I answer that, As stated above (Q[16], A[1]; [2690]FS, Q[99], A[1]), a
precept implies the notion of something due.
precept implies the notion of something due.
Summa Theologica
" Much more therefore can other
perfect men suffer scandal.
Objection 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a
person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their
progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We would
have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath
hindered us. " Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.
Objection 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins,
according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves. " Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes venial, as stated above [2684](A[4]). Therefore passive
scandal may be found in perfect men.
On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Mat. 18:6, "He that shall
scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is the
little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take scandal. "
I answer that, Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person who
takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man can be
unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, i. e.
the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is unchangeable, for
though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as
these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16: "Be ye followers of
me, as I also am of Christ. " Wherefore, however much others may appear
to them to conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they themselves do
not stray from their righteousness, according to Ps. 124:1: "They that
trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for
ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem. " Therefore scandal is not found in
those who adhere to God perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165:
"Much peace have they that love Thy law, and to them there is no
stumbling-block [scandalum]. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[2], ad 2), in this passage,
scandal is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance.
Hence Our Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he
was endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of
external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of
others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according
to Rom. 8:38,39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be able to
separate us from the love of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins
through the weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking
scandal in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although
there can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My
feet were almost moved. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the
perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are scandalized
passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according to Mat.
15:12: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word,
were scandalized? " Therefore active scandal can be found in the
perfect.
Objection 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the
state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for
it is written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly
unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i. e. Peter, "before
them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gentiles,
and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to live as do
the Jews? " Therefore active scandal can be in the perfect.
Objection 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But
venial sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in
perfect men.
On the contrary, Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than
passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much
less, therefore, can active scandal be in them.
I answer that, Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a man
says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion
another's spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or
does is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their
actions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40:
"Let all things be done decently and according to order"; and they are
careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only would they
do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of wrongdoing. And if
indeed they fail in this moderation in such words or deeds as come to
the knowledge of others, this has its origin in human weakness wherein
they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not fall short so far as to
stray far from the order of reason, but only a little and in some
slight matter: and this is not so grave that anyone can reasonably take
therefrom an occasion for committing sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active
scandal; yet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the
very person who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes
himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl,
lxxxii) and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in
withdrawing from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the
Jews, because he did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles
who had been converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless
Peter's action was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient
ground for scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while
there was no active scandal in Peter.
Reply to Objection 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in
sudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If, however,
they commit any venial sins even in their external words or deeds,
these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give
scandal.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone on
account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) teaches
that "punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of schism is
feared. " But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since it is an act
of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone on account of
scandal.
Objection 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing.
Yet one ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to
Mat. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your
pearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you. "
Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.
Objection 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity,
it is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in
order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De Civ.
Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of
scandal.
Objection 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher. , In Matth. xviii; in
Luc. xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego
whatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold
truth, i. e. "the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine. " Now the
observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be
omitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else
whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such things
are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works should
be omitted on account of scandal.
Objection 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good,
since any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that
one ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid
scandalizing one's neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially,
one would prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because
one is bound to hinder the damnation of one's neighbor as much as one
can without prejudice to one's own salvation, which is not precluded by
a venial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order
to avoid scandal.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): "If people are
scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of scandal,
than to abandon the truth. " Now spiritual goods belong, above all
others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to be foregone
on account of scandal.
I answer that, Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the
present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active
scandal is "something said or done less rightly," nothing ought to be
done that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply to
passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be
foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in
spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and
cannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man
ought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from sinning,
because according to the order of charity, a man ought to love his own
spiritual welfare more than another's. Therefore one ought not to
forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order to avoid giving
scandal.
Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are
not necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from such
things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man wishes
to hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This is the
"scandal of the Pharisees," who were scandalized at Our Lord's
teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Mat. 15:14) that we ought to treat such
like scandal with contempt. Sometimes scandal proceeds from weakness or
ignorance, and such is the "scandal of little ones. " In order to avoid
this kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be either concealed, or
sometimes even deferred (if this can be done without incurring
immediate danger), until the matter being explained the scandal cease.
If, however, the scandal continue after the matter has been explained,
it would seem to be due to malice, and then it would no longer be right
to forego that spiritual good in order to avoid such like scandal.
