No More Learning

In fact, the continuance of peace on the part of Rome was
proffered on the most moderate terms consistent with her honour —the release of the captives, the restoration of Thurii, the surrender of the originators of the attack on the fleet A Roman embassy proceeded with these proposals to
14
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
Ml. Tarentum (473), while at the same time, to add weight to their words, a Roman army under the consul Lucius Aemilius advanced into Samnium. The Tarentines could, without forfeiting aught of their independence, accept these terms ; and considering the little inclination for war in so wealthy a commercial city, the Romans had reason to pre sume that an accommodation was still possible. But the attempt to preserve peace failed, whether through the oppo sition of those Tarentines who recognized the necessity of meeting the aggressions of Rome, the sooner the better, by
a resort to arms, or merely through the unruliness of the city rabble, which with characteristic Greek naughtiness sub jected the person of the envoy to an unworthy insult. The consul now advanced into the Tarentine territory ; but in stead of immediately commencing hostilities, he offered once more the same terms of peace; and, when this proved in vain, he began to lay waste the fields and country houses, and he defeated the civic militia. The principal persons captured, however, were released without ransom; and the hope was not abandoned that the pressure of war would give
to the aristocratic party ascendency in the city and so bring
chap, vh AND ROME
15
about peace. The reason of this reserve was, that the Romans were unwilling to drive the city into the arms of the Epirot king. His designs on Italy were no longer a secret. A Tarentine embassy had already gone to Pyrrhus and re turned without having accomplished its object. The king had demanded more than it had powers to grant. It was necessary that they should come to a decision. That the civic militia knew only how to run away from the Romans, had been made sufficiently clear. There remained
only the choice between a peace with Rome, which the Romans
still were ready to agree to on equitable terms, and a treaty with Pyrrhus on any condition that the king might think proper ; or, in other words, the choice between submission to the supremacy of Rome, and subjection to the tyrannis of a Greek soldier.
The parties in the city were almost equally balanced. At length the ascendency remained with the national party — a result, that was due partly to the justifiable predilection which led them, if they must yield to a master at all, to prefer a Greek to a barbarian, but partly also to the dread of the demagogues that Rome, notwith standing the moderation now forced upon it by circum stances, would not neglect on a fitting opportunity to exact vengeance for the outrages perpetrated by the Tarentine rabble. The city, accordingly, came to terms with Pyrrhus. He obtained the supreme command of the troops of the Tarentines and of the other Italians in arms against Rome, along with the right of keeping a garrison in Tarentum. The expenses of the war were, of course, to be borne by the city. Pyrrhus, on the other hand, promised to remain no longer in Italy than was necessary ; probably with the tacit reservation that his own judgment should fix the time during
Pyrrhus J^j^y
Nevertheless, the prey While the Tarentine envoys — the chiefs, no doubt, of the war party — were
which he would be needed there. had almost slipped out of his hands.
16 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
absent in Epirus, the state of feeling in the city, now hard pressed by the Romans, underwent a change. The chief command was already entrusted to Agis, a man favourable to Rome, when the return of the envoys with the concluded treaty, accompanied by Cineas the confidential minister of Pyrrhus, again brought the war party to the helm.
Landing of
the citadel of the town. He was followed in the beginning 280. of the year 474 by the king himself, who landed after a stormy passage in which many lives were lost He
Pyn-hus and the coalition.
a. firmer hand now grasped the reins, and put an end to 28i. the pitiful vacillation. In the autumn of 473 Milo, the
general of Pyrrhus, landed with 3000 Epirots and occupied
transported to Tarentum a respectable but miscellaneous army, consisting partly of the household troops, Molossians, Thesprotians, Chaonians, and Ambraciots; partly of the Macedonian infantry and the Thessalian cavalry, which Ptolemy king of Macedonia had conformably to stipu lation handed over to him ; partly of Aetolian, Acarnanian, and Athamanian mercenaries. Altogether it numbered
20,000 phalangitae, 2000 archers,
cavalry, and 20 elephants, and thus was not much smaller than the army with which fifty years before Alexander had crossed the Hellespont
The affairs of the coalition were in no very favourable state when the king arrived. The Roman consul indeed, as soon as he saw the soldiers of Milo taking the field against him instead of the Tarentine militia, had abandoned the attack on Tarentum and retreated to Apulia ; but, with the exception of the territory of Tarentum, the Romans virtually ruled all Italy. The coalition had no army in the field anywhere in Lower Italy; and in Upper Italy the
Etruscans, who alone were still in arms, had in the last 281. campaign (473) met with nothing but defeat The allies had, before the king embarked, committed to him the chief
command of all their troops, and declared that they were
500 slingers, 3000
chap, vil AND ROME
17
able to place in the field an army of 350,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry. The reality formed a sad contrast to these great promises. The army, whose chief command had been committed to Pyrrhus, had still to be created ; and for the time being the main resources available for forming it were those of Tarentum alone. The king gave orders for the enlisting of an army of Italian mercenaries with Tarentine money, and called out the able-bodied citizens to serve in the war. But the Tarentines had not so understood the agreement They had thought to purchase victory, like any other commodity, with money ; it was a sort of breach of contract, that the king should compel them to fight for it themselves. The more glad the citizens had been at first after Milo's arrival to be quit of the burdensome service of mounting guard, the more unwillingly they now rallied to the standards of the king: it was necessary to threaten the negligent with the penalty of death. This result now justified the peace party in the eyes of all, and communications were entered into, or at any rate appeared
to have been entered into, even with Rome.
prepared for such opposition, immediately treated Tarentum as a conquered city ; soldiers were quartered in the houses, the assemblies of the people and the numerous clubs
were suspended, the theatre was shut, the promenades were closed, and the gates were occupied with Epirot guards. A number of the leading men were sent over the sea as hostages ; others escaped the like fate by flight to Rome. These strict measures were necessary, for it was absolutely impossible in any sense to rely upon the Taren tines. It was only now that the king, in possession of that important city as a basis, could begin operations in the field.
The Romans too were well aware of the conflict which Prepar*. awaited them. In order first of all to secure the fidelity of ^°" in their allies or, in other words, of their subjects, the towns
that could not be depended on were garrisoned, and the
(trurorma)
VOL. II
34
Pyrrhus,
Com-
of the conflict
in Lower Italy.
|8 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
leaders of the party of independence, where it seemed needful, were arrested or executed : such was the case with a number of the members of the senate of Praeneste. For the war itself great exertions were made ; a war con tribution was levied; the full contingent was called forth from all their subjects and allies ; even the proletarians who we re properly exempt from obligation of service were called to arms. A Roman army remained as a reserve in the capital. A second advanced under the consul Tiberius Coruncanius into Etruria, and dispersed the forces of Volci
and Volsinii. The main force was of course destined for .
