thence into the
northern
part of Apulia.
William Smith - 1844 - Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities - b
There
father took him with him into Spain, and it was on could be little doubt, therefore, that an attack upon
this occasion that Hamilcar made him swear upon Saguntum would inevitably bring on a war with
the altar eternal hostility to Rome. The story was Rome ; but for this Hannibal was prepared, or
told by Hannibal himself many years afterwards to rather it was unquestionably his real object. The
Antiochus, and is one of the best attested in ancient immediate pretext of his invasion was the same of
history. (Polyb. iii. 11; Liv. xxi. 1, xxxv. 19; which the Romans so often availed themselves,
Com. Nep. Hann. 2; Appian, Hisp. 9 ; Val. Max. some injuries inflicted by the Saguntines upon one
ix. 3, ext. § 3. ) Child as he then was, Hannibal of the neighbouring tribes, who invoked the assist-
never forgot his vow, and his whole life was one ance of Hannibal. But the resistance of the city
continual struggle against the power and domina- was long and desperate, and it was not till after a
tion of Rome. He was early trained in arms siege of near eight months, in the course of which
under the eye of his father, and probably accom- Hannibal himself had been severely wounded, that
panied him on most of his campaigns in Spain. We he made himself master of the place. (Polyb. iii.
find him present with him in the battle in which I 17; Liv. xxi. 6-15; Appian, llisp. 10–12 ;
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334
HANNIBAL
HANNIBAL. .
test.
Zonár. viii. 21. ) During all this period the Ro | ously gained over by his emissaries. • The Roman
mans sent no assiblance to their allies: they had, consul, P. Scipio, had already arrived in the neigh-
indced, as soon as they heard of the siege, dis bourhood of Massilia, when he heard that Hannibal
patched ambassadors to Hannibal, but he referred had reached the Rhone, but was too late to dispute
them for an answer to the government at home, the passage of that river: the barbarians on the
and they could obtain no satisfaction from the left bank in vain endeavoured to prevent the Car-
Carthaginians, in whose councils the war party had | thaginian army from crossing; and Hannibal, hav-
now a decided predominance. A second embassy ing effected his passage with but little loss, continued
wns sent after the fall of Saguntum to demand the his march up the left bank of the Rhone as far as
surrender of Hannibal in atonement for the breach its confluence with the Isère. Here he interposed
of the treaty ; but this was met by an open decla- in a dispute between two rival chiefs of the Allo-
ration of war, and thus began the long and ar brnges, and by lending his aid to establish one of
duous struggle called the Second Punic War. Of them firmly on the throne, secured the co-opemtion
this it has been justly remarked, that it was not 80 of an efficient ally, who greatly facilitated his
much a contest between the powers of two great farther progress. But at the very commencement
nations, - between Carthage and Rome, -as be of the actual passage of the Alps he was met by
tween the individual genius of Hannibal on the one hostile barbarians, who at first threatened altogether
hand, and the combined energies of the Roman to prevent his ndvance ; and it was not without
penple on the other. The position of Hannibal heavy loss that he was able to surmount this diffi-
was indeed very peculiar: his command in Spain, cult pass. For some time after this his advance
and the powerful army there, which was entirely was comparatively unimpeded ; but a sudden and
at his own disposal, rendered him in great measure treacherous attack from the Gaulish mountaineers
independent of the government at Carthage, and at the moment when his troops were struggling
the latter seemed disposed to take advantage of through a narrow and dangerous defile, went near
this circunıstance to devolve all responsibility upon to annihilate his whole army. Surmounting all
him. When he sent to Carthage for instructions these dangers, he at length reached the summit of
as to how he should act in regard to Saguntum, the pass, and thenceforth suffered but little from
he could obtain no other reply than that he should hostile attacks; but the natural difficulties of the
do as he thought best (Appian, Hisp. 10); and road, enhanced by the lateness of the season (the
though the government afterwards avowed and sup beginning of October, at which time the snows
ported his proceedings in that instance, they did have already commenced in the high Alps), caused
little themselves to prepare for the impending con him almost as much detention and difficulty as the
All was left to Hannibal, who, after the opposition of the barbarians on the other side of
conquest of Saguntum, had returned once more to the mountains. So heavy were his losses from
New Carthage for the winter, and was there ac- these combined causes, that when he at length
tively engaged in preparations for transporting the emerged from the valley of Aosta into the plains of
scene of war in the ensuing campaign from Spain the Po, and encamped in the friendly country of
into Italy. At the same time, he did not neglect to the Insubrians, he had with him no more than
provide for the defence of Spain and Africa during 20,000 foot and 6000 horse. Such were the forces,
his absence : in the former country he placed his as Polybius remarks (ii. 21), with which he de-
brother Hasdrubal with a considerable army, great scended into Italy, to attempt the overthrow of a
part of which was composed of Africans, while he power that a few years before was able to muster
sent over a large body of Spanish troops to con- a disposable force of above 700,000 fighting men.
tribute to the defence of Africa and even of Car- (Polyb. iii. 35, 40—56 ; Liv. xxi. 21—37. )
thage itself. (Polyb. iii. 33. ) During the winter The march of Hannibal across the Alps is one of
he allowed many of the Spaniards in his own the most remarkable events in ancient history, and,
army to return to their homes, that they might re- as such, was early disfigured by exaggerations and
join their standards with fresh spirits for the ap- misconceptions. The above narrative is taken
proaching campaign : he himself is said to have wholly from that of Polybius, which is certainly by
repaired to Gades, and there to have offered up in far the most trustworthy that has descended to us;
the temple of Melkarth, the tutelary deity of Tyre but that author has nowhere clearly stated by
and of Carthage, a solemn sacrifice for the success which of the passes across the Alps Hannibal
of his expedition. (Liv. xxi. 21. )
cffected his march; and this qnestion has given
All his preparations being now completed, Han- rise to much controversy both in ancient and mo-
nibal quitted his winter-quarters at New Carthage dern times. Into this discussion our limits will not
in the spring of 218, and crossed the Iberus with allow us to enter, but the following may be briefly
an army of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse. (Polyb. stated as the general results :- 1. That after a
iii. 35). The tribes between that river and the careful examination of the text of Polybius, and
Pyrenees offered at first a vigorous resistance; and comparison of the different localities, his narrative
though they were quickly subdued, Hannibal will be found on the whole to agree best with the
thought it necessary to leave behind him a force of supposition that Hannibal crossed the Graian Alps,
11,000 men, under Hanno, to maintain this newly or Little St. Bernard, though it cannot be denied
acquired province. His forces were farther thinned that there are some difficulties attending this line,
during the passage of the Pyrenees by desertion, especially in regard to the descent into Italy. 2.
which obliged him to send home a large body of his That Caelius Antipater certainly represented him
Spanish troops. With a greatly diminished army, as taking this route (Liv. xxi. 38); and as he is
but one on which he could securely rely, he now con- known to have followed the Greek history of
tinued his march from the foot of the Pyrenees to Silenus, who is said to have accompanied Hannibal
the Rhone without meeting with any opposition, in many of his campaigns, his authority is of the
the Gaulish tribes through which he passed being greatest weight. 3. That Livy and Strabo, on
favourably disposed to him, or having been previ- che contrary, both suppose him to have crossed the
a
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HANNIBAL.
333
&
HANNIBAL.
