No More Learning

On the contrary, Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says:
"Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man,
let him be anathema. " But satisfaction is commanded (Lk. 3:8): "Bring
forth . . . fruits worthy of penance. " Therefore it is possible to make
satisfaction to God.

Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make
satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to
God.

Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the
fault, since "justice is the same as counterpassion," as the
Pythagoreans said [*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf. [4855]SS, Q[61], A[4]].
Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed.
Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.

I answer that, Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by reason
of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just as
thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors
received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in
giving honor to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher
says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to repay them measure for
measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for
friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible.
Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as
the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do,
in comparison with himself, so that in another way the form of justice
is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man
cannot make satisfaction to God if "satis" [enough] denotes
quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality,
as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it
suffice for satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the offense derived a certain infinity
from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a
certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is
quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes
acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as
regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gratuitously,
but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which respect it
is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point,
since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as this is an offense
against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of
turning away from God. Others again say that even as regards the
aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of
Christ's merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the
same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through
faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise,
satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: Man, who was made to God's image, has a certain
share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his
free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make
satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was
bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he
might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that it is impossible to
make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to
make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that
he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that
he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is
impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put
forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be
heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain
measure, viz. the fulfillment of God's commandments, over and above
which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 4: Though man cannot recover the time that is past,
he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should
have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the
fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).

Reply to Objection 5: Though original sin has less of the nature of sin
than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an
infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could
not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory
punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction.
Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written
(Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. "
Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.

Objection 2: Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and
confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another.
Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.

Objection 3: Further, by praying for another one merits also for
oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he
satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man
satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.

Objection 4: Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he
takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from his
debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after
the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another; else,
if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for
the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and by
him who is punished in Purgatory.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 6:2): "Bear ye one another's
burdens. " Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment
laid upon another.

Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before
man, one can pay another's debt for love of him. Much more, therefore,
can this be done before the judgment seat of God.

I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to
pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin.
Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one
does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by
another's fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing,
through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a
man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another,
since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin.
But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. on the other
hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for
another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may
avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for
another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would
have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by
his own punishment than by another's), because punishment derives its
power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it. And
since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than
for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for
another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the
Fathers (v, 5) of one who for love of his brother did penance for a sin
which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity
his brother was released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it
necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable
to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be
released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But this
is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so
that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for another, unless there
be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he
is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo
it.

Reply to Objection 1: The essential reward is bestowed on a man
according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God
will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just
as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man does
not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has
infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to
eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal
punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured
according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since
sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment.
Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from
punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity
whereby we are "all one in Christ" (Gal. 3:28).

Reply to Objection 2: Contrition is ordained against the guilt which
affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is
not freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by
confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one
man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace
is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there is no
comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.

Reply to Objection 3: In the payment of the debt we consider the
measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is
charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at
least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for
another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the
punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by
satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release
from punishment, viz. eternal life.

Reply to Objection 4: If this man bound himself to undergo a certain
punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it:
wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other
makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are
debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin
committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that
one sin is twice punished.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head
there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for
another?

(2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his
sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins
which were pardoned him through his contrition?

(3) Whether a man's previous satisfaction begins to avail when he
recovers charity?

(4) Whether works done without charity merit any good?

(5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without
satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected
together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not
connected together, else whoever had one would have them all. Therefore
one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.

Objection 2: Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts
the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore God
accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.

Objection 3: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15),
"satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to
the suggestions thereof. " Now this can be done with regard to one sin
and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres in
covetousness. Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without
satisfying for another.

On the contrary, The fast of those who fasted "for debates and strifes"
(Is. 58:4,5) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of
satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that are
acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot
make satisfaction to God.

Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for
preserving from future sins, as stated above ([4856]Q[12], A[3]). But
without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin
excludes grace, it is not possible to make satisfaction for one sin and
not for another.

I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction
for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D,
15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be
removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must needs be
consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is
renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything to hinder the
renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore,
every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the
friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make
satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither
would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing
himself at his feet he were to give him another.

Reply to Objection 1: As sins are not connected together in some single
one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins
are remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of
various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot
be made for one and not for another.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man is under obligation to another by
reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is
opposed to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required
than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and this can be
done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is
based on an offense, there is inequality not only of justice but also
of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by satisfaction,
not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a
punishment equal to the offense, but also the equality of friendship
must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to
friendship remains.

