher spheres is either a dharmajndna or an anvayajndna. Therefore the knowledge of the mind of another (paracittavid) contains fourjndnas.
17. See vii. lla-d and the Balas, Abhijnas, etc.
18. The text has: Paracittajndna by the lower does not know the higher: it does not know, by the Anagamin path, the path of the Arhat. . .
19. He begins the preparatory cultivations from the time that he sees that the ascetic is about to enter into darianamdrga; this cultivation is accomplished when he sees the mind of another occupied in the duhkha of Kamadhatu, in duhkha as part of dharmajfidna.
? 20. On the paracittajndna of the Pratyekabuddhas, see Vibhdsd TD 27, p. 515al8, p. 515c7, and elsewhere. Four opinions according to Sarhghabhadra, namely the two opinions mentioned by Vasubandhu, and also: "The Fratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 8, 14", "The Pratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 11 and 12. " The third opinion is the correct one: for if he knows moment 8, it is because his preparatory cultivation with its consciousness as part of anvayajndna lasts only 5 moments; thus during moments 9-13 he could prepare himself for the consciousness of moment 14.
21. Nettippakarana, 15: khind me jdtiti idam khaye ndnam naparam itthattdyd ti pajdndti idam anuppdde ndnam.
22. Paramartha, "According to the Abhidharma. " This is the text of the Prakarana, TD 26, p. 694a8 (Hsiian-tsang's translation); see also Jfidnaprastbana, TD 26, p. 1021c.
23. Omitted by Paramartha; given by the Prakarana and Hsiian-tsang.
24. The Vydkhyd explains tad upadaya as tat puraskrtya. See p. 1108.
Hsiian-tsang translates tad updddya asyu-tz'u ? ? |? ? > by reason of this" (Gloss of the
editor: "the jndna which grasps these aspects: Suffering is known . . . "); Paramartha has i-tz'u- i tJljktit "taking this meaning into consideration"; the Prakarana has
yu-tz'u-erh-ch'i ? ? ? ? ? ?
25. We have, Nettippakarana, 54: cakkhu, vijjd, buddhi, bhuri, medhd, dloka. Compare Kosa,
vi. 54d.
26. In fact pure jndna bears on duhkha, on the dharmas and their general characteristics, and not on a "self" knowing the duhkha, a self which implies the formula duhkham me parijn~dtam. All knowledge which envisions a "self" is saihvrtijndna, conventional, impure knowledge.
27. The specific (vis'esa) characteristic of the two pure jndnas, which are nirvikalpa, is known by inference {anumiyate) by reason of the two samvrtijndnas which are their outflowing (nisyanda). Below vii. l2a-b.
28. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor: pafcdtyasramanasautrdntikadayah. According to these masters, there are some pure aspects outside of the sixteen recognized by the Vaibhasikas (see below vii. l2c).
29. See ii. trans, p. 263, iv. trans, p. 701.
30. The Sdstra is quoted in the Vydkhyd: ? at tdvaj jndnam darsanam api tat/ sydt tu darsanam najndnam astdv abhisamaydntikdh ksdntayah. According to the note of the Japanese, the Jndnaprasthana, TD 26, p. 957c2, and the Prakaranapada, TD 26, p. 694c5.
31. Paramartha adds: "Furthermore, in order to indicate that the darsanas here differ from the drstis discussed above. "
32. Same order in the Prakaranapada, TD 26, p. 693c22. The order differs in Hsiian-tsang (above note 7) and Mahdvyutpatti, 57.
33. This question is absent in Paramartha and in the original. The original has tatra . . . = "Among these jndnas, saihvrtijndna constitutes . . . "
34. Vydkhyd: samvrtijndnam samvrtijndnam eva svabhavdsamgrahatah/ ekasya ca paracittajndnasya bhdga ekadesah/.
35. The part which presents the aspect "Duhkha is known by me . . . "
36. The Vydkhyd does not give the Sdstra's definition.