Reply to Objection 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the
punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties
in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of
justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident that the
infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous
sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a
part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking, when,
to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to bring about the
danger of a schism, for in that case it would be contrary to the truth
of justice to pronounce excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: With regard to a man's doctrine two points must
be considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of
teaching. The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that
he whose duty it is to teach should no' teach what is contrary to the
truth, and that he should teach the truth according to the requirements
of times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he to suppress the
truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal that might ensue.
But the act itself of teaching is one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as
stated above ([2685]Q[32], A[2]), and so the same is to be said of it
as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall speak further on (ad
4).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2686]Q[33], A[1]), fraternal
correction aims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be
reckoned among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained,
which is not the case if the brother be scandalized through being
corrected. And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid
scandal, no spiritual good is foregone.
Reply to Objection 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice
comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also
whatever is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according to
1 Cor. 12:31: "Be zealous for the better gifts. " Wherefore neither the
counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted in
order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or
deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated
above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the
fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This may
be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, and
of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either in
temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual matters
(as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise from their
being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from the need on the part
of the person in want; and then the same applies to these things as to
others that are necessary for salvation.
Reply to Objection 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial
sin in order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since
if it ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin
cannot be a matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of
some circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be
were it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin,
when it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable
cause, it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not
deprive a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far
as it disposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on
account of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual
welfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods
whatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake of what we love
more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to avoid
scandalizing our neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A[7], OBJ[4]],
whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth,
should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can be
foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they
should be foregone in order to avoid scandal.
Objection 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But
we ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rom.
14:15: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died. " Much more
therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account of
scandal.
Objection 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and
recovering temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful
to have recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is
written (Mat. 5:40): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and
take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him"; and (1 Cor. 6:7):
"Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have
lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do you
not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded? " Therefore it seems that
we ought to forego temporal goods on account of scandal.
Objection 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those
temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we
ought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while
sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he
"should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ" as we read 1 Cor.
9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain
countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we to
forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
On the contrary, Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the restitution
of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took scandal from his
doing so.
I answer that, A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for either
they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of them for
someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to prelates,
and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such persons as
have authority over the common weal. In this latter case the care of
such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of necessity on
those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore, even as other
things that are necessary for salvation, they are not to be foregone on
account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards those temporalities
of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal, we are
bound to forego them, and sometimes we are not so bound, whether we
forego them by giving them up, if we have them in our possession, or by
omitting to claim them, if they are in the possession of others. For if
the scandal arise therefrom through the ignorance or weakness of others
(in which case, as stated above, A[7], it is scandal of the little
ones) we must either forego such temporalities altogether, or the
scandal must be abated by some other means, namely, by some kind of
admonition. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): "Thou
shouldst give so as to injure neither thyself nor another, as much as
thou canst lend, and if thou refusest what is asked, thou must yet be
just to him, indeed thou wilt give him something better than he asks,
if thou reprove him that asks unjustly. " Sometimes, however, scandal
arises from malice. This is scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not
to forego temporal goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of
this kind, for this would both be harmful to the common good, since it
would give wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious
to the plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they
were in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral.
xxxi, 13): "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our
temporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as equity
allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our property, but
also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose themselves. "
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob
other people of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the
truth of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to forego
our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total
abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare
requires that we should take food: but he intended to counsel
abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal,
according to 1 Cor. 8:13: "I will never eat flesh, lest I should
scandalize my brother. "
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i,
19) this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of
the mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to
suffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But sometimes
it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same applies to the
saying of the Apostle.
Reply to Objection 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from
an error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it
behooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be
taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason
the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it
is not customary to pay them.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?
(2) Whether there should be one or two?
(3) Whether two suffice?
(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with
thy whole heart"?
(5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc. ?
(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?
(7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";
(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any precept should be given about charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about
charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it
is the form of the virtues as stated above ([2687]Q[23], A[8]), while
the precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the
common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no
precepts should be given about charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of
the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that
arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a
necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to
which the precepts are directed, as shown above ([2688]FS, Q[90], A[2];
[2689]FS, Q[100], A[9]). If, therefore, any precepts were given about
charity, they should have a place among the chief precepts which are
those of the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no
precepts should be given about charity.
On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept.
Now God requires that man should love Him, according to Dt. 10:12.
Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity,
which is the love of God.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[16], A[1]; [2690]FS, Q[99], A[1]), a
precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter
of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two
ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In every
affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, because it has the
character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to
the end is due for the sake of something else: thus for a physician, it
is due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the
sake of something else that he should give a medicine in order to heal.