Cottian Alps, or Mont Genèvre. (Liv. I. c. ; Strab. Gaul, took the command of the praetor's army,
iv. p. 209. ) But the main argument that appears which he found there, and led it against Hannibal.
to have weighed with Livy, as it has done with in the first action, which took place in the plains
several modern writers on the subject, is the as-westward of the Ticinus, the cavalry and light-
sumption that Hannibal descended in the first armed troops of the two armies were alone engaged;
instance into the country of the Taurinians, which and the superiority of Hannibal's Numidian horse
is opposed to the direct testimony of Polybius, at once decided the combat in his favour. The
who says expressly that he descended among the Romans were completely routed, and Scipio him-
Insubrians (xat pe tohumpôs els td tepl Tov self severely wounded; in consequence of which he
Πάδον πεδία, και το των Ισόμβρων έθνος, iii. 56. ), hastened to retreat beyond the Ticinus and the Po,
and subscquently mentions his attack on the Tauri- under the walls of Placentia. Hannibal crossed
nians. 4. That as according to Livy himself (xxi. the Po higher up; and advancing to Placentin,
29) the Gaulish emissaries who acted as Hannibal's offered battle to Scipio; but the latter declined the
guides were Boians, it was natural that these should combat, and withdrew to the hills on the left bank
conduct him by the passage that led directly into of the Trebia. Here he was soon after joined by
the territory of their allies and brothers-in-arms, the other consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus, who had
the Insubrians, rather than into that of the Tauri- hastened from Ariminum to his support: their
nians, a Ligurian tribe, who were at this very time combined armies were greatly superior to that of
in a state of hostility with the Insubrians. (Polyb. the Carthaginians, and Sempronius was eager to
iii
. 60. ) And this remark will serve to explain bring on a general battle, of which Hannibal, on
why Hannibal chose apparently a longer route his side, was not less desirous, notwithstanding
instead of the more direct one of the Mont Genèvre. the great inferiority of his force. The result was
Lastly, it is remarkable that Polybius, though he decisive: the Romans were completely defeated,
censures the exaggerations and absurdities with with heavy loss; and the remains of their shattered
which earlier writers had encumbered their narra- army, together with the two consuls, took refuge
tive (iii. 47, 48), does not intimate that any doubt within the walls of Placentia. (Polyb. iii. 60—74;
was entertained as to the line of his march ; and Liv. xxi. 39--48, 52–56; Appian, Annib, 5—7;
Pompey, in a letter to the senate, written in 73 Zonar. viii. 23, 24. )
B. c. (ap. Sallust. Hist. Frag. lib. iii. ), alludes to the The battle of the Trebia was fought late in the
route of Hannibal across the Alps as something year, and the winter had already begun with un-
well known : hence it appears clear that the pas usual severity, so that Hannibal's troops suffered
sage by which he crossed them must have been one severely from cold, and all his elephants perished,
of those frequented in subsequent times by the except one. But his victory had caused all the
Romans; and this argument seems decisive against wavering tribes of the Gauls to declare in his
the claims of the Mont Cenis, which have been ad-favour; and he was now able to take up his winter-
vocated by some modern writers, that pass having quarters in security, and to levy fresh troops among
apparently never been used until the middle ages. the Gauls, while he awaited the approach of spring.
For a fuller examination of this much controverted According to Livy (xxi. 58), he made an unsuc-
subject, the reader may consult De Luc, Histoire du cessful attempt to cross the Apennines before the
Passage des Alpes par Annibal, 8vo. Genève, 2d winter was well over, but was driven back by the
edit. 1825; Wickham and Cramer, Dissertation violence of the storms that he encountered. But
on the Passage of Hannibal over the Alps, Lond, as soon as the season permitted the renewal of
1828, 2d edit. ; Ukert, Hannibal's Zug. über die military operations (B. C. 217), he entered the
Alpen, appended to the 4th vol. of his Geographie country of the Ligurian tribes, who had lately de-
d. Griech. z. Römer: in which works the earlier clared in his favour, and descended by the valley
dissertations and scattered remarks of other writers of the Macra into the marshes on the banks of the
are discussed or referred to. Of the latest histo- Amo. He had apparently chosen this route in
rians it may be noticed that Niebuhr (Lect. on order to avoid the Roman armies, which, under the
Rom. Hist, vol. i. p. 170) and Arnold (Hist. of two consuls, Flaminius and Servilius, guarded the
Rome, vol. iii. p. 83–92, note m), as well as Böt- more obvious passes of the Apennines; but the
ticher (Gesch. d. Carthager, p. 261), have decided hardships and difficulties which he encountered in
in favour of the Little St. Bernard ; while Michelet struggling through the marshes were immense,
(Hist. Romaine, vol. ii. p. 10) and Thierry (Hist. great numbers of his horses and beasts of burthen
des Gaulois, vol. i. p. 276), in common with almost perished, and he himself lost the sight of one eye
all French writers, adopt the Mont Genèvre or by a violent attack of ophthalmia. At length,
Mont Cenis.
however, he reached Faesulae in safety, and was
Five months had been employed in the march able to allow his troops a short interval of repose.
from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, of which Flaminius, with his army, was at this time at
the actual passage of the Alps had occupied fifteen Arretium; and Hannibal (whose object was always
days. (Polyb. iii. 56. ) Hannibal's first care was to bring the Roman commanders to a battle, in
now to recruit the strength of his troops, exhausted which the superior discipline of his veteran troops,
by the hardships and fatigues they had undergone : and the excellence of his numerous cavalry, rendered
after a short interval of repose, he turned his arms him secure of victory), when he moved from
against the Taurinians (a tribe bordering on, and Faesulae, passed by the Roman general, and ad-
hostile to, the Insubrians), whom he quickly re- vanced towards Perugia, laying waste the fertile
duced, and took their principal city. The news of country on his line of march. Flaminius imme-
the approach of P. Scipio next obliged him to turn diately broke up his camp, and following the traces
his attention towards a more formidable enemy. of Hannibal, fell into the snare which was prepared
Scipio had sent on his own army from Massilia for him. His army was attacked under the most
into Spain, while he himself, returning to Etruria, disadvantageous circumstances, where it was
crossed the Apennines from thence into Cisalpine hemmed in between rocky heights previously occu-
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335
HANNIBAL.
HANNIBAL
pied by the enemy and the lake of Thrasymenus ; | the Roman magazines at Cannae, a small town of
and its destruction was almost complete, thousands Apulia, and established his head-quarters there
fell by the sword, among whom was the consul until the harvest could be got in. Meanwhile, the
himself; thousands more perished in the lake, and two Roman consuls, L. Aemilius Paullus and C.
no less than 15,000 prisoners fell into the hands | Terentius Varro, arrived at the head of an army of
of Hannibal, who on his side is said to have lost little less than 90,000 men. To this mighty host
only 1500 men. A body of 4000 horse, who had Hannibal gave battle in the plains on the right
been sent to the support of Flaminius, under C. bank of the Aufidus, just below the town of Can-
Centenius, were also intercepted, and the whole of nae. We have no statement of the numbers
them cut to pieces or made prisoners. (Polyb. iii. of his army, but it is certain that it must bare
77—86 ; Liv. xxii, 1–8 ; Appian, Annib. 9, 10; been greatly inferior to that of the enemy; not-
Zonar. viii. 25. ) Hannibal's treatment of the cap- withstanding which, the excellence of his cavalry,
tives on this occasion, as well as after the battle of and the disciplined valour of his African and
the Trebia, was marked by the same policy on which Spanish infantry, gave him the most decisive vic-
he afterwards uniformly acted: the Roman citizens tory. The immense army of the Romans was
alone were retained ns prisoners, while their Italian noi only defeated, but annihilated ; and between
allies were dismissed without ransom to their re- forty and fifty thousand men are said to have fallen
spective homes. By this means he hoped to ex- in the field, among whom was the consul Aemilius
cite the nations of Italy against their Roman Paullus, both the consuls of the preceding year, the
masters, and to place himself in the position of the late master of the horse, Minucius, above eighty
leader of a national movement rather than that of senators, and a multitude of the wealthy knights
a foreign invader. It was probably in order to give who composed the Roman cavalry. The other consul,
time for this feeling to display itself, that he did Varro, escaped with a few horsemen to Venusia,
not, after so decisive a victory, push on towards and a small band of resolute men forced their way
Rome itself; but after an unsuccessful attempt from the Roman camp to Canusium ; all the rest
upon the Roman colony of Spoletium, he turned were killed, dispersed, or taken prisoners. (Polyb.
aside through the Apennines into Picenum, and ii. 107-117; Liv. xxii. 36, 38—50 ; Plut. Fab.
thence into the northern part of Apulia. Here he 14–16; Appian, Annib. 17-25; Zonar. ix. 1. )
spent a great part of the summer, and was able Hannibal has been generally blamed for not fol-
effectually to restore his troops, which had suffered lowing up his advantage at once, after so decisive
much from the hardships of their previous marches. a victory, by an immediate advance upon Rome
But no symptoms appeared of the insurrections he itself,- - a measure which was strongly urged upon
had looked for among the Italians. The Romans him by Maharbal (MAHARBAL); and we are told
had collected a fresh army; and Fabius, who had that he himself afterwards bitterly repented of his
been appointed to the command of in with the error. Whatever may be the motives that de-
title of dictator, while he prudently avoided a terred him from such a step, we cannot but be sur-
general action, was able frequently to harass and prised at his apparent inactivity after the battle.
