No More Learning

The Peshwa at once objected to the asylum thus
given to the ex-Peshwa.
Colonel Upton was recalled to Bengal (1777) and Mostyn was
then sent to Poona to superintend the carrying out of the treaty. But
nothing resulted, as he was suspected by the ministers, who believed
that he was the person responsib! for the capture of Salsette, while
dissensions between the aged Sakharam Bapu and Nana Phadnavis
tended to complicate matters still more.
These negotiations were dragging on when an entirely fresh turn
was given to events by the unexpected appearance of a French
adventurer, called St Lubin. He landed at Chaul from a French ship
and stated that he was an accredited ambassador from the French
king Louis. He was in fact, as Mr. Farmer reported, "a most per-
fect adventurer" who had previously lived at Pondichery and had
some connection with the Madras authorities. He had contrived to
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 296.


## p. 262 (#290) ############################################

262
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
a
-
ingratiate himself with Sartine, the French minister of marine, alleg-
ing that he was an intimate friend of the raja at Satara, whose
children he had taught to ride. He soon disgusted his colleagues by
his arrogance, and the mission came to nothing. Nana affected, at any
rate, to credit his story, as he was not prepared to lose such an oppor-
tunity of opposing the English, and St Lubin was received with a
respect and ceremony never shown to the British resident, being met
personally, as he alighted from his elephant, by Sakharam Bapu and
Nana. The idea of a French intrigue in India was sufficient to stir up
the resentment of every Englishman in the country. At the same time
a dispatch dated 7 April was received from the directors regretting
the sacrifices made by the Treaty of Purandhar, but stating that it
must be adhered to unless any attempts were made by the ministers
to evade its conditions, in which case the Bombay Government would
be at liberty to form a fresh alliance with Raghunath Rao on the
basis of the Treaty of Surat. As the ministers had never carried out
the stipulations of the Treaty of Purandhar the Bombay Government
at once formed a fresh alliance with Raghunath Rao.
In 1778 Sakharam Bapu, whose quarrel with Nana had reached
an acute stage, with Holkar's assistance commenced intriguing to
support Raghunath Rao, and enlisted Moroba Phadnavis, a cousin
of Nana, on his side. Moroba appealed to the Bombay Council who
agreed to assist him, informing Hastings of their action, which met
with his approval and that of Mr Barwell, though strongly opposed
by the rest of the council, and he agreed to send a force to aid them.
The force assembled at Kalpi, Colonel Leslie being put in command
with orders to march across India to Bombay. 1 This feat had never
before been attempted and was stigmatised by Dundas as one of
Hastings' "frantic military exploits", exploits, nevertheless, which
fully justified their inception and proved the governor-general's
courage and understanding of Indian psychology. Events were
becoming insistent, and fully established the truth of Hornby's
opinion, expressed in a minute written at the time, that we were fast
verging on a period which must compel the English nation either to
take some active and decisive part in events or relinquish for ever all
hopes of bettering their situation on the west of India.
Moroba Phadnavis soon proved to be a broken reed, while Sakha-
ram Bapu, always a trimmer, declined specifically to announce his
support of Raghunath Rao. The Bombay Council were deliberating
how to effect a change in the control at Poona when Nana, who had
been driven temporarily to take refuge in Purandhar Fort, managed to
cajole Moroba into deserting Raghunath Rao, and soon after, with
the connivance of Sindhia, seized his cousin and imprisoned him at
Ahmadnagar, Holkar, who had been supporting him, being easily
bribed, with nine lakhs, to stand aside. Nana was now again in
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 327.


## p. 263 (#291) ############################################

RENEWAL OF WAR
263
power, but he had miscalculated the effect of the change at Poona on
the English, who at once called upon him to state whether he was
prepared to carry out the Treaty of Purandhar, and dismiss St Lubin,
with whom he was still coquetting, and to whom it appears he had
made certain promises, though probably with no intention of ful-
filling them. Nana was in a dilemma. It was impossible for him to
conciliate the ex-Peshwa, towards whoin his enmity was too well
known, while on the other hand he had no desire to fulfil the con-
ditions of the Treaty of Purandhar and so come to terms with the
English.
This evasion was enough for the Bombay authorities and they felt
that they might now act under the instructions conveyed to them by
the dispatch of 23 March, 1778, from the Supreme Government, which
empowered them to take any step necessary to subvert a hostile
party in the Maratha state. The Bombay Council thereupon de-
cided that Raghunath Rao should be installed at Poona as regent for
the young Peshwa, Madhu Rao Narayan, since he could no longer
claim the Peshwaship. ?
Nana, fully cognisant of their intentions, took immediate steps to
oppose them. He removed the aged Sakharam Bapu from all voice
in affairs and collected troops. Sindhia and Nana held complete
control, Holkar, whose leaning towards Raghunath Rao made him
suspect, being employed at a distance. Luckily the Bombay Govern-
ment had a most able agent, Lewis, at Poona who kept them fully
informed of Nana's activities.
The Bombay forces were weak, and Draper urged caution, but
was outvoted by the rest of the council, though Colonel Leslie's force,
on which they relied for support, was still far distant in Bundelkhand.
Hastings remarked, when criticising these proceedings, that the
passions of the Council were enlisted on Raghunath Rao's side
because in supporting him they were carrying out their own personal
wishes.
The council placed their forces under the command of Colonel
Egerton, an officer whose health was bad, and whose purely European
training and entire ignorance of Indian conditions wholly unfitted
him for the post. Thus, with a mere handful of troops under an ineffi-
cient commander, and most ill-considered preparations for hostilities,
the Bombay Council set out to defy the whole strength of the
Maratha Empire; that they in fact suffered comparatively lightly
was due to good fortune and not to any action of their own.
The campaign started in November, 1778, the force consisting of
3900 men, of whom 592 were Europeans. Owing to jealousies in the
Bombay Council a curious and fatal arrangement was adopted, by
which the control of the troops in the field was vested in a committee
of three, consisting of the commanding officer and two civilians. The
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 314.
2 Idem, p. 334.