Now the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and
this union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the
spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their end. Hence the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from
a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith. " For all
the virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed
either to the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the
passions---such are the virtues that regulate the passions---or at
least to the possession of a good conscience---such are the virtues
that regulate operations---or to the having of a right faith---such are
those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three things are
required of man that he may love God. For an impure heart is withdrawn
from loving God, on account of the passion that inclines it to earthly
things; an evil conscience gives man a horror for God's justice,
through fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's
affections to an untrue representation of God, and separates him from
the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is for its own sake
takes precedence of that which is for the sake of another, wherefore
the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in Mat. 22:39.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2691]FS, Q[100], A[10]) when we
were treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under
those precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance,
this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe
that this should be done out of charity. The act of love does, however,
fall under special precepts.
Reply to Objection 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to
liberty, except in one whose mind is averted from that which is
prescribed, as may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear
alone. But the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own
will, wherefore it is not opposed to charity.
Reply to Objection 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to
the love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of
charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue,
since they are included in all of them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two
precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to
virtue, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Now charity is one virtue, as
shown above ([2692]Q[33], A[5]). Therefore only one precept of charity
should have been given.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27),
charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently
directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God. " Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our
neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts.
But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we
put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Lk. 15:26): "If
any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot
be My disciple. " Therefore the precept of the love of God is not
distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his
neighbor hath fulfilled the Law. " But a law is not fulfilled unless all
its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in
the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love
of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have
from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2693]FS, Q[91], A[3]; [2694]FS, Q[94],
A[2]) when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to
the Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these
latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first
principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire
virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately
before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable to
consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary, for
their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their
principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law
direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above
(Q[23], A[7], ad 2; Q[26], A[1], ad 1): and the love of God is the end
to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved us
to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also of the love of
our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not
easily understand that one of these precepts is included in the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two
acts, one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts
are given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts
of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved
in that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an
explicit precept about both, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: The means derive their goodness from their
relation to the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives
its malice from the same source and from no other
Reply to Objection 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the
end is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each
precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether two precepts of charity suffice?
Objection 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice.
For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished
by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of
charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown
above ([2695]Q[25], A[12];[2696] Q[26]), it seems that there ought to
be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.
Objection 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also
joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts
of the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.
Objection 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also
in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good,
and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to
have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity;
and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): "On these two commandments
dependeth the whole Law and the prophets. "
I answer that, Charity, as stated above ([2697]Q[23], A[1]), is a kind
of friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another,
wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible
between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love
oneself out of charity ([2698]Q[25], A[4]). Now since good is the
object of dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a
means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one
whereby we are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we
are led to love our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23),
"though four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need
of a precept as regards the second and fourth," i. e. love of oneself
and of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the
truth, the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him. "
And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that
he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this
is done by his loving God and his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2699]Q[28], A[4];[2700] Q[29],
A[3]), the other acts of charity result from the act of love as effects
from their cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the
precepts about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of
the laggards, special precepts were given about each act---about joy
(Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always"---about peace (Heb. 12:14):
"Follow peace with all men"---about beneficence (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we
have time, let us work good to all men"---and Holy Writ contains
precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by
anyone who considers the matter carefully.
Reply to Objection 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and
therefore the positive precepts virtually include the negative
precepts. Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices
contrary to charity: for, against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17):
"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus.
6:26): "Be not grieved with her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let
us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying
one another"; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the
same thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against
scandal (Rom. 14:13): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal
in your brother's way. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole
heart?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man
should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act is
not a matter of precept, as shown above (A[1], ad 1; [2701]FS, Q[100],
A[9]). Now the words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the
love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should love
God with his whole heart.
Objection 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks
nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that
God be loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not
pertaining to the love of God, acts counter to the precept, and
consequently sins mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the
love of God. Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to
perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64),
"to be whole is to be perfect. " But that which belongs to perfection is
not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought
not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart. "
I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is
a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is
requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own
matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances,
whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the
last end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind
of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the
love of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue
does not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and
higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own
proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole
heart. "
Reply to Objection 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold
signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always
actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly,
in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so
that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the
perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter
perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it
does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of
charity.