annoy the Carthaginian army. Hannibal now, He probably expected that so brilliant a success
therefore, recrossed the Apennines, descended into would immediately produce a general rising among
the rich plains of Campania, and laid waste, with the nations of Italy, and remained for a time
out opposition, that fertile territory. But he was quietly in Apuliah until they should have had
unable either to make himself master of any of the time to declare themselves. Nor were his hopes
towns, or to draw the wary Fabius to a battle. disappointed: the Hirpinians, all the Samnites
The Roman general contented himself with occupy- (except the Pentrian tribe), and almost all the
ing the mountain passes leading from Samnium Apulians, Lucanians, and Bruttians declared in
into Campania, by which Hannibal must of neces- favour of Carthage. But though the whole of the
sity retreat, and believed that he had caught him south of Italy was thus apparently lost to the Ro
as it were in a trap; but Hannibal eluded his vigi- mans, yet the effect of this insurrection was not so
iance by an ingenious stratagem, passed the defiles decisive as it would at first appear ; for the Latin
of the Apennines without loss, and established him- colonies, which still without exception remained
self in the plains of Apulia, where he collected sup-faithful, gave the Romans a powerful hold upon the
plies from all sides, in order to prepare for the revolted provinces ; and the Greek cities on the
winter. During this operation the impatience of coast, though mostly disposed to join the Cartha-
the Romans and the rashness of Minucius (who ginians, were restrained by the presence of Roman
had been raised by the voice of popular clamour to garrisons. Hence it became necessary to support
an equality in the command with Fabius) were the insurrection in the different parts of Italy with
very near giving Hannibal the opportunity for a Carthaginian force ; and Hannibal, while he
which he was ever on the watch, to crush the himself moved forward into Samnium, detached his
Roman army by a decisive blow ; but Fabius was brother Mago into Bruttium, and Hanno, one of
able to save his colleague from destruction; and his ablest officers, into Lucania After securing the
Hannibal, after obtaining only a partial advantage,
took up his winter-quarters at the small town of • The battle of Cannae was fought, according
Geronium. (Polyb. iii. 85-94, 100-105 ; Liv. to Claudius Quadrigarius (ap. Macrob. i. 16 ; Gell.
xxii. 7—18, 23-30, 32; Plut. Fab. 3—13; Ap-v. 17. & 2), on the 2nd of August; but it seems
pian, Annib, 12-16; Zonar. viii, 25, 26. ) probable that the Roman calendar was at this
The next spring (B. C. 216) was a period of in- period considerably in advance of the true time, and
action on both sides: the Romans were engaged in that the battle was fought in reality at least as early
making preparations for bringing an unusually large as the middle of June. (See Arnold's Rome,
force into the field ; and Hannibal remained at vol. iii. p. 136; Clinton, F. H. vol. iii. p. 42;
Geronium until late in the spring, when the want where the words “ behind the true time” are eri
of provisions compelling him to move, he surprised | dently an accidental error. )
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HANNIBAL
:
submission of the Samnites, he pushed forward into | decisire events. Casilinum had fallen in the
Campania, and though foiled in the attempt to course of the winter, and with the advance of
make himself master of Neapolis, which had been spring Hannibal took up his camp on Mount
the immediate object of his advance, he was more Tifata, where, while awaiting the arrival of rein-
than compensated by the acquisition of Capua (a forcements from Carthage, he was at hand to supe
city scarcely inferior to Rome itself in importance), port his partisans in Campania, and oppose the
the gates of which were opened to him by the Roman generals in that province. But his attempts
popular party. Here, after reducing the small on Cumae and Neapolis were foiled ; and even after
towns of Nuceria and Acerrae, he established his he had been joined by a force from Carthage (very
army in winter-quarters ; while he, at the same inferior, however, to what he had expected), he
time, carried on the siege of Casilinum, a small but sustained a repulso before Nola, which was magni-
strong fortress in the immediate neighbourhood. fied by the Romans into a defeat. As the winter
(Liv. xxii. 58, 61, xxiii. 1-10, 14—18; Zonar. approached, he withdrew into Apulia, and took up
ix. 1, 2; Plut. Fab. 17. )
his quarters in the plains around Arpi
. But other
Capua was celebrated for its wealth and luxury, prospects were already opening before him ; in his
and the enervating effect which these produced camp on Tifata he had received embassies from
upon the army of Hannibal became a favourite Philip, king of Macedonia, and Hieronymus of
theme of rhetorical exaggeration in later ages. Syracuse, both of which he had eagerly welcomed ;
(Zonar. ix. 3; Florus, ii. 6. ) The futility of and thus sowed the seeds of two fresh wars, and
such declamations is sufficiently shown by the raised up two formidable enemies against the
simple fact that the superiority of that army in Roman power. (Liv. xxiii. 19, 20, 30–39, 41-
the field remained as decided as ever. Still it may 46 ; xxiv. 6 ; Plut. Marc. 10–12; Polyb. vii. 2,
be truly said that the winter spent at Capua, B. C. 9; Zonar. ix. 4. )
216–215, was in great measure the turning point These two collateral wars in some degree drew
of Hannibal's fortune, and from this time the war off the attention of both parties from that in Italy
assumed an altered character. The experiment of itself; yet the Romans still opposed to the Car-
what he could effect with his single army had now thaginian general a chain of armies which hampered
been fully tried, and, notwithstanding all his vic- all his operations ; and though Hannibal was ever
tories, it had decidedly failed; for Rome was still on the watch for the opportunity of striking a
unsubdued, and still provided with the means of blow, the campaign of 214 was still less decisive
maintaining a protracted contest. But Hannibal than that of the preceding year. Early in the
had not relied on his own forces alone, and he now summer he advanced from Apulia to his former
found himself, apparently at least, in a condition station on Mount Tifata, to watch over the safety
to commence the execution of his long-cherished of Capua ; from thence he had descended to the
plan, — that of arming Italy itself against the Ro Lake Avernus, in hopes of making himself master
mans, and crushing the ruling power by means of of Puteoli, when a prospect was held out to him of
her own subjects. It was to this object that his surprising the important city of Tarentum. Thither
attention was henceforth mainly directed ; and he hastened by forced marches, but arrived too
hence, even when apparently inactive, he was, in late,—Tarentum had been secured by a Roman
reality, occupied with the most important schemes, force. After this his operations were of little im-
and busy in raising up fresh foes to overwhelm his portauce, until he again took up his winter-quarters
antagonists. From this time, also, the Romans in Apulia (Liv. xxiv, 12, 13, 17, 20. )
in great measure changed their plan of operations, During the following summer (B. C. 213), while
and, instead of opposing to Hannibal one great all eyes were turned towards the war in Sicily,
army in the field, they hemmed in his move- Hannibal remained almost wholly inactive in the
ments on all sides, guarded all the most important neighbourhood of Tarentum, the hopes he still
towns with strong garrisons, and kept up an army entertained of making himself master of that im-
in every province of Italy, to thwart the opera- portant city rendering him unwilling to quit that
tions of his lieutenants, and check the rising dis- quarter of Italy. Fabius, who was opposed to him,
position to revolt. It is impossible here to follow in was equally inefficient ; and the capture of Arpi,
detail the complicated movements of the subse which was betrayed into his hands, was the only
quent campaigns, during which Hannibal himself advantage he was able to gain. But before the
frequently traversed Italy in all directions, appear- close of the ensuing winter Hannibal was rewarded
ing suddenly wherever his presence was called for, with the long-looked for prize, and Tarentum was
and astonishing, and often baffling, the enemy by betrayed into his hands by Nicon and Philemenus.
the rapidity of his marches. Still less can we ad The advantage, however, was still incomplete, for
vert to all the successes or defeats of his generals, a Roman garrison still held possession of the cita-
though these of necessity often influenced his own del, from which he was unable to dislodge them.
operations. All that we can do is, to notice very (Polyb. viii. 26–36; Liv. xxiv. 44-47 ; xxv. 1,
briefly the leading events which distinguished 8-11; Appian, Annib, 31-33. )
each successive campaign. But it is necessary to The next year (212) was marked by important
bear in mind, if we would rightly estimate the events. In Sicily, on the one hand, the fall of
character and genius of Hannibal, that it was not Syracuse more than counterbalanced the acquisition
only where he was present in person that his su- of Tarentum ; while in Spain, on the contrary, the
periority made itself felt: as Polybius has justly defeat and death of the two Scipios (HASDRU-
remarked (ix. 22), he was at once the author and BAL, No. 6) seemed to establish the superiority of
the presiding spirit of all that was done in this Carthage in that country, and open the way to
war against the Roman power, — in Sicily and in Hasdrubal to join his brother in Italy; a movement
Macedonia, as well as in Italy itself, from one ex. which Hannibal appears to have been already long
tremity of the peninsula to the other.
expecting. Meanwhile, the two consuls, em-
The campaign of 215 was not marked by any boldened by the apparent inactivity of the Cartha-
VOL. II.