Lower Italy; its departure was hastened as much as possible, in order to reach Pyrrhus while still in the territory of Tarentum, and to prevent him and his forces from
a junction with the Samnites and other south Italian levies that were in arms against Rome. The Roman garrisons, that were placed in the Greek towns of Lower Italy, were intended temporarily to check the king's progress. But the mutiny of the troops stationed in Rhegium—one of the legions levied from the Campanian subjects of Rome under a Campanian captain Decius— deprived the Romans of that important town. It was not, however, transferred to the hands of Pyrrhus. While on the one hand the national hatred of the Campanians against the Romans undoubtedly contributed to produce this military insurrection, it was impossible on the other hand that Pyrrhus, who had crossed the sea to shield and protect the Hellenes, could receive as his allies troops who had put to death their Rhegine hosts in their own houses. Thus they remained isolated, in close league with their kinsmen and comrades in crime, the Mamertines, that the Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles, who had similar means gained possession of Messana on the opposite side of the straits; and they pillaged and laid waste for their own behoof the adjacent Greek towns, such as Croton,
forming
by
is,
chap, vu AND ROME
19
where they put to death the Roman garrison, and Caulonia, which they destroyed. On the other hand the Romans succeeded, by means of a weak corps which advanced along the Lucanian frontier and of the garrison of Venusia, in preventing the Lucanians and Samnites from uniting with Pyrrhus; while the main force — four legions as it would appear, and so, with a corresponding number of allied troops, at least 50,000 strong —marched
Pyrrhus, under the consul Publius Laevinus.
With a view to cover the Tarentine colony of Heraclea, Battle neat
the king had taken up a position with his own and the Heraclea-
Tarentine troops between that city and Pandosia1
The Romans, covered by their cavalry, forced the passage of the Siris, and opened the battle with a vehement and successful cavalry charge ; the king, who led his cavalry in person, was thrown from his horse, and the Greek horse men, panic-struck by the disappearance of their leader, abandoned the field to the squadrons of the
Pyrrhus, however, put himself at the head of his infantry, and began a fresh and more decisive engagement Seven times the legions and the phalanx met in shock of battle, and still the conflict was undecided. Then Megacles, one of the best officers of the king, fell, and, because on this hotly-contested day he had worn the king's armour, the army for the second time believed that the king had fallen ; the ranks wavered; Laevinus already felt sure of the victory and threw the whole of his cavalry on the flank of the Greeks. But Pyrrhus, marching with uncovered head
through the ranks of the infantry, revived the sinking courage of his troops. The elephants which had hitherto been kept in reserve were brought up to meet the cavalry ; the horses took fright at them ; the soldiers, not knowing how to encounter the huge beasts, turned and fled; the
1 Near the modern Anglona ; not to be confounded with the better known town of the same name in the district of Co—Mi
against
(474). 2g0
enemy.
so STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
masses of disordered horsemen and the pursuing elephants at length broke the compact ranks of the Roman infantry, and the elephants in concert with the excellent Thessalian cavalry wrought great slaughter among the fugitives. Had not a brave Roman soldier, Gaius Minucius, the first hastate of the fourth legion, wounded one of the elephants and thereby thrown the pursuing troops into confusion, the Roman army would have been extirpated ; as it was, the remainder of the Roman troops succeeded in retreating across the Siris. Their loss was great; 7000 Romans were found by the victors dead or wounded on the field of battle, 2000 were brought in prisoners; the Romans themselves stated their loss, including probably the wounded carried off the field, at 15,000 men. But Pyrrhus's army had suffered not much less : nearly 4000 of his best soldiers strewed the field of battle, and several of his ablest captains had fallen. Considering that his loss fell chiefly on the veteran soldiers who were far more difficult to be replaced than the Roman militia, and that he owed his victory only to the surprise produced by the attack of the elephants which could not be often repeated, the king, skilful judge of tactics as he was, may well at an after period have described this victory as resembling a defeat ; although he was not so foolish as to communicate that piece of self- criticism to the public—as the Roman poets afterwards invented the story—in the inscription of the votive offering presented by him at Tarentum. Politically it mattered little in the first instance at what sacrifices the victory was bought ; the gain of the first battle against the Romans was of inestimable value for Pyrrhus. His talents as a general had been brilliantly displayed on this new field of battle, and if anything could breathe unity and energy into the languishing league of the Italians, the victory of Heraclea could not fail to do so. But even the immediate results of the victory were considerable and lasting. Lucania was
chap, vii AND ROME Si
lost to the Romans : Laevinus collected the troops stationed there and marched to Apulia. The Bruttians, Lucanians, and Samnites joined Pyrrhus unmolested. With the exception of Rhegium, which pined under the oppression of the Campanian mutineers, the whole of the Greek cities joined the king, and Locri even voluntarily delivered up to him the Roman garrison ; in his case they were persuaded, and with reason, that they would not be abandoned to the Italians. The Sabellians and Greeks thus passed over to Pyrrhus ; but the victory produced no further eflect. The Latins showed no inclination to get quit of the Roman rule, burdensome as it might be, by the help of a foreign dynast. Venusia, although now wholly surrounded by enemies, adhered with unshaken steadfastness to Rome. Pyrrhus proposed to the prisoners taken on the Siris, whose brave demeanour the chivalrous king requited by the most honourable treatment, that they should enter his army in accordance with the Greek fashion ; but he learned that he was fighting not with mercenaries, but with a nation. Not one, either Roman or Latin, took service with him.
Pyrrhus offered peace to the Romans. He was too Attempts sagacious a soldier not to recognize the precariousness of at P*3"*- his footing, and too skilled a statesman not to profit opportunely by the moment which placed him in the most favourable position for the conclusion of peace. He now
hoped that under the first impression made by the great
battle on the Romans he should be able to secure the freedom of the Greek towns in Italy, and to call into existence between them and Rome a series of states of the
second and third order as dependent allies of the new
Greek power ; for such was the tenor of his demands : the
release of all Greek towns —and therefore of the Campanian
and Lucanian towns in particular —from allegiance to Rome,
and restitution of the territory taken from the Samnites,
Daunians, Lucanians, and Bruttians, or in other words
32 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ll
especially the surrender of Luceria and Venusia. If a further struggle with Rome could hardly be avoided, it was not desirable at any rate to begin it till the western Hellenes should be united under one ruler, till Sicily should be acquired and perhaps Africa be conquered.
Provided with such instructions, the Thessalian Cineas, the confidential minister of Pyrrhus, went to Rome. That dexterous negotiator, whom his contemporaries compared to Demosthenes so far as a rhetorician might be compared to a statesman and the minister of a sovereign to a popular leader, had orders to display by every means the respect which the victor of Heraclea really felt for his vanquished
opponents, to make known the wish of the king to come to Rome in person, to influence men's minds in the king's favour by panegyrics which sound so well in the mouth of an enemy, by earnest flatteries, and, as opportunity offered, also by well-timed gifts—in short to try upon the Romans all the arts of cabinet policy, as they had been tested at the courts of Alexandria and Antioch. The senate hesitated ; to many it seemed a prudent course to draw back a step and to wait till their dangerous antagonist should have further entangled himself or should be no more. But the
and blind consular Appius Claudius (censor 812-807. 442, consul 447, 458), who had long withdrawn from state affairs but had himself conducted at this decisive moment to the senate, breathed the unbroken energy of his own
vehement nature with words of fire into the souls of the younger generation. They gave to the message of the king the proud reply, which was first heard on this occasion and became thenceforth a maxim of the state, that Rome never negotiated so long as there were foreign troops on Italian ground ; and to make good their words they dis missed the ambassador at once from the city. The object of the mission had failed, and the dexterous diplomatist, instead of producing an effect by his oratorical art, had
grey-haired
chap, Til AND ROME
23
on the contrary been himself impressed by such manly earnestness after so severe a defeat — he declared at home that every burgess in that city had seemed to him a king ; in truth, the courtier had gained a sight of a free people.