## p. 264 (#292) ############################################

264
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
movements of the troops were in fact controlled by Colonel Carnac
acting as civil commissioner, in spite of Colonel Egerton's protests.
He was by profession a soldier, who had distinguished himself in
Bengal, but he failed lamentably on this occasion. Governor Hornby
afterwards admitted that the powers granted to the committee were
far too comprehensive and had escaped his notice when they were
issued. Raghunath Rao, in his usual vacillating way, now began to
raise various objections and insisted on being granted certain con-
cessions before he would move. The force, encumbered with an
enormous baggage-train of 19,000 bullocks, was scarcely able to march
two miles a day.
Raghunath Rao at length appreciated that he was being used as
a mere pawn in the game. In December, 1778, he sent an envoy to
Dom José da Camara, the captain-general at Goa, asking for assistance
in troops and munitions and offering in return to cede Bassein and
other forts as well as territory in the neighbourhood of Daman. The
envoy said that Raghunath Rao had become suspicious of British
intehsions in regard to his affairs and feared that their real object
was to place him in the same position of subjection as that in which
they had placed the nawab of Bengal; hence he was most anxious to
become an ally of the king of Portugal. The captain-general com-
mended the proposal to his superiors, but nothing came of it. "
In January, 1779, Colonel Egerton had to resign the command
through ill-health and Colonel Cockburn took over the force.
Raghunath Rao and his adopted son Amrit Rao now joined the army
which proceeded up the ghats. On 9 January the army reached the
village of Talegaon, twenty miles north-west of Poona, to find it
destroyed and themselves confronted by a large Maratha army.
Colonel Carnac was seized with panic and instead of boldly pushing
on to Poona, most fatally counselled retreat, his panic being aug-
mented by Raghunath Rao who assured him that until a substantial
victory was gained no influential Maratha would join his standard.
Colonel Cockburn considered he could reach Poona with the troops,
but that he could only do so by abandoning the enormous baggage-
train. Raghunath Rao begged them not to retire, but in vain, and
on 11 January all the heavy guns were thrown into a tank, the stores
were burnt, and the force started on its return journey, as it fondly
believed unbeknown to the enemy, some 50,000 strong.
On 12 January, 1779, the force encamped at Wadgaon, twenty-
three miles north-west of Poona. The retreat was at once known to
the enemy who attacked continuously. On the 13th further retreat
was held to be impossible, and Farmer, secretary to the committee,
was sent to negotiate terms. As a preliminary Nana demanded the
surrender of Raghunath Rao, and this would have been perforce
1 Letter from the captain-general to Martinho de Mello e Castro of 22
December, 1778 (unpublished).


## p. 265 (#293) ############################################

CONVENTION OF WADGAON
266
agreed to, but luckily the ex-Peshwa decided the matter for himself
by taking refuge with Sindhia. The action taken by Colonel Carnac
was inconsistent, for while Farmer was instructed to point out that
no treaty could be made without the sanction of the Supreme
Government, Holmes was at the same time deputed with full powers
to negotiate with Mahadaji Sindhia. Sindhia was delighted at this
mark of distinction as it assisted him to attain the position he had so
long coveted, that of acting as an independent arbiter between the
two Maratha parties.
Finally terms were settled : that all acquisitions of territory made
since 1773 should be restored; that the force advancing from Bengal
should be stopped; that Sindhia was to obtain the share of the Broach
revenues; and that a sum of 41,000 rupees and two hostages were to
be surrendered as security for performance. Such was the disgraceful
Convention of Wadgaon, fatal alike to the interests and good name
of the Company. The army retired but the order countermanding
the advance of the Bengal force was suspended.
This ill-starred venture of the Bombay army was at once repu-
diated by Hastings who felt the disgrace acutely, and wrote: "We
have already disavowed the Convention of Wargaum. Would to God
we could as easily efface the infamy which our national character has
sustained”. ? He considered, however, that the promise in the treaty
made to Sindhia should be carried out, in return for his support.
The directors, on receiving the report of the convention, ordered the
dismissal of Colonel Carnac, Colonel Egerton and Colonel Cockburn
from the Company's service. The scheme deserved, indeed, no better
fate in view of the impolitic lines on which it was conceived and the
lack of care devoted to its execution. It was in fact born of pique,
pique at the control exercised by the Supreme Government, and of
the insane desire to show what Bombay could do on their own initia-
tive, combined with a greater consideration for private interests than
for the general good of the Company, the limited views of the com-
mercial adventurer obscuring the wider outlook required by states-
manship.
Hornby, however, rose to the occasion. He also disavowed the
convention, which Carnac had, indeed, no power to make, and at
once took steps to recruit and improve his army. He believed, more-
over, that Sindhia, who was known to be inimical to the French,
would be open to an alliance, and he urged the payment to Mahadaji
of the sum of 41,000 rupees settled under the Convention of Wadgaon.
Colonel Leslie, who had been instructed to march with all speed
to Bombay, had wasted time embroiling himself with the chiefs in
Bundelkhand. When the detachment started, Nana had been asked
3
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 333-6; Aitchison, Treaties, vi, 39.
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, 1, 672.
3 Forrest, Maratha Series, I, 385.