Z
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338
HANNIBAL
HANNIBAL
ginian general, began to draw together their forces to its fate, soon after surrendered to the Romans,
for the purpose of besieging Capua Hanno, who Hannibal once more took up his winter-quarters in
was despatched thither by Hannibal with a large Apulia. (Liv. xxvi. 4–14; Polyb. ix. 3—7;
convoy of stores and provisions, was defeated, and Appian, Annib. 38–43; Zonar. ix. 6. )
the object of his march frustrated ; and though The commencement of the next season (210)
another officer of the same name, with a body of was marked by the fall of Salapia, which was bé
Carthaginian and Numidian troops, threw himself trayed by the inhabitants to Marcellus; but this loss
into the city, the Romans still threatened it with was soon avenged by the total defeat and destruo-
a siege, and Hannibal himself was compelled to tion of the army of the proconsul Cn. Fulvius at
advance to its relief. By this movement he for a Herdonea. Marcellus, on his part, carefully avoided
time checked the operations of the consuls, and an action for the rest of the campaign, while he
compelled them to withdraw; but he was unable harassed his opponent by every possible means.
to bring either of them to battle. Centenius, a Thus the rest of that summer, too, wore away
centurion, who had obtained the command of a without any important results. But this state of
force of 8000 men, was more confident ; he ven- comparative inactivity was necessarily injurious to
tured an engagement with Hannibal, and paid the the cause of Hannibal : the nations of Italy that
penalty of his rashness by the loss of his army had espoused that cause when triumphant, now
and his life. This success was soon followed by a began to waver in their attachment ; and, in the
more important victory over the practor Cn. Ful- course of the following summer (209), the Samnites
vius at Herdonea in Apulia, in which the army of and Lucanians submitted to Rome, and were ad-
the latter was utterly destroyed, and 20,000 men mitted to favourable terms. A still more disastrous
cut to pieces. But while Hannibal was thus em- blow to the Carthagininn cause was the loss of
ployed elsewhere, he was unable to prevent the Tarentum, which was betrayed into the hands of
consuls from effectually forming the siege of Capua, Fabius, as it had been into those of Hannibal.
and surrounding that city with a double line of in vain did the latter seek to draw the Roman
intrenchments. (Liv. xxv. 13-15, 18--22. ) general into a snare ; the wary Fabius eluded his
His power in the south had been increased toils. But Marcellus, after a pretended victory
during this campaign by the important accession of over Hannibal during the earlier part of the cam-
Metapontum and Thurii: but the citadel of Taren-paign, had shut himself up within the walls of
tum still held out, and, with a view to urge the Venusia, and remained there in utter inactivity.
siege of this fortress by his presence, Hannibal Hannibal meanwhile still traversed ine open coun-
spent the winter, and the whole of the ensuing try unopposed, and laid waste the territories of his
spring (211), in its immediate neighbourhood. But enemies. Yet we cannot suppose that he any longer
as the season advanced, the pressing danger of looked for ultimate success from any efforts of his
Capna once more summoned him to its relief. He own: his object was, doubtless, now only to maine
accordingly presented himself before the Roman tain his ground in the south until his brother Has-
camp, and attacked their lines from without, while drubal should appear in the north of Italy, an event
the garrison co-operated with him by a vigorous to which he had long looked forward with anxious
sally from the walls. Both attacks were, however, expectation. (Liv. xxvii. 1, 2, 4, 12—16, 20;
repulsed, and Hannibal, thus foiled in his attempt | Plut. Fab. 19, 21-23, Marc. 24—27; Appian,
to raise the siege by direct means, determined on Annib. 45–50 ; Zonar. ix. 7, 8. )
the bold manoeuvre of marching directly upon Rome Yet the following summer (208) was not an-
itself, in hopes of thus compelling the consuls to marked by some brilliant achievements. The
abandon their designs upon Capua, in order to Romans having formed the siege of Locri, a legion,
provide for the defence of the city. But this daring which was despatched to their support from Taren-
scheme was again frustrated : the appearance of tum, was intercepted in its march, and utterly de
Hannibal before the gates of Rome for a moment stroyed; and not long afterwards the two consuls,
struck terror through the city, but a considerable Crispinus and Marcellus, who, with their united
body of troops was at the time within the walls, armies, were opposed to Hannibal in Lucania, al-
and the consul, Fulvius Flaccus, as soon as he lowed themselves to be led into an ambush, in
heard of Hannibal's march, hastened, with a por- which Marcellus was killed, and Crispinus mortally
tion of the besieging army, from Capua, while he wounded. After this the Roman armies withdrew,
still left with the other consul a force amply suf while Hannibal hastened to Locri, and not only
ficient to carry on the siege. Hannibal was thus raised the siege, but utterly destroyed the besieging
disappointed in the main object of his advance, and army. Thus he again found himself undisputed
he bad no means of effecting any thing against master of the south of Italy during the remainder
Rome itself, where Fulvius and Fabius confined of this campaign. (Liv. xxvii. 25—28 ; Polyb.
themselves strictly to the defensive, allowing him x. 32 ; Plut. Marc. 29 ; Appian, Anrib. 50 ;
to rarage the whole country, up to the very walls Zonar. ix. 9. )
of Rome, without opposition. Nothing therefore Of the two consuls of the ensuing year (207),
remained for him but to retreat, and he accordingly C. Nero was opposed to Hannibal, while M. Livius
recrossed the Anio, and marched slowly and sul was appointed to take the field against Hasdrubal,
lenly through the land of the Sabines and Samnites, who had at length crossed the Alps, and descended
ravaging the country which he traversed, and into Cisalpine Gaul. [HASDRUBAL, No. 6. ) AC-
closely followed by the Roman consul, upon whom cording to Livy (xxvii. 39), Hannibal was apprised
he at length turned suddenly, and, by a night of his brother's arrival at Placentia before he had
attack, very nearly destroyed his whole army. himself moved from his winter-quarters; but it is
When he had thus reached Apulia, he made from difficult to believe that, if this had been the case,
thence a forced march into Bruttium, in hopes of he would not have made more energetic efforts to
surprising Rhegium ; but here he was again foiled, join him. If we can trust the narrative transmitted
and Capua, which he was now compelled to abandon to us, which is certainly in many respects unsatis-
:
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HANNIBAL.
339
HANNIBAL.
factory, Hannibal spent much time in various unim- , to the strong city of Hadrimetum. The circum-
portant movements, before he advanced northwards stances of the campaign which followed are very
into Apulia, where he was met by the Roman differently related, nor will our space allow us to
consul, and not only held in check, but so effectu- enter into any discussion of the details. Some of
ally deceived, that he knew nothing of Nero's these, especially the well-known account of the in-
march to support his colleague until after his return, terview between Scipio and Hannibal, savour
and the first tidings of the battle of the Metaurus strongly of romance, notwithstanding the high au-
were conveyed to him by the sight of the head of thority of Polybius. (Comp. Polyb. xv. 1-9;
Hasdrubal. (Liv. xxvii. 40–51 ; Polyb. xi. 1-3; Liv. xxx. 25—32 ; Appian, Pun. 33—41; Zonar.