Pyrrhus, who during these negotiations had advanced Pynfcmi into Campania, immediately on the news of their being ^Lj^J* broken off marched against Rome, to co-operate with the Rome. Etruscans, to shake the allies of Rome, and to threaten the
city itself. But the Romans as little allowed themselves to
be terrified as cajoled. At the summons of the herald " to
enrol in the room of the fallen," the young men immediately
after the battle of Heraclea had pressed forward in crowds
to enlist ; with the two newly-formed legions and the corps withdrawn from Lucania, Laevinus, stronger than before, followed the march of the king. He protected Capua
against him, and frustrated his endeavours to enter into communications with Neapolis. So firm was the attitude
of the Romans that, excepting the Greeks of Lower Italy,
no allied state of any note dared to break off from the
Roman alliance. Then Pyrrhus turned against Rome itself. Through a rich country, whose flourishing condition he
beheld with astonishment, he marched against Fregellae
which he surprised, forced the passage of the Liris, and
reached Anagnia, which is not more than forty miles from
Rome. No army crossed his path ; but everywhere the
towns of Latium closed their gates against him, and with measured step Laevinus followed him from Campania,
while the consul Tiberius Coruncanius, who had just con
cluded a seasonable peace with the Etruscans, brought up
a second Roman army from the north, and in Rom" itself
the reserve was preparing for battle under the dictator
Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus. In these circumstances Pyrrhus
could accomplish nothing; no course was left to him but
to retire. For a time he still remained inactive in Cam-
280. Second
year of the war.
pania in presence of the united armies of the two consuls ; but no opportunity occurred of striking an effective blow. When winter came on, the king evacuated the enemy's territory, and distributed his troops among the friendly towns, taking up his own winter quarters in Tarentum. Thereupon the Romans also desisted from their operations. The army occupied standing quarters near Firmum in Picenum, where by command of the senate the legions defeated on the Siris spent the winter by way of punishment under tents.
Thus ended the campaign of 474. The separate peace which at the decisive moment Etruria had concluded with Rome, and the king's unexpected retreat which entirely disappointed the high-strung hopes of the Italian con federates, counterbalanced in great measure the impression of the victory of Heraclea. The Italians complained of the burdens of the war, particularly of the bad discipline of the mercenaries quartered among them, and the king, weary of the petty quarrelling and of the impolitic as well as un- military conduct of his allies, began to have a presentiment that the problem which had fallen to him might be, despite all tactical successes, politically insoluble. The arrival of a Roman embassy of three consulars, including Gaius Fabricius the conqueror of Thurii, again revived in him for a moment the hopes of peace ; but it soon appeared that they had only power to treat for the ransom or exchange of prisoners. Pyrrhus rejected their demand, but at the festival of the Saturnalia he released all the prisoners on their word of honour. Their keeping of that word, and the repulse by the Roman ambassador of an attempt at bribery, were celebrated by posterity in a manner most unbecoming and betokening rather the dishonourable character of the later, than the honourable feeling of that earlier, epoch.
In the spring of 475 Pyrrhus resumed the offensive, and advanced into Apulia, whither the Roman army
24
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK 11
179.
chap, vii AND ROME
marched to meet him. In the hope of shaking the Roman Battle of
symmachy in these regions by a decisive victory, the king offered battle a second time, and the Romans did not refuse it The two armies encountered each other near Ausculum (Ascoli di Puglia). Under the banners of
Pyrrhus there fought, besides his Epirot and Macedonian troops, the Italian mercenaries, the burgess-force—the white shields as they were called—of Tarentum, and the allied Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites —altogether 70,000 infantry, of whom 16,000 were Greeks and Epirots, more than 8000 cavalry, and nineteen elephants. The Romans were supported on that day by the Latins, Campanians, Volscians, Sabines, Umbrians, Marrucinians, Paelignians, Frentanians, and Arpanians. They too numbered above 70,000 infantry, of whom 20,000 were Roman citizens, and 8000 cavalry. Both parties had made alterations in their military system. Pyrrhus, perceiving with the sharp eye of a soldier the advantages of the Roman manipular organization, had on the wings substituted for the long front of his phalanxes an arrangement by companies with intervals between them in imitation of the cohorts, and— perhaps for political no less than for military reasons—had placed the Tarentine and Samnite cohorts between the sub divisions of his own men. In the centre alone the Epirot phalanx stood in close order. For the purpose of keeping off the elephants the Romans produced a species of war- chariot, from which projected iron poles furnished with chafing-dishes, and on which were fastened moveable masts adjusted with a view to being lowered, and ending in an iron spike — in some degree the model of the boarding- bridges which were to play so great a part in the first Punic war.
According to the Greek account of the battle, which seems less one-sided than the Roman account also extant, the Greeks had the disadvantage on the first day, as tney
35
ol °*
*6 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
did not succeed in deploying their line along the steep and marshy banks of the river where they were compelled to accept battle, or in bringing their cavalry and elephants into action. On the second day, however, Pyrrhus antici pated the Romans in occupying the intersected ground, and thus gained without loss the plain where he could without disturbance draw up his phalanx. Vainly did the Romans with desperate courage fall sword in hand on the sar issue ; the phalanx preserved an unshaken front under every assault, but in its turn was unable to make any
on the Roman legions. It was not till the numerous escort of the elephants had, with arrows and stones hurled from slings, dislodged the combatants stationed in the Roman war-chariots and had cut the traces of the horses, and the elephants pressed upon the Roman line, that it began to waver. The giving way of the attached to the Roman chariots formed the signal foruniversal flight, which, however, did not involve the sacrifice of many lives, as the adjoining camp received the fugitives. The Roman account of the battle alone mentions the circum stance, that during the principal engagement an Arpanian corps detached from the Roman main force had attacked and set on fire the weakly-guarded Epirot camp ; but, even if this were correct, the Romans are not at all justified in their assertion that the battle remained undecided. Both accounts, on the contrary, agree in stating that the Roman army retreated across the river, and that Pyrrhus remained in possession of the field of battle. The number of the fallen was, according to the Greek account, 6000 on the side of the Romans, 3505 on that of the Greeks. 1 Amongst
1 These numbers appear credible. The Roman account assigns, probably in dead and wounded, 15,000 to each side ; a later one even specifies 5000 as dead on the Roman, and 20,000 on the Greek side. These accounts may be mentioned here for the purpose of exhibiting, in one of the few instances where it is possible to check the statement, the untrustworthiness —almost without exception —of the reports of numbers.