Reply to Objection 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels
are directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding
reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal
things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and
hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart," it was fitting to add "and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole
strength"?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with
thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Dt. 6:5). For heart does
not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily
action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense.
Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part
of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and
soul.
Objection 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal
depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with
all thy strength. "
Objection 3: Further, in Mat. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which
words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is
unfittingly worded in Dt. 6.
On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places:
for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. 6 three points are
mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with
thy whole strength. " In Mat. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz.
"with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole
strength" is omitted, but "with thy whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark
12 we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole
soul," and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is
the same as "strength. " Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10,
where in place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might. "
[*St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota
fortitudine tua" (Dt. ), "ex tota virtue tua" (Mk. ), and "ex omnibus
tuis" (Lk. ), although the Greek in all three cases has {ex holes tes
ischyos}, which the Douay renders "with thy whole strength. "]
Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of
them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must
therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted
by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of
all the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards
the intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the
principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three
principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect
which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified
by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by
"strength," "force" or "might. " Accordingly we are commanded to direct
our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with
thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed
in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according
to God, in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our
external actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength,"
"force" or "might. "
Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished
work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth. ) which is included in
Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the
contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers "heart"
to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the
intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the
intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy
mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory of
Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul,
"soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our
nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by
us to God.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil
this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius,
Exposit. Cath. Fid. ] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded
anything impossible. " But God gave this commandment, as is clear from
Dt. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally,
since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a
transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments. " If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by
wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal
sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): "(Who
also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim. 3:10):
"Let them minister, having no crime. "
Objection 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the
way of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord
is lightsome, enlightening the eyes. " Now it is useless to direct
anyone to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill
this precept in this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the
fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence
remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with
all his heart.
I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and
imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by
the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly
however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached,
nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the
commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be
perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the
commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by
those who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing
contrary to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that
man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in
heaven, when God will be "all in all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence
this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is
fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one
man will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the more,
as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the precept can be
fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately
without conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this,
so too he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does
nothing against the love of God, does not sin mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii),
"why should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man
attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows
whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it
out. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor
is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men,
even to our enemies, as may be seen in Mat. 5:44. But the word
"neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist
towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly
expressed.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the
origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to
ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin
of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than
that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his
neighbor as himself.
Objection 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor,
naturally.
perfect men suffer scandal.
Objection 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a
person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their
progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We would
have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath
hindered us. " Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.
Objection 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins,
according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves. " Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes venial, as stated above [2684](A[4]). Therefore passive
scandal may be found in perfect men.
On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Mat. 18:6, "He that shall
scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is the
little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take scandal. "
I answer that, Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person who
takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man can be
unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, i. e.
the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is unchangeable, for
though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as
these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16: "Be ye followers of
me, as I also am of Christ. " Wherefore, however much others may appear
to them to conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they themselves do
not stray from their righteousness, according to Ps. 124:1: "They that
trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for
ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem. " Therefore scandal is not found in
those who adhere to God perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165:
"Much peace have they that love Thy law, and to them there is no
stumbling-block [scandalum]. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[2], ad 2), in this passage,
scandal is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance.
Hence Our Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he
was endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of
external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of
others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according
to Rom. 8:38,39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be able to
separate us from the love of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins
through the weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking
scandal in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although
there can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My
feet were almost moved. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the
perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are scandalized
passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according to Mat.
15:12: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word,
were scandalized? " Therefore active scandal can be found in the
perfect.
Objection 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the
state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for
it is written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly
unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i. e. Peter, "before
them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gentiles,
and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to live as do
the Jews? " Therefore active scandal can be in the perfect.
Objection 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But
venial sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in
perfect men.
On the contrary, Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than
passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much
less, therefore, can active scandal be in them.
I answer that, Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a man
says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion
another's spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or
does is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their
actions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40:
"Let all things be done decently and according to order"; and they are
careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only would they
do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of wrongdoing. And if
indeed they fail in this moderation in such words or deeds as come to
the knowledge of others, this has its origin in human weakness wherein
they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not fall short so far as to
stray far from the order of reason, but only a little and in some
slight matter: and this is not so grave that anyone can reasonably take
therefrom an occasion for committing sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active
scandal; yet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the
very person who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes
himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl,
lxxxii) and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in
withdrawing from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the
Jews, because he did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles
who had been converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless
Peter's action was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient
ground for scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while
there was no active scandal in Peter.
Reply to Objection 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in
sudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If, however,
they commit any venial sins even in their external words or deeds,
these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give
scandal.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone on
account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) teaches
that "punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of schism is
feared. " But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since it is an act
of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone on account of
scandal.
Objection 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing.
Yet one ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to
Mat. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your
pearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you. "
Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.
Objection 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity,
it is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in
order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De Civ.
Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of
scandal.
Objection 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher. , In Matth. xviii; in
Luc. xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego
whatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold
truth, i. e. "the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine. " Now the
observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be
omitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else
whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such things
are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works should
be omitted on account of scandal.
Objection 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good,
since any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that
one ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid
scandalizing one's neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially,
one would prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because
one is bound to hinder the damnation of one's neighbor as much as one
can without prejudice to one's own salvation, which is not precluded by
a venial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order
to avoid scandal.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): "If people are
scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of scandal,
than to abandon the truth. " Now spiritual goods belong, above all
others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to be foregone
on account of scandal.
I answer that, Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the
present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active
scandal is "something said or done less rightly," nothing ought to be
done that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply to
passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be
foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in
spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and
cannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man
ought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from sinning,
because according to the order of charity, a man ought to love his own
spiritual welfare more than another's. Therefore one ought not to
forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order to avoid giving
scandal.
Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are
not necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from such
things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man wishes
to hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This is the
"scandal of the Pharisees," who were scandalized at Our Lord's
teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Mat. 15:14) that we ought to treat such
like scandal with contempt. Sometimes scandal proceeds from weakness or
ignorance, and such is the "scandal of little ones. " In order to avoid
this kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be either concealed, or
sometimes even deferred (if this can be done without incurring
immediate danger), until the matter being explained the scandal cease.
If, however, the scandal continue after the matter has been explained,
it would seem to be due to malice, and then it would no longer be right
to forego that spiritual good in order to avoid such like scandal.
Reply to Objection 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the
punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties
in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of
justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident that the
infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous
sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a
part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking, when,
to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to bring about the
danger of a schism, for in that case it would be contrary to the truth
of justice to pronounce excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: With regard to a man's doctrine two points must
be considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of
teaching. The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that
he whose duty it is to teach should no' teach what is contrary to the
truth, and that he should teach the truth according to the requirements
of times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he to suppress the
truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal that might ensue.
But the act itself of teaching is one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as
stated above ([2685]Q[32], A[2]), and so the same is to be said of it
as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall speak further on (ad
4).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2686]Q[33], A[1]), fraternal
correction aims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be
reckoned among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained,
which is not the case if the brother be scandalized through being
corrected. And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid
scandal, no spiritual good is foregone.
Reply to Objection 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice
comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also
whatever is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according to
1 Cor. 12:31: "Be zealous for the better gifts. " Wherefore neither the
counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted in
order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or
deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated
above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the
fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This may
be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, and
of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either in
temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual matters
(as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise from their
being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from the need on the part
of the person in want; and then the same applies to these things as to
others that are necessary for salvation.
Reply to Objection 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial
sin in order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since
if it ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin
cannot be a matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of
some circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be
were it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin,
when it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable
cause, it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not
deprive a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far
as it disposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on
account of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual
welfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods
whatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake of what we love
more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to avoid
scandalizing our neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A[7], OBJ[4]],
whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth,
should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can be
foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they
should be foregone in order to avoid scandal.
Objection 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But
we ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rom.
14:15: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died. " Much more
therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account of
scandal.
Objection 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and
recovering temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful
to have recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is
written (Mat. 5:40): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and
take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him"; and (1 Cor. 6:7):
"Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have
lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do you
not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded? " Therefore it seems that
we ought to forego temporal goods on account of scandal.
Objection 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those
temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we
ought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while
sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he
"should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ" as we read 1 Cor.
9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain
countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we to
forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
On the contrary, Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the restitution
of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took scandal from his
doing so.
I answer that, A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for either
they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of them for
someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to prelates,
and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such persons as
have authority over the common weal. In this latter case the care of
such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of necessity on
those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore, even as other
things that are necessary for salvation, they are not to be foregone on
account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards those temporalities
of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal, we are
bound to forego them, and sometimes we are not so bound, whether we
forego them by giving them up, if we have them in our possession, or by
omitting to claim them, if they are in the possession of others. For if
the scandal arise therefrom through the ignorance or weakness of others
(in which case, as stated above, A[7], it is scandal of the little
ones) we must either forego such temporalities altogether, or the
scandal must be abated by some other means, namely, by some kind of
admonition. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): "Thou
shouldst give so as to injure neither thyself nor another, as much as
thou canst lend, and if thou refusest what is asked, thou must yet be
just to him, indeed thou wilt give him something better than he asks,
if thou reprove him that asks unjustly. " Sometimes, however, scandal
arises from malice. This is scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not
to forego temporal goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of
this kind, for this would both be harmful to the common good, since it
would give wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious
to the plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they
were in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral.
xxxi, 13): "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our
temporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as equity
allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our property, but
also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose themselves. "
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob
other people of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the
truth of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to forego
our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total
abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare
requires that we should take food: but he intended to counsel
abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal,
according to 1 Cor. 8:13: "I will never eat flesh, lest I should
scandalize my brother. "
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i,
19) this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of
the mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to
suffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But sometimes
it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same applies to the
saying of the Apostle.
Reply to Objection 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from
an error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it
behooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be
taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason
the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it
is not customary to pay them.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?
(2) Whether there should be one or two?
(3) Whether two suffice?
(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with
thy whole heart"?
(5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc. ?
(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?
(7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";
(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any precept should be given about charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about
charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it
is the form of the virtues as stated above ([2687]Q[23], A[8]), while
the precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the
common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no
precepts should be given about charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of
the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that
arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a
necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to
which the precepts are directed, as shown above ([2688]FS, Q[90], A[2];
[2689]FS, Q[100], A[9]). If, therefore, any precepts were given about
charity, they should have a place among the chief precepts which are
those of the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no
precepts should be given about charity.
On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept.
Now God requires that man should love Him, according to Dt. 10:12.
Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity,
which is the love of God.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[16], A[1]; [2690]FS, Q[99], A[1]), a
precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter
of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two
ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In every
affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, because it has the
character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to
the end is due for the sake of something else: thus for a physician, it
is due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the
sake of something else that he should give a medicine in order to heal.
Now the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and
this union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the
spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their end. Hence the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from
a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith. " For all
the virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed
either to the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the
passions---such are the virtues that regulate the passions---or at
least to the possession of a good conscience---such are the virtues
that regulate operations---or to the having of a right faith---such are
those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three things are
required of man that he may love God. For an impure heart is withdrawn
from loving God, on account of the passion that inclines it to earthly
things; an evil conscience gives man a horror for God's justice,
through fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's
affections to an untrue representation of God, and separates him from
the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is for its own sake
takes precedence of that which is for the sake of another, wherefore
the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in Mat. 22:39.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2691]FS, Q[100], A[10]) when we
were treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under
those precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance,
this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe
that this should be done out of charity. The act of love does, however,
fall under special precepts.
Reply to Objection 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to
liberty, except in one whose mind is averted from that which is
prescribed, as may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear
alone. But the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own
will, wherefore it is not opposed to charity.
Reply to Objection 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to
the love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of
charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue,
since they are included in all of them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two
precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to
virtue, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Now charity is one virtue, as
shown above ([2692]Q[33], A[5]). Therefore only one precept of charity
should have been given.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27),
charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently
directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God. " Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our
neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts.
But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we
put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Lk. 15:26): "If
any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot
be My disciple. " Therefore the precept of the love of God is not
distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his
neighbor hath fulfilled the Law. " But a law is not fulfilled unless all
its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in
the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love
of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have
from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2693]FS, Q[91], A[3]; [2694]FS, Q[94],
A[2]) when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to
the Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these
latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first
principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire
virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately
before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable to
consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary, for
their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their
principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law
direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above
(Q[23], A[7], ad 2; Q[26], A[1], ad 1): and the love of God is the end
to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved us
to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also of the love of
our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not
easily understand that one of these precepts is included in the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two
acts, one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts
are given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts
of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved
in that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an
explicit precept about both, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: The means derive their goodness from their
relation to the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives
its malice from the same source and from no other
Reply to Objection 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the
end is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each
precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether two precepts of charity suffice?
Objection 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice.
For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished
by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of
charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown
above ([2695]Q[25], A[12];[2696] Q[26]), it seems that there ought to
be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.
Objection 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also
joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts
of the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.
Objection 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also
in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good,
and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to
have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity;
and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): "On these two commandments
dependeth the whole Law and the prophets. "
I answer that, Charity, as stated above ([2697]Q[23], A[1]), is a kind
of friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another,
wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible
between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love
oneself out of charity ([2698]Q[25], A[4]). Now since good is the
object of dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a
means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one
whereby we are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we
are led to love our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23),
"though four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need
of a precept as regards the second and fourth," i. e. love of oneself
and of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the
truth, the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him. "
And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that
he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this
is done by his loving God and his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2699]Q[28], A[4];[2700] Q[29],
A[3]), the other acts of charity result from the act of love as effects
from their cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the
precepts about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of
the laggards, special precepts were given about each act---about joy
(Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always"---about peace (Heb. 12:14):
"Follow peace with all men"---about beneficence (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we
have time, let us work good to all men"---and Holy Writ contains
precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by
anyone who considers the matter carefully.
Reply to Objection 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and
therefore the positive precepts virtually include the negative
precepts. Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices
contrary to charity: for, against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17):
"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus.
6:26): "Be not grieved with her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let
us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying
one another"; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the
same thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against
scandal (Rom. 14:13): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal
in your brother's way. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole
heart?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man
should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act is
not a matter of precept, as shown above (A[1], ad 1; [2701]FS, Q[100],
A[9]). Now the words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the
love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should love
God with his whole heart.
Objection 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks
nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that
God be loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not
pertaining to the love of God, acts counter to the precept, and
consequently sins mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the
love of God. Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to
perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64),
"to be whole is to be perfect. " But that which belongs to perfection is
not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought
not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart. "
I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is
a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is
requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own
matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances,
whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the
last end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind
of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the
love of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue
does not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and
higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own
proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole
heart. "
Reply to Objection 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold
signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always
actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly,
in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so
that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the
perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter
perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it
does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of
charity.
Reply to Objection 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels
are directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding
reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal
things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and
hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart," it was fitting to add "and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole
strength"?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with
thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Dt. 6:5). For heart does
not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily
action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense.
Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part
of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and
soul.
Objection 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal
depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with
all thy strength. "
Objection 3: Further, in Mat. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which
words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is
unfittingly worded in Dt. 6.
On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places:
for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. 6 three points are
mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with
thy whole strength. " In Mat. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz.
"with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole
strength" is omitted, but "with thy whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark
12 we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole
soul," and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is
the same as "strength. " Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10,
where in place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might. "
[*St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota
fortitudine tua" (Dt. ), "ex tota virtue tua" (Mk. ), and "ex omnibus
tuis" (Lk. ), although the Greek in all three cases has {ex holes tes
ischyos}, which the Douay renders "with thy whole strength. "]
Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of
them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must
therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted
by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of
all the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards
the intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the
principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three
principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect
which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified
by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by
"strength," "force" or "might. " Accordingly we are commanded to direct
our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with
thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed
in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according
to God, in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our
external actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength,"
"force" or "might. "
Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished
work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth. ) which is included in
Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the
contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers "heart"
to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the
intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the
intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy
mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory of
Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul,
"soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our
nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by
us to God.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil
this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius,
Exposit. Cath. Fid. ] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded
anything impossible. " But God gave this commandment, as is clear from
Dt. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally,
since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a
transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments. " If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by
wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal
sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): "(Who
also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim. 3:10):
"Let them minister, having no crime. "
Objection 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the
way of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord
is lightsome, enlightening the eyes. " Now it is useless to direct
anyone to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill
this precept in this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the
fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence
remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with
all his heart.
I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and
imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by
the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly
however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached,
nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the
commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be
perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the
commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by
those who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing
contrary to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that
man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in
heaven, when God will be "all in all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence
this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is
fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one
man will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the more,
as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the precept can be
fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately
without conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this,
so too he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does
nothing against the love of God, does not sin mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii),
"why should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man
attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows
whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it
out. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor
is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men,
even to our enemies, as may be seen in Mat. 5:44. But the word
"neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist
towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly
expressed.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the
origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to
ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin
of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than
that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his
neighbor as himself.
Objection 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor,
naturally.