## p. 266 (#294) ############################################

268
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
to grant passports for the march. He objected, on the ground that
as the force was sent to counteract French machinations, its advance
was now unnecessary, since St Lubin had gone. But Holkar and
Sindhia, who feared that their possessions in Malwa might suffer,
agreed to allow the detachment a passage. Nana ultimately also
granted permission, but secretly told his officers and the Bundelkhand
chiefs to oppose the advance. Hastings, in view of Leslie's incompet-
ence, had decided to replace him by his second-in-command, Colonel
Goddard, and letters had been issued to the Bundelkhand chiefs,
disavowing Colonel Leslie's acts. At this moment, however, news
arrived of Leslie's death on 3 October, 1778. Goddard was a man of
very different calibre. He used the utmost tact, and advanced with
great rapidity through Bhopal, where Nawab Hayat Muhammad
Khan assisted him to the utmost in spite of Maratha threats. On
2 December he reached the Narbada where, in accordance with
Hastings's instructions, he awaited a communication from Mudaji
Bhonsle, with whom Hastings hoped to form an alliance thus de-
taching him from the Peshwa's party. But Mudaji declined, and
informed Colonel Goddard that he could not negotiate.
The Bombay Council now sent urgent appeals to Colonel Goddard
to expedite his ma . . and although, by Hastings's express orders,
Goddard was independent of Bombay control, he considered it was
incumbent on him, in the interests of his country, to comply.
He reached Burhanpur on 30 January, 1779, and Surat on 26
February. Thus by his tact and skill did Goddard bring this "frantic
military exploit” of Hastings to a successful conclusion, and as
Hastings had foreseen, immensely increase the prestige of the British
arms throughout India. Writing to Laurence Sulivan 2 (1779) Hastings
says that the precipitate and miserable enterprise of the Bombay
Presidency had blasted his political plans, but that Goddard's march
had gained no trivial or speculative advantage as it had shown the
people of India the difference between the powers of the capital
government of the British nation and the feeble efforts of an inferior
presidency, and had done far more than military victories to confirm
our ascendancy. On reaching Bombay Goddard was given a seat on
the council and the position of commander-in-chief. 3
Mahadaji Sindhia had not as yet responded, as Hornby had hoped
he would, and hence nothing remained but to continue the war, a
somewhat alarming situation, in view of the fact that the Bombay
Council had no funds for the purpose. Hastings had instructed
Goddard, who remained directly under his orders, to endeavour to
make peace with the ministerial party at Poona on the lines of the
Purandhar Treaty, adding a clause specifically excluding the French
from acquiring any settlements in Maratha territory. He refused,
1
1 Bhopal State Gazetteer, p. 16.
3 Forrest, Home Series, I, 368.
2 Gleig, Warren Hastings, , 272.
Forrest, Maratha Series, I, 386.
4


## p. 267 (#295) ############################################

GODDARD'S CAMPAIGN
267
1
however, to agree to Hornby's proposal to intervene and settle the
quarrel between Govind Rao and Fateh Singh Gaekwad. As regarded
Sindhia, Goddard was to wait until he showed a desire to form an
alliance before approaching him. At this time, however, Sindhia was
secretly instigating hostilities against the Company while simul-
taneously sending his agents to talk platitudes at Bombay.
Sindhia now saw that nothing was to be gained by supporting
Raghunath Rao, whereas his hold over Nana would be strengthened
if the ex-Peshwa returned to the English. He used his influence,
therefore, to get Nana to grant the ex-Peshwa a jagir in Bundelkhand,
and then connived at his escape from custody while proceeding there.
Raghunath Rao at once fled to the protection of Goddard, who made
him an allowance of 50,000 rupees a month, which Hastings con-
sidered excessive. No treaty was, however, arranged for him, and
from this moment he drops out of practical politics, the support of
one so unpopular with the whole of his compatriots being too obvious
a mistake to be continued. The English now became in name, as well
as in fact, a principal in the struggle which ensued.
Negotiations continued between Nana and General Goddard with-
out any definite result until, at the end of the rains, Goddard learnt
of the formation of a confederacy of the Marathas, the Nizam and
Hyder 'Ali, which was to make a series of simultaneous attacks on
the English possessions. A final request to Nana for a definite reply
elicited a reiteration of the demand for the surrender of Raghunath
Rao and the restoration of Salsette, as preliminaries.
Without sending an answer to this demand, General Goddard
proceeded to Bombay, where he expedited the dispatch of a force
under Colonel Hartley, and obtained sanction to make a treaty with
Fateh Singh Gaekwad. At the same time Hastings, in order to create
a diversion in the north, entered into a treaty with the rana of Gohad,
who had always been a thorn in the side of the Marathas.
On his return to Surat Goddard dismissed the vakils of Nana
Phadnavis and opened negotiations with Fateh Singh who, however,
gave no definite reply until Goddard, crossing the Tapti on 1 January,
1780,2 captured Dhaboi, on which he signed a treaty (26 January)
agreeing to assist General Goddard with a force of 3000 horse and
cede the revenues of certain districts as soon as he was put in posses-
sion of Ahmadabad, the Peshwa's possessions north of the Mahi river
being also made over to him.
Goddard at once marched on Ahmadabad, which was carried by
assault by Colonel Hartley on 15 February, eighty-one Europeans
being killed and wounded including ten officers. 3 Sindhia and Holkar
now advanced in support of the Peshwa, though how far Sindhia was
in earnest seems doubtful, as on reaching Baroda he released Farmer
2 Idem, pp. 392-96.
1 Forrest, Maratha Series, I, 387.
3 Idem, pp. 397-99.