Appian, Annib. 52 ; Zonar. ix. 9. )
ix. 13.
father took him with him into Spain, and it was on could be little doubt, therefore, that an attack upon
this occasion that Hamilcar made him swear upon Saguntum would inevitably bring on a war with
the altar eternal hostility to Rome. The story was Rome ; but for this Hannibal was prepared, or
told by Hannibal himself many years afterwards to rather it was unquestionably his real object. The
Antiochus, and is one of the best attested in ancient immediate pretext of his invasion was the same of
history. (Polyb. iii. 11; Liv. xxi. 1, xxxv. 19; which the Romans so often availed themselves,
Com. Nep. Hann. 2; Appian, Hisp. 9 ; Val. Max. some injuries inflicted by the Saguntines upon one
ix. 3, ext. § 3. ) Child as he then was, Hannibal of the neighbouring tribes, who invoked the assist-
never forgot his vow, and his whole life was one ance of Hannibal. But the resistance of the city
continual struggle against the power and domina- was long and desperate, and it was not till after a
tion of Rome. He was early trained in arms siege of near eight months, in the course of which
under the eye of his father, and probably accom- Hannibal himself had been severely wounded, that
panied him on most of his campaigns in Spain. We he made himself master of the place. (Polyb. iii.
find him present with him in the battle in which I 17; Liv. xxi. 6-15; Appian, llisp. 10–12 ;
## p. 334 (#350) ############################################
334
HANNIBAL
HANNIBAL. .
test.
Zonár. viii. 21. ) During all this period the Ro | ously gained over by his emissaries. • The Roman
mans sent no assiblance to their allies: they had, consul, P. Scipio, had already arrived in the neigh-
indced, as soon as they heard of the siege, dis bourhood of Massilia, when he heard that Hannibal
patched ambassadors to Hannibal, but he referred had reached the Rhone, but was too late to dispute
them for an answer to the government at home, the passage of that river: the barbarians on the
and they could obtain no satisfaction from the left bank in vain endeavoured to prevent the Car-
Carthaginians, in whose councils the war party had | thaginian army from crossing; and Hannibal, hav-
now a decided predominance. A second embassy ing effected his passage with but little loss, continued
wns sent after the fall of Saguntum to demand the his march up the left bank of the Rhone as far as
surrender of Hannibal in atonement for the breach its confluence with the Isère. Here he interposed
of the treaty ; but this was met by an open decla- in a dispute between two rival chiefs of the Allo-
ration of war, and thus began the long and ar brnges, and by lending his aid to establish one of
duous struggle called the Second Punic War. Of them firmly on the throne, secured the co-opemtion
this it has been justly remarked, that it was not 80 of an efficient ally, who greatly facilitated his
much a contest between the powers of two great farther progress. But at the very commencement
nations, - between Carthage and Rome, -as be of the actual passage of the Alps he was met by
tween the individual genius of Hannibal on the one hostile barbarians, who at first threatened altogether
hand, and the combined energies of the Roman to prevent his ndvance ; and it was not without
penple on the other. The position of Hannibal heavy loss that he was able to surmount this diffi-
was indeed very peculiar: his command in Spain, cult pass. For some time after this his advance
and the powerful army there, which was entirely was comparatively unimpeded ; but a sudden and
at his own disposal, rendered him in great measure treacherous attack from the Gaulish mountaineers
independent of the government at Carthage, and at the moment when his troops were struggling
the latter seemed disposed to take advantage of through a narrow and dangerous defile, went near
this circunıstance to devolve all responsibility upon to annihilate his whole army. Surmounting all
him. When he sent to Carthage for instructions these dangers, he at length reached the summit of
as to how he should act in regard to Saguntum, the pass, and thenceforth suffered but little from
he could obtain no other reply than that he should hostile attacks; but the natural difficulties of the
do as he thought best (Appian, Hisp. 10); and road, enhanced by the lateness of the season (the
though the government afterwards avowed and sup beginning of October, at which time the snows
ported his proceedings in that instance, they did have already commenced in the high Alps), caused
little themselves to prepare for the impending con him almost as much detention and difficulty as the
All was left to Hannibal, who, after the opposition of the barbarians on the other side of
conquest of Saguntum, had returned once more to the mountains. So heavy were his losses from
New Carthage for the winter, and was there ac- these combined causes, that when he at length
tively engaged in preparations for transporting the emerged from the valley of Aosta into the plains of
scene of war in the ensuing campaign from Spain the Po, and encamped in the friendly country of
into Italy. At the same time, he did not neglect to the Insubrians, he had with him no more than
provide for the defence of Spain and Africa during 20,000 foot and 6000 horse. Such were the forces,
his absence : in the former country he placed his as Polybius remarks (ii. 21), with which he de-
brother Hasdrubal with a considerable army, great scended into Italy, to attempt the overthrow of a
part of which was composed of Africans, while he power that a few years before was able to muster
sent over a large body of Spanish troops to con- a disposable force of above 700,000 fighting men.
tribute to the defence of Africa and even of Car- (Polyb. iii. 35, 40—56 ; Liv. xxi. 21—37. )
thage itself. (Polyb. iii. 33. ) During the winter The march of Hannibal across the Alps is one of
he allowed many of the Spaniards in his own the most remarkable events in ancient history, and,
army to return to their homes, that they might re- as such, was early disfigured by exaggerations and
join their standards with fresh spirits for the ap- misconceptions. The above narrative is taken
proaching campaign : he himself is said to have wholly from that of Polybius, which is certainly by
repaired to Gades, and there to have offered up in far the most trustworthy that has descended to us;
the temple of Melkarth, the tutelary deity of Tyre but that author has nowhere clearly stated by
and of Carthage, a solemn sacrifice for the success which of the passes across the Alps Hannibal
of his expedition. (Liv. xxi. 21. )
cffected his march; and this qnestion has given
All his preparations being now completed, Han- rise to much controversy both in ancient and mo-
nibal quitted his winter-quarters at New Carthage dern times. Into this discussion our limits will not
in the spring of 218, and crossed the Iberus with allow us to enter, but the following may be briefly
an army of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse. (Polyb. stated as the general results :- 1. That after a
iii. 35). The tribes between that river and the careful examination of the text of Polybius, and
Pyrenees offered at first a vigorous resistance; and comparison of the different localities, his narrative
though they were quickly subdued, Hannibal will be found on the whole to agree best with the
thought it necessary to leave behind him a force of supposition that Hannibal crossed the Graian Alps,
11,000 men, under Hanno, to maintain this newly or Little St. Bernard, though it cannot be denied
acquired province. His forces were farther thinned that there are some difficulties attending this line,
during the passage of the Pyrenees by desertion, especially in regard to the descent into Italy. 2.
which obliged him to send home a large body of his That Caelius Antipater certainly represented him
Spanish troops. With a greatly diminished army, as taking this route (Liv. xxi. 38); and as he is
but one on which he could securely rely, he now con- known to have followed the Greek history of
tinued his march from the foot of the Pyrenees to Silenus, who is said to have accompanied Hannibal
the Rhone without meeting with any opposition, in many of his campaigns, his authority is of the
the Gaulish tribes through which he passed being greatest weight. 3. That Livy and Strabo, on
favourably disposed to him, or having been previ- che contrary, both suppose him to have crossed the
a
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HANNIBAL.
333
&
HANNIBAL.
Cottian Alps, or Mont Genèvre. (Liv. I. c. ; Strab. Gaul, took the command of the praetor's army,
iv. p. 209. ) But the main argument that appears which he found there, and led it against Hannibal.
to have weighed with Livy, as it has done with in the first action, which took place in the plains
several modern writers on the subject, is the as-westward of the Ticinus, the cavalry and light-
sumption that Hannibal descended in the first armed troops of the two armies were alone engaged;
instance into the country of the Taurinians, which and the superiority of Hannibal's Numidian horse
is opposed to the direct testimony of Polybius, at once decided the combat in his favour. The
who says expressly that he descended among the Romans were completely routed, and Scipio him-
Insubrians (xat pe tohumpôs els td tepl Tov self severely wounded; in consequence of which he
Πάδον πεδία, και το των Ισόμβρων έθνος, iii. 56. ), hastened to retreat beyond the Ticinus and the Po,
and subscquently mentions his attack on the Tauri- under the walls of Placentia. Hannibal crossed
nians. 4. That as according to Livy himself (xxi. the Po higher up; and advancing to Placentin,
29) the Gaulish emissaries who acted as Hannibal's offered battle to Scipio; but the latter declined the
guides were Boians, it was natural that these should combat, and withdrew to the hills on the left bank
conduct him by the passage that led directly into of the Trebia. Here he was soon after joined by
the territory of their allies and brothers-in-arms, the other consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus, who had
the Insubrians, rather than into that of the Tauri- hastened from Ariminum to his support: their
nians, a Ligurian tribe, who were at this very time combined armies were greatly superior to that of
in a state of hostility with the Insubrians. (Polyb. the Carthaginians, and Sempronius was eager to
iii
. 60. ) And this remark will serve to explain bring on a general battle, of which Hannibal, on
why Hannibal chose apparently a longer route his side, was not less desirous, notwithstanding
instead of the more direct one of the Mont Genèvre. the great inferiority of his force. The result was
Lastly, it is remarkable that Polybius, though he decisive: the Romans were completely defeated,
censures the exaggerations and absurdities with with heavy loss; and the remains of their shattered
which earlier writers had encumbered their narra- army, together with the two consuls, took refuge
tive (iii. 47, 48), does not intimate that any doubt within the walls of Placentia. (Polyb. iii. 60—74;
was entertained as to the line of his march ; and Liv. xxi. 39--48, 52–56; Appian, Annib, 5—7;
Pompey, in a letter to the senate, written in 73 Zonar. viii. 23, 24. )
B. c. (ap. Sallust. Hist. Frag. lib. iii. ), alludes to the The battle of the Trebia was fought late in the
route of Hannibal across the Alps as something year, and the winter had already begun with un-
well known : hence it appears clear that the pas usual severity, so that Hannibal's troops suffered
sage by which he crossed them must have been one severely from cold, and all his elephants perished,
of those frequented in subsequent times by the except one. But his victory had caused all the
Romans; and this argument seems decisive against wavering tribes of the Gauls to declare in his
the claims of the Mont Cenis, which have been ad-favour; and he was now able to take up his winter-
vocated by some modern writers, that pass having quarters in security, and to levy fresh troops among
apparently never been used until the middle ages. the Gauls, while he awaited the approach of spring.
For a fuller examination of this much controverted According to Livy (xxi. 58), he made an unsuc-
subject, the reader may consult De Luc, Histoire du cessful attempt to cross the Apennines before the
Passage des Alpes par Annibal, 8vo. Genève, 2d winter was well over, but was driven back by the
edit. 1825; Wickham and Cramer, Dissertation violence of the storms that he encountered. But
on the Passage of Hannibal over the Alps, Lond, as soon as the season permitted the renewal of
1828, 2d edit. ; Ukert, Hannibal's Zug. über die military operations (B. C. 217), he entered the
Alpen, appended to the 4th vol. of his Geographie country of the Ligurian tribes, who had lately de-
d. Griech. z. Römer: in which works the earlier clared in his favour, and descended by the valley
dissertations and scattered remarks of other writers of the Macra into the marshes on the banks of the
are discussed or referred to. Of the latest histo- Amo. He had apparently chosen this route in
rians it may be noticed that Niebuhr (Lect. on order to avoid the Roman armies, which, under the
Rom. Hist, vol. i. p. 170) and Arnold (Hist. of two consuls, Flaminius and Servilius, guarded the
Rome, vol. iii. p. 83–92, note m), as well as Böt- more obvious passes of the Apennines; but the
ticher (Gesch. d. Carthager, p. 261), have decided hardships and difficulties which he encountered in
in favour of the Little St. Bernard ; while Michelet struggling through the marshes were immense,
(Hist. Romaine, vol. ii. p. 10) and Thierry (Hist. great numbers of his horses and beasts of burthen
des Gaulois, vol. i. p. 276), in common with almost perished, and he himself lost the sight of one eye
all French writers, adopt the Mont Genèvre or by a violent attack of ophthalmia. At length,
Mont Cenis.
however, he reached Faesulae in safety, and was
Five months had been employed in the march able to allow his troops a short interval of repose.
from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, of which Flaminius, with his army, was at this time at
the actual passage of the Alps had occupied fifteen Arretium; and Hannibal (whose object was always
days. (Polyb. iii. 56. ) Hannibal's first care was to bring the Roman commanders to a battle, in
now to recruit the strength of his troops, exhausted which the superior discipline of his veteran troops,
by the hardships and fatigues they had undergone : and the excellence of his numerous cavalry, rendered
after a short interval of repose, he turned his arms him secure of victory), when he moved from
against the Taurinians (a tribe bordering on, and Faesulae, passed by the Roman general, and ad-
hostile to, the Insubrians), whom he quickly re- vanced towards Perugia, laying waste the fertile
duced, and took their principal city. The news of country on his line of march. Flaminius imme-
the approach of P. Scipio next obliged him to turn diately broke up his camp, and following the traces
his attention towards a more formidable enemy. of Hannibal, fell into the snare which was prepared
Scipio had sent on his own army from Massilia for him. His army was attacked under the most
into Spain, while he himself, returning to Etruria, disadvantageous circumstances, where it was
crossed the Apennines from thence into Cisalpine hemmed in between rocky heights previously occu-
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335
HANNIBAL.
HANNIBAL
pied by the enemy and the lake of Thrasymenus ; | the Roman magazines at Cannae, a small town of
and its destruction was almost complete, thousands Apulia, and established his head-quarters there
fell by the sword, among whom was the consul until the harvest could be got in. Meanwhile, the
himself; thousands more perished in the lake, and two Roman consuls, L. Aemilius Paullus and C.
no less than 15,000 prisoners fell into the hands | Terentius Varro, arrived at the head of an army of
of Hannibal, who on his side is said to have lost little less than 90,000 men. To this mighty host
only 1500 men. A body of 4000 horse, who had Hannibal gave battle in the plains on the right
been sent to the support of Flaminius, under C. bank of the Aufidus, just below the town of Can-
Centenius, were also intercepted, and the whole of nae. We have no statement of the numbers
them cut to pieces or made prisoners. (Polyb. iii. of his army, but it is certain that it must bare
77—86 ; Liv. xxii, 1–8 ; Appian, Annib. 9, 10; been greatly inferior to that of the enemy; not-
Zonar. viii. 25. ) Hannibal's treatment of the cap- withstanding which, the excellence of his cavalry,
tives on this occasion, as well as after the battle of and the disciplined valour of his African and
the Trebia, was marked by the same policy on which Spanish infantry, gave him the most decisive vic-
he afterwards uniformly acted: the Roman citizens tory. The immense army of the Romans was
alone were retained ns prisoners, while their Italian noi only defeated, but annihilated ; and between
allies were dismissed without ransom to their re- forty and fifty thousand men are said to have fallen
spective homes. By this means he hoped to ex- in the field, among whom was the consul Aemilius
cite the nations of Italy against their Roman Paullus, both the consuls of the preceding year, the
masters, and to place himself in the position of the late master of the horse, Minucius, above eighty
leader of a national movement rather than that of senators, and a multitude of the wealthy knights
a foreign invader. It was probably in order to give who composed the Roman cavalry. The other consul,
time for this feeling to display itself, that he did Varro, escaped with a few horsemen to Venusia,
not, after so decisive a victory, push on towards and a small band of resolute men forced their way
Rome itself; but after an unsuccessful attempt from the Roman camp to Canusium ; all the rest
upon the Roman colony of Spoletium, he turned were killed, dispersed, or taken prisoners. (Polyb.
aside through the Apennines into Picenum, and ii. 107-117; Liv. xxii. 36, 38—50 ; Plut. Fab.
thence into the northern part of Apulia. Here he 14–16; Appian, Annib. 17-25; Zonar. ix. 1. )
spent a great part of the summer, and was able Hannibal has been generally blamed for not fol-
effectually to restore his troops, which had suffered lowing up his advantage at once, after so decisive
much from the hardships of their previous marches. a victory, by an immediate advance upon Rome
But no symptoms appeared of the insurrections he itself,- - a measure which was strongly urged upon
had looked for among the Italians. The Romans him by Maharbal (MAHARBAL); and we are told
had collected a fresh army; and Fabius, who had that he himself afterwards bitterly repented of his
been appointed to the command of in with the error. Whatever may be the motives that de-
title of dictator, while he prudently avoided a terred him from such a step, we cannot but be sur-
general action, was able frequently to harass and prised at his apparent inactivity after the battle.
annoy the Carthaginian army. Hannibal now, He probably expected that so brilliant a success
therefore, recrossed the Apennines, descended into would immediately produce a general rising among
the rich plains of Campania, and laid waste, with the nations of Italy, and remained for a time
out opposition, that fertile territory. But he was quietly in Apuliah until they should have had
unable either to make himself master of any of the time to declare themselves. Nor were his hopes
towns, or to draw the wary Fabius to a battle. disappointed: the Hirpinians, all the Samnites
The Roman general contented himself with occupy- (except the Pentrian tribe), and almost all the
ing the mountain passes leading from Samnium Apulians, Lucanians, and Bruttians declared in
into Campania, by which Hannibal must of neces- favour of Carthage. But though the whole of the
sity retreat, and believed that he had caught him south of Italy was thus apparently lost to the Ro
as it were in a trap; but Hannibal eluded his vigi- mans, yet the effect of this insurrection was not so
iance by an ingenious stratagem, passed the defiles decisive as it would at first appear ; for the Latin
of the Apennines without loss, and established him- colonies, which still without exception remained
self in the plains of Apulia, where he collected sup-faithful, gave the Romans a powerful hold upon the
plies from all sides, in order to prepare for the revolted provinces ; and the Greek cities on the
winter. During this operation the impatience of coast, though mostly disposed to join the Cartha-
the Romans and the rashness of Minucius (who ginians, were restrained by the presence of Roman
had been raised by the voice of popular clamour to garrisons. Hence it became necessary to support
an equality in the command with Fabius) were the insurrection in the different parts of Italy with
very near giving Hannibal the opportunity for a Carthaginian force ; and Hannibal, while he
which he was ever on the watch, to crush the himself moved forward into Samnium, detached his
Roman army by a decisive blow ; but Fabius was brother Mago into Bruttium, and Hanno, one of
able to save his colleague from destruction; and his ablest officers, into Lucania After securing the
Hannibal, after obtaining only a partial advantage,
took up his winter-quarters at the small town of • The battle of Cannae was fought, according
Geronium. (Polyb. iii. 85-94, 100-105 ; Liv. to Claudius Quadrigarius (ap. Macrob. i. 16 ; Gell.
xxii. 7—18, 23-30, 32; Plut. Fab. 3—13; Ap-v. 17. & 2), on the 2nd of August; but it seems
pian, Annib, 12-16; Zonar. viii, 25, 26. ) probable that the Roman calendar was at this
The next spring (B. C. 216) was a period of in- period considerably in advance of the true time, and
action on both sides: the Romans were engaged in that the battle was fought in reality at least as early
making preparations for bringing an unusually large as the middle of June. (See Arnold's Rome,
force into the field ; and Hannibal remained at vol. iii. p. 136; Clinton, F. H. vol. iii. p. 42;
Geronium until late in the spring, when the want where the words “ behind the true time” are eri
of provisions compelling him to move, he surprised | dently an accidental error. )
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HANNIBAL
:
submission of the Samnites, he pushed forward into | decisire events. Casilinum had fallen in the
Campania, and though foiled in the attempt to course of the winter, and with the advance of
make himself master of Neapolis, which had been spring Hannibal took up his camp on Mount
the immediate object of his advance, he was more Tifata, where, while awaiting the arrival of rein-
than compensated by the acquisition of Capua (a forcements from Carthage, he was at hand to supe
city scarcely inferior to Rome itself in importance), port his partisans in Campania, and oppose the
the gates of which were opened to him by the Roman generals in that province. But his attempts
popular party. Here, after reducing the small on Cumae and Neapolis were foiled ; and even after
towns of Nuceria and Acerrae, he established his he had been joined by a force from Carthage (very
army in winter-quarters ; while he, at the same inferior, however, to what he had expected), he
time, carried on the siege of Casilinum, a small but sustained a repulso before Nola, which was magni-
strong fortress in the immediate neighbourhood. fied by the Romans into a defeat. As the winter
(Liv. xxii. 58, 61, xxiii. 1-10, 14—18; Zonar. approached, he withdrew into Apulia, and took up
ix. 1, 2; Plut. Fab. 17. )
his quarters in the plains around Arpi
. But other
Capua was celebrated for its wealth and luxury, prospects were already opening before him ; in his
and the enervating effect which these produced camp on Tifata he had received embassies from
upon the army of Hannibal became a favourite Philip, king of Macedonia, and Hieronymus of
theme of rhetorical exaggeration in later ages. Syracuse, both of which he had eagerly welcomed ;
(Zonar. ix. 3; Florus, ii. 6. ) The futility of and thus sowed the seeds of two fresh wars, and
such declamations is sufficiently shown by the raised up two formidable enemies against the
simple fact that the superiority of that army in Roman power. (Liv. xxiii. 19, 20, 30–39, 41-
the field remained as decided as ever. Still it may 46 ; xxiv. 6 ; Plut. Marc. 10–12; Polyb. vii. 2,
be truly said that the winter spent at Capua, B. C. 9; Zonar. ix. 4. )
216–215, was in great measure the turning point These two collateral wars in some degree drew
of Hannibal's fortune, and from this time the war off the attention of both parties from that in Italy
assumed an altered character. The experiment of itself; yet the Romans still opposed to the Car-
what he could effect with his single army had now thaginian general a chain of armies which hampered
been fully tried, and, notwithstanding all his vic- all his operations ; and though Hannibal was ever
tories, it had decidedly failed; for Rome was still on the watch for the opportunity of striking a
unsubdued, and still provided with the means of blow, the campaign of 214 was still less decisive
maintaining a protracted contest. But Hannibal than that of the preceding year. Early in the
had not relied on his own forces alone, and he now summer he advanced from Apulia to his former
found himself, apparently at least, in a condition station on Mount Tifata, to watch over the safety
to commence the execution of his long-cherished of Capua ; from thence he had descended to the
plan, — that of arming Italy itself against the Ro Lake Avernus, in hopes of making himself master
mans, and crushing the ruling power by means of of Puteoli, when a prospect was held out to him of
her own subjects. It was to this object that his surprising the important city of Tarentum. Thither
attention was henceforth mainly directed ; and he hastened by forced marches, but arrived too
hence, even when apparently inactive, he was, in late,—Tarentum had been secured by a Roman
reality, occupied with the most important schemes, force. After this his operations were of little im-
and busy in raising up fresh foes to overwhelm his portauce, until he again took up his winter-quarters
antagonists. From this time, also, the Romans in Apulia (Liv. xxiv, 12, 13, 17, 20. )
in great measure changed their plan of operations, During the following summer (B. C. 213), while
and, instead of opposing to Hannibal one great all eyes were turned towards the war in Sicily,
army in the field, they hemmed in his move- Hannibal remained almost wholly inactive in the
ments on all sides, guarded all the most important neighbourhood of Tarentum, the hopes he still
towns with strong garrisons, and kept up an army entertained of making himself master of that im-
in every province of Italy, to thwart the opera- portant city rendering him unwilling to quit that
tions of his lieutenants, and check the rising dis- quarter of Italy. Fabius, who was opposed to him,
position to revolt. It is impossible here to follow in was equally inefficient ; and the capture of Arpi,
detail the complicated movements of the subse which was betrayed into his hands, was the only
quent campaigns, during which Hannibal himself advantage he was able to gain. But before the
frequently traversed Italy in all directions, appear- close of the ensuing winter Hannibal was rewarded
ing suddenly wherever his presence was called for, with the long-looked for prize, and Tarentum was
and astonishing, and often baffling, the enemy by betrayed into his hands by Nicon and Philemenus.
the rapidity of his marches. Still less can we ad The advantage, however, was still incomplete, for
vert to all the successes or defeats of his generals, a Roman garrison still held possession of the cita-
though these of necessity often influenced his own del, from which he was unable to dislodge them.
operations. All that we can do is, to notice very (Polyb. viii. 26–36; Liv. xxiv. 44-47 ; xxv. 1,
briefly the leading events which distinguished 8-11; Appian, Annib, 31-33. )
each successive campaign. But it is necessary to The next year (212) was marked by important
bear in mind, if we would rightly estimate the events. In Sicily, on the one hand, the fall of
character and genius of Hannibal, that it was not Syracuse more than counterbalanced the acquisition
only where he was present in person that his su- of Tarentum ; while in Spain, on the contrary, the
periority made itself felt: as Polybius has justly defeat and death of the two Scipios (HASDRU-
remarked (ix. 22), he was at once the author and BAL, No. 6) seemed to establish the superiority of
the presiding spirit of all that was done in this Carthage in that country, and open the way to
war against the Roman power, — in Sicily and in Hasdrubal to join his brother in Italy; a movement
Macedonia, as well as in Italy itself, from one ex. which Hannibal appears to have been already long
tremity of the peninsula to the other.
expecting. Meanwhile, the two consuls, em-
The campaign of 215 was not marked by any boldened by the apparent inactivity of the Cartha-
VOL. II.