impression
guard
CHAP, vil AND ROME ay
the wounded was the king himself, whos e arm had been
pierced with a javelin, while he was fighting, as was his wont, in the thickest of the fray. Pyrrhus had achieved a victory, but his were unfruitful laurels ; the victory was creditable to the king as a general and as a soldier, but it did not promote his political designs. What Pyrrhus needed was a brilliant success which should break up the Roman army and give an opportunity and impulse to the wavering allies to change sides ; but the Roman army and the Roman confederacy still remained unbroken, and the Greek army, which was nothing without its leader, was fettered for a considerable time in consequence of his wound. He was obliged to renounce the campaign and to go into winter quarters ; which the king took up in Tarentum, the Romans on this occasion in Apulia. It was becoming daily more evident that in a military point of view the resources of the king were inferior to those of the Romans, just as,
the loose and refractory coalition could not stand a comparison with the firmly -established Roman
The sudden and vehement style of the Greek warfare and the genius of the general might perhaps achieve another such victory as those of Heraclea and Ausculum, but every new victory was wearing out his resources for further enterprise, and it was clear that the Romans already felt them selves the stronger, and awaited with a courageous patience final victory. Such a war as this was not the delicate game of art that was practised and understood by the Greek princes. All strategical combinations were shattered against the full and mighty energy of the national levy. Pyrrhus felt how matters stood : weary of his victories and despising his allies, he only persevered because military honour required him not to leave Italy till he should have secured his clients from barbarian assault With his impatient temperament
which are swelled by the unscrupulous invention of the annalists with avalanche-like rapidity.
politically,
symmachy.
289.
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK II
it might be presumed that he would embrace the first pretext to get rid of the burdensome duty ; and an oppor tunity of withdrawing from Italy was soon presented to him by the affairs of Sicily.
After the death of Agathocles (465) the Greeks of Sicily
Relations were without any leading power. While in the several of Sicily,
Syracuse, and Carthage.
Hellenic cities incapable demagogues and incapable tyrants were replacing each other, the Carthaginians, the old rulers of the western point, were extending their dominion un molested. After Agrigentum had surrendered to them, they believed that the time had come for taking final steps towards the end which they had kept in view for centuries, and for reducing the whole island under their authority; they set themselves to attack Syracuse. That city, which formerly by its armies and fleets had disputed the possession of the island with Carthage, had through internal dissension and the weakness of its government fallen so low that it was obliged to seek for safety in the protection of its walls and in foreign aid ; and none could afford that aid but king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus was the husband of Agathocles's daughter, and his son Alexander, then sixteen years of age, was Agathocles's grandson. Both were in every respect natural heirs of the ambitious schemes of the ruler of Syracuse ;
and if her freedom was at an end, Syracuse might find com pensation in becoming the capital of a Hellenic empire of the West. So the Syracusans, like the Tarentines, and under similar conditions, voluntarily offered their sovereignty to king Pyrrhus (about 475) ; and by a singular conjuncture of affairs everything seemed to concur towards the success of the magnificent plans of the Epirot king, based as they primarily were on the possession of Taren tum and Syracuse.
The immediate effect, indeed, of this union of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks under one control was a closer concert also on the part of their antagonists. Carthage and Rome now converted their old commercial treaties into an offensive
Pyrrhus invited to Syracuse.
279.
League between Rome and Carthage.
chap, vil AND ROME 39
and defensive league against Pyrrhus (475), the tenor of tit. which was that, if Pyrrhus invaded Roman or Carthaginian territory, the party which was not attacked should furnish
that which was assailed with a contingent on its own terri
tory and should itself defray the expense of the auxiliary troops ; that in such an event Carthage should be bound to furnish transports and to assist the Romans also with a war fleet, but the crews of that fleet should not be obliged to fight for the Romans by land ; that lastly, both states should pledge themselves not to conclude a separate peace with Pyrrhus. The object of the Romans in entering into the treaty was to render possible an attack on Tarentum and to cut off Pyrrhus from his own country, neither of which ends could be attained without the co-operation of the Punic fleet; the object of the Carthaginians was to detain the king in Italy, so that they might be able without molestation to carry into effect their designs on Syracuse. 1 It was accordingly the interest of both powers in the first instance to secure the sea between Italy and Sicily. A powerful Carthaginian fleet of 120 sail under the admiral Mago proceeded from Ostia, whither Mago seems to have gone to conclude the treaty, to the Sicilian straits. The Mamertines, who anticipated righteous punishment for their outrage upon the Greek population of Messana in the event of Pyrrhus becoming ruler of Sicily and Italy, attached themselves closely to the Romans and Carthaginians, and secured for them the Sicilian side of the straits. The allies would willingly have brought Rhegium also on the opposite coast under their power ; but Rome could not possibly
1 The later Romans, and the modems following them, give a version of the league, as if the Romans had designedly avoided accepting the Cartha ginian help in Italy. This would have been irrational, and the facts pro nounce against it. The circumstance that Mago did not land at Ostia is to be explained not by any such foresight, but simply by the fact that tattain was not at all threatened by Pyrrhus and so did not need Cartha ginian aid ; and the Carthaginians certainly fought for Rome in front of
30
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
pardon the Campanian garrison, and an attempt of the combined Romans and Carthaginians to gain the city by force of arms miscarried. The Carthaginian fleet sailed thence for Syracuse and blockaded the city by sea, while at the same time a strong Phoenician army began the siege by
278. land (476). It was high time that Pyrrhus should appear Third year at Syracuse : but, in fact, matters in Italy were by no means
o t e war.
m gucn a con(iition that he and his troops could be dis- 278. pensed with there. The two consuls of 476, Gaius Fabri-
cius Luscinus, and Quintus Aemilius Papus, both experi enced generals, had begun the new campaign with vigour, and although the Romans had hitherto sustained nothing but defeat in this war, it was not they but the victors that were weary of it and longed for peace. Pyrrhus made another attempt to obtain accommodation on tolerable terms. The consul Fabricius had handed over to the king a wretch, who had proposed to poison him on condition of being well paid for Not onlv did the king in token of gratitude release all his Roms*. prisoners without ransom, but he felt himself so moved the generosity of his brave opponents that he offered, way of personal recompense,
singularly fair and favourable peace. Cineas appears to have gone once more to Rome, and Carthage seems to have been seriously apprehensive that Rome might come to terms. But the senate remained firm, and repeated its former answer. Unless the king was willing to allow Syracuse to fall into the hands of the Carthaginians and to have his grand scheme thereby disconcerted, no other course remained than to abandon his Italian allies and to confine himself for the time being to the occupation of the most important seaports, particularly Tarentum and Locri. In vain the Lucanians and Samnites conjured him not to desert them in vain the Tarentines summoned him either to comply with his duty as their general or to give them back their city. The king met their complaints and reproaches with
;
a
by
by
it.
chap, vii AND ROME
31
the consolatory assurance that better times were coming, or with abrupt dismissal. Milo remained behind in Tarentum ; Alexander, the king's son, in Locri ; and Pyrrhus, with his main force, embarked in the spring of 476 at Tarentum for Syracuse.
Embarka-
"°1tJ%! S' for Sicily.