## p. 268 (#296) ############################################

268
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
and Captain Stewart, the hostages for the Convention of Wadgaon,
and also sent his agent, who assured General Goddard of his master's
friendly feelings towards the English and of Nana's enmity. Goddard
made no overtures, merely replying in the same vein, but requiring
Sindhia, if he wished to treat, to send definite proposals within three
days, thus defeating any intention of the Maratha leader to keep him
inactive until the dry season was over. Nothing came of these pour-
parlers, while Sindhia began to negotiate with Govind Rao Gaekwad,
the rival of Fateh Singh.
Goddard, finding negotiation useless, proceeded to attack. He
advanced against the Marathas and drove them back with severe
loss, but without any material gain as the enemy following their
usual tactics, merely encamped at a short distance, in an endeavour
to lead the English into a long fruitless pursuit.
In spite of protests from Bombay, where the council were urging
the need for capturing Bassein, General Goddard refused to leave
Gujarat, as it would have meant abandoning his ally Fateh Singh
Gaekwad.
The approaching summer found the fortunes of the English at a
somewhat low ebb. Funds were exhausted, in all three presidencies;
the Nizam, and Hyder 'Ali, who had swept over the Carnatic up to
the gates of Madras, were supporting the Marathas; and fears were
entertained of the co-operation of a French fleet on the east coast.
But numerous successful engagements of minor importance took
place, including the seizure of Kalyan (October, 1780). 1
Amidst all these difficulties Hastings never lost his head. He
created a diversion in Central India by dispatching Captain Popham
from Bengal to support the rana of Gohad. Captain Popham after
capturing the fort of Lahar, fifty miles from Kalpi, advanced to
Gwalior which he carried by a brilliant night escalade on 3 August,
1780. This, an achievement of great merit in itself, was of far greater
importance in its political effects. This fort had always been looked
upon throughout India as impregnable, and its capture raised the
prestige of the English enormously. Warren Hastings writing to
Laurence Sulivan on 27 August, 1780,3 thus refers to this episode :
"I shall begin by reciting to you an event of the greatest importance
. . . an enterprise . . . (of which] in this country the effect is not to be
described . . . it is the key of Indostan”. But it also had another, and
perhaps even more important, result. Sindhia, to whom the fort
belonged, was dismayed at its loss and at once hurried northwards,
abandoning his colleagues.
To turn for a moment to the other members of the confederacy.
Hyder 'Ali had attacked the Carnatic, and Mudaji Bhonsle had sent
his son Chimnaji against Cuttack, but as he had no real intention of
1 Forrest, Maratha Series, I, 413-15.
2 East Indian Military Calendar, 1823, II, 93.
3 Gleig, Warren Hastings, II, 311.


## p. 269 (#297) ############################################

RELATIONS WITH NAGPUR
269
1
seriously aiding the cause, he was easily bought off by Hastings. "
Mudaji had, in fact, himself originally informed Warren Hastings of
the confederacy formed between Nana Phadnavis, the Nizam, and
Hyder 'Ali, also intimating that the obligation to attack Bengal had
been laid upon him, and that he could not refuse to obey. His son
Chimnaji was, however, instructed to delay his march as much as
possible. This he effectually contrived to do, reaching the Bengal
border in May, 1780, instead of in October, 1779, as he might have
done. Hastings, well aware of the enmity which existed, the alliance
notwithstanding, between the Poona ministers and Hyder 'Ali, asked
Mudaji if he would act as mediator between the English and Nana
Phadnayis, and even sent him a draft treaty. But these negotiations
came to nothing. Hastings then deputed David Anderson to inter-
view Chimnaji and inform him that a force, under Colonel Pearse,
was marching from Bengal to Madras,” and to ask for his assistance
for the detachment. This was granted, and the promise most faith-
fully kept. Anderson then went to Cuttack where he induced Mudaji
to recall his forces on the payment of fifteen lakhs. The Nizam took
no active part in the proceedings of the confederacy.
In October General Goddard advanced on Bassein and, starting
operations against the fort in November, captured it on 11 December.
The fall of Bassein was a very serious blow to Nana, as besides the
loss of a stronghold the moral effect of the victory was almost as
great as that caused by the capture of Gwalior, owing to the fact that
it had been taken from the Portuguese in 1739 and thus represented
a victory over Europeans.
Goddard in 1781 received orders to conclude peace if he saw any
chance of effecting it. The Madras Presidency, in particular, was
anxious for a cessation of hostilities, ascribing the attacks made on
them by Hyder 'Ali to the support of Raghunath Rao and the
consequent war. Sir Eyre Coote, at this time in Southern India,
wrote to Goddard in the strongest terms pointing out that he must
impose upon him as a duty he owed to his king, his country and his
employers to leave no means untried to effect a peace. He also wrote
in similar strain to the Bengal Council (March, 1781). He says,
I have frequently declared it to you, gentlemen, as my firm opinion that we
are altogether unequal to the difficult and dangerous contention in which we
are now engaged . . . and I must once more call upon you to apply the least
dangerous and least expensive means whereof a change may be speedily brought
about on a system of policy so ruinous in itself and so destructive to their (the
Company's] interests.
After the capture of Bassein Goddard moved up and forced the
Bhor Ghat pass. But he allowed himself to be delayed in negotiations,
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, a,
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, 1, 749.
8 Forrest, Maratha Series, 1, 445-7.
4 Forrest, Selections
from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, m, 760.
707.


## p. 270 (#298) ############################################

270
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
which Nana began in order to give himself time to bring up more
troops. Holkar and Hari Pant advanced with a large force and when
Goddard, seeing that the negotiations were leading to nothing, tried
to retire on Kalyan and Bombay, he was attacked fiercely and lost
400 men killed and wounded. This it may be noted was the only
reverse Goddard ever suffered.
Sindhia who had hastened northwards on the fall of Gwalior was
defeated on 16 February, 1781, at Sipri (now Shivpuri) by Major
Camac, who had been sent in June, 1780, to support the rana of
Gohad.
The effect of the fall of Gwalior and of Bassein, his own defeat
and the enhancement of his rival Holkar's reputation by the victory
at Bhor Ghat, convinced Sindhia that his real advantage lay in
coming to early terms with the English, and he never again took up
arms against them. He opened negotiations with Colonel Muir and
signed a treaty on 13 October, 1781. 1 By this treaty Sindhia agreed
to retire to Ujjain while Colonel Muir recrossed the Jumna. But the
really important clause in the agreement was that by which Mahadaji
undertook to effect a treaty between the ministers and the English
and so stand guarantee for its observance.
Hastings, on receiving this news, deputed David Anderson, in
January, 1782, with full powers to conclude a treaty. His instructions
to Anderson are contained in a letter dated 4 November, 1781, from
Benares. The points which Anderson was to bear in mind were : to
make an alliance with the Peshwa through Sindhia's mediation against
all enemies, but in particular against Hyder 'Ali; otherwise simply
peace, on the condition that we restored all territory gained during
the war, except the city of Ahmadabad and lands granted to Fateh
Singh Gaekwad; adequate provision to be made for Raghunath Rao;
Bassein to be kept if possible, even if all the lands obtained by the
Treaty of Purandhar had to be restored, except Salsette and the
islands and revenues of Broach; but if the retention of Bassein hin-
dered the settlement of the peace, it must be given up; nothing was to
be done hostile to the raja of Berar; Fateh Singh Gaekwad was to be
included in the treaty; the treacherous rana of Gohad was to be left
to make his own terms; all other European nations were to be pro-
hibited from founding new settlements; and if possible the Marathas
were to be induced to attack Hyder 'Ali.
Hastings, when he learnt of Colonel Muir's negotiations, was at
Benares, surrounded by rebels, almost in their hands, yet, wholly
undisturbed, he issued these instructions to his envoy. Well might
he refer to this transaction with pardonable pride in one of his letters
as having "conducted a successful negotiation of peace with Mah-
dajee Sindia in the most desperate period of my distress". 3 Anderson
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, m,
813; Aitchison, Treaties, IV, 33.
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department,
8 Gleig, Warren Hastings, II, 453.
DII, 821-2.


## p. 271 (#299) ############################################

TREATY OF SALBAI
271
joined Mahadaji Sindhia, who was acting as our intermediary, and
on 17 May the Treaty of Salbai was signed. 1
The Treaty of Salbai contains seventeen clauses, the chief stipu-
lațions being that the whole of the territory conquered since the
Treaty of Purandhar (1776) should be restored, together with three
lakhs' worth of revenue at Broach; the Gaekwad's possessions to be
restored to what they were before the war, in 1775; Raghunath Rao,
within three months from the signing of the treaty, to fix on a place of
residence, receiving no further help from the English, the Peshwa
undertaking to pay him an allowance of 25,000 rupees a month, if
he would of his own accord repair to Sindhia; Hyder 'Ali to return
all territory recently taken from the English, and the nawab of Arcot;
and the Peshwa and the English undertook that their several allies
should remain at peace with one another.
Anderson writing about these negotiations (27 February, 1783)
remarks on Sindhia's difficulties as intermediary owing to differences
among the ministers at Poona, the opposition of his rival Holkar, who
was supported by Hari Pant, and the Nizam's intrigues. The treaty
was ratified by Nana till the next year, as he was still striving for the
restoration of Salsette and was, in fact, secretly intriguing with
Hyder 'Ali in hopes of being able to reject the treaty altogether.
But on 7 December, 1782, Hyder 'Ali had died. In any case his
support would have been unlikely, as he was said to be convinced of
the futility of opposing these new forces which had entered the arena
or Indian politics, and to have left a written message for his son Tipu
enjoining him to make peace with the English on any terms, and so
avoid ruining himself, advice which Tipu did not follow. Hyder
'Ali's death obliged Nana to ratify the treaty, which he did not do
until 20 February, 1783.
The importance of this treaty, which placed the political relations
of the English and the Marathas on an entirely new and definite
footing, cannot be over-estimated. It formed the turning-point in the
history of the English in India. It secured us peace with the Marathas
for twenty years, and, without the acquisition of any fresh territory,
it established, beyond dispute, the dominance of the British as con-
trolling factor in Indian politics, their subsequent rise in 1818 to the
position of the paramount power, being an inevitable result of the
position gained by the Treaty of Salbai.
No greater vindication of Hastings's policy can be asked for than
this successful termination of seven years of constant struggling, no
finer monument be raised to his courage, talents and amazing powers
of organisation for it was he, single-handed, who found money and
men, and steered the political course which led to victory.
1 Gleig, op. cit. 1, chap. xii; Aitchison, Treaties, IV, 41.
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, ui,
929.


## p. 272 (#300) ############################################

272
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
It forms the turning-point in Mahadaji's career. Mahadaji and
Nana were both desirous of forcing Tipu to conform to the Treaty of
Salbai in order that he should figure as a tributary, but each of them
wished to claim the whole credit for doing so and Sindhia was not
prepared to abrogate his newly-established, independence of Poona
by sharing that credit with Nana. Hitherto, though he had often
disregarded orders, Mahadaji had considered himself a vassal of the
Peshwa, and had generally acted in conformity with the wishes of
his chief. During the next twelve years, however, assured that the
English would leave him a free hand, he becomes the most prominent
actor on the stage of Indian history, pursuing with quiet tenacity, but
without ever forgetting, as his successor did, the limits of his strength,
his policy of personal aggrandisement, a policy, moreover, which, to
a very large extent, determined the general course of events in India,
up to his death in 1794.


## p. 273 (#301) ############################################

CHAPTER X V
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
In the Carnatic the course of events was very different from that
in Bengal. In both provinces the English had attained military supre-
macy; but in the south they did not follow this up by the almost
immediate assumption of political control. The reasons for the differ-
ence seem to be that with the overthrow of the French the Carnatic
had become a secondary area not rich enough to provoke direct
administration or to bring the interests of the nawab and the Com-
pany's servants into direct conflict. The pet vice of the latter in the
Carnatic was indeed quite different from that which prevailed in
Bengal. In Bengal they had sought to trade untaxed; in the Carnatic
they found their easiest advantage to lie in lending money to the
nawab. Muhammad 'Ali had from the first found himself in em-
barrassed circumstances. The war with the French had been carried
on at his expense though largely with the Company's funds; so that
the fall of Pondichery found him with a debt of 22,25,373 pagodas
owing to the Company. In 1766 this had been reduced to 13,65,104
pagodas; but in reality his financial position had grown worse instead
of better, for at the later date he owed private creditors a sum
exceeding that which he had owed the Company in 1761. These
private loans had been borrowed at the high rates of interest prevailing
in the country-at first from 30 to 36 per cent. ; then 25 per cent. ;
and then on the intervention of the governor, Palk, to 20 per cent.
When questioned, the nawab stated, probably with truth, that he
would have had to pay higher rates to Indian lenders. In 1766 the
interest was reduced by the Company's orders to 10 per cent. The
existence of thiş large private debt, which so far from being liquidated
went on increasing throughout the whole of Mohammad 'Ali's gov-
ernment, branching out into all those divers funds which Burke
enumerated with such passionate emphasis, affected the whole of
the relations between the English and the Nawab Walajah, as he
became after Clive's Treaty of Allahabad. Having the control of so
large a portion of the private savings of the settlement, the nawab
was able to exercise a most unwholesome influence over the policy of
the council, particularly in regard to Tanjore; and was sure of a
following even when the Company or the governor was positively
opposed to his designs. Not a governor but was corrupted by his
bribes or calumniated by his hatred. For a time at least the financial
interests thus created dominated Madras in the person of Paul
Benfield, who, though probably not quite deserving all the strictures
of Burke, undoubtedly subordinated public affairs to the exigencies
of private concerns. The true history of the period will perhaps
18


## p. 274 (#302) ############################################

274
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
never be written. The persons principally concerned did not entrust
their designs to the publicity of the Company's records; and though
a certain number of private papers have come to light, many others
have been destroyed or concealed; so that we are often left to guess
at what actually happened.
While the French war was still continuing, there was a strong
inclination on the part of the council to take the direct administra-
tion of the territory secured by the Company's arms. But the
nawab's protests and perhaps more solid arguments induced the
council to abandon that idea; 1 nor, even under the pressure of cir-
cumstances, did it in fact proceed to that extremity. Probably the
financial help which was received from Bengal saved the nawab's
independence. At the fall of Pondichery he found his nominal power
undiminished. He had granted to the Company the district imme-
diately surrounding Madras, and mortgaged other parts of his
dominions, but the English displayed no desire to take any part in the
administration of these areas; and even in the Company's jagir the
revenue was ultimately leased out to the nawab himself.
In the south the first ostensible exercise of power resulted from
Clive's Treaty of Allahabad. Among the other grants which he
secured from Shah 'Alam was one exempting Walajah from his tradi-
tional dependence on the Deccan and another for the Northern
Sarkars, which in the time of French greatness had been granted by
the Nizam to Bussy, and which after the expulsion of the French had
lapsed into the hands of that prince. By this time the feeble prince,
whom Bussy had had such difficulty in maintaining at Hyderabad,
had been replaced, and put to death, by his more vigorous brother,
Nizam 'Ali. The latter had already made more than one offer of the
sarkars to the English on conditions of military help; but these had
not been accepted, in view of the Company's strong desire to limit
its responsibilities; and offers, the origins of which are obscure, to set
up Walajah in the Deccan instead of Nizam 'Ali, had also been
rejected under English dissuasion. However, the English now took
steps to carry the grant of 1765 into effect. Caillaud was sent up
into the sarkars, and succeeded in occupying them practically without
resistance. But it was not to be expected that Nizam 'Ali would
silently acquiesce in this dismemberment of his dominions. In the
end Caillaud was sent to Hyderabad to settle the dispute, and on
12 November, 1766, he concluded a treaty with Nizam 'Ali on the
following terms : in return for a grant of the five sarkars the Com-
pany agreed “to have a body of troops ready to settle the affairs of His
1 Madras Mil. Consultations, 1754, p. 145; 1755, pp. 146 sqq. ; 20 August
and 1. September, 1757.
· Bengal Select Committee to. Madras, 27 April, 1768; R. J. Sulivan, Ana-
lysis of the Political History of India, p. 104:


## p. 275 (#303) ############################################

EARLY RELATIONS WITH HYDER
275
Highness's government in everything that is right and proper, when-
ever required", but it retained liberty to withdraw the troops if
demanded by the safety of the English settlements, and it was to pay
a tribute of nine lakhs a year in each year in which its military
assistance was not required. By a final article the Nizam was to assist
the English when needed. This agreement was pointed directly at
Hyder 'Ali, against whom the Nizam had already entered into an
alliance with the Marathas, and with whom now the English were
inevitably embroiled. The Company condemned the negotiations as
showing great lack of firmness.
Hyder 'Ali, who had very recently established his power in
Mysore, was the son of a soldier who had risen to the post of command-
ant of the fortress of Bangalore. During the Seven Years' War he had
coquetted with the idea of assisting the French, but had judged the
situation too correctly to involve himself in their failing fortunes.
Instead, he had succeeded in placing himself in the position of the
chief minister-the dalavay-seizing the person of Khande Rao, the
last holder of that post, and keeping him in prisoned in an iron cage
until he died. The raja was kept a prisoner in his palace, and showu
to the people once a year; but altogether ceased to enjoy power or
influence. The new ruler of Mysore was an unlettered soldier, but a
man of great energy and talent. His main preoccupation was the
extension of his dominions. He quickly extended his rule to the
Malabar Coast; but when he turned his attention to the north he
found his way blocked by the Marathas and the Nizam. Meanwhile
his conquests on the Malabar Coast had brought him into contact
with the English factories there. At first the Bombay. Presidency
was in favour of an agreement. It decided to afford Hyder facilities
for building fighting vessels in the Marine Yard at Bombay; and
hoped that Madras would be able to accommodate the disputes sub-
sisting between Hyder and Walajah. Hyder also hoped for advant-
ages from supplies of arms and gunpowder from the English, and
offered his alliance, both parties affording military help to the other
in case of need. This was in 1766, just before Caillaud's treaty with
the Nizam. But by then Hyder's conquest of the petty Nair chiefs
with whom the English were in alliance had on the whole indisposed
the Bombay Government to any formal alliance with its restless
neighbour, though it was at the same time anxious to avoid hostilities
if possible. In the meantime, as has been seen, the Madras Govern-
ment had agreed to assist the Nizam against Hyder as the price of the
cession of the Northern Sarkars, rather than face the probable alter-
native of an alliance between Hyder 'Ali and the Nizam against
Walajah.
1 Caillaud's proceedings on this mission are recorded in two volumes (Mili-
tory Sundries, 31-32) in the Madras Record Office.
? Forrest, Bombay Selections, 11, 123-31


## p. 276 (#304) ############################################

276
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
English hopes rested in the triple alliance of themselves, the
Nizam, and the Marathas. But the Marathas, who were first in the
field, were quickly bought off by, Hyder. The Nizam, accompanied
by a detachment under the command of General Joseph Smith,
invaded Mysore, and advanced within sight of Bangalore. But the
attack was not seriously pressed home; the invaders entered Mysore
on 29 April, 1767, but all the time Mahfuz Khan (brother and rival of
Walajah) remained in the Nizam's camp as Hyder's agent; many
letters passed between the enemies; and a secret understanding was
reached, probably while the Nizam was still before Bangalore. Thus
the English were abandoned by the allies on whose assistance they
had relied, and left by themselves to encounter the full brunt of
Hyder's attack. They had indeed managed matters with a great
want of skill.
The war which followed (August, 1767, to April, 1769) was one
of tactical success and strategic failure in the Carnatic. At Changama
and Tiruvannamalai Smith succeeded in driving Hyder off the field
of battle; and after the severe lessons which he received on those
occasions, Hyder was careful how he ventured within the reach of
the English infantry; but these successes led to nothing. The English
leaders had not at their disposal sufficient bodies of cavalry to keep
the enemy's horse out of the Carnatic. They were further distracted
by personal jealousies between Smith, the senior commander, and
Colonel Wood, the favourite of the council. And they were harassed
by the appointment of "field-deputies” sent by the council to keep
watch over their movements. On 23 February, 1768, the Nizam made
peace with the English in the same irresponsible manner as he had
broken with them; confirming his previous treaty engagements, con-
senting to a limitation of the forces which the English were obliged
to send to him on demand to two battalions and six guns, and ceding
to the Company the diwanni of Mysore when that country should
have been conquered from the enemy. About the same time the
Bombay forces managed to capture the town of Mangalore; but the
place was not defended when Hyder appeared to recover it, and the
peace with the Nizam made little difference to the course of the war.
The Carnatic lay still open to the ravages of the enemy horse, so that
the principal sources of English finance were dried up; and, finally,
when in the month of March, 1769, Hyder appeared before Madras
at the head of a body of cavalry, and when Smith had conspicuously
failed to expel the enemy from the nawab's country, the Madras
Government resolved to make peace. But it had to do so on Hyder's
terms. These were generous enough, but included the burden of a
defensive alliance, so that the Madras Council was still far from free
of the political difficulties in which it had become involved. In the
1 Smith's Narrative, ap. Orme MŚS, - Various, 10; and Cosby's Journal (Brit.
Mus. Add. MSS, 29898).


## p. 277 (#305) ############################################

ENGLISH POLICY
277
1
following year a further treaty was concluded between Hyder and
the Bombay Government, which thereby secured further commercial
privileges,
The general conduct of the war, incompetent as it had been, was
a small evil, compared with the purposeless, undecided policy by
which it was preceded and followed. At this time the interests of
Southern and Western India were closely connected; the Marathas,
the Nizam, Hyder 'Ali, and the English at Bombay and Madras, were
in close and intimate association from which they could not escape.
Moreover, the interests of the three Indian powers were mutually
destructive. The one certain thing about the situation was that an
alliance between any two of them against the third would be only
temporary, and would be dissolved by its own success. In these
circumstances the obvious course for the English was to avoid entan-
glements with any of the parties. But what they did was to ally
themselves first with the Nizam, then with Hyder, and then with a
party of the Marathas, without any clear idea of the responsibilities
to which they were pledging themselves, and without the vigour to
carry out the responsibilities which they had undertaken. But we
must remember that they had certain excuses for the imbecility of
their policy. In the first place their interests were divided between
the rival presidencies of Madras and Bombay; and when under the
Regulating Act the government of Bengal tried to impose on the
subordinate presidencies a common policy, its action was neutralised
by the jealousies of the minor governments for each other and for the
Supreme Government. In the second place the action of the Madras
Presidency was hampered by the conduct of its protégé the nawab
Walajah. He was jealous of the superior rank of the Nizam; he was
jealous of the assumed and (in his eyes) illegitimate rank of Hyder;
he was jealous of the influence which the English claimed to exercise
in his councils in virtue of the military power which alone preserved
his position in the face of an enemy_incomparably his superior in
vigour and talent. So that while the English had imposed on them-
selves the impossible duties of assisting both the Nizam and Hyder
in their various policies, the nawab was always seeking to impose on
them the further duty, hardly more inconsistent with their treaty
obligations, of assisting the Marathas. In the third place the local
governments were always liable to the interference of the home
authorities, sometimes ill-informed, sometimes ill-authorised, but at
this time generally incalculable.
In 1770 this was illustrated by the arrival of a small naval squad-
ron in Indian waters, under the command of Sir John Lindsay, who
proceeded to take an active, authorised, but illegitimate part in the
politics of Madras. His appointment was the result of a series of
intrigues in England in which the ministry was on the whole discre.
1 Dupré to Orme, 10 June, 1769 (Love, Vestiges, 11, 599); Auber, I, 266.


## p. 278 (#306) ############################################

278
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
ditably concerned. The discussions of 1766-7 had left the ministry
decidedly inclined to interfere in the conduct of Indian affairs; and
occasions were not wanting to provide it with excuses. In 1768, on
the news that the government of Bengal had allowed the French at
Chandernagore to mount cannon on their walls contrary to the treaty
of Paris, Shelburne had written with some justification :
I cannot conceal from you His Majesty's surprise that so extraordinary a
transaction with a foreign power, by which the articles of a treaty of peace
have been dispensed with, should have passed in India by the sole authority
of the Company's servants and have received your approbation at home, with-
out your having previously attempted to know His Majesty's opinion or receive
his commands upon so hazardous a concession. . . .
In the following year complaints were received from the ambassador
at Constantinople about the conduct of the Company's servants in
the Persian Gulf;” and at the same time, the Company gave an
opening to the ministry by asking for naval assistance on an alarm
of French preparations. At this moment the Company was proposing
to send three supervisors to India with extraordinary powers.
Grafton, who was now secretary of state, seized, the occasion to try
to secure some controlling share in the proposed commission; he
suggested that the commander of the naval force which the Company
had asked for should be joined with the supervisors. This proposal
was rejected by the Company. About the time that these affairs were
in progress there arrived from Madras John Macpherson on a mission
from the nawab of Arcot. He had gone out as purser on an East-
Indiaman, and had got access to the s3wab on the pretext of showing
him "some electrical experiments and the phenomenon of the magic
lanthorn”. 4 He appears to have persuaded Grafton that the nawab
was a much ill-used person. The result was that, as the Company
would not agree to giving Lindsay the powers that the ministry
demanded, he was sent with a secret commission, which was not
communicated to the Company, empowering him not only to act as
plenipotentiary on behalf of the crown with all the princes of India,
but also to enquire into the relations between the nawab and the
Company's servants on the Coromandel Coast.
3
“As there is great reason to fear”, his secret instructions ran, “that the
Nabob of Arcot has been treated in a manner by no means correspondent to the
friendly stipulations which His Majesty procured in his favour at the Company's
request (in the Treaty of Paris) . . . it is therefore His Majesty's pleasure that
you make the strictest enquiry into their conduct towards the Nabob of Arcot
since the last peace in order to judge how far it has coincided with His Majesty's
friendly declarations. " J
1 Shelburne to the Company, 21 January, 1768 (Lansdowne House MSS,
No. 99).
2 Michell to Wood, 17 March, 1769 (P. R. O. , C. O. 77-21).
3 Wood to the Chairs, 26 July, 1769 (loc. cit. ).
4 Harland to Rochford, 1 September, 1772 (1. 0. , Hoine Miscellaneous, 110,
6 Weymouth to Lindsay, Secret, 13 September, 1769, (P. R. O. , T. 49-1).
p. 495).


## p. 279 (#307) ############################################

LINDSAY'S MISSION
270
Lindsay arrived at Bombay early in 1770 and after some preliminary
enquiries into the position of the Marathas, sailed for Madras. His
secret mission naturally involved him in disputes with the council,
which knew nothing of it, and had received no instructions to admit
him to a part in its political deliberations. The result was that the
commodore was thrown into the nawab's arms and adopted his
political views. He advocated an alliance with the Marathas and the
abandonment of the treaty with Hyder; and interfered at Bombay
to prevent the council there from entering into a treaty promising
Hyder the same friendship and support that had been promised by
the Treaty of Madras. In the course of the war between Hyder and
Madhu Rao. in 1770-1 Lindsay did his utmost to bring the Com-
pany in on the side of the Marathas; and his successor, Harland, in
1771, actually threatened to enter into negotiations and frame a
treaty with Madhu Rao on his own account. When the council ob.
jected that that would be a violation of its treaty with Hyder,
Harland replied :
Should it be found expedient to enter into an alliance with any Indian power
for the preservation of the Carnatic, for the security of the possessions of the
East India Company in it, and to give a probability of permanency to the British
interests in this country, which may be incompatible with the agreement you
made with Hyder Ally, in 1769, it would be so far from a breach of national
faith that even as private persons you stand exculpated. 1
The threatened treaty was indeed avoided. But backed by the
plenipotentiary on the one side, and the corrupt influences of the
private debt on the other, the nawab became irresistible and exacted
from the council its agreement to the attack and capture of the little
kingdom of Tanjore. Its relations with the nawab were regulated by
a treaty of 1762 which Pigot, the governor, and the council of that time
had forced upon the nawab. It was alleged that the raja had violated
its terms partly by neglect to pay the stipulated tribute, and partly
by hostile intrigues with Hyder 'Ali and with Yusuf Khan, the sepoy
commandant who had rebelled at Madura and whom it had taken
the English long months and considerable efforts to reduce. The first
attack took place in 1771; but on that occasion the raja was allowed
to remain on terms. But two years later he was again attacked, and
this time his kingdom was annexed to the nawab's possessions. About
the same time English expeditions were sent to reduce the two great
southern poligars of Ramnad and Sivaganga.
These acquisitions caused much stir in England. By some, and by
the Burkes in particular, they were attributed to the corrupt intrigues
of the Company's servants. A whole pamphlet literature sprang up
on the subject, fathered by the Burkes and their friends on the one
side, and by the two Macphersons on the other. The truth of the
matter, as distinguished from the mere external facts, remains very
1 Harland to Dupré, etc. , 25 December, 1771 (P. R. O. ; C. O.