Z
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HANNIBAL
ginian general, began to draw together their forces to its fate, soon after surrendered to the Romans,
for the purpose of besieging Capua Hanno, who Hannibal once more took up his winter-quarters in
was despatched thither by Hannibal with a large Apulia. (Liv. xxvi. 4–14; Polyb. ix. 3—7;
convoy of stores and provisions, was defeated, and Appian, Annib. 38–43; Zonar. ix. 6. )
the object of his march frustrated ; and though The commencement of the next season (210)
another officer of the same name, with a body of was marked by the fall of Salapia, which was bé
Carthaginian and Numidian troops, threw himself trayed by the inhabitants to Marcellus; but this loss
into the city, the Romans still threatened it with was soon avenged by the total defeat and destruo-
a siege, and Hannibal himself was compelled to tion of the army of the proconsul Cn. Fulvius at
advance to its relief. By this movement he for a Herdonea. Marcellus, on his part, carefully avoided
time checked the operations of the consuls, and an action for the rest of the campaign, while he
compelled them to withdraw; but he was unable harassed his opponent by every possible means.
to bring either of them to battle. Centenius, a Thus the rest of that summer, too, wore away
centurion, who had obtained the command of a without any important results. But this state of
force of 8000 men, was more confident ; he ven- comparative inactivity was necessarily injurious to
tured an engagement with Hannibal, and paid the the cause of Hannibal : the nations of Italy that
penalty of his rashness by the loss of his army had espoused that cause when triumphant, now
and his life. This success was soon followed by a began to waver in their attachment ; and, in the
more important victory over the practor Cn. Ful- course of the following summer (209), the Samnites
vius at Herdonea in Apulia, in which the army of and Lucanians submitted to Rome, and were ad-
the latter was utterly destroyed, and 20,000 men mitted to favourable terms. A still more disastrous
cut to pieces. But while Hannibal was thus em- blow to the Carthagininn cause was the loss of
ployed elsewhere, he was unable to prevent the Tarentum, which was betrayed into the hands of
consuls from effectually forming the siege of Capua, Fabius, as it had been into those of Hannibal.
and surrounding that city with a double line of in vain did the latter seek to draw the Roman
intrenchments. (Liv. xxv. 13-15, 18--22. ) general into a snare ; the wary Fabius eluded his
His power in the south had been increased toils. But Marcellus, after a pretended victory
during this campaign by the important accession of over Hannibal during the earlier part of the cam-
Metapontum and Thurii: but the citadel of Taren-paign, had shut himself up within the walls of
tum still held out, and, with a view to urge the Venusia, and remained there in utter inactivity.
siege of this fortress by his presence, Hannibal Hannibal meanwhile still traversed ine open coun-
spent the winter, and the whole of the ensuing try unopposed, and laid waste the territories of his
spring (211), in its immediate neighbourhood. But enemies. Yet we cannot suppose that he any longer
as the season advanced, the pressing danger of looked for ultimate success from any efforts of his
Capna once more summoned him to its relief. He own: his object was, doubtless, now only to maine
accordingly presented himself before the Roman tain his ground in the south until his brother Has-
camp, and attacked their lines from without, while drubal should appear in the north of Italy, an event
the garrison co-operated with him by a vigorous to which he had long looked forward with anxious
sally from the walls. Both attacks were, however, expectation. (Liv. xxvii. 1, 2, 4, 12—16, 20;
repulsed, and Hannibal, thus foiled in his attempt | Plut. Fab. 19, 21-23, Marc. 24—27; Appian,
to raise the siege by direct means, determined on Annib. 45–50 ; Zonar. ix. 7, 8. )
the bold manoeuvre of marching directly upon Rome Yet the following summer (208) was not an-
itself, in hopes of thus compelling the consuls to marked by some brilliant achievements. The
abandon their designs upon Capua, in order to Romans having formed the siege of Locri, a legion,
provide for the defence of the city. But this daring which was despatched to their support from Taren-
scheme was again frustrated : the appearance of tum, was intercepted in its march, and utterly de
Hannibal before the gates of Rome for a moment stroyed; and not long afterwards the two consuls,
struck terror through the city, but a considerable Crispinus and Marcellus, who, with their united
body of troops was at the time within the walls, armies, were opposed to Hannibal in Lucania, al-
and the consul, Fulvius Flaccus, as soon as he lowed themselves to be led into an ambush, in
heard of Hannibal's march, hastened, with a por- which Marcellus was killed, and Crispinus mortally
tion of the besieging army, from Capua, while he wounded. After this the Roman armies withdrew,
still left with the other consul a force amply suf while Hannibal hastened to Locri, and not only
ficient to carry on the siege. Hannibal was thus raised the siege, but utterly destroyed the besieging
disappointed in the main object of his advance, and army. Thus he again found himself undisputed
he bad no means of effecting any thing against master of the south of Italy during the remainder
Rome itself, where Fulvius and Fabius confined of this campaign. (Liv. xxvii. 25—28 ; Polyb.
themselves strictly to the defensive, allowing him x. 32 ; Plut. Marc. 29 ; Appian, Anrib. 50 ;
to rarage the whole country, up to the very walls Zonar. ix. 9. )
of Rome, without opposition. Nothing therefore Of the two consuls of the ensuing year (207),
remained for him but to retreat, and he accordingly C. Nero was opposed to Hannibal, while M. Livius
recrossed the Anio, and marched slowly and sul was appointed to take the field against Hasdrubal,
lenly through the land of the Sabines and Samnites, who had at length crossed the Alps, and descended
ravaging the country which he traversed, and into Cisalpine Gaul. [HASDRUBAL, No. 6. ) AC-
closely followed by the Roman consul, upon whom cording to Livy (xxvii. 39), Hannibal was apprised
he at length turned suddenly, and, by a night of his brother's arrival at Placentia before he had
attack, very nearly destroyed his whole army. himself moved from his winter-quarters; but it is
When he had thus reached Apulia, he made from difficult to believe that, if this had been the case,
thence a forced march into Bruttium, in hopes of he would not have made more energetic efforts to
surprising Rhegium ; but here he was again foiled, join him. If we can trust the narrative transmitted
and Capua, which he was now compelled to abandon to us, which is certainly in many respects unsatis-
:
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HANNIBAL.
339
HANNIBAL.
factory, Hannibal spent much time in various unim- , to the strong city of Hadrimetum. The circum-
portant movements, before he advanced northwards stances of the campaign which followed are very
into Apulia, where he was met by the Roman differently related, nor will our space allow us to
consul, and not only held in check, but so effectu- enter into any discussion of the details. Some of
ally deceived, that he knew nothing of Nero's these, especially the well-known account of the in-
march to support his colleague until after his return, terview between Scipio and Hannibal, savour
and the first tidings of the battle of the Metaurus strongly of romance, notwithstanding the high au-
were conveyed to him by the sight of the head of thority of Polybius. (Comp. Polyb. xv. 1-9;
Hasdrubal. (Liv. xxvii. 40–51 ; Polyb. xi. 1-3; Liv. xxx. 25—32 ; Appian, Pun. 33—41; Zonar.
Appian, Annib. 52 ; Zonar. ix. 9. )
ix. 13.