Reply to Objection 3: By its weight, one sin drags us down to another,
as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he
does not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for
which he was previously contrite?

Objection 1: It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being
contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity,
satisfy for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his
contrition. For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:24): "Redeem thou
thy sins with alms. " Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his
subsequent punishment. Therefore a man can make satisfaction while in a
state of sin.

Objection 2: Further, "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or
hatred" (Eccles. 9:1). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless
one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether
one had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.

Objection 3: Further, a man's entire action takes its form from the
intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state
of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore his whole subsequent
satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity which quickens
his intention.

Objection 4: Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization
of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in one
who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, "Charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). But
satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. Therefore it is
powerless without charity.

Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. But alms given by
one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is clearly stated 1 Cor.
13:3, "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. " Therefore there can be no
satisfaction with mortal sin.

I answer that, Some have said that if, when all a man's sins have been
pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction for
them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction
will be valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished
in hell for the other sins.

But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of
friendship and the restoration of the equality of justice, the contrary
of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix,
1,3). Now in satisfaction made to God, the equality is based, not on
equivalence but rather on God's acceptation: so that, although the
offense be already removed by previous contrition, the works of
satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent
on charity. Consequently works done without charity are not
satisfactory.

Reply to Objection 1: Daniel's advice meant that he should give up sin
and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as man knows not for certain whether he had
charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he
knows not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it
is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear about sin forgiven. " And
yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction
made, if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not
have expiated his punishment by that satisfaction, he does not incur
the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as
he who receives the Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin
of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving
unworthily.

Reply to Objection 3: His intention was interrupted by his subsequent
sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.

Reply to Objection 4: Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to
the Divine acceptation and as to equivalence: so that the argument
proves nothing.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to
charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that when a man has recovered charity his
previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on Lev. 25:25,
"If thy brother being impoverished," etc. , says that "the fruit of a
man's good works should be counted from the time when he sinned. " But
they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his
subsequent charity. Therefore they begin to avail after he recovers
charity.

Objection 2: Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by
sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity. Now Baptism
begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins
to avail when sin is taken away.

Objection 3: Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he
has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling again
into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to
confession a second time, to fast once again. But he would be told to
do so, if he did not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them.
Therefore his previous works become valid unto satisfaction, through
his subsequent repentance.

On the contrary, Works done without charity were not satisfactory,
through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance.
Therefore they do not begin to be satisfactory.

Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in some way that work
proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable to God, and
therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity.
Since then the works done without charity, in no way proceeded from
charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count
towards satisfaction.

I answer that, Some have said that works done while in a state of
charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of
eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of
punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done without charity
are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious
of eternal life. But this is impossible, because works done in charity
produce both these effects for the same reason, viz. because they are
pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make
works done without charity to be pleasing in one respect, so neither
can it make them pleasing in the other respect.

Reply to Objection 1: This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from
the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to
sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon
as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he confessed. Or we
may say that the greater the contrition the more it alleviates the
punishment, and the more good actions a man does while in sin, the more
he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so that it is probable
that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest
should use discretion in taking them into account, so as to give him a
lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.

Reply to Objection 2: Baptism imprints a character on the soul, whereas
satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes
both insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas
it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism confers
justification in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is not
man's deed but God's, wherefore it does not become a lifeless deed as
satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an
effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of
satisfaction has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and
almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person's substance, and so on. In
such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they
have been done while in a state of sin, because through penance they
are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But when a work
of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does
satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and so
forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise
quickened, and must be repeated.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good?

Objection 1: It would seem that works done without charity merit some,
at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act, so is
reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just
judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and so every good deed
merits some good.

Objection 2: Further, reward is not given except for merit. Now some
reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written
(Mat. 6:2, 5, 16) of those who do good actions for the sake of human
glory, that "they have received their reward. " Therefore those works
merit some good.

Objection 3: Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does
many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances,
while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception
of good things from Gods else the latter need not be advised to do any
good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His good
things. Therefore the former, on account of his good works, merits some
good from God.

On the contrary, Augustine says that "the sinner is not worthy of the
bread he eats. " Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.

Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through
not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual being, according
to 1 Cor. 13:2. Therefore he can merit nothing.

I answer that, Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of
which it is just that the agent should be given something.
Now justice
is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards
something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly, there is
metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the
part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to give something
to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the "fitness of the
Divine goodness" is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that "God is
just when He spares the sinner, because this is befitting. " And in this
way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the
agent himself has a claim to receive something, and this is called
merit of "condignity. " The second is an act the result of which is that
there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness,
wherefore it is called merit of "congruity. " Now since in all
gratuitous givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is
impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift, if he
lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal,
are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no one can acquire a claim to
any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done
without charity are not condignly meritorious of any good from God
either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of
God, that wherever He finds a disposition He should grant the
perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of
good works done without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a
threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace,
habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly
so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious of any
good, rather than that they are.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14),
since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father
the equal of what he has received from him a father can never become
his son's debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor on account
of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward
by reason of its measure of goodness, but it can by reason of charity,
which makes friends hold their possessions in common. Therefore, no
matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does
not give man a claim to receive anything from God. On the other hand,
an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure
of its malice, because no evil has been done to us on the part of God,
like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed
deserves condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity
does not merit condign reward.

Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments consider merit of congruity; while
the other arguments consider merit of condignity.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid works do not avail for
the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment in
hell will answer to the measure of guilt. But works done without
charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither, therefore, do
they lessen the pains of hell.

Objection 2: Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is
nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done away with
by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity canceled
any of the punishment due for sins, those works might be so numerous,
that the pain of hell would be done away with altogether: which is
false.

Objection 3: Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious
than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine
(Enchiridion cx), "the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned
in hell. " Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works done
without charity.

On the contrary, Augustine also says (Enchiridion cx): "Whomsoever they
profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself
more tolerable. "

Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil
deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids a punishment, even
in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void
punishment.

I answer that, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two
ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which he
already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment
unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect is not diminished or
taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of
hell cannot be mitigated by works done without charity, since they are
unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that the demerit of
punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain
of hell---first because he who does such works escapes being guilty of
omitting them---secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to
good, so that a man sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away
from many sins thereby.

These works do, however merit a diminution or postponement of temporal
punishment, as in the case of Achab (3 Kings 21:27, seqq. ), as also the
acquisition of temporal goods.

Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by
subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening the subject,
so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because
there is no strengthening without a diminution of passibility. Now
passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is
not removed, neither can the subject be strengthened.

Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of
conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither will this
stand, because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is
the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that what applies to one
applies to the other.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head
there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?

(2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are
satisfactory?

(3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying
that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?

Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means
of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the
offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given
to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as
appears from Tob. 3:22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by
means of penal works.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the charity from which a work
proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain
[*Vulg. : 'Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain']"
according to 1 Jn. 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be
penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will
they be: which is false.

Objection 3: Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo
i) "consists in giving due honor to God. " But this can be done by other
means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by
means of penal works.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is just that the
sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the
greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his
sin. "

Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by
satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of
penal works.

I answer that, As stated above ([4857]Q[12], A[3]), satisfaction
regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its
means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in
both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works.
For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must needs be
between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization
in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too
much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been
taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He
is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something
by sinning as stated above ([4858]Q[12], AA[3],4). Consequently, in
order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that
may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now
a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but
perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work
unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it
needs to be good that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be
penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.

Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not
easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment.
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are
medicinal.

Reply to Objection 1: Though God does not delight in our punishments as
such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be
satisfactory.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the
penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now
if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being
equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be
diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not
diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution
of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more
prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but
increases it.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is due for sin is compensation for the
offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It
is of this debt that Anselm speaks.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?

Objection 1: It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by
God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is
meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said
([4859]Q[14], A[2]). But we do not merit except by what is in our own
power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not
in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.

Objection 2: Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these
scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them
most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.

Objection 3: Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these
scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the
case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:3,4): "Tribulation worketh
patience, and patience trial, i. e. deliverance from sin," as a gloss
explains it.

Further, Ambrose says (Super Ps. 118): "Although faith," i. e. the
consciousness of sin, "be lacking, the punishment satisfies. " Therefore
the scourges of this life are satisfactory.