By the departure of Pyrrhus the hands of the Romans The war in
Italy fla8s,
were set free in Italy ; none ventured to oppose them in
the open field, and their antagonists everywhere confined themselves to their fastnesses or their forests. The struggle
however was not terminated so rapidly as might have been
expected ; partly in consequence of its nature as a warfare
of mountain skirmishes and sieges, partly also, doubtless,
from the exhaustion of the Romans, whose fearful losses
are indicated by a decrease of 17,000 in the burgess-roll
from 473 to 479. In 476 the consul Gaius Fabricius 281. 875.
succeeded in inducing the considerable Tarentine settle
ment of Heraclea to enter into a separate peace, which was granted to it on the most favourable terms. In the campaign of 477 a desultory warfare was carried on in 277. Samnium, where an attack thoughtlessly made on some entrenched heights cost the Romans many lives, and thereafter in southern Italy, where the Lucanians and Bruttians were defeated. On the other hand Milo, issuing from Tarentum, anticipated the Romans in their attempt
to surprise Croton : whereupon the Epirot garrison made even a successful sortie against the besieging army. At length, however, the consul succeeded by a stratagem in inducing it to march forth, and in possessing himself of the undefended town (477). An incident of more moment 277. was the slaughter of the Epirot garrison by the Locrians,
who had formerly surrendered the Roman garrison to the king, and now atoned for one act of treachery by another. By that step the whole south coast came into the hands of the Romans, with the exception of Rhegium and Tarentum. These successes, however, advanced the main object but
Pyrrhus Siriiy.
little. Lower Italy itself had long been defenceless ; but Pyrrhus was not subdued so long as Tarentum remained in his hands and thus rendered it possible for him to renew the war at his pleasure, and the Romans could not think of undertaking the siege of that city. Even apart from the fact that in siege-warfare, which had been revolutionized by Philip of Macedonia and Demetrius Poliorcetes, the Romans were at a very decided disadvantage when matched against an experienced and resolute Greek commandant, a strong fleet was needed for such an enterprise, and, although the Carthaginian treaty promised to the Romans support by sea, the affairs of Carthage herself in Sicily were by no means in such a condition as to enable her to grant that support,
The landing of Pyrrhus on the island, which, in spite of the Carthaginian fleet, had taken place without interruption, had changed at once the aspect of matters there.
He had immediately relieved Syracuse, had in a short time united under his sway all the free Greek cities, and at the head of the Sicilian confederation had wrested from the Cartha
ginians nearly their whole possessions. It was with difficulty that the Carthaginians could, by the help of their fleet which at that time ruled the Mediterranean without a rival, maintain themselves in Lilybaeum; it was with difficulty, and amidst constant assaults, that the Mamertines held their ground in Messana. Under such circumstances,
3a
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
279. agreeably to the treaty of 475, it would have been the duty of Rome to lend her aid to the Carthaginians in Sicily, far rather than that of Carthage to help the Romans with her fleet to conquer Tarentum ; but on the side of neither ally was there much inclination to secure or to extend the power of the other. Carthage had only offered help to the Romans when the real danger was past ; they in their turn had done nothing to prevent the departure of the king from Italy and the fall of the Carthaginian power in Sicily.
CHAP. Vil AND ROME
33
Indeed, in open violation of the treaties Carthage had even proposed to the king a separate peace, offering, in return
for the undisturbed possession of Lilybaeum, to give up all claim to her other Sicilian possessions and even to place at
the disposal of the king money and ships of war, of course with a view to his crossing to Italy and renewing the war against Rome. It was evident, however, that with the possession of Lilybaeum and the departure of the king the position of the Carthaginians in the island would be nearly
the same as it had been before the landing of Pyrrhus;
the Greek cities if left to themselves were powerless, and
the lost territory would be easily regained. So Pyrrhus rejected the doubly perfidious proposal, and proceeded to build for himself a war fleet. Mere ignorance and short sightedness in after times censured this step ; but it was really as necessary as it was, with the resources of the island, easy of accomplishment. Apart from the considera
tion that the master of Ambracia, Tarentum, and Syracuse could not dispense with a naval force, he needed a fleet to conquer Lilybaeum, to protect Tarentum, and to attack Carthage at home as Agathocles, Regulus, and Scipio did before or afterwards so successfully. Pyrrhus never was so near to the attainment of his aim as in the summer of 478, 276 when he saw Carthage humbled before him, commanded Sicily, and retained a firm footing in Italy by the possession
of Tarentum, and when the newly-created fleet, which was to connect, to secure, and to augment these successes, lay ready for sea in the harbour of Syracuse.
The real weakness of the position of Pyrrhus lay in his The faulty internal policy. He governed Sicily as he had seen J^aa. Ptolemy rule in Egypt : he showed no respect to the local =nent <*
constitutions ; he placed his confidants as magistrates over the cities whenever, and for as long as, he pleased; he made his courtiers judges instead of the native jurymen ; he pronounced arbitrary sentences of confiscation, banish-
^^ m
vou II
35
Departure of Pyrrhus
merit, or death, even against those who had been most active in promoting his coming thither ; he placed garrisons in the towns, and ruled over Sicily not as the leader of a national league, but as a king. In so doing he probably reckoned himself according to oriental-Hellenistic ideas a good and wise ruler, and perhaps he really was so ; but the Greeks bore this transplantation of the system of the Diadochi to Syracuse with all the impatience of a nation that in its long struggle for freedom had lost all habits of discipline; the Carthaginian yoke very soon appeared to the foolish people more tolerable than their new military government. The most important cities entered into communications with the Carthaginians, and even with the Mamertines ; a strong Carthaginian army ventured again to appear on the island; and everywhere supported by the Greeks, it made rapid progress. In the battle which Pyrrhus fought with it fortune was, as always, with the " Eagle " ; but the circumstances served to show what the state of feeling was in the island, and what might and must ensue, if the king should depart.
To this first and most essential error Pyrrhus added a second ; he proceeded with his fleet, not to Lilybaeum, but to Tarentum. It was evident, looking to the very ferment in the minds of the Sicilians, that he ought first of all to have dislodged the Carthaginians wholly from the island, and thereby to have cut off the discontented from their last support, before he turned his attention to Italy; in that quarter there was nothing to be lost, for Tarentum was safe enough for him, and the other allies were of little moment now that they had been abandoned. It is conceivable that his soldierly spirit impelled him to wipe off the stain of his
34
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book it
278. not very honourable departure in the year 476 by a brilliant return, and that his heart bled when he heard the com plaints of the Lucanians and Samnites. But problems, such as Pyrrhus had proposed to himself, can only be
chat, vii AND ROME
35
solved by men of iron nature, who are able to control their feelings of compassion and even their sense of honour ; and Pyrrhus was not one of these.
The fatal embarkation took place towards the end of Fall of the
On the voyage the new Syracusan fleet had to ^Bxiam sustain a sharp engagement with that of Carthage, in which
it lost a considerable number of vessels. The departure of
the king and the accounts of this first misfortune sufficed
for the fall of the Sicilian kingdom. On the arrival of the
news all the cities refused to the absent king money and
troops ; and the brilliant state collapsed even more rapidly
than it had arisen, partly because the king had himself undermined in the hearts of his subjects the loyalty and affection on which every commonwealth
because the people lacked the devotedness to renounce freedom for perhaps but a short term in order to save their
Thus the enterprise of Pyrrhus was wrecked, Recom- and the plan of his life was ruined irretrievably ; he was ! 5^J. cemen, thenceforth an adventurer, who felt that he had been great Italian war. and was so no longer, and who now waged war no longer
as a means to an end, but in order to drown thought
amidst the reckless excitement of the game and to find, if
possible, in the tumult of battle a soldier's death. Arrived
on the Italian coast, the king began by an attempt to get possession of Rhegium ; but the Campanians repulsed the
attack with the aid of the Mamertines, and in the heat of
the conflict before the town the king himself was wounded
in the act of striking down an officer of the enemy. On
the other hand he surprised Locri, whose inhabitants
suffered severely for their slaughter of the Epirot garrison,
and he plundered the rich treasury of the temple of Persephone there, to replenish his empty exchequer. Thus
he arrived at Tarentum, it is said with 20,000 infantry and
3000 cavalry. But these were no longer the experienced
veterans of former days, and the Italians no longer hailed
478.
nationality.
depends, partly
Battle near tumeV[276
them as deliverers; the confidence and hope with which they had received the king five years before were gone ; the allies were destitute of money and of men.
The king took the field in the spring of 479 with the v'ew o^ aiding the hard-pressed Samnites, in whose territory the Romans had passed the previous winter; and he forced the consul Manius Curius to give battle near Beneventum on the campus Arusinus, before he could form
a junction with his colleague advancing from Lucania. But the division of the army, which was intended to take the Romans in flank, lost its way during its night march in the woods, and failed to appear at the decisive moment ; and after a hot conflict the elephants again decided the battle, but decided it this time in favour of the Romans, for, thrown into confusion by the archers who were stationed to protect the camp, they attacked their own people. The victors occupied the camp ; there fell into their hands
1300 prisoners and four elephants—the first that were seen in Rome—besides an immense spoil, from the proceeds of which the aqueduct, which conveyed the water of the Anio from Tibur to Rome, was subsequently built Without troops to keep the field and without money, Pyrrhus applied to his allies who had contributed to his equipment for Italy, the kings of Macedonia and Asia ; but even in his native land he was no longer feared, and his request was refused. Despairing of success against Rome and exasper
Pyrrhus
Italy
ated by these refusals, Pyrrhus left a garrison in Tarentum, 275. and went home himself in the same year (479) to Greece, where some prospect of gain might open up to the desperate player sooner than amidst the steady and measured course of Italian affairs. In fact, he not only rapidly recovered the portion of his kingdom that had been taken away, but
once more grasped, and not without success, at the Mace donian throne. But his last plans also were thwarted by the calm and cautious policy of Antigonus Gonatas, and
36
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
chap, vn AND ROME
37
still more by his own vehemence and inability to tame his Death of proud spirit ; he still gained battles, but he no longer ^rr "*. gained any lasting success, and met his death in a miserable
street combat in Peloponnesian Argos (482). 272.
In Italy the war came to an end with the battle of Last Beneventum ; the last convulsive struggles of the national i^i^y* party died slowly away. So long indeed as the warrior
prince, whose mighty arm had ventured to seize the reins
of destiny in Italy, was still among the living, he held, even
when absent, the stronghold of Tarentum against Rome. Although after the departure of the king the peace party recovered ascendency in the city, Milo, who commanded
there on behalf of Pyrrhus, rejected their suggestions and
allowed the citizens favourable to Rome, who had erected
a separate fort for themselves in the territory of Tarentum,
to conclude peace with Rome as they pleased, without on
that account opening his gates. But when after the death
of Pyrrhus a Carthaginian fleet entered the harbour, and
Milo saw that the citizens were on the point of delivering
up the city to the Carthaginians, he preferred to hand over
the citadel to the Roman consul Lucius Papirius (482), 271 and by that means to secure a free departure for himself
and his troops. For the Romans this was an immense
piece of good fortune. After the experiences of Philip
before Perinthus and Byzantium, of Demetrius before
Rhodes, and of Pyrrhus before Lilybaeum, it may be doubted whether the strategy of that period was at all able to compel the surrender of a town well fortified, well defended, and freely accessible by sea ; and how different a turn matters might have taken, had Tarentum become to the Phoenicians in Italy what Lilybaeum was to them in Sicily 1 What was done, however, could not be undone. The Carthaginian admiral, when he saw the citadel in the hands of the Romans, declared that he had only appeared before Tarentum conformably to the treaty to lend
Capture of arentum-
Submission Iuj WCT
assistance to his allies in the siege of the town, and set sail for Africa ; and the Roman embassy, which was sent to Carthage to demand explanations and make complaints re garding the attempted occupation of Tarentum, brought back nothing but a solemn confirmation on oath of that allega tion as to its ally's friendly design, with which accordingly the Romans had for the time to rest content The Taren- tines obtained from Rome, presumably on the intercession of their emigrants, the restoration of autonomy ; but their arms and ships had to be given up and their walls had to be pulled down.
In the same year, in which Tarentum became Roman, ^e Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians finally submitted. The latter were obliged to cede the half of the lucrative, and for ship-building important, forest of Sila.
At length also the band that for ten years had sheltered themselves in Rhegium were duly chastised for the breach of their military oath, as well as for the murder of the citizens of Rhegium and of the garrison of Croton. In this instance Rome, while vindicating her own rights vin dicated the general cause of the Hellenes against the bar barians. Hiero, the new ruler of Syracuse, accordingly supported the Romans before Rhegium by sending sup plies and a contingent, and in combination with the Roman expedition against the garrison of Rhegium he made an attack upon their fellow-countrymen and fellow-criminals, the Mamertines of Messana. The siege of the latter town was long protracted. On the other hand Rhegium, although the mutineers resisted long and obstinately, was
38
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
270. stormed by the Romans in 484 ; the survivors of the garrison were scourged and beheaded in the public market at Rome, while the old inhabitants were recalled and, as far as possible, reinstated in their possessions. Thus all
270. Italy was, in 484, reduced to subjection. The Samnites alone, the most obstinate antagonists of Rome, still in
chap. Vil AND ROME
39
spite of the official conclusion of peace continued the struggle as "robbers," so that in 485 both consuls had to be once more despatched against them. But even the most high-spirited national courage—the bravery of despair —comes to an end; the sword and the gibbet at length carried quiet even into the mountains of Samnium.
269.
For the securing of these immense acquisitions a new
series of colonies was instituted: Paestum and Cosa in
I. ucania (481): Beneventum (486), and Aesernia (about
491) to hold Samnium in check ; and, as outposts against
the Gauls, Ariminum (486), Firmum in Picenum (about 268.
490), and the burgess colony of Castrum Novum. Prepara- 264.
tions were made for the continuation of the great southern highway—which acquired in the fortress of Beneventum a
new station intermediate between Capua and Venusia —as
far as the seaports of Tarentum and Brundisium, and for
the colonization of the latter seaport, which Roman policy
had selected as the rival and successor of the Tarentine emporium. The construction of the new fortresses and
roads gave rise to some further wars with the small tribes,
whose territory was thereby curtailed : with the Picentes
(485, 486), a number of whom were transplanted to the 269. 268.
district of Salernum ; with the Sallentines about Brundisium
(487, 488); and with the Umbrian Sassinates (487, 488), 267. 266. who seem to have occupied the territory of Ariminum after
the expulsion of the Senones. By these establishments the
dominion of Rome was extended over the interior of
Lower Italy, and over the whole Italian east coast from
the Ionian sea to the Celtic frontier.
Before we describe the political organization under which Maritime the Italy which was thus united was governed on the part rela001* of Rome, it remains that we should glance at the maritime
relations that subsisted in the fourth and fifth centuries. At
this period Syracuse and Carthage were the main competi tors for the dominion of the western waters. On the whole,
Constroc-
^^f* and roads.
2g«'
4o
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
notwithstanding the great temporary successes which 406-865. Dionysius (348-389), Agathocles (437-465), and Pyrrhus
(476-47 8) obtained at sea, Carthage had the preponderance, and Syracuse sank more and more into a naval power of the second rank. The maritime importance of Etruria was wholly gone 415); the hitherto Etruscan island of Corsica, did not quite pass into the possession, fell under the maritime supremacy, of the Carthaginians. Tarentum, which for time had played considerable part, had its power broken the Roman occupation. The brave Massiliots maintained their ground in their own waters; but they exercised no material influence over the course of events in those of Italy. The other maritime cities hardly came as yet into serious account-
Rome itself was not exempt from similar fate; its the Roman own waters were likewise commanded by foreign fleets. power. was indeed from the first maritime city, and in the
of its vigour never was so untrue to its ancient traditions as wholly to neglect its war marine or so foolish as to desire to be a mere continental power. Latium furnished the finest timber for ship-building, far surpassing the famed growths of Lower Italy; and the very docks constantly maintained in Rome are enough to show that the Romans never abandoned the idea of possessing fleet of their own. During the perilous crises, however, which the expulsion of the kings, the internal disturbances in the Romano-Latin confederacy, and the unhappy wars with the Etruscans and Celts brought upon Rome, the Roman? could take but little interest in the state of matters in the Mediterranean; and, in consequence of the policy of Rome directing itself more and more decidedly to the subjugation of the Italian continent, the growth of its naval power was arrested. There hardly any mention of Latin vessels of war up to the end of the fourth century,
e. 850. except that the votive offering from the Veientine spoil was
278 27e!
Decline of
period
is
a
a
It
a
a
by
(i. a
if it
chap, Til AND ROME
41
sent to Delphi in a Roman vessel (360). The Antiates 891. indeed continued to prosecute their commerce with armed vessels and thus, as occasion offered, to practise the trade
of piracy also, and the "Tyrrhene corsair" Postumius, whom Timoleon captured about 415, may certainly have 889. been an Antiate; but the Antiates were scarcely to be reckoned among the naval powers of that period, and, had they been so, the fact must from the attitude of Antium towards Rome have been anything but an advantage to the latter. The extent to which the Roman naval power had declined about the year 400 is shown by the plundering of 850. the Latin coasts by a Greek, presumably a Sicilian, war fleet in 405, while at the same time Celtic hordes were 819. traversing and devastating the Latin land 43 In the following year (406), and beyond doubt under the 818. immediate impression produced these serious events,
the Roman community and the Phoenicians of Carthage, acting respectively for themselves and for their dependent allies, concluded treaty of commerce and navigation — the oldest Roman document of which the text has reached us, although only in Greek translation. 1 In that treaty the Romans had to come under obligation not to navigate the Libyan coast to the west of the Fair Promontory (Cape Bon) excepting cases of necessity. On the other hand they obtained the privilege of freely trading, like the natives, in Sicily, so far as was Carthaginian and in Africa and Sardinia they obtained at least the right to dispose of their merchandise at price fixed with the concurrence of the Carthaginian officials and guaranteed by the Carthaginian community. The privilege of free trading seems to have been granted to the Carthaginians at least in Rome, perhaps in all Latium only they bound them-
The grounds for assigning the document given in Polyblns (ill. a3)
not to 345, bat to 406, are set forth in my Rim. Chronologic, 320 609. US. [translated in the Appendix to this volume
p.
/.
1
1;
it a
;
(i. a).
in
a
a
by
283. 268.
and, on the coast of the Adriatic, Sena Gallica and Castrum Novum about 471 12), and Ariminum 486 39); to which falls to be added the occupation of Brundisium, which took place immediately after the close of the Pyrrhic
4S
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
selves neither to do violence to the subject Latin communi ties 452), nor, they should set foot as enemies on Latin soil, to take up their quarters for night on shore— in other words, not to extend their piratical inroads into the interior —nor to construct any fortresses in the Latin land.
We may probably assign to the same period the already mentioned 12) treaty between Rome and Tarentum, respecting the date of which we are only told that was
282. concluded considerable time before 472. By the Romans bound themselves — for what concessions on the part of Tarentum not stated—not to navigate the waters to the east of the Lacinian promontory stipulation which they were thus wholly excluded from the eastern basin of the Mediterranean.
These were disasters no less than the defeat on the Allia, and tjje Roman senate seems to have felt them as such and coast. to have made use of the favourable turn, which the Italian
Roman fortifica- uon of the
relations assumed soon after the conclusion of the humiliat ing treaties with Carthage and Tarentum, with all energy to improve its depressed maritime position. The most import ant of the coast towns were furnished with Roman colonies: Pyrgi the seaport of Caere, the colonization of which probably falls within this period along the west coast, Antium in 415 462), Tarracina in 425 462), the island
889. 829.
818. of Pontia in 441 476), so that, as Ardea and Circe had
previously received colonists, all the Latin seaports of con sequence in the territory of the Rutuli and Volsci had now become Latin or burgess colonies further, in the territory
295. of the Aurunci, Minturnae and Sinuessa in 459 492); 278. in that of the Lucanians, Paestum and Cosa in 481 (p. 39);
(p.
in (p.
(i.
;
;
(i. (i.
if
ii
it it
(i.
;a a
by
a is
(p.
(i.
crap, VII AND ROME
43
war. In the greater part of these places—the burgess or maritime colonies 1—the young men wer<? exempted from serving in the legions and destined solely for the watching of the coasts. The well-judged preference given at the same time to the Greeks of Lower Italy over their Sabellian neighbours, particularly to the considerable communities of Neapolis, Rhegium, Locri, Thurii, and Heraclea, and their similar exemption under the like conditions from furnishing contingents to the land army, completed the network drawn by Rome around the coasts of Italy.
But with a statesmanlike sagacity, from which the sue- The ceeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the leading ? £mav men of the Roman commonwealth perceived that all these
coast fortifications and coast garrisons could not but prove inadequate, unless the war marine of the state were again placed on a footing that should command respect. Some
sort of nucleus for this purpose was already furnished on
the subjugation of Antium (416) by the serviceable war- 388. galleys which were carried off to the Roman docks; but
the enactment at the same time, that the Antiates should abstain from all maritime traffic,' is a very clear and dis tinct indication how weak the Romans then felt themselves
at sea, and how completely their maritime policy was still summed up in the occupation of places on the coast.
1 These were Pyrgi, Ostia, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae, Sinuessa Sena Gallica, and Castrum Novum.
* This statement is quite as distinct (Liv. viii. 14 ; inttrdictum mari Antiati populo est) as it is intrinsically credible ; for Antium was inhabited
not merely by colonists, but also by its former citizens who had been nursed
in enmity to Rome 462). This view is, no doubt, inconsistent with the Greek accounts, which assert that Alexander the Great 431) and 823. Demetrius Poliorcetes 471) lodged complaints at Rome regarding 283. Antiate pirates. The former statement of the same stamp, and perhaps
from the same source, with that regarding the Roman embassy to Babylon (p. 1). It seems more likely that Demetrius Poliorcetes may have tried by edict to put down piracy in the Tyrrhene sea which he had never set eyes upon, and not at all inconceivable that the Antiates may have even as Roman citizens, in defiance of the prohibition, continued for time their old trade in an underhand fashion much dependence must not. how ever, be placed even on the second story.
S
:
is
a
it is
(i. (t
(t
44
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS book ii
Thereafter, when the Greek cities of southern Italy, Neapolis S26. leading the way in 428, were admitted to the clientship of
Rome, the war-vessels, which each of these cities bound itself to furnish as a war contribution under the alliance to the Romans, formed at least a renewed nucleus for a Roman
•11. fleet. In 443, moreover, two fleet-masters (duoviri navales) were nominated in consequence of a resolution of the
burgesses specially passed to that effect, and this Roman naval force co-operated in the Samnite war at the siege of Nuceria 480). Perhaps even the remarkable mission of Roman fleet of twenty-five sail to found " colony
Corsica, which Theophrastus mentions his History of 808. Plants" written about 446, belongs to this period. But
how little was immediately accomplished with all this pre
paration, shown the renewed treaty with Carthage in •M. 848. 448. While the stipulations of the treaty of 406 relating to Italy and Sicily 41) remained unchanged, the Romans
were now prohibited not only from the navigation of the eastern waters, but also from that of the Atlantic Ocean which was previously permitted, as well as debarred from holding commercial intercourse with the subjects of Carthage in Sardinia and Africa, and also, all probability, from effecting settlement in Corsica so that only Carthaginian Sicily and Carthage itself remained open to their traffic. We recognize here the jealousy of the dominant maritime power, gradually increasing with the extension of the Roman dominion along the coasts. Carthage compelled the
Romans to acquiesce in her prohibitive system, to submit to be excluded from the seats of production in the west and
According to Servius (in Aen. iv. 628) was stipulated in the Romano-Carthaginian treaties, that no Roman should set foot on (or rather occupy) Carthaginian, and no Carthaginian on Roman, soil, but Corsica was to remain in a neutral position between them (ut tuque Romani ad Mora Carthaginicnsium accederent tuque Carthaginienses ad litora Roma- norum Cr-sica esset media inter Romano! et Curlhaginienses). This appears to refer to our present period, and the colonization of Corsica seems to have been prevented by this very treaty.
1
a
it
in
a
a
is
(i.
;i
in
(p.
by
in
hap, vii AND ROME
45
east (connected with which exclusion is the story of a public reward bestowed on the Phoenician mariner who at the sacrifice of his own ship decoyed a Roman vessel, steering after him into the Atlantic Ocean, to perish on a sand-bank), and to restrict their navigation under the treaty to the narrow space of the western Mediterranean —and all this for the mere purpose of averting pillage from their coasts and of securing their ancient and important trading connec tion with Sicily. The Romans were obliged to yield to these terms ; but they did not desist from their efforts to rescue their marine from its condition of impotence.
A comprehensive measure with that view was the Quaestors institution of four quaestors of the fleet (guaestorcs dassici) ° *** in 487 : of whom the first was stationed at Ostia the port 267.
of Rome ; the second, stationed at Cales then the capital
of Roman Campania, had to superintend the ports of Campania and Magna Graecia; the third, stationed at Ariminum, superintended the ports on the other side of
the Apennines ; the district assigned to the fourth is not
known. These new standing officials were intended to
exercise not the sole, but a conjoint, guardianship of the
coasts, and to form a war marine for their protection. The Variance
objects of the Roman senate —to recover their independence
by sea, to cut off the maritime communications of Tarentum, Carthage. to close the Adriatic against fleets coming from Epirus, and
to emancipate themselves from Carthaginian supremacy —
were very obvious. Their already explained relations
with Carthage during the last Italian war discover traces
of such views. King Pyrrhus indeed compelled the two
cities once more — it was for the last time — to conclude an offensive alliance ; but the lukewarmness and faithlessness of that alliance, the attempts of the Carthaginians to establish themselves in Rhegium and Tarentum, and the immediate occupation of Brundisium by the Romans after the termination of the war, show
great
Ro^^
Rome and
n^aj powen.
46
UNION OF ITALY book h
clearly how much their respective interests already came into collision.
Rome very naturally sought to find support against Carthage from the Hellenic maritime states. Her old and close relations of amity with Massilia continued uninter rupted. The votive offering sent by Rome to Delphi, after the conquest of Veii, was preserved there in the treasury
of the Massiliots. After the capture of Rome by the Celts there was a collection in Massilia for the sufferers by the fire, in which the city chest took the lead ; in return the Roman senate granted commercial advantages to the Massiliot merchants, and, at the celebration of the games in the Forum assigned a position of honour (Graecostasis) to the Massiliots by the side of the platform for the senators. To the same category belong the treaties of commerce
806. and amity concluded by the Romans about 448 with Rhodes and not long after with Apollonia, a considerable mercantile town on the Epirot coast, and especially the closer relation, so fraught with danger for Carthage, which immediately after the end of the Pyrrhic war sprang up between Rome and Syracuse (p. 38).
United '•
850.
While the Roman power by sea was thus very far from keeping pace with the immense development of their power by land, and the war marine belonging to the Romans in particular was by no means such as from the geographical and commercial position of the city it ought to have been, yet it began gradually to emerge out of the complete nullity to which it had been reduced about the year 400 ; and, considering the great resources of Italy, the Phoenicians might well follow its efforts with anxious eyes.
The crisis in reference to the supremacy of the Italian waters was approaching ; by land the contest was decided. For the first time Italy was united into one state under the sovereignty of the Roman community. What political prerogatives the Roman community on this occasion with
chap. Vil UNION OF ITALY
47
drew from all the other Italian communities and took into its own sole keeping, or in other words, what conception in state-law is to be associated with this sovereignty of Rome, we are nowhere expressly informed, and—a signifi cant circumstance, indicating prudent calculation —there does not even exist any generally current expression for that conception. 1 The only privileges that demonstrably belonged to it were the rights of making war, of concluding treaties, and of coining money. No Italian community could declare war against any foreign state, or even negotiate with or coin money for circulation. On the other hand every declaration of war made by the Roman people and every state -treaty resolved upon by were binding in law on all the other Italian communities, and
the silver money of Rome was legally current throughout all Italy. It probable that the formulated prerogatives of the leading community extended no further. But to these there were necessarily attached rights of sovereignty that practically went far beyond them.
The relations, which the Italians sustained to the leading The full community, exhibited in detail great inequalities.