No More Learning

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Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the
consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue. "
And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three
speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which
all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore
man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
sciences.

Objection 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to
be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire
to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative
sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists
in the consideration of speculative sciences.

Objection 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now
everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality
to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration
of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration
of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): "Let not the wise man glory
in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences.
Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration
of these.

I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is
twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we
are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness;
and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but
partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect
prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while
imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed
of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of
prudence.

Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the
consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe
that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond
the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science
is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of
speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the
Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1),
and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the
entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than
knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is
his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For
a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the
lower partakes of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of
a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the
intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but
inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above
the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the
kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of
itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through
knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown
([1008]FP, Q[88], A[2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the
knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect.
Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible
forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the
consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of
true and perfect happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of
imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above
(A[2], ad 4).

Reply to Objection 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired,
but also any likeness or participation thereof.

Reply to Objection 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by
the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and
perfect act.
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Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely,
angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the
knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a
homily (xxvi in Evang. ): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts
of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels"; by which he
means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels
by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final happiness
consists in contemplating the angels.

Objection 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to
be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of
human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human
intellect consists in contemplating the angels.

Objection 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher
nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the
spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order,
are the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect
is to be united to the angels by contemplation.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:24): "Let him that glorieth,
glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me. " Therefore man's
final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.

I answer that, As stated above [1009](A[6]), man's perfect happiness
consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some
participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is
evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as
the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper
object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of
whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with
its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same
in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever are beings by
participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by
participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as shown
in the [1010]FP, Q[44], A[1]. It follows that contemplation of Him
makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should
not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the
angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative
science.

Reply to Objection 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels,
by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God
Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: According to those that hold human souls to be
created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness
should consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it
were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in
[1011]FP, Q[90], A[3]. Wherefore the final perfection of the human
intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the
creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel
enlightens as a minister, as stated in the [1012]FP, Q[111], A[2], ad
2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to
happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.

Reply to Objection 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two
ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus
man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation
such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the
power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in
which is found the fulness of its formal object.
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Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the
vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that
by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to
something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is
not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the
intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His
Essence.

Objection 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher
nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the
Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect
does not reach to this, but consists in something less.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear, we
shall be like to Him; and [Vulg. : 'because'] we shall see Him as He
is. "

I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else
than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as
something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the
perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now
the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i. e. the essence of a
thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains
perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore
an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not
possible to know the essence of the cause, i. e. to know of the cause
"what it is"; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply,
although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that
the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it
has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know
about the cause, "what it is. " And this desire is one of wonder, and
causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i,
2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider
that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he
wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this
inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the
cause.

If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created
effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that
intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains
in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet
perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect
needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will
have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in
which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above ([1013]AA[1],7;
Q[2], A[8]).

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers
journeying towards happiness.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1014]Q[1], A[8]), the end has a
twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired:
and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the
lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ([1015]Q[1],
A[8]). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end
of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to
their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of
God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than
that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
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OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness:
and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?

(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?

(3) Whether comprehension is required?

(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?

(5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?

(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?

(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?

(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?
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Whether delight is required for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness.
For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of
faith. " But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the
Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides
vision is required for happiness.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all
goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs
something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of
happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above ([1016]Q[3], A[8]);
it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.

Objection 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be
unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the
intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy
in truth. "

I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways.
First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is
necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is
necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from
without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as
something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for
fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is
caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore,
since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign
Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.

Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to
anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this
consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion
of reward.

Reply to Objection 2: The very sight of God causes delight.
Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.

Reply to Objection 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of
the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated
in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care
and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the
operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the
attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those
things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we
must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of
opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders
the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the
speculative intellect.
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Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?

Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before
vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But
perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks
before the operation of the intellect, i. e. vision.

Objection 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is
yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the
delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those
operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual
and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations.
Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the
intellect, which is vision.

Objection 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or
enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks
before vision.

On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is
the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.

I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4),
and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the
operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before
delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that
the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness
of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an
operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the
operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus
the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved
above ([1017]Q[1], A[1], ad 2;[1018] Q[3], A[4]): but it seeks to be at
rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently
it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before
the resting of the will therein.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight
perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of
youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but
not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.

Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to
the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful.
And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in
animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the
intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which
results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather
than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the
operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply
according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according
to the order of the intellectual appetite.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for the
sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in
the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity
as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to
charity.
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Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for
happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm.
xxxciii De Verb. Dom. ]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to
comprehend Him is impossible. " Therefore happiness is without
comprehension.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his
intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect
is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him.
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.

Objection 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But
operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal
objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to
vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for
comprehension as a third.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you may
comprehend [Douay: 'obtain'].
" But happiness is the goal of the
spiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good
fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest
there is laid up for me a crown of justice. " Therefore comprehension is
necessary for Happiness.

I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those
things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in
which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible
end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through
his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end
pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is
the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real
relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be
threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and
then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is
impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But
sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the
capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and
this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and
this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there
are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of
the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end
corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present
results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these
three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect
knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies
presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of
the lover in the object beloved.

Reply to Objection 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the
comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended
by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the
holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs
after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say
'catch. '] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension
is necessary for Happiness.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will,
because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards
it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to
the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes
therein.

Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from
vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore
even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is
the object of comprehension.
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Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary
for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of
the intellect, as stated above ([1019]Q[3], A[4]). But rectitude of the
will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not
necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine
says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O
God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For
it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many
truths. " Therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for
Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows.
But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will.
Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect,
does not depend on rectitude of the will.

Objection 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is
not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance,
after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of
virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness
once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of
heart; for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with
all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God. "

I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both
antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in
comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to
matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be
duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly
ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without
rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above
([1020]Q[3], A[8]), final Happiness consists in the vision of the
Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will
of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he
loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not
God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common
notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the
will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a
right will.

Reply to Objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of
the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of
the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect
which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is
required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a
right course in order to strike the target.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end,
ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves
imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are
no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to
the end is necessary.
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Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness.
For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of
nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the
soul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is
naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while
separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without
the body.

Objection 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above
([1021]Q[3], AA[2],5). But perfect operation follows perfect being:
since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being.
Since, therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated
from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate from its
whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.

Objection 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul,
without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul
separated from the body.

Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13)
"the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is
"not hindered. " But the operation of the separate soul is hindered;
because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul "has a
natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held
back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward
journey," i. e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul
cannot be happy without the body.

Objection 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls
desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet
desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body.

Objection 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the
soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed']
are the dead who die in the Lord. "

I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in
this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now
it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this
life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the
intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the
intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a
bodily organ, as was shown in the [1022]FP, Q[84], AA[6],7.
Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in
a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the
vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul
separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when
separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the
Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And
this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By
authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): "While we are in the
body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of
this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and not by sight. " Now from
this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight,
bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the
Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in
God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are confident and
have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present
with the Lord. " Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints,
separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of
God, wherein is true Happiness.

Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the
body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it
looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the [1023]FP, Q[84],
A[7]. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means
of phantasms, as stated in the [1024]FP, Q[12], A[3]. Wherefore, since
man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence,
it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul
can be happy.

We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's
perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof;
thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary
for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection
belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong
in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in
the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the
more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its
proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine,
after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness
can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies,"
answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the
blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or
because they have a natural desire to rule the body. "

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the
part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the
organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form
of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in
respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that
natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same
as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any
individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be,
when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the
animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual
being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the
whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite after
the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is
the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite.
Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the [1025]FP,
Q[75], A[2]. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the
body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect
operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his
intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have
Happiness. Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is
said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.

Reply to Objection 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways.
First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and
such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by
way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has
not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a
hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents
it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from
the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might
to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God
in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as
far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the
fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has,
in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its
share.

Reply to Objection 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at
rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which
suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the
desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would
wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed,
Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.

Reply to Objection 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the
effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do,"
is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because
even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of
the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it
refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the
lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have,
whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.
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Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary
for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily
good. But it has been shown above ([1026]Q[2]) that Happiness does not
consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body
is necessary for man's Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the
Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not part
in this operation, as shown above [1027](A[5]). Therefore no
disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.

Objection 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the
body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the
most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be
abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a
disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.

On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is
written (Jn. 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them. " But the
reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is
written (Is. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and
your bones shall flourish like a herb. " Therefore good disposition of
the body is necessary for Happiness.

I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in
this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect
virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of
the body, from every operation of virtue.

But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no
disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is
necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said
that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything
corporeal. " But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the
soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of
the soul to exclude its natural perfection.

Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is
necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which
is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, that the governance thereof is
difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and
weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the
highest heaven. " Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no
longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the
angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden. "
Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an
overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection.
Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. ) that "God gave the soul such a
powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor
of incorruption overflows into the lower nature. "

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its
object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to
Happiness.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the body has not part in that operation
of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove
a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary,
lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.

Reply to Objection 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires
indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body
which weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will
be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the
Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq. ).
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Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for
Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to
Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance,
food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Lk. 22:30): "That
you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (Mat. 6:20): "Lay
up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (Mat. 25:34): "Come, ye
blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom. " Therefore external
goods are necessary for Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness
is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. " But some
of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary
for Happiness.

Objection 3: Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:12): "Your reward is very
great in heaven. " But to be in heaven implies being in a place.
Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in heaven?
and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth? " As though to say: "I
desire nothing but this,"---"It is good for me to adhere to my God. "
Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.

I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this
life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists
in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in
this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of
contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which
latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its
operations.

On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect
Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all
suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the
animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life,
which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect
Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul
separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no
longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are
nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the
animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as
being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the
likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of
these goods of the body as stated in Ethic.