I answer that, Compensation for a past offense can be enforced either
by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such
compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature,
whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also satisfactory.
Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of
sin, become in some way the act of the sufferer they acquire a
satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in so
far as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking
advantage of them patiently. If, however, he refuse to submit to them
patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are
not of a satisfactory, but merely of a vindictive character.

Reply to Objection 1: Although these scourges are not altogether in our
power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them
patiently. In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such
things can become both meritorious and satisfactory.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 8), even as
"the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek," so by the same
scourges are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of
their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both,
satisfaction is only on the side of the good.

Reply to Objection 3: These scourges always regard past guilt, not
always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For
had there not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no
punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted
by God on a person without the person's fault, that his virtue may be
meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover, these two
things are necessary in satisfaction. For the work needs to be
meritorious, that honor may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard
of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the works of satisfaction are
unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds,
fasting, and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But
prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow, and is
a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written (James 5:13): "Is any of
you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing. " Therefore
prayer should not be reckoned among the works of satisfaction.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. Now, as
Jerome says on Mk. 9:28, "This kind" of demons "can go out by nothing,
but by prayer and fasting: Diseases of the body are healed by fasting,
diseases of the mind, by prayer. " Therefore no other work of
satisfaction is necessary.

Objection 3: Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be
cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins,
according to Lk. 11:41: "Give alms, and behold all things are clean
unto you. " Therefore the other two are in excess.

Objection 4: On the other hand, it seems that there should be more. For
contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds of
sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.

Objection 5: Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as
works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above. Therefore
they are not sufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve
something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but
three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or
external goods. By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some goods of
fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of
the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either
in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we
should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.

This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots
the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three (1 Jn. 2:16),
viz. "concupiscence of the flesh," "concupiscence of the eyes," and
"pride of life. " Fasting is directed against concupiscence of the
"flesh," alms-deeds against concupiscence of the "eyes," and "prayer"
against "pride of life," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 42).

This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does
not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because every sin is
committed either against God, and this is prevented by "prayer," or
against our neighbor, and this is remedied by "alms-deeds," or against
ourselves, and this is forestalled by "fasting. "

Reply to Objection 1: According to some, prayer is twofold. There is
the prayer of contemplatives whose "conversation is in heaven": and
this, since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction.
The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal
and a part of satisfaction.

It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character
of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul it is painful to
the body, since, as Gregory says (Super Ezech. , Hom. xiv), "doubtless,
when our soul's love is strengthened, our body's strength is weakened";
hence we read (Gn. 32:25) that the sinew of Jacob's thigh shrank
through his wrestling with the angel.

Reply to Objection 2: Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in
carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust. and, another which is
completed in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in
the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness.
Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that
they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.

Reply to Objection 3: Although each of these three, by a kind of
likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is
reasonable that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and
that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed,
yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is
unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed on him, chiefly
almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far as in
those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction
thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does
not follow that other works are in excess.

Reply to Objection 4: Though there are many kinds of sins, all are
reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which,
as we have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.

Reply to Objection 5: Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all
referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one's
neighbor is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God
becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in
several ways.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under
which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether penance can be in the innocent?

(2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory?

(3) Whether in the good or bad angels?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether penance can be in the innocent?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent. For
penance consists in bewailing one's evil deeds: whereas the innocent
have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.

Objection 2: Further, the very name of penance [poenitentia] implies
punishment [poena]. But the innocent do not deserve punishment.
Therefore penance is not in them.

Objection 3: Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if
all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice.
Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none in the
innocent.

On the contrary, All the virtues are infused together. But penance is a
virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent
at Baptism, penance is infused with them.

Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in
body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been sick
spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of
sin without an act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure
without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the
disease of sin, has the habit of penance.

I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal
of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not
conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the
power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal
of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act
without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a virtue is
possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the reason
that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its
act---thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not the
act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of
magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the innocent have committed no sin,
nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of
penance. Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps
with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the
habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a
perfection of the natural power.

Reply to Objection 2: Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet
it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve
to be punished.

Reply to Objection 3: So long as the power to sin remains, there would
be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the
act, if there were no actual sins.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the saints in glory have penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in glory have not penance.
For, as Gregory says (Moral. iv), "the blessed remember their sins,
even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been
healed. " But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the saints in
heaven have not penance.

Objection 2: Